MHaggis

Original sending to Mockbin (use a new mockbin)

[byte[]]$NTLMType2 =
@(
    0x4e,0x54,0x4c,0x4d,
    0x53,0x53,0x50,0x00,
    0x02,0x00,0x00,0x00,
    0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,
    0x00,0x28,0x00,0x00,

MHaggis

- name: Modify Internet Zone Protocol Defaults in Current User Registry - cmd
  description: |
    This test simulates an adversary modifying the Internet Zone Protocol Defaults in the registry of the currently logged-in user using the reg.exe utility via the command prompt. Such modifications can be indicative of an adversary trying to weaken browser security settings. Upon execution, if successful, the message "The operation completed successfully." will be displayed.

    To verify the effects of the test:
    1. Open the Registry Editor (regedit.exe).
    2. Navigate to "HKEY_CURRENT_USER\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Internet Settings\ZoneMap\ProtocolDefaults".
    3. Check for the presence of the "http" and "https" DWORD values set to `0`.
    Or run:
    ```batch

MHaggis

Inventory Protocol Handlers

Splunk:

[powershell://LOLProtocolHandlers]
script = Get-Item Registry::HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\*| Select-Object "Property", "PSChildName"  | ForEach-Object { $_ | ConvertTo-Json; Write-Host "" }
#schedule = 0 0 * * *
schedule = */1 * * * *
sourcetype = PwSh:LOLProtocolHandlers
index=win 

MHaggis

#include <windows.h>
#include <iostream>
#include <dbghelp.h>
#include <TlHelp32.h>


#define IOCTL_BASE 0x80012008
constexpr DWORD IREC_IOCTL(DWORD x) { return IOCTL_BASE + x; }
#define IOTCL_IREC_OPEN_PROCESS IREC_IOCTL( 0x20 )
static const char* DeviceName = R"(\\.\IREC)";

MHaggis

Organizations who cannot take advantage of these protections can set the FEATURE_BLOCK_CROSS_PROTOCOL_FILE_NAVIGATION registry key to avoid exploitation. Please note that while these registry settings would mitigate exploitation of this issue, it could affect regular functionality for certain use cases related to these applications.

MS Documentation for the referenced registry settings:

• https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/internet-explorer/ie-developer/general-info/ee330731(v=vs.85)#file-protocol-navigation (Thank you @johnmccash)

$registryPath = "HKLM:\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\Main\FeatureControl\FEATURE_BLOCK_CROSS_PROTOCOL_FILE_NAVIGATION"
$applications = @("Excel.exe", "Graph.exe", "MSAccess.exe", "MSPub.exe", "PowerPnt.exe", "Visio.exe", "WinProj.exe", "WinWord.exe", "Wordpad.exe")

MHaggis

PowerDropping

My script, PowerDropping, currently accomplishes the following parts of the PowerDrop behavior:

• It sets a buffer size of 128 bytes, matching the chunk size PowerDrop uses when responses exceed this length.
• It uses an ICMPClient, which aligns with PowerDrop's use of ICMP Echo Request messages.
• It includes the use of a hard-coded IP address, similar to PowerDrop's hard-coded IP address for command and control communication.
• It includes data in the ICMP Echo Request message. While my script uses a test string, PowerDrop uses a UTF16-LE encoded string, often a simple string like "!".
• It includes a response timeout of 60 seconds, which is the same as PowerDrop's dwell time after sending a beacon.
• It uses "DRP" and "OCD" as markers, aligning with PowerDrop's use of these strings as prepending and postpending markers in responses.

MHaggis

Ref: https://www.rapid7.com/blog/post/2023/06/01/rapid7-observed-exploitation-of-critical-moveit-transfer-vulnerability/

Rapid7 incident response consultants have identified a method to determine what was exfiltrated from compromised MOVEit customer environments. MOVEit writes its own Windows EVTX file, which is located at C:\Windows\System32\winevt\Logs\MOVEit.evtx. The MOVEit event logs contain a single event ID (Event ID 0) that provides a plethora of information, including the following:

• File name
• File path
• File size
• IP address
• Username that performed download

MHaggis

 function Scan-LOLDrivers {
    param(
        [Parameter(Mandatory=$true)]
        [string]$path
    )

    Add-Type -TypeDefinition @"
    using System;
    using System.Security.Cryptography;
    using System.Security.Cryptography.X509Certificates;

MHaggis

# Define the typical path of the Snake Queue File
$filePath = "$env:windir\registration\"

# Create the folder if it doesn't exist
$null = New-Item -Path $filePath -ItemType Directory -Force

# Generate a random GUID
$guid = [guid]::NewGuid().ToString()

# Define the file name using the generated GUID and the regex pattern

MHaggis

To collect Windows-TerminalServices-RemoteConnectionManager/Operational, add the following to a inputs.conf

We've found that multiline data parses better natively without having to create a props/transforms.

[WinEventLog://Microsoft-Windows-TerminalServices-RemoteConnectionManager/Operational]
disabled = False
renderXml = False
index = win