PierreRochard

from twython import Twython

api_key = input('Enter the API key: ')
print('\n')
api_secret = input('Enter the API secret: ')
print('\n')

twitter = Twython(api_key, api_secret)
auth = twitter.get_authentication_tokens()
print(auth['auth_url'])

PierreRochard

bitcoin-s {
    datadir = ${HOME}/.bitcoin-s
    network = mainnet # regtest, testnet3, mainnet

    logging {
        level = WARN # trace, debug, info, warn, error, off

        # You can also tune specific module loggers.
        # They each take the same levels as above.
        # If they are commented out (as they are

PierreRochard

Bitcoin’s Cost of Counter-Censorship

When miners or outside sponsors attempt to suppress transactions, Bitcoin’s
defense is not a committee vote but a market response. The network raises a
price for inclusion on the honest tip and stretches the time an attacker must
sustain losses. The cost of counter-censorship is what users and miners
collectively spend to make the next parent-confirming block the higher-paying
choice. It is not a permanent stipend. It is elastic and appears exactly when
censorship or reorg risk appears.

PierreRochard

The object we are estimating is the probability that a just-found honest
block is orphaned immediately when the attacker has no private lead. In the
Nakamoto Poisson race, a minority attacker must find two blocks before the
honest side finds one. The chance of "attacker then attacker" is p^2, where
p is the attacker's hash share. That is the baseline result from the
whitepaper-style catch-up analysis and the backbone literature. It is a
timing statement about who finds the next two blocks, not about fee levels
or miner opinions.

If you want to model miners who sometimes follow the attacker in a tie, the