Rucknium Rucknium

Tabulation of Monero transaction inputs and outputs

Here is a tabulation of the number of inputs and outputs of each Monero transaction during a five-year period (2019-03-04 to 2024-03-04).

R code to reproduce:

# Run https://github.com/Rucknium/misc-research/blob/main/Monero-Effective-Ring-Size/xmr-ring-gathering.R
# Then:

Monero double spend attack success probability

Below is a table of the attack success probability for different values of the adversary's hashpower share and the number of blocks that the victim waits for "full confirmation" of a transaction.

The computations are based on Theorem 1 of Grunspan & Perez-Marco (2018). "Double spend races." It is assumed that the attacker has a one-block advantage at the start of the attack.

Theorem 1 is

Required possession duration of malicious hashpower for successful double-spend attack with a $z$ stopping rule.

An attacker possesses $q$ share of Monero's hashpower for a duration of $d$ blocks. Honest miners possess $p=1-q$ hashpower share.

Let $z$ be the number of blocks that the potential victim waits for "full confirmation" of a transaction. When a transaction is mined in a block on the honest chain, that means that the transaction has one confirmation, i.e. $z=1$. When another block is mined on the honest chain, $z=2$.

	# Simulations carried out by the R statistical language: https://www.r-project.org/

	set.seed(314)
	# Set the random seed to make the results reproducible
	current.target.block.time <- 10
	modified.target.block.time <- 1
	hashpower.honest.miners <- 0.70
	hashpower.malicious.miner <- 0.30

	n.simulations <- 1000000

	set.seed(314)


	black.marble.proportion <- 0.9

	ring.size <- 16

	outputs <- sample(c(TRUE, FALSE), 1000000, replace = TRUE,
	prob = c(1 - black.marble.proportion, black.marble.proportion))

	-----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----

	mQINBGMpq0ABEAChYESXlM6m89PhlHh016lGFP24REvOHBdwRIYSesBlCfaPIvtX
	F7WDL8xxf+rgidbQMNKHVzUBgzj7IIRKLQ5BgQcCIaL9l02yotdgjcRheXCAYbKY
	7kZfzKM9lEH2OIFN3/1WFMFnYM7nqcxWghJuwzCg/lTia8obPBOVftEN6iGn2Agb
	Wl5h/AV/AIAjwuylBZYmPSNZHCQK7Mjjn1QAJmeCM06KjYrodrEjadiGAJebtvNE
	gRCBb+xkpWRKRq3lUrQyOU+p1KT7ffEfFmzZu5fKf5s3XX9h0QIywDsejp0+DZv6
	8BeYUXzApGrVg2dqOWM0F3tygkYdKDn8xKHI3+CcNQ3HY/cYuubgTK1h0N1vwLTJ
	uBnZgsiDghZnBnw5pyX4eLEr0A5rRHig2/CFphhKjo3B6bP7jH+hvB27kTNQ5FGg
	JLCNer1DUAYAv6QwZTpmpkpFWxVlR+6oKVIyKTeINa+7HHyYgIqzMm6pQXU5vzCl


	Data on the share of outputs on Monero's blockchain that were produced by coinbase transactions,
	Mordinal minting transactions, or Mordinal transfer transactions.

	Based on some modifications to https://github.com/Rucknium/misc-research/tree/main/Monero-Effective-Ring-Size

	My criteria for detecting mordinal minting transactions is:
	height >= 2838965 & length(tx.json$vout) == 2 & i > 1 [not coinbase] & length(tx.json$extra) > 44 & tx.json$extra[45] == 16

	My criteria for detecting mordinal transfer transactions is:


	Below are tables about the number of outputs of parent transactions contained in each ring on the Monero
	blockchain from April 3 to April 9, 2023. The number of outputs of parent transactions are arranged as
	the row of the table. The number of times that each type of output appears in rings is arranged as the column.

	For example, 55397 is the number of rings where exactly 2 outputs from 16-output parent transactions were
	included in the ring.

	When the parent transaction is a coinbase, they are put in their own category. Their row name is "CB".

	minutes.waiting <- 10

	1 - pexp(minutes.waiting, rate = 1/2)
	# [1] 0.006737947


	# When current.height = 3100144,
	# start.spam.height = 3097308, and
	# spam.share <- 0.75
	# 59% of the probability mass function of the DSA are outputs created by the suspected spammer

	# Formula for the exact Monero Decoy Selection Algorithm (DSA) probability mass function is based on:
	# jeffro256 (2023) "Implementing Monero Decoy Selection"
	# https://github.com/jeffro256/monero/blob/decoy_selection_md/docs/DECOY_SELECTION.md
	# and