Adam Buran aburan28

Studying for a Tech Interview Sucks, so Here's a Cheat Sheet to Help

This list is meant to be a both a quick guide and reference for further research into these topics. It's basically a summary of that comp sci course you never took or forgot about, so there's no way it can cover everything in depth. It also will be available as a gist on Github for everyone to edit and add to.

Data Structure Basics

###Array ####Definition:

Stores data elements based on an sequential, most commonly 0 based, index.
Based on tuples from set theory.

	{
	"AWSTemplateFormatVersion": "2010-09-09",
	"Description": "CoreOS on EC2: http://coreos.com/docs/running-coreos/cloud-providers/ec2/",
	"Mappings" : {
	"RegionMap" : {

	"eu-central-1" : {
	"AMI" : "ami-573ef338"
	},

	From [email protected] Sun Oct 12 09:36:34 1997
	Received: from RSA.COM (chirality.rsa.com [192.80.211.33])
	by shire.ontko.com (8.8.5/8.8.5) with SMTP id JAA17505
	for ; Sun, 12 Oct 1997 09:36:33 -0500
	Received: by RSA.COM
	id AA20097; Sun, 12 Oct 97 06:29:28 PDT
	Date: Sun, 12 Oct 97 06:29:28 PDT
	Message-Id: <[email protected]>
	From: [email protected] (RSA Factoring Challenge Administrator)
	To: [email protected]

	Domain Type Sponsoring Organisation
	.aaa generic American Automobile Association, Inc.
	.aarp generic AARP
	.abb generic ABB Ltd
	.abbott generic Abbott Laboratories, Inc.
	.abogado generic Top Level Domain Holdings Limited
	.ac country-code Network Information Center (AC Domain Registry) c/o Cable and Wireless (Ascension Island)
	.academy generic Half Oaks, LLC
	.accenture generic Accenture plc
	.accountant generic dot Accountant Limited

	listed in order of preference:

	TLS-ECDHE-RSA-WITH-AES-256-GCM-SHA384
	TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-AES-256-GCM-SHA384
	TLS-ECDHE-RSA-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA384
	TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA384
	TLS-ECDHE-RSA-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA
	TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA
	TLS-SRP-SHA-DSS-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA
	TLS-SRP-SHA-RSA-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA

	q = 134747661567386867366256408824228742802669457
	Zq = Zmod(q)
	E = EllipticCurve(Zq, [0,0,0,-1,0])
	P = E(18185174461194872234733581786593019886770620, 74952280828346465277451545812645059041440154)
	Q = E(76468233972358960368422190121977870066985660, 33884872380845276447083435959215308764231090)
	n = P.order()
	k = GF(n)(q).multiplicative_order()
	R = E.random_element()
	w1 = P.tate_pairing(R, n, k)
	w2 = Q.tate_pairing(R, n, k)

	int do_lookup(int a[16], int bit[4]) {
	int t0[8], t1[4], t2[2];
	t0[0] = select(a[0], a[1], bit[0]); t0[1] = select(a[2], a[3], bit[0]);
	t0[2] = select(a[4], a[5], bit[0]); t0[3] = select(a[6], a[7], bit[0]);
	t0[4] = select(a[8], a[9], bit[0]); t0[5] = select(a[10], a[11], bit[0]);
	t0[6] = select(a[12], a[13], bit[0]); t0[7] = select(a[14], a[15], bit[0]);
	t1[0] = select(t[0], t[1], bit[1]); t1[1] = select(t[2], t[3], bit[1]);
	t1[2] = select(t[4], t[5], bit[1]); t1[3] = select(t[6], t[7], bit[1]);
	t2[0] = select(t2[0], t[1], bit[2]); t2[1] = select(t2[2], t2[3], bit[2]);
	ret = select(t3[0], t3[1], bit[3]);

	def generate_safe_prime():
	found = False
	while not found:
	p = random_prime(2^128)
	q = 2*p + 1
	if is_prime(q):
	found = True
	return p,q,n

	Chosen Ciphertext Attack (CCA):
	The adversary gets acces to an oracle for the decryption function.
	• Chosen Ciphertext Attack (CCA1):
	- The adversary can use this oracle before it gets the challenge ciphertext.
	- The queries cannot depend on the ciphertext C.
	• Adaptative Chosen Ciphertext Attack (CCA2):
	- The adversary gets acces to a decryption oracle without restrictions

	#define OAKLEY_PRIME_MODP768 \
	"FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF C90FDAA2 2168C234 C4C6628B 80DC1CD1" \
	"29024E08 8A67CC74 020BBEA6 3B139B22 514A0879 8E3404DD" \
	"EF9519B3 CD3A431B 302B0A6D F25F1437 4FE1356D 6D51C245" \
	"E485B576 625E7EC6 F44C42E9 A63A3620 FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF"

	#define OAKLEY_PRIME_MODP1024 \
	"FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF C90FDAA2 2168C234 C4C6628B 80DC1CD1" \
	"29024E08 8A67CC74 020BBEA6 3B139B22 514A0879 8E3404DD" \
	"EF9519B3 CD3A431B 302B0A6D F25F1437 4FE1356D 6D51C245" \