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<title>Federal Reserve System publications</title>
<link>http://www.fedinprint.org/</link>
<description>Economic research and commentary from the Federal Reserve System</description>
<dc:language>en-us</dc:language>
<dc:date></dc:date>
<dc:publisher>[email protected]</dc:publisher>
<dc:subject>Fed in Print</dc:subject>
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<title>Decentralization and Overborrowing in a Fiscal Federation</title>
<link>http://www.fedinprint.org/items/fedawp/2018-09.html</link>
<description>We build an infinite horizon equilibrium model of fiscal federation, where anticipation of transfers from the central government creates incentives for local governments to overborrow. Absent commitment, the central government over-transfers, which distorts the central-local distribution of resources. Applying the model to fiscal decentralization, we find when decentralization widens local governments&#x2019; fiscal gap, borrowings by both local and central governments rise. Quantitatively, fiscal decentralization accounts for from 19 percent to 40 percent of changes in general government debt in Spain during 1988&#x2013;2006. A macroprudential tax on local borrowing that implements Pareto optimal allocation would reduce debt by 27 percent and raise welfare by 3.75 percent.</description>
<dc:creator>Si Guo &#x26; Yun Pei &#x26; Zoe Xie </dc:creator>
<dc:subject>Debt;Diversity;Fiscal policy;</dc:subject>
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<title>Cyclical Properties of Bank Margins: Small versus Large Banks</title>
<link>http://www.fedinprint.org/items/fedreq/00056.html</link>
<description>We study cyclical properties of the net interest margin (NIM) in the US banking sector in the aggregate as well as separately for small and large banks. In the aggregate and among large banks, NIM is countercyclical. Among small banks, however, NIM is procyclical. Further, we find that this result is driven by differences in the cyclical dynamics of small and large banks&#x27; funding costs rather than asset yields.</description>
<dc:creator>Borys Grochulski &#x26; Daniel Schwam &#x26; Yuzhe Zhang </dc:creator>
<dc:subject>Banks and banking;</dc:subject>
</item>                                                              
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