hightemp

#!/usr/bin/env ruby

# Commands:
#   sl2pm add PACKAGE_NAME                    # add one of the available packages
#   sl2pm add_all STRING N_PAGES              # add all packages that matches string
#   sl2pm add_popular FROM_PAGE N_PAGES MASK  # add popular packages
#   sl2pm clear_cache                         # clear cache
#   sl2pm help [COMMAND]                      # Describe available commands or one spec...
#   sl2pm list MASK                           # list all of the available packages
#   sl2pm open PACKAGE_NAME                   # open in browser package description

hightemp

class ClassA
    @@class_var1 = 1
    @var1 = -1
    
    class << self
        attr_accessor :attr_var1
        
        def class_method1
            puts "\t#{self.class}.class_method1"
            puts "\t\t@var1: #{@var1}"

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PATH=$(echo "$PATH" | awk -v RS=':' -v ORS=":" '!a[$1]++')

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vboxmanage clonehd image.vdi image.img --format RAW
qemu-img convert -f vdi -O raw image.vdi image.img
vbox-img convert --srcfilename image.vdi --stdout --srcformat VDI --dstformat RAW image.img

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To remove Nessus, delete the following directories (including subdirectories) and files:
/Library/Receipts/Nessus*
/Library/LaunchDaemons/com.tenablesecurity.nessusd.plist
/Library/Nessus
/Library/PreferencePanes/Nessus Preferences.prefPane
/Applications/Nessus

hightemp

Port Forwarding in Mavericks

---

Since Mavericks stopped using the deprecated ipfw (as of Mountain Lion), we'll be using pf to allow port forwarding.

####1. anchor file Create an anchor file under /etc/pf.anchors/<anchor file> with your redirection rule like:

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The Theory

We need to hash passwords as a second line of defence. A server which can authenticate users necessarily contains, somewhere in its entrails, some data which can be used to validate a password. A very simple system would just store the passwords themselves, and validation would be a simple comparison. But if an hostile outsider gains a simple glimpse at the contents of the file or database table which contains the passwords, then that attacker learns a lot. Unfortunately, such partial, read-only breaches do occur in practice (a mislaid backup tape, a decommissioned but not wiped out hard disk, as an aftermath of a SQL injection attack... the possibilities are numerous). See this blog post for a detailed discussion.

Since the overall contents of a server which can validate passwords are necessarily sufficient to, indeed, validate passwords, an attacker who got a read-only snapshot of the server is in position to ma

hightemp

#!/bin/bash

INSTALLPATH="/usr/local/bin"

if [ "$1" = "install" ]; then
  chmod +x $0
  cp $0 $INSTALLPATH/$(basename "$0" ".sh") 
  echo "Installed into $INSTALLPATH"
  exit 0
elif [ "$1" = "createapp" -o "$1" = "installapp" ]; then

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function fnValidCreditCardNumber( objFormField )
{
		var		nSum = 0;
		var		nMultiplier = 1;
		var		nIndex;
		var		sDigit;
		var		nProduct;
		var		sCreditCardAccountNumber	= objFormField.value;
		var		nLength						= objFormField.value.length;
	

hightemp

#!/bin/bash

# Script to convert PDF file to JPG images
#
# Dependencies:
# * pdftk
# * imagemagick

PDF=$1