# Process packets despite bad checksums.
redef ignore_checksums = T;
This will change significantly with Bro 2.2 when we have the file analysis
The regex patterns in this gist are intended to match any URLs, | |
including "mailto:[email protected]", "x-whatever://foo", etc. For a | |
pattern that attempts only to match web URLs (http, https), see: | |
https://gist.github.com/gruber/8891611 | |
# Single-line version of pattern: | |
(?i)\b((?:[a-z][\w-]+:(?:/{1,3}|[a-z0-9%])|www\d{0,3}[.]|[a-z0-9.\-]+[.][a-z]{2,4}/)(?:[^\s()<>]+|\(([^\s()<>]+|(\([^\s()<>]+\)))*\))+(?:\(([^\s()<>]+|(\([^\s()<>]+\)))*\)|[^\s`!()\[\]{};:'".,<>?«»“”‘’])) |
#! /bin/sh | |
# ================================================================== | |
# ______ __ _____ | |
# /_ __/___ ____ ___ _________ _/ /_ /__ / | |
# / / / __ \/ __ `__ \/ ___/ __ `/ __/ / / | |
# / / / /_/ / / / / / / /__/ /_/ / /_ / / | |
#/_/ \____/_/ /_/ /_/\___/\__,_/\__/ /_/ | |
# Multi-instance Apache Tomcat installation with a focus | |
# on best-practices as defined by Apache, SpringSource, and MuleSoft |
[ | |
{ | |
"docTitle": [], | |
"docAuthors": [], | |
"docDate": [] | |
}, | |
[ | |
{ | |
"Header": [ | |
1, |
<?php | |
/********************************************************************************************* | |
* Example usage (In view) | |
* <div class="welcome"> | |
<?php echo Form::open(array('route'=>'process','class'=>'form-horizontal'))?> | |
<?php echo Form::textField('first_name')?> | |
<?php echo Form::textField('last_name')?> | |
<?php echo Form::emailField('email')?> | |
<?php echo Form::passwordField('password')?> | |
<?php echo Form::selectField('select_one', array('1'=>'abc', '2'=>'def'))?> |
#! /usr/bin/env bash | |
### | |
# | |
# install_mysql.sh | |
# | |
# This script assumes your Vagrantfile has been configured to map the root of | |
# your application to /vagrant and that your web root is the "public" folder | |
# (Laravel standard). Standard and error output is sent to | |
# /vagrant/vm_build.log during provisioning. |
The regex patterns in this gist are intended only to match web URLs -- http, | |
https, and naked domains like "example.com". For a pattern that attempts to | |
match all URLs, regardless of protocol, see: https://gist.github.com/gruber/249502 | |
# Single-line version: | |
(?i)\b((?:https?:(?:/{1,3}|[a-z0-9%])|[a-z0-9.\-]+[.](?:com|net|org|edu|gov|mil|aero|asia|biz|cat|coop|info|int|jobs|mobi|museum|name|post|pro|tel|travel|xxx|ac|ad|ae|af|ag|ai|al|am|an|ao|aq|ar|as|at|au|aw|ax|az|ba|bb|bd|be|bf|bg|bh|bi|bj|bm|bn|bo|br|bs|bt|bv|bw|by|bz|ca|cc|cd|cf|cg|ch|ci|ck|cl|cm|cn|co|cr|cs|cu|cv|cx|cy|cz|dd|de|dj|dk|dm|do|dz|ec|ee|eg|eh|er|es|et|eu|fi|fj|fk|fm|fo|fr|ga|gb|gd|ge|gf|gg|gh|gi|gl|gm|gn|gp|gq|gr|gs|gt|gu|gw|gy|hk|hm|hn|hr|ht|hu|id|ie|il|im|in|io|iq|ir|is|it|je|jm|jo|jp|ke|kg|kh|ki|km|kn|kp|kr|kw|ky|kz|la|lb|lc|li|lk|lr|ls|lt|lu|lv|ly|ma|mc|md|me|mg|mh|mk|ml|mm|mn|mo|mp|mq|mr|ms|mt|mu|mv|mw|mx|my|mz|na|nc|ne|nf|ng|ni|nl|no|np|nr|nu|nz|om|pa|pe|pf|pg|ph|pk|pl|pm|pn|pr|ps|pt|pw|py|qa|re|ro|rs|ru|rw|sa|sb|sc|sd|se|sg|sh|si|s |
USER_NAME=marcy | |
sed -i "s/.*RSAAuthentication.*/RSAAuthentication yes/g" /etc/ssh/sshd_config | |
sed -i "s/.*PubkeyAuthentication.*/PubkeyAuthentication yes/g" /etc/ssh/sshd_config | |
sed -i "s/.*PasswordAuthentication.*/PasswordAuthentication no/g" /etc/ssh/sshd_config | |
sed -i "s/.*AuthorizedKeysFile.*/AuthorizedKeysFile\t\.ssh\/authorized_keys/g" /etc/ssh/sshd_config | |
sed -i "s/.*PermitRootLogin.*/PermitRootLogin no/g" /etc/ssh/sshd_config | |
echo "${USER_NAME} ALL=(ALL) NOPASSWD: ALL" >> /etc/sudoers | |
service sshd restart |
# Calculates metrics on March Madness video streaming, including | |
# unique IPs, total HTTP requests, and total bytes downloaded. | |
# Sample output: | |
# | |
# fields ts ts_delta app uniq_hosts hits bytes | |
# types time interval string count count count | |
# 1395331457.824587 900.000000 march-madness 4 569 164589761 | |
# 1395332324.854514 900.000000 march-madness 17 1917 704801124 | |
@load misc/app-stats |
The attack detailed below has stopped (for the time being) and almost all network access for almost all customers have been restored. We're keeping this post and the timeline intact for posterity. Unless the attack resumes, we'll post a complete postmortem within 48 hours (so before Wednesday, March 26 at 11:00am central time).
Criminals have laid siege to our networks using what's called a distributed denial-of-service attack (DDoS) starting at 8:46 central time, March 24 2014. The goal is to make Basecamp, and the rest of our services, unavailable by flooding the network with bogus requests, so nothing legitimate can come through. This attack was launched together with a blackmail attempt that sought to have us pay to avoid this assault.
Note that this attack targets the network link between our servers and the internet. All the data is safe and sound, but nobody is able to get to it as long as the attack is being successfully executed. This is like a bunch of people