scrapped from @x0rz,@etlow,@Dinosn,@hackerfantastic,@highmeh,@cyb3rops and others
- A quick analysis of the latest Shadow Brokers dump https://labs.nettitude.com/blog/a-quick-analysis-of-the-latest-shadow-brokers-dump/
- Timestamps
| #!/bin/bash | |
| # Usage : ./scanio.sh <save file> | |
| # Example: ./scanio.sh cname_list.txt | |
| # Premium | |
| function ech() { | |
| spinner=( "|" "/" "-" "\\" ) | |
| while true; do | |
| for i in ${spinner[@]}; do | |
| echo -ne "\r[$i] $1" | 
| # All scripts | |
| ``` | |
| --tamper=apostrophemask,apostrophenullencode,appendnullbyte,base64encode,between,bluecoat,chardoubleencode,charencode,charunicodeencode,concat2concatws,equaltolike,greatest,halfversionedmorekeywords,ifnull2ifisnull,modsecurityversioned,modsecurityzeroversioned,multiplespaces,nonrecursivereplacement,percentage,randomcase,randomcomments,securesphere,space2comment,space2dash,space2hash,space2morehash,space2mssqlblank,space2mssqlhash,space2mysqlblank,space2mysqldash,space2plus,space2randomblank,sp_password,unionalltounion,unmagicquotes,versionedkeywords,versionedmorekeywords | |
| ``` | |
| # General scripts | |
| ``` | |
| --tamper=apostrophemask,apostrophenullencode,base64encode,between,chardoubleencode,charencode,charunicodeencode,equaltolike,greatest,ifnull2ifisnull,multiplespaces,nonrecursivereplacement,percentage,randomcase,securesphere,space2comment,space2plus,space2randomblank,unionalltounion,unmagicquotes | |
| ``` | |
| # Microsoft access | |
| ``` | 
| :: Windows 10 Hardening Script | |
| :: This is based mostly on my own personal research and testing. My objective is to secure/harden Windows 10 as much as possible while not impacting usability at all. (Think being able to run on this computer's of family members so secure them but not increase the chances of them having to call you to troubleshoot something related to it later on). References for virtually all settings can be found at the bottom. Just before the references section, you will always find several security settings commented out as they could lead to compatibility issues in common consumer setups but they're worth considering. | |
| :: Obligatory 'views are my own'. :) | |
| :: Thank you @jaredhaight for the Win Firewall config recommendations! | |
| :: Thank you @ricardojba for the DLL Safe Order Search reg key! | |
| :: Thank you @jessicaknotts for the help on testing Exploit Guard configs and checking privacy settings! | |
| :: Best script I've found for Debloating Windows 10: https://github.com/Sycnex/Windows10Debloater | |
| : | 
| #!/bin/bash | |
| # | |
| # Script requires `brew` | |
| # - `/usr/bin/ruby -e "$(curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Homebrew/install/master/install)"` | |
| # | |
| # Variables | |
| # - $IPA -> Source IPA | |
| # - $MOBILEPROVISION -> Source embedded.mobileprovision | |
| # find ~/Library/Developer/Xcode | grep embedded.mobileprovision | 
| #!/usr/bin/python | |
| # This file has no update anymore. Please see https://github.com/worawit/MS17-010 | |
| from impacket import smb | |
| from struct import pack | |
| import sys | |
| import socket | |
| ''' | |
| EternalBlue exploit for Windows 7/2008 by sleepya | |
| The exploit might FAIL and CRASH a target system (depended on what is overwritten) | 
| import requests | |
| import sys | |
| import json | |
| def waybackurls(host, with_subs): | |
| if with_subs: | |
| url = 'http://web.archive.org/cdx/search/cdx?url=*.%s/*&output=json&fl=original&collapse=urlkey' % host | |
| else: | |
| url = 'http://web.archive.org/cdx/search/cdx?url=%s/*&output=json&fl=original&collapse=urlkey' % host | 
scrapped from @x0rz,@etlow,@Dinosn,@hackerfantastic,@highmeh,@cyb3rops and others
| %PDF-1.0 | |
| 1 0 obj | |
| << | |
| /Type /Catalog | |
| /Pages 2 0 R | |
| /Names 6 0 R | |
| >> | |
| endobj | 
The VMware vSphere Data Protection (VDP) appliance is based on the EMC Avamar solution. To perform an in-depth analysis of VDP, a virtual test appliance of EMC Avamar was downloaded. Known Avamar default credentials did work fine on the Avamar appliance, but were not valid to log into the vSphere Data Protection. Further file system objects in the EMC Avamar appliance were analyzed, leading to the interesting detection of a private SSH key belonging to the admin user.
A web search did reveal that the corresponding password for the SSH key file is ‘P3t3rPan’ (see http://judsonian.com/content/licensing-an-avamar-system/). Using the SSH key file a login as admin to the VMware Data Protection was successful and did grant root permissions on the appliance.
11.08.2016 report of vulnerability to VMware Security Response team