LinusHenze

iOS 16 introduced launch constraints, which can be used to constraint the launch of an application.
There are three types of constraints:
    Self Constraints, which the launched application itself must meet
    Parent Constraints, which the parent process must meet
    Responsible Constraints, which the "responsible process" must meet (I assume that the responsible process is the process that asked launchd to launch a service)

Additionally, the TrustCache format was updated (see below) to support assigning each binary a "Constraint Category", which forces Self and Parent Constraints.
Note that Self, Parent and Responsible Constraints can also be set by the process performing the launch and they can be included in the code signature, in the new blob type 0xFADE8181. In both cases, the constraints are DER encoded (just like the DER entitlements).

Constraint Categories (from TrustCache, new in version 2):

robertoostenveld

#!/usr/bin/env python

# Unicorn2lsl streams data from a Unicorn Hybrid Black EEG system to LSL
#
# Copyright (C) 2022 Robert Oostenveld
#
# This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
# it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
# the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or
# (at your option) any later version.

carlospolop

import plistlib
import struct
import logging
import lief
import sys
from typing import List
from macholib import MachO, mach_o

logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)

paj28

Unicode XSS via Combining Characters

Most application security practitioners are familiar with Unicode XSS, which typically arises from the Unicode character fullwidth-less-than-sign. It’s not a common vulnerability but does occasionally appear in applications that otherwise have good XSS protection. In this blog I describe another variant of Unicode XSS that I have identified, using combining characters. I’ve not observed this in the wild, so it’s primarily of theoretical concern. But the scenario is not entirely implausible and I’ve not otherwise seen this technique discussed, so I hope this is useful.

Recap of Unicode XSS

Lab: https://4t64ubva.xssy.uk/

A quick investigation of the lab shows that it is echoing the name parameter, and performing HTML escaping:

maple3142

POST / HTTP/1.1
Host: localhost
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/142.0.0.0 Safari/537.36
Next-Action: x
Content-Type: multipart/form-data; boundary=----WebKitFormBoundaryx8jO2oVc6SWP3Sad
Content-Length: 459

------WebKitFormBoundaryx8jO2oVc6SWP3Sad
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="0"