zooko

Cyber Fast Track: Redundant Array of Independent Clouds

DARPA-RA-11-52 Cyber Fast Track

• Principal Investigators:

zooko

test gtesttest 

zooko

use std::time::Instant;
use std::time::Duration;

fn meas(n: usize, f: fn(n: usize, iters: usize, inpv: Vec<Vec<u8>>, outpv: &mut Vec<Vec<u8>>, measures: &mut Vec<Duration>)->(), setup_for_f: fn(n: usize, iters: usize, inpv: &mut Vec<Vec<u8>>, outpv: &mut Vec<Vec<u8>>)->()) {
  let iters : usize = 800;
  let mut inpv : Vec<Vec<u8>> = Vec::with_capacity(iters);
  let mut outpv : Vec<Vec<u8>> = Vec::with_capacity(iters);
  let mut measures : Vec<Duration> = Vec::with_capacity(iters);

  setup_for_f(n, iters, &mut inpv, &mut outpv);

zooko

--- log of AI interactions:

---- GPT 5.4:

prompt:

I'm writing a memory allocator. It is already extremely simple — far simpler than comparable memory allocators like mimalloc, snmalloc, or rpmalloc — and extremely fast. Now I'm thinking about "hardening" against exploitation. Hardening against exploitation is a complicated topic, and I find it difficult to assess which kinds of hardening actually provide the most "bang for the buck" in terms of stopping attacks effectively while adding a minimal cost in terms of complexity and runtime. How would you go about determining what "hardening" features provide the most real-world protection?

Here's the current source code:

zooko

### Small message (64 bytes, one compression of each)

| Hash | GF(2), cost/byte | Prime field, cost/byte |
|---|---|---|
| BLAKE3 | **322** | 235–400 |
| SHA-256 | **694** | 290–490 |
| SHA3-256 | 1,095–1,260 | **2,880** |

### Long message (asymptotic)

zooko

Small message (64 bytes, one compression of each)

Hash	GF(2), cost/byte	Prime field, cost/byte
BLAKE3	322	235–400
SHA-256	694	290–490
SHA3-256	1,095–1,260	2,880

Long message (asymptotic)