4thel00z · July 11, 2021 09:03
diff --git a/gcc-security.txt b/gcc-security.txt
 Source material:
  http://security.stackexchange.com/questions/24444/what-is-the-most-hardened-set-of-options-for-gcc-compiling-c-c
  https://wiki.gentoo.org/wiki/Hardened_Gentoo
  https://wiki.debian.org/Hardening

 ================================================================================================================>
 GCC Security related flags and options:

 CFLAGS="-fPIE -fstack-protector-all -D_FORTIFY_SOURCE=2" 
 LDFLAGS="-Wl,-z,now -Wl,-z,relro"
  Hardened gentoo default flags.
  
 -Wall -Wextra
  Turn on all warnings.

 -Wconversion -Wsign-conversion
  Warn on unsign/sign conversions.

 -Wformatsecurity
  Warn about uses of format functions that represent possible security problems

 -Werror
  Turns all warnings into errors.

 -arch x86_64
  Compile for 64-bit to take max advantage of address space (important for ASLR; more virtual address space to chose from when randomising layout).

 -fstack-protector-all -Wstack-protector --param ssp-buffer-size=4
  Your choice of "-fstack-protector" does not protect all functions (see comments). You need -fstack-protector-all to guarantee guards are applied to all functions, although this will likely incur a performance penalty. Consider -fstack-protector-strong as a middle ground.
  The -Wstack-protector flag here gives warnings for any functions that aren't going to get protected.

 -pie -fPIE
  For ASLR

 -ftrapv
  Generates traps for signed overflow (currently bugged in gcc)

 -D_FORTIFY_SOURCE=2 O2
  Buffer overflow checks. See also difference between =2 and =1

 -Wl,-z,relro,-z,now
  RELRO (read-only relocation). The options relro & now specified together are known as "Full RELRO". You can specify "Partial RELRO" by omitting the now flag. RELRO marks various ELF memory sections readonly (E.g. the GOT)

 If compiling on Windows, please Visual Studio instead of GCC, as some protections for Windows (ex. SEHOP) are not part of GCC, but if you must use GCC:

 -Wl,dynamicbase
  Tell linker to use ASLR protection

 -Wl,nxcompat
  Tell linker to use DEP protection

 >>>

 From https://wiki.debian.org/Hardening#Notes_on_Memory_Corruption_Mitigation_Methods

 User Space:
 ----------
 Stack Protector
  gcc's -fstack-protector attempts to detect when a stack has been overwritten and aborts the program. Ubuntu has had this enabled by default since Edgy. Some programs do not play nice with it, and can be worked around with -fno-stack-protector. It would be nice to enable this by default, and for gcc to only attempt to use it when libc is being linked against.
  already done in sendmail.

 heap protection
  In glibc2.5, no additional work needed.

 libc pointer encryption
  In mainline glibc, as PTR_MANGLE.

 gcc -D_FORTIFY_SOURCE=2 -O1
  Compile-time protection against static sized buffer overflows. No known regressions or performance loss. This should be enabled system-wide

 gcc -Wformat -Wformat-security
  While not all programs correctly implement the printf hints (like glib's G_GNUC_PRINTF macro), adding this will at least call out simple printf format string vulnerabilities. Any programs whose builds become "noisy" as a result, should be fixed anyway.

 gcc -pie -fPIE
  This is especially difficult to plumb into packaging in a safe way, since it requires the executable be built with -fPIE for any .o files that are linked at the end with -pie. There is some amount of performance loss, but only due to the -fPIE, which is already true for all the linked libraries (via their -fPIC).
  Already done with openssh, sendmail.

 ld -z relro
  (Or via gcc with -Wl,-z,relro) Already done with sendmail.

 ld -z now
  (Or via gcc with -Wl,-z,now).

 Kernel Space:
 ------------
 non-exec memory segmentation (ExecShield)
  Stops execution of code in heap/stack. i386 specific (nx already does this for amd64), and introduces some small level of performance loss (5% for CPU-bound). Some people have worked on getting it pushed into the mainline kernel. Current state unknown -- would be very handy to have due to the popularity of i386. Marcus Better may be willing to continue to maintain the patchset for Debian.
  Some applications appear to break when run in the protected memory layout. Most of these issues should be fixed due to RH (and SUSE?) already running with these protections.
  Additional work for user-space is identifying programs that build assembly but fail to explicitly mark their stack as non-exec (gnupg, for example).

 -fstack-protector
  Is available for amd64 builds:
  config CC_STACKPROTECTOR 

 runtime memory allocation validation
  Detect double-frees in kernel space. No idea where it stands.

 Address Space Layout Randomization
  mmap: in mainline
  stack: in mainline
  vdso: in since 2.6.18 (COMPAT_VDSO disables it)
  heap/exec: in -mm, 2.6.24
  brk: 2.6.25 

 Having heap/exec ASLR is a prerequisite for -pie being useful. Presently, openssh is compiled with -pie.
  /proc/$pid/maps protection

 Present in 2.6.22; requires sysctl toggle (kernel.maps_protect = 1). Became non-optional in 2.6.27
  /dev/mem protection

 Included in 2.6.25.
  link protections

 In Linux 3.6, and enabled by default! https://git.kernel.org/?p=linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git;a=commitdiff;h=800179c9b8a1e796e441674776d11cd4c05d61d7
  in sysctl via protected_hardlinks and proctected_symlinks

 From the GRSecurity patchset, protections against hardlink/symlink creation/following in world-writable areas. (Solves tmp races.) May potentially break things like postfix that manipulation hardlinks? Breaks POSIX. Getting taken in mainline may be tpossible with a build-time or proc toggle.
  http://lkml.org/lkml/2005/3/10/101 http://lkml.org/lkml/2005/4/18/167

 chroot, dmesg, fifo protections
  Also from GRSecurity patchset.

 References(from hardened gentoo page):
  https://wiki.ubuntu.com/CompilerFlags
  http://people.redhat.com/drepper/nonselsec.pdf
  http://www.suse.de/~krahmer/no-nx.pdf
  http://www.neworder.box.sk/newsread.php?newsid=13007
  http://www.hackinthebox.org/modules.php?op=modload&name=News&file=article&sid=15604&mode=thread&order=0&thold=0
  http://www.phrack.org/archives/issues/58/4.txt
  http://insecure.org/sploits/non-executable.stack.problems.html
  http://www.phrack.org/archives/issues/59/9.txt
  http://www.coresecurity.com/files/attachments/Richarte_Stackguard_2002.pdf
  http://www.redhat.com/archives/fedora-tools-list/2004-September/msg00002.html
  http://www.gentoo.org/proj/en/hardened/hardened-toolchain.xml
  http://labs.mwrinfosecurity.com/notices/security_mechanisms_in_linux_environment__part_1___userspace_memory_protection/
  http://labs.mwrinfosecurity.com/notices/assessing_the_tux_strength_part_2_into_the_kernel/
	Source material:
	http://security.stackexchange.com/questions/24444/what-is-the-most-hardened-set-of-options-for-gcc-compiling-c-c
	https://wiki.gentoo.org/wiki/Hardened_Gentoo
	https://wiki.debian.org/Hardening

	================================================================================================================>
	GCC Security related flags and options:

	CFLAGS="-fPIE -fstack-protector-all -D_FORTIFY_SOURCE=2"
	LDFLAGS="-Wl,-z,now -Wl,-z,relro"
	Hardened gentoo default flags.

	-Wall -Wextra
	Turn on all warnings.

	-Wconversion -Wsign-conversion
	Warn on unsign/sign conversions.

	-Wformatsecurity
	Warn about uses of format functions that represent possible security problems

	-Werror
	Turns all warnings into errors.

	-arch x86_64
	Compile for 64-bit to take max advantage of address space (important for ASLR; more virtual address space to chose from when randomising layout).

	-fstack-protector-all -Wstack-protector --param ssp-buffer-size=4
	Your choice of "-fstack-protector" does not protect all functions (see comments). You need -fstack-protector-all to guarantee guards are applied to all functions, although this will likely incur a performance penalty. Consider -fstack-protector-strong as a middle ground.
	The -Wstack-protector flag here gives warnings for any functions that aren't going to get protected.

	-pie -fPIE
	For ASLR

	-ftrapv
	Generates traps for signed overflow (currently bugged in gcc)

	-D_FORTIFY_SOURCE=2 O2
	Buffer overflow checks. See also difference between =2 and =1

	-Wl,-z,relro,-z,now
	RELRO (read-only relocation). The options relro & now specified together are known as "Full RELRO". You can specify "Partial RELRO" by omitting the now flag. RELRO marks various ELF memory sections readonly (E.g. the GOT)

	If compiling on Windows, please Visual Studio instead of GCC, as some protections for Windows (ex. SEHOP) are not part of GCC, but if you must use GCC:

	-Wl,dynamicbase
	Tell linker to use ASLR protection

	-Wl,nxcompat
	Tell linker to use DEP protection

	>>>

	From https://wiki.debian.org/Hardening#Notes_on_Memory_Corruption_Mitigation_Methods

	User Space:
	----------
	Stack Protector
	gcc's -fstack-protector attempts to detect when a stack has been overwritten and aborts the program. Ubuntu has had this enabled by default since Edgy. Some programs do not play nice with it, and can be worked around with -fno-stack-protector. It would be nice to enable this by default, and for gcc to only attempt to use it when libc is being linked against.
	already done in sendmail.

	heap protection
	In glibc2.5, no additional work needed.

	libc pointer encryption
	In mainline glibc, as PTR_MANGLE.

	gcc -D_FORTIFY_SOURCE=2 -O1
	Compile-time protection against static sized buffer overflows. No known regressions or performance loss. This should be enabled system-wide

	gcc -Wformat -Wformat-security
	While not all programs correctly implement the printf hints (like glib's G_GNUC_PRINTF macro), adding this will at least call out simple printf format string vulnerabilities. Any programs whose builds become "noisy" as a result, should be fixed anyway.

	gcc -pie -fPIE
	This is especially difficult to plumb into packaging in a safe way, since it requires the executable be built with -fPIE for any .o files that are linked at the end with -pie. There is some amount of performance loss, but only due to the -fPIE, which is already true for all the linked libraries (via their -fPIC).
	Already done with openssh, sendmail.

	ld -z relro
	(Or via gcc with -Wl,-z,relro) Already done with sendmail.

	ld -z now
	(Or via gcc with -Wl,-z,now).

	Kernel Space:
	------------
	non-exec memory segmentation (ExecShield)
	Stops execution of code in heap/stack. i386 specific (nx already does this for amd64), and introduces some small level of performance loss (5% for CPU-bound). Some people have worked on getting it pushed into the mainline kernel. Current state unknown -- would be very handy to have due to the popularity of i386. Marcus Better may be willing to continue to maintain the patchset for Debian.
	Some applications appear to break when run in the protected memory layout. Most of these issues should be fixed due to RH (and SUSE?) already running with these protections.
	Additional work for user-space is identifying programs that build assembly but fail to explicitly mark their stack as non-exec (gnupg, for example).

	-fstack-protector
	Is available for amd64 builds:
	config CC_STACKPROTECTOR

	runtime memory allocation validation
	Detect double-frees in kernel space. No idea where it stands.

	Address Space Layout Randomization
	mmap: in mainline
	stack: in mainline
	vdso: in since 2.6.18 (COMPAT_VDSO disables it)
	heap/exec: in -mm, 2.6.24
	brk: 2.6.25

	Having heap/exec ASLR is a prerequisite for -pie being useful. Presently, openssh is compiled with -pie.
	/proc/$pid/maps protection

	Present in 2.6.22; requires sysctl toggle (kernel.maps_protect = 1). Became non-optional in 2.6.27
	/dev/mem protection

	Included in 2.6.25.
	link protections

	In Linux 3.6, and enabled by default! https://git.kernel.org/?p=linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git;a=commitdiff;h=800179c9b8a1e796e441674776d11cd4c05d61d7
	in sysctl via protected_hardlinks and proctected_symlinks

	From the GRSecurity patchset, protections against hardlink/symlink creation/following in world-writable areas. (Solves tmp races.) May potentially break things like postfix that manipulation hardlinks? Breaks POSIX. Getting taken in mainline may be tpossible with a build-time or proc toggle.
	http://lkml.org/lkml/2005/3/10/101 http://lkml.org/lkml/2005/4/18/167

	chroot, dmesg, fifo protections
	Also from GRSecurity patchset.

	References(from hardened gentoo page):
	https://wiki.ubuntu.com/CompilerFlags
	http://people.redhat.com/drepper/nonselsec.pdf
	http://www.suse.de/~krahmer/no-nx.pdf
	http://www.neworder.box.sk/newsread.php?newsid=13007
	http://www.hackinthebox.org/modules.php?op=modload&name=News&file=article&sid=15604&mode=thread&order=0&thold=0
	http://www.phrack.org/archives/issues/58/4.txt
	http://insecure.org/sploits/non-executable.stack.problems.html
	http://www.phrack.org/archives/issues/59/9.txt
	http://www.coresecurity.com/files/attachments/Richarte_Stackguard_2002.pdf
	http://www.redhat.com/archives/fedora-tools-list/2004-September/msg00002.html
	http://www.gentoo.org/proj/en/hardened/hardened-toolchain.xml
	http://labs.mwrinfosecurity.com/notices/security_mechanisms_in_linux_environment__part_1___userspace_memory_protection/
	http://labs.mwrinfosecurity.com/notices/assessing_the_tux_strength_part_2_into_the_kernel/