Make sure to think about data backup before you proceed with the below guide.
Tested on HP Elitebook 840 G6 in April 2024.
There are various options for creating a bootable USB drive.
Start by checking that there aren't any previous ssh keys inside the FIDO2 authenticator of your YubiKey. You can check if they exist by running the command below:
nix shell nixpkgs#yubikey-manager -c ykman fido credentials list
If the command above outputs a string mentioning "ssh" or "openssh", then you have already got a key generated and store on your YubiKey.
Before generating a new ssh key to store on your YubiKey you must consider which additional required authentication factors you want to use. Below you can see a table with the available factors and their corresponding command:
Follow-up to https://communities.vmware.com/t5/Fusion-for-Apple-Silicon-Tech/Unable-to-launch-a-VM-after-fresh-install-with-latest-technology/m-p/2900760# and related threads.
The 22H2 release of Tech Preview claims to fix the problem.
#!/usr/bin/env bash | |
sudo hdiutil create -o /tmp/Monterey -size 16g -volname Monterey -layout SPUD -fs HFS+J | |
sudo hdiutil attach /tmp/Monterey.dmg -noverify -mountpoint /Volumes/Monterey | |
sudo /Applications/Install\ macOS\ Monterey.app/Contents/Resources/createinstallmedia --volume /Volumes/Monterey --nointeraction | |
hdiutil eject -force /Volumes/Install\ macOS\ Monterey | |
hdiutil convert /tmp/Monterey.dmg -format UDTO -o ~/Downloads/Monterey | |
mv -v ~/Downloads/Monterey.cdr ~/Downloads/Monterey.iso | |
sudo rm -fv /tmp/Monterey.dmg |
My work requires us to have full-disk encryption, so these are the steps I use.
The basic idea is to create a LUKS-encrypted partition which is used as an LVM Physical Volume.
The GRUB boot partition isn't encrypted, but everything else is.
These steps tested and working on 22.04 (jammy) and 20.04 (focal).
CLSID,ClassName | |
{0000031A-0000-0000-C000-000000000046},CLSID | |
{0000002F-0000-0000-C000-000000000046},CLSID CLSID_RecordInfo | |
{00000100-0000-0010-8000-00AA006D2EA4},CLSID DAO.DBEngine.36 | |
{00000101-0000-0010-8000-00AA006D2EA4},CLSID DAO.PrivateDBEngine.36 | |
{00000103-0000-0010-8000-00AA006D2EA4},CLSID DAO.TableDef.36 | |
{00000104-0000-0010-8000-00AA006D2EA4},CLSID DAO.Field.36 | |
{00000105-0000-0010-8000-00AA006D2EA4},CLSID DAO.Index.36 | |
{00000106-0000-0010-8000-00AA006D2EA4},CLSID DAO.Group.36 | |
{00000107-0000-0010-8000-00AA006D2EA4},CLSID DAO.User.36 |
(EDIT: Besides Reddit, I've also put this up on Github Gist)
So while looking for information on security keys before getting one myself, I got very confused reading about all the different modes and advertised features of Yubikeys and other similar dongles. The official documentation tends to be surprisingly convoluted at times, weirdly organized and oddly shy about a few of the limitations of these keys (which I'm making a point of putting front and center). Now that I have one, I decided to write down everything I figured out in order to help myself (and hopefully some other people reading this) make sense of all this.
Since I'm partly writing these notes for myself, there might be some back and forth between "exp
# MacOS smartcard | |
List tokens available in the system | |
pluginkit -m -p com.apple.ctk-tokens | |
ex: com.apple.CryptoTokenKit.setoken(1.0) | |
com.apple.CryptoTokenKit.pivtoken(1.0) |
// Mac OS Big Sur 11.2.3: | |
http://swcdn.apple.com/content/downloads/12/32/071-14766-A_Q2H6ELXGVG/zx8saim8tei7fezrmvu4vuab80m0e8a5ll/InstallAssistant.pkg | |
// Mac OS Catalina 10.15: | |
https://itunes.apple.com/us/app/macos-catalina/id1466841314?ls=1&mt=12 | |
// Mac OS Mojave 10.14: | |
https://itunes.apple.com/us/app/macos-mojave/id1398502828?ls=1&mt=12 | |
// Mac OS High Sierra 10.13: |
DOMAIN_USR=domainjoinusername | |
DOMAIN_PWD=domainjoinpassword | |
# get instance ID | |
ID=$(curl http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/instance-id) | |
# install deps | |
DEBIAN_FRONTEND=noninteractive apt-get -y install sssd heimdal-clients msktutil | |
# set hostname |