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With multiparty computation multisignatures like FROST [0], it is possible to build a collaborative custodian service that is extremely private for users.
Today's collaborative custodians can see your entire wallet history even if you never require them to help sign a transaction, and they have full liberty to censor any signature requests they deem inappropriate or are coerced into censoring.
With FROST, a private collaborative custodian can hold a key to a multisig while remaining unaware of the public key (and wallet) which they help control. By hiding this public key, we solve the issue of existing collaborative custodians who learn of all wallet transactions even if you never use them.
Further, in the scenario that we do call upon a private collaborative custodian to help sign a transaction, this transaction could be signed blindly. Being blind to the transaction request itself and unknowing of past onchain behavior, these custodians have no practical in
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FROST's distributed key generation involves N parties each creating a secret polynomial, and sharing evaluations of this polynomial with other parties to create a distributed FROST key.
The final FROST key is described by a joint polynomial, where the x=0 intercept is the jointly shared secret s=f(0). Each participant controls a single point on this polynomial at their participant index.
The degree T-1 of the polynomials determines the threshold T of the multisignature - as this sets the number of points required to interpolate the joint polynomial and compute evaluations under the joint secret.
T parties can interact in order to interpolate evaluations using the secret f[0] without ever actually reconstructing this secret in isolation (unlike Shamir Secret Sharing where you have to reconstruct the secret).
These are are some notes I put together on butchering the rectangular dishy
cable.
FOLLOW THESE GUIDELINES AT YOUR OWN RISK. I TAKE NO RESPONSIBILITY
FOR ANY DAMAGE OR INJURY YOU SUSTAIN FROM FOLLOWING OR NOT FOLLOWING
THESE GUIDELINES.
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A demo of using Apple's EndpointSecurity framework - tested on macOS Monterey 12.2.1 (21D62)
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Detailed guide to installing LND and Bitcoind on Ubuntu 16.04 LTS for Mainnet
Intro
This guide is specific to getting LND 0.5-beta and Bitcoind running on Ubuntu 16.04 LTS for mainnet. It is aging rapidly and includes steps not necessary on newer versions of LND. As of April 2021 it is very out of date for bitcoind. As of December 2021 it is outdated for LND too.