A decaying MultiSig that requires no bitcoin script other than regular MultiSigs.
A 3-of-3 that decays into a 2-of-3 at block height x.
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Alice, Bob, and Carol create a 3-of-3 regular MultiSig output.
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Alice signs the output with
nLocktime = xandSIGHASH_NONE. -
She sends this partially signed TX to Bob and Carol.
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Bob and Carol do the same and send their transactions to the other two.
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They all make their transaction slightly unique, such that Alice cannot combine Bob and Carol's signatures to reduce it to a 1-of-3.
- E.g. by each signing distinct bits of the
nSequencefield, or distinct fees
- Now they are ready to receive the output trustlessly.
- For each output this ceremony is required.
- For it to become trustless, the exact spending output has to be known upfront.
- For a Schnorr MuSig the receiving output has to be known, too. E.g., it could be send to an output controlled by the remaining signers.