District of Maryland, No. 1:25‑cv‑02029
Pre‑litigation context embedded in the record: Standing Order 2025‑01 and Amended Standing Order 2025‑01
Standing Order 2025‑01 (SO 2025‑01, issued May 21, 2025; retroactive to May 20, 2025). The order invokes the All Writs Act and a limited judicial power “to preserve the court’s jurisdiction or maintain the status quo by injunction pending review of an agency’s action.” It provides that upon the filing of a § 2241 habeas petition on behalf of an alien detainee (with the petitioner’s full name and A‑number supplied), Government/Respondents, including those acting for them, are enjoined and restrained from removing the petitioner from the continental United States or altering legal status. Its terms remain in effect until 4:00 p.m. on the second business day after filing unless extended by the assigned judge. The Clerk must docket the Standing Order in each covered case and transmit the order, petition, and identifying information to the Civil Division Chief and Deputy Chief of the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the District of Maryland. The stated purposes include preserving existing conditions and potential jurisdiction, ensuring petitioner participation and access to counsel, and ensuring the Government has a fulsome opportunity to brief and present arguments.
Amended Standing Order 2025‑01 (ASO 2025‑01, issued May 28, 2025). The amendment keeps the core features and formalizes the transmission‑trigger: after a qualifying habeas petition is filed and the A‑number is provided, the Clerk must simultaneously send ASO 2025‑01, the petition, and the identifying information to the USAO Civil Division Chief and Deputy Chief and then file a Notice that transmission occurred. Effective upon that Notice, Government/Respondents are enjoined and restrained from removing the petitioner from the continental United States or altering legal status until 4:00 p.m. on the second business day after the Notice, unless extended. The amended order cites a recent influx of after‑hours petitions, scheduling difficulties, “hurried and frustrating” hearings, and “elusive” information about detainees’ location/status. It also directs Government/Respondents to notify appropriate officials promptly and provide necessary information to effectuate compliance.
Parties and posture. Plaintiffs are the United States and the U.S. Department of Homeland Security. Defendants are the U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland, the Chief Judge and all active/senior district judges in their official capacities, and the Clerk of Court, Catherine M. Stavlas (sued for executing the standing orders, including directing personnel to enter those orders in all subject cases). The Court itself is also named.
Challenged measures. Plaintiffs challenge SO 2025‑01 and ASO 2025‑01 as unlawful “automatic” injunctive relief issued outside individualized case adjudication. They contend the orders purport to bind the Executive upon clerk transmission and operate ex parte, without the traditional procedural or substantive predicates for injunctions.
Count I — Violation of requirements for injunctions. Plaintiffs argue the standing orders contravene Rule 65 and the standards for TROs and preliminary injunctions (Winter/Nken). They assert the orders assume removal is categorically irreparable, omit Rule 65(b)(1) predicates for ex parte TROs (specific facts by affidavit showing immediate irreparable injury; attorney certification re: notice), omit Rule 65(d) requirements (reasons stated, specificity), and bypass security. They also argue the All Writs Act cannot authorize relief contrary to “usages and principles of law” in Rule 65.
Count II — Violation of jurisdictional bars. Plaintiffs invoke 8 U.S.C. § 1252, arguing these orders enjoin or restrain the Executive’s performance of removal “operations” in the face of channeling and stripping provisions (§ 1252(a)(5), (b)(9), (g), (f)(1), (e)). On Plaintiffs’ telling, the orders broadly interfere with decisions to execute removal orders and impermissibly bypass the INA’s review scheme.
Count III — Violation of requirements for local rules. Plaintiffs assert the orders function as local rules controlling district‑wide practice; thus, they required § 2071(a) and Rule 83 procedures (notice and comment) and cannot be justified by § 2071(e)’s “immediate need” exception as used here.
Equitable authority and immunity themes. Plaintiffs assert a sovereign equitable cause of action (citing Debs and related cases) to vindicate federal interests and seek declaratory and injunctive relief; they contend prospective official‑capacity relief may be available notwithstanding judicial immunity. They characterize the orders as unprecedented automatic injunctions that, by design, delay enforcement without individualized merits findings.
Motion for Recusal and Designation of a Visiting Judge (June 24, 2025) — ECF No. 2; Referral and Reassignment (June 26 & July 2, 2025)
Motion. Plaintiffs moved to recuse the entire bench and to refer the matter for designation of an out‑of‑district judge because every District of Maryland judge was named as a defendant. The Clerk provided notice. The Chief Judge of the Fourth Circuit designated an out‑of‑district judge.
Reassignment. The case was reassigned to U.S. District Judge Thomas T. Cullen (W.D. Va.) to sit by designation.
Relief sought. Plaintiffs seek to preliminarily enjoin Defendants from implementing or effectuating SO 2025‑01 and ASO 2025‑01 going forward. The motion contends Plaintiffs are likely to succeed on their Rule 65 and § 1252 theories; that irreparable harm arises when unlawful injunctions impede removal operations and policy implementation; that equities favor the Executive’s enforcement duties; and that the public interest supports compliance with statutory limits.
Baker declaration (ICE/ERO operations). Acting Field Office Director Nikita Baker describes coordination required for removals (especially involving dangerous criminal aliens or recalcitrant countries), the difficulties created by automatic restraints that trigger upon clerk transmission, timing risks that can halt weeks of planning, and the logistical problem that ERO would effectively need to monitor the District of Maryland docket nationwide to avoid violating automatic restraints. She flags ambiguity where proceedings are ongoing and an order purports to bar changing legal status.
Briefing order. The court set a 14/7 opposition/reply briefing schedule and indicated an intention to hold a hearing the week of August 11, 2025, in Baltimore. Subsequent docket entries reflect similar timing for later motions and an eventual August 13 hearing.
Non‑party filings. Pro se submissions included (a) a motion by K. L. Smith to intervene (raising collateral issues, including presidential qualifications and generalized constitutional arguments), (b) Shaunesi Yvette DeBerry’s motion for leave to file an amicus brief in support of Plaintiffs, and (c) George Edward McDermott’s filings to intervene and to “preserve the record,” with broad allegations regarding unrelated matters and assertions of long‑standing grievances.
Order addressing pro se filings. The court denied DeBerry’s amicus request under Local Rule 105.12 because it did not provide helpful analysis or demonstrate a special interest in the subject matter; denied intervention to Smith and McDermott under Rule 24 (no unconditional statutory right to intervene, no protectable interest that would be impaired, and adequate representation by existing parties); and rejected additional pro se requests because non‑parties cannot seek relief within the action.
Defendants’ combined Motion to Dismiss (12(b)(1)/(6)) and Opposition to PI (July 21, 2025) — ECF Nos. 24 & 24‑1
Threshold arguments — non‑justiciability, cause of action, immunities. Defendants characterize the suit as extraordinary and essentially unprecedented: the Executive suing the Judiciary, a coequal branch, to “erase” standing orders and to enjoin judges and the Clerk from using a case‑management tool. They argue the proper vehicles are as‑applied challenges (with appeal, including capable‑of‑repetition‑yet‑evading‑review if necessary) or petitioning the Fourth Circuit’s judicial council to modify or abrogate under § 2071(c)(1), not a facial lawsuit against an entire bench. They contend the United States has identified no cause of action to sue a federal court and its judges for promulgating or implementing standing orders; that the Court itself enjoys sovereign immunity; and that judges and the Clerk enjoy absolute judicial immunity for quintessential judicial acts, including docket‑management orders and clerk actions taken in obedience to judicial direction.
Merits alternative — inherent authority and the administrative‑stay analogy. Even if the case were justiciable, Defendants argue SO/ASO are modest administrative pauses within the inherent judicial power, preserved by the All Writs Act, to preserve jurisdiction. They analogize to courts of appeals’ long‑standing practices of entering short administrative stays on immigration stay motions to allow considered rulings (for example, the Fourth Circuit’s 14‑day standing order, and similar practices or rules in the Third, Ninth, First, and Sixth Circuits). They stress that the District’s orders confer at most a two‑business‑day interval, a more modest pause than appellate practice.
Compatibility with Nken and Rule 65; A.A.R.P. v. Trump. Defendants frame the orders as temporary measures to allow the court to decide whether it has jurisdiction and whether TRO/PI relief is appropriate, not as substitutes for such decisions. They rely on the Supreme Court’s recognition that temporary injunctive relief may preserve jurisdiction without immediate merits resolution and cite the appellate administrative‑stay regimes as comparable.
As‑applied experience in D. Md. cases. Defendants point to several District of Maryland habeas cases filed in the same period to show administrative stays often lapsed on their own (for example, the petitioner voluntarily dismissed), were extended without objection, or were quickly superseded by decisions on the merits. In one case that Plaintiffs called “extraordinary,” proceedings were expedited, a hearing was held, and the Executive promptly prevailed with dismissal after a short extension.
Equities and public interest (Defendants). Defendants argue that a brief pause furthers the public interest in the Great Writ and the judiciary’s ability to render informed decisions rather than being overtaken by removal before claims can be heard, and that the Executive’s asserted “loss of time” does not trump the judiciary’s duty to ensure lawful action.
America’s Future (supporting Plaintiffs). America’s Future moves for leave and files an amicus brief supporting the PI motion. The brief asserts that the District of Maryland’s standing orders are the first known instance of automatic district‑court injunctions issued ex parte and without regard to jurisdiction or merits, and that these measures join a larger pattern of injunctive constraints on the Trump Administration. The brief catalogs 103 injunctions across districts since January 20, 2025 (excluding the automatic orders here), describes the challenged orders as highly unusual equitable relief issued without compliance with Rule 65, likens the automatic stay to a bankruptcy‑style stay “without Congressional authorization,” and argues the orders operate even where Congress has withdrawn district‑court authority under the INA. It emphasizes that the court’s docketing burdens cannot justify such automatic injunctions.
Retired federal judges (supporting Defendants). Eleven retired federal judges move unopposed for leave and file an amicus brief supporting Defendants. They argue that short administrative stays to preserve jurisdiction are well established, essential docket‑management tools across the judiciary, and consistent with appellate practice; that the District’s two‑business‑day pause is modest; that suing an entire bench and its Clerk raises serious separation‑of‑powers problems, risks intrusive inter‑branch discovery, and drains scarce judicial resources; and that the Executive has ordinary avenues (as‑applied litigation; judicial‑council petition) to challenge standing orders. The filing includes an appendix listing all signatories (retired district and circuit judges associated with D. Md. and other courts).
LDAD, MD‑LDAD, SRLI, and Judge J. Michael Luttig (supporting Defendants). These amici move for leave and file a brief supporting dismissal and opposing PI. They focus on judicial independence, separation of powers, and the judiciary’s inherent authority to protect jurisdiction in the face of governmental conduct that could deprive jurisdiction. The brief describes case examples in which removals or transfers risk mooting review, lists administrative practices at the Supreme Court and courts of appeals that utilize administrative stays, and argues that Plaintiffs’ lawsuit is unnecessary and potentially harmful because traditional pathways are available.
Electronic‑devices order. The court enters an order restricting electronics in the courtroom for further proceedings (exceptions for court staff, U.S. Marshals/CSOs, counsel, and identified law‑enforcement/investigative personnel) and directs the Marshals/CSOs to enforce. This pertains to hearing logistics and security as the August hearing approaches.
Coordinated scheduling motion. Plaintiffs file a consent motion setting August 1 for their combined reply (PI) and response (to Defendants’ MTD), and August 11 for Defendants’ reply on the MTD. The court grants the schedule, leading into the mid‑August hearing.
Plaintiffs’ combined filing (reply on PI; response to MTD). Plaintiffs press that facial challenges to standing orders/local rules are proper in district court and supported by precedent; that Rule 65’s requirements and Nken’s understanding of irreparable harm govern and are bypassed by automatic injunctions; that § 1252’s channeling and restrictions foreclose district‑court interference in removal operations; and that the orders operate as local rules promulgated without § 2071 compliance. They argue that sovereign interests and public interest support an injunction, that the All Writs Act cannot excuse Rule 65, and that the cases Defendants cite involve case‑specific stays or appellate administrative practices, not automatic trial‑level injunctions.
Defendants’ reply in support of MTD (August). Defendants reiterate that there is no cause of action for the Executive to sue the Judiciary to invalidate a standing order; that sovereign immunity protects the Court; that judicial immunity protects judges and the Clerk for judicial acts; that the Executive has ordinary avenues to challenge application; and that the orders fall within inherent authority and align with accepted administrative‑stay practices. They underscore separation‑of‑powers concerns and the risk of inter‑branch discovery if such suits proceed.
Proceedings. The court hears argument on both the PI motion and the MTD. Later excerpts of the Memorandum Opinion note that both sides discussed authorities including Grupo Mexicano and a recent Supreme Court decision addressing the scope of equitable power. The court’s standing analysis is prompted by what it characterizes as its independent duty to ensure it may exercise judicial power.
Holding and disposition. The court grants Defendants’ motion to dismiss and denies Plaintiffs’ preliminary‑injunction motion as moot. The opinion characterizes the suit as extraordinary: an Executive‑versus‑Judiciary action that is “not ordinary.” It concludes that if the Executive believes the standing orders unlawful, it must use proper avenues.
Standing for injunctive relief. The court finds that the Executive lacks standing to pursue the particular injunctive relief requested because such relief is not within the court’s traditional equitable power in this posture. Although neither party framed this as a standing argument, the court states it must independently ensure that the exercise of judicial power is proper, and it rejects reliance on the All Writs Act to avoid limits on equitable authority.
Sovereign immunity and judicial immunity. In the alternative and independently, the court holds that the District of Maryland is protected by sovereign immunity, and the judicial officers and Clerk are protected by absolute judicial immunity for judicial acts (promulgating and implementing standing orders). It rejects Plaintiffs’ efforts to treat prior cases as implicit waivers and distinguishes authorities Plaintiffs cite (including Strickland) as inapposite to the Court itself and insufficient to pierce immunity. The court notes that judicial immunity covers acts taken in excess of authority and even those alleged to be malicious or procedurally flawed, unless taken in the clear absence of all jurisdiction, which is not shown here. The Clerk’s implementation of judicial orders is protected by derivative absolute judicial immunity.
No cause of action. As an additional alternative ground, the court concludes Plaintiffs identify no cognizable cause of action authorizing a suit by the Executive against the Judicial Branch to invalidate standing orders. The court declines to create such a cause of action and stresses the separation‑of‑powers concerns inherent in doing so.
Proper avenues identified. The court emphasizes that the Executive may proceed through traditional means: (1) raise objections and appeal in individual cases where the standing orders are applied, or (2) petition the Fourth Circuit Judicial Council under § 2071(c)(1) to modify or abrogate the standing orders. The opinion remarks that the judiciary and Executive must exhibit reciprocal respect for each branch’s role.
Order. The accompanying order grants the motion to dismiss and denies the PI as moot.
Appeal. Plaintiffs file a notice of appeal to the Fourth Circuit from the dismissal and order of August 26, 2025.
Consolidated issue‑by‑issue presentation of arguments and reasoning (for completeness; drawn entirely from the filings)
Trigger and effect. On filing a § 2241 habeas petition on behalf of an alien detainee and supplying name/A‑number, the Clerk is directed to docket the order and transmit it (and the petition and identifiers) to specified USAO officials; upon the Clerk’s Notice of transmission under the amended order, Government/Respondents are enjoined and restrained from removing the petitioner from the continental U.S. or altering legal status until 4:00 p.m. on the second business day after the Notice, unless extended. Government/Respondents must notify appropriate officials promptly and provide necessary information and documents to effect compliance.
Stated purposes. Preserve existing conditions and potential jurisdiction; ensure participation and access to counsel; ensure the court can evaluate claims (including based on possible in‑court testimony); and ensure the Government can brief and present arguments. The amended order adds that surges of after‑hours petitions created scheduling difficulties and hurried, frustrating hearings with elusive information about detainee locations/status.
Analogy to appellate administrative stays. Defendants and supporting amici highlight that the Fourth Circuit directs its Clerk to enter an administrative stay of removal for 14 days upon filing a stay motion in an immigration case and that the Third and Ninth Circuits have similar practices; the First and Sixth Circuits address analogous needs by local rules or recent emergency amendments. The District’s two‑business‑day interval is portrayed as a shorter, trial‑level analogue.
Rule 65 and Nken. Plaintiffs assert automatic injunctions cannot issue without Rule 65 compliance (statement of reasons, specificity, security) and the four‑factor test; ex parte TROs require verified facts and attorney notice certification; and Nken forecloses a categorical presumption that removal is irreparable. They argue the All Writs Act cannot substitute for Rule 65 or authorize novel forms of equitable relief that dispense with established procedures.
INA § 1252 channeling and limits. Plaintiffs argue § 1252(b)(9) consolidates claims arising from removal proceedings; § 1252(g) bars review of the decision to execute removal; § 1252(f)(1) limits injunctive relief except as to an individual alien in narrow circumstances; and § 1252(e) restricts habeas for expedited removal. In their view, the orders restrain removal operations regardless of jurisdiction in individual cases.
Local‑rules process. Plaintiffs contend the orders function as local rules requiring § 2071/Rule 83 procedures; § 2071(e) “immediate need” does not justify adoption without public notice and comment.
Sovereign interests and harms. Plaintiffs assert irreparable harm to sovereign enforcement interests and to the public interest when unlawful orders delay removals and policy execution; they describe operational burdens on ICE/ERO, including timing, communications, and nationwide compliance problems produced by an automatic order keyed to one district’s docket.
Vehicle and justiciability. Defendants argue the Executive cannot bring a facial erasure suit against a federal court and its judges; the proper avenues are as‑applied litigation with appeal or a § 2071(c)(1) judicial‑council petition. They assert no cause of action exists, sovereign immunity protects the Court, and judicial immunity protects judges and the Clerk for judicial acts and acts taken under judicial direction.
Inherent authority and administrative‑stay practice. Defendants describe the orders as short, administrative pauses to preserve jurisdiction while the court decides whether and how to proceed; they analogize to appellate practices and emphasize the two‑business‑day duration. They cite the pressures created by late‑hour filings and logistical obstacles to obtaining reliable location/status information before removals.
As‑applied track record. Defendants present examples where the stay lapsed by itself or was extended without objection, and one “extraordinary” case in which the Executive prevailed quickly after expedited briefing and a brief extension to allow adverse presentation and a hearing.
Equities and public interest. Defendants emphasize the judiciary’s obligation to ensure lawful Executive action and the role of the Great Writ; a brief pause allows an informed decision and prevents removal from mooting review.
Retired federal judges (supporting Defendants). These amici stress crushing caseloads and the routine need for short administrative stays to preserve the status quo so courts can decide emergency motions. They list analogous standing orders or rules in multiple circuits; argue that the suit risks inter‑branch discovery (e.g., depositions of judges or discovery of judicial communications) and could subvert judicial independence; and warn that the Executive’s theory has no limiting principle and could extend to suits against circuit judges or even Supreme Court Justices for administrative stays.
LDAD, MD‑LDAD, SRLI, and Judge Luttig (supporting Defendants). These amici argue that governmental conduct has at times deprived courts of jurisdiction by removing or transferring detainees before meaningful review; they supply examples (including Ozturk and Suri) to show why a brief pause can be necessary and emphasize that the standing orders reflect a measured response to recurring emergencies.
America’s Future (supporting Plaintiffs). This amicus asserts the orders create automatic injunctions unlike any known district‑court practice, that they conflict with Rule 65 and INA limits, that courts in certain districts have been highly receptive to enjoining Executive action, and that the District of Maryland’s approach marks a novel escalation because it is court‑initiated and operates without a merits request. It lists numerous injunctions in other matters to frame a broader context of judicial constraints on the Administration.
Standing. The court concludes Plaintiffs lack standing to seek the requested injunctive relief because such relief is not within the traditional equitable powers of the court in this posture. Although the parties raised related authorities in other contexts, the court applies its independent duty to confirm it may exercise judicial power, including by evaluating equitable limits.
Immunities. The District Court is protected by sovereign immunity; judges and the Clerk are protected by judicial immunity for judicial acts and acts taken under judicial direction. The opinion rejects Plaintiffs’ reliance on cases that did not confront sovereign immunity head‑on and underscores the high bar for showing a clear absence of jurisdiction that might defeat judicial immunity. It notes that alleged procedural errors or even malicious conduct do not strip judicial immunity for judicial acts. The Clerk’s obedience to court orders is protected by derivative immunity.
No cause of action. The court determines there is no cause of action authorizing an Executive‑versus‑Judiciary suit to invalidate standing orders; it declines to create one and points to the separation‑of‑powers concerns such a step would generate.
Proper avenues. The court reiterates that the Executive may challenge application in individual cases (with appeal) or petition the Judicial Council under § 2071(c)(1). It emphasizes reciprocal respect between branches and notes that judges need limited administrative time to make an informed decision rather than being overtaken by events.
- Standing Order 2025‑01 (May 21, 2025; retroactive to May 20) and Amended Standing Order 2025‑01 (May 28, 2025) — text and purposes; clerk‑transmission trigger; two‑business‑day duration; enforcement notice requirement.
- Complaint (June 24, 2025) — Counts I–III (Rule 65/Nken; § 1252; § 2071/Rule 83); sovereign equitable authority asserted.
- Motion for Recusal/Visiting Judge; referral to Fourth Circuit; reassignment to Judge Thomas T. Cullen (by designation).
- Motion for Preliminary Injunction (July 3, 2025); Baker declaration (ICE/ERO).
- PI scheduling and hearing notice; later, August 13 hearing held.
- Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss and Opposition to PI — non‑justiciability, no cause of action, sovereign/judicial immunities; inherent authority and administrative‑stay analogy; as‑applied examples; equities.
- Amici: America’s Future (for Plaintiffs); Retired Judges (for Defendants); LDAD/MD‑LDAD/SRLI/Judge Luttig (for Defendants).
- Electronic‑devices order (courtroom administration).
- Memorandum Opinion and Order (Aug. 26, 2025) — MTD granted; PI denied as moot; holdings on standing, immunities, lack of cause of action; proper avenues.
- Notice of Appeal (Aug. 26, 2025) — to the Fourth Circuit.
Introductory framing. The record reflects a structural conflict about how trial courts manage an influx of last‑minute immigration‑related habeas filings that potentially become moot if deportation occurs before a court can address jurisdiction and emergency relief. The District of Maryland adopted a short automatic pause—two business days—to preserve the court’s ability to hear petitions and to receive briefing and reliable status/location information. The Executive contends that this automatic pause is an injunction without Rule 65 predicates, beyond statutory authority given § 1252, and adopted in violation of rulemaking requirements. Defendants and their supporting amici argue the orders are modest administrative‑stay analogues authorized by inherent powers, consistent with appellate practices, and necessary for docket management and the integrity of judicial review. The court ultimately dismisses on threshold grounds and does not reach the merits.
Complaint details. The complaint is emphatic that injunctions are extraordinary and never awarded as of right; that injunctive relief against the Executive is especially weighty; and that the District’s automatic restraints are ex parte, case‑indifferent, and incompatible with Rule 65. Plaintiffs argue the orders improperly treat removal as inherently irreparable and effectively require the Executive to monitor the District’s docket before any removal nationwide to avoid violating the automatic bar. Section 1252 is presented as a set of specific limits that the orders flout by restraining “operations” connected with execution of removal orders, channeling claims away from district courts, and limiting injunctive relief that is not individualized. As to § 2071/Rule 83, Plaintiffs present the orders as local rules adopted without notice‑and‑comment.
Recusal and reassignment. Because every district judge was named as a defendant, the Chief Judge of the Fourth Circuit designated Judge Thomas T. Cullen to sit by designation, and the case was reassigned accordingly.
PI motion specifics. Plaintiffs’ PI motion seeks to halt any implementation of SO/ASO. They present Winter/Nken factors and attach the Baker declaration, which provides operational detail: extended planning for removals, coordination with foreign governments, safety issues, and the logistics of learning of automatic bars in time. Baker describes practical confusion when legal status cannot be altered while proceedings continue before EOIR or USCIS, suggesting ripple effects through multiple agencies.
Defendants’ non‑justiciability and immunities. Defendants cast the suit as structurally improper: the Executive suing the Judiciary in a facial way to enjoin a district court’s standing orders. They argue the proper path is to litigate in a specific case and appeal, or to seek modification/abrogation from the judicial council under § 2071(c)(1). They stress sovereign immunity for the Court, judicial immunity for judges and the Clerk, and the absence of any cause of action. The memorandum also warns of separation‑of‑powers dangers, including the specter of inter‑branch discovery into judicial communications if litigation proceeds.
Inherent authority and administrative‑stay analogy. Defendants anchor their defense in the court’s inherent authority to preserve jurisdiction, identifying the two‑business‑day stop as a short administrative interval to allow the court to assess jurisdiction and decide case‑specific relief. They analogize to the Fourth Circuit’s standing order (14 days upon filing a stay motion) and to other circuits’ rules. They emphasize that administrative stays do not themselves resolve the four‑factor test but temporarily protect the judicial process so that those factors can be considered.
As‑applied examples. Defendants present a catalogue of recent D. Md. habeas cases where the administrative pause expired by itself (for example, petitioner dismissal), was extended with no Executive objection, or culminated in expedited decisions. In one highlighted matter, the court quickly held a conference, extended the stay briefly to obtain adversarial briefing, held a prompt hearing, and then dissolved a TRO and dismissed—timelines only marginally longer than the Fourth Circuit’s routine 14‑day window.
Amicus landscape. America’s Future paints the orders as a novel escalation—automatic court‑initiated injunctions with no merits inquiry—set against what it says is a wave of judicial constraints on the Administration. In contrast, the retired‑judges brief and LDAD/SRLI/Judge Luttig stress crushing dockets, routine use of administrative stays at every judicial level, and practical reasons the judiciary must have a short buffer to avoid mooting review through removal. The retired judges also emphasize collateral harms of this suit’s posture, including resource drain, conflict‑free representation for judges, and inter‑branch discovery risks.
Pro se filings. The court denies non‑party requests for amicus participation and intervention for failing to meet Local Rule 105.12 or Rule 24 standards and reiterates that non‑parties cannot seek relief in the case.
Hearing. On August 13, the court hears argument. The final opinion notes that both sides discussed the scope of equitable powers in light of recent Supreme Court decisions and that, even though neither side framed the issue as standing, the court had to ensure it could exercise judicial power.
Memorandum Opinion and Order (August 26). The court dismisses the action and denies the PI as moot. On standing, it holds the Executive lacks standing to obtain the injunction it seeks because that remedy is outside the court’s traditional equitable power in this posture. On immunities, it concludes the Court is protected by sovereign immunity and that judges and the Clerk are protected by judicial and derivative judicial immunity for promulgating and executing standing orders. It also holds that there is no cause of action authorizing such a suit. The court emphasizes that the Executive retains proper avenues: as‑applied challenges with appeal and § 2071(c)(1) petitions to the Judicial Council. It cites the need for reciprocal respect across branches.
Appeal. Plaintiffs file a notice of appeal to the Fourth Circuit on the same day the court issues the Memorandum Opinion and Order.
As of August 26, 2025, the district court dismissed the suit on threshold grounds (standing, sovereign/judicial immunities, lack of cause of action), declined to reach the merits of the standing orders, denied the preliminary‑injunction motion as moot, and Plaintiffs appealed to the Fourth Circuit.