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const Stripe = require('stripe');
const Promise = require('bluebird');

class StripeService {

    constructor(server) {
        this.server = server;
        this.logger = server.plugins.core.LoggerService.tagged('StripeService');
        const secretKey = this.server.app.config.get('/payments/stripe/secretKey');
        if (!secretKey) {

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const Boom = require('boom');
const BaseController = require('../../core/abstract/BaseApiController');

class UsersController extends BaseController {

    constructor(...args) {
        super(...args);
        this.User = this.server.plugins.users.User;
        this.UserService = this.server.plugins.users.UserService;
    }

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const _ = require('lodash');

class EmailVerificationService {

    constructor(server) {
        this.server = server;
        this.logger = server.plugins.core.LoggerService.tagged('EmailVerificationService');
        this.jwtKey = server.app.config.get('/jwt/key');
        this.MailService = server.plugins.mail.MailService;
        this.MailTemplateService = server.plugins.mail.MailTemplateService;

adnan-i

const Promise = require('bluebird');
const GMaps = require('@google/maps');
const Joi = require('joi');

const geocodeResponseSchema = Joi.object().keys({
    json: Joi.object().keys({
        results: Joi.array().required().min(1).items(Joi.object().keys({
            address_components: Joi.array().required(),
            formatted_address: Joi.string().required(),
            geometry: Joi.object().keys({

adnan-i

/*
 * All logs are streamed through the "white-out" middleware
 * which is responsible for removing any instances of password 
 * properties from the logged objects
 */
{
    myConsoleReporter: [{
        module: 'good-squeeze',
        name: 'Squeeze',
        args: [{log: '*', response: '*', request: '*'}]

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/*
 * Password are never stored as plain-text.
 * Instead, their one-way hashes are stored along with a unique salt.
 * This means that not even the DB owner can reverse-engineer the plain passwords
 */
static hashPassword(password, salt) {
    if (!password) throw new Error('Missing password argument');
    if (!salt) throw new Error('Missing salt argument');

    return crypto.pbkdf2Sync(password, new Buffer(salt, 'base64'), 10000, 64, 'sha512').toString('base64');

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/*
 * Whenever possible try and construct all the queries by using the ORM API.
 * Manually written queries are susceptible to SQL-injections
 */
_getClosestQuery(params) {
    const seq = this.Model.sequelize;
    const point = seq.fn('ST_MakePoint', ...params.point.coordinates);
    const srid = seq.fn('ST_SetSRID', point, 4326);
    const stDistanceSphere = seq.fn('ST_DISTANCE_SPHERE', seq.col('point'), srid);

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/*
 * This is one of the few public routes in the project.
 * This particular route is accepting unauthenticated POST requests 
 * from a remote server.
 * As such, this route is specifically rate-limited to 120 requests per hour 
 * in order to mitigate flooding.
 */
server.route({
    method: 'POST',
    path: `${path}/remote`,

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update(req, reply) {
return Promise.resolve()
.then(() => {
    /* 
     * Even though this action is accessed from the "PUT /api/users/:id" route
     * we cannot rely on reading the user id from the params. Instead we're using 
     * the user id from the session.
     * This is to mitigate the Broken Access Control threat 
     * (https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Top_10-2017_A5-Broken_Access_Control)
     */

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User.aggregate([
  {
    /* Filter out users who have not yet subscribed */
    $match: {
      /* "joined" is an ISODate field */
      'subscription.joined': {$ne: null}
    }
  },
  {
    /* group by year and month of the subscription event */