@SirFuzzalot presented an idea for a new PB pay model for an EOSIO network in https://t.me/EOSPros
Fuzzy, [12.05.19 04:56]
Here is my thought on fixing dpos away from pageantry though.
Let me find the discussion (should prob post it on whaleshares first but oh well)
Fuzzy, [12.05.19 05:03]
Ok ill just type it here since i am no longer in the group i posted it in initially.
Fuzzy, [12.05.19 05:04]
Bps must stake N tokens to be in a pool of potential producers.
Fuzzy, [12.05.19 05:05]
A number of bps are pulled from this pool every round of block production
Fuzzy, [12.05.19 05:06]
Based on the amount they have staked at any given time, a randomized
modifier (1-4?) is used to multiply this staked amount.
Fuzzy, [12.05.19 05:07]
But only for the purpose of establishing order of bps from highest
to lowest...from which the top 21 will be chosen.
Fuzzy, [12.05.19 05:10]
A % of that final number is charged to produce a block. If block is
produced and the bp candidate has not staked too high, the bp gets
paid more than they paid to produce it
Fuzzy, [12.05.19 05:11]
If they staked too much block production costs more than its worth
(incentivizing away from big greedballs taking too much control via one node)
Fuzzy, [12.05.19 05:12]
Alternatively if they staked enough to be profitable but miss the
block...they lose the tokens paid for the right to produce the
block...and receive no reward (ie net loss)
Fuzzy, [12.05.19 05:14]
Under this system bps in dpos become connected to a similar incentive
structure to miners where they must balance risk vs reward.
Fuzzy, [12.05.19 05:15]
And must also produce blocks or lose money
Fuzzy, [12.05.19 05:15]
It also takes away from the pageantry and ass kissing incentive
Fuzzy, [12.05.19 05:15]
Because that incentive is toxic
Fuzzy, [12.05.19 05:16]
Its ok for private chains that want to build like traditional companies
but not for ones built as a common space for the public
Fuzzy, [12.05.19 05:18]
Now ill screenshot this so i dont have to refind it and feel free to
give your own thoughts.
Fuzzy, [12.05.19 05:18]
I believe the game theory behind this is pretty strongly aligned with
what we would want though
Fuzzy, [12.05.19 05:20]
And of course if anyone is ever interested in working on such a thing
let me know. Id love to participate with a chain that wants to do something
like this and would gladly advise if they agree with me and would have me ☺️
Bai, [12.05.19 05:35]
[In reply to Fuzzy]
🙊😂😂
Fuzzy, [12.05.19 05:37]
[In reply to Bai]
I know...
What sucks is feeling like an asshole for saying it
Fuzzy, [12.05.19 05:37]
😅
Fuzzy, [12.05.19 05:38]
But i guess now is a good time to say this channel is called EOS
blockpros for a reason.
Fuzzy, [12.05.19 05:38]
Exponential OS
Fuzzy, [12.05.19 05:38]
If all EOS chains did this
Fuzzy, [12.05.19 05:38]
Bp operations could potentially choose to stake in more than one
Fuzzy, [12.05.19 05:39]
And we could build voltron together in an ecosystem unlike any others in crypto
Eric - sw/eden, [12.05.19 05:43]
[In reply to Fuzzy]
Could you give an example here so I'm sure I understand the idea correct?
Fuzzy, [12.05.19 05:54]
[In reply to Eric - sw/eden]
Sure.
Bob is a blockpro candidate. He has to stake a minimum amount to get there.
For this situation lets just say that is 1000EOS.
Wanting to have an edge on the competition, Bob decides to stake 2000.
Round 1 of block production is about to start and the chain needs to
establish the bps who will produce for this round.
Bob gets a random multiplier to his stake (2)
Effectively now bobs number of "votes" is 4000. If this puts him in the
top 21 for this round he will get to produce a block.
But the cost to produce this block for this round is 1% of his staked
tokens x the multiplier (40EOS).
And the reward for producing the block is not effected by this multiplier.
If the block reward is higher than 40EOS (+equipment costs) it is worth it.
If he misses the block...he is harming the chain. The chain should not have
to pay for this given it was bobs job to produce the block. So he will lose
the amount he had to post for producing the block.
Fuzzy, [12.05.19 05:56]
Now with this said...its obviously hypothetical. Numbers would need to make
sense...but this is something that can be refined.
Fuzzy, [12.05.19 05:56]
The best way to game the system would be to provide many nodes...all up
running efficiently to minimum standards and providing redundancy to the network.
Fuzzy, [12.05.19 05:57]
But that is also a risk
Fuzzy, [12.05.19 05:57]
Because with more nodes comes more overhead and more potential for costly messups.
Fuzzy, [12.05.19 05:58]
This is the basic gist of it though
Fuzzy, [12.05.19 05:59]
I think the block reward also should be defined dynamically by the profitability
of the chain. Aka a % of how much the chain is making from users paying for its services
Fuzzy, [12.05.19 06:00]
But this is just the initial thought. I do believe though its a dang good start
cc32d9, [12.05.19 08:44]
I'll copy this to GitHub if you don't mind
Tal Muskal | LiquidApps.io, [12.05.19 08:53]
[In reply to Fuzzy]
Love the general approach. it would be interesting to simulate this method
somehow to get a feel of the dynamics.
Eric - sw/eden, [12.05.19 08:53]
There are some technical points that needs to be made but that can be discussed
later (probably we don't want elections every 3min except if someone missed
blocks...); I think it's a very interesting approach and would also love to try it out.
Tal Muskal | LiquidApps.io, [12.05.19 08:59]
[In reply to Fuzzy]
"Bob gets a random multiplier to his stake (2)" - is not trivial though
More ideas that I have been scratching down as they come to me. Base pay and fees etc on percentages so that they are no longer controlled by humans, and the whale problem disappears completely:
https://docs.google.com/document/d/1PaB9-ccGRB-DB719UdJRXu1KR1Zd0Yr0OgbWrCRoR6U/edit