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IN THE CIRCUIT COURT
FOR DAVIDSON COUNTY, TENNESSEE
TWENTIETH JUDICIAL DISTRICT AT NASHVILLE

3 ---------------------------------------------------4 RACHEL AND P.J. ANDERSON,
5

Plaintiff,

6 VS.
7 METROPOLITAN GOVERNMENT OF
NASHVILLE AND DAVIDSON
8 COUNTY,
9

Defendants.

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TRANSCRIPT OF JUDGE'S RULING
October 21, 2016

16
17 By: The Honorable Kelvin D. Jones
Circuit Court Judge
18
Metropolitan Courthouse, Room 604
Nashville, Tennessee
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PREPARED BY:
22
CRISTI G. WATSON, LCR
23 Briggs & Associates

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No. 15C3212

P.O. Box 682704
24 Franklin, Tennessee 37068
Phone: (615) 424-0999
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APPEARANCES

2
3 FOR THE PLAINTIFFS:
4 Braden H. Boucek, Esq.
Beacon Center of Tennessee
5 P.O. Box 198646
Nashville, Tennessee 37219
6
7 FOR THE DEFENDANT:
8 Catherine J. Pham
Attorney at Law
9 Metropolitan Courthouse, Suite 108
P.O. Box 196300
10 Nashville, Tennessee 37219
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(JUDGE'S RULING)
THE COURT: This is the matter of Rachel

3 and P.J. Anderson, plaintiffs, versus Metropolitan
4 Government of Nashville and Davidson County, Case No.
5 15C-3212. The Court is here today hearing motions for
6 summary judgment filed by both parties. The issues
7 being addressed are the constitutionality of the STRP
8 statute.
9

There is also an issue regarding the

10 equal protection clause, whether there was a rational

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11 basis for the imposition of a 3 percent cap on owner
12 occupied STRPs and not on non-owner occupied STRPs.
13

The other issue -- main issue is does the

14 imposition of the 3 percent cap create an illegal
15 monopoly. The Court has had an opportunity to review
16 the briefs filed in the case, as well as the arguments
17 of the counsel. The Court makes the following ruling.
18

As relates to the issue of whether the

19 statute is unconstitutional and vague, the Court does
20 find that it is, because the definition of STRP is
21 subject to multiple interpretations. The Court finds
22 that an ordinary person of average intelligence would
23 not be able to understand the differences and/or
24 distinctions between STRPs and hotels, bed and
25 breakfast, boarding houses, hostels, et cetera.
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1 Because the Court finds that the ordinance is vague,
2 the Court cannot conclude the plaintiffs are exempt
3 from the STRP ordinance, nor can it conclude that the
4 ordinance applies to the plaintiff's property.
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So the Court grants the Anderson's motion

6 for summary judgment as relates to the issue of whether
7 the ordinance is unconstitutional and vague.
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As relates to the issue of equal

9 protection, the question is does the ordinance violate
10 equal protection and specifically owner occupied versus
11 owner -- versus non-owner or unoccupied STRPs similarly
12 situated. The Court does find that they are, and as
13 related to which test applies to this, it would be
14 rational basis test.
15

The next question is, is there a rational

16 basis for the imposition of the 3 percent cap on owner
17 occu -- on owner unoccupied STRPs and not owner
18 occupied. The answer to that question is, yes, there
19 is a rational basis because the metropolitan government
20 wanted to balance the interest between the citizens
21 who, one, wanted to achieve benefits from renting their
22 property on a short-term basis and give the interest
23 of, two, citizens who want to protect the residential
24 character of neighborhoods. So imposing a cap is a
25 reasonable means of doing so.
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Next question is, does concern still

2 exist. Plaintiff says, no, but the Court disagrees,
3 because there are citizens who still want to protect
4 the residential character of the neighborhood, and if
5 you strike down the cap, there is no guarantee
6 unoccupied owners will not purchase properties and

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7 convert them to commercial enterprises.
8

The final issue is related to the

9 imposition of the 3 percent cap and question of whether
10 that creates an illegal monopoly. The Court is finding
11 that in answering the question is short-term rental by
12 non-owner occupier a common right that existed prior to
13 the enactment of the ordinance, the answer of the Court
14 is no.
15

Even if it was a common right rendering a

16 3 percent cap a monopoly, the Court finds that it is
17 still a permissible monopoly. That relates to does the
18 3 percent cap aid in promoting health, safety, moral or
19 well-being of citizens. The Court answers, yes, and,
20 therefore, it is a permissible monopoly and does not
21 constitute an illegal monopoly. Questions? Who will
22 prepare the order?
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MR. BOUCEK: You want to talk about it?

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MS. PHAM: We can work together.

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MR: BOUCEK: We will work it out.

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THE COURT: You all do that. I think

2 it's appropriate to in this particular case assess the
3 court costs against Metro. That will be the ruling of
4 the Court.

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(END OF JUDGE'S RULING)

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REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE

2 STATE OF TENNESSEE
3 COUNTY OF DAVIDSON
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I, Cristi G. Watson, Licensed Court Reporter

5 and Notary Public, in and for the State of Tennessee,
6 do hereby certify that the foregoing proceedings were
7 stenographically reported by me on the 21st day of
8 October, 2016, and that the foregoing transcript
9 constitutes a true and accurate record to the best of
10 my ability.
11

I further certify that I am not related to

12 nor an employee of counsel or any of the parties to the
13 action, nor am I in any way financially interested in
14 the outcome of this case.
15

I further certify that I am duly licensed by

16 the Tennessee Board of Court Reporting as a Licensed
17 Court Reporter as evidenced by the LCR number and
18 expiration date following my name below.
19

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my

20 hand and affixed my notary seal this 22nd day of
21 October, 2016.
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_______________________________
24 My Notary Commission Cristi G. Watson, LCR #187
Expires: 7/31/2019
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