david-andrew · January 26, 2023 21:03
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 data/transition_reports/cb4410en.pdf
 (page [0]) Food and Agriculture Organization
 (page [0]) of the United Nations
 (page [0]) FAOSTAT ANALYTICAL BRIEF 19
 (page [0]) Temperature change statistics
 (page [0]) 1961–2020
 (page [0]) Global, regional and country trends
 (page [0]) ISSN 2709-006X [Print] ISSN 2709-0078 [Online]
 (page [1]) Temperature change statistics 1961 –2020 - Global, regional and country trends
 (page [1]) FAOSTAT Analytical Brief 19
 (page [1]) FAOSTAT TEMPERATURE CHANGE
 (page [1]) INTRODUCTION
 (page [1]) The FAOSTAT Temperature Change  statistics provide information on surface air temperature changes (⁰C) measured over the global land area, disseminated by country and region over the period 1961 –2020 , for 192 countries and 38 territories. Temperature change data were produced in collaboration with the NASA Goddard Institute for Space Studies  (NASA –GISS). Increases in land surface air temperature associated with rising greenhouse gas c oncentrations threaten plant growth and yield, putting millions of farmers and communities at risk throughout the world. Together with changes in precipitation and increases in extreme events s uch as flooding and droughts, climate change threatens countries’ food security, and their ability to eradi cate poverty and achieve sustainable development. Based on scientifically robust information , the FAOSTAT Temperature change statistics document recent warming trends in all coun tries in the world, facilitating public understanding of the climate change challenges to agricultur e, and helping to identify possible responses necessary to minimize risk to food production.
 (page [1]) HIGHLIGHTS
 (page [1])  FAO updated the FAOSTAT Temperature change dataset for 1961 –2020 , in collaboration with NASA. In 2020, statistics cover ed 192 countries and 38 territories and show ed significant warming trends worldwide.  In 2020 , nearly 1 60 countries and territories recorded much warmer than usual
 (page [1]) mean annual temperatures.
 (page [1])  2020 was the warmest year on record in terms of global mean annual temperature. The global mean temperature change was 1.7 ⁰C  above the climate
 (page [1]) normal.
 (page [1])  In 20 20, the mean annual temperature change was largest in Europe , followed by Asia , Oceania and South America, North America and Africa .
 (page [1]) = Annex! countries ~~ Non-Annex! countries ~- World
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 (page [2]) 0 aN h / V
 (page [2]) —_— ——_——
 (page [2]) 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020
 (page [2]) Source: FAOSTAT, 2021.
 (page [2]) GLOBAL
 (page [2]) In 2020, global mean annual temperature change over land was the highest in the instrumental recor d, 1.71 ⁰C above the 1951 –1980 climate normal (Figure 1). The global mean annual temperature change, averaged over the past decade ( 2011 –2020) was 1.31 ⁰C and well above earlier periods. It was 1.01 ⁰C in the previous decade (2001 –2010) and 0.58 ⁰C in the decade before (1991 –2000). In 2020, compared to the 1951 –1980 climate normal, 159 countries and territories recorded much warmer than usual mean annual temperatures (temperature change above three standard deviations), and in 177 countries and territories, mean annual temperatures were warm er than usual (temperature change above two standard deviations; see Figure 2). Figure 1. Mean annual temperature anomalies over land for World, Annex I countries (developed, according to the climate convention) and non-Annex I countries (developing)1
 (page [2]) In every year since 1993 and including 2020, no country recorded colder than usual m ean annual temperatures, i.e. years with mean annual temperature anomalies below two standard  deviations, relative to the 1951 –1980 climate normal.
 (page [2]) 1The list of the type of parties to the UN Climate Convention is available at https://unfccc.int/process/parties-non- party-stakeholders/parties-convention-and-observer-states . For corresponding FAOSTAT area codes, please see the tab ‘Country Group ’ in the FAOSTAT Definitions and Standards http://www.fao.org/faostat/en/#definitions .
 (page [3]) Number
 (page [3]) of
 (page [3]) countries 200
 (page [3]) 150
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 (page [3]) 0 a Mean annual temperature change [J cold J warm 9) normal 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 +2005 2006 2007, +2008 += 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 «2014 2015) 2016S. 2017'S 2018 +=2019 +=2020
 (page [3]) Source: FAOSTAT, 2021.
 (page [3]) Temperature change statistics 1961 –2020 - Global, regional and country trends
 (page [3]) FAOSTAT Analytical Brief 19
 (page [3]) Figure 2. Trends in mean annual temperature change over land expressed as anomalies by
 (page [3]) country, 1961 –2020*
 (page [3]) *Each bar in each year of Figure 2 represents the number of countries and territor ies in FAOSTAT where the mean annual temperature was within the 1951 –1980 climate normal (grey bars), warmer than usual (red bars), or colder than usual (blue bars). Normal values are those withi n two standard deviations of the climatological mean; cold and warm years are years exceedi ng two standard deviations at either end of the climatological distribution.
 (page [3]) REGIONAL
 (page [3]) In 2020 , the mean annual temperature change was largest in Europe ( 3.3 ⁰C), followed by Asia (1.5 ⁰C), Oceania and South America (1.3 ⁰C), Africa and North America (1.2 ⁰C). The uncertainties in the data of land surface temperature changes of FAOSTAT are strongly influenced by the spatial and temporal coverage of GHCN 4  stations used to generate the data. Lower uncertainty of, and high er confidence in the temperature changes estimates characterize the estimates in areas with dense station networks such as North America, Europe, and Australi a. Greater uncertainty is found in regions with less dense and reliable networks such as parts of South America and Africa, and the Near East. These limitations may contribute to the differences observed
 (page [3]) in regional patterns.
 (page [3]) The year 2020 recorded the highest annual average temperature change in Europe and Asia and the second highest in South America and Oceania during the entire period 1961 –2020. In Africa and North America, the recorded warming in 20 20 was within the average warming of the last 20 years. In all regions, decadal –average mean annual temperature change was larger in the last decade (2011 –2020) compared to the previous one (2001 –2010) (Figure 3). The largest increase was recorded in Europe (2.0 ⁰ C vs. 1.3 ⁰C) and the smallest in Asia (1. 2 ⁰C vs. 1.0 ⁰C). In the last decade, all regions had decadal mean annual temperature change greater than or equal to 1.0 ⁰C.
 (page [4]) Temperature change (°C)
 (page [4]) oO on oO or
 (page [4]) 2.0
 (page [4]) NP 2001-2010 J 2011-2020 |
 (page [4]) 0.0 | i | | | | i World Africa Asia North America South America Europe Oceania
 (page [4]) Source: FAOSTAT, 2021.
 (page [4]) Figure 3 . Mean annual temperature changes measured over the land surface, global and
 (page [4]) regional trends by recent decades
 (page [4]) COUNTRY
 (page [4]) In 2020, 158 countries and territories had a mean annual temperature change 1.0 ⁰C higher than normal. Over 70 percent of them recorded mean annual temperature changes above 1.5 ⁰C. The 10 largest mean annual temperature changes were all recorded in European countries and particularly in Eastern and Northern Europe : the Russian Federation (3.7 ⁰C), Estonia (3.6 ⁰C), Belarus and Latvia (3.5 ⁰C), Lithuania (3.4 ⁰C), Finland ( 3.3 ⁰C), the Republic of Moldova and Ukraine (3.0 ⁰C), Sweden (2.9 ⁰C), and Kazakhstan (2.8 ⁰C) (Figure 4). Figure 5 shows the mean temperature change in 2020 for countries and territories worldwide. As observed ear lier, countries in Eastern and Northern Europe recorded the largest temperature changes. Nepal was the only country with values slightly below its normal reference value (-0.02 ⁰C). 2020 was the warmest year for 55 countries, including the 10 countries listed above. The next years with most country records were 2016 (30) and 2010 (27) (Figure 6).
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 (page [5]) ‘ ‘ xo S & < A o 9 @ < s\ FS €§ © & X ee Re es J & seg » s < e & e x» 3 se x » @ we S S r@ 3 S oO <> Ss aS x$ & FF KF PKK PF VK KE SF SF SF FF KF CF SF # @ ~ ov 4 Q Oo Ss x << « ° Y » S we & . RF y x Ss £ S
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 (page [5]) Source: FAOSTAT, 2021.
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 (page [5]) material on this ma oo ng imply the expression of any opinion whi n the part of the Sao crant of the United Nations. concerning the legal stat ‘country, territory, city or area or of its cunoien or. concerning the ‘delimitation of its frontiers or boundaries.       2020, Mean temperature change (°C)
 (page [5]) -0.02- 0.0
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 (page [5]) Py 14-21
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 (page [5]) Mss
 (page [5]) No Data \ Source: FAOSTAT 2021, UN boundaries map (version 2020).
 (page [5]) Final boundary between the Republic of Sudan and CO the Republic of South Sudan has not yet been determined. Dotted line represents approximately the Line of Control in Jammu and Kashmir agreed upon by India and Pakistan. The final status of Jammu and Kashmir has not yet been
 (page [5]) agreed upon by the parties.
 (page [5]) Temperature change statistics 1961 –2020 - Global, regional and country trends
 (page [5]) FAOSTAT Analytical Brief 19
 (page [5]) Figure 4. Countries and territories with record mean annual temperature change over land for the year 20 20, with respect to the period 1961 –2020
 (page [5]) Figure 5 . Mean temperature change, 2020
 (page [6]) 50
 (page [6]) N wo 4
 (page [6]) Oo Oo Oo Number of countries
 (page [6]) =
 (page [6]) Oo
 (page [6]) 1961 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000
 (page [6]) 2005 2010 2015 2020
 (page [6]) Source: FAOSTAT, 2021.
 (page [6]) Figure 6 . Number of countries and territories with record mean annual temperature change over land for a specific year, with respect to the period 1961 –2020
 (page [6]) EXPLANATORY NOTES
 (page [6, 7]) The FAOSTAT  Temperature Change  domain disseminates statistics of land surface air temperature change by country, with annual updates. The current dissemination co vers the period 1961 –2020. Statistics are available for monthly, seasonal and annual mean temper ature anomalies, i.e. temperature change with respect to a baseline climatology, correspond ing to the period 1951 –1980. The standard deviation of the temperature change of the baseline methodolog y is also available. Data are based on the publicly available GISTEMP data , the Global Surface Temperature Change data distributed by the National Aeronautics and Space Admini stration Goddard Institute for Space Studi es (NASA –GISS) with information from the year 1880 onward. The original GISTEMP analysis generates a set of gridded values based on obs erved data from over 26 000 meteorological stations situated around the globe. A finer grid was prepared for the purpose of the FAOSTAT dataset excluding ocean data, and subsequently aggreg ated at the country level using the FAO Global Administrative Unit Layer (GAUL). The F AOSTAT methodology includes reconstructing the time series to take into account the administrative changes  that occurred since 1961 (e.g. the split of the Soviet Union in 1991 or the s eparation of Sudan in 2011). For each country or territory, the standard deviation is also computed when at leas t 20 records in the reference period (1951 –1980) are available. Regional values are computed applying an area weighted system and using country area data from FAOSTAT Land Use  dataset. Temperature change statistics were available for 192 countries and 38 territories i n 2020. Data are also disseminated for regional aggregates and special groups, such as the Annex I an d Non-Annex I Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC).
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 (page [7]) Temperature change statistics 1961 –2020 - Global, regional and country trends
 (page [7]) FAOSTAT Analytical Brief 19
 (page [7]) NASA uses monthly surface air temperature observations from 26 000 meteorological s tations around the world as a basis to generate temperature change data on a global spatial grid, with respect to a reference climatology, 1951 –1980. FAO and NASA jointly aggregate the underlying spatial data to produce statistics at the country level, generating monthly, seasonal and annual temperature change data by country, along with their standard deviations. A methodological note  of the Temperature Change domain is available in FAOSTAT.
 (page [7]) REFERENCES
 (page [7]) GISTEMP Team.  2020. GISS Surface Temperature Analysis (GISTEMP) . NASA Goddard Institute for Space Studies. Last data access 2020- 01-28 at https://data.giss.nasa.gov/gistemp/ . Hansen, J., Johnson, D., Lacis, A., Lebedeff, S., Lee, P., Rind, D. & Russell, G.  1981 . Climate impact of increasing atmospheric carbon dioxide. Science  213, 957 –966. Hansen, J., Sato, M., Ruedy, R., Lo, K., Lea, D.W. & Medina-Elizade, M.  2006 . Global temperature change. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences  103, 14288 –14293. Hansen, J., Ruedy, R., Sato, M. & Lo, K. 2010 . Global surface temperature change. Reviews
 (page [7]) of Geophysics  48.
 (page [7]) Lenssen, N.J., Schmidt, G.A., Hansen, J.E., Menne, M.J., Persin, A., Ruedy, R. & Zyss, D. 2019 . Improvements in the GISTEMP uncertainty model. Journal of Geophysical Research :
 (page [7]) Atmospheres  124, 6307 –6326.
 (page [7]) Menne, M.J., Williams, C.N., Gleason, B.E., Rennie, J.J. & Lawrimore, J.H.  2018. The global historical climatology network monthly temperature dataset, version 4 . Journal of Climate  31,
 (page [7]) 9835 –9854.
 (page [7]) This analytical brief was prepared by Giulia Conchedda and Francesco Nico la Tubiello, FAO Statistics Division. Temperature change data were provided to FAO by the  NASA  Goddard Institute for Space Studies, with support from Gavin Schmidt, Reto Ruedy, Michael Hendrickson and Nathan Lenssen. Suggested citation: FAO, 2021 . Temperature Change Statistics 1961 –2020 : Global, regional and country trends. FAOSTAT Analytical Brief Series No. 19. Rome.
 (page [7]) Cover photo: ©FAO/Luis Tato
 (page [7]) CONTACTS
 (page [7]) Statistics Division - Economic and Social Development
 (page [7]) [email protected]
 (page [7]) www.fao.org/food-agriculture-statistics
 (page [8]) Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
 (page [8]) Rome, Italy
 (page [8]) CB4410EN/1/04.21
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 pages: 8
 path: data/transition_reports/cb4410en.pdf
 author: Utente di Microsoft Office
 title: None
 creatione date: 2021-04-20 09:23:57+02:00



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 data/transition_reports/FEWS NET/KENYA_Food_Security_Outlook_Oct 2022_Final.pdf
 (page [0]) FEWS NET
 (page [0]) FAMINE EARLY WARNING SYSTEMS NETWORK
 (page [0]) /WFP
 (page [0]) 4 ir y \ v World Food SY Programme
 (page [0]) wfp.org
 (page [0]) 0 75 150 0
 (page [0]) Kilometers
 (page [0]) { SOUTH SUDAN ETHIOPIA
 (page [0]) SOMALIA
 (page [0]) IPC V3.1 Acute Food Insecurity Phase
 (page [0]) 1: Minimal .
 (page [0]) em 2: Stressed Would likely be at lea t mm 3: Crisis one phase worse withput
 (page [0]) . * current or programmed
 (page [0]) humanitarian assistance Mombasa
 (page [0]) Mim 4: Emergency
 (page [0]) mg 5: Famine
 (page [0]) ‘om S) USAID
 (page [0]) FROM THE AMERICAN PEOPLE
 (page [0]) FEWS NET Kenya
 (page [0]) [email protected]
 (page [0]) www.fews.net/kenya  FEWS NET is a USAID-funded activity. The content of this report does not necessarily reflect the view of the United States Agency for International Development or the United States Government.
 (page [0]) KENYA Food Security Outlook October 2022 to May 2023 Humanitarian assistance provides some relief, but E mergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes persist
 (page [0]) KEY MESSAGES
 (page [0]) • The historic drought, which has now persisted into a fifth consecutive rainy season, is expected to drive Crisis (IPC Phase 3) and Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes through at least mid-2023 across Kenya’s northern and eastern arid and semi-arid lands . Cumulative rainfall has been less than 55 percent of the 40-year average since October 1st, leading to severely diminished food and income from livestock production among pastoral households and crop production and agricultural labor among agropastoral and farming households. Ongoing humanitarian food assistance and government safety nets are expected to mitigate large food consumption deficits among beneficiary households, resulting in Crisis! (IPC Phase 3!) outcomes in several counties through January . However, Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes will likely persist in the worst-affected areas of Turkana and Marsabit, where there remains a high level of need and high prevalence of acute malnutrition despite food assistance deliveries . • Pastoral households continue to face precipitous declines in milk availability and livestock-related sources of food and income. As of September, the Kenyan government estimates that around 2.4 million livestock have died due to drought-related causes. County- level estimates indicate that cattle have around a nine percent mortality rate, while sheep and goats have around a six percent mortality rate. Poor rangeland resources have led household members to migrate most of their livestock far away from typical grazing areas and homesteads, limiting milk consumption among women, children, and the elderly . Livestock body conditions are largely in poor to very poor condition, with livestock reproduction increasingly unviable. Many households are primarily relying on income earned from casual labor or self-employment, as well as cash or in-ki nd food assistance via government safety nets and humanitarian aid, to minimize food consumption gaps. • In the marginal agricultural areas, cropping activities have been delayed due to the late onset of the October to December rains. Well-below average rainfall is limiting land preparation and planting activities, resulting in below-ave rage agricultural labor opportunities for poor and very poor households. Depleted household food stocks are increasing dependence on high-priced staple foods from the markets, with households relying on income from off-farm labor activities like causal labor and petty trade. Households are applying livelihood and consumption-based coping s trategies to minimize food consumption gaps, resulting in Stressed (IPC Phase 2) and Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes. • Given the severity of drought impacts, FEWS NET continues to closely monitor the potential for a  risk of Famine (IPC Phase 5) in Kenya . Based on available food assistance plans, and given that humanitarian access and government capacity for safety nets are expected to remain normal during the outlook period, the likelihood of a scenario in  which no food assistance reaches the drought-affected population is currently still considered low. FEWS NET assesses that both regular safety nets and emergency assistance would need to be minimal or completely absent to lead to Famine (IPC Phase 5) , with particular concern for Turkana and Marsabit where acute malnutrition levels are already high . Otherwise, significant delays or interruptions in assistance would likely lead to an increase in the population in Emergenc y (IPC Phase 4) , as well as some households in Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5). It must be emphasized that Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes – associated with an increase in acute malnutrition and mortality levels – are still extremely concerning. Current food security outcomes, October 2022
 (page [0]) Source: FEWS NET
 (page [0]) FEWS NET ’s classifications are IPC-compatible. IPC-compatible analysis follows key IPC protocols but does not necessarily reflect the consensus of national food security partners.
 (page [1]) 0 75 150 0
 (page [1]) Kilometers
 (page [1]) ETHIOPIA     SOMALIA
 (page [1]) IPC V3.1 Acute Food Insecurity Phase       1: Minimal Would likely be at lea. mm 5: Cisie | O78 phase worse wi = 4: E current or programmed “Emergency humanitarian assistarice ‘ Mi 5: Famine J
 (page [1]) O Concentration of displaced people
 (page [1]) VS NET
 (page [1]) 0 70 140 280
 (page [1]) Kilometers
 (page [1]) ETHIOPIA
 (page [1]) SOMALIA
 (page [1]) IPC V3.1 Acute Food Insecurity Phase    } Minimal Would likely be at least _ ; aces’ d ! one phase worse withput = 4: E current or programmed “EMeMeENCy humanitarian assistance Mi 5: Famine y
 (page [1]) O Concentration of displaced people
 (page [1]) VS NET
 (page [1]) KENYA Food Security Outlook October 2022 to May 2023
 (page [1]) Famine Early Warning Systems Network 2
 (page [1]) NATIONAL OVERVIEW
 (page [1]) Current Situation
 (page [1]) Rainfall performance: The October to December short rains have had a late onset, with cumulative rainfall in October largely less than 85 percent of the 30-year average across most of Kenya (Figure 1) . The rainfall deficits are more pronounced in the northwestern, coastal, southeastern, and northeastern areas, with cumulative rainfall less than 55 percent of the 30-year average in October. In western Kenya, apart from the lake basin region that received 70 to 95 percent of average rainfall, the rains have been mostly above average, ranging from 105 to 130 percent of the 30-year average, with localized areas receiving over 130 percent of the 30-year average rainfall. Crop production:  On September 20, a government  directive announced that 3.55 billion KES (~ 29.1 million USD) will be used to subsidize 71,000 MT (1.42 million 50-kilogram bags) of fertilizer for use during the short rains season, at a maximum subsidized price of 3,500 KES (~29 USD) per 50-kilogram bag — down from 6,500 KES (~53 USD) per 50-kilogram bag — to boost crop production and address the high cost of living . Individual farmers are entitled to a maximum of 100 bags each from National Cereals and Produce Board (NCPB) depots and s ub-depots country wide. It is expected that farmers in the medium and high potential areas are likely to benefit the most from this subsidy as the below-average rainfall in the marginal agricultural areas limits planting. Harvesting of long rains crops is continuing in the high and medium rainfall areas, particularly in cooler regions of the North Rift and the unimodal central regions. In the relatively warmer areas of Nyanza and parts of the western region, planting for the October to December short rains crop is ongoing. In the bimodal marginal agricultural areas, land preparation for the October to December short rains began in September; however, the delayed onset of rainfall is delaying planting activities and constraining agricultural casual wage labor opportunities, especially for poor and very poor households. Livestock body conditions:  In October, National Drought Management Authority (NDMA) sentinel site data indicates that livestock body conditions in the marginal areas are fair to poor for all species of livestock, while in the pastoral areas, livestock body conditions for most livestock are poor to very poor, except in Isiolo and Wajir, where livestock body conditions are deteriorating but in fair to poor condition. The below-average livestock body conditions are being driven by the record-breaking fifth successive below-average rainfall season, along with increased return trekking distances between grazing areas and
 (page [1]) water sources.
 (page [1]) Pasture conditions:  Following four consecutive below-average rainy seasons and a poor start to a likely fifth below-average rainy season, the NDMA is reporting that browse and pasture conditions are largely poor in the northwestern, northern, and northeastern pastoral livelihood zones. Remote-sensing data, including the satellite-derived eVIIRS Normalized Difference Vegetation Index (NDVI), is confirming ground reports that vegetation greenness is less than 80 percent of normal across most of Kenya (Figure 2). In particular, in the northwestern, northern, northeastern, and southeastern areas of Kenya, vegetation greenness is less than 60 percent of the 2012 to 2021 mean. The poor pasture conditions are driving pastoral households to migrate their herds further from their homesteads to find adequate pasture and water resources to keep their livestock alive.  Projected food security outcomes, October 2022 to
 (page [1]) January 2023
 (page [1]) Source:  FEWS NET
 (page [1]) Projected food security outcomes, February to May
 (page [1]) 2023
 (page [1]) Source: FEWS NET
 (page [1]) FEWS NET ’s classifications are IPC-compatible. IPC-compatible analysis follows key IPC protocols but does not necessarily reflect the consensus of national food security partners.
 (page [2]) % of normal
 (page [2]) Mmy<ss
 (page [2]) Hg SS-70
 (page [2]) fil 70-85
 (page [2]) Gil 85-95
 (page [2]) [195-105
 (page [2]) [ay 105 - 115
 (page [2]) Gd 115 - 130
 (page [2]) GS 130 - 145
 (page [2]) Mi > 145    Percent of Normal
 (page [2]) <60
 (page [2]) 60-70
 (page [2]) 70 - 80
 (page [2]) 80 - 90
 (page [2]) 90-95
 (page [2]) 95 - 105
 (page [2]) 105 - 110
 (page [2]) 110 - 120
 (page [2]) 120 - 130
 (page [2]) 130 - 140
 (page [2]) > 140 GREED | OM
 (page [2]) ET/USGS
 (page [2]) aNDMA  KENYA Food Security Outlook October 2022 to May 2023
 (page [2]) Famine Early Warning Systems Network 3 Return trekking distances  from grazing areas to water sources in the marginal agricultural areas are around 4 to 11 kilometers, slightly higher than the five-year average for October. However, in Meru (Meru North), return trekking distances are 32 kilometers due to the limited number of functioning boreholes, compared to the five-year average of around 13 kilometers. In the pastoral areas, the trekking distances ranged from 15 to 38 kilometers, around 11 to 35 percent above average, but more than double the average distance in Marsabit. The trekking distances are on an upward trend as water sources continue to dry up and forage dwindles in the grazing areas. Livestock migration:  In the pastoral areas, intra-county migration is taking place, along with inter- county migration to neighboring pastoral counties and to marginal agricultural areas such as Tharaka Nithi, Meru, Kitui, and Lamu. Additionally, migration to Uganda, Ethiopia, and Somalia has been reported from Garissa, Mandera, Marsabit, Wajir, Turkana, and West Pokot. The increased concentration of livestock in areas with available pasture and water is resulting in over-grazing and further diminishing rangeland resources. Milk production and consumption:  Due to limited kidding and calving during the long rains, along with poor livestock body conditions, livestock milk production remains well below average in October. In pastoral areas, milk production rang es from 0 to 1.5 liters per household per day, with no milk production in Turkana and Samburu, compared to an average of 1.1 to over 2 liters of milk per household per day (Figure 3). In the marginal agricultural areas where rangeland resources are better, milk production ranges from 0.3 to 4 liters compared to the five-year average of 0.6 to 5 liters. Relatedly, milk consumption in most pastoral areas ranges from zero to 0.4 liters of milk per household per day, with households in Garissa reporting on average 0.9 liters of milk per household per day. Overall, milk production and availability are significantly lower than normal due to poor livestock body conditions and the fact that most livestock have migrated away from the homesteads in search
 (page [2]) of forage and water.
 (page [2]) Domestic water access:  Due to the delaye d rainfall onset , water availability remains atypically low. Most open water sources such as pans, dams, and seasonal rivers remain dry, increasing household reliance on groundwater sources such as boreholes, traditional river wells, and shallow wells to atypically high levels.  As a result, household return trekking distances to watering points remain unseasonably long, ranging between 4 and 9 kilometers in October, compared to the five-year average of 2 to 8 kilometers. The drying up of most rivers in Meru (Meru North) has resulted in return trekking distances of 22 kilometers, in October, compared to the five-year average of 8 kilometers . According to the United States Geological Survey (USGS) Water Point Viewer , water levels in the monitored waterpoints in the pastoral areas are currently ranging from 33 to 99 percent of the median levels, with approximately two-thirds of the monitored waterpoints nearly dry. Return trekking distances for water for domestic use in the pastoral areas range from 4.2 to 16.3 kilometers but were 24 percent below average in Isiolo due to availability of piped water, while remaining 25 to 80 percent longer than average across the rest of the counties. Overall, the trekking distances are on an upward trend as water levels continue  Figure 1.   Seasonal rainfall accumulation percent of the 1981 to 2010 average, October 1 to November 5 , 2022
 (page [2]) Source : FEWS NET/USGS
 (page [2]) Figure 2.  EVIIRS Normalized Difference
 (page [2]) Vegetation Index (NDVI) compared to the 2012 to 2021 mean, November 1 to 10, 2022
 (page [2]) Source: FEWS NET/USGS
 (page [2]) Figure 3.  Milk production in northwestern, northern, and northeastern pastoral livelihood zones, October 2022
 (page [2]) Source: FEWS NET using data from NDMA
 (page [2, 3]) s     a    a sa       ana  an e a  a  ssa  a                  n     e s    se      ay n     e s  e   ay  e     se e a e              n     e s  e   ay  e     se
 (page [3]) 7,000
 (page [3]) 6,000
 (page [3]) 5,000
 (page [3]) 4,000
 (page [3]) 3,000
 (page [3]) 2,000
 (page [3]) 1,000
 (page [3]) =e—2021 =e—2022
 (page [3]) KENYA Food Security Outlook October 2022 to May 2023
 (page [3]) Famine Early Warning Systems Network 4 to drop due to evaporation and continued high usage rates. Additionally, the increasing time it takes for households to fetch water takes away from other activities such as childcare
 (page [3]) and income-earning opportunities.
 (page [3]) Markets and trade:  Staple food prices remain significantly above average, constraining household food access. Generally, maize prices remained significantly higher than 2021 and the five-year average due to various factors, including below- average national production, high production and marketing costs due to high global and regional cereal, fuel, and fertilizer prices, and the strengthening of the USD against the KES, which is increasing the cost of importing goods. In Nairobi, Kisumu, Eldoret, and Mombasa, the major urban consumption markets, wholesale maize prices ranged from 5,600 to 6,400 KES per 90-kilogram bag and were 95 to 110 percent above average (Figure 4) . In the pastoral areas, maize retail prices in October remained high due to increased food insecurity, driving an atypically high demand for both human and livestock consumption. Maize prices ranged from 8 7 to 118 KES and were 29 to 124 percent above the five-year average . In Marsabit and Isiolo, maize prices are over 80 percent higher than the five-year average, due to reduced local supplies from the marginal agricultural areas such as Meru and Laikipia and the high transport costs. In Mandera, prices are 29 percent higher than the five-year average due to a preference for other staples such as pasta and rice. Retail maize prices are 43 to 138 percent above the five-year average across the rest of the marginal agricultural areas due to the prevailing maize shortage following successive seasons of below-average production . In Kilifi, the availability of local harvests and cross-border imports from Tanzania are keeping maize prices  43 percent higher
 (page [3]) than the five-year average .
 (page [3]) Dry bean prices remain high across Kenya, with wholesale dry bean prices in the urban reference markets ranging from 8,100 to 12,500 KES, around 35 to 44 percent above the five-year average, driven by successive below-average production seasons and declining cross-border imports. However, in Eldoret, bean prices are within the five-year average due to the availabi lity of the long rains harvest from the medium-potential areas of western Kenya since August. Retail bean prices a re 52 to 133 percent above the five-year average due to low local supplies, including those of substitutes such as cowpeas and green grams, following the below-average March to May long rains production, in addition to declining cross-border imports from
 (page [3]) Tanzania.
 (page [3]) Livestock prices are continuing to decline due to below-average forage and water conditions. In October, the price of  a mature medium-sized goat is unseasonably low , with most prices ranging from 16 to 42 percent below the five-year average, except in Garissa and Samburu, where goat prices are similar to the five-year average, although they are declining due to re duced demand and declining livestock body conditions. As a result of high maize prices and below-average goat prices, the goat- to- maize terms of trade are 35 to 67 percent below the five-year averages and are indicative of significantly below-average
 (page [3]) household food access.
 (page [3]) Interannual and emergency food assistance:  In response to the drought, the government has allocat ed an additional 2 billion KES (~16.39 million USD) following an initial 3.2 billion KES (~26.23 million USD) to mitigate the impacts of the drought across Kenya. The government has launched an appeal for an additional 16 billion KES (~131.16 million USD) to sup port drought response activities through December. According to the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) the Kenya Drought Flash Appeal  is around 63 percent funded. Approximately 100,000 households across Mandera, Wajir, Marsabit, and Turkana counties continue to receive bi-monthly cash transfers of 5,400 KES (~44 USD), sufficient to m eet six to nine days of monthly kilocalorie needs for a family of six through NDMA's Hunger Safety Net Programme (HSNP) at c urrent maize prices . Additionally, WFP is continuing to provide around 390,000 beneficiaries in nine arid counties with food transfers through its Sustainable Food Systems Program (SFSP) and has reached about 475,000 beneficiaries with food  and cash transfers through its Lisha Jamii  program. WFP is planning to continue the SFSO and Lisha Jamii  program through February . Around 440,000 refugees are also receiving cash and food rations equivalent to 52 percent of a daily 2, 100-kilocalorie diet from WFP. Other humanitarian partners are also engaged in various interventions, including water trucking, distributing cash transfers and humanitarian assistance , along with the distribution of livestock feed and livestock destocking programs. Figure 4.  Nairobi market wholesale maize prices
 (page [3]) Source : FEWS NET
 (page [3]) an  e  a     ay   n        e        e K    e            a  e
 (page [4]) yea  a e a e
 (page [4]) KENYA Food Security Outlook October 2022 to May 2023
 (page [4]) Famine Early Warning Systems Network 5 Acute malnutrition: Following the July 2022 IPC AMN analysis , nutrition surveillance data from the NDMA indicates that the prevalence of acute malnutrition is increasing, evidenced by a higher than typical or increasing proportion of children recording a mid-upper arm circumference (MUAC) of less than 135 mm in most pastoral and marginal agricultural livelihood zones . The decline in nutrition outcomes is being driven by a severe reduction in the quantity and quality of food consumed, including low to no milk consumption. High morbidity levels are also aggravating the prevalence of acute malnutrition , with Mandera, Wajir, Garissa, Isiolo, Turkana West, and Turkana Central likely in Critical (global acute malnutrition (GAM) we ight- for-height z-score (W HZ) 15 to 29.9 percent), while the prevalence of Extremely Critical (G AM WHZ > 30 percent) acute malnutrition is likely in Marsabit and i n Turkana North and Turkana South sub-counties. In the marginal agricultural areas, the proportion of children under five years old with a MUAC of less than 135 mm is negligible in Embu, and 20 to 88 percent below the five-year average in most areas. However, in Tharaka Nithi (Tharaka) and Meru (Meru North) the proportion of children with a MUAC of less than 135 mm is 13 to 46 percent above average, indicating that an increasing number of children are not accessing enough nutritious food.
 (page [4]) Current Food Security Outcomes
 (page [4]) In the pastoral area s, Crisis! (IPC Phase 3!) outcomes are likely ongoing in Mandera, Marsabit, and Isiolo, supported by ongoing cash transfers and humanitarian assistance . However, in Turkana and Marsabit, poor purchasing power, low livestock productivity, low household income, and high malnutrition rates are driving area-level Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes despite ongoing cash transfers. In October, pastoral households are entering the October to December short rains season ; however, the protracted drought and progressive depletion of forage and water resources over the past four seasons ha ve resulted in significantly low livestock productivity and sale values , which are reducing household access to food and milk. The loss of livestock-related food and income and significantly above-average prices of dietary staples such as maize are resulting in moderate to large food consumption gaps and elevated acute malnutrition levels. This is reflected in the increasing percentage of households in NDMA sentinel sites that are reporting food consumption scores (FCS) indicative of Crisi s (IPC Phase 3) or Emergency (IPC Phase 4). In October, up to 50 percent of households reported an FCS indicative of Crisis (IPC Phase 3), while up to 40 percent of households reported an FCS indicative of Emergency (IPC Phase 4).  Poor livestock body conditions, declining herd sizes, and low livestock birth and conception rates mean most poor pastoralists in n orthwestern, northern, and northeastern pastoral livelihood zones face increasing difficulty selling their livestock for income to pur chase food . Many households have turned to selling bush products, seeking employment in towns and villages, soliciting social support from their community or relatives, and relying on government safety nets and humanitarian assistance, but thi s is inadequate to substantially ameliorate food consumption gaps, especially given low consumer demand and high labor sup ply due to the economic impacts of drought. In the marginal areas, Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes are most likely in Meru (Meru North), Tharaka Nithi (Tharaka), Kitui, and most of Makueni, driven by limited access to income and high food prices, which are constraining h ousehold purchasing power, along with limited food stocks following large crop losses in the March to May long rains season . However, across the rest of the marginal agricultural areas, slightly lower maize prices and higher food stocks following the l ong rains are supporting Stressed (IPC Phase 2) outcomes. The October to December short rains account for nearly 70 percent of total annual food production in the marginal agricultural areas. Most households have been engaging in land preparation since September; however, the delayed onset of the short rains is delaying planting and limiting agricultural wage labor opportunities to earn income. Instead, households are increasingly relying on income from charcoal and firewood sales, remittances, and non-farm related casual waged labor opportunities to earn income .
 (page [4]) Assumptions
 (page [4]) The most likely scenario from October 2022 to May 2023 is based on the following national-level assumptions: • International, regional, and national forecasts indicate that there is a high likelihood of below-average rai nfall (< 60 percent of average) during the October to December short rains season across northern and eastern Kenya.  Additionally, historical analogs of waning La Nina events indicate that the March to May 2023 long rains will likely also be bel ow
 (page [4]) average.
 (page [4]) • The continuation of the drought into 2023 is expected to result in another below-average harvest in marginal agricultural areas and the further deterioration of already below-average pasture and water resources in pastoral areas, making
 (page [5]) pastoral livelihoods increasingly unviable.
 (page [5]) OcT ocT
 (page [5]) Western and
 (page [5]) Rift Valley
 (page [5]) NOV DEC JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG SEP
 (page [5]) Short rains
 (page [5]) harvest Long rains maize harvest
 (page [5]) Teta teh tel g)
 (page [5]) oc
 (page [5]) Eastern and
 (page [5]) northern Kenya
 (page [5]) Livestock migration to
 (page [5]) dry season grazing areas
 (page [5]) Livestock migration to
 (page [5]) dry season grazing areas
 (page [5]) T T T T T T T T T T T NOV DEC JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG SEP ocT T
 (page [5]) WS NET
 (page [5]) KENYA Food Security Outlook October 2022 to May 2023
 (page [5]) Famine Early Warning Systems Network 6 SEASONAL CALENDAR FOR A TYPICAL YEAR
 (page [5]) Source: FEWS NET
 (page [5]) • The long rains unimodal crop harvest from western Kenya and the Rift Valley is expected to be 10 to 15 percent below average following dry spells at the early crop developmental stages, damage from Fall and African armyworm infestations, and lower than normal planted areas following high fuel and fertilizer prices. In the marginal agricultural areas, forecast ed below-average October to December short rains and high fuel and seed prices are expected to constrain crop production activities and result in at least 10 to 50 percent below-average crop production in February 2023. • The below-average October to December short rains and March to May long rains will driv e below-average regeneration of forage and water resources, which will deteriorate rapidly and remain significantly below average throughout the scenario period . Below-average vegetation and access to water will keep return trekking distances to water sources for domestic use and for livestock significantly above average levels and drive increased atypical migration through May
 (page [5]) 2023.
 (page [5, 6]) • Livestock migration is expected to remain atypically high through May 2023 . At least 60 percent of livestock herds are expected to remain in the dry-season grazing lands and further along atypical migration routes. Increased migration i s expected to limit household milk availability and increase incidences of livestock diseases and resource-based and intertribal conflicts , likely resulting in livestock deaths, disruption of livelihoods, loss of property, and human fatalities. • According to FEWS NET integrated price projections, wholesale maize prices in the Nairobi market will begin declining in October, driven by increased maize supply from the local unimodal harvests and cross-border imports. However, des pite the available supplies, the impacts of inflation, high fuel and fertilizer prices, high demand caused by t he ongoing drought, and below-average upcoming rainfall seasons will keep maize prices above the five-year average and 2021 prices. • Wholesale bean prices in the Nairobi urban market are expected to begin declining in October, driven by  incoming local and cross-border supplies, but prices will remain high due to inflation, drought, high fuel prices, bel ow-average rainfall, and likely below-average harvests. Prices will likely follow seasonal trends but remain 20 to 30 percent above the five- year average throughout the scenario period. • Ongoing safety nets such as cash transfers to Orphans and Vulnerable Children (OVC), Older Persons Cash Transfer (OPCT), and Persons with Severe Disability – Cash Transfer (PWSD – CT) are expected to continue throughout the scenario period, providing approximately one million targeted households across Kenya with 2,000 KES each month. In the pastoral and marginal agricultural areas, the HSNP will likely continue disbursing 2,700 KES each month to at least 100,000 households. Approximately 175,000 households under the SFSP will continue to receive assistance equivalent to at least 30 to 50 percent of a 2,100-kilocalorie monthly ration through food commodities and cash-based transfers. WFP is also expected to continue providing humanitarian assistance (cash and food commodities), targeting at l east 79,280 food -insecure households in Turkana, Garissa, Isiolo, Samburu, Wajir, Mandera, and Marsabit (Priority 1), and Tana River, Baringo, Kitui, Kwale, and Kilifi (Priority 2), with beneficiaries in Crisis (IPC Phase 3 ) and Emergency (IPC Phase 4) receiving an equivalent of 50 percent of a full monthly ration through January 2023. • The scaling up of humanitarian assistance, including for food, health, and nutrition services, will mi tigate a severe
 (page [6]) KENYA Food Security Outlook October 2022 to May 2023
 (page [6]) Famine Early Warning Systems Network 7 deterioration in nutrition outcomes. Overall, the prevalence of acute malnutrition is likely to be Critical (GAM 15 –29.9 percent ) through May 2023 in Garissa, Wajir, Mandera, Samburu, Turkana, and Tana River counties, North Horr and Laisamis sub-counties in Marsabit, and Tiaty s ub-county in Baringo County.  However, the prevalence of Extreme ly Critical ≥  30 percent) acute malnutrition is likely to persist in parts of Turkana (Turkana North and South sub-counties) and Marsabit (Laisamis and North Horr sub-counties) from October 2022 to February 2022 period , after which improved food access during the long rains in 2023 is likely to improve nutrition outcomes to Critical levels  (GAM 15 –29.9 percent). In the other counties, the prevalence of atypically elevated Alert (GAM 5 –9.9 percent) to Serious (GAM 10 –14.9 percent ) acute malnutrition is likely to persist through the scenario period. Chronic factors including poor infa nt and young child feeding practices, health seeking behavior, low literacy levels, poor infrastructure, and poverty that hinder recovery fr om the recurrent shocks will contribute to poor nutrition outcomes. These chronic factors are likely to worsen as households
 (page [6]) cope with reduced food access.
 (page [6]) Most Likely Food Security Outcomes
 (page [6, 7]) In pastoral areas,  Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes will prevail across most of the pastoral areas; however, in Mandera, Wajir and Isiolo, ongoing humanitarian assistance to at least 20 percent of the populations through January 2023 will support Crisis! (IPC Phase 3!) outcomes. However, in Turkana and Marsabit, Emergency (IPC Phase 4) are expected to prevail despite ongoing humanitarian assistance, driven by low livestock productivity, low household income and purchasing power, and the prevalence of high levels of acute malnutrition. Without additional planned and funded huma nitarian assistance from February to May 2023, the drought will lead to significant reductions in household food and income sources, erode resilience and coping capacity, and elevate acute malnutrition and mortality levels . However, given normal humanitarian access and government capacity for safety nets, the likelihood of a scenario in which no food assistance reaches the drought-affecte d population is currently still considered low . Nevertheless, rising acute malnutrition is of particular concern in Turkana, Marsabit, Mandera, Wajir, Garissa, Isiolo, and Samburu, where high levels of Critical (GAM WHZ 15 –29.9 percent) acute malnutrition are already expected to be present . It must be emphasized that Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes – associated with increased acute malnutrition and mortality – are still extremely concerning. The below-average October to December short rains are likely to result in limited forage regeneration, keepi ng livestock in the dry-season grazing areas away from homesteads, continuing to limit milk availability for households. High staple food prices and low livestock prices will continue to reduce household food access and income . Households will likely seek additional income from non-livestock related sources such as non-agricultural wage labor, safety nets, remittances, and charcoal and firewood sales, where opportunities and income generation are likely to be constrained by increased competition and inflation . However, the subsequent dry season from January to March is expected to erode wate r resources and reduce pasture and browse availability. Consequently, it will be difficult for poor pastoral households to ac cess food and water for both their livestock and their families. Many pastoralists will face difficult coping decisions, such as selling off their livestock at lower values, migrating longer distances that risk further weakening their livestock, or culling young livestock to preserve the health of mothers. Household purchasing capacity is expected to be lowest and excess livestock mortality is expected to be highest in areas where herd sizes are already low . In late March, the start of the likely below-average March to May long rains will result in short-term improvements to forage and water resources; however, this will likely be insufficient to bring livestock back to the wet-season grazing areas. Slight improvements in livestock body conditions will i mprove sale values, but livestock prices are expected to remain well below average. Staple food prices will likely remain above th e five- year average and, together with the below average livestock prices, will keep household food access and consump tion below average through May. Households will likely continue applying consumption-based coping strategies such as re ducing the number of meals and portion sizes and sending children to eat elsewhere, as well as livelihood-based coping strategies that include withdrawing children from school, reducing expenditures on healthcare, selling last female animals , and dropping out of pastoralism to destitution (begging) indicative of Crisis (IPC Phase 3) and Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes. In the marginal areas, between October 2022 and January 2023, household dependency on market purchases is expected to remain atypically high following the depletion of food stocks from the below-average long rains harvest. Household food access will be limited by below-average incomes and above-average staple food prices. From October, income from agricultural wage labor opportunities such as cropping activities for the short rains agricultural season will likely be below average due to below-average rainfall and limited access to agricultural inputs. Income from other non-agricultural  related sources such as casual labor, charcoal and firewood sales, and remittances will likely be limited by environmental degradation , increased competition, and the constrained economy. Limited income, coupled with high food prices, will resul t in reduced food availability and consumption , driving an increasing number of households to employ livelihood and consumption-based
 (page [7]) senario.
 (page [7]) KENYA Food Security Outlook October 2022 to May 2023
 (page [7]) Famine Early Warning Systems Network 8 coping strategies indicative of Stressed (IPC Phase 2) and Crisis (IPC Phase 3) for the worse-off households. Stressed (IPC Phase 2) outcomes will prevail across most of the marginal areas. However, in Meru (Meru North), Tharaka Nithi (Tharaka), Kitui, and Makueni, at least one in five households will marginally meet minimum food needs but onl y through crisis-coping strategies and will be in Crisis (IPC Phase 3). From late February, the anticipated below-average short rains production will stabilize household food availability and consumption through March. Staple food prices are expected to remain at above-average levels with reduced demand driving slight price declines between February and March. Household incomes from crop sales from the short rains harvest will likely be limited by a below-average harvest. Relatedly, agricultural waged labor opportunities for the March to May lo ng rains will also likely be below average due to farmers having limited access to seed following multiple below-average harvests, and high fuel and input prices. Faced with low household food availability, reduced incomes, and limited pu rchasing power due to above-average staple food prices, most of the marginal agricultural areas will be Stressed (IPC Phase 2); howe ver, in Meru (Meru North), Tharaka Nithi (Tharaka), Kitui, and Makueni, Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes will prevail. Events that Might Change the Outlook Table 1. Possible events over the next eight months that could change the most-likely scenario. Area Event Impact on food security outcomes
 (page [7]) National Significantly below-
 (page [7]) average short rains
 (page [7]) crop harvest from the
 (page [7]) marginal agricultural
 (page [7]) areas  A significantly below-average short rains crop harvest will result in staple food deficits, likely raising staple food prices and reducing household food access. A significant number of marginal agricultural and pastoral households will likely deteriorate from Stressed (IPC Phase 2) to Crisis (IPC Phase 3) or worse acute food insecurity.
 (page [7]) Change in current
 (page [7]) government safety net
 (page [7]) and humanitarian
 (page [7]) food assistance plans FEWS NET currently assess es that the risk of Famine (IPC Phase 5)  in Kenya is low, based on available food assistance plans and given that humanitarian access and government capacity for safety nets are expected to remain normal during the outlook period. Both regular safety nets and emergency assistance would need to be minimal or completely absent to lead to Famine (IPC Phase 5), with particular concern for Turkana and Marsabit where acute malnutrition levels are already high. Otherwise, significant delays or interruptions in assistance would likely lead to an increase in the population in Emergency (IPC Phase 4), as well as some households in
 (page [7]) Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5).
 (page [7]) Northwestern,
 (page [7]) northern, and
 (page [7]) northeastern
 (page [7]) pastoral
 (page [7]) livelihood zones Average to above-
 (page [7]) average 2023 March
 (page [8, 7]) to May long rains  If rainfall is cumulatively average to above average, the subsequent improvements rangeland resource availability would prompt pastoral and livestock migration into normal wet-season grazing areas closer to homesteads and drive improvements in body conditions and productivity, improving household milk availability. Households are likely to minimize livestock sales to improve their herd sizes, resulting in higher livestock prices. Although staple food prices would likely remain above average, an increase in household incomes would partially improve household purchasing power . Overall , improvement from Emergency (IPC Phase 4) to Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes would be expected between February and May in pastoral areas; however, a subset of households with few remaining livestock and assets would likely continue to be in Emergency (IPC Phase 4 ).
 (page [8]) ETHIOPIA
 (page [8]) \ Marsabit |
 (page [8]) ‘ Moyale
 (page [8]) ae Wali
 (page [8]) '
 (page [8]) North Horr’, ~~, ‘, ~~ -—~WWalir
 (page [8]) Saku)
 (page [8]) ee N Laisamis >
 (page [8]) we
 (page [8]) < Wajir South
 (page [8]) \ we call
 (page [8]) \ So ; Lagdera a
 (page [8]) mo F salatibala \ Garissa a he ~ \ / Ag rn ___Dadaab
 (page [8]) FARO
 (page [8]) Fibeceis
 (page [8]) Fafi SOMALIA
 (page [8]) Driest
 (page [8]) KENYA Food Security Outlook October 2022 to May 2023
 (page [8]) Famine Early Warning Systems Network 9
 (page [8]) AREAS OF CONCERN
 (page [8]) Northeastern Pastoral Livelihood Zone (Figure 4)
 (page [8]) Current Situation
 (page [8]) The start of the October to December 2022 short rains is well-below the 1981 to 2020 average, with large swathes of Wajir recording the driest start in the 40-year record (Figure 5). Across the northeastern pastoral livelihood zone, the poor start to the short rains marks the fifth consecutive below-average rainy season since October 2020. According to October NDMA sentinel site data, most poor households are accessing water from boreholes, rivers, shallow wells, water pans and dams, and rivers. Most water levels at monitored waterpoints  are near-dry and less than 3 percent of the long-term median water level. In Isiolo, households are also using piped water and sand dams to access wate      a  ess wa e         es     se     se    s  n     ’s sen  ne sites report trekking 4.1 to 9.5 kilometers across most of the livelihood zone, but 18.9 kilometers in the northern part of the zone. These trekking distances are 14 to 36 percent higher than the three-year average across the rest of the zone, but 64 percent above the three-year average in the northern parts of the zone. The long travel distances and waiting time of 45 to 120 minutes due to low water supply, compared to 10 to 60 minutes normally, are reducing the time available to engage in income-earning opportunities or other livelihood activities. Similarly, return trekking distances to water sources from grazing areas for livestock are on an increasing trend attributed to deteriorating availability of forage and drying up water sources. Trekking distances range from 3.6 to 7 kilometers across the livelihood zone but are 11.5 kilometers in the northern parts of the zone and are 21 to 28 percent
 (page [8]) above the three-year average.
 (page [8]) According to the satellite-derived eVIIRS NDVI for October 21 to 31, 2022, vegetation greenness across the zone is less than 60 percent of the 10-year average in the eastern part of the livelihood zone and 70 to 80 percent of the 10-year average in the more western parts. Poor vegetation and water conditions are impacting livestock body conditions, which are largely poor across the livelihood zone, with Mandera reporting very poor body conditions for all livestock species but particularly sheep and cows, which are totally emaciated, with no fat and all ribs visible. Pastures are totally depleted and overgrazed, and animals are being migrated to dry-season grazing areas in Kenya, Ethiopia, and Somalia. According to NDMA, in Mandera and Wajir, animals are reportedly relying mainly on ground litters, kitchen wastes, livestock feeds, and cartons for survival. As a result of deteriorating livestock body conditions due to drought, poor access to pasture, and long trekking distances to water, milk production is well below normal, ranging from les s than 0.4 to 0.8 liters of milk, compared to 1.1 to 1.8 liters normally. Households are consuming 0.1 to 0.4 liters of milk per household per day, around 55 to 91 percent below the three-year average across the zone (Figure 6). Below-average livestock body conditions are contributing to an upsurge in endemic livestock diseases such as Contagious caprine pleuropneumonia (CCPP) and Peste des petit ruminants (PPR). In the northern part of the zone, livestock deaths due to starvation, dehydration, and endemic diseases such as CCPP, PPR, goat pox, and camel pox are increasing every m onth. In September, around 4,500 cattle, 2,250 camel, 4,150 sheep, and 5,680 goats died in Mandera. In the western part of the  Figure 4.  Area of concern reference map:
 (page [8]) Northeastern Pastoral Livelihood Zone
 (page [8]) Source: FEWS NET
 (page [8]) Figure 5.  CHIRPS seasonal historical precipitation rank, October 01 to November 15, 2022
 (page [9]) Source: Climate Hazards Center
 (page [9]) 3.5
 (page [9]) 2.5
 (page [9]) 1.5
 (page [9]) 0.5
 (page [9]) ca I | g
 (page [9]) MA data
 (page [9]) data
 (page [9]) KENYA Food Security Outlook October 2022 to May 2023
 (page [9]) Famine Early Warning Systems Network 10 livelihood zone, livestock deaths due to disease were reported in Iresaboru in Sericho ward and the Kombola Gafarsa area in Garbatulla ward. Although still unconfirmed by laboratory tests, the cause of death is suspected to be bloating. It is estimated that about 8 percent, 5 percent, and 6 percent of cattle, goat, and sheep, respectively, have died of starvation across this part of the zone, with most deaths being recorded
 (page [9]) in Oldonyiro ward, Isiolo.
 (page [9]) According to the July 2022 Kenya Food Security Steering Group (KFSSG) Long Rains Assessment, poor households have two to four tropical livestock units1 (TLUs), compared to four to eight normally. The loss of livestock since the last assessment is further reducing herd sizes and limiting the number of livestock that can be sold or slaughtered by households. The continued loss of livestock through death or sale is significantly s n     se    s’ asse   ase an  a  ess     n   e
 (page [9]) food purchases.
 (page [9]) The livelihood zone is experiencing increased livestock migration due to the drought. In the western parts of the zone, insecurity has forced a significant proportion of herders out of the dry-season grazing areas in Cherab and Charri wards and to the riverine areas, while herders moved to Harbuyo in Garbatulla Ward, Meru National Park, and lower parts of Tharaka Nithi county. In the northern parts of the zone, out- migration to Somalia and Ethiopia was reported. Migration into the traditional grazing areas in the western parts of the livelihood zone from the eastern parts had been curtailed by conflicts among the border communities of Isiolo and Marsabit counties. In the northern parts of zone, the threat of banditry and Al-Shabaab attacks remains high, making some of the road impassible. The conflict and tension are locally disrupting livelihood activities such as herding, casual labor, and trade, negatively affecting household access to food and income. Maize prices in October are relatively stable, with maize retailing at 100 KES per kilogram, around 29 to 83 percent above the five-year average. The high maize prices are being driven by below-average production in the source markets of Laikipia and Meru, reduced cross-border imports from Ethiopia, low national supply following consecutive below-average produc tion seasons, high demand, and high fuel prices that have increased transaction costs. Goat prices continue to decline in Isiolo, driven by deteriorating livestock body conditions, but remained stable in the Mandera and Wajir markets , as herders anticipate improvements in livestock body conditions during the short rains. Goat prices are 2,300 to 2,865 KES in monitored markets, around 16 to 25 percent below the five-year average. The goat- to-maize terms of trade, a proxy for pastoral purchasing power, are 23 to 29 kilograms for the sale of a goat, around seven to nine days of kilocalories for a family of six if all they eat is maize. This is around 35 to 58 percent below the five-year average, indicative of a signifi cant reduction in household food access (Figure 7). To earn income for food purchases, most households are relying on casual labor as the main source of income, followed by the sale of livestock and livestock products, trade, and employment. n      e    as    ans e s          ’s H n e   a e y  et Program (HSNP) and other humanitarian partners, and some food assistance, are being distributed to around 23 to 37 percent of the population (Table 2). The assistance is  distributed as monthly payments or one-time payments expected to last for three to five months. At current maize prices, HSNP cash transfers of 5,400 KES (45.30 USD) every two months can purchase seven to nine days of monthly kilocalorie needs. Additional interventions include water trucking, borehole rehabilitation, cattle destocking programs, and the transfer of animal feeds.
 (page [9]) 1 Tropical Livestock Units are livestock numbers converted to a common unit. Camels = 1.1; cattle=0.5; sheep and goats=0.1; pigs=0. 2; chickens=0.01.  Figure 6.  Liters of milk consumed per household per day in September in Isiolo, Wajir, and Mandera
 (page [9]) Source: FEWS NET using NDMA data Figure 7.  Goat- to-maize terms- of-trade, Mandera
 (page [9]) Source:  FEWS NET using NDMA data
 (page [10]) s     a    an e a
 (page [10]) e s  e   ay   e     se           e e s  e   ay   e     se       n a e a e  n      e
 (page [10]) KENYA Food Security Outlook October 2022 to May 2023
 (page [10]) Famine Early Warning Systems Network 11 In July 2022 a SMART survey reported that acute malnutrition in Mandera, Wajir, Garissa, and Isiolo is at Critical levels (GAM WHZ 15 to 29.9 percent). Since July, NDMA nutrition surveillance data has continued reporting an atypically high and increasing proportion of children at risk of acute malnutrition (MUAC < 135mm), reflecting a worsening prevalence of acute nutrition. This is driven by reduced food access, a significant decline in milk consumption, poorly diversified diets, and decreased number of meals taken per day. Relatedly, 15 to 22 percent of households in October reported a poor food consumption score (FCS), indicative of Emergency (IPC Phase 4), while 33 to 39 percent of households reported a borderline FCS indicative of Crisis (IPC Phase 3). To cope with the high food prices and lack of income, households are primarily applying consumption-based coping strategies such as r educing meal frequency and meal sizes, borrowing food from friends or relatives, and reducing adult meal frequency and m eal sizes. Households are also relying on livelihood-based coping strategies such as selling more anim als than usual, sending household members to eat elsewhere, purchasing food on credit, selling productive assets, spending savings, and borrowing money.  A smaller proportion of households are employing strategies indicative of Crisis (IPC Phase 3), such as withdrawing childre n from school and reducing health expenses, while worse-off households are employing coping strategies indica tive of Emergency (IPC Phase 4), such as the sale of last female animals due to the protracted drought and low herd sizes. Drive n by the current situation, area level Crisis! (IPC Phase 3!) outcomes are present, as ongoing humanitarian assistance, particularly in-kind food and cash transfers, is mitigating Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes.
 (page [10]) Assumptions
 (page [10]) In addition to the national-level assumptions, the following assumptions apply to this area of concern: • The forecast below-average October to December and March to May rains are expected to provide only short-term improvements to forage and water conditions. Rangeland resources are expected to remain significantly below the average, maintaining above-average return trekking distances to domestic and livestock water sources and driving atypical migration outside the livelihood zone into Kenya and across national borders to Somalia and Ethiopia throughout
 (page [10]) the scenario period.
 (page [10]) • Maize prices are projected to be 17 to 27 percent above the five-year average through the scenario period, slightly moderated by maize harvests from the medium and high potential areas. However, the ongoing drought and expected below-average short rains will keep maize demand high for human and livestock consumption. • Goat prices are anticipated to follow the seasonal trends but be 12 to 20 percent below the five-year average due to well-below average body conditions and market oversupply as more households seek to sell for additional income. • Below-average birth rates are expected during the October to December short rains, following below-average conception rates during the 2022 March to May long rains. Any livestock births will be insufficient to raise livestock holdings am id sales and losses to drought and disease. Livestock holdings are expected to remain below 50 percent of the five-year
 (page [10]) average at least through mid-2023.
 (page [10]) • Below-average livestock milk production and atypically high livestock migration are expected to reduce household milk availability for consumption or sale throughout the scenario period. Increased livestock migration is likely to result in increased incidents of resource-based conflict and livestock disease, which will result in displacements, di sruption of livelihood activities, destruction of assets, and livestock mortalities. • Household income is expected to remain below average throughout the scenario period due to below-average livestock sale values and productivity. Poor households are likely to intensify their reliance on limited non-livestock- related income sources such as remittances, casual labor, and firewood and charcoal sales that will likely be insufficient to support the purchase of food and non-food needs. Households are expected to increasingly rely on consumption and liveli hood Table 2.  Reported cash transfers and food assistance in October 2022 Type of assistance Mandera Isiolo Wajir
 (page [10]) Number of households
 (page [11]) Cash transfers 40,303 12,360 48,092
 (page [11]) Food assistance 7,000 - 200
 (page [11]) Percent of population 23 28 37
 (page [11]) Source: NDMA
 (page [11]) KENYA Food Security Outlook October 2022 to May 2023
 (page [11]) Famine Early Warning Systems Network 12 coping strategies to minimize food consumption gaps. • Insecurity will likely be above normal, especially as rangeland resources dwindle and migratory communities and herders move across borders with their livestock resulting in resource-based conflict and inter-tribal clashes. Additionally, terrorism along the Kenya-Somalia border will continue to restrict livelihood activities and humanitari an operations within the area. Considering the prolonged drought, a disruption in market operations and livelihood activities will have a significantly negative impact on food security in the affected areas throughout the scenario period. • Household food access is unlikely to improve due to high food prices, significantly low access to milk, and re duced and lost income from livestock. The ongoing scale-up of humanitarian assistances in these counties will remai n a critical factor in mitigating severe deterioration of acute malnutrition. As a result, a Critical (GAM WHZ 15 –29.9 percent) prevalence of acute malnutrition will likely be sustained through the scenario period. Additionally, high disease prevalence and frequent disease outbreaks such as of Kalazar, Chikungunya, measles, and cholera, especially in Wajir and Mandera counties, will contribute to worsening acute malnutrition. Chronic factors such as low access to health nutriti on services and poor hygiene and sanitation, which are worsened by limited access to food and water and poor child and maternal care practices, will also sustain poor nutrition outcomes.
 (page [11]) Most Likely Food Security Outcomes
 (page [11, 12]) From October to January,  the October to December short rains are unlikely to drive livestock back to wet-season grazing areas, and most livestock will remain in the dry-season grazing areas, keeping milk availability for co nsumption and sale low for households. It is likely that livestock deaths will occur due to drought and from hypothermia when t he rains start due to e an  a s’     en  wea ene  s a e    e s            e en s  n    a e an  water resources will stabilize livestock body conditions and in turn sale values and milk production, especially for camels and goats. However, these will remain below average, limiting household income. Households are likely to increasingly depend on income from self-employment, no n- agricultural wage labor, sale of charcoal and firewood, remittances, regular and emergency safety nets, and emergency humanitarian assistance for cash and food. However, increased competition and high food and fuel prices are likely to constrain household purchasing power. Households are expected to face food gaps and apply consumption-coping strategies indicative of Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes or worse, such as eating less preferred foods, reducing meal portions,  reducing meal frequency, sending children to eat elsewhere, and reducing adult food intake in favor of children. Households will  also engage in livelihood coping strategies indicative of Crisis (IPC Phase 3) or worse outcomes, such as withd rawing children from school, reducing health expenses, and selling last female animals. Ongoing distribution of humanitarian assistance is expected to support the most vulnerable households. However, due to the high need, ongoing livestock deaths, increasing prevalence of acute malnutrition, and increasing dependence on cash transfers and humanitarian assistance to fill food and income gaps, Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes are expected to persist through January 2023. Households regularly receiving assistance are likely facing Crisis! (IPC Phase 3!) outcomes. From February to May: In February, any slight improvements in forage and water resources following the below-average rains will deteriorate in the dry season. Livestock that may have returned to the wet-season grazing areas will migrate away, further reducing household milk access and increasing the prevalence of malnutrition, especially among children und er five years of age, although malnutrition will likely remain within Critical (GAM WHZ 15 –29.9 percent) levels due to humanitarian food assistance and targeted nutrition interventions. Livestock body condition will remain poor, due to well above-average e   n    s an es         na  y          es        y   n     ns an   e   e   e   s  es w             se    s’ a     y    se l livestock for income. In late March, the forecasted below-average March to May long rains are set to slightly ameliorate forage and water availability. Competition for forage resources will likely be a driver of conflict among livestock herders, resulting in loss of property, restriction of livelihood activities, and displacement of households in conflict hotspots . Low income from livestock and milk sales will force households to depend more on non-livestock income sources such as non- livestock wage labor and remittances, which will likely be limited by inflation and slow economic growth, forcing ho useholds to increasingly apply livelihood-based coping strategies. Currently, FEWS NET does not have distribution pl ans for humanitarian assistance, although humanitarian assistance is expected to continue being distributed. Nevertheless, the compounding effect of six consecutive below-average rainy seasons is expected to drive significant income and food gaps, along with an increased prevalence in acute malnutrition. Households are expected to increase their dependence on copi ng strategies indicative of Crisis (IPC Phase 3) or worse to minimize food consumption gaps, with at least 20 percent  of households in Emergency (IPC Phase 4).
 (page [12]) ETHIOPIA
 (page [12]) rer
 (page [12]) KENYA Food Security Outlook October 2022 to May 2023
 (page [12]) Famine Early Warning Systems Network 13
 (page [12]) AREAS OF CONCERN
 (page [12]) Northern Pastoral (Marsabit and Samburu counties) and Northwestern Pastoral (Turkana County) Livelihood
 (page [12]) Zones (Figure 8)
 (page [12]) Current Situation
 (page [12]) The June to September rains were less than 70 percent of average across the area of concern, with central areas of Turkana recording less than 55 percent of average. In both livelihood zones, the start of the 2022 October to December short rains is over a month delayed, except in the northern parts of Marsabit, where the onset of rainfall has been timely. By mid-November, cumulative rainfall by the end of the season is forecast to be less than 75 percent of average, with the Northern Pastoral areas of Samburu and most of the Northern Pastoral areas of Marsabit likely to record cumulative rainfall totals of around 60 percent of average. Across both livelihood zones, vegetation greenness, measured using the satellite derived eVIIRS Normalized Vegetation Condition Index (NDVI), is less than 60 percent of the 10-year average following four consecutive below- average seasons. Above-average land surface temperatures are also accelerating the deterioration of vegetation conditions. Field observations from NDMA also report that pasture and browse conditions are poor to very poor compared to good to fair normally this time of year. Most open water sources such as water pans and dams are dry, but a limited number of boreholes, shallow wells, and traditional river wells are providing water due to below normal recharge rates and frequent breakdowns due to the unusually high traffic. According to the USGS/FEWS NET waterpoint viewer,  most boreholes are dry or less than 3 percent of long-term median water level. As a result of limited access to water and poor vegetation conditions, livestock trekking distances are significantly higher than normal, while livestock watering frequencies have declined. According to NDMA sentinel site data for October, l ivestock trekking distances from grazing areas to water are 13 to 38 kilometers, well above the three-year average of 9 to 14 kilometers. Relatedly, livestock watering frequencies have significantly reduced. In the Northwestern Pastoral areas  of Turkana, cattle are watered once every week, compared to four to five times normally, while in the Northern Pastoral areas of Marsabit, the watering frequencies for cattle, goats, and sheep are twice a week compared to four to five times a week. With the limited availability of rangeland resources in the typical wet-season grazing areas , most livestock remain in the dry- season grazing areas, where they had migrated to earlier this year. Int ra-migration of livestock is also unusually high as herders seek out pasture and water for their herds. According to the NDMA, around 85 to 90 percent of livestock in the Northern Pastoral areas of Marsabit remain in the dry-season grazing areas in the south, with most migrating to northern Samburu, but reports suggest that a notable but unspecified number of herders have also migrated north to Ethiopia. In the Northern Pastoral areas of Samburu, livestock have migrated from Samburu East sub-county into Samburu Central sub-county following an improvement in pasture conditions, but field reports indicate that pasture conditions have declined due  to overgrazing. Other herders in Samburu have migrated to the agro-pastoral areas of Laikipia. In the Northwestern Pastoral areas of Turkana, approximately 75 percent of livestock have migrated into dry-season grazing areas, especially alon g River Turkwel, into eastern Uganda and into South Sudan. While the migration of livestock into grazing areas is normal at this ti me, the high numbers of livestock that have migrated are unusual and have limited household milk availability , income from milk sales , and food access due to limited purchasing power. Besides low livestock holdings, livestock body conditions are unseasonably low due to the extended and ongoing low availability of rangeland resources and long trekking distances. In most areas , livestock body conditions are poor, while livestock body conditions in Marsabit are poor to very poor. NDMA sentinel sites report that livestock are producing around 0.25 liters of milk per day in October in Marsabit, compared to the three-year average of 1 liter per household per day.  Figure 8.   Area of concern reference map:
 (page [13]) Northern and Northwestern Pastoral
 (page [13]) Livelihood Zones
 (page [13]) Source: FEWS NET
 (page [13]) nonmnoiwn MOM NN
 (page [13]) yeos Jad aziew 3) ° a wn c
 (page [13]) KENYA Food Security Outlook October 2022 to May 2023
 (page [13]) Famine Early Warning Systems Network 14 According to NDMA data, milk production in Turkana has been negligible since December 2021, while households in Samburu have not reported any milk production since March 2022, apart from June 2022 when livestock produced 0.25 liters per household per day on average. The absence of milk is significantly constraining household food availability and income to purchase food. Additionally, this indicates that calving and kidding rates
 (page [13]) are also extremely low.
 (page [13]) In both livelihood zones, livestock holdings are likely less than half of normal following successive seasons of atypically low conception and birth rates, in addition to higher-than-normal mortality rates. According to the 2022 Kenya Food Security Steering Group long rains assessment, conducted in July, poor households in Northern Pastoral areas of Marsabit had four to six Tropical Livestock Units (TLU) compared to six to 10 normally, while in the Northern Pastoral areas of Samburu, households had two TLUs compared to four normally. In the Northwestern Pastoral areas of Turkana, the TLUs were two compared to five normally. It is likely that herd sizes have declined further due to sales for income or death due to destocking programs o r
 (page [13]) the drought.
 (page [13, 14]) Household return trekking distances to watering points are unusually high in most areas. According to the NDMA monthly monitoring data, the household return trekking distances to watering points are 8 to 14 kilometers compared to the short- term average of 6 to 9 kilometers, in October. Additionally, households are reporting up to two to four hours of waiting ti me at water sources compared to one hour normally. The long trekking distances, reduced number of functional water sources, and increased waiting times are significantly lowering household water consumption, with households consuming 5 to 10 liters per person per day in October, compared to 15 to 20 liters normally . Additionally, trekking distances are taking time away from other activities, including income-earning opportunities and childcare. Although there are no resources-based conflicts in either livelihood zones at the moment, tensions remain high i n the traditional conflict hotspot areas along the Laikipia-Samburu border, at Baragoi along the Turkana and Samburu border, and Turkana North and South Sudan border, especially in Kibish, and along the Kenya-Ethiopia border. These tensions continue to limit access to pasture, browse, and water resources in these areas. In October, livestock sale values are unseasonably low in most areas due to poor body conditions. In Marsabit and Turkana, goat prices are 18 and 45 percent lower than the five-year average while being average in Samburu,  where body conditions are slightly better. The low sale values are limiting household income and constraining household purchasing power . At the same time, staple food prices, such as maize, are 58 to 96 percent above prices last year, and 71 to 88 percent ab ove the five- year average. The high maize prices are being driving by reduced local availability, atypically high demand for both live stock and human consumption, high transport costs, and declining cross-border imports from Ethiopia and Uganda. Consequently, household purchasing power, expressed by the goat- to-maize terms of trade, is 47 to 65 percent lower than the five-year average (Figure 9). In October, the sale of a mature medium-sized goat could purchase 16 to 33 kilograms of maize, equivalent to six to eight days of kilocalorie requirements for a family of six if they just ate maize, compared to a five-year average of 45 to 74 kilogram of maize per goat sold, around 12 to 21 days of kilocalories for a family of six. In Turkana, the goat- to-maize terms of trade are the lowest on record since October 2009, while the goat- to-maize terms of trade in Marsabit and Samburu are the lowest since September 2011 and June 2011, respectively. Due to reduced household milk availability and constrained access to food, 20 to more than 50 percent of h ouseholds in Marsabit and Turkana are reporting a food consumption score indicative of Emergency (IPC Phase 4) or worse, while over 40 percent of households in Samburu are reporting an FCS indicative of Crisis (IPC Phase 3). Households are engaging  in consumption and livelihood coping strategies indicative of Stressed (IPC Phase 2) such as borrowing food from relati ves and friends , reducing the portion size of meals, reducing the number of meals eaten per day , consuming less preferred food, reducing  livestock sales, reducing health and veterinary expenses, and withdrawing children from school. The most affected are engaging in begging due to destitution. In Samburu, households are reportedly consuming one to two meals per day  Figure 9.  Goat- to-maize terms of trade, Turkana
 (page [14]) Source: FEWS NET using data from NDMA
 (page [14]) KENYA Food Security Outlook October 2022 to May 2023
 (page [14]) Famine Early Warning Systems Network 15 instead of two to three meals a day, with meals consisting of cereals, vegetables, milk, and oil. In October, available information on ongoing cash transfers and food assistance interventions indicates that around 63 to 88 percent of the population are receiving humanitarian assistance (Table 3). The assistance in being distributed as monthly payments or one-time payments expected to last through the end of the year. FEWS NET has yet to confirm plans for humanitarian assistance programs to occur in 2023, but anticipates that the distribution of humanitarian assistance will continue given the high dependence on cash transfers and humanitarian food assistance to minimize food consumption gaps. In Marsabit, an estimated 56,215 households, approximately 73 percent of the population, are receiving cash transfers and food assistance. Cash t ransfers range between 5,400 to 15,000 KES (~40-123 USD), covering on average around 61 percent of daily kilocalorie requirements. Additionally, humanitarian organizations are distributing in-kind food assistance to around 133,465 households across Turkana, Samburu, and Marsabit. However, in Marsabit and Turkana, around 60,370 households have not received bi- monthly cash transfers of 5,400 KES per household          ’s Hunger Safety Net Program (HSNP) since July 2022. In June 2022, SMART survey results reported that the prevalence of acute malnutrition was Extremely  Critical (GAM WHZ ≥ 30 percent) in Turkana and Marsabit, with GAM rates highest in Turkana South sub-county (GAM WHZ 41.4 percent), Turkana North sub-county (GAM WHZ 38.8 percent ), North Horr sub-county in Marsabit (GAM WHZ 39.7 percen t), and in Laisamis sub-county , Marsabit (GAM WHZ 47.1 percent). In the Northern Pastoral areas of Samburu, the prevalence of acute malnutrition is Critical (GAM WHZ 15 –29.9 percent). In October, sentinel sites in Turkana reported a GAM MUAC (< 125mm) of 13.6 percent, indicative of Serious (GAM 10 –14.9 percent). However, a mass screening of around 51,500 children in Marsabit in October recorded a GAM MUAC ( ≤ 125mm) of 22.4 percent; but in North Horr and Laisamis sub-counties, a GAM MUAC ( ≤ 125mm) of 32.1 and 29.6 percent was recorded, indicative of Extremely Critical (GAM ≥ 30 percent) and Critical (GAM 15 –29.9 percent) acute malnutrition. However, around 50 –55 percent of the children are receiving treatment for acute malnutrition. Across the Northwestern and the Northern Pastoral livelihood zones areas of Marsabit, despite the presence of humanitarian assistance, one in five households are facing Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes, while a small propo rtion of poor households are likely in Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5). In Samburu, Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes are present as average goat prices support household purchasing power as evidence with a declining trend in the prevalence of acute malnutrition.
 (page [14]) Assumptions
 (page [14]) In addition to the national-level assumptions, the following assumptions apply to this area of concern: • Rangeland resources will remain unseasonably low throughout the scenario period, but short-lived improvements i n conditions are expected between November and December and late April and May, following the forecast below-average October to December short rains and March to May long rains. • Livestock body conditions and productivity are expected to remain well below average throughout the scenario period due to the long-term impacts of the drought. Slight improvements in livestock body conditions are likely i n November and December following any short-lived improvements in the availability of rangeland resources, but livestock body conditions will likely remain well below-normal through May 2023. Additionally, livestock birth rates will continue to be below average due to poor conception rates resulting from sustained poor body conditions. • Livestock are likely to remain in the dry-season grazing areas and unseasonal grazing areas such as the marginal agricultural areas of Meru (Meru North), Tharaka Nithi, Kitui, Laikipia, and along the Kenyan border of Uganda, Ethi opia, and South Sudan. Internal livestock movements in search of pastures, browse, and water resources will remain unusual ly
 (page [14]) high.
 (page [14, 15]) • According to FEWS NET technical price projections, maize retail prices in the Northern Pastoral Livelihood Zone are expected to be 40 to 55 percent above the five-year average and follow seasonal trends throughout the scenario period. In the Northwestern Pastoral Livelihood Zone, maize prices are projected to follow seasonal trends but be 60 to 66 percent above the five-year average. The price of maize will remain high, driven by below-average local produc tion and Table 3.  Reported cash transfers and food assistance in October 2022 Type of assistance Turkana Samburu Marsabit
 (page [15]) Number of households
 (page [15]) Cash transfers 23,510 13,275 29,117
 (page [15]) Food assistance 73,902 32,465 27,098
 (page [15]) Percent of population 63 88 73
 (page [15]) Source: NDMA
 (page [15]) KENYA Food Security Outlook October 2022 to May 2023
 (page [15]) Famine Early Warning Systems Network 16 high fuel and transport costs. In the Northern Pastoral Livelihood Zone, the high prices will also be driven by decli ning cross-border imports from Ethiopia, where production is expected to be below average due to the drought and declining cross-border imports from Uganda. Goat prices are expected to follow seasonal trends but be around 10 to 15 per cent below the five-year average throughout the scenario period. Similarly, in the Northwestern Pastoral Livelihood Zone, goat prices are expected to follow seasonal trends but be around 39 to 48 percent below the five-year average. • The prevalence of acute malnutrition among children under five years is expected to remain at Extremely Critical (GAM ≥ 30 percent) in the Northwestern Pastoral areas of Turkana North and South sub-counties in Turkana and in the Northern Pastoral areas of North Horr and Laisamis sub counties in Marsabit until February 2023. The expected slight improvements in food availability and access following the 2022 October to December short rains are likely to reduce the prevalence of malnutrition to Critical (GAM 15 –29.9 percent). The prevalence of acute malnutrition is expected to remain Critical (GAM 15 –29.9 percent) in the rest of the areas throughout the scenario period, driven by reduced milk consumption, poor food utilization and hygiene, high disease incidences due to reduced water availability, and constrained household access to food. Ongoing humanitarian assistance in form of food and nutrition and health assistance will prevent worse nutrition outcomes. • The regular cash transfers under the Hunger Safety Net Program (HSNP) by the national government through NDMA are planned, funded, and likely in the Northwestern Pastoral areas of Turkana and the Northern Pastoral areas of Samburu and Marsabit throughout the scenario period. Approximately 39,9 20 households in Turkana and 20,450 households in Marsabit, around 25 percent of the total population, will receive 5,400 KES bi-monthly throughout  the scenario period . From October 2022 to January 2023, cash transfers and food assistance are expected to continue to be distributed by
 (page [15]) humanitarian organizations.
 (page [15]) Most Likely Food Security Outcomes
 (page [15]) From October 2022 to January 2023, the below-average October to December short rains will only temporar ily ameliorate rangeland resources, beginning in late November. As a result, livestock that have migrated into the marginal agricultural areas of Meru (Meru North), Tharaka Nithi, Kitui, Laikipia, and along the Kenyan border of Uganda, Ethiopia, and South Sudan are unlikely to migrate back into the wet-season grazing areas. At the same time, internal livestock movements in search of pastures and water are expected to remain unusually high. Household income from livestock and milk sales will likely be below average due to poor body conditions, milk production, and conception rates.  Increased competition and the limited expandability of other sources of income, such as the sale of charcoal, firewood, and bush products, in addition to below- average remittances from relatives living in urban areas due to the high inflation rates and high cost of living, will continue to limit household incomes. Despite the planned, funded, an     e y  as    ans e       a s s    as     ’s  e   a  H  P an other transfers from humanitarian organizations, income gaps are still expected to remain wide. Household reliance on market purchases will remain high, but the purchasing capacities of poor households will be limited by above -average staple food prices and below-average household incomes. As a result, a significant proportion of poor households will likely face large food consumption gaps and engage in consumption- and livelihood based-coping strategies indicative of Crisis (IPC Phase 3) or worse, such as reducing healthcare and veterinary expenses and withdrawing children from school, while the most affected households will likely employ livelihood coping strategies indicative of Emergency (IPC P hase 4), such as selling of last female animals and begging. While the prevalence of acute malnutrition is expected to remain Cri tical (GAM 15 –29.9 percent) in most areas, Extremely Critical      ≥  30 percent ) rates are expected to persist in Turkana North and South sub- counties in Turkana and in North Horr and Laisamis sub-counties in Marsabit. Consequently, Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes are likely to persist, while a small proportion of poor households will likely face Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) outcomes in the Northern Pastoral areas of Marsabit and Northwestern Pastoral livelihood areas of Turkana. However, area-level Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes are most likely in Samburu due to near-average income from livestock sales, which is expected to improve household purchasing power and access to food. However, the most affected households are likely to be in
 (page [15]) Emergency (IPC Phase 4).
 (page [16, 15]) From February to May 2023 , the availability of rangeland resources will remain low due to poor regeneration following the below-average 2022 short rains. During the February to March short lean season, rangeland resources are expected to rapidly deteriorate due to overgrazing and limited regeneration. However, the 2023 long rains are likely to temporarily ameliorate rangeland conditions . Most livestock are also unlikely to migrate back into the wet-season grazing areas. As a result, livestock body conditions and productivity will remain unseasonably low, maintaining significantly below-average household mi lk availability. Livestock birth rates will be below average due to below-average conception rates, maintaining unusually low livestock herd sizes. Livestock sale values are expected to remain below average throughout the scenario period, with slight KENYA Food Security Outlook October 2022 to May 2023
 (page [16, 17]) Famine Early Warning Systems Network 17 improvements expected at the peak of the March to May long rains, as households reduce sales to improve body conditions and herd sizes. Income-earning opportunities from livestock and milk sales and other sources such as charcoal and fi rewood sales and remittances, in addition to regular HSNP cash transfers, will likely be below average due to increased competition and low liquidity from better-off households. As a result , household access to food will also be limited by above-average staple food prices. Consequently, poor households are likely to continue facing large food consumption gaps, with  a significant proportion of poor households marginally meeting their food nee ds engaging in livelihood and consumption coping strategies indicative of Crisis (IPC Phase 3) or worse, while the most-affected households will likely employ liveli hood coping strategies indicative of Emergency (IPC Phase 4). As a result of little to no milk availability, limited access to inc ome, and constrained access to food, area-level Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes are expected to persist, while a small proportion of poor households will be in Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5). However, in Samburu, Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes are most li kely to persist due to anticipated stabilization and slight recovery in livestock productivity and sale values, which will contin ue supporting household purchasing power and access to food.
 (page [17]) 0 75 150 300
 (page [17]) Kilometers
 (page [17]) { SOUTH SUDAN ETHIOPIA
 (page [17]) SOMALIA
 (page [17]) IPC V3.1 Acute Food Insecurity Phase - Mina 225% of households ~ 3 vinimal 4 ©) met 25-50% of their M@® 3: Crisis kcal mm 4 Em h 225% of households ergency met >50% of their kcal Ml S: Famine needs through HFA
 (page [17]) O Concentration of displaced
 (page [17]) WS NET
 (page [17]) 0 75 150
 (page [17]) ETHIOPIA 00 0 70 140 80
 (page [17]) Kilometers Kilometers
 (page [17]) ETHIOPIA
 (page [17]) SOMALIA SOMALIA
 (page [17]) IPC V3.1 Acute Food Insecurity Phase IPC V3.1 Acute Food Soecorh Phase 1: Minimal <=> 225% of households 1; Minimal AB 25.50% of the it : CO) met 25-50% of their lm 2: Stressed me onnerr | 2: Stressed keal mm 3: Crisi kcal Mombasa mm 3: Crisis > Crisis >25% of households mm 4:£ @ 725% of households mm 4: Emergency @ met >50% of their kcal mS. Fone met >50% of their kcal mm 5: Famine needs through HFA ri - needs through HFA - a 0 Concentration of displaced i D) Concentration of displaced
 (page [17]) WS NET WS NET
 (page [17]) KENYA Food Security Outlook October 2022 to May 2023
 (page [17]) Famine Early Warning Systems Network 18 MOST LIKELY FOOD SECURITY OUTCOMES AND AREAS RECEIVING SIGNIFICANT LEVELS OF
 (page [17]) HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE
 (page [17]) Current food security outcomes , October 2022 Each of these maps adheres to IPC v3.1 humanitarian assistance mapping protocols and flags where significant levels of humanitarian assistance are being/are expected to be provided.   indicates that at least 25 percent of households receive on average 25–50 percent of caloric needs from humanitarian food assistance (HFA) . indicates that at least 25 percent of households receive on average over 50 percent of caloric needs through HFA . This mapping protocol differs from the (!) protocol used in the maps at the top of the report. The use of (!) indicates areas that would likely be at least one phase worse in the absence of current or programmed
 (page [17]) humanitarian assistance.
 (page [17]) Source: FEWS NET
 (page [17]) Projected food security outcomes, October 2022 to January 2023  Projected food security outcomes, February to May 2022
 (page [17]) Source: FEWS NET  Source: FEWS NET FEWS NET ’s classifications are IPC-compatible. IPC-compatible analysis follows key IPC protocols but  does not necessarily reflect the consensus of national food security
 (page [17]) partners.
 (page [17]) Recommended citation: FEWS NET . Kenya Food Security Outlook October 2022 to May 2023 : Humanitarian assistance provides some relief, but Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes persist, 2022.
 (page [18]) ABOUT SCENARIO DEVELOPMENT
 (page [18]) To project food security outcomes, FEWS NET develops a set of assumptions about likely events, their effects, and the probabl e responses of various actors. FEWS NET analyzes these assumptions in the context of current conditions and local livelihoods  to arrive at a most likely scenario for the coming eight months. Learn more here .
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 path: data/transition_reports/FEWS NET/KENYA_Food_Security_Outlook_Oct 2022_Final.pdf
 author: FEWS NET
 title: Humanitarian assistance provides some relief, but Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes persist
 creatione date: 2022-12-04 16:34:34-05:00



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 data/transition_reports/FEWS NET/Somalia-Seasonal-Monitor-20221205-final.pdf
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 (page [0]) somalia @fews.net
 (page [0]) www.fews.net/somalia  FEWS NET is a USAID -funded activity. The content of this report does not nece ssarily reflect the view of the United States Agency for International Development or the
 (page [0]) United States Government.
 (page [0]) SOMALIA  Seasonal  Monitor  December  5, 2022
 (page [0]) FEWS  NET publishe s a Seasonal  Monitor  for Somalia  every 10 days  (dekad)  through  the end of the current  October  to December  deyr  rainy  season. The purpose  of this document  is to provide  updated  information  on the progress  of the deyr  season  to facilitate  contingency  and response  planning.  This Somalia Seasonal  Monitor  is valid  through  December 10, 2022, and is produced  in collaboration  with  U.S. Geological  Survey  (USGS) , the Food  Security  and Nutrition Analysis  Unit (FSNAU)  Somalia , the Somali  Water  and Land  Information  System  (SWALIM) , a number  of other  agencies,  and several Somali  non-governmental
 (page [0]) organizations  (NGOs).
 (page [0]) Despite localized light to moderate rains, most of Somalia remained dry duri ng the end of November Remote -sensing  rainfall estimates  corroborated by field reports  show that most of Somalia received little to no rainfall between  November 21-30. However, preliminary CHIRPS remote -sensing data indicat es localized areas in the southern  and coastal regions received light to moderate rainfall , amounting to 5-25 millimeters (mm) , while totals in the rest of the country were below 5 mm  (Figure 1) . Across most of the country, rainfall totals recorded  by remote -sensing data did not deviate more  than 10 mm from the long -term average (1981 -2020) for this 10 -day period . However, rainfall totals in most of  the south were 10-50 mm below average (Figure 2) , particularly in Lower Juba and southern Gedo regions . However, c umulative rainfall deficits since the start of the deyr season in October are much larger, ranging from 25 to 70 percent below average across most of Somalia . According to  FAO  SWALIM river station gauge data , river water levels in most stations along the Juba  and Shabelle rivers were below the long -term  mean as of December  5 and a forecast ed dry spell in the Ethiopian highlands  is anticipated to drive  further river water recessions along the Juba and Shabelle rivers in the coming weeks . In the northwest , ground reports , supported by remote -sensing data , indicated there was little to no rainfall across all pastoral and agropastoral livelihood zones in Woqooyi Galbeed, Togdheer, Sool, and Sanaag regions durin g the November 21-30 period . However , isolated light showers were reported in parts of Guban Pastoral livelihood zone of Zeylac district  in Awdal region.  The poor  deyr rainfall in most areas has driven below -average  rangeland conditions in most of the northwest , with the exception of  localized average to above -average vegetation conditions in some parts Togdheer, Sool , and Sanaag regions. In the northeast,  most pastoral areas of Bari, Nugaal , and northern Mudug regions received little to no rainfal l during the November 21-3 0 period . However, in Bari region, limited areas of East Golis Pastora l livelihood zone , specifically  in Caluula and Qandala districts , and Coastal Deeh  Pastoral livelihood zone, in Iskushuban and Bandarbeyla district s, received localized light to moderate rains. In contrast, li ttle to no rainfall was reported across all pastoral areas of Nugaal  and northern Mudug regions. The localized light to moderate rains in Bari attracted massive livestock in -migration,  increasing pressure on limited  rangeland , which result ed in continued poor pasture  conditions and limited water availability across most  areas . In central regions,  following several weeks of localized light to moderate deyr  rainfall in parts of Galg aduud and southern Mudug regions, no rainfall was reported in pastoral  or agropastoral areas between  November 21 -30. Despite the rainfall received in mid -November, a ccording to field information and available remote -sensing data, overall deyr  performance in the central region is far below  average , with the  worst affected areas being Coastal Deeh  Pastoral  areas and large parts of Addun Pastoral  livelihood zone . As a result, rangeland condition s, access to pasture , and water availability  are all below  average. In the south, rainfall levels varied across pastoral and agropastoral li velihood zones, with  most areas receiving  little to no rainfall during the November 21 -30 period . According to ground information  supported by the satellite imagery , little to no rainfall was reported in Hiraan , Middle Shabelle, Lower Juba, Gedo , and Bakool regions. However, localized light to moderate ra infall was reported in agropastoral and pastoral areas  of Lower Shabelle , Lower Juba, and Bay regions , as well as in  the riverine areas  of Middle and Lower Shabelle  regions. Rain gauge stations recorded 22 mm in Baidoa (Bay), 17 mm in Janaale  (Lower Shabelle), 11.5 mm in Dinsoor (Bay),  and 11 mm in Sa akow (Middle Juba) . No rainfall was recorded at the rain gauge stations in Xudur (Bakool), Buloburte (Hiraan), and Jamame (Lower Juba). According to SWALIM’s river gauge station  data on December 5 , river water levels in most stations along the Juba and Shabelle river s were below the long - term mean  and significantly below flood risk level . According to the satellite -derived eVIIRs  Normalized Difference Vegetation Index (NDVI)  for November  21-30, vegetation conditions  in Somalia  remain largely below typical levels . However, areas in the south -central and northern regions have shown average to above av erage vegetation  conditions, reflecting some localized positive deyr  rainfall amounts (Figure 3). NOAA Climate Prediction Center’s  seven -day weather forecast through December 10  indicates that dry conditions are expected  to continue  across most of the country (Figure 4). However, the weather forecast shows the likelihood of localized m oderate to light rainfall during this period along th e coastline of southern and central regions and in the pastoral , agropastoral , and riverine  livelihood zones  of Lower Juba . With no rainfall likely in the Ethiopian highlands, riv er water levels in the Juba and Shabelle basins in southern Somalia are expec ted to remain below  normal levels  in the coming weeks.
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 (page [1]) ee ee ee ee ae ee ee ee ee ee ee SOMALIA  Seasonal Monitor                                                                                                                                       December  5, 2022 Famine  Early  Warning  Systems  Network  2 For more  rain gauge  data,  please  contact  [email protected]  or visit www.faoswalim.org . Figure 1.  Estimated rainfall (CHIRPS Preliminary) in mm, November  21-3 0, 202 2 Figure 2. Estimated rainfall anomaly (CHIRPS Preliminary) in mm compared to the 1981 -2020 average , November
 (page [1]) 21-30 , 202 2
 (page [1]) This
 (page [1]) Source: UC Santa Barbara Climate Hazards Center  Source: UC Santa Barbara Climate Hazards Center Figure 3.  eVIIRS Normalized Difference Vegetation Index (NDVI) anomaly from 20 12-2021  average , November  21-30 , 2022 Figure 4.  Global Forecast System (GFS) rainfall forecast in mm for December  5-11, 202 2
 (page [1]) Source: FEWS NET  Source:  NOAA/CPC
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 title: FEWS NET Somalia Deyr 2022 Seasonal Monitor, December 5, 2022
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 data/transition_reports/FEWS NET/Ethiopia - Key Message Update: Tue, 2022-09-27.pdf
 (page [0]) :36 AM 12/14/22, 10 :36 AM Ethiopia - Key Message Update: Tue, 2022-09-27 Page 1 of 4 https://fews.net/print/east-africa/ethiopia/key-message-update/september-2022Famine Early Warning Systems Network
 (page [0]) East Africa
 (page [0]) Ethiopia
 (page [0]) Key Message Update
 (page [0]) Large-scale humanitarian assistance is needed
 (page [0]) to prevent further deterioration in food security
 (page [0]) 7:36 AM
 (page [1]) 12/14/22, 10 :36 AM Ethiopia - Key Message Update: Tue, 2022-09-27 Page 2 of 4 https://fews.net/print/east-africa/ethiopia/key-message-update/september-2022September 2022
 (page [1]) October 2022 - January 2023
 (page [1]) IPC v3.0 Acute Food Insecurity Phase
 (page [1]) 1: Minimal
 (page [1]) 2: Stressed
 (page [1]) 3: Crisis
 (page [1]) 4: Emergency
 (page [1]) 5: Famine
 (page [1]) Outcomes may be worse than mapped, but available evidence is in sufﬁcient to conﬁrm or deny Would likely be at least one phase worse without current or p rogrammed humanitarian assistance FEWS NET classiﬁcation is IPC-compatible. IPC-compatible analysis follo ws key IPC protocols but does not necessarily reﬂect the consensus of national food security partners.
 (page [1]) September 2022
 (page [1]) Key Messages:
 (page [1, 2]) Extreme levels of acute food insecurity persist in northern conﬂict-aff ected areas and drought- affected pastoral areas in southern and southeastern areas of Et hiopia, and sub-national assistance needs will remain historically high in these parts of the country through at least January 2023. In much of western and central Ethiopia, however , the start of the meher harvest :36 AM 12/14/22, 10 :36 AM Ethiopia - Key Message Update: Tue, 2022-09-27 Page 3 of 4 https://fews.net/print/east-africa/ethiopia/key-message-update/september-2022is improving household food availability in terms of own-produce d foods, alleviating food consumption deﬁcits. The harvest is expected to drive a seasonal de cline in the total national size of the acutely food-insecure population in late 2022. In southern and southeastern areas, the ongoing historic droug ht continues to lead to widespread livestock deaths, displacement, and limited access to f ood and income. As of late September – the peak of the local dry season – over 4.5 million  livestock had died in these areas, according to regional governments, with millions more in e xtremely poor condition. As livestock body conditions deteriorate, milk availability is dwind ling, and livestock are increasingly unsellable. In search of pasture and water, pastoralists are a typically moving their livestock to the highlands of Oromia Region and Siti and Fafan zones of th e Somali Region. In addition to minimal income from livestock and milk sales, pastoralists are earning reduced income from ﬁrewood and charcoal sales and petty trading amid increased compet ition and falling demand. Low household income, coupled with high food prices, contin ue to severely restrict ﬁnancial access to food among many pastoral households in southern and sou theastern Ethiopia. As many households have sustained food consumption gaps over time, a cute food insecurity is visibly manifesting in rising acute malnutrition levels among chi ldren and adults. In June, admissions to Therapeutic Feeding Program centers were over 10 percen t higher than in June 2021. While humanitarian assistance is helping to mitigate food consumption deﬁcits among beneﬁciaries, there remains very high concern for the risk of deteriora tion in food security conditions beyond Emergency (IPC Phase 4) if food aid is not consist ently delivered or if
 (page [2]) quantities remain inadequate.
 (page [2]) In northern Ethiopia, the renewed and escalating conﬂict has led to increased population displacement and the disruption of harvesting, market, and huma nitarian activities. As of late September, OCHA reported that around 23,000 people are ne wly displaced. Given that current conﬂict dynamics are ﬂuid and information on the conﬂict's impacts on  the harvest is limited, the magnitude of harvest losses is not yet clear. However, in areas where conﬂict is not active the harvest is ongoing and nearing completion in late September,  with households consuming food from own production. According to the Food Cluster, humanitari ans continued to distribute available supplies of assistance in September, reaching over 3.2  million people. While humanitarians are reprioritizing available supplies to recently d isplaced people, many recipients are receiving partial rations, and in areas where conﬂict is active , households are unlikely to receive assistance at all. While the meher harvest is likely to mitigate some of the most extreme outcomes for much of the population, Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes with some households in Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) will most likely persist th rough at least January 2023. There is a risk that more extreme outcomes could emerge if conﬂict sign iﬁcantly restricts harvest
 (page [2]) activities and people movement.
 (page [2]) In northern pastoral areas, generally favorable June to Septembe r karma/karan  rainfall reduced the extremely large rainfall deﬁcits that emerged during the March  to May diraac/sugum  season. This has improved pasture and water availability, which in tu rn has driven improvements in livestock body conditions. Nevertheless, livestock herds are low, espe cially in areas adjacent to Tigray, which limits household income from both livestock and mil k sales. Furthermore, the resumption of conﬂict has newly displaced over 107,000 people, while heavy rainfall and ﬂooding
 (page [2]) :36 AM
 (page [3]) f=
 (page [3]) i=) USAID12/14/22, 10 :36 AM Ethiopia - Key Message Update: Tue, 2022-09-27 Page 4 of 4 https://fews.net/print/east-africa/ethiopia/key-message-update/september-2022of the Awash River displaced around 60,000 people. Given t he limited ability of households to earn income due to conﬂict in Zones 2 and 4 of Afar, Emergency (I PC Phase 4) outcomes are expected through at least January 2023. In the rest of southe rn Afar and northern Somali regions, seasonal improvement in income from livestock is expected in non-conﬂict affected areas, which will likely lead to improvement in food security ou tcomes to Stressed (IPC Phase 2)
 (page [3]) in October.
 (page [3]) On the national level, June to September kiremt  rainfall was generally favorable across much of the country, resulting in favorable cropping conditions for meher crops, including short-cycle meher crops. However, national meher production is expected to be lower than normal due to several factors, including conﬂict; the poor performance of the belg rains, which led to the failure of some long-cycle meher crops; high agricultural input costs; and poor rainfall during the kiremt season in SNNP and Sidama regions, which has led to poor croppi ng conditions for short-cycle
 (page [3]) meher crops.
 (page [3]) Annual inﬂation remains high, driven by high food and fuel prices along with poor macroeconomic conditions. According to the Central Statistics Agency, inﬂation stood at 32.5 percent in August, which is one percentage point lower than July’s annual inﬂation rate. Additionally, the ETB continues to depreciate on the formal and parallel markets, with the ETB depreciating by 14.1 percent and 19.0 percent, respectively, f rom August 2021 to August 2022. According to WFP, fuel prices were nearly 90 percent higher in Au gust than at the same time last year. High fuel costs increase transportation costs for people an d increase the cost of transporting goods across the country, thereby placing upward pressu re on the market prices of essential goods, especially in deﬁcit-producing areas. The high food prices and the overall high and the rising cost of living in Ethiopia limit households’ ability to purchase food and non-food items to meet their basic needs. In Adama market in Oromia, maize p rices in August were over 85 percent higher than the three-year average.
 (page [3]) Region Contact Information:
 (page [3]) Email: [email protected]
 (page [3]) https://fews.net/east-africa/ethiopia/key-message-update/september-2 022
 (page [3]) FEWS NET is a USAID-funded activity. The content of this report does not necessarily reﬂect the view of the United States Agency for International Development or the United Stat es Government.
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 data/transition_reports/FEWS NET/Press Release - HoA 2023 MAM Rains.pdf
 (page [0]) FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE:
 (page [0]) November 7, 2022
 (page [0]) Contact: Hannah Button, Communications T eam Lead,
 (page [0]) Famine Early Warning Systems Network
 (page [0]) Email:     [email protected]
 (page [0]) UNPRECEDENTED SIXTH CONSECUTIVE SEASON OF DROUGHT FORECAST IN HORN OF AFRICA: HUNGER SURGES AS
 (page [0]) HUMANITARIAN EFFORTS REMAIN UNDERFUNDED
 (page [0]) Washington, D.C. – Sixteen international organizations have joined forces to warn, once again, of the already dire and deteriorating food security crisis in the eastern Horn of Africa. On Monday, the Famine Early Warning Systems Network (FEWS NET) was among a consortium of food security organizations that issued a new Joint Statement urging the humanitarian community to immediately increase funding for the Ethiopia, Kenya, and Somalia drought response. Record-breaking levels of acute food insecurity are being recorded across the region, which has experienced a relentless series of droughts over the last two years. Another poor rainy season is expected in the remaining months of 2022, and forecasts now indicate a significant likelihood that the March-to-May 2023 rainy season will also be below-average. “We are already witnessing a poor start to the current rainy season in the Horn, and FEWS NET scientists have compared model forecasts of Pacific Ocean sea surface temperatures with previous years to warn that we may well see another failed rainy season in 2023,” FEWS NET T eam Leader Kiersten Johnson said. “Even if the March-to-May rainy season performs well, it will take years for impacted communities in the eastern Horn to recover from the damage that has already been done over the past two years of drought.” According to the Joint Statement, 20.9 million people across Ethiopia, Kenya, and Somalia are acutely food insecure. Increases in child deaths have been observed across the region, and 7.46 million children under the age of five are estimated to face acute malnutrition. The drought is also contributing to significant health risks, including multiple ongoing disease outbreaks. “We do not need to wait for a formal Famine declaration in any of these countries to warrant action,” Johnson said. “Millions of peoples’ lives are already at risk. Lives will continue to be lost and people will continue to suffer if the drought response continues to be underfunded.” For the latest information on Ethiopia, Kenya, and Somalia and the ongoing drought situation in the eastern Horn of Africa, follow FEWS NET on T witter andFacebook andsubscribe for updates.
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 (page [1]) About FEWS NET: FEWS NET, the Famine Early Warning Systems Network, is a leading provider of early warning and analysis on acute food insecurity around the world. Created in 1985 by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) in response to devastating famines in East and West Africa, FEWS NET provides unbiased, evidence-based analysis to governments and relief agencies who plan for and respond to humanitarian crises. FEWS NET analysts and specialists work with scientists, government ministries, international agencies, and NGOs to track and publicly report on conditions in the world’s most food-insecure countries. The content of this press release does not necessarily reflect the view of the United States Agency for International Development or the United States Government. For more information, visit: www.fews.net .
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 data/transition_reports/FEWS NET/Somalia-ALERT-202212-final_0.pdf
 (page [0]) FEWS NET
 (page [0]) FAMINE EARLY WARNING SYSTEMS NETWORK FSNAU
 (page [0]) Food Security and Nutrition
 (page [0]) Analysis Unit - Somalia W/
 (page [0]) PCAC Regs}
 (page [0]) Wogooyi
 (page [0]) ETHIOPIA
 (page [0]) Middle}Jubay Galbeed
 (page [0]) sTogdheers
 (page [0]) Hiiraan:
 (page [0]) Middle
 (page [0]) I
 (page [0]) Kilometers   IPC V3.0 Acute Food Insecurity Phase
 (page [0]) |: Minimal
 (page [0]) 1) 2:Stressed
 (page [0]) Mm 3: Crisis
 (page [0]) Ml 4: Emergency
 (page [0]) Mil S: Famine
 (page [0]) OQ Concentration of displaced people
 (page [0]) Would likely be at least one phase
 (page [0]) worse without current or programmed
 (page [0]) humanitarian assistance       Baidoa District
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 (page [0]) Burhakaba District
 (page [0]) LY Coy ee Tey     IPC V3.0 Acute Food Insecurity Phase
 (page [0]) |: Minimal
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 (page [0]) MB 3: Crisis
 (page [0]) MMM 4: Emergency
 (page [0]) Mi 5S: Famine
 (page [0]) QO Concentration of displaced people
 (page [0]) Would likely be at least one phase ! worse without current or programmed
 (page [0]) humanitarian assistance
 (page [0]) USAID
 (page [0]) FROM THE AMERICAN PEOPLE
 (page [0]) FEWS NET Somalia
 (page [0]) somalia @fews.net
 (page [0]) www.fews.net/ somalia  FEWS NET is a USAID -funded activity. The content of this report does not necessarily reflect the view of the United States Agency for International Development or the United States Government.
 (page [0]) SOMALIA  Food Security Alert  Dece mber 13, 2022 As deaths  continue t o accumulate  despite assistance , Somalia is projected to face Famine in 2023 Famine (IPC Phase 5) is projected to emerge in three  areas in southern Somalia in April -June 2023 if current high levels of multi -sectoral humanitarian assistance are not sustained. These areas include rural areas in Baidoa and Burhakaba districts in Bay Region  and settlements of internally displaced people  (IDPs)  in Baidoa and Mogadishu. After warnings of the likelihood of Famine (IPC Phase 5) were issued in September 2022, governments and humanitarians responded with a significant scale -up in assistance that has thus far prevented the minimum thresholds  for Famine (IPC Phase 5) from being met; however, food security outcomes remain very near the famine thresholds and high levels of acute malnutrition and hunger -related mortality, exacerbated by concurrent disease outbreaks, are still ongoing.  The Famine (IPC Phase 5) thresholds are expected to be meti during the April -June 2023 projection period based on currently available information that humanitarian food assistance will decline to minimal levels a fter March 2023 due to insufficient funds.  Furthermore, several other areas are assessed to face a risk of Famineii in central and southern Somalia. Donor governments and humanitarians must act immediately to mitigate the acceleration of deaths and destitution in Bay Region and Mogadishu , at a minimum,  and across Somalia  more broadly . The latest IPC analysis update  – conducted by experts across multiple agencies, including FEWS NET and FSNAU – anticipates that up to 8.3 million people will need urgent  humanitarian food  assistance through at least mid -2023 in order to treat and prevent hunger  and acute malnutrition and reduce the accumulation of ongoing, hunger -related deaths.  The scale of humanitarian interventions  in Som alia currently exceed s that of  any year of the past decade , reaching 5.8 million people with food assistance and 1.1 million people with acute mal nutrition treatment  and prevention  assistance since January . Nevertheless, the scale of the response is not keeping pace with the historic level of need amid the relentless 2.5-year What is a Famine declaration? According to the IPC protocols, Famine (IPC Phase 5) is declared when at least 20 percent of the population  in a given area currently  has an extreme lack of food, resulting in extremely critical levels of acute malnutrition (≥30  percent of  children under five) and significant levels of mortality attributed to starvation and/ or the interaction of malnutrition and disease (≥2 people per
 (page [0]) 10,000 dying per day).
 (page [0]) What is a Famine projection?
 (page [0]) Available information and the likely evolution of events suggest that Famine (IPC Phase 5), as defined above, is likely to occur in
 (page [0]) the future .
 (page [0]) Figure 1. Projected food security outcomes, Somalia, April -June 2023 Figure 2. Projected food security outcomes, Burhakaba and Baidoa districts in Bay Region and Mogadishu, April -June 2023
 (page [0]) Source: Somalia IPC multi-partner consensus analysis
 (page [1]) igadishu between April
 (page [1]) SOMALIA  Food Security Alert    December 13, 2022 Famine Early Warning Systems Network  and Food Security and Nutrition Analysis Unit  2 drought, record -high staple food prices, persistent conflict  and insecurity , and disease outbreaks . The October -December 2022 deyr rains have performed 40 -70 percent below average across  large swaths of Somalia, resulting in a fifth consecutive season of poor -to-failed crop production and livestock losses in the areas most affected by  drought.  The drought continues to result in rising levels of destitution and displace ment, with over 1.3 million people displaced by drought  since early 2021. Moreover , a sixth consecutive below -average rainfall season is forecast in April -June 2023 , which would break yet another historical record  for the longest drou ght sequence and further prolong the humanitarian catastrophe into late 2023 . Amid concurrent water scarcity  and measles and cholera outbreaks , millions of households continue to face s evere hunger and acute malnutrition and e xcess mortality levels remain elevated . Household survey data collected by FSNAU and partners in late October 2022 found that acute malnutrition among children under five is still affectin g 19.8 to 24.5 percent of the  rural and displaced  population s in Baidoa, Burhakaba, and Mogadishu, while mor tality levels have breached the Famine (IPC Phase 5) threshold among children under five among displaced populations in Baidoa and Moga dishu. The loss of livelihoods in rural areas continues to compel hundreds of thousands of people to seek assistance in d isplacement sites, where the dense concentration of displaced people exceed s the availability of water, sanitation, health, and nutrit ion services. Lengthy journeys to displacement sites, challenges in timely registration processes for assistance amid  the large  volume of need, very low vaccination coverage, and poor sanitation and hygiene conditi ons are converging with severe hunger to drive high disease incidence , with the worst outcomes observed among new IDP arrivals . These results, which are in the presence of food assistance reaching well over  50 percent of the rural and IDP population in Baidoa and Burhakaba and over  25 percent of the IDP population  in Mogadishu , are indicative of Emergency ! (IPC Phase 4 !)iii  outcomes that are near Famine (IPC Phase 5). Prospects for recovery in the worst drought -affected areas of southern Somalia  will remain  slim until at least late 2023 . The 2022 deyr season cereal harvest in January is expected to be 40 -60 percent below the 1995 -2021 average,  resulting from both poor rainfall and the abandonment of fields given the scale of current displa cement. M illions of poor households are expected to harvest minimal to no food stocks and will face concurrent, steep decline s in income from agricu ltural labor. Livestock are also generally in poor and unsalable condition  with little to no milk productivity , and around 40 percent of rural household  survey respondents  in Bay Region reported they no longer own ed any livestock in October  2022 . Staple food prices remain exorbitantly high and out of reach for most poor households , approaching or exceeding double the five -year average in major southern markets such as Baidoa, Qoryoley , and Mogadishu , and  prices are not expected to decline significa ntly in the near -to-medium term. With the next rainy season in April -June 2023 also forecast to be below average,  household food and income from crop and livestock production will remain very low through the next gu harvest in July 2023 . As a result, livelihoods are expected to erode further , and destitution  levels will rise, until the next rainy season starts in late 2023 . If additional funding is not obtained to scale -up and sustain multi -sectoral assistance, then additional hunger -related deaths and destitution will occur in the coming months and accelerate to meet the Famine (IPC Phase 5) thresholds in April -June 2023 , when many households will lack any other options for survival . While food assistance is expected  to reach 5.8 million people per month on average in Somalia through March and will most likely sustain Emergency! (IPC Phase 4!)  outcomes in Bay Region and Mogadishu during that time, information from the Somalia Food Security Cluster suggests the numbe r of beneficiaries will drop by  60-80 percent by April due to funding shortfall s. Without this critical lifeline , Famine (IPC Phase 5) is expected to occur  among rural and displaced households in the three areas of Bay Region and Mogadishu between April and June . Furthermore, while it is not currently considered to be the most likely scena rio, there is a credible risk of Famine among pastoral  populations in Hawd, Addun, and Coastal Deeh livelihood zones in central, Hiiraa n, and northeastern regions; agropastoral  populations in Middle Shabelle  Region ; and displaced populations in Garowe ( Nugaal Region) , Galkacyo  (Mudug Region) , and Dollow (Gedo Region) if rainfall performs worse than forecast in April -June  and food assistan ce remains low . Even if the technical thresholds for Famine (IPC Phase 5) are not reached during this period,  a scale -up in the humanitarian response is still critically needed to lower the ongoing high leve ls of acute malnutrition and excess mortality that occur amid Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes . Without significantly higher levels of assistance , the accumulation of deaths will undoubtedly be substantial , and it remain s within the realm of possibility that hunger -related deaths over the course of this (2020 -2023) drought could exceed that of the 2011 -12 Famine in Somalia without the thresholds for Famine ever offici ally being met, as widespread hunger -related death can occur well before  (or in the absence of) an official Famine declaration. Recommend Citation: FEWS NET and FSNAU . Somalia Food Security Alert: As deaths continue to accumulate despite assistance, Somalia is projected to face Famine in 2023 , December 2022. i The IPC Famine Review Committee  (FRC)  reviewed the analysis  and ultimately determined it was not possible for them to endorse the projecti on of Famine given the high degree of uncertainty and volatility of the drivers; however, the FRC recommended t hat IPC partners release the projection with  a clear outline of the assumptions behind that scenario. ii “Risk of Famine” is defined as a scenario in which Famine (IPC Phase 5) would oc cur if a specific set of events evolve worse than assumed and projected in the  most -likely scenario. In order for a scenario to describe a “Risk of Famine” it must have a reasonable li kelihood of occurrence, even though it does not represent  the most  likely scenario. iii A classification of Emergency! (IPC Phase 4!) indicates Famine (IP C Phase 5) would be expected in the absence of humanitarian assistance distributio ns.
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 path: data/transition_reports/FEWS NET/Somalia-ALERT-202212-final_0.pdf
 author: FEWS NET and FSNAU
 title: FEWS NET and FSNAU Somalia Food Security Alert, December 13, 2022
 creatione date: 2022-12-13 13:26:39-05:00



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 data/transition_reports/World Bank Climate Change Country Reports/15520-WB_Colombia Country Profile-WEB (3).pdf
 (page [0]) COLOMBIA
 (page [0]) CLIMATE RISK COUNTRY PROFILE
 (page [1]) ymmons CC BY-NC-ND 2.0. © Dorninic Chavez/
 (page [1]) isterstown, MD,
 (page [1]) ii CLIMATE RISK COUNTRY PROFILE: COLOMBIACOPYRIGHT © 2021 by the World Bank Group 1818 H Street NW, Washington, DC 20433
 (page [1]) Telephone: 202-473-1000; Internet: www.worldbank.org
 (page [1]) This work is a product of the staff of the World Bank Group (WBG) and with external contributions. The opinions, ﬁndings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this work are those of the authors and do not necessarily reﬂect the views or the ofﬁcial policy or position of the WBG, its Board of Executive Directors, or the governments it represents. The WBG does not guarantee the accuracy of the data included in this work and do not make any warranty, express or implied, nor assume any liability or responsibility for any consequence of their use. This publication follows the WBG’s practice in references to member designations, borders, and maps. The boundaries, colors, denominations, and other information shown on any map in this work, or the use of the term “country” do not imply any judgment on the part of the WBG, its Boards, or the governments it represents, concerning the legal status of any territory or geographic area or the endorsement or acceptance
 (page [1]) of such boundaries.
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 (page [1]) RIGHTS AND PERMISSIONS
 (page [1, 2]) The material in this work is subject to copyright. Because the WBG encourages dissemination of its knowledge, this work may be reproduced, in whole or in part, for noncommercial purposes as long as full attribution to this work is given. Please cite the work as follows: Climate Risk Proﬁle: Colombia (2021): The World Bank Group. Any queries on rights and licenses, including subsidiary rights, should be addressed to World Bank Publications, The World Bank Group, 1818 H Street NW, Washington, DC 20433, USA; fax: 202-522-2625; e-mail: [email protected] . Cover Photos:  © Noelia Diaz, “ Colombia ” August 1, 2015” via Flickr, Creative Commons CC BY-NC-ND 2.0. © Dominic Chavez/ World Bank “ City of Bogotá ” January 10, 2016 via Flickr, Creative Commons CC BY-NC-ND 2.0. Graphic Design:  Circle Graphics , Reisterstown, MD. iii CLIMATE RISK COUNTRY PROFILE: COLOMBIAACKNOWLEDGEMENTS This proﬁle is part of a series of Climate Risk Country Proﬁles developed by the World Bank Group (WBG). The country proﬁle synthesizes most relevant data and information on climate change, disaster risk reduction, and adaptation actions and policies at the country level. The country proﬁle series are designed as a quick reference source for development practitioners to better integrate climate resilience in development planning and policy making. This effort is managed and led by Veronique Morin (Senior Climate Change Specialist, WBG) and Ana E. Bucher (Senior Climate Change Specialist, WBG). This proﬁle was written by Fernanda Zermoglio (Senior Climate Change Consultant, WBG) and MacKenzie Dove (Senior Climate Change Consultant, WBG). Additional support was provided by Yunziyi Lang (Climate Change Analyst, WBG) and Jason
 (page [2]) Johnston (Operations Analyst, WBG).
 (page [2]) Climate and climate-related information is largely drawn from the Climate Change Knowledge Portal (CCKP) , a WBG online platform with available global climate data and analysis based on the latest Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) reports and datasets. The team is grateful for all comments and suggestions received from the sector, regional, and country development specialists, as well as climate research scientists and institutions for their advice and guidance on use of climate
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 (page [3]) iv CLIMATE RISK COUNTRY PROFILE: COLOMBIAFOREWORD .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 1 COUNTRY OVERVIEW  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 2 CLIMATOLOGY   .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 4 Clim/a.altt/e.alt B/a.alts/e.altlin/e.alt  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 4 Ov/e.altrvi/e.altw  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 4 K/e.alt/y.alt Tr/e.altnds   .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 6 Clim/a.altt/e.alt Futur/e.alt  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 7 Ov/e.altrvi/e.altw  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 7 K/e.alt/y.alt Tr/e.altnds   .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 9 CLIMATE RELATED NATURAL HAZARDS  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  10 Ov/e.altrvi/e.altw   .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  10 K/e.alt/y.alt Tr/e.altnds .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  12 Implic/a.alttions for DRM  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  14 CLIMATE CHANGE IMPACTS TO KEY SECTORS  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  15 A/g.altricultur/e.alt   .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  15 W/a.altt/e.altr .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  17 Co/a.altst/a.altl Zon/e.alts /a.altnd S/e.alt/a.alt L/e.altv/e.altl Ris/e.alt   .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  18 En/e.altr/g.alt/y.alt   .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 20 H/e.alt/a.altlth .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 22 ADAPTATION .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  24 Institution/a.altl Fr/a.altm/e.altwork for Ad/a.altpt/a.alttion .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 24 Polic/y.alt Fr/a.altm/e.altwork for Ad/a.altpt/a.alttion   .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 24 R/e.altcomm/e.altnd/a.alttions .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  25 R/e.alts/e.alt/a.altr ch G/a.altps .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 25 D/a.altt/a.alt /a.altnd Inform/a.alttion G/a.altps  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  25 Institution/a.altl G/a.altps  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  25
 (page [3]) CONTENTS
 (page [4]) 1 CLIMATE RISK COUNTRY PROFILE: COLOMBIA Climate change is a major risk to good development outcomes, and the World Bank Group is committed to playing an important role in helping countries integrate climate action into their core development agendas. The World Bank Group is committed to supporting client countries to invest in and build a low-carbon, climate-resilient future, helping them to be better prepared to adapt to current and future climate impacts. The World Bank Group is investing in incorporating and systematically managing climate risks in development operations through its individual corporate commitments. A key aspect of the World Bank Group’s Action Plan on Adaptation and Resilience (2019) is to help countries shift from addressing adaptation as an incremental cost and isolated investment to systematically incorporating climate risks and opportunities at every phase of policy planning, investment design, implementation and evaluation of development outcomes. For all IDA and IBRD operations, climate and disaster risk screening is one of the mandatory corporate climate commitments. This is supported by the Bank Group’s Climate and Disaster Risk Screening Tool which enables all Bank staff to assess short- and long-term climate and disaster risks in operations and national or sectoral planning processes. This screening tool draws up-to-date and relevant information from the World Bank’s Climate Change Knowledge Portal, a comprehensive online ‘one-stop shop’ for global, regional, and country data related to climate change and development. Recognizing the value of consistent, easy-to-use technical resources for client countries as well as to support respective internal climate risk assessment and adaptation planning processes, the World Bank Group’s Climate Change Group has developed this content. Standardizing and pooling expertise facilitates the World Bank Group in conducting initial assessments of climate risks and opportunities across sectors within a country, within institutional portfolios across regions, and acts as a global resource for development practitioners. For developing countries, the climate risk proﬁles are intended to serve as public goods to facilitate upstream country diagnostics, policy dialogue, and strategic planning by providing comprehensive overviews of trends and projected changes in key climate parameters, sector-speciﬁc implications, relevant policies and programs, adaptation priorities and opportunities for further actions. It is my hope that these efforts will spur deepening of long-term risk management in developing countries and our engagement in supporting climate change adaptation planning at operational levels.
 (page [4]) Bernice Van Bronkhorst
 (page [4]) Global Director
 (page [4]) Climate Change Group (CCG)
 (page [4]) The World Bank Group (WBG)
 (page [5]) FOREWORD
 (page [5]) * National capital =,
 (page [5]) 2 CLIMATE RISK COUNTRY PROFILE: COLOMBIA
 (page [5]) COUNTRY OVERVIEW
 (page [5]) Colombia, located in the northwest corner of South America, is a topographically diverse country traversed by the Andes Mountains with lowland plains in the east. It has a 3,208 kilometers (km) coastline along both the Paciﬁc Ocean to the east and the Caribbean Sea to the north and the northern edges of the Amazon basin’s tropical rainforests are located in the southeast. The country is considered the 25th largest nation in the world, covering 1,138,910 km2 of land. The Andes, represented by the Cordillera Occidental, reaches up to 15,000 ft in elevation, and the Cordillera Central hosts several snow-covered volcanos including the Nevado del Ruiz and Nevado de Santa Isabel, that extend to over 17 ,000 ft in elevation ( Figure 1 ). Between these mountains, which traverse the country, lies the Magdalena River valley, home to Colombia’s
 (page [5]) important oil reserves.
 (page [5]) Colombia is a populous country, with an estimated 50.8 million people in 20202 with projections suggesting the country’s population could reach nearly 56 million people by 2050 ( Table 1 ). Most of the country’s population is concentrated in the Andean highlands and along the Caribbean coast. The expansive eastern and southern llanos and tropical forests are home to less than 10% of the country’s population. An estimated 81.4% of the country’s population live in urban areas and this is projected to increase to 88.8% by 2050. Despite its middle-income status, Colombia’s wealth is heavily concentrated in the country’s capital city, Bogota, and in cities such as Medellin and Cali, and most rural regions of the country remain severely underdeveloped. Though poverty rates have seen signiﬁcant improvements since the 2000s, extreme inequalities continue to be signiﬁcant and the national poverty rate in 2017 was still estimated to be 49.6%, with Choco remaining the poorest province bordering the northern Paciﬁc coast. After accelerating to 3.3% in 2019, economic growth was on track to accelerate further in 2020, however, the COVID-19 pandemic hit the economy hard, causing the worst recession in almost half a century.3 1 World B/a.altnk Group (2019). Int/e.altrn/a.altl Clim/a.altt/e.alt Mi/g.altr/a.alttion Proﬁl/e.alt – Colombi/a.alt. 2 World B/a.altnk Op/e.altn D/a.altt/a.alt, D/a.altt/a.alt R/e.alttri/e.altv/e.altd M/a.altrch 2021. D/a.altt/a.alt B/a.altnk: Popul/a.alttion Estim/a.altt/e.alts /a.altnd Proj/e.altctions, Colombi/a.alt. URL: https:/ /
 (page [5]) d/a.altt/a.altb/a.altnk.worldb/a.altnk.or/g.alt/d/a.altt/a.alt/r/e.altports./a.altspx?sourc/e.alt=h/e.alt/a.altlth-nutrition-/a.altnd-popul/a.alttion-st/a.alttistics:-popul/a.alttion-/e.altstim/a.altt/e.alts-/a.altnd-proj/e.altctions
 (page [6]) 3 World B/a.altnk (2021). Colombi/a.alt – Ov/e.altrvi/e.altw. URL: https:/ /www.worldb/a.altnk.or/g.alt//e.altn/countr/y.alt/colombi/a.alt/ov/e.altrvi/e.altw FIGURE 1. T opo/g.altr/a.altph/y.alt  of Colombi/a.alt1
 (page [6]) AL
 (page [6]) (2019)
 (page [6]) (2018)
 (page [6]) (2019)
 (page [6]) -) (2019)
 (page [6]) Nationally-Determined
 (page [6]) > in 2018, QD,
 (page [6]) 2020, and its Third National
 (page [6]) oe
 (page [6]) 3 CLIMATE RISK COUNTRY PROFILE: COLOMBIAThe ND-GAIN Index5 ranks 181 countries using a score which calculates a country’s vulnerability to climate change and other global challenges as well as their readiness to improve resilience. This Index aims to help businesses and the public sector better identify vulnerability and readiness in order to better prioritize investment for more efﬁcient responses to global challenges. Due to a combination of political, geographic, and social factors, Colombia is recognized as vulnerable to climate change impacts, ranked 89 out of 181 countries in the 2020 ND-GAIN Index. The more vulnerable a country is the lower their score, while the more ready a country is to improve its resilience the higher it will be. Norway has the highest score and is ranked 1st. Figure 2  is a time-series plot of the ND-GAIN
 (page [6]) Index showing Colombia’s progress.
 (page [6]) Colombia submitted its Nationally-Determined
 (page [6]) Contribution  (NDC) to the UNFCCC in 2018, its Updated NDC  in 2020, and its Third National Communication  (NC3) in 2017 , in support of the country’s efforts to realize its development goals and increase its resilience to climate change by
 (page [6]) enhancing mitigation and adaptation implementation
 (page [6]) efforts. The Colombian territory is highly vulnerable to extreme events, particularly ﬂooding from “La Nina” phenomena. Vulnerability hotspots include the Caribbean and the Andean regions, with key sectors
 (page [6]) including housing, transport, energy, agriculture
 (page [6]) and health. Adaptation is guided by the National Adaptation Plan to Climate Change (PNACC in Spanish), which was formulated in 2011, and has been implemented through different territorial and
 (page [6]) sectorial efforts.6
 (page [6]) TABLE 1. D/a.altt/a.alt sn/a.altpshot: K/e.alt/y.alt d/e.altv/e.altlopm/e.altnt indic/a.alttors4
 (page [6]) Indicator
 (page [6]) Life Expectancy at Birth, Total (Years)  (2019) 77. 3 Population Density (People per sq. km Land Area)  (2018) 44.8 % of Population with Access to Electricity  (2019) 99.8% GDP per Capita (Current US$ ) (2019) $6,428.71 FIGURE 2. ND-GAIN  Ind/e.altx for Colombi/a.alt
 (page [6]) Colombia
 (page [6]) 1997
 (page [6]) 2000
 (page [6]) 2003
 (page [6]) 2006
 (page [6]) 2009
 (page [6]) 2012
 (page [6]) 2015
 (page [6]) 2018Score
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 (page [6]) 42
 (page [6]) 44
 (page [6]) 46
 (page [6]) 48
 (page [6]) 50
 (page [6, 7]) 4 World B/a.altnk (2021). D/a.altt/a.altB/a.altnk – World D/e.altv/e.altlopm/e.altnt Indic/a.alttors. URL: https:/ /d/a.altt/a.altb/a.altnk.worldb/a.altnk.or/g.alt/sourc/e.alt/world-d/e.altv/e.altlopm/e.altnt-indic/a.alttors 5 Univ/e.altrsit/y.alt of Notr/e.alt D/a.altm/e.alt (2020). Notr/e.alt D/a.altm/e.alt Glob/a.altl Ad/a.altpt/a.alttion Initi/a.alttiv/e.alt. URL: https:/ //g.alt/a.altin.nd./e.altdu/our-work/countr/y.alt-ind/e.altx/ 6 Colombi/a.alt (2020). Upd/a.altt/e.altd N/a.alttion/a.altll/y.alt-D/e.altt/e.altrmin/e.altd Contribution. URL: https:/ /www4.unfccc.int/sit/e.alts/ndcst/a.alt/g.altin/g.alt/Publish/e.altdDocum/e.altnts/
 (page [7]) Colombi/a.alt%20First/NDC%20/a.altctu/a.altli/z.alt/a.altd/a.alt%20d/e.alt%20Colombi/a.alt.pdf
 (page [7]) 4 CLIMATE RISK COUNTRY PROFILE: COLOMBIAGr/e.alt/e.altn, Inclusiv/e.alt /a.altnd R/e.altsili/e.altnt R/e.altcov/e.altr/y.alt The coronavirus disease (COVID-19) pandemic has led to unprecedented adverse social and economic impacts. Further, the pandemic has demonstrated the compounding impacts of adding yet another shock on top of the multiple challenges that vulnerable populations already face in day-to-day life, with the potential to create devastating health, social, economic and environmental crises that can leave a deep, long-lasting mark. However, as governments take urgent action and lay the foundations for their ﬁnancial, economic, and social recovery, they have a unique opportunity to create economies that are more sustainable, inclusive and resilient. Short and long- term recovery efforts should prioritize investments that boost jobs and economic activity; have positive impacts on human, social and natural capital; protect biodiversity and ecosystems services; boost resilience; and advance the
 (page [7]) decarbonization of economies.
 (page [7]) Clim/a.altt/e.alt B/a.alts/e.altlin/e.alt
 (page [7]) Ov/e.altrvi/e.altw
 (page [7]) Colombia is recognized as a megadiverse country with a diverse range of ecosystems, such as paramos, mangroves, wetlands, coral reefs, glaciers, oceans, and tropical forests, as well as signiﬁcant biodiversity and water resources.7 Colombia’s climate is tropical along the coast and the eastern lowlands, and cooler in the highlands and Andes. The country’s topographic diversity deﬁnes the three recognized climatic zones: the high elevation cold zones ( tierra fria), located above 2,000 meters (m) in elevation, with mean annual temperatures ranging between 13°C–17°C, a temperate zone ( tierra templada ), located between 1,000 m–2,000 m, with mean annual temperatures of approximately 18°C, and a tropical zone ( tierra caliente ), which covers all areas below 1,000 m and mean annual temperatures of 24°C–27°C. Average annual rainfall is 2,630 mm; but there is signiﬁcant variability across the country. The West Paciﬁc coast and in the Andean interior receive the highest rainfall amounts (approximately 6 mm–7 ,000 mm per year), while the drier steppe climates in the north and south west receive less than 500 mm per year. The Andean regions experience a bimodal pattern of rains during April–June and October–December, while the northern Caribbean region, due to its proximity to the equator, experiences a single rainy season between May–October. Inter-annual rainfall variability is inﬂuenced by the El Niño Southern Oscillation (ENSO). The ENSO brings droughts and warmer weather and La Niña is associated with ﬂoods and cooler weather in Colombia, particularly between June and August.8
 (page [7]) CLIMATOLOGY
 (page [7]) 7 Colombi/a.alt (2020). Upd/a.altt/e.altd N/a.alttion/a.altll/y.alt-D/e.altt/e.altrmin/e.altd Contribution. URL: https:/ /www4.unfccc.int/sit/e.alts/ndcst/a.alt/g.altin/g.alt/Publish/e.altdDocum/e.altnts/
 (page [7]) Colombi/a.alt%20First/NDC%20/a.altctu/a.altli/z.alt/a.altd/a.alt%20d/e.alt%20Colombi/a.alt.pdf
 (page [8]) 8 Colombi/a.alt (2016). Pl/a.altn N/a.altcion/a.altl d/e.alt Ad/a.altpt/a.altcion /a.altl C/a.altmbio Clim/a.alttico. URL: https:/ /www.min/a.altmbi/e.altnt/e.alt./g.altov.co/im/a.alt/g.alt/e.alts/c/a.altmbioclim/a.alttico/
 (page [8]) pdf/Pl/a.altn_n/a.altcion/a.altl_d/e.alt_/a.altd/a.altpt/a.altcion/1._Pl/a.altn_N/a.altcion/a.altl_d/e.alt_Ad/a.altpt/a.altci%C3%B3n_/a.altl_C/a.altmbio_Clim%C3%A1tico.pdf
 (page [8]) ~ Table 2) shows historical
 (page [8]) Figure 3). 4
 (page [8]) OQ,
 (page [8]) 5 CLIMATE RISK COUNTRY PROFILE: COLOMBIAColombia is highly vulnerable to the impacts of climate variability and change as the country already routinely experiences damaging droughts and ﬂoods. The heavy rains in 2010 and 2011, for example, caused over $6 billion in damages to crops and infrastructure, and displaced many. The economically important coffee industry is highly vulnerable to rising temperatures and hydrologic events. Water provision is heavily reliant on glacier melt, which under rising temperatures are projected to continue receding. Analysis of data from the World Bank Group’s Climate Change Knowledge Portal (CCKP) ( Table 2 ) shows historical climate information. Mean annual temperature for Colombia is 24.37°C, with average monthly temper atures ranging between 23°C (June, July) and 35°C (March). Mean annual precipitation is 2,629 mm, with year-round rainfall and highest rainfall occurring May to July, as shown in the latest climatology, 1991–2020 ( Figure 3 ).9 Figure 4 presents the spatial variation of observed average annual precipitation and temperature. TABLE 2. D/a.altt/a.alt sn/a.altpshot: Countr/y.alt-l/e.altv/e.altl summ/a.altr/y.alt st/a.alttistics
 (page [8]) Climate Variables 1991–2020
 (page [8]) Mean Annual Temperature (°C) 24.8°C
 (page [8]) Mean Annual Precipitation (mm) 2,627 .9 mm Mean Maximum Annual Temperature (°C) 29.5°C Mean Minimum Annual Temperature (°C) 20.2°C
 (page [8]) Rainfall Temperature
 (page [8]) Temperature (°C)
 (page [8]) Rainfall (mm)
 (page [8]) Jan
 (page [8]) Feb
 (page [8]) Mar
 (page [8]) Apr
 (page [8]) May
 (page [8]) Jun
 (page [8]) Jul
 (page [8]) Aug
 (page [8]) Sep
 (page [8]) Oct
 (page [8]) Nov
 (page [8]) Dec
 (page [8]) 24
 (page [8]) 24.4
 (page [8]) 24.8
 (page [8]) 25.2
 (page [8]) 25.6
 (page [8]) 0
 (page [8]) 100
 (page [8]) 200
 (page [8]) 300
 (page [8]) 400FIGURE 3. Av/e.altr/a.alt/g.alt/e.alt monthl/y.alt t/e.altmp/e.altr/a.alttur/e.alt /a.altnd r/a.altinf/a.altll of Colombi/a.alt for 1991–202010 9 WBG Clim/a.altt/e.alt Ch/a.altn/g.alt/e.alt Knowl/e.altd/g.alt/e.alt Port/a.altl (CCKP, 2021). Colombi/a.alt Historic/a.altl D/a.altt/a.alt. URL: https:/ /clim/a.altt/e.altknowl/e.altd/g.alt/e.altport/a.altl.worldb/a.altnk.or/g.alt/
 (page [8]) countr/y.alt/south-/a.altfric/a.alt/clim/a.altt/e.alt-d/a.altt/a.alt-historic/a.altl
 (page [9]) 10 WBG Clim/a.altt/e.alt Ch/a.altn/g.alt/e.alt Knowl/e.altd/g.alt/e.alt Port/a.altl (CCKP, 2021). Colombi/a.alt Historic/a.altl D/a.altt/a.alt. URL: https:/ /clim/a.altt/e.altknowl/e.altd/g.alt/e.altport/a.altl.worldb/a.altnk.or/g.alt/
 (page [9]) countr/y.alt/colombi/a.alt/clim/a.altt/e.alt-d/a.altt/a.alt-historic/a.altl
 (page [9]) 3500
 (page [9]) 3400
 (page [9]) 3300
 (page [9]) 3200
 (page [9]) 3100 10N
 (page [9]) 2800
 (page [9]) 2700
 (page [9]) 2500
 (page [9]) 2400
 (page [9]) 2300
 (page [9]) 2200
 (page [9]) 2100 SN
 (page [9]) 1800
 (page [9]) 1700
 (page [9]) 1600
 (page [9]) — 1400
 (page [9]) 1200
 (page [9]) 1100
 (page [9]) —— 1000
 (page [9]) 5S
 (page [9]) 75W 7OW 75W 70W
 (page [9]) Figure 5). Maximum
 (page [9]) 6 CLIMATE RISK COUNTRY PROFILE: COLOMBIAK/e.alt/y.alt Tr/e.altnds
 (page [9]) Temperature
 (page [9]) Temperatures in Colombia have already increased by at least 1°C in the last twenty years ( Figure 5 ). Maximum temperatures have risen between 1°C per decade in the high mountains, and 0.6°C per decade in the sub-paramo regions. The number of warm nights12 have increased, while the number of cold nights13 have decreased.
 (page [9]) Precipitation
 (page [9]) Precipitation patterns exhibit a high degree of inter-annual variability in Colombia, while ENSO brings droughts and warmer weather, La Niña is associated with ﬂoods and cooler weather in Colombia, particularly between June and August. Nevertheless, a statistically signiﬁcant i ncrease in rainfall between March and December was recorded between 1950 and 2006, which is partly offset by a decrease in June–April rains, though the latter are not statistically signiﬁcant.FIGURE 4. M/a.altp of /a.altv/e.altr/a.alt/g.alt/e.alt /a.altnnu/a.altl t/e.altmp/e.altr/a.alttur/e.alt (°C) (l/e.altft); /a.altnnu/a.altl pr/e.altcipit/a.alttion (mm) (ri/g.altht)
 (page [9]) for Colombi/a.alt, 1991–202011
 (page [9]) 11 WBG Clim/a.altt/e.alt Ch/a.altn/g.alt/e.alt Knowl/e.altd/g.alt/e.alt Port/a.altl (CCKP, 2021). Colombi/a.alt Historic/a.altl D/a.altt/a.alt. URL: https:/ /clim/a.altt/e.altknowl/e.altd/g.alt/e.altport/a.altl.worldb/a.altnk.or/g.alt/
 (page [9]) countr/y.alt/colombi/a.alt/clim/a.altt/e.alt-d/a.altt/a.alt-historic/a.altl
 (page [10]) 12 “W/a.altrm: ni/g.altht is d/e.altﬁn/e.altd b/y.alt th/e.alt t/e.altmp/e.altr/a.alttur/e.alt /e.altxc/e.alt/e.altd/e.altd on 10% of d/a.alt/y.alts or ni/g.althts in curr/e.altnt clim/a.altt/e.alt of r/e.alt/g.altion or s/e.alt/a.altson. 13 “Cold” ni/g.altht is d/e.altﬁn/e.altd b/y.alt th/e.alt t/e.altmp/e.altr/a.alttur/e.alt b/e.altlow which 10% of d/a.alt/y.alts or ni/g.althts /a.altr/e.alt r/e.altcord/e.altd in curr/e.altnt clim/a.altt/e.alt of th/a.altt r/e.alt/g.altion or s/e.alt/a.altson.
 (page [10]) arios are referred
 (page [10]) Table 3 provides
 (page [10]) —  S.
 (page [10]) 7 CLIMATE RISK COUNTRY PROFILE: COLOMBIAClim/a.altt/e.alt Futur/e.alt
 (page [10]) Ov/e.altrvi/e.altw
 (page [10]) The main data source for the World Bank Group’s Climate Change Knowledge Portal (CCKP) is the CMIP5 (Coupled Inter-comparison Project No.5) data ensemble, which builds the database for the global climate change projections presented in the Fifth Assessment Report (AR5) of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). Four Representative Concentration Pathways (i.e. RCP2.6, RCP4.5, RCP6.0, and RCP8.5) were selected and deﬁned by their total radiative forcing (cumulative measure of GHG emissions from all sources) pathway and level by 2100. The RCP2.6 for example represents a very strong mitigation scenario, whereas the RCP8.5 assumes business-as-usual scenario. For more information, please refer to the RCP Database . For simpliﬁcation, these scenarios are referred to as a low (RCP2.6); a medium (RCP4.5) and a high (RCP8.5) emission scenario in this proﬁle. Table 3  provides CMIP5 projections for essential climate variables under high emission scenario (RCP 8.5) over 4 different time horizons. Figure 6  presents the multi-model (CMIP5) ensemble of 32 Global Circulation Models (GCMs) showing the projected changes in annual precipitation and temperature for the periods 2040–2059 and 2080–2099.FIGURE 5. Obs/e.altrv/e.altd t/e.altmp/e.altr/a.alttur/e.alt for Colombi/a.alt, 1901–202014
 (page [10]) Annual mean
 (page [10]) Smoothed
 (page [10]) 1911 1901 1921 1931 1941 1951 1961 1971 1981 1991 2001 2011 2020
 (page [10]) 23
 (page [10]) 24
 (page [10]) 25
 (page [10]) 26Temperature (°C)
 (page [10]) 14 WB Clim/a.altt/e.alt Ch/a.altn/g.alt/e.alt Knowl/e.altd/g.alt/e.alt Port/a.altl (CCKP, 2021). Colombi/a.alt URL: https:/ /clim/a.altt/e.altknowl/e.altd/g.alt/e.altport/a.altl.worldb/a.altnk.or/g.alt/countr/y.alt/colombi/a.alt/ clim/a.altt/e.alt-d/a.altt/a.alt-historic/a.altlTABLE 3. D/a.altt/a.alt sn/a.altpshot: CMIP5 /e.altns/e.altmbl/e.alt proj/e.altction Cmip5 Ensemble Projection 2020–2039 2040–2059 2060–2079 2080–2099 Annual Temperature Anomaly (°C) +0.64 to +2.17
 (page [10]) (+1.05°C)+1.2 to +3.87
 (page [10]) (+1.88°C)+1.96 to +5.6
 (page [10]) (+2.85°C)+2.54 to +7 .13
 (page [10]) (+3.88°C)
 (page [10]) Annual Precipitation Anomaly (mm) -40.96 to +44.70
 (page [10]) (+1.87 mm)-54.37 to +70.76
 (page [10]) (+0.81mm)-73.28 to +92.24
 (page [10]) (+5.15 mm)-89.78 to +116.43
 (page [10]) (+5.99 mm)
 (page [11]) Note:  The table shows CMIP5 ensemble projection under RCP8.5. Bold value is the range (10th–90th Percentile) and values in parentheses show the median (or 50th Percentile).
 (page [11]) wm =
 (page [11]) +4 12N
 (page [11]) 10N —
 (page [11]) 4N
 (page [11]) 15
 (page [11]) 12N —
 (page [11]) 10N —
 (page [11]) 8N
 (page [11]) 6N
 (page [11]) 4N
 (page [11]) 76W 74W 72W 70W 68W 78W 76W 74w 72W 7OW 68W 78w   x 8
 (page [11]) ee ose
 (page [11]) 12N
 (page [11]) z
 (page [11]) nN -
 (page [11]) 10oN — 10N
 (page [11]) 8N
 (page [11]) 6N 6N
 (page [11]) 4N
 (page [11]) 2N —
 (page [11]) °
 (page [11]) 2s
 (page [11]) 4S
 (page [11]) 76W 74W 72W 7OwW 68W 78W 76W 74w 72W 7OW 68W 78W 8 CLIMATE RISK COUNTRY PROFILE: COLOMBIAFIGURE 6. CMIP5 multi-mod/e.altl /e.altns/e.altmbl/e.alt proj/e.altct/e.altd ch/a.altn/g.alt/e.alt (32 GCMs) in /a.altnnu/a.altl t/e.altmp/e.altr/a.alttur/e.alt (top) /a.altnd pr/e.altcipit/a.alttion (bottom) b/y.alt 2040–2059 (l/e.altft) /a.altnd b/y.alt 2080–2099 (ri/g.altht), r/e.altl/a.alttiv/e.alt to
 (page [11]) 1986–2005 b/a.alts/e.altlin/e.alt und/e.altr RCP8.515
 (page [12]) 15 WBG Clim/a.altt/e.alt Ch/a.altn/g.alt/e.alt Knowl/e.altd/g.alt/e.alt Port/a.altl (CCKP, 2021). Colombi/a.alt Proj/e.altct/e.altd Futur/e.alt Clim/a.altt/e.alt. URL: https:/ /clim/a.altt/e.altknowl/e.altd/g.alt/e.altport/a.altl.
 (page [12]) worldb/a.altnk.or/g.alt/countr/y.alt//e.altl-s/a.altlv/a.altdor/clim/a.altt/e.alt-d/a.altt/a.alt-proj/e.altctions
 (page [12]) end of the century, primarily impacting the
 (page [12]) i/images/cambioclimatico/
 (page [12]) 9 CLIMATE RISK COUNTRY PROFILE: COLOMBIAK/e.alt/y.alt Tr/e.altnds
 (page [12]) Temperature
 (page [12]) Temperatures across Colombia are projected to continue rising, with mean monthly temperatures projected to rise by +1.88°C by the 2050s and by 3.88°C by the end of the century under a high-emissions scenario (RCP 8.5). Rising temperatures are projected across all months, with slightly sharper increases between December and January. The highest temperature rise is projected for the northeast. As temperatures rise, particularly in the Andean regions, glacier loss is expected to continue, with critical consequences for water availability in this highly populated region. Of critical importance are the number of very hot days (where temperatures are above 35°C), which are projected to increase from approximately 16 to 131 days of the year by the end of the century, primarily impacting the
 (page [12]) Caribbean coast.16
 (page [12]) Across all emissions scenarios, temperatures are projected to continue to rise in Colombia, through the end of the century. As seen in Figure 7 , under a high-emissions scenario (RCP 8.5), average temperatures are projected to rise rapidly after the 2040s. Extreme temperatures, analyzed in terms of the number of days above 35 degrees, are expected to rise signiﬁcantly across the seasonal cycle, with the most pronounced changes occurring during September-October and March to May ( Figure 8 ). Rising temperatures and extreme heat conditions will result in signiﬁcant implications for human and animal health, agriculture, water resources, and ecosystems. Historical RCP 2.6 RCP 4.5 RCP 6.0 RCP 8.5
 (page [12]) 1980
 (page [12]) 2000
 (page [12]) 2020
 (page [12]) 2040
 (page [12]) 2060
 (page [12]) 2080
 (page [12]) 2100
 (page [12]) Year
 (page [12]) 31
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 (page [12]) 29
 (page [12]) 28
 (page [12]) 27
 (page [12]) 26
 (page [12]) 25
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 (page [12]) 23
 (page [12]) Tempierature (°C)FIGURE 7. Historic/a.altl /a.altnd proj/e.altct/e.altd /a.altv/e.altr/a.alt/g.alt/e.alt t/e.altmp/e.altr/a.alttur/e.alt for Colombi/a.alt from 1986 to 2099
 (page [12]) (R/e.altf/e.altr/e.altnc/e.alt P/e.altriod, 1986–2005)17
 (page [12]) Jan
 (page [12]) Feb
 (page [12]) Mar
 (page [12]) Apr
 (page [12]) May
 (page [12]) Jun
 (page [12]) Jul
 (page [12]) Aug
 (page [12]) Sep
 (page [12]) Oct
 (page [12]) Nov
 (page [12]) Dec
 (page [12]) 5.5
 (page [12]) 4.5
 (page [12]) 3.5
 (page [12]) 2.5
 (page [12]) 1.5
 (page [12]) 5.0
 (page [12]) 4.0
 (page [12]) 3.0
 (page [12]) 2.0
 (page [12]) 1.0
 (page [12]) 0.5
 (page [12]) Days
 (page [12]) FIGURE 8. Proj/e.altct/e.altd c h/a.altn/g.alt/e.alt in summ/e.altr d/a.alt/y.alts
 (page [12]) (Tm/a.altx >25°C), (RCP8.5, R/e.altf/e.altr/e.altnc/e.alt P/e.altriod,
 (page [12]) 1986–2005)18
 (page [12]) 16 Colombi/a.alt (2016). Pl/a.altn N/a.altcion/a.altl d/e.alt Ad/a.altpt/a.altcion /a.altl C/a.altmbio Clim/a.alttico. URL: https:/ /www.min/a.altmbi/e.altnt/e.alt./g.altov.co/im/a.alt/g.alt/e.alts/c/a.altmbioclim/a.alttico/
 (page [12]) pdf/Pl/a.altn_n/a.altcion/a.altl_d/e.alt_/a.altd/a.altpt/a.altcion/1._Pl/a.altn_N/a.altcion/a.altl_d/e.alt_Ad/a.altpt/a.altci%C3%B3n_/a.altl_C/a.altmbio_Clim%C3%A1tico.pdf
 (page [12]) 17 WBG Clim/a.altt/e.alt Ch/a.altn/g.alt/e.alt Knowl/e.altd/g.alt/e.alt Port/a.altl (CCKP, 2021). Int/e.altr/a.altctiv/e.alt Clim/a.altt/e.alt Indic/a.alttor D/a.altshbo/a.altrd - A/g.altricultur/e.alt. Colombi/a.alt. URL https:/ /
 (page [12]) clim/a.altt/e.altd/a.altt/a.alt.worldb/a.altnk.or/g.alt/CRM/e.altPort/a.altl/w/e.altb//a.alt/g.altricultur/e.alt/crops-/a.altnd-l/a.altnd-m/a.altn/a.alt/g.alt/e.altm/e.altnt?countr/y.alt=COL&p/e.altriod=2080-2099
 (page [13]) 18 WBG Clim/a.altt/e.alt Ch/a.altn/g.alt/e.alt Knowl/e.altd/g.alt/e.alt Port/a.altl (CCKP, 2021). Int/e.altr/a.altctiv/e.alt Clim/a.altt/e.alt Indic/a.alttor D/a.altshbo/a.altrd - A/g.altricultur/e.alt. Colombi/a.alt. URL https:/ /
 (page [13]) clim/a.altt/e.altd/a.altt/a.alt.worldb/a.altnk.or/g.alt/CRM/e.altPort/a.altl/w/e.altb//a.alt/g.altricultur/e.alt/crops-/a.altnd-l/a.altnd-m/a.altn/a.alt/g.alt/e.altm/e.altnt?countr/y.alt=COL&p/e.altriod=2080-2099
 (page [13]) 10 CLIMATE RISK COUNTRY PROFILE: COLOMBIAPrecipitation Rainfall in Colombia is subject to signiﬁcant interannual variability due to the El Nino Southern Oscillation, which brings droughts and warmer weather, whereas La Niña episodes are associated with ﬂoods and cooler weather in Colombia, particularly between June and August. Nevertheless, statistically signiﬁcant increases in rainfall between March, April and May, and June, July and August have been recorded since 1960. Additionally, the amoun t of rain (maximum 1-day rainfall totals) have seen an increase of 3.5 mm per decade in December, January and February. Maximum 5-day rainfall totals are recorded for all seasons except June–August but with the largest increases in March to May. Maximum 5-days totals in June–August recorded a decrease of 6.48 mm per decade).19 As shown in Figure 9  below, there is signiﬁcant uncertainty on the future of rainfall patterns for Colombia,20 with most scenarios pointing to an average projected increase in annual precipitation is by the end of the century under a high emissions scenario for Colombia as a whole (RCP8.5). However, projections point to signiﬁcant regional variability, with rainfall increasing in Colombia’s Amazon basin and the coastal areas and decreasing in the highlands. Historical RCP 2.6 RCP 4.5 RCP 6.0 RCP 8.5
 (page [13]) 1980
 (page [13]) 2000
 (page [13]) 2020
 (page [13]) 2040
 (page [13]) 2060
 (page [13]) 2080
 (page [13]) 2100
 (page [13]) Year
 (page [13]) Precipitation (mm)
 (page [13]) 3400
 (page [13]) 3200
 (page [13]) 3000
 (page [13]) 2800
 (page [13]) 2600
 (page [13]) 2400
 (page [13]) 2200
 (page [13]) 2000
 (page [13]) 1800
 (page [13]) 1600FIGURE 9. Annu/a.altl /a.altv/e.altr/a.alt/g.alt/e.alt pr/e.altcipit/a.alttion in Colombi/a.alt for 1986 to 2099, (R/e.altf/e.altr/e.altnc/e.alt P/e.altriod,
 (page [13]) 1986–2005)21
 (page [13]) Ov/e.altrvi/e.altw
 (page [13]) Colombia’s diverse landscape is subject to the impacts of extreme events. The highland areas, where the majority of the country’s population is concentrated, are subject to landslides and signiﬁcant ﬂooding due to increased surface run off from snow melt and extreme rainfall on degraded high elevation forest ecosystems which, additionally, increases sediment loads. As temperatures continue to rise, critical glaciers are likely to disappear, further contributing to water shortages in the highlands. In the coastal areas, rising seas, coupled with increased storm surges and hurricanes can lead to localized ﬂooding.22 Droughts are also common, particularly between January and March, as well as July and September, which are drier seasons, and which can lead to water supply shortages CLIMATE RELATED NATURAL HAZARDS 19 UNDP (2012). Clim/a.altt/e.alt Ch/a.altn/g.alt/e.alt Countr/y.alt Proﬁl/e.alts. URL: https:/ /www./g.alt/e.alto/g.alt.ox./a.altc.uk/r/e.alts/e.alt/a.altrch/clim/a.altt/e.alt/proj/e.altcts/undp-cp/ 20 WBG Clim/a.altt/e.alt Ch/a.altn/g.alt/e.alt Knowl/e.altd/g.alt/e.alt Port/a.altl (CCKP, 2021). Colombi/a.alt W/a.altt/e.altr D/a.altshbo/a.altrd. D/a.altt/a.alt D/e.altscription. URL: https:/ /
 (page [13]) clim/a.altt/e.altknowl/e.altd/g.alt/e.altport/a.altl.worldb/a.altnk.or/g.alt/countr/y.alt/colombi/a.alt/clim/a.altt/e.alt-s/e.altctor-w/a.altt/e.altr
 (page [13]) 21 WBG Clim/a.altt/e.alt Ch/a.altn/g.alt/e.alt Knowl/e.altd/g.alt/e.alt Port/a.altl (CCKP, 2021). Clim/a.altt/e.alt D/a.altt/a.alt-Proj/e.altctions. Colombi/a.alt. URL: https:/ /clim/a.altt/e.altd/a.altt/a.alt.worldb/a.altnk.or/g.alt/
 (page [13]) CRM/e.altPort/a.altl/w/e.altb//a.alt/g.altricultur/e.alt/crops-/a.altnd-l/a.altnd-m/a.altn/a.alt/g.alt/e.altm/e.altnt?countr/y.alt=COL&p/e.altriod=2080-2099
 (page [14]) 22 World B/a.altnk (2020). Mod/e.altl/a.altción /y.alt /a.altn/aacute.altlisis d/e.alt ri/e.alts/g.altos c/a.altt/a.altstróﬁcos p/a.altr/a.alt l/a.alt Ali/a.altn/z.alt/a.alt d/e.altl P/a.altcíﬁco (Colombi/a.alt, P/e.altru, M/e.altxico). Imp/a.altcto ﬁsc/a.altl /y.alt socio/e.altconómico d/e.alt /e.altv/e.altntos históricos d/e.alt ori/g.alt/e.altn hidrom/e.altt/e.altoroló/g.altico. Colombi/a.alt. (Unpublish/e.altd). 11 CLIMATE RISK COUNTRY PROFILE: COLOMBIAfor human and agricultural needs.23 The drought related conditions have seen an increase of approximately 2.2 times more frequent than in previous years.24 Abnormal climatic conditions associated with the El Nino phenomenon can produce high temperatures and severe droughts in Colombia, damaging agricultural output and threatening operations at the hydroelectric power projects which generate most domestic energy supplies. Climate related disasters comprise nearly 90% of the emergencies reported in the country between 1998–2011 and represent signiﬁcant economic losses. For example, the 2010–2011 ﬂoods from the La Nina phenomenon cost 500 million pesos (US$133,400) in natural parks; losses in agriculture and infrastructure were valued at 739.9 million pesos, over 470 people lost their lives through the proliferation of water-borne illnesses such as diarrhea, with damages to water infrastructure (sanitation and potable water) estimated at 3.4 billion pesos to infrastructure itself, 417 .8 million pesos to operational costs, and over 525 homes affected, which costs 2.6 billion pesos to rebuild and/or relocate.25,26 For the Amazonas regions, higher-intensity rainfall, associated ﬂoods and potential landslides and land erosion is expected to lead to increased risks of water turbidity and mobilization of pathogens, while periods of drought will lead to higher concentrations of pollutants in the reduced water ﬂows. Higher sediment loads could have negative consequences for biodiversity by increasing hypoxia mortalities due to ﬁne sediment obstruction of the gills, interruption of the photosynthesis of aquatic plants, among others. Enhanced hot seasons have been identiﬁed as increasing the risk of underground ﬁres in the peatlands with severe ecological impacts and carbon emissions.27 Data from the Emergency Event Database: EM-Dat database,28 presented in Table 4 , shows the country has endured various natural hazards, including ﬂoods, landslides, epidemic diseases, storms, earthquakes and droughts,
 (page [14]) costing lives, and economic damage.
 (page [14]) 23 Aror/a.alt, D. (2019). Extr/e.altm/e.alt w/e.alt/a.altth/e.altr /e.altv/e.altnts (drou/g.altht) /a.altnd its imp/a.altct on /a.altss/e.altts, liv/e.altlihoods /a.altnd /g.alt/e.altnd/e.altr rol/e.alts: C/a.alts/e.alt stud/y.alt of sm/a.altll-sc/a.altl/e.alt liv/e.altstock h/e.altrd/e.altrs in C/a.altuc/a.alt, Colombi/a.alt. CCAFS Workin/g.alt P/a.altp/e.altr. CGIAR R/e.alts/e.alt/a.altrch Pro/g.altr/a.altm on Clim/a.altt/e.alt Ch/a.altn/g.alt/e.alt, A/g.altricultur/e.alt /a.altnd Food S/e.altcurit/y.alt (CCAFS). Cop/e.altnh/a.alt/g.alt/e.altn (D/e.altnm/a.altrk). URL: https:/ /c/g.altsp/a.altc/e.alt.c/g.alti/a.altr.or/g.alt/bitstr/e.alt/a.altm/h/a.altndl/e.alt/10568/99725/Liv/e.altstockPlus%20%20
 (page [14]) G/e.altnd/e.altr%20%28002%29.pdf?s/e.altqu/e.altnc/e.alt=5&isAllow/e.altd=/y.alt
 (page [14]) 24 Colombi/a.alt (2016). Pl/a.altn N/a.altcion/a.altl d/e.alt Ad/a.altpt/a.altcion /a.altl C/a.altmbio Clim/a.alttico. URL: https:/ /www.min/a.altmbi/e.altnt/e.alt./g.altov.co/im/a.alt/g.alt/e.alts/c/a.altmbioclim/a.alttico/
 (page [14]) pdf/Pl/a.altn_n/a.altcion/a.altl_d/e.alt_/a.altd/a.altpt/a.altcion/1._Pl/a.altn_N/a.altcion/a.altl_d/e.alt_Ad/a.altpt/a.altci%C3%B3n_/a.altl_C/a.altmbio_Clim%C3%A1tico.pdf
 (page [14]) 25 Colombi/a.alt (2016). Pl/a.altn N/a.altcion/a.altl d/e.alt Ad/a.altpt/a.altción /a.altl C/a.altmbio Clim/aacute.alttico. URL: https:/ /www.min/a.altmbi/e.altnt/e.alt./g.altov.co/im/a.alt/g.alt/e.alts/c/a.altmbioclim/a.alttico/
 (page [14]) pdf/Pl/a.altn_n/a.altcion/a.altl_d/e.alt_/a.altd/a.altpt/a.altcion/1._Pl/a.altn_N/a.altcion/a.altl_d/e.alt_Ad/a.altpt/a.altci%C3%B3n_/a.altl_C/a.altmbio_Clim%C3%A1tico.pdf
 (page [14]) 26 World B/a.altnk (2020). Mod/e.altl/a.altción /y.alt /a.altn/aacute.altlisis d/e.alt ri/e.alts/g.altos c/a.altt/a.altstróﬁcos p/a.altr/a.alt l/a.alt Ali/a.altn/z.alt/a.alt d/e.altl P/a.altcíﬁco (Colombi/a.alt, P/e.altrú, M/e.altxico). Imp/a.altcto ﬁsc/a.altl /y.alt socio/e.altconómico d/e.alt /e.altv/e.altntos históricos d/e.alt ori/g.alt/e.altn hidrom/e.altt/e.altoroló/g.altico. Colombi/a.alt. (Unpublish/e.altd). 27 Fi/e.altld Mus/e.altum (2019). R/a.altpid Biolo/g.altic/a.altl /a.altnd Soci/a.altl Inv/e.altntori/e.alts. B/a.altjo Putum/a.alt/y.alto-Y/a.alt/g.altu/a.alts-Cotú/a.alt Colombi/a.alt /a.altnd P/e.altrú R/e.alt/g.altión. URL: http:/ /
 (page [14]) fm2.ﬁ/e.altldmus/e.altum.or/g.alt/rbi/r/e.altsults./a.altsp
 (page [15]) 28 EM-DAT: Th/e.alt Em/e.altr/g.alt/e.altnc/y.alt Ev/e.altnts D/a.altt/a.altb/a.alts/e.alt - Univ/e.altrsit/e.alt c/a.alttholiqu/e.alt d/e.alt Louv/a.altin (UCL) - CRED, D. Guh/a.alt-S/a.altpir, Bruss/e.altls, B/e.altl/g.altium.
 (page [15]) http:/ //e.altmd/a.altt.b/e.alt//e.altmd/a.altt_db/
 (page [15]) 12 CLIMATE RISK COUNTRY PROFILE: COLOMBIAK/e.alt/y.alt Tr/e.altnds The potential for damage from ﬂoods, droughts and landslides affect millions of people, either due to the occurrence of a severe event, or by several that occur in the same year, is signiﬁcant for Colombia. Since 2016, the Colombian Government has implemented a policy for mobilizing ﬁnancial resources to address the effects of natural disasters and climate change. As the climate changes, weather related disasters are likely to continue, exacerbating existing vulnerabilities in Colombia, such as infrastructure conducted on unstable mountains, which could increase the damage and loss from landslides and avalanches. As temperatures rise, glaciers are likely to be diminished and this will pose a signiﬁcant challenge for water resource management and likely affect all sectors of society.29 The most signiﬁcant disasters for the country include ﬂoods, primarily riverine but also along the coast as the seas rise and increase ﬂash ﬂood events. Studies suggest that  climate change could increase the frequency of occurrence and the intensity of these phenomena. As such, the country is working to understand, anticipate and take action to reduce their impacts. An increase in extreme rainfall events will likely continue to cause localized ﬂooding events. The majority of the country’s Paciﬁc and Caribbean coasts are vulnerable to coastal ﬂooding from rising seas and storm surges ( Figure 10 ).TABLE 4. N/a.alttur/a.altl  dis/a.altst/e.altrs in Colombi/a.alt, 1900–2020
 (page [15]) Natural Hazard
 (page [15]) 1900–2020 SubtypeEvents
 (page [15]) CountTotal
 (page [15]) Deaths Total AffectedTotal Damage
 (page [15]) (’000 USD)
 (page [15]) Drought Drought 2 0 11,000,000
 (page [15]) EpidemicBacterial Disease 2 412 17 ,137 0
 (page [15]) Viral Disease 4 260 104,057
 (page [15]) FloodRiverine Flood 46 2212 10,198,629 3,452,500
 (page [15]) Flash Flood 2 132 166,283
 (page [15]) Coastal Flood 2 14 11,050
 (page [15]) EarthquakeGround Movement 28 3497 1,460,619 2,318,666
 (page [15]) Tsunami 1 111 46
 (page [15]) Landslide (Dry)Avalanche 2 87 2,411
 (page [15]) Landslide 1 160
 (page [15]) Landslide (wet)Avalanche 1 10 117
 (page [15]) Landslide 37 2880 27 ,826 2,400
 (page [15]) Mudslide 4 538 48,139 100,000
 (page [15]) StormTropical Cyclone 4 28 103,074 50,500
 (page [15]) Convective Storm 3 17 8,258
 (page [16, 15]) Volcanic Activity Ash Fall 11 22826 56,964 1,000,000 29 GFDRR (2011). An/a.altl/y.altsis of dis/a.altst/e.altr Risk M/a.altn/a.alt/g.alt/e.altm/e.altnt in Colombi/a.alt: A Contribution to th/e.alt Cr/e.alt/a.alttion of Public Polici/e.alts. URL: https:/ /
 (page [16]) www./g.altfdrr.or/g.alt//e.altn/public/a.alttion//a.altn/a.altl/y.altsis-dis/a.altst/e.altr-risk-m/a.altn/a.alt/g.alt/e.altm/e.altnt-colombi/a.alt-contribution-cr/e.alt/a.alttion-public-polici/e.alts-2011
 (page [16]) 10
 (page [16]) © Mapbox © OpenstreetMa bt © Magpox © Openstreetas Ne ee © Mapbor © Openstreetmop
 (page [16]) [accessed Jul 06 2020].
 (page [16]) 13 CLIMATE RISK COUNTRY PROFILE: COLOMBIARiverine ﬂoods ( Figure 10 ), already a hazard across the country, are likely to get more pronounced as snow melts faster due to rising temperatures from the country’s glaciers. Coupled with the effects of the El Nino Southern Oscillation phenomenon, both the frequency of ﬂoods and droughts will likely increase. In 2015, for example, Colombia experienced one of the worst droughts in its history, with low rainfall drying rivers such as the critical Magdalena and Cauca rivers, the former of which ﬂows were the lowest on record. The Colombian government earmarked 4.2 billion pesos to combat the drought, allocating half of the budget to delivering potable water to affected areas in the north and west, and the other half to the country’s ﬁre departments who struggled to contain the ﬁres that emerged from the drought. The multiyear extreme drought (2012–2015) that occurred in La Guajira, a northeast department of Colombia, saw a more intense El Niño phenomenon, with the drought resulting in substantial losses in the agricultural sector, and numerous communities without water supply.30 As temperatures rise, these will likely (i) exacerbate existing tensions for water between agricultural and livestock needs as well as human populations needs, especially during the dry seasons; (ii) alter water quality from available surface sources; and (iii) increase pressures on urban zones as urbanization rates grow. Small-scale farmers are particularly vulnerable to the effects of climate change due to their dependency on rainfed agriculture for food production and income generation, as well as their limited capacity to adapt. Extreme weather events such as droughts negatively impact agro-pastoralists’ livelihoods due to the loss of productive assets, severely affecting
 (page [16]) their food security.31
 (page [16]) FIGURE 10. Risk of riv/e.altrin/e.alt ﬂood (l/e.altft),32 l/a.altndslid/e.alts (c/e.altnt/e.altr),33 risks of cost/a.altl ﬂoods (ri/g.altht)34 30 V/e.altl/a.altsqu/e.alt/z.alt, C. (2016). Dis/a.altst/e.altr Risk M/a.altn/a.alt/g.alt/e.altm/e.altnt in Colombi/a.alt. URL: https:/ /www.r/e.alts/e.alt/a.altrch/g.alt/a.altt/e.alt.n/e.altt/public/a.alttion/314090911_Dis/a.altst/e.altr_
 (page [16]) Risk_M/a.altn/a.alt/g.alt/e.altm/e.altnt_in_Colombi/a.alt  [/a.altcc/e.altss/e.altd Jul 06 2020].
 (page [16, 17]) 31 FAO (2017). Colombi/a.alt R/e.altsili/e.altnc/e.alt Pro/g.altr/a.altmm/e.altr – 2017–2020. URL: http:/ /www.f/a.alto.or/g.alt/3//a.alt-i7584/e.alt.pdf 32 ThinkH/a.alt/z.alt/a.altrd! (2020) Colombi/a.alt – Riv/e.altr Flood: URL: https:/ /www.thinkh/a.alt/z.alt/a.altrd.or/g.alt//e.altn/r/e.altport/57-colombi/a.alt/FL 33 ThinkH/a.alt/z.alt/a.altrd! (2020) Colombi/a.alt – Co/a.altst/a.altl Flood. URL: https:/ /www.thinkh/a.alt/z.alt/a.altrd.or/g.alt//e.altn/r/e.altport/57-colombi/a.alt/CF 34 ThinkH/a.alt/z.alt/a.altrd! (2020). Colombi/a.alt – L/a.altndslid/e.alt URL: https:/ /www.thinkh/a.alt/z.alt/a.altrd.or/g.alt//e.altn/r/e.altport/57-colombi/a.alt/LS
 (page [17]) i/images/cambioclimatico/
 (page [17]) 14 CLIMATE RISK COUNTRY PROFILE: COLOMBIAImplic/a.alttions for DRM The potential for damage from ﬂoods, droughts and landslides affect millions of people, either due to the occurrence of a severe event, or by several that occur in the same year, is signiﬁcant for Colombia. Since 2016, the Colombian Government has implemented a policy for mobilizing ﬁnancial resources to address the effects of natural disasters and climate change.35 The Colombian Government continues to be committed to strengthening its capacity to manage and reduce disaster risks. Colombia’s National Adaptation Plan36 considers disaster risk management and climate change adaptation as complementary actions that need to be taken to safeguard the country’s development goals. Disaster risk management in Colombia recognizes the need to integrate environmental, climate change and land use management into risk management process as a way of safeguarding the safety, welfare, and sustainable development of the country. It is managed through a decentralized system of intergovernmental councils and committees under the National Risk Disaster System (SNRGD). SNRGD coordinates among six agencies: the National Council for Risk Management, the National Unit for Disaster Risk Management, the National Committee for Risk Knowledge, the National Committee for Risk Reduction, the National Committee for Disaster Management and Departmental and municipal councils for Risk Management.37
 (page [17]) Gender
 (page [17]) An increasing body of research has shown that climate-related disasters have impacted human populations in many areas including agricultural production, food security, water management and public health. The level of impacts and coping strategies of populations depends heavily on their socio-economic status, socio-cultural norms, access to resources, poverty as well as gender. Research has also provided more evidence that the effects are not gender neutral, as women and children are among the highest risk groups. Key factors that account for the differences between women’s and men’s vulnerability to climate change risks include: gender-based differences in time use; access to assets and credit, treatment by formal institutio ns, which can constrain women’s opportunities, limited access to policy discussions and decision making, and a lack of sex-disaggregated data for policy change.38 35 World B/a.altnk (2020). Mod/e.altl/a.altción /y.alt /a.altn/aacute.altlisis d/e.alt ri/e.alts/g.altos c/a.altt/a.altstróﬁcos p/a.altr/a.alt l/a.alt Ali/a.altn/z.alt/a.alt d/e.altl P/a.altcíﬁco (Colombi/a.alt, P/e.altru, M/e.altxico). Imp/a.altcto ﬁsc/a.altl /y.alt socio/e.altconómico d/e.alt /e.altv/e.altntos históricos d/e.alt ori/g.alt/e.altn hidrom/e.altt/e.altoroló/g.altico. Colombi/a.alt. (Unpublish/e.altd). 36 Colombi/a.alt (2016). Pl/a.altn N/a.altcion/a.altl d/e.alt Ad/a.altpt/a.altción /a.altl C/a.altmbio Clim/aacute.alttico. URL: https:/ /www.min/a.altmbi/e.altnt/e.alt./g.altov.co/im/a.alt/g.alt/e.alts/c/a.altmbioclim/a.alttico/
 (page [17]) pdf/Pl/a.altn_n/a.altcion/a.altl_d/e.alt_/a.altd/a.altpt/a.altcion/1._Pl/a.altn_N/a.altcion/a.altl_d/e.alt_Ad/a.altpt/a.altci%C3%B3n_/a.altl_C/a.altmbio_Clim%C3%A1tico.pdf
 (page [17]) 37 GFDRR (2011). An/a.altl/y.altsis of dis/a.altst/e.altr Risk M/a.altn/a.alt/g.alt/e.altm/e.altnt in Colombi/a.alt: A Contribution to th/e.alt Cr/e.alt/a.alttion of Public Polici/e.alts. URL: https:/ /
 (page [17]) www./g.altfdrr.or/g.alt//e.altn/public/a.alttion//a.altn/a.altl/y.altsis-dis/a.altst/e.altr-risk-m/a.altn/a.alt/g.alt/e.altm/e.altnt-colombi/a.alt-contribution-cr/e.alt/a.alttion-public-polici/e.alts-2011
 (page [18]) 38 World B/a.altnk Group (2016). G/e.altnd/e.altr Equ/a.altlit/y.alt, Pov/e.altrt/y.alt R/e.altduction, /a.altnd Inclusiv/e.alt Growth. URL: http:/ /docum/e.altnts1.worldb/a.altnk.or/g.alt/cur/a.altt/e.altd/
 (page [18]) /e.altn/820851467992505410/pdf/102114-REVISED-PUBLIC-WBG-G/e.altnd/e.altr-Str/a.altt/e.alt/g.alt/y.alt.pdf
 (page [18]) years been used for palm oil 15 CLIMATE RISK COUNTRY PROFILE: COLOMBIAA/g.altricultur/e.alt
 (page [18]) Ov/e.altrvi/e.altw
 (page [18]) Agriculture is an important source of export earnings and food security in Colombia. The country’s diverse climates allow for an equally diverse crop mix and accounted for 6% of GDP in 2018.39 Coffee, produced at largely small scales, has long been the backbone of Colombia’s agriculture, and the country is one of the most important exporters of coffee in the world. Tropical fruits such as bananas and plantains, along with sugarcane are important coastal and alluvial crops.40 Cut ﬂowers are a growing industry, worth over US$1 billion per year. Other crops grown include rice, maize, cotton, beans, oil palm, and tobacco. Cattle production is widespread, and the country’s dairy industry is growing. Livestock rearing, and the deforestation associated, takes place across the country, however practices have impacted the Amazon region the most. In 2018, the Amazon represented 70% of deforestation in the country and in 2019, 62%. It is also a leading driver of deforestation in the tropical lowland regions of the Orinoco river watershed. The coastal zones around Magdalena have for over 20 years been used for palm oil production, and Colombia is among the top exporters of palm oil in the world. Oil palm production in the Orinoquia region, is has also been a driver of natural savannas and wetlands transformation Additionally, deforestation is linked to the production of coca plants, a source of cocaine, but only in certain areas of the country, Narino and Cataumbo. Despite considerable progress in poverty reduction - from 45% in 2005 to 30.6% in 2013, a signiﬁcant portion of the Colombian population still lives in poverty and extreme poverty, requiring food assistance41.
 (page [18]) Clim/a.altt/e.alt Ch/a.altn/g.alt/e.alt Imp/a.altcts
 (page [18]) Agricultural activity in Colombia is vulnerable to the wide range of extreme events that the country regularly experiences, including ﬂoods and droughts, as well as rising temperatures and desertiﬁcation driven by poor land use practices.42 The projected impacts from a changing climate on food production, agricultural livelihoods and food security in Colombia are signiﬁcant national policy concerns. Impacts are crucially linked to future projected water supply constraints. The ﬂoods brought about through the La Niña phenomenon in 2010–2011 brought signiﬁcant losses, lowered crop yields and damaging rice, vegetables, and corn. The livestock sector also suffered ﬂooding of 1,165,413 hectares, equivalent to 3% of the livestock area. Small scale agriculture is especially vulnerable in areas over-exploited by livestock. Much of the country’s agroecosystems are vulnerable to the effects of drought, soil erosion, desertiﬁcation and changes in the rainfall and hydrological regimes. The increase of droughts in inland areas pose a risk to crops and livestock. Projections suggest that by 2050, climate change in Colombia will impact CLIMATE CHANGE IMPACTS TO KEY SECTORS 39 World B/a.altnk Group (2020). D/a.altt/a.altb/a.altnk – Countr/y.alt Proﬁl/e.alt: Colombi/a.alt. URL: https:/ /d/a.altt/a.altb/a.altnk.worldb/a.altnk.or/g.alt/vi/e.altws/r/e.altports/r/e.altportwid/g.alt/e.altt./a.altspx?
 (page [18]) R/e.altport_N/a.altm/e.alt=Countr/y.altProﬁl/e.alt&Id=b450fd57&tb/a.altr=/y.alt&dd=/y.alt&inf=n&/z.altm=n&countr/y.alt=COL  [Acc/e.altss/e.altd Jul/y.alt 06 2020].
 (page [18]) 40 FAO (2020). Int/e.alt/g.altr/a.alttin/g.alt A/g.altricultur/e.alt in N/a.alttion/a.altl Ad/a.altpt/a.alttion Pl/a.altns (NAP-A/g.alt) – Colombi/a.alt. URL: http:/ /www.f/a.alto.or/g.alt/in-/a.altction/n/a.altps/
 (page [18]) p/a.altrtn/e.altr-countri/e.alts/colombi/a.alt//e.altn/ .
 (page [19]) 41 FAO (2017). R/e.altsili/e.altnc/e.alt Pro/g.altr/a.altm in Colombi/a.alt 2017–2020. URL: http:/ /www.f/a.alto.or/g.alt/3//a.alt-i7584/e.alt.pdf 42 FAO (2020). N/a.alttion/a.altl Ad/a.altpt/a.alttion Pro/g.altr/a.altm in Colombi/a.alt. URL: http:/ /www.f/a.alto.or/g.alt/in-/a.altction/n/a.altps/p/a.altrtn/e.altr-countri/e.alts/colombi/a.alt//e.altn/
 (page [19]) https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/
 (page [19]) 16 CLIMATE RISK COUNTRY PROFILE: COLOMBIA14% of the GDP corresponding to agriculture, and that without adaptation, 80% of the country’s crops could be impacted in more than 60% of their current areas of cultivation, especially high value perennial and export crops. Further, highly specialized niche crops such as coffee, cocoa, and other fruits will likely see critical changes in the
 (page [19]) prevalence of pests and diseases.43
 (page [19]) Rising temperatures, particularly daily maximum
 (page [19]) temperatures, pose an increased risk of heat stress for livestock and could signiﬁcantly reduce critical crop yields for rural populations. Under present climate conditions, heat stress already poses challenges for heat dissipation in livestock populations, rendering them vulnerable to heat stress during certain periods of the year. Heat stress can reduce milk production and reproduction, particularly for cattle. As heat increases, so is the likelihood of altered growing seasons. Figure 11  shows the projected change in average daily maximum temperatures for Colombia across the seasonal cycle. What is clear is that higher temperatures are expected throughout the year.
 (page [19]) Ad/a.altpt/a.alttion Options
 (page [19]) Colombia launched a National Adaptation Program speciﬁcally for agriculture in 2017 , following the country’s landmark National Adaptation Plan (Plan Nacional de Adaptacion al Cambio Climatico, PNACC) in 2012. One of the most important goals of the NAPag program is to build the evidence base for understanding the impacts of climate change on Colombia’s diverse agriculture sector.45 Adaptation strategies to be implemented include varietal changes to certain crops or aligning planting dates with evolving rainfall patterns. Such strategies could be successful in the cultivation of beans, potatoes and citric fruits. Irrigation systems to supplement water supplies during dry periods could help to reduce the risk from droughts to rice and other key crops. Other crops, such as coffee, however, would require speciﬁc adaptation strategies such as altitudinal migration to higher elevation areas or shading, whereas adaptation in the sugarcane industry will require the planting of varieties resistant to higher temperatures, which are also less water intensive. There is  a clear role for the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development (MADR) to promote investments in climate impact assessments, fu nding smallholder adaptation pilots, ﬁnancing and expanding national extension mechanisms to achieve an adequate level of technology transfer to rural producers, and establishing agricultural insurance mechanisms for smallholder farmers.46
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 (page [19]) 1Temperature (°C)
 (page [19]) FIGURE 11. Av/e.altr/a.alt/g.alt/e.alt d/a.altil/y.alt m/a.altx t/e.altmp/e.altr/a.alttur/e.alt
 (page [19]) for Colombi/a.alt, (RCP8.5, R/e.altf/e.altr/e.altnc/e.alt P/e.altriod,
 (page [19]) 1986–2005)44
 (page [19]) 43 R/a.altmir/e.alt/z.alt-Vill/e.alt/g.alt/a.alts, J. M. S/a.altl/a.alt/z.alt/a.altr, A. J/a.altrvis /a.altnd C.E. N/a.altv/a.altrro-R/a.altcin/e.alts (2012). A w/a.alt/y.alt forw/a.altrd on /a.altd/a.altpt/a.alttion to clim/a.altt/e.alt ch/a.altn/g.alt/e.alt in Colombi/a.altn /a.alt/g.altricultur/e.alt: p/e.altrsp/e.altctiv/e.alts tow/a.altrds 2050. Clim/a.alttic Ch/a.altn/g.alt/e.alt 115,611–628(2012). URL: https:/ /link.sprin/g.alt/e.altr.com//a.altrticl/e.alt/10.1007/
 (page [19]) s10584-012-0500-/y.alt
 (page [19]) 44 WBG Clim/a.altt/e.alt Ch/a.altn/g.alt/e.alt Knowl/e.altd/g.alt/e.alt Port/a.altl (CCKP, 2021). Colombi/a.alt A/g.altricultur/e.alt. D/a.altshbo/a.altrd URL: https:/ /clim/a.altt/e.altd/a.altt/a.alt.worldb/a.altnk.or/g.alt/
 (page [19]) CRM/e.altPort/a.altl/w/e.altb//a.alt/g.altricultur/e.alt/crops-/a.altnd-l/a.altnd-m/a.altn/a.alt/g.alt/e.altm/e.altnt?countr/y.alt=SLV&p/e.altriod=2080-2099
 (page [19]) 45 Colombi/a.alt (2020). Upd/a.altt/e.altd N/a.alttion/a.altll/y.alt-D/e.altt/e.altrmin/e.altd Contribution. URL: https:/ /www4.unfccc.int/sit/e.alts/ndcst/a.alt/g.altin/g.alt/Publish/e.altdDocum/e.altnts/
 (page [19]) Colombi/a.alt%20First/NDC%20/a.altctu/a.altli/z.alt/a.altd/a.alt%20d/e.alt%20Colombi/a.alt.pdf
 (page [20]) 46 OECD (2015). OECD R/e.altvi/e.altw of A/g.altricultur/a.altl Polici/e.alts – Colombi/a.alt, URL: https:/ /www.min/a.alt/g.altricultur/a.alt./g.altov.co/R/e.altport/e.alts/Colombi/a.alt_%20A/g.altc_
 (page [20]) R/e.altvi/e.altw.pdf
 (page [20]) ) of coverage
 (page [20]) m
 (page [20]) 17 CLIMATE RISK COUNTRY PROFILE: COLOMBIAW/a.altt/e.altr
 (page [20]) Ov/e.altrvi/e.altw
 (page [20]) Colombia is technically among one of the most water-rich countries of the world, with nearly 50,000 cubic meters of water available per person, per year. Nevertheless, the unequal distribution of the population in the Caribbean coast and the highlands, coupled with pollution, deforestation and a highly variable rainfall regime make water resources management a critical challenge for the country. The Magdalena-Cauca river basins, which traverse the Andes chains across Colombia, are critically important surface water sources in Colombia. Covering a total land area of approximately 273,000 km2, or 24% of the Colombian territory, the basins house 80% of the country’s population and supports a majority (80%) of the country’s GDP.47 Infrastructure developments intended to safeguard water supplies have increased the geographical imbalance of water resources.
 (page [20]) Clim/a.altt/e.alt Ch/a.altn/g.alt/e.alt Imp/a.altcts
 (page [20]) Altered rainfall patterns will inevitably impact water resource availability across Colombia. The reductions of river ﬂows due to the El Nino phenomenon alone are signiﬁcant, particularly in the Magdalena-Cauca river basin, which can see reductions of 26% in ﬂows, the middle Cauca river basin with reductions of 38%, the Sogamoso and Suarez river basins reductions of 30%, and in Sumapaz and Antioquia Department reductions of 30–40%. La Nina impacts can exceed ﬂows of the Cauca River by 60% of their normal level.48 Over 60% of Colombia’s energy is predominantly water-powered, further exacerbating the vulnerability of the country to reduced ﬂows. High elevation glacier peaks in the Andes are a critical source of water for the country. Rising temperatures are already leading to rapid de-glaciations, particularly in the last 30 years, with losses of 3–5% of coverage per year and a retreat of glacial volumes of 20–25 m
 (page [20]) per year.49
 (page [20]) Figure 12  shows the projected annual Standardized Precipitation Evapotranspiration Index (SPEI), an index which represents the measure of the given water deﬁcit in a speciﬁc location, accounting for contributions
 (page [20]) of temperature-dependent evapotranspiration and
 (page [20]) providing insight into increasing or decreasing pressure on water resources. Negative values for SPEI represent dry conditions, with values below −2 indicating severe
 (page [20]) Historical
 (page [20]) RCP 2.6
 (page [20]) RCP 4.5
 (page [20]) RCP 6.0
 (page [20]) RCP 8.5
 (page [20]) 1.5
 (page [20]) 1.0
 (page [20]) 0.5
 (page [20]) 0
 (page [20]) –0.5
 (page [20]) –1.0
 (page [20]) –1.5
 (page [20]) –2.0
 (page [20]) –2.5
 (page [20]) IndexFIGURE 12. Annu/a.altl  SPEI Drou/g.altht Ind/e.altx in Colombi/a.alt for th/e.alt p/e.altriod, 1986 to 2099
 (page [20]) (R/e.altf/e.altr/e.altnc/e.alt P/e.altriod, 1986–2005)50
 (page [20]) 47 Vivisc/a.alts, C. /a.altnd Rodri/g.altu/e.alt/z.alt, E. (2019). Ev/a.altlu/a.alttion of r/e.alt/a.altn/a.altl/y.altsis d/a.altt/a.alt in th/e.alt stud/y.alt of m/e.altt/e.altorolo/g.altic/a.altl /a.altnd h/y.altdrolo/g.altic/a.altl drou/g.althts in th/e.alt M/a.alt/g.altd/a.altl/e.altn/a.alt- C/a.altuc/a.alt riv/e.altr b/a.altsin, Colombi/a.alt. URL: http:/ /www.sci/e.altlo.or/g.alt.co/sci/e.altlo.php?pid=S0012-73532019000400268&script=sci_/a.altrtt/e.altxt&tln/g.alt=/e.altn 48 G/a.altrci/a.alt, M. /e.altt /a.altl., (2012). Clim/a.altt/e.alt v/a.altri/a.altbilit/y.alt, clim/a.altt/e.alt ch/a.altn/g.alt/e.alt /a.altnd th/e.alt w/a.altt/e.altr r/e.altsourc/e.alt in Colombi/a.alt. En/g.altin/e.alt/e.altrin/g.alt M/a.alt/g.alt/a.alt/z.altin/e.alt . 36 (2012).
 (page [20]) URL: http:/ /www.sci/e.altlo.or/g.alt.co/sci/e.altlo.php?pid=S0121-49932012000100012&script=sci_/a.altrtt/e.altxt&tln/g.alt=/e.altn
 (page [20]) 49 World B/a.altnk (2017). Environm/e.altnt/a.altl Prioriti/e.alts /a.altnd Pov/e.altrt/y.alt R/e.altduction – A Countr/y.alt Environm/e.altnt/a.altl An/a.altl/y.altsis for Colombi/a.alt. URL: https:/ /
 (page [20]) op/e.altnknowl/e.altd/g.alt/e.alt.worldb/a.altnk.or/g.alt/bitstr/e.alt/a.altm/h/a.altndl/e.alt/10986/6700/405210Env0prio101OFFICIAL0USE0ONLY1.pdf?s/e.altqu/e.altnc/e.alt=1&isAllow/e.altd=/y.alt
 (page [21]) 50 WBG Clim/a.altt/e.alt Ch/a.altn/g.alt/e.alt Knowl/e.altd/g.alt/e.alt Port/a.altl (CCKP, 2021). Colombi/a.alt. W/a.altt/e.altr S/e.altctor D/a.altshbo/a.altrd. URL: https:/ /clim/a.altt/e.altd/a.altt/a.alt.worldb/a.altnk.or/g.alt/
 (page [21]) CRM/e.altPort/a.altl/w/e.altb//a.alt/g.altricultur/e.alt/crops-/a.altnd-l/a.altnd-m/a.altn/a.alt/g.alt/e.altm/e.altnt?countr/y.alt=COL&p/e.altriod=2080-2099
 (page [21]) 1,760 km of these along the Caribbean Sea and 1,448 km along 18 CLIMATE RISK COUNTRY PROFILE: COLOMBIAdrought conditions, likewise, positive values indicate increased wet conditions. This is an important understanding for the water sector in regard to quantity and quality of supply for human consumption and agriculture use as well as for the energy sector as reductions in water availability impacts river ﬂ ow and the hydropower generating capabilities. At national scale, Colombia is expected to experience slightly decreased SPEI through the end of the century,
 (page [21]) representing slightly drier conditions
 (page [21]) Ad/a.altpt/a.alttion Options
 (page [21]) The basin is an essential unit of planning and management for Colombia. Vulnerability studies are underway to understand the varied degrees of impacts across the country’s basins, information that will be useful in prioritizing adaptation measures. Adaptation in the water resources sector should focus on 1) strengthening the capacity of the research community to generate policy-oriented data on watershed management and climate change adaptation, 2) mainstreaming and integrating climate data in decision making related to watershed management, and 3) strengthening systems that optimize water use across a watershed.51 Colombia’s Department of National Planning (DNP) prioritized the long-term sustainability of ecosystem services that will beneﬁt watershed conservation actions throughout the nation. The watershed management plan, Plan de Ordenación y Manejo de la Cuenca (POMCA), is the guiding policy of environmental management of the country’s watersheds, owned and developed by regional corporations. The Policy and National Program for Payments for Environmental Services for the reconstruction of Peace (CONPES 3886) provides guidelines to strengthen the current PES schemes by providing economic incentives to local communities to engage in and improve the use and management of soil,
 (page [21]) forests and water resources.52
 (page [21]) Co/a.altst/a.altl Zon/e.alts /a.altnd S/e.alt/a.alt L/e.altv/e.altl Ris/e.alt
 (page [21]) Ov/e.altrvi/e.altw
 (page [21]) Colombia’s coastal region covers 3,208 km, with 1,760 km of these along the Caribbean Sea and 1,448 km along the Paciﬁc Ocean. Coastal erosion is rampant, with approximately 50% of the Caribbean coastline suffering from erosion due to extreme waves rising seas, and ecosystem destruction brought about by a growing “sun, sea and sand” tourism industry centered around the cities of Cartagena, Barranquilla, Santa Marta and Riohacha. Millions have been invested to safeguard high value coastal infrastructure, including US$25 million in the Puerto Colombia pier, US$6 million for hard defenses including groins, seawall and rip rap revetments, among others.53 51 Colombi/a.alt (2020). Upd/a.altt/e.altd N/a.alttion/a.altll/y.alt-D/e.altt/e.altrmin/e.altd Contribution. URL: https:/ /www4.unfccc.int/sit/e.alts/ndcst/a.alt/g.altin/g.alt/Publish/e.altdDocum/e.altnts/
 (page [21]) Colombi/a.alt%20First/NDC%20/a.altctu/a.altli/z.alt/a.altd/a.alt%20d/e.alt%20Colombi/a.alt.pdf
 (page [21]) 52 G/a.altrci/a.alt, M. /e.altt /a.altl., (2012). Clim/a.altt/e.alt v/a.altri/a.altbilit/y.alt, clim/a.altt/e.alt ch/a.altn/g.alt/e.alt /a.altnd th/e.alt w/a.altt/e.altr r/e.altsourc/e.alt in Colombi/a.alt. En/g.altin/e.alt/e.altrin/g.alt M/a.alt/g.alt/a.alt/z.altin/e.alt . 36 (2012).
 (page [21]) URL: http:/ /www.sci/e.altlo.or/g.alt.co/sci/e.altlo.php?pid=S0121-49932012000100012&script=sci_/a.altrtt/e.altxt&tln/g.alt=/e.altn
 (page [21]) 53 R/a.altn/g.alt/e.altl-Buitr/a.alt/g.alto, N., Anfuso, G., /a.altnd Willi/a.altms, A. (2015). Co/a.altst/a.altl /e.altrosion /a.altlon/g.alt th/e.alt C/a.altribb/e.alt/a.altn co/a.altst of Colombi/a.alt: M/a.alt/g.altnitud/e.alts, c/a.altus/e.alts /a.altnd m/a.altn/a.alt/g.alt/e.altm/e.altnt. Oc/e.alt/a.altn & Co/a.altst/a.altl M/a.altn/a.alt/g.alt/e.altm/e.altnt. 114 (S/e.altpt/e.altmb/e.altr), p. 129–144. URL: https:/ /www.sci/e.altnc/e.altdir/e.altct.com/
 (page [22]) sci/e.altnc/e.alt//a.altrticl/e.alt/pii/S0964569115001775?c/a.alts/a.alt_tok/e.altn=DN/a.altT/e.alt8/e.altvkLYAAAAA:-dkKBvQpbECposp8M69iP7wuhcHdrVUJsb/z.althqC21DTW
 (page [22]) 5lQDG/z.altj7E72nm61HhhOVm/e.altoA5/y.alt6o6tw
 (page [22]) 43.
 (page [22]) 19 CLIMATE RISK COUNTRY PROFILE: COLOMBIAClim/a.altt/e.alt Ch/a.altn/g.alt/e.alt Imp/a.altcts Warmer ocean temperatures are associated with coral bleaching episodes, as well as reduced growth and reproductive rates of surviving corals. Rising sea levels are projected to ﬂood 4,900 km2 of low coasts and 5,100 km2 inland, affecting between 1.4 to 1.7 million people, 80% of which are living in the Caribbean coast and the other 20% in the Paciﬁc coast. The island of San Andres would see signiﬁcant ﬂooding across its marshes, ridges, and mangroves, with over 10% of its land area ﬂooded by a one-meter rise in sea levels.54 Furthermore, more than 45% of Colombia’s areas of coastal mangroves, grasslands, scrub and lagoons are vulnerable, particularly in the Departments of Magdalena, Nariño and La Guajira.55 Figure 13  shows the annual average sea level change from 1993 to 2015. FIGURE 13. S/e.alt/a.alt l/e.altv/e.altl /a.altnom/a.altl/y.alt in Colombi/a.alt (1993–2015)56
 (page [22]) Sea level anomaly (mm)
 (page [22]) 050100
 (page [22]) –50150
 (page [22]) Year
 (page [22]) Sea level anomaly1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 2015
 (page [22]) Ad/a.altpt/a.alttion Options
 (page [22]) Colombia’s coastal zones are highly vulnerable to multiple stresses. To date, the many hard engineering defenses implemented to safeguard the coasts have had limited success. However, soft engineering measures, ones that work with nature, could help to build the resilience of coastal areas. For example, beach nourishment along popular tourist places such as San Andres, Santa Marta, Puerto Colombia, and Cartagena could protect beach structures. Relocation deserves a priority consideration, particularly along highly erosive coastal roads. Other adaptation strategies could focus on land use changes to reduce ﬂooding and sedimentation, as well as adapting of homes and infrastructure in response to erosion and ﬂooding. Colombia has committed to supporting investigation to better understand and identify hot spots of coastal risks, along with their stressors, in order to prioritize actions.57 54 Colombi/a.alt Pl/a.altn N/a.altcion/a.altl d/e.alt Ad/a.altpt/a.altción /a.altl C/a.altmbio Clim/aacute.alttico https:/ /www.min/a.altmbi/e.altnt/e.alt./g.altov.co/im/a.alt/g.alt/e.alts/c/a.altmbioclim/a.alttico/pdf/
 (page [22]) Pl/a.altn_n/a.altcion/a.altl_d/e.alt_/a.altd/a.altpt/a.altcion/1._Pl/a.altn_N/a.altcion/a.altl_d/e.alt_Ad/a.altpt/a.altci%C3%B3n_/a.altl_C/a.altmbio_Clim%C3%A1tico.pdf
 (page [22]) 55 Colombi/a.alt (2017). Third N/a.alttion/a.altl Communic/a.alttion to th/e.alt UNFCCC. URL: https:/ /unfccc.int/sit/e.alts/d/e.altf/a.altult/fil/e.alts/r/e.altsourc/e.alt/
 (page [22]) TCNCC%20COLOMBIA%20A%20LA%20CMNUCC%202017.pdf
 (page [22]) 56 WBG Clim/a.altt/e.alt Ch/a.altn/g.alt/e.alt Knowl/e.altd/g.alt/e.alt Port/a.altl (CCKP, 2021). Colombi/a.alt. Imp/a.altcts-S/e.alt/a.alt L/e.altv/e.altl Ris/e.alt. URL: https:/ /clim/a.altt/e.altknowl/e.altd/g.alt/e.altport/a.altl.
 (page [22]) worldb/a.altnk.or/g.alt/countr/y.alt/colombi/a.alt/imp/a.altcts-s/e.alt/a.alt-l/e.altv/e.altl-ris/e.alt
 (page [23]) 57 Colombi/a.alt (2020). Upd/a.altt/e.altd N/a.alttion/a.altll/y.alt-D/e.altt/e.altrmin/e.altd Contribution. URL: https:/ /www4.unfccc.int/sit/e.alts/ndcst/a.alt/g.altin/g.alt/Publish/e.altdDocum/e.altnts/
 (page [23]) Colombi/a.alt%20First/NDC%20/a.altctu/a.altli/z.alt/a.altd/a.alt%20d/e.alt%20Colombi/a.alt.pdf
 (page [23]) 20 CLIMATE RISK COUNTRY PROFILE: COLOMBIAEn/e.altr/g.alt/y.alt
 (page [23]) Ov/e.altrvi/e.altw
 (page [23]) Colombia has productive petroleum reserves, South America ’s most extensive coal reserves, and signiﬁcant but largely untapped natural gas reserves. A large amount of potentially productive oil and natural gas areas remain unexplored. Demand for energy (petroleum, natural gas, and electricity) is expected to continue to grow. Colombia’s energy is sourced primarily from hydro power ( ∼60%) and coal ( ∼25%).58 Service quality, as measured by service interruptions, is low, and losses in transmission and leaks in the distribution system are a concern. Nevertheless, given the high reliance on hydro power, the droughts brought by phenomena such as El Nino could affect the country’s energy sustainability. Colombia’s Energy Plan 2050 aims to diversity the country’s energy resources and ensure a reliable energy supply by diversifying the energy mix to include wind power plants, solar photovoltaic and geothermal energy generation. The country’s he National Energy Plan (PEN), prepared by the Ministry of Mines and Energy and the Unit of Energy Mining Planning (UPME) has ﬁve speciﬁc objectives and two transversal ones. The speciﬁc ones are oriented to the projection of an efﬁcient, productive, formal country and of opportunities in energy matters, and are the following: 1) Reliable supply and diversiﬁcation of the energy basket, 2) Efﬁcient demand management and incorporation of clean transport technologies, 3) Universalization and affordability of the energy service - energy equity, 4) International interconnection and infrastructure, and 5) Generation of value in the energy sector for the development of regions and populations.59
 (page [23]) Clim/a.altt/e.alt Ch/a.altn/g.alt/e.alt Imp/a.altcts
 (page [23]) Although plans are underway to diversify the Colombian energy mix, the country’s reliance on hydropower as a primary energy source could wreak havoc on the population in years to come, as altered rainfall patterns, combined with higher temperatures which in turn increase energy demands of the population, and melting glaciers can reduce the ﬂows and thus the productive potential of many of the country’s rivers, especially the Magdalena basin which is a major power source for the country. Rainfall and temperature scenarios for 2071–2100 indicate that some regions may see a 30% reduction in rainfall, which would reduce runoff to rivers, water stored in dams and aquifer recharge. Additionally, ﬂoods resulting from heavy rains can damage critical energy infrastructure. Runoff levels are expected to rise in coastal regions, negatively impacting energy infrastructure along the coast via ﬂoods and landslides, and the increasing the occurrence of natural disasters.60 58 Fossil En/e.altr/g.alt/y.alt Int/e.altrn/a.alttion/a.altl (2003). An En/e.altr/g.alt/y.alt Ov/e.altrvi/e.altw of Colombi/a.alt. URL: http:/ /www./g.alt/e.altni.or/g.alt//g.altlob/a.altl/e.altn/e.altr/g.alt/y.alt/libr/a.altr/y.alt/n/a.alttion/a.altl_/e.altn/e.altr/g.alt/y.alt_/g.altrid/
 (page [23]) colombi/a.alt/En/e.altr/g.alt/y.altOv/e.altrvi/e.altwofColombi/a.alt.shtml
 (page [23]) 59 Colombi/a.alt Pl/a.altn N/a.altcion/a.altl d/e.alt Ad/a.altpt/a.altción /a.altl C/a.altmbio Clim/aacute.alttico https:/ /www.min/a.altmbi/e.altnt/e.alt./g.altov.co/im/a.alt/g.alt/e.alts/c/a.altmbioclim/a.alttico/pdf/
 (page [23]) Pl/a.altn_n/a.altcion/a.altl_d/e.alt_/a.altd/a.altpt/a.altcion/1._Pl/a.altn_N/a.altcion/a.altl_d/e.alt_Ad/a.altpt/a.altci%C3%B3n_/a.altl_C/a.altmbio_Clim%C3%A1tico.pdf
 (page [24]) 60 Colombi/a.alt (2017). Third N/a.alttion/a.altl Communic/a.alttion to th/e.alt UNFCCC. URL: https:/ /unfccc.int/sit/e.alts/d/e.altf/a.altult/ﬁl/e.alts/r/e.altsourc/e.alt/
 (page [24]) TCNCC%20COLOMBIA%20A%20LA%20CMNUCC%202017.pdf
 (page [24]) 21 CLIMATE RISK COUNTRY PROFILE: COLOMBIACooling Degree Days show the relationship between daily heat and cooling demand, typically sourced through a form of active cooling or an evaporative process. The change in cooling degree days provides insight into the potential for extended seasons of power demand or periods in which cooling demand (power demands) will increase. As seen in Figure 14 , seasonal increases for cooling demands are expected to increase throughout the year. The Warm Spell Duration Index represents the number of days in a sequence of at least six days in which the daily maximum temperature is greater than the 90th percentile of daily maximum temperature. As shown in Figure 15 , warm spells are expected to sharply increase in the second half of the century.
 (page [24]) Jan
 (page [24]) Feb
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 (page [24]) Temperature (°C)
 (page [24]) FIGURE 14. Ch/a.altn/g.alt/e.alt in Coolin/g.alt D/e.alt/g.altr/e.alt/e.alt D/a.alt/y.alts (65°F) in Colombi/a.alt for th/e.alt p/e.altriod 2040–2059,
 (page [24]) (RCP8.5, R/e.altf/e.altr/e.altnc/e.alt P/e.altriod, 1986–2005)61
 (page [24]) Historical RCP 2.6 RCP 4.5 RCP 6.0 RCP 8.5
 (page [24]) 1980
 (page [24]) 2000
 (page [24]) 2020
 (page [24]) 2040
 (page [24]) 2060
 (page [24]) 2080
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 (page [24]) 350
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 (page [24]) DaysFIGURE 15. Proj/e.altct/e.altd  ch/a.altn/g.alt/e.alt in W/a.altrm Sp/e.altll Dur/a.alttion Ind/e.altx in Colombi/a.alt for th/e.alt p/e.altriod 2020
 (page [24]) to 2099, (R/e.altf/e.altr/e.altnc/e.alt P/e.altriod, 1986–2005)62
 (page [24]) Ad/a.altpt/a.alttion Options
 (page [24]) Adaptation options for the hydropower sector should focus on improved water resource management under changing conditions. Additional investments may need to be made in building more storage capacity, improving turbine efﬁciencies or other engineering measures to make efﬁcient use of available resources. Integrated water use management will be required as competing demands for water begin to come into play through increased demand for water for other uses such as irrigation and urban demands.63 Colombia’s National Policy for Climate Change aims to incorporate climate change management into public and private decisions to advance in a climate-resilient and low-carbon development path that reduces the risks of climate change and allows opportunities to be seized. The long-term objective is for the
 (page [24]) country to be carbon neutral.
 (page [24]) 61 WBG Clim/a.altt/e.alt Ch/a.altn/g.alt/e.alt Knowl/e.altd/g.alt/e.alt Port/a.altl (CCKP, 2021). Colombi/a.alt – En/e.altr/g.alt/y.alt. URL: https:/ /clim/a.altt/e.altknowl/e.altd/g.alt/e.altport/a.altl.worldb/a.altnk.or/g.alt/
 (page [24]) countr/y.alt/colombi/a.alt/clim/a.altt/e.alt-d/a.altt/a.alt-proj/e.altctions
 (page [24]) 62 WBG Clim/a.altt/e.alt Ch/a.altn/g.alt/e.alt Knowl/e.altd/g.alt/e.alt Port/a.altl (CCKP, 2021). Colombi/a.alt – En/e.altr/g.alt/y.alt. URL: https:/ /clim/a.altt/e.altknowl/e.altd/g.alt/e.altport/a.altl.worldb/a.altnk.or/g.alt/
 (page [24]) countr/y.alt/colombi/a.alt/clim/a.altt/e.alt-d/a.altt/a.alt-proj/e.altctions
 (page [25]) 63 Colombi/a.alt (2020). Upd/a.altt/e.altd N/a.alttion/a.altll/y.alt-D/e.altt/e.altrmin/e.altd Contribution. URL: https:/ /www4.unfccc.int/sit/e.alts/ndcst/a.alt/g.altin/g.alt/Publish/e.altdDocum/e.altnts/
 (page [25]) Colombi/a.alt%20First/NDC%20/a.altctu/a.altli/z.alt/a.altd/a.alt%20d/e.alt%20Colombi/a.alt.pdf
 (page [25]) https: //www.who.int/alliance-hpsr/projects/
 (page [25]) 22 CLIMATE RISK COUNTRY PROFILE: COLOMBIAForests and forest coverage are also critically important for the country’s water supply for dams and human consumption. Sedimentation due to forest loss in upper watersheds is known to have resulted in adverse economic impacts. The country’s protected areas, particularly in the Andes, is important for water production necessary for electricity and human consumption. Colombia has prioritized ecosystem-based adap tation, which is a central component of the adaptation and mitigation measures of Colombia’s NDC,64 where special attention is paid to protected areas, as well as to the conservation and restoration of strategic ecosystems, in recognition of their intrinsic value and the environmental services they provide for Colombia and the world. In its NDC, Colombia also recognized the value provided by Nature- based Solutions (NBS), the bioeconomy, sustainable infrastructure and climate-smart agriculture.65 Adaptation options emphasized in the policy with respect to the energy sector include the promotion of energy efﬁciency and integrated water resources management, including educating the public on the impacts of climate change on energy supplies and implementing behavioral techniques to increase energy use efﬁciency in tandem with water conservation.66
 (page [25]) H/e.alt/a.altlth
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 (page [25]) While Colombia is a middle-income country, it still faces high poverty rates and one of the highest inequality rates in the world, making the health of the country’s population vulnerable to climate change impacts.67 The climate change projections point to continued rising temperatures, more variable rainfall, rising seas and more frequent extreme weather events. Impacts are expected in food and water security, human settlements, infrastructure and ecosystems, as well as health, the latter particularly through increasing heat stress, the altered range, seasonality and distribution of vector-borne diseases including malaria, zika, chikungunya, as well as air pollution and associated respiratory illnesses, as well as water-borne illnesses such as cholera and diarrheal disease.68
 (page [25]) Clim/a.altt/e.alt Ch/a.altn/g.alt/e.alt Imp/a.altcts
 (page [25]) Rising temperatures will expand the range of vector-borne illnesses such as malaria and zika into higher elevation areas. More intense ﬂooding such as that from La Nina events can spread water-borne illnesses such as diarrheal disease and cholera. Indeed, the “La Niña” phenomenon 2010–2011 increased the cases of acute respiratory infections and triggered the alerts of spread of malaria, cholera, leishmaniasis, tuberculosis and dengue.69 At the end of 2011, observed a total of 470 cases of death from acute di arrheal infection in children under ﬁve years of age, higher than the cases that occurred in both 2009 and 2010. Rising temperatures year-round will bring a more 64 Colombi/a.alt (2017). Third N/a.alttion/a.altl Communic/a.alttion to th/e.alt UNFCCC. URL: https:/ /unfccc.int/sit/e.alts/d/e.altf/a.altult/ﬁl/e.alts/r/e.altsourc/e.alt/
 (page [25]) TCNCC%20COLOMBIA%20A%20LA%20CMNUCC%202017.pdf
 (page [25]) 65 Colombi/a.alt (2020). Upd/a.altt/e.altd N/a.alttion/a.altll/y.alt-D/e.altt/e.altrmin/e.altd Contribution. URL: https:/ /www4.unfccc.int/sit/e.alts/ndcst/a.alt/g.altin/g.alt/Publish/e.altdDocum/e.altnts/
 (page [25]) Colombi/a.alt%20First/NDC%20/a.altctu/a.altli/z.alt/a.altd/a.alt%20d/e.alt%20Colombi/a.alt.pdf
 (page [25]) 66 Colombi/a.alt (2020). En/e.altr/g.alt/y.alt – Inv/e.altst in Colombi/a.alt. URL: https:/ /inv/e.altstincolombi/a.alt.com.co//e.altn/s/e.altctors//e.altn/e.altr/g.alt/y.alt/r/e.altn/e.altw/a.altbl/e.alt-/e.altn/e.altr/g.alt/y.alt 67 WHO (2015). Clim/a.altt/e.alt /a.altnd H/e.alt/a.altlth Countr/y.alt Proﬁl/e.alt – Colombi/a.alt. URL: https:/ /www.who.int//g.altlob/a.altlch/a.altn/g.alt/e.alt/r/e.altsourc/e.alts/countr/y.alt-proﬁl/e.alts/
 (page [25]) PHE-countr/y.alt-proﬁl/e.alt-Colombi/a.alt.pdf?u/a.alt=1
 (page [25]) 68 WHO (2016). Countr/y.alt Coop/e.altr/a.alttion Str/a.altt/e.alt/g.alt/y.alt – At /a.alt /g.altl/a.altnc/e.alt: Colombi/a.alt. URL: https:/ //a.altpps.who.int/iris/bitstr/e.alt/a.altm/h/a.altndl/e.alt/10665/137151/
 (page [25]) ccsbri/e.altf_col_/e.altn.pdf;js/e.altssionid=D7C70E7D273F545879D4A509FFCB03C0?s/e.altqu/e.altnc/e.alt=1
 (page [26]) 69 WHO (2017). Prim/a.altr/y.alt h/e.alt/a.altlth c/a.altr/e.alt s/y.altst/e.altms (PRIMASYS): c/a.alts/e.alt stud/y.alt from Colombi/a.alt. URL: https:/ /www.who.int//a.altlli/a.altnc/e.alt-hpsr/proj/e.altcts/
 (page [26]) /a.altlli/a.altnc/e.althpsr_colombi/a.altprim/a.alts/y.alts.pdf?u/a.alt=1
 (page [26]) https: //www.who.int/alliance-hpsr/projects/
 (page [26]) 23 CLIMATE RISK COUNTRY PROFILE: COLOMBIApronounced heat season with more frequent and intense heatwaves becoming a new norm. Figure 16  shows the expected Number of Days with a Heat Index >35°C through the 2090s; appointing to a sharp increase in the number of very hot days, which will accelerate by mid-century and continue to sharply increase under a high-emission scenario (RCP 8.5) through the end of the century. Heat discomfort and heat stress increases mortality and morbidity for the most vulnerable, especially the elderly, children and pregnant women. Additionally, children’s learning ability signiﬁcantly decreases with increased heat exposure. Figure 17  shows that tropical nights, minimum temperatures (>20°C), will follow a similar warming as days with a high heat i ndex, rising rapidly under a high-emission scenario
 (page [26]) (RCP8.5).
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 (page [26]) FIGURE 16. D/a.alt/y.alts with /a.alt H/e.alt/a.altt Ind/e.altx >35°C,
 (page [26]) (R/e.altf/e.altr/e.altnc/e.alt P/e.altriod, 1986–2005)70
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 (page [26]) NightsFIGURE 17. Numb/e.altr  of Tropic/a.altl Ni/g.althts
 (page [26]) (Tmin >20°C), (R/e.altf/e.altr/e.altnc/e.alt P/e.altriod, 1986–2005)71
 (page [26]) Ad/a.altpt/a.alttion Options
 (page [26]) A quantitative vulnerability and risk assessment for Colombia’s health sector is an important ﬁrst step in identifying the most critical climate change impacts and the most vulnerable populations and communities. To reduce the impacts of climate change on public health, context speciﬁc actions need to be implemented, particularly ones that align with the realities of the communities affected.72 As such, there is a need to develop locally relevant health vulnerability assessments. Strategic priorities include 1) developing public policies to reduce inequities in health, 2) strengthening the primary health care system to improve access, timelines s, quality and economic sustainability, 3) strengthening interventions to address the health challenges associated with environmental changes, and 4) promoting interagency coordination particularly in light of climate change.73 70 WBG Clim/a.altt/e.alt Ch/a.altn/g.alt/e.alt Knowl/e.altd/g.alt/e.alt Port/a.altl (CCKP, 2021). Colombi/a.alt H/e.alt/a.altlth S/e.altctor D/a.altshbo/a.altrd. URL: https:/ /clim/a.altt/e.altd/a.altt/a.alt.worldb/a.altnk.or/g.alt/
 (page [26]) CRM/e.altPort/a.altl/w/e.altb/h/e.alt/a.altlth/s/y.altst/e.altms-/a.altnd-s/e.altrvic/e.alt?countr/y.alt=COL&p/e.altriod=2080-2099
 (page [26]) 71 WBG Clim/a.altt/e.alt Ch/a.altn/g.alt/e.alt Knowl/e.altd/g.alt/e.alt Port/a.altl (CCKP, 2021). Colombi/a.alt H/e.alt/a.altlth S/e.altctor. URL: https:/ /clim/a.altt/e.altknowl/e.altd/g.alt/e.altport/a.altl.worldb/a.altnk.or/g.alt/
 (page [26]) countr/y.alt/Colombi/a.alt/clim/a.altt/e.alt-s/e.altctor-h/e.alt/a.altlth
 (page [26]) 72 WHO (2015). Clim/a.altt/e.alt /a.altnd H/e.alt/a.altlth Countr/y.alt Proﬁl/e.alt – Colombi/a.alt. URL: https:/ /www.who.int//g.altlob/a.altlch/a.altn/g.alt/e.alt/r/e.altsourc/e.alts/countr/y.alt-proﬁl/e.alts/
 (page [26]) PHE-countr/y.alt-proﬁl/e.alt-Colombi/a.alt.pdf?u/a.alt=1
 (page [27]) 73 WHO (2017). Prim/a.altr/y.alt h/e.alt/a.altlth c/a.altr/e.alt s/y.altst/e.altms (PRIMASYS): c/a.alts/e.alt stud/y.alt from Colombi/a.alt. URL: https:/ /www.who.int//a.altlli/a.altnc/e.alt-hpsr/proj/e.altcts/
 (page [27]) /a.altlli/a.altnc/e.althpsr_colombi/a.altprim/a.alts/y.alts.pdf?u/a.alt=1
 (page [27]) ) (Spanish)
 (page [27]) (2018)
 (page [27]) 17)
 (page [27]) 2010)
 (page [27]) 11)
 (page [27]) 24 CLIMATE RISK COUNTRY PROFILE: COLOMBIAInstitution/a.altl Fr/a.altm/e.altwork for Ad/a.altpt/a.alttion Colombia’s National Climate Change Policy (2017) aims to incorporate climate change management into decisions public and private to advance a path of development, climate-resilience and low-carbon economy, which reduces the risks of climate change and to take advantage of the opportunities that emerge.74 It takes a broad, territorial vision that focuses on the cross linkages between sectors. Actions identiﬁed in the strategy fall under four pillars: (i) information, science, technology and innovation; (ii) education, training and public awareness; (iii) planning of climate change management and; (iv) ﬁnancing and economic instruments. Colombia’s National Development Plan of 2010–2014 listed climate adaptation as a priority and established the National Climate Change System to improve institutional coordination. The country’s National Adaptation Plan of 2012 outlined the priorities for climate adaptation and was followed by a 2013 Road Map for the country’s National Adaptation Plan which outlines the process for implementing adaptation priorities.
 (page [27]) Polic/y.alt Fr/a.altm/e.altwork for Ad/a.altpt/a.alttion
 (page [27]) Adaptation is guided by the National Adaptation Plan (Plan Nacional de Adaptación al Cambio Climático – PNACC), which identiﬁed ﬁve strategic lines for a planned adaptation to serve as work guides for different sectors and territories in the formulation of their adaptation plans: 1. Raise awareness about climate change, 2. Generate information and knowledge to measure climate risk, 3. Plan the use of the territory,
 (page [27]) 4. Implement adaptation actions,
 (page [27]) 5. Strengthen reaction capacity.
 (page [27]) National Frameworks and Plans
 (page [27, 28]) • Updated Nationally Determined Contribution  (2020) (Spanish) • Second Biennial Update Report  (2018) (Spanish) • Colombia’s First Nationally Determined Contribution  (2018) • Third National Communication to the UNFCCC  (2017) • National Climate Change Policy  (2017) (Spanish) • First Biennial Update Report  (2016) (Spanish) • National Adaptation Road Map  (2013) (Spanish) • National Adaptation Plan  (2012) (Spanish) • Second National Communication to the UNFCCC  (2010) • First National Communication to the UNFCCC  (2001)ADAPTATION 74 Colombi/a.alt (2017). N/a.alttion/a.altl Clim/a.altt/e.alt Ch/a.altn/g.alt/e.alt Polic/y.alt. URL: https:/ /www.min/a.altmbi/e.altnt/e.alt./g.altov.co/im/a.alt/g.alt/e.alts/c/a.altmbioclim/a.alttico/pdf/Politic/a.alt_
 (page [28]) N/a.altcion/a.altl_d/e.alt_C/a.altmbio_Clim/a.alttico_-_PNCC_/PNCC_Politic/a.alts_Public/a.alts_LIBRO_Fin/a.altl_W/e.altb_01.pdf
 (page [28]) 25 CLIMATE RISK COUNTRY PROFILE: COLOMBIAR/e.altcomm/e.altnd/a.alttions
 (page [28]) R/e.alts/e.alt/a.altr ch G/a.altps
 (page [28]) • Support research on the impacts of climate change on key economic and social sectors, as well as the tourism industry, including the identiﬁcation of hot spots of risk • Support decision-based dialogues in critical watersheds such as the Magdalena in order to mainstream and integrate climate information into local decision-making contexts • Engage vulnerable populations and address barriers to decision-making. Women, especially in rural areas lack access to decision-making processes.75 As a result, decisions often fail to reﬂect women’s needs and perspectives leaving them particularly vulnerable to the impacts of climate change. To make the decision-making process more accessible, it is important to review existing regulations and policies and suggest ways they can more clearly
 (page [28]) incorporate gender norms
 (page [28]) D/a.altt/a.alt /a.altnd Inform/a.alttion G/a.altps
 (page [28]) • Develop early warning systems for hot spot areas of ﬂooding, building on Colombia’s Wetlands Map and existing information on freshwater, coastal, and marine wetlands, their cycles and ﬂooding regimes. • Strengthen the technical capacity to integrate climate-smart agriculture and climate change risk management into farmer’s and the wider agricultural sector • Raise public awareness about climate risks76 • Use technology to reach greater audiences. The demand for knowledge-sharing, training and capacity building opportunities continues to grow. Programs that wish to strengthen and empower water management and local actors should include training and tools to develop individual and collective capacity of the water managers. Incorporate climate resilient considerations in the engineering and design of new infrastructure77
 (page [28]) Institution/a.altl G/a.altps
 (page [28]) • Revise current legislation on coastal zone management • Promote climate resilient production systems agriculture, forestry and livelihood sectors to improve competitiveness, income and food security, especially in vulnerable areas78 • Provide ﬁnancing mechanisms for community investments in adaptation • Facilitate community involvement on coastal erosion issues and related problems to land uses • Move beyond awareness raising, capacity building and planning to actual implementation of appropriate adaptation
 (page [28]) measures at the watershed level
 (page [28]) • Strengthen planning systems to optimize water use across a watershed in the context of climate change. For example, using the POMCAs as a guide, work to prepare projects for submission to various funding agencies to secure ﬁnancing for adaptation strategies 75 Colombi/a.alt (2017). N/a.alttion/a.altl Clim/a.altt/e.alt Ch/a.altn/g.alt/e.alt Polic/y.alt. URL: https:/ /www.min/a.altmbi/e.altnt/e.alt./g.altov.co/im/a.alt/g.alt/e.alts/c/a.altmbioclim/a.alttico/pdf/Politic/a.alt_
 (page [28]) N/a.altcion/a.altl_d/e.alt_C/a.altmbio_Clim/a.alttico_-_PNCC_/PNCC_Politic/a.alts_Public/a.alts_LIBRO_Fin/a.altl_W/e.altb_01.pdf
 (page [28]) 76 Colombi/a.alt (2020). Upd/a.altt/e.altd N/a.alttion/a.altll/y.alt-D/e.altt/e.altrmin/e.altd Contribution. URL: https:/ /www4.unfccc.int/sit/e.alts/ndcst/a.alt/g.altin/g.alt/Publish/e.altdDocum/e.altnts/
 (page [28]) Colombi/a.alt%20First/NDC%20/a.altctu/a.altli/z.alt/a.altd/a.alt%20d/e.alt%20Colombi/a.alt.pdf
 (page [28]) 77 Colombi/a.alt (2017). Third N/a.alttion/a.altl Communic/a.alttion to th/e.alt UNFCCC. URL: https:/ /unfccc.int/sit/e.alts/d/e.altf/a.altult/ﬁl/e.alts/r/e.altsourc/e.alt/
 (page [28]) TCNCC%20COLOMBIA%20A%20LA%20CMNUCC%202017.pdf
 (page [31]) 78 Colombi/a.alt (2020). Upd/a.altt/e.altd N/a.alttion/a.altll/y.alt-D/e.altt/e.altrmin/e.altd Contribution. URL: https:/ /www4.unfccc.int/sit/e.alts/ndcst/a.alt/g.altin/g.alt/Publish/e.altdDocum/e.altnts/
 (page [31]) Colombi/a.alt%20First/NDC%20/a.altctu/a.altli/z.alt/a.altd/a.alt%20d/e.alt%20Colombi/a.alt.pdf
 (page [32]) COLOMBIA
 (page [32]) CLIMATE RISK COUNTRY PROFILE
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 data/transition_reports/World Bank Climate Change Country Reports/15915-WB_Brazil Country Profile-WEB.pdf
 (page [0]) WORLD BANK GROU
 (page [0]) BRAZIL
 (page [0]) CLIMATE RISK COUNTRY PROFILE
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 (page [1]) ii CLIMATE RISK COUNTRY PROFILE: BRAZILCOPYRIGHT © 2021 by the World Bank Group 1818 H Street NW, Washington, DC 20433
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 (page [1]) This work is a product of the staff of the World Bank Group (WBG) and with external contributions. The opinions, ﬁndings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this work are those of the authors and do not necessarily reﬂect the views or the ofﬁcial policy or position of the WBG, its Board of Executive Directors, or the governments it represents. The WBG does not guarantee the accuracy of the data included in this work and do not make any warranty, express or implied, nor assume any liability or responsibility for any consequence of their use. This publication follows the WBG’s practice in references to member designations, borders, and maps. The boundaries, colors, denominations, and other information shown on any map in this work, or the use of the term “country” do not imply any judgment on the part of the WBG, its Boards, or the governments it represents, concerning the legal status of any territory or geographic area or the endorsement or acceptance
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 (page [1, 2]) The material in this work is subject to copyright. Because the WBG encourages dissemination of its knowledge, this work may be reproduced, in whole or in part, for noncommercial purposes as long as full attribution to this work is given. Please cite the work as follows: Climate Risk Proﬁle: Brazil (2021): The World Bank Group. Any queries on rights and licenses, including subsidiary rights, should be addressed to World Bank Publications, The World Bank Group, 1818 H Street NW, Washington, DC 20433, USA; fax: 202-522-2625; e-mail: [email protected] . Cover Photos:  © Mariana Ceratti/World Bank, “ Port of Salvador in All Saints Bay ” February 20, 2013 via Flickr, Creative Commons CC BY-NC-ND 2.0. © Scott Wallace/World Bank, “ Man tending manioc ﬁeld in Northeast Brazil ” June 16, 2009 via Flickr, Creative Commons CC BY-NC-ND 2.0. Graphic Design:  Circle Graphics, Inc. , Reisterstown, MD. iii CLIMATE RISK COUNTRY PROFILE: BRAZILACKNOWLEDGEMENTS This proﬁle is part of a series of Climate Risk Country Proﬁles developed by the World Bank Group (WBG). The country proﬁle synthesizes most relevant data and information on climate change, disaster risk reduction, and adaptation actions and policies at the country level. The country proﬁle series are designed as a quick reference source for development practitioners to better integrate climate resilience in development planning and policy making. . This effort is managed and led by Veronique Morin (Senior Climate Change Specialist, WBG) and Ana E. Bucher (Senior Climate Change Specialist, WBG). This proﬁle was written by MacKenzie Dove (Senior Climate Change Consultant, WBG). Additional support was provided by Fernanda Zermoglio (Senior Climate Change Consultant, WBG), Yunziyi Lang (Climate Change Analyst, WBG), and Jason
 (page [2]) Johnston (Operations Analyst, WBG).
 (page [2]) Climate and climate-related information is largely drawn from the Climate Change Knowledge Portal (CCKP) , a WBG online platform with available global climate data and analysis based on the latest Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) reports and datasets. The team is grateful for all comments and suggestions received from the sector, regional, and country development specialists, as well as climate research scientists and institutions for their advice and guidance on use of climate
 (page [2]) related datasets.
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 (page [3]) iv CLIMATE RISK COUNTRY PROFILE: BRAZILFOREWORD .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 1 COUNTRY OVERVIEW  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 2 CLIMATOLOGY   .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 5 Clim/a.altt/e.alt B/a.alts/e.altlin/e.alt  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 5 Ov/e.altrvi/e.altw  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 5 K/e.alt/y.alt Tr/e.altnds   .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 7 Clim/a.altt/e.alt Futur/e.alt  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 8 Ov/e.altrvi/e.altw  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 8 K/e.alt/y.alt Tr/e.altnds   .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  10 CLIMATE RELATED NATURAL HAZARDS  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 11 Ov/e.altrvi/e.altw  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .11 K/e.alt/y.alt Tr/e.altnds .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  13 Implic/a.alttions for DRM  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  15 CLIMATE CHANGE IMPACTS TO KEY SECTORS  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  15 A/g.altricultur/e.alt   .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  16 W/a.altt/e.altr .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  19 En/e.altr/g.alt/y.alt   .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 22 For/e.altstr/y.alt .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 24 H/e.alt/a.altlth .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  27 ADAPTATION .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  29 Institution/a.altl Fr/a.altm/e.altwork for Ad/a.altpt/a.alttion .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 29 Polic/y.alt Fr/a.altm/e.altwork for Ad/a.altpt/a.alttion   .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 29 R/e.altcomm/e.altnd/a.alttions .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  30 R/e.alts/e.alt/a.altrch G/a.altps .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 30 D/a.altt/a.alt /a.altnd Inform/a.alttion G/a.altps  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  31 Institution/a.altl G/a.altps  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  31
 (page [3]) CONTENTS
 (page [4]) 1 CLIMATE RISK COUNTRY PROFILE: BRAZIL Climate change is a major risk to good development outcomes, and the World Bank Group is committed to playing an important role in helping countries integrate climate action into their core development agendas. The World Bank Group is committed to supporting client countries to invest in and build a low-carbon, climate-resilient future, helping them to be better prepared to adapt to current and future climate impacts. The World Bank Group is investing in incorporating and systematically managing climate risks in development operations through its individual corporate commitments. A key aspect of the World Bank Group’s Action Plan on Adaptation and Resilience (2019) is to help countries shift from addressing adaptation as an incremental cost and isolated investment to systematically incorporating climate risks and opportunities at every phase of policy planning, investment design, implementation and evaluation of development outcomes. For all IDA and IBRD operations, climate and disaster risk screening is one of the mandatory corporate climate commitments. This is supported by the Bank Group’s Climate and Disaster Risk Screening Tool which enables all Bank staff to assess short- and long-term climate and disaster risks in operations and national or sectoral planning processes. This screening tool draws up-to-date and relevant information from the World Bank’s Climate Change Knowledge Portal, a comprehensive online ‘one-stop shop’ for global, regional, and country data related to climate change and development. Recognizing the value of consistent, easy-to-use technical resources for client countries as well as to support respective internal climate risk assessment and adaptation planning processes, the World Bank Group’s Climate Change Group has developed this content. Standardizing and pooling expertise facilitates the World Bank Group in conducting initial assessments of climate risks and opportunities across sectors within a country, within institutional portfolios across regions, and acts as a global resource for development practitioners. For developing countries, the climate risk proﬁles are intended to serve as public goods to facilitate upstream country diagnostics, policy dialogue, and strategic planning by providing comprehensive overviews of trends and projected changes in key climate parameters, sector-speciﬁc implications, relevant policies and programs, adaptation priorities and opportunities for further actions. It is my hope that these efforts will spur deepening of long-term risk management in developing countries and our engagement in supporting climate change adaptation planning at operational levels.
 (page [4]) Bernice Van Bronkhorst
 (page [4]) Global Director
 (page [4]) Climate Change Group (CCG)
 (page [4]) The World Bank Group (WBG)
 (page [5]) FOREWORD
 (page [5]) . Elevation
 (page [5]) Elevation in Meters
 (page [5]) 0
 (page [5]) 5
 (page [5]) -   S8e' :
 (page [5]) * National capital
 (page [5]) 2 CLIMATE RISK COUNTRY PROFILE: BRAZIL
 (page [5]) COUNTRY OVERVIEW
 (page [5]) Brazil is the largest country in South America. It has an extensive coastline to the east, covering over 7 ,491 kilometers (km), along the Atlantic Ocean and a land area of 8,510,295 km2, making it the ﬁfth largest country in the world. The country shares a border with
 (page [5]) Colombia, Venezuela, Guyana, Suriname, and
 (page [5]) French Guiana in the northwest; Peru, and Bolivia in the west; and Paraguay, Argentina, and Uruguay in the southwest. The nation’s territory also includes several oceanic islands: Fernando de Noronha, Abrolhos and Trindade. In addition to harboring over a third of the Earth’s tropical forests, Brazil is home to an extremely rich ﬂora and fauna and a rich diversity of ecosystems including, but not limited to, the Amazon forest, the Cerrado (central plateaus, covering 21% land area), the Atlantic Forest (forests which extend along the Atlantic coastline), the Caatinga (desert shrubland in the northeast)
 (page [5]) and the Pantanal wetlands(encompasses the
 (page [5]) world’s largest wetland area, located along the western border) ( Figure 1 ).1 Brazil’s diverse and abundant natural resources, ecosystems, and signiﬁcant biodiversity are world renowned. The national territory comprises six unique biomes: Amazon, Caatinga, Cerrado, Atlantic Forest, Pampa, and Pantanal. The Amazon and Atlantic Forest are home to humid and seasonal forests and signiﬁcant biodiversity. The Caatinga is characterized by semi-arid climate and arid plant life. Cerrado houses three major watersheds of South America, which makes it the richest savannah in
 (page [5]) biodiversity worldwide.2
 (page [5]) Brazil has a complex and dynamic economy and is classiﬁed as a developing country. While the country experienced a period of economic and social progress between 2003 and 2014, in which more than 29 million people were lifted out of poverty and inequality declined signiﬁcan tly, the economic recovery weakened from 2015 to 2018. The more frequent and continuing periods of recession, which started in 2015, have left the country ‘s economy sluggish and created signiﬁcant political upheaval, stagnating the gains and pace of poverty and inequality reduction. In the ﬁrst quarter of 2021, the unemployment rate reached 14.7%, the highest since 2012.4 Brazil’s 1 Br/a.alt/z.altil (2020). Fourth N/a.alttion/a.altl Communic/a.alttion of Br/a.alt/z.altil to th/e.alt UNFCCC. URL: https:/ /unfccc.int/sit/e.alts/d/e.altf/a.altult/ﬁl/e.alts/r/e.altsourc/e.alt/
 (page [5]) 4/a.alt%20Comunic/a.altc/a.alto%20N/a.altcion/a.altl.pdf
 (page [5]) 2 World B/a.altnk Group (2017). Br/a.alt/z.altil’s INDC R/e.altstor/a.alttion /a.altnd R/e.altfor/e.altst/a.alttion T/a.altr/g.alt/e.altt — An/a.altl/y.altsis of INDC L/a.altnd-us/e.alt T/a.altr/g.alt/e.altts. WBG Environm/e.altnt & N/a.alttur/a.altl R/e.altsourc/e.alts. URL: http:/ /docum/e.altnts1.worldb/a.altnk.or/g.alt/cur/a.altt/e.altd//e.altn/917511508233889310/pdf/AUS19554-WP-
 (page [5]) P159184-PUBLIC-Br/a.alt/z.altils-INDC-R/e.altstor/a.alttion-/a.altnd-R/e.altfor/e.altst/a.alttion-T/a.altr/g.alt/e.altt.pdf
 (page [5]) 3 World B/a.altnk (2019). Int/e.altrn/a.altl Clim/a.altt/e.alt Mi/g.altr/a.alttion Proﬁl/e.alt — Br/a.alt/z.altil. 4 B/a.altrros, A. (2021). Un/e.altmplo/y.altm/e.altnt r/e.alt/a.altch/e.alts 14.7% in th/e.alt ﬁrst qu/a.altrt/e.altr, hi/g.alth/e.altst sinc/e.alt 2012. A/g.alt/e.altnci/a.alt IBGE. [M/a.alt/y.alt 21, 2021}. URL: https:/ /
 (page [5]) /a.alt/g.alt/e.altnci/a.altd/e.altnotici/a.alts.ib/g.alt/e.alt./g.altov.br//a.alt/g.alt/e.altnci/a.alt-notici/a.alts/2012-/a.alt/g.alt/e.altnci/a.alt-d/e.alt-notici/a.alts/notici/a.alts/30793-d/e.alts/e.altmpr/e.alt/g.alto-ch/e.alt/g.alt/a.alt-/a.alt-14-7-no-prim/e.altiro-
 (page [6]) trim/e.altstr/e.alt-m/a.altior-d/e.altsd/e.alt-2012-/e.alt-/a.alttin/g.alt/e.alt-14-8-milho/e.alts-d/e.alt-p/e.altsso/a.alts
 (page [6]) FIGURE 1.  El/e.altv/a.alttion  in Br/a.alt/z.altil3
 (page [6]) (2019)
 (page [6]) - (2018)
 (page [6]) (2019)
 (page [6]) -) (2020)
 (page [6]) --population-estimates-and-projections
 (page [6]) 3 CLIMATE RISK COUNTRY PROFILE: BRAZILmacro-economic environment is expected to remain in place, however, a lack of structural reforms and the need for strong ﬁscal consolidation continues to create bottlenecks for expanded growth and productivity.5 Brazil has a population of 212.6 million people (2020) with an annual population growth rate of 0.7% (2020).6 The population projected to reach 223.8 million people by 2030 and 228.9 million by 2050 ( Table 1 ). An estimated 86% of the country’s population resides in urban areas, and this is expected to increase to 92% by 2050. Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in 2020 was $1.44 trillion and Brazil has experienced volatile growth rates, which ﬂuctuated signiﬁcantly over the past decade.7 The volatility of economic growth can be seen across the years, with the economy growing at an annual rate of 4.5% (between 2006 and 2010) to 2.1% (between 2011 and 2014). A signiﬁcant contraction in economic activity occurred in 2015 and 2016, with GDP dropping by 3.6% and 3.4% (respectively).8 The country’s economy is driven primarily by industry, its services sector and agriculture. Brazil is the largest net-exporter of agricultural commodities, with the agri-business sector contributing approximately 20% of the country’s GDP and over 30% of all domestic employment.9 Brazil is one of the world’s leading exporters of soybeans, beef, coffee, and automobiles. Imports are dominated by agricultural and industrial machinery, electrical equipment, oil, and automotive parts from other countries, particularly China and the United States. TABLE 1. D/a.altt/a.alt  sn/a.altpshot: K/e.alt/y.alt d/e.altv/e.altlopm/e.altnt indic/a.alttors10
 (page [6]) Indicator
 (page [6]) Life Expectancy at Birth, Total (Years)  (2019) 75.9 Population Density (People per sq. km Land Area)  (2018) 25.1 km % of Population with Access to Electricity  (2019) 99.8% GDP per Capita (Current US$ ) (2020) $6,796.80 The ND-GAIN Index11 ranks 181 countries using a score which calculates a country’s vulnerability to climate change and other global challenges as well as their readiness to improve resilience. This Index aims to help businesses and the public sector better identify vulnerability and readiness in order to better prioritize investment for more efﬁcient responses to global challenges. Due to a combination of political, geographic, and social factors, Brazil is recognized as vulnerable to climate change impacts, ranked 96 out of 181 countries in the 2020 ND-GAIN Index. The more vulnerable a country is the lower their score, while the more ready a country is to improve its resilience the higher it will be. Norway has the highest score and is ranked 1st. Figure 2  is a time-series plot of the ND-GAIN Index
 (page [6]) showing Brazil’s progress
 (page [6]) 5 World B/a.altnk Group (2021). Br/a.alt/z.altil Ov/e.altrvi/e.altw. URL: https:/ /www.worldb/a.altnk.or/g.alt//e.altn/countr/y.alt/br/a.alt/z.altil/ov/e.altrvi/e.altw 6 World B/a.altnk Op/e.altn D/a.altt/a.alt (2021). D/a.altt/a.alt R/e.alttri/e.altv/e.altd April 2021. D/a.altt/a.alt B/a.altnk: World D/e.altv/e.altlopm/e.altnt Indic/a.alttors, Br/a.alt/z.altil. URL: https:/ /d/a.altt/a.altb/a.altnk.
 (page [6]) worldb/a.altnk.or/g.alt/sourc/e.alt/world-d/e.altv/e.altlopm/e.altnt-indic/a.alttors
 (page [6]) 7 World B/a.altnk Op/e.altn D/a.altt/a.alt (2021). D/a.altt/a.alt R/e.alttri/e.altv/e.altd April 2021. D/a.altt/a.alt B/a.altnk: Popul/a.alttion Estim/a.altt/e.alts /a.altnd Proj/e.altctions, Br/a.alt/z.altil. URL: https:/ /
 (page [6]) d/a.altt/a.altb/a.altnk.worldb/a.altnk.or/g.alt/d/a.altt/a.alt/r/e.altports./a.altspx?sourc/e.alt=h/e.alt/a.altlth-nutrition-/a.altnd-popul/a.alttion-st/a.alttistics :-popul/a.alttion-/e.altstim/a.altt/e.alts-/a.altnd-proj/e.altctions
 (page [6]) 8 World B/a.altnk Group (2021). Br/a.alt/z.altil Ov/e.altrvi/e.altw. URL: https:/ /www.worldb/a.altnk.or/g.alt//e.altn/countr/y.alt/br/a.alt/z.altil/ov/e.altrvi/e.altw 9 World B/a.altnk Group (2017). Br/a.alt/z.altil’s INDC R/e.altstor/a.alttion /a.altnd R/e.altfor/e.altst/a.alttion T/a.altr/g.alt/e.altt — An/a.altl/y.altsis of INDC L/a.altnd-us/e.alt T/a.altr/g.alt/e.altts. WBG Environm/e.altnt & N/a.alttur/a.altl R/e.altsourc/e.alts. URL: http:/ /docum/e.altnts1.worldb/a.altnk.or/g.alt/cur/a.altt/e.altd//e.altn/917511508233889310/pdf/AUS19554-WP-P159184-PUBLIC-
 (page [6]) Br/a.alt/z.altils-INDC-R/e.altstor/a.alttion-/a.altnd-R/e.altfor/e.altst/a.alttion-T/a.altr/g.alt/e.altt.pdf
 (page [7]) 10 World B/a.altnk (2021). D/a.altt/a.altB/a.altnk — World D/e.altv/e.altlopm/e.altnt Indic/a.alttors. URL: https:/ /d/a.altt/a.altb/a.altnk.worldb/a.altnk.or/g.alt/sourc/e.alt/world-d/e.altv/e.altlopm/e.altnt-indic/a.alttors 11 Univ/e.altrsit/y.alt of Notr/e.alt D/a.altm/e.alt (2020). Notr/e.alt D/a.altm/e.alt Glob/a.altl Ad/a.altpt/a.alttion Initi/a.alttiv/e.alt. URL: https:/ //g.alt/a.altin.nd./e.altdu/our-work/countr/y.alt-ind/e.altx/
 (page [7]) Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC) to the UNFCCC
 (page [7]) ; and continued economic and
 (page [7]) 4 CLIMATE RISK COUNTRY PROFILE: BRAZILBrazil is vulnerable to climate change impacts, which present a signiﬁcant threat to the country’s economic growth as well as its continued social development. Extreme temperatures, rising seas, as well as the complex challenges of different regions across the country experiencing signiﬁcant water scarcity and heavy rainfall place signiﬁcant pressure on vulnerable groups, urban infrastructure, the economy and the country’s unique ecosystems. Furthermore, while Brazil’s economy is dominated by its agricultural sector, this often results in competing demands and economic priorities which are intertwined with environmental and climate change adaptation and mitigation priorities.12 Brazil is home to the second largest forest in the world and also experiences the largest net forest loss worldwide. The country’s deforestation and environmental degradation can be attributed largely to the agricultural sector.13 As of 2015, the Agriculture and Forest and Land-Use Sectors represented a combined 55% of the country’s greenhouse gas emissions (GHG), with the energy sector contributing 33%.14 Brazil adopted the Paris Agreement and submitted its Nationally Determined Contribution  (NDC) to the UNFCCC in 2016 and its Updated NDC  in 2020 in support of its adaptation commitments and continued economic and social development agendas. Through its NDC, Brazil has committed to reduce its GHG emissions by 37% below 2005 levels, by 2025. Brazil has also committed to address climate change impacts to the country’s sectors environment, forestry, agricultural and livestock, energy, and health sectors.15 Brazil submitted its Fourth National Communication  to the UNFCCC in 2020.FIGURE 2. ND-GAIN ind/e.altx for Br/a.alt/z.altil
 (page [7]) 43444546474849Score
 (page [7]) 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018 12 Sou/z.alt/a.alt-Rodri/g.altu/e.alts, E. (2019). D/e.altfor/e.altst/a.alttion in th/e.alt Am/a.alt/z.alton: A uniﬁ/e.altd Fr/a.altm/e.altwork for Estim/a.alttion /a.altnd Polic/y.alt An/a.altl/y.altsis. Th/e.alt R/e.altvi/e.altw of Economic Studi/e.alts , 86 (6). pp. 2713–2744. DOI: https:/ /doi.or/g.alt/10.1093/r/e.altstud/rd/y.alt070 13 World B/a.altnk Group (2017). Br/a.alt/z.altil’s INDC R/e.altstor/a.alttion /a.altnd R/e.altfor/e.altst/a.alttion T/a.altr/g.alt/e.altt — An/a.altl/y.altsis of INDC L/a.altnd-us/e.alt T/a.altr/g.alt/e.altts. WBG Environm/e.altnt & N/a.alttur/a.altl R/e.altsourc/e.alts. URL: http:/ /docum/e.altnts1.worldb/a.altnk.or/g.alt/cur/a.altt/e.altd//e.altn/917511508233889310/pdf/AUS19554-WP-P159184-PUBLIC-
 (page [7]) Br/a.alt/z.altils-INDC-R/e.altstor/a.alttion-/a.altnd-R/e.altfor/e.altst/a.alttion-T/a.altr/g.alt/e.altt.pdf
 (page [8, 7]) 14 Br/a.alt/z.altil (2019). Br/a.alt/z.altil’s Third Bi/e.altnni/a.altl Upd/a.altt/e.alt R/e.altport to th/e.alt UNFCCC. Ministr/y.alt of For/e.alti/g.altn Aﬀ/a.altirs, Ministr/y.alt of Sci/e.altnc/e.alt, T/e.altchnolo/g.alt/y.alt, Innov/a.alttions /a.altnd Communic/a.alttions. URL: https:/ /unfccc.int/sit/e.alts/d/e.altf/a.altult/ﬁl/e.alts/r/e.altsourc/e.alt/2018-02-28_BRA-BUR3_ENG_FINAL.pdf 15 Br/a.alt/z.altil (2020). Upd/a.altt/e.altd N/a.alttion/a.altll/y.alt-D/e.altt/e.altrmin/e.altd Contributions. URL: https:/ /www4.unfccc.int/sit/e.alts/ndcst/a.alt/g.altin/g.alt/Publish/e.altdDocum/e.altnts/
 (page [8]) Br/a.alt/z.altil%20First/Br/a.alt/z.altil%20First%20NDC%20(Upd/a.altt/e.altd%20submission).pdf
 (page [8]) 5 CLIMATE RISK COUNTRY PROFILE: BRAZILGr/e.alt/e.altn, Inclusiv/e.alt /a.altnd R/e.altsili/e.altnt R/e.altcov/e.altr/y.alt The coronavirus disease (COVID-19) pandemic has led to unprece dented adverse social and economic impacts. Further, the pandemic has demonstrated the compounding impacts of adding yet another shock on top of the multiple challenges that vulnerable populations already face in day-to-day life, with the potential to create devastating health, social, economic and environmental crises that can leave a deep, long-lasting mark. However, as governments take urgent action and lay the foundations for their ﬁnancial, economic, and social recovery, they have a unique opportunity to create economies that are more sustainable, inclusive and resilient. Short and long-term recovery efforts should prioritize investments that boost jobs and economic activity; have positive impacts on human, social and natural capital; protect biodiversity and ecosystems services; boost resilience; and advance the decarbonization
 (page [8]) of economies.
 (page [8]) Clim/a.altt/e.alt B/a.alts/e.altlin/e.alt
 (page [8]) Ov/e.altrvi/e.altw
 (page [8]) Brazil’s vast territory is home to an extraordinary mosaic of ecosystems, which parallel its climatic and topographic diversity. Brazil experiences equatorial, tropical as well as sub-tropical climates. The Amazon forest drives rainfall conditions across the South American continent, and is a critical factor to the planet’s energy balance. Brazil’s forest formations occupy most of the national territory, and include humid and seasonal forests, which appear most commonly in the Amazon and Atlantic Forest.16 Savannas are predominant in the Cerrado, but they also appear in other regions of the country, including the Amazon. Steppe savannah formations appear mainly in the Northeastern Caatinga and in the plateaus and prairies in the far southern areas of Brazil, in the Pampa biome. Campinaranas are found primarily in the Amazon and in the Rio Negro Watershed. Dominated by equatorial and tropical climates, northern and central Brazil receives frequent rainfall and experiences higher temperatures. Meanwhile, southern Brazil is characterized by a humid subtropical climate. Notably, northeast Brazil exhibits a semi-arid climate, receiving less than 700 mm per year of rain.17 Climate variability across the country is driven by the South American Monsoon System (SAMS), the El Niño Southern Oscillation (ENSO), and the Inter Tropical Convergence Zone (ITCZ). T ypically, early October marks the beginning of monsoon season in tropical Brazil. For the country’s austral summer (December to February), the Amazon Basin receives a signiﬁcant increase of precipitation. The country experiences a rainfall gradient from the northwest to the south and east.18
 (page [8]) CLIMATOLOGY
 (page [8]) 16 Sot/e.altrroni, A., Mosni/e.altr, A., C/a.altrv/a.altlho, A., C/a.altm/a.altr/a.alt. G., Ob/e.altrst/e.altin/e.altr, M., Andr/a.altd/e.alt, P.R., Sou/z.alt/a.alt, R.C., /a.altnd Brock, R. /e.altt /a.altl. (2018). Futur/e.alt /e.altnvironm/e.altnt/a.altl /a.altnd /a.alt/g.altricultur/a.altl imp/a.altcts of Br/a.alt/z.altil’s For/e.altst Cod/e.alt. Environm/e.altnt/a.altl R/e.alts/e.alt/a.altrch L/e.alttt/e.altrs . DOI: 10.1088/1748-9326//a.alt/a.altccbb . 17 Br/a.alt/z.altil (2020). Fourth N/a.alttion/a.altl Communic/a.alttion of Br/a.alt/z.altil to th/e.alt UNFCCC. URL: https:/ /unfccc.int/sit/e.alts/d/e.altf/a.altult/ﬁl/e.alts/r/e.altsourc/e.alt/
 (page [9]) 4/a.alt%20Comunic/a.altc/a.alto%20N/a.altcion/a.altl.pdf
 (page [9]) 18 Li/e.altbm/a.altnn, B. /a.altnd M/e.altchoso, C. (2011). Th/e.alt South Am/e.altric/a.altn Monsoon S/y.altst/e.altm: R/e.alts/e.alt/a.altrch /a.altnd For/e.altc/a.altst (2nd Edition) (2011). URL: http:/ /
 (page [9]) p/e.altopl/e.alt./a.alttmos.ucl/a.alt./e.altdu/m/e.altchoso/Li/e.altbm/a.altnn.pdf
 (page [9]) — - Table ql
 (page [9]) mm, with
 (page [9]) imatology,
 (page [9]) iperature
 (page [9]) 6 CLIMATE RISK COUNTRY PROFILE: BRAZILAnalysis of data from the World Bank’s Climate Change Knowledge Portal (CCKP) ( Table 2 ) shows historical climate information for Brazil. Mean annual temperatures are 25°C, with average monthly temperatures ranging between 25°C (November to February) and 23°C (June, July). Mean annual precipitation is 1,741.8 mm, with highest rainfall amounts falling between December and March ( Figure 3 ), as shown in the latest climatology, 1991–2020.19 Figure 4  shows the spatial variation of observed average annual precipitation and temperature
 (page [9]) across Brazil.
 (page [9]) TABLE 2. D/a.altt/a.alt  sn/a.altpshot: Summ/a.altr/y.alt st/a.alttistics
 (page [9]) Climate Variables 1991–2020
 (page [9]) Mean Annual Temperature (°C) 25.6°C
 (page [9]) Mean Annual Precipitation (mm) 1,755.8 mm Mean Maximum Annual Temperature (°C) 30.9°C Mean Minimum Annual Temperature (°C) 20.3°C
 (page [9]) Rainfall Temperature
 (page [9]) Jan
 (page [9]) Feb
 (page [9]) Mar
 (page [9]) Apr
 (page [9]) May
 (page [9]) Jun
 (page [9]) Jul
 (page [9]) Aug
 (page [9]) Sep
 (page [9]) Oct
 (page [9]) Nov
 (page [9]) DecTemperature (°C)Rainfall (mm)
 (page [9]) 20.822.42425.627 .2
 (page [9]) 0
 (page [9]) 80
 (page [9]) 160
 (page [9]) 240
 (page [9]) 320FIGURE 3. Av/e.altr/a.alt/g.alt/e.alt  monthl/y.alt t/e.altmp/e.altr/a.alttur/e.alt /a.altnd r/a.altinf/a.altll of Br/a.alt/z.altil for 1991–202020 19 WBG Clim/a.altt/e.alt Ch/a.altn/g.alt/e.alt Knowl/e.altd/g.alt/e.alt Port/a.altl (CCKP, 2021). Br/a.alt/z.altil. URL: https:/ /clim/a.altt/e.altknowl/e.altd/g.alt/e.altport/a.altl.worldb/a.altnk.or/g.alt/countr/y.alt/br/a.alt/z.altil/
 (page [10]) clim/a.altt/e.alt-d/a.altt/a.alt-historic/a.altl
 (page [10]) 20 WBG Clim/a.altt/e.alt Ch/a.altn/g.alt/e.alt Knowl/e.altd/g.alt/e.alt Port/a.altl (CCKP, 2021). Br/a.alt/z.altil. URL: https:/ /clim/a.altt/e.altknowl/e.altd/g.alt/e.altport/a.altl.worldb/a.altnk.or/g.alt/countr/y.alt/br/a.alt/z.altil/
 (page [10]) clim/a.altt/e.alt-d/a.altt/a.alt-historic/a.altl
 (page [10]) 3
 (page [10]) 75w Tow esw 6ow ssw Sow 45w
 (page [10]) 40w eeoSitsStFSTSSRNRBRRRVBBS 20S
 (page [10]) 75w 6sw Ssw sow 45w
 (page [10]) 35w
 (page [10]) 7 CLIMATE RISK COUNTRY PROFILE: BRAZILK/e.alt/y.alt Tr/e.altnds
 (page [10]) Temperature
 (page [10]) Brazil’s warmest areas are in the north, with high temperatures also occurring northeaster coastline. Temperatures across the Amazon Basin have risen by 0.5°C since 1980 ( Figure 5 ), with greater rates of warming observed during the dry season (August to November). Winter temperatures are rising, while the frequency of cool nights across the country have decreased. As temperatures continue to rise, the number of warm days and nights have also increased signiﬁcantly, particularly during the dry season, with a slight increase in the number of warm days also occurring during winter seasons.22 Given the country’s high humidity, rising temperatures have also increased values for critical heat indexes, particularly in low-lying areas and the northern and central-west regions, which are the most humid. Extreme low temperatures have also been observed in southern areas of Brazil, with extreme low temperatures continuing to occur over the past half century, but at a less frequent pace.23FIGURE 4. M/a.altp of /a.altv/e.altr/a.alt/g.alt/e.alt /a.altnnu/a.altl t/e.altmp/e.altr/a.alttur/e.alt (°C) (l/e.altft); /a.altnnu/a.altl pr/e.altcipit/a.alttion (mm) (ri/g.altht) of
 (page [10]) Br/a.alt/z.altil, 1991–202021
 (page [10]) 21 WBG Clim/a.altt/e.alt Ch/a.altn/g.alt/e.alt Knowl/e.altd/g.alt/e.alt Port/a.altl (CCKP, 2021). Br/a.alt/z.altil. URL: https:/ /clim/a.altt/e.altknowl/e.altd/g.alt/e.altport/a.altl.worldb/a.altnk.or/g.alt/countr/y.alt/br/a.alt/z.altil/
 (page [10]) clim/a.altt/e.alt-d/a.altt/a.alt-historic/a.altl
 (page [10, 11]) 22 Pr/e.altv/e.altd/e.altll/a.alt, J., Winck, G., W/e.altb/e.altr, M., Nichol/a.alts, E., Sin/e.altrvo, B. (2019). Imp/a.altcts of for/e.altst/a.alttion /a.altnd d/e.altfor/e.altst/a.alttion on loc/a.altl t/e.altmp/e.altr/a.alttur/e.alts /a.altcross th/e.alt /g.altlob/e.alt. PLOS On/e.alt [M/a.altrch 20, 2019]. DOI: https:/ /doi.or/g.alt/10.1371/journ/a.altl.pon/e.alt.0213368 23 Br/a.alt/z.altil (2020). Fourth N/a.alttion/a.altl Communic/a.alttion of Br/a.alt/z.altil to th/e.alt UNFCCC. URL: https:/ /unfccc.int/sit/e.alts/d/e.altf/a.altult/ﬁl/e.alts/r/e.altsourc/e.alt/
 (page [11]) 4/a.alt%20Comunic/a.altc/a.alto%20N/a.altcion/a.altl.pdf
 (page [11]) 8 CLIMATE RISK COUNTRY PROFILE: BRAZILPrecipitation Given Brazil’s size and diverse topography, the country has highly variable precipitation patterns. Brazil receives the highest average monthly precipitation in January to March and the least amount of average precipitation in July to September. Historically, average annual rainfall decreases from north to south, however this pattern continues to be largely affected by the country’s monsoon regime. Inter-annual climate variability plays a vital role in affecting the seasonal cycle of precipitation.24 Over the last three decades, the increased frequency and intensity of heavy rainfall events have often resulted in intense soil run-off, ﬂash ﬂooding and landslides, due in part to an increase in environmental degradation.25 During El Niño events, the northern region receives less rainfall than normal in summer, while the southern region receives more rainfall; the opposite occurs during La Niña events. Since 1960, a trend has been observed of an average annual increase in precipitation. Speciﬁcally, its tropical wet region, which covers the majority of the Amazon, has experienced a 5% increase in rainfall over the past 30 years.26
 (page [11]) Clim/a.altt/e.alt Futur/e.alt
 (page [11]) Ov/e.altrvi/e.altw
 (page [11]) The main data source for the World Bank Group’s CCKP is the CMIP5 (Coupled Inter-comparison Project Phase5) data ensemble, which builds the database for the global climate change projections presented in the Fifth Assessment Report (AR5) of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). Four Representative Concentration Pathways (i.e. RCP2.6, RCP4.5, RCP6.0, and RCP8.5) were selected and deﬁned by their total radiative forcing (cumulative measure of GHG emissions from all sources) pathway and level by 2100. The RCP2.6 for example represents a very strong mitigation scenario, whereas the RCP8.5 assumes business-as-usual scenario. For more information, please refer to the RCP Database . For simpliﬁcation, these scenarios are referred to as a low (RCP2.6); a medium (RCP4.5) and a high (RCP8.5) emission scenario in this proﬁle. Table 3  provides CMIP5 projections for essential climate variables under high emission scenario (RCP 8.5) over 4 different time horizons. Figure 6  presents the multi-model (CMIP5) ensemble of 32 Global Circulation Models (GCMs) showing the projected changes in annual precipitation and temperature for the periods 2040–2059 and 2080–2099.FIGURE 5. Obs/e.altrv/e.altd /a.altnnu/a.altl t/e.altmp/e.altr/a.alttur/e.alt /a.altnom/a.altli/e.alts for Br/a.alt/z.altil, 1901–2020Temperature (°C)
 (page [11]) 24
 (page [11]) 25
 (page [11]) 26
 (page [11]) 27
 (page [11]) Annual mean
 (page [11]) Smoothed
 (page [11]) 1911 1901 1921 1931 1941 1951 1961 1971 1981 1991 2001 2011 2020 24 Br/a.alt/z.altil (2020). Fourth N/a.alttion/a.altl Communic/a.alttion of Br/a.alt/z.altil to th/e.alt UNFCCC. URL: https:/ /unfccc.int/sit/e.alts/d/e.altf/a.altult/ﬁl/e.alts/r/e.altsourc/e.alt/
 (page [11]) 4/a.alt%20Comunic/a.altc/a.alto%20N/a.altcion/a.altl.pdf
 (page [11, 12]) 25 An/a.altch/e.alt, J., W/e.altndl/a.altnd, E., Oliv/e.altri/a.alt, P., Fl/a.altn/a.alt/g.alt/a.altn, D., /a.altnd N/e.alt/a.altrin/g.alt, M. (2017). Runoﬀ /a.altnd soil /e.altrosion plot-sc/a.altl/e.alt studi/e.alts und/e.altr n/a.alttur/a.altl r/a.altinf/a.altll: A m/e.altt/a.alt-/a.altn/a.altl/y.altsis of th/e.alt Br/a.alt/z.altili/a.altn /e.altxp/e.altri/e.altnc/e.alt. CATENA, 152 (M/a.alt/y.alt). pp. 29–39. DOI: https:/ /doi.or/g.alt/10.1016/j.c/a.altt/e.altn/a.alt.2017.01.003 26 USAID (2018). Clim/a.altt/e.alt Risk Proﬁl/e.alt F/a.altct Sh/e.alt/e.altt — Br/a.alt/z.altil. URL: https:/ /www.clim/a.altt/e.altlinks.or/g.alt/sit/e.alts/d/e.altf/a.altult/ﬁl/e.alts//a.altss/e.altt/docum/e.altnt/
 (page [12]) 2018-April-30_USAID_C/a.altdmusCISF_Clim/a.altt/e.alt-Risk-Proﬁl/e.alt-Br/a.alt/z.altil.pdf
 (page [12]) 3.
 (page [12]) 55
 (page [12]) 4N an
 (page [12]) 5.25
 (page [12]) 0 5 0
 (page [12]) 4.75
 (page [12]) 4s is 4s
 (page [12]) 425
 (page [12]) as as
 (page [12]) 4
 (page [12]) 128 3.75 128
 (page [12]) 35
 (page [12]) 16S 3.25 16S
 (page [12]) 3
 (page [12]) 20S 20S
 (page [12]) 2.75
 (page [12]) 2s — a as
 (page [12]) 2.25
 (page [12]) 28S 2 28s
 (page [12]) — 1.75
 (page [12]) 32S is 32s
 (page [12]) ] ] ] T T T T T 72w «GB SCAWSCGOW SEW SOW ABW Ws GW 72 «6«6BWOAWSC GOW) SsSGW SQW) aW WOW 286
 (page [12]) 4N
 (page [12]) 0 —
 (page [12]) 4s —
 (page [12]) 8s
 (page [12]) 128 —
 (page [12]) 16S
 (page [12]) 20S
 (page [12]) 2s —
 (page [12]) 28S
 (page [12]) 32S
 (page [12]) : : : : . . ; . — . . . ; . . . 77 COBWCWCCOW CSW SW SSW KW SOW SW 72w «BW CAWSEY 9 CLIMATE RISK COUNTRY PROFILE: BRAZILTABLE 3. D/a.altt/a.alt sn/a.altpshot: CMIP5 /e.altns/e.altmbl/e.alt proj/e.altction CMIP5 Ensemble Projection 2020–2039 2040–2059 2060–2079 2080–2099 Annual Temperature Anomaly (°C) +0.6°C to +2.0°C
 (page [12]) (+1.1°C)+1.3°C to +3.2°C
 (page [12]) (+2.0°C)+2.1°C to +4.7°C
 (page [12]) (+3.1°C)+2.9°C to +6.4°C
 (page [12]) (+4.1°C)
 (page [12]) Annual Precipitation Anomaly (mm) -25.6 to +23.0
 (page [12]) (−1.2 mm)-30.1 to +28.1
 (page [12]) (−1.5 mm)-39.1 to +34.3
 (page [12]) (−1.5 mm)-47 .4 to +40.4
 (page [12]) (−3.5 mm)
 (page [12]) Note:  The table shows CMIP5 ensemble projection under RCP8.5. Bold value is the range (10th–90th Percentile) and values in parentheses show the median (or 50th Percentile). FIGURE 6. Multi-mod/e.altl (CMIP5) /e.altns/e.altmbl/e.alt proj/e.altct/e.altd ch/a.altn/g.alt/e.alts (32 GCMs) in /a.altnnu/a.altl t/e.altmp/e.altr/a.alttur/e.alt (top) /a.altnd pr/e.altcipit/a.alttion (bottom) b/y.alt 2040–2059 (l/e.altft) /a.altnd b/y.alt 2080–2099 (ri/g.altht), r/e.altl/a.alttiv/e.alt to 1986–2005
 (page [13]) b/a.alts/e.altlin/e.alt und/e.altr RCP8.527
 (page [13]) 27 WBG Clim/a.altt/e.alt Ch/a.altn/g.alt/e.alt Knowl/e.altd/g.alt/e.alt Port/a.altl (CCKP, 2021). Br/a.alt/z.altil Proj/e.altct/e.altd Futur/e.alt Clim/a.altt/e.alt. URL: https:/ /clim/a.altt/e.altd/a.altt/a.alt.worldb/a.altnk.or/g.alt/
 (page [13]) CRM/e.altPort/a.altl/w/e.altb//a.alt/g.altricultur/e.alt/crops-/a.altnd-l/a.altnd-m/a.altn/a.alt/g.alt/e.altm/e.altnt?countr/y.alt=BRA&p/e.altriod=2080-2099
 (page [13]) erence Period,
 (page [13]) 10 CLIMATE RISK COUNTRY PROFILE: BRAZILK/e.alt/y.alt Tr/e.altnds
 (page [13]) Temperature
 (page [13]) Brazil’s average annual temperatures are expected to rise by 1.7°C to 5.3°C by the end of the century. The most signiﬁcant increases are expected to occur on the months of January and July. Higher warming is projected to increase from the country’s western interior to its eastern coast. Central regions are expected to experience the most signiﬁcant temperature increases. The interior of the country is expected to warm at a faster rate than areas along the coast, however, rising sea surface temperatures may adversely impact the normally cooling ocean air ﬂow for coastal regions. The frequency and duration of heat waves over the Amazon is projected to increase by as much as an additional 214 days by the 2090s.28 Across all emission scenarios, temperatures in Brazil will continue to rise throughout the end of the century. As seen in Figure 7 , under a high-emission scenario (RCP 8.5), average temperatures will increase rapidly by mid-century. Although temperature will raise throughout the year, important peaks are projected between April and September (Figure 8 ). Increased heat and extreme heat conditions will result in signiﬁcant implications for human and animal health, agriculture, water resources, and ecosystems.
 (page [13]) 32
 (page [13]) 31
 (page [13]) 30
 (page [13]) 29
 (page [13]) 28
 (page [13]) 27
 (page [13]) 26
 (page [13]) 25
 (page [13]) 24Temperature (°C)
 (page [13]) Historical RCP 2.6 RCP 4.5 RCP 6.0 RCP 8.5
 (page [13]) 1980
 (page [13]) 2000
 (page [13]) 2020
 (page [13]) 2040
 (page [13]) 2060
 (page [13]) 2080
 (page [13]) 2100
 (page [13]) YearFIGURE 7. Proj/e.altct/e.altd  /a.altv/e.altr/a.alt/g.alt/e.alt t/e.altmp/e.altr/a.alttur/e.alt for
 (page [13]) Br/a.alt/z.altil (R/e.altf/e.altr/e.altnc/e.alt P/e.altriod, 1986–2005)29
 (page [13]) 3.5
 (page [13]) 3.0
 (page [13]) 2.5
 (page [13]) 2.0
 (page [13]) 1.5
 (page [13]) 1.0
 (page [13]) 0.5
 (page [13]) 0
 (page [13]) –0.5
 (page [13]) Days
 (page [13]) Jan
 (page [13]) Feb
 (page [13]) Mar
 (page [13]) Apr
 (page [13]) May
 (page [13]) Jun
 (page [13]) Jul
 (page [13]) Aug
 (page [13]) Sep
 (page [13]) Oct
 (page [13]) Nov
 (page [13]) DecFIGURE 8. Proj/e.altct/e.altd  ch/a.altn/g.alt/e.alt in summ/e.altr d/a.alt/y.alts
 (page [13]) (Tm/a.altx >25°C) (RCP8.5, R/e.altf/e.altr/e.altnc/e.alt P/e.altriod,
 (page [13]) 1986–2005)30
 (page [13]) 28 Br/a.alt/z.altil (2020). Fourth N/a.alttion/a.altl Communic/a.alttion of Br/a.alt/z.altil to th/e.alt UNFCCC. URL: https:/ /unfccc.int/sit/e.alts/d/e.altf/a.altult/ﬁl/e.alts/r/e.altsourc/e.alt/
 (page [13]) 4/a.alt%20Comunic/a.altc/a.alto%20N/a.altcion/a.altl.pdf
 (page [13]) 29 WBG Clim/a.altt/e.alt Ch/a.altn/g.alt/e.alt Knowl/e.altd/g.alt/e.alt Port/a.altl (CCKP, 2021). Int/e.altr/a.altctiv/e.alt Clim/a.altt/e.alt Indic/a.alttor D/a.altshbo/a.altrd — A/g.altricultur/e.alt. Br/a.alt/z.altil. URL https:/ /
 (page [14]) clim/a.altt/e.altd/a.altt/a.alt.worldb/a.altnk.or/g.alt/CRM/e.altPort/a.altl/w/e.altb//a.alt/g.altricultur/e.alt/crops-/a.altnd-l/a.altnd-m/a.altn/a.alt/g.alt/e.altm/e.altnt?countr/y.alt=BRA&p/e.altriod=2080-2099
 (page [14]) 30 WBG Clim/a.altt/e.alt Ch/a.altn/g.alt/e.alt Knowl/e.altd/g.alt/e.alt Port/a.altl (CCKP, 2021). Int/e.altr/a.altctiv/e.alt Clim/a.altt/e.alt Indic/a.alttor D/a.altshbo/a.altrd — A/g.altricultur/e.alt. Br/a.alt/z.altil. URL https:/ /
 (page [14]) clim/a.altt/e.altd/a.altt/a.alt.worldb/a.altnk.or/g.alt/CRM/e.altPort/a.altl/w/e.altb//a.alt/g.altricultur/e.alt/crops-/a.altnd-l/a.altnd-m/a.altn/a.alt/g.alt/e.altm/e.altnt?countr/y.alt=BRA&p/e.altriod=2080-2099
 (page [14]) 11 CLIMATE RISK COUNTRY PROFILE: BRAZILPrecipitation Rainfall is highly variable across Brazil as are projections at the seasonal and geographical level. However, through the end of the century, annual precipitation is projected to increase northern, center-west and southern areas of Brazil. Decreases are expected for northeastern, central, and southwestern areas of the country.31 The dry season in the Amazon will likely get longer as precipitation values decline, notably for the traditional dry season (August to November). ENSO events bring stronger and more frequent precipitation events, with an increased likelihood of longer drier periods in between.32 The country’s tropical wet region is projected to also experience a signiﬁcant increase in dry spells. Figure 9 , shows the change in the projected annual average precipitation for Brazil. Water routing, storage and other management options can be highly varied depending if the precipitation input comes frequently or with long periods of aridity in between rainfall.33 At a nationally aggregated scale, annual average precipitation is expected to remain similar to historical observations, but will vary slightly throughout the century, based on emission scenarios.1900
 (page [14]) 1800
 (page [14]) 1700
 (page [14]) 1600
 (page [14]) 1500
 (page [14]) 1400
 (page [14]) 1300
 (page [14]) 1200
 (page [14]) 1100
 (page [14]) 1000Precipitation (mm)
 (page [14]) Historical RCP 2.6 RCP 4.5 RCP 6.0 RCP 8.5
 (page [14]) 1980
 (page [14]) 2000
 (page [14]) 2020
 (page [14]) 2040
 (page [14]) 2060
 (page [14]) 2080
 (page [14]) 2100
 (page [14]) YearFIGURE 9. Proj/e.altct/e.altd /a.altnnu/a.altl /a.altv/e.altr/a.alt/g.alt/e.alt
 (page [14]) pr/e.altcipit/a.alttion in Br/a.alt/z.altil (R/e.altf/e.altr/e.altnc/e.alt P/e.altriod,
 (page [14]) 1986–2005)34
 (page [14]) Ov/e.altrvi/e.altw
 (page [14]) Brazil’s diverse territory renders it susceptible to a variety of natural hazards, including ﬂoods, earthquakes, droughts, extreme temperatures, landslides, tropical cyclones, and infectious diseases. Brazil is also highly susceptible to natural disasters due to its location in tropical regions, with high temperatures and high evaporation potential facilitates large rainfall amounts. Drought and excess rainfall, resulting in recurrent ﬂoods and landslides, are the most frequent and disruptive hazard events, with important impacts for urban areas. Floods, landslides, and droughts have occurred on a regular basis throughout the past century, accompanied by signiﬁcant mortality, economic and CLIMATE RELATED NATURAL HAZARDS 31 Alm/a.alt/g.altro, A., Oliv/e.altri/a.alt, P., N/e.alt/a.altrin/g.alt, M. /a.altnd H/a.alt/g.alt/e.altm/a.altnn, S. (2017). Proj/e.altct/e.altd clim/a.altt/e.alt ch/a.altn/g.alt/e.alt imp/a.altcts in r/a.altinf/a.altll /e.altrosivit/y.alt ov/e.altr Br/a.alt/z.altil. Sci/e.altntiﬁc R/e.altports . 7 (2017). URL: https:/ /www.n/a.alttur/e.alt.com//a.altrticl/e.alts/s41598-017-08298-/y.alt 32 An/a.altch/e.alt, J., W/e.altndl/a.altnd, E., Oliv/e.altri/a.alt, P., Fl/a.altn/a.alt/g.alt/a.altn, D., /a.altnd N/e.alt/a.altrin/g.alt, M. (2017). Runoﬀ /a.altnd soil /e.altrosion plot-sc/a.altl/e.alt studi/e.alts und/e.altr n/a.alttur/a.altl r/a.altinf/a.altll: A m/e.altt/a.alt-/a.altn/a.altl/y.altsis of th/e.alt Br/a.alt/z.altili/a.altn /e.altxp/e.altri/e.altnc/e.alt. CATENA, 152 (M/a.alt/y.alt). pp. 29–39. DOI: https:/ /doi.or/g.alt/10.1016/j.c/a.altt/e.altn/a.alt.2017.01.003 33 Br/a.alt/z.altil (2020). Fourth N/a.alttion/a.altl Communic/a.alttion of Br/a.alt/z.altil to th/e.alt UNFCCC. URL: https:/ /unfccc.int/sit/e.alts/d/e.altf/a.altult/ﬁl/e.alts/r/e.altsourc/e.alt/
 (page [15]) 4/a.alt%20Comunic/a.altc/a.alto%20N/a.altcion/a.altl.pdf
 (page [15]) 34 WBG Clim/a.altt/e.alt Ch/a.altn/g.alt/e.alt Knowl/e.altd/g.alt/e.alt Port/a.altl (CCKP, 2021). Clim/a.altt/e.alt D/a.altt/a.alt-Proj/e.altctions. Br/a.alt/z.altil. URL: https:/ /clim/a.altt/e.altknowl/e.altd/g.alt/e.altport/a.altl.
 (page [15]) worldb/a.altnk.or/g.alt/countr/y.alt/br/a.alt/z.altil/clim/a.altt/e.alt-s/e.altctor-w/a.altt/e.altr
 (page [15]) m. The northeast region of Brazil Table 4, shows the country has endured various 12 CLIMATE RISK COUNTRY PROFILE: BRAZILsocial losses. Floods comprise over 65% of the natural hazards and intense rainfall events, which triggered ﬂash ﬂoods and landslides were responsible for 74% of the deaths related to natural disasters in the 1991–2010 period.35 In 2011, ﬂoods, landslides, and mudslides in Rio de Janeiro claimed roughly 1,000 lives and registered economic losses of 1.35% of the state’s GDP. Brazil’s coast was impacted by Hurricane Catarina in 2004, which caused infrastructure damage and disrupted key economic activities and production zones.36 The country’s high susceptibility to climate hazards translates into signiﬁcant economic impacts, with annual losses from natural disasters estimated at $3.9 billion.37 Rapid, unplanned and uncontrolled urbanization, which has taken place since the 1960s has meant building in unsafe areas (ﬂoodplains, steep hillside slopes) making urban residents and public infrastructure additionally vulnerable. Between 2009 and 2014, nearly every highly populated municipality in Brazil was affected by ﬂoods and about 50,000 low-income homes were destroyed.38 The western and central Amazon suffered severe ﬂoods in 2009, 2011, 2012–2013, and 2014. The ﬂoods of 2009, known as the “ﬂood of the century”, surged ﬂows of the Rio Negro by 29.77 m. The northeast region of Brazil has experienced some of the worst droughts in the history, affecting over 4 million people and 1,400 municipalities. Although tropical cyclones are nearly non-existent, Hurricane Catarina (category 2) appeared in the south region of Brazil in March 2004, destroying 1,500 households and damaging another 40,000, also causing three deaths
 (page [15]) and 75 injuries.39
 (page [15]) Data from the Emergency Event Database: EM-Dat, presented in Table 4 , shows the country has endured various natural hazards, including ﬂoods, landslides, epidemic diseases, extreme temperatures, and storms. 35 D/e.altbortoil, N. /e.altt /a.altl., (2017). An ind/e.altx of Br/a.alt/z.altil’s vuln/e.altr/a.altbilit/y.alt to /e.altxp/e.altct/e.altd incr/e.alt/a.alts/e.alts in n/a.alttur/a.altl ﬂ/a.altsh ﬂoodin/g.alt /a.altnd l/a.altndslid/e.alt dis/a.altst/e.altrs in th/e.alt cont/e.altxt of clim/a.altt/e.alt ch/a.altn/g.alt/e.alt. N/a.alttur/a.altl H/a.alt/z.alt/a.altrds . 86, pp. 557–582. URL: https:/ /link.sprin/g.alt/e.altr.com//a.altrticl/e.alt/10.1007/s11069-016-2705-2 36 World B/a.altnk (2014). Copin/g.alt with Loss: Options for Dis/a.altst/e.altr Risk Fin/a.altncin/g.alt in Br/a.alt/z.altil. GFDRR. URL: https:/ /www./g.altfdrr.or/g.alt//e.altn/
 (page [15]) public/a.alttion/options-dis/a.altst/e.altr-risk-ﬁn/a.altncin/g.alt-br/a.alt/z.altil
 (page [16, 15]) 37 GFDRR (2020). Br/a.alt/z.altil — Ov/e.altrvi/e.altw. URL: https:/ /www./g.altfdrr.or/g.alt//e.altn/br/a.alt/z.altil 38 D/e.altbortoil, N. /e.altt /a.altl., (2017). An ind/e.altx of Br/a.alt/z.altil’s vuln/e.altr/a.altbilit/y.alt to /e.altxp/e.altct/e.altd incr/e.alt/a.alts/e.alts in n/a.alttur/a.altl ﬂ/a.altsh ﬂoodin/g.alt /a.altnd l/a.altndslid/e.alt dis/a.altst/e.altrs in th/e.alt cont/e.altxt of clim/a.altt/e.alt ch/a.altn/g.alt/e.alt. N/a.alttur/a.altl H/a.alt/z.alt/a.altrds . 86, pp. 557–582. URL: https:/ /link.sprin/g.alt/e.altr.com//a.altrticl/e.alt/10.1007/s11069-016-2705-2 39 Br/a.alt/z.altil (2020). Fourth N/a.alttion/a.altl Communic/a.alttion of Br/a.alt/z.altil to th/e.alt UNFCCC. URL: https:/ /unfccc.int/sit/e.alts/d/e.altf/a.altult/ﬁl/e.alts/r/e.altsourc/e.alt/
 (page [16]) 4/a.alt%20Comunic/a.altc/a.alto%20N/a.altcion/a.altl.pdf
 (page [16]) 13 CLIMATE RISK COUNTRY PROFILE: BRAZILK/e.alt/y.alt Tr/e.altnds Climate change is expected to increase the risk and intensity of water scarcity and drought across the country, with the main exception of increased precipitation experienced in Brazil’s south-central tip, from São Paulo south. The primary sectors affected are water, agriculture and livestock, forestry, and infrastructure. As intense precipitation events become more common, these will translate into increased risks of ﬂoods, both riverine and ﬂash ﬂooding. Such ﬂoods could further erode soils and damage crops through water logging, further damaging yield potentials and increasing food insecurity; particularly for subsistence-scale farmers. Higher temperatures will increase soil moisture loss, leading to greater aridity, affecting livestock and crops, furthering economic losses, damage to agricultural lands and infrastructure as well as human casualties. Furthermore, land degradation and soil erosion, exacerbated by recurrent ﬂood and drought adversely impact agricultural production, and thus the livelihoods of the rural poor. Small rural farmers, are more sensitive to impacts of disasters (ﬂoods, dry periods) because they have limited resources with which to inﬂuence and increase their responses to these risks.41 Large urban zones, such as São Paulo (estimated population of 11 million people) are impacted by seasonal ﬂooding, which damages infrastructure and housing, particularly for the urban poor.42 Rising temperatures are expected to exacerbate existing TABLE 4. N/a.alttur/a.altl dis/a.altst/e.altrs in Br/a.alt/z.altil, 1900–202040
 (page [16]) Natural Hazard
 (page [16]) 1900–2020 SubtypeEvents
 (page [16]) CountTotal
 (page [16]) Deaths Total AffectedTotal Damage
 (page [16]) (’000 USD)
 (page [16]) Drought Drought 18 20 78,812,000 111,831,100 Earthquake Ground Movement 2 2 23,286 5,000 EpidemicBacterial Disease 5 1,696 45,893 0 Viral Disease 11 633 1,937 ,335 0 Extreme TemperaturesCold Wave 5 154 600 1,075,000 Heat Wave 3 201 0 0 FloodFlash Flood 11 658 325,931 275,770 Riverine Flood 69 3,106 11,418,683 6,158,670 Insect Infestation Infestation 1 0 2,000 0
 (page [16]) LandslidesLandslide 15 1,262 4004045 27
 (page [16]) Mudslide 10 483 234,569 231,000
 (page [16]) StormConvective Storm 10 70 36,257 183,000
 (page [16]) Extra-tropical
 (page [16]) Storm1 3 1,600 350,000
 (page [16]) Tropical Cyclone 1 4 150,060 350,000 WildﬁreForest Fire 2 0 0 0
 (page [16]) Land Fire (Brush,
 (page [16]) Bush, Pasture)2 1 12,000 36,000
 (page [16]) 40 EM-DAT: Th/e.alt Em/e.altr/g.alt/e.altnc/y.alt Ev/e.altnts D/a.altt/a.altb/a.alts/e.alt — Univ/e.altrsit/e.alt c/a.alttholiqu/e.alt d/e.alt Louv/a.altin (UCL) — CRED, D. Guh/a.alt-S/a.altpir, Bruss/e.altls, B/e.altl/g.altium.
 (page [16]) URL: http:/ //e.altmd/a.altt.b/e.alt//e.altmd/a.altt_db/
 (page [16]) 41 Br/a.alt/z.altil (2020). Fourth N/a.alttion/a.altl Communic/a.alttion of Br/a.alt/z.altil to th/e.alt UNFCCC. URL: https:/ /unfccc.int/sit/e.alts/d/e.altf/a.altult/ﬁl/e.alts/r/e.altsourc/e.alt/
 (page [17]) 4/a.alt%20Comunic/a.altc/a.alto%20N/a.altcion/a.altl.pdf
 (page [17]) 42 H/a.altdd/a.altd, E. /a.altnd T/e.altix/e.altir/a.alt, E. (2015). Economic imp/a.altcts of n/a.alttur/a.altl dis/a.altst/e.altrs in m/e.alt/g.alt/a.altciti/e.alts: Th/e.alt c/a.alts/e.alt of ﬂoods in S/atilde.alto P/a.altulo, Br/a.alt/z.altil. H/a.altbit/a.altt Int/e.altrn/a.alttion/a.altl. 45(2). pp. 106–113. DOI: https:/ /doi.or/g.alt/10.1016/j.h/a.altbit/a.alttint.2014.06.023 Show data source * bs “3 Show data source ~ "very low J Medium very low 14 CLIMATE RISK COUNTRY PROFILE: BRAZILtensions for water resources, particularly between the agricul ture and livestock sector, and urban populations, especially during periods of high aridity and drought. Water scarcity and changing rainfall patterns will signiﬁcantly impact the agricultural sector. Rising temperatures and degraded agricultural conditions are expected to also adversely affect ‘working days’, impacting livelihoods and economic resilience of vulnerable groups.43 Brazil’s extensive network of rivers and streams makes the country vulnerable to riverine ﬂoods, which, according to some estimates have resulted in an accumulated economic loss of over 6.1 billion USD. Flash ﬂoods in Brazil have inﬂicted damage to infrastructure and human lives. In the west and northeastern areas of the country, precipitation is projected to increase by 5% in the second half of the century, which could potentially lead to ﬂash or riverine ﬂood. In addition, as a consequence of rising sea levels in southern At lantic Ocean, coastal ﬂoods are expected to happen at least once over the coming decade.44 Droughts in Brazil have caused more than 11.2 billion USD in total damages. In addition, almost 80 million people have been affected by these events. The likelihood of drought occurrence in the coming decade is expected to increase by approximately 20%. This is of critical importance to the northeastern and southeastern regions, both of which will face higher drought and water scarcity issues in the future compared to other regions of the country. Figure 10  below present the risk of coastal ﬂooding and
 (page [17]) landslides for Brazil.45
 (page [17]) FIGURE 10. Risk of urb/a.altn ﬂood (l/e.altft);46 risks of l/a.altndslid/e.alt (ri/g.altht)47 43 D/e.altbortoil, N. /e.altt /a.altl., (2017). An ind/e.altx of Br/a.alt/z.altil’s vuln/e.altr/a.altbilit/y.alt to /e.altxp/e.altct/e.altd incr/e.alt/a.alts/e.alts in n/a.alttur/a.altl ﬂ/a.altsh ﬂoodin/g.alt /a.altnd l/a.altndslid/e.alt dis/a.altst/e.altrs in th/e.alt cont/e.altxt of clim/a.altt/e.alt ch/a.altn/g.alt/e.alt. N/a.alttur/a.altl H/a.alt/z.alt/a.altrds . 86, pp. 557–582. URL: https:/ /link.sprin/g.alt/e.altr.com//a.altrticl/e.alt/10.1007/s11069-016-2705-2 44 ThinkH/a.alt/z.alt/a.altrd! (2016). Br/a.alt/z.altil. URL: http:/ /thinkh/a.alt/z.alt/a.altrd.or/g.alt/r/e.altport/37-br/a.alt/z.altil 45 FAO (2018). Drou/g.altht Ch/a.altr/a.altct/e.altristics /a.altnd m/a.altn/a.alt/g.alt/e.altm/e.altnt in North Afric/a.altn /a.altnd th/e.alt N/e.alt/a.altr E/a.altst. URL: http:/ /www.f/a.alto.or/g.alt/3/CA0034EN/
 (page [18]) c/a.alt0034/e.altn.pdf
 (page [18]) 46 ThinkH/a.alt/z.alt/a.altrd! (2020). Br/a.alt/z.altil — Urb/a.altn Floodin/g.alt. URL: http:/ /thinkh/a.alt/z.alt/a.altrd.or/g.alt//e.altn/r/e.altport/37-br/a.alt/z.altil/UF 47 ThinkH/a.alt/z.alt/a.altrd! (2020). Br/a.alt/z.altil — L/a.altndslid/e.alt. URL: https:/ /thinkh/a.alt/z.alt/a.altrd.or/g.alt//e.altn/r/e.altport/37-br/a.alt/z.altil/LS 15 CLIMATE RISK COUNTRY PROFILE: BRAZILImplic/a.alttions for DRM Brazil’s policy on Disaster Risk Management (DRM) is increasingly moving from response-oriented to proactive anticipation and management and investments are focused on ensuring DRM continuity by building technical capacity at the federal, state, and municipal levels. In 2012, the government invested in the production of risk information to support informed decision-making and streamline risk-management strategies, spearheaded through the creation of the National Natural Disasters Database. Brazil has also implemented its National Center for Monitoring and Early Warning of Natural Disasters (CEMADEN), which is responsible for the development, testing and implementation of systems to predict natural disasters in susceptible areas in Brazil and provide necessary alerts on natural disasters.48 Most recently, CEMADEN developed drought indicators, informed by a remote sensing- based index, to provide detailed information to sub-state actors involved in drought risk management.49 The center is also currently monitoring natural hazards in 795 municipalities in addition to all municipalities in the Northeastern semiarid region, which is highly vulnerable to severe droughts. Additionally, advanced hydro-meteorological services provide a concrete foundation for effective early warning systems and include the Brazilian Network on Global Climate Change Research (CLIMA), System for Monitoring and Observation of Impacts of Climate Change (SISMOI), Brazilian Earth System Model (BESM), and the Earth System Grid Federation (ESGF).50 The federal government is responsible for preparing the Nat ional Civil Protection and Defense Plan and for identifying the most disaster-prone municipalities. All municipalities are now required, by law, to follow disaster risk management guidelines.51 The country is also working on the development and implementation of a quantitative analysis of exposure and vulnerabilities for its population and assets, such as infrastructure, agricultural land and livestock, to speciﬁc natural hazards. Given the increasing frequency and intensity of extreme weather events, early warning systems can play a vital role in preventing natural hazard related mortality and property damages.52 Brazil is highly vulnerable to climate variability and change in the immediate as well as longer-term, particularly for the country’s water, agriculture, forestry, energy, and health sectors. Environmental degradation, changes in water resources, and loss of biodiversity are signiﬁcant obstacles to the country’s continued development and poverty reduction efforts.53 The country’s diverse topography, complex climate, dispersed rural and urban populations and socio-economic disparity, increases its vulnerability to climate change impacts. Competing demands CLIMATE CHANGE IMPACTS TO KEY SECTORS 48 Br/a.alt/z.altil (2020). Fourth N/a.alttion/a.altl Communic/a.alttion of Br/a.alt/z.altil to th/e.alt UNFCCC. URL: https:/ /unfccc.int/sit/e.alts/d/e.altf/a.altult/ﬁl/e.alts/r/e.altsourc/e.alt/
 (page [18]) 4/a.alt%20Comunic/a.altc/a.alto%20N/a.altcion/a.altl.pdf
 (page [18]) 49 Cunh/a.alt, A. /e.altt /a.altl. (2019). Br/a.alt/z.altili/a.altn /e.altxp/e.altri/e.altnc/e.alt on th/e.alt d/e.altv/e.altlopm/e.altnt of drou/g.altht monitorin/g.alt /a.altnd imp/a.altct /a.altss/e.altssm/e.altnt s/y.altst/e.altms. Contributin/g.alt P/a.altp/e.altr to Glob/a.altl Ass/e.altssm/e.altnt R/e.altport on Dis/a.altst/e.altr Risk R/e.altduction 2019. URL: https:/ /www.undrr.or/g.alt/public/a.alttion/br/a.alt/z.altili/a.altn-/e.altxp/e.altri/e.altnc/e.alt-
 (page [18]) d/e.altv/e.altlopm/e.altnt-drou/g.altht-monitorin/g.alt-/a.altnd-imp/a.altct-/a.altss/e.altssm/e.altnt-s/y.altst/e.altms
 (page [18]) 50 Br/a.alt/z.altil (2020). Fourth N/a.alttion/a.altl Communic/a.alttion of Br/a.alt/z.altil to th/e.alt UNFCCC. URL: https:/ /unfccc.int/sit/e.alts/d/e.altf/a.altult/ﬁl/e.alts/r/e.altsourc/e.alt/
 (page [18]) 4/a.alt%20Comunic/a.altc/a.alto%20N/a.altcion/a.altl.pdf
 (page [18, 19]) 51 GFDRR (2020). Br/a.alt/z.altil — Ov/e.altrvi/e.altw. URL: https:/ /www./g.altfdrr.or/g.alt//e.altn/br/a.alt/z.altil 52 D/e.altbortoil, N. /e.altt /a.altl., (2017). An ind/e.altx of Br/a.alt/z.altil’s vuln/e.altr/a.altbilit/y.alt to /e.altxp/e.altct/e.altd incr/e.alt/a.alts/e.alts in n/a.alttur/a.altl ﬂ/a.altsh ﬂoodin/g.alt /a.altnd l/a.altndslid/e.alt dis/a.altst/e.altrs in th/e.alt cont/e.altxt of clim/a.altt/e.alt ch/a.altn/g.alt/e.alt. N/a.alttur/a.altl H/a.alt/z.alt/a.altrds . 86, pp. 557–582. URL: https:/ /link.sprin/g.alt/e.altr.com//a.altrticl/e.alt/10.1007/s11069-016-2705-2 53 Br/a.alt/z.altil (2020). Upd/a.altt/e.altd N/a.alttion/a.altll/y.alt-D/e.altt/e.altrmin/e.altd Contributions. URL: https:/ /www4.unfccc.int/sit/e.alts/ndcst/a.alt/g.altin/g.alt/Publish/e.altdDocum/e.altnts/
 (page [19]) Br/a.alt/z.altil%20First/Br/a.alt/z.altil%20First%20NDC%20(Upd/a.altt/e.altd%20submission).pdf
 (page [19]) 16 CLIMATE RISK COUNTRY PROFILE: BRAZILbetween economic growth and environmental stewardship increase the country’s challenges for implementing effective climate change adaptation and mitigation efforts.54
 (page [19]) Gender
 (page [19]) An increasing body of research has shown that climate-related disasters have impacted human populations in many areas including agricultural production, food security, water management and public health. The level of impacts and coping strategies of populations depends heavily on their socio-economic status, socio-cultural norms, access to resources, poverty as well as gender. Research has also provided more evidence that the effects are not gender neutral, as women and children are among the highest risk groups. Key factors that account for the differences between women’s and men’s vulnerability to climate change risks include: gender-based differences in time use; access to assets and credit, treatment by formal institutio ns, which can constrain women’s opportunities, limited access to policy discussions and decision making, and a lack of sex-disaggregated data for policy change.55
 (page [19]) A/g.altricultur/e.alt
 (page [19]) Ov/e.altrvi/e.altw
 (page [19]) Agriculture remains a critical element of the Brazilian economy, with total output more than doubling since the 1990s. As of 2016, the sector employed over 18 million people and contributes over one-ﬁfth to the country’s GDP. Brazil is the largest net exporter of agricultural commodities in the world, however 85% of farmers are part of small family farms. Brazil has a relatively complex network of rural credit and farmer ﬁnancing opportunities to support its small-scale farming businesses, however resources can be unevenly distributed across large geographic areas and throughout complex terrain. Additionally, farm cooperatives have gained inﬂuence and economic power for members, speciﬁcally for primary export commodities such as coffee.56 The Brazilian livestock industry accounts for 14% of the world’s beef output. Brazil’s vast agricultural and grazing land (33.4% of total land area) make it a prominent factor in overall global agricultural production, and a leading exporter of various agricultural goods (e.g. soybeans, corn, coffee, beef, sugarcane, and rice). Soybeans, maize, wheat, cotton, coffee, oranges, and sugarcane are among the country’s most important crops. Given its long coastline, the ﬁshing industry is also a signiﬁcant part of its economy and food security. The Northern Brazil Shelf, which hosts a $700 million ﬁshing industry is at increasing risk to increased intensity and frequency of hurricanes, as well as
 (page [19]) rising sea surface temperature.57
 (page [19]) 54 Br/a.alt/z.altil (2020). Fourth N/a.alttion/a.altl Communic/a.alttion of Br/a.alt/z.altil to th/e.alt UNFCCC. URL: https:/ /unfccc.int/sit/e.alts/d/e.altf/a.altult/ﬁl/e.alts/r/e.altsourc/e.alt/
 (page [19]) 4/a.alt%20Comunic/a.altc/a.alto%20N/a.altcion/a.altl.pdf
 (page [19]) 55 World B/a.altnk Group (2016). G/e.altnd/e.altr Equ/a.altlit/y.alt, Pov/e.altrt/y.alt R/e.altduction, /a.altnd Inclusiv/e.alt Growth. URL: http:/ /docum/e.altnts1.worldb/a.altnk.or/g.alt/
 (page [19]) cur/a.altt/e.altd//e.altn/820851467992505410/pdf/102114-REVISED-PUBLIC-WBG-G/e.altnd/e.altr-Str/a.altt/e.alt/g.alt/y.alt.pdf
 (page [19]) 56 Assunc/a.alto, J., Sou/z.alt/a.alt, P. /a.altnd Fi/g.altu/e.altir/e.altdo, B. (2018). Distribution Ch/a.altnn/e.altls for Rur/a.altl Cr/e.altdit. Polic/y.alt Bri/e.altf — INPUT. URL: https:/ /www.
 (page [20]) inputbr/a.altsil.or/g.alt/wp-cont/e.altnt/uplo/a.altds/2018/02/CPI_Bri/e.altf_IN_-_Distribution_Ch/a.altnn/e.altls_for_Rur/a.altl_Cr/e.altdit.pdf
 (page [20]) 57 Br/a.alt/z.altil (2020). Fourth N/a.alttion/a.altl Communic/a.alttion of Br/a.alt/z.altil to th/e.alt UNFCCC. URL: https:/ /unfccc.int/sit/e.alts/d/e.altf/a.altult/ﬁl/e.alts/r/e.altsourc/e.alt/
 (page [20]) 4/a.alt%20Comunic/a.altc/a.alto%20N/a.altcion/a.altl.pdf
 (page [20]) 17 CLIMATE RISK COUNTRY PROFILE: BRAZILAlthough Brazil’s food production is robust enough to meet both domestic and export demands, nearly a third of the population remains food-insecure. Advances of Brazil’s agricultural sector have also resulted in intense environmental degradation and the loss of biodiversity and ecosystem services. Pressure from the production of beef, resulting in the destruction of forested land for intensive cattle grazing and ranching has advanced forest cover loss.58 Beef production, followed by soy are the largest drivers of tropical deforestation for the country and the demand for meat and dairy products is projected to rise 80–90% by the mid-century.59
 (page [20]) Clim/a.altt/e.alt Ch/a.altn/g.alt/e.alt Imp/a.altcts
 (page [20]) Projected climate change impacts to food production, agricultural livelihoods and food security in Brazil are signiﬁcant national concerns. These are linked to future projected water supply constraints as well as temperature rise. While the increase in agricultural productivity has been largely driven by technological advancements, changes in rainfall patterns and rising temperatures present serious challenges to the continued success of the sector, as well as the country’s food security.60 Climate risks threaten land availability and continues to drive agricultural intensiﬁcation, furthering deforestation and increasing soil erosion and deterioration. Decreased agricultural production may be further impacted by the loss of up to 11 million hectares of agricultural land by the 2030s as a result of cumulative climate change impacts, accelerated by deforestation.61 Soybean and cotton crops are expected to be moderately impacted by climatic changes, but maize and wheat yields will decline signiﬁcantly. The agriculture sector is also threatened by potential increase in extreme events, with an increase of frequency and intensity for ﬂooding and drought due to strong El Niño events. Key specialty crops, such as coffee and cocoa, are expected to be impacted by high temperatures and changing rainfall patterns, as they are both drought sensitive crops and dependent on rainfall.62 Sugarcane is also heavily reliant upon intense water availability, but production zones in southern Brazil are likely to improve in suitably due to increased rainfall.63 The country’s livestock industry is also highly vulnerable due to the impact of increased temperatures on animals. Brazil’s robust ﬁshing industry also faces increased risk due to rising ocean temperatures and altered ocean currents. Overﬁshing and rising sea temperatures have the potential to decrease maximum ﬁsh catch potential by up to 50%.64 Heat stress will have a variety of detrimental effects on Brazil’s crops and livestock, with signiﬁcant effects on milk production and reproduction in dairy cows.65 The projected increased heat will also increase stress 58 World B/a.altnk Group (2017). Br/a.alt/z.altil’s INDC R/e.altstor/a.alttion /a.altnd R/e.altfor/e.altst/a.alttion T/a.altr/g.alt/e.altt — An/a.altl/y.altsis of INDC L/a.altnd-us/e.alt T/a.altr/g.alt/e.altts. WBG Environm/e.altnt & N/a.alttur/a.altl R/e.altsourc/e.alts. URL: http:/ /docum/e.altnts1.worldb/a.altnk.or/g.alt/cur/a.altt/e.altd//e.altn/917511508233889310/pdf/AUS19554-WP-
 (page [20]) P159184-PUBLIC-Br/a.alt/z.altils-INDC-R/e.altstor/a.alttion-/a.altnd-R/e.altfor/e.altst/a.alttion-T/a.altr/g.alt/e.altt.pdf
 (page [20]) 59 PROFOR (2019). L/e.altv/e.altr/a.alt/g.altin/g.alt A/g.altricultur/a.altl V/a.altlu/e.alt Ch/a.altins to /e.altnh/a.altnc/e.alt tropic/a.altl tr/e.alt/e.alt cov/e.altr /a.altnd slow d/e.altfor/e.altst/a.alttion — S/y.altnth/e.altsis R/e.altport.
 (page [20]) URL: https:/ /www.profor.info/sit/e.alts/profor.info/ﬁl/e.alts/LEAVES_S/y.altnth/e.altsisR/e.altport_PROFOR_2018.pdf
 (page [20]) 60 Br/a.alt/z.altil (2020). Fourth N/a.alttion/a.altl Communic/a.alttion of Br/a.alt/z.altil to th/e.alt UNFCCC. URL: https:/ /unfccc.int/sit/e.alts/d/e.altf/a.altult/ﬁl/e.alts/r/e.altsourc/e.alt/
 (page [20]) 4/a.alt%20Comunic/a.altc/a.alto%20N/a.altcion/a.altl.pdf
 (page [20]) 61 Gi/a.altnnini, T. /e.altt /a.altl., (2017). Proj/e.altct/e.altd clim/a.altt/e.alt ch/a.altn/g.alt/e.alt thr/e.alt/a.altt/e.altns pollin/a.alttors /a.altnd crop production in Br/a.alt/z.altil. PLOS On/e.alt. DOI: https:/ /doi.or/g.alt/
 (page [20]) 10.1371/journ/a.altl.pon/e.alt.0182274
 (page [20]) 62 G/a.altt/e.alt/a.altu-R/a.alt/y.alt, L. /e.altt /a.altl. (2018). Clim/a.altt/e.alt ch/a.altn/g.alt/e.alt could thr/e.alt/a.altt/e.altn coco/a.alt production: Eﬀ/e.altcts of 2015–2016 El Nino-r/e.altl/a.altt/e.altd drou/g.altht on coco/a.alt /a.alt/g.altrofor/e.altsts in B/a.althi/a.alt, Br/a.alt/z.altil. PLOS On/e.alt. DOI: https:/ /doi.or/g.alt/10.1371/journ/a.altl.pon/e.alt.0200454 63 M/a.altrin, F. /e.altt /a.altl. (2012). Clim/a.altt/e.alt ch/a.altn/g.alt/e.alt imp/a.altcts on su/g.alt/a.altrc/a.altn/e.alt /a.alttt/a.altin/a.altbl/e.alt /y.alti/e.altld in south/e.altrn Br/a.alt/z.altil. Clim/a.alttic Ch/a.altn/g.alt/e.alt , 117. pp. 227–239.
 (page [20]) URL: https:/ /link.sprin/g.alt/e.altr.com//a.altrticl/e.alt/10.1007/s10584-012-0561-/y.alt
 (page [20]) 64 Br/a.alt/z.altil (2020). Fourth N/a.alttion/a.altl Communic/a.alttion of Br/a.alt/z.altil to th/e.alt UNFCCC. URL: https:/ /unfccc.int/sit/e.alts/d/e.altf/a.altult/ﬁl/e.alts/r/e.altsourc/e.alt/
 (page [21]) 4/a.alt%20Comunic/a.altc/a.alto%20N/a.altcion/a.altl.pdf
 (page [21]) 65 WWF (2018). Wh/a.altt /a.altr/e.alt th/e.alt bi/g.alt/g.alt/e.altst driv/e.altrs of tropic/a.altl d/e.altfor/e.altst/a.alttion. URL: https:/ /www.worldwildlif/e.alt.or/g.alt/m/a.alt/g.alt/a.alt/z.altin/e.alt/issu/e.alts/summ/e.altr-2018/
 (page [21]) /a.altrticl/e.alts/wh/a.altt-/a.altr/e.alt-th/e.alt-bi/g.alt/g.alt/e.altst-driv/e.altrs-of-tropic/a.altl-d/e.altfor/e.altst/a.alttion
 (page [21]) 18 CLIMATE RISK COUNTRY PROFILE: BRAZILon crops and is likely to change the length of the growing season. Decreased water availability is likely to reduce yields and the reduction in soil moisture may alter suitable areas for agriculture or crop production. Increased heat and water scarcity conditions are likely to increase evapotranspiration, which is expected to contribute to crop
 (page [21]) failures and overall yield reductions.66
 (page [21]) Figure 11  shows the projected change in average daily max-temperature across the seasonal cycle. Higher temperatures experienced throughout the year have implications soil moisture availability and crop growth. Many of Brazil’s key staple crops such as corn, soy, sugarcane, coffee and cocoa are limited in their heat tolerance.67 Through the end of the century, under a high emissions scenario, RCP 8.5, daily max temperatures will increase throughout the year, with max temperatures projected to reach a median increase of 6°C from September to November, impacting planting and harvest seasons. Figure 12 shows the spatial variation for ‘hot days’, temperatures reaching over 35°C for the period 2040–2059 and 2080–2099, under RCP8.5. The areas experiencing the largest increase in hot days will also experience some of the largest reductions in precipitation.
 (page [21]) Ad/a.altpt/a.alttion Options
 (page [21]) Climate change trends and impacts to the country’s agricultural sector are linked with many other challenges and stressors that Brazil faces due to environmental degradation, disease outbreaks, and higher input costs as well as challenges regarding land rights and inequality. Brazil has committed to supporting adaptation strategies such as climate smart agriculture practices, improved water man agement, improved monitoring and early warning, the development of knowledge and decision-support systems, and the development of new crop varieties and technologies to support farming. Brazil has also committed to strengthen its Low Carbon Emission Agriculture Program, which includes the restoration of an additional 15 million hectares of degraded pasturelands and enhancing integrated cropland-livestock-forestry systems by 2030. The country already operates one of the largest and most successful biofuel production programs to date, and is increasing efforts to increase biofuel production (dominated by corn and
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 (page [21]) Temperature (°C)
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 (page [21]) DecFIGURE 11. Proj/e.altct/e.altd /a.altv/e.altr/a.alt/g.alt/e.alt d/a.altil/y.alt m/a.altx
 (page [21]) t/e.altmp/e.altr/a.alttur/e.alt for Br/a.alt/z.altil (RCP8.5, R/e.altf/e.altr/e.altnc/e.alt
 (page [21]) P/e.altriod, 1986–2005)68
 (page [21]) 66 WBG (2013). Imp/a.altcts of Clim/a.altt/e.alt Ch/a.altn/g.alt/e.alt on Br/a.alt/z.altili/a.altn A/g.altricultur/e.alt. URL: https:/ /op/e.altnknowl/e.altd/g.alt/e.alt.worldb/a.altnk.or/g.alt/bitstr/e.alt/a.altm/h/a.altndl/e.alt/
 (page [21]) 10986/18740/687740R/e.altvis/e.altd00LIC00w/e.altb0br/a.altsil02030.pdf?s/e.altqu/e.altnc/e.alt=1&isAllow/e.altd=/y.alt
 (page [21]) 67 Gi/a.altnnini, T. /e.altt /a.altl., (2017). Proj/e.altct/e.altd clim/a.altt/e.alt ch/a.altn/g.alt/e.alt thr/e.alt/a.altt/e.altns pollin/a.alttors /a.altnd crop production in Br/a.alt/z.altil. PLOS On/e.alt. DOI: https:/ /doi.or/g.alt/
 (page [22]) 10.1371/journ/a.altl.pon/e.alt.0182274
 (page [22]) 68 WBG Clim/a.altt/e.alt Ch/a.altn/g.alt/e.alt Knowl/e.altd/g.alt/e.alt Port/a.altl (CCKP, 2021). Br/a.alt/z.altil A/g.altricultur/e.alt. D/a.altshbo/a.altrd URL: https:/ /clim/a.altt/e.altd/a.altt/a.alt.worldb/a.altnk.or/g.alt/
 (page [22]) CRM/e.altPort/a.altl/w/e.altb//a.alt/g.altricultur/e.alt/crops-/a.altnd-l/a.altnd-m/a.altn/a.alt/g.alt/e.altm/e.altnt?countr/y.alt=BRA&p/e.altriod=2080-2099
 (page [22]) ail for 2040-2059 (left) and
 (page [22]) > (Reference Period, 1986-2005)
 (page [22]) \essss282a2828
 (page [22]) 72W «66BWOCOMW OO CSGW SWB WEG 720 0«COBBWOGMW OW CSW S2WCABWHsCA
 (page [22]) eA ot ee eS ae Sssssesssess co
 (page [22]) ese8Bses88e88
 (page [22]) 19 CLIMATE RISK COUNTRY PROFILE: BRAZILsugarcane) and its usage.70 Additional adaptation strategies include the establishment of an Agricultural Risk and Vulnerability Monitoring and Simulation System and the creation of a Centre for Climatic Intelligence for Agriculture. This would be developed by combining the Agricultural Risk and Vulnerability Monitoring and Simulation System with national monitoring and early-warning system; establishment of an inter-ministerial working group involving key stakeholders. Brazil is also developing contingency plans to improve current agricultural policies for climate related disasters based upon climate risk analysis.71 Efforts also continue in support of improved ﬁnancial options and credit availability for rural farmers through the increased geographic distribution of bank branches and cooperatives as well as an in the total funding amounts available across institutions.72
 (page [22]) W/a.altt/e.altr
 (page [22]) Ov/e.altrvi/e.altw
 (page [22]) Brazil has abundant water resources available throughout the country, with eight primary watersheds: the Amazon River, the Tocantins River, and the South Atlantic in the north and northeast, the São Francisco River, and the South Atlantic in the east, and the Paraná River, the Uruguay River and the South Atlantic in the southeast. Endowed with a vast and dense hydrological network, many of Brazil rivers are additionally valued for their length, width and/or depth. Plateau rivers, which are characterized by sudden drops in altitude, deep narrow valleys, among FIGURE 12. Numb/e.altr of hot d/a.alt/y.alts (Tm/a.altx >35°C) in Br/a.alt/z.altil for 2040–2059 (l/e.altft) /a.altnd 2080–2099 (ri/g.altht), und/e.altr RCP8.5 (R/e.altf/e.altr/e.altnc/e.alt P/e.altriod, 1986–2005)69 69 WBG Clim/a.altt/e.alt Ch/a.altn/g.alt/e.alt Knowl/e.altd/g.alt/e.alt Port/a.altl (CCKP, 2021). Br/a.alt/z.altil A/g.altricultur/e.alt. D/a.altshbo/a.altrd URL: https:/ /clim/a.altt/e.altd/a.altt/a.alt.worldb/a.altnk.or/g.alt/
 (page [22]) CRM/e.altPort/a.altl/w/e.altb//a.alt/g.altricultur/e.alt/crops-/a.altnd-l/a.altnd-m/a.altn/a.alt/g.alt/e.altm/e.altnt?countr/y.alt=BRA&p/e.altriod=2080-2099
 (page [22]) 70 Br/a.alt/z.altil (2020). Upd/a.altt/e.altd N/a.alttion/a.altll/y.alt-D/e.altt/e.altrmin/e.altd Contributions. URL: https:/ /www4.unfccc.int/sit/e.alts/ndcst/a.alt/g.altin/g.alt/Publish/e.altdDocum/e.altnts/
 (page [22]) Br/a.alt/z.altil%20First/Br/a.alt/z.altil%20First%20NDC%20(Upd/a.altt/e.altd%20submission).pdf
 (page [23]) 71 Br/a.alt/z.altil (2016). N/a.alttion/a.altl Ad/a.altpt/a.alttion Pl/a.altn to Clim/a.altt/e.alt Ch/a.altn/g.alt/e.alt URL: http:/ /www4.unfccc.int/n/a.altp/P/a.alt/g.alt/e.alts/n/a.alttion/a.altl-/a.altd/a.altpt/a.alttion-pl/a.altns./a.altspx 72 Assunc/a.alto, J., Sou/z.alt/a.alt, P. /a.altnd Fi/g.altu/e.altir/e.altdo, B. (2018). Distribution Ch/a.altnn/e.altls for Rur/a.altl Cr/e.altdit. Polic/y.alt Bri/e.altf — INPUT. URL: https:/ /www.
 (page [23]) inputbr/a.altsil.or/g.alt/wp-cont/e.altnt/uplo/a.altds/2018/02/CPI_Bri/e.altf_IN_-_Distribution_Ch/a.altnn/e.altls_for_Rur/a.altl_Cr/e.altdit.pdf
 (page [23]) 20 CLIMATE RISK COUNTRY PROFILE: BRAZILother characteristics, offer the country signiﬁcant options for electric power generation. Only the Amazon and the Paraguay are predominantly lowland rivers and these are extensively used for navigation and transport of goods. The main plateau rivers are the São Francisco and Paraná.73 Water is a critical resource for many key sectors. Brazil is believed to hold nearly 1/5th of the earth’s fresh water supply, however, 70% of it lies in the Amazon region where less than 7% of the population lives. This has created signiﬁcant challenges for urban populations and a high disparity with regards to water availability and access. The majority of the country’s population is concentrated in major cities in the southeast of the country (São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro) and northeast (Fortaleza and Recife), all areas far from Amazonia. An estimated 15 million Brazilians in urban areas do not have access to safe drinking water and in rural areas, 25 million people only have limited access to safe drinking water.74 It is estimated over 100 million people live without adequate sanitation or waste water treatment.75 Brazil also has a strong hydropower reliance, with 62% of the country’s energy generated through hydropower plants. Water is essential for agricultural sector and irrigation currently consumes 72% of the
 (page [23]) national water supply.76
 (page [23]) Clim/a.altt/e.alt Ch/a.altn/g.alt/e.alt Imp/a.altcts
 (page [23]) Despite Brazil’s relative abundance of water, droughts and water scarcity typically occur in the northeast and central regions. However, since 2012, the country has experienced increasing water crises, which have additionally hit large regions in the southeast and center-west of the country. The ongoing water crises have had uneven regional impacts, with rivers in the northeast, in critical condition due to limited rainfall and high evapotranspiration. In the southeast, water demand continues to increase given the burgeoning population and urbanization as well as the region’s severe pollution. The insecurity of supply affects metropolitan areas due to high demand and in the south of the country there is water stress due to the heavy demand for the irrigation of rice.77 Across the country, it is estimated that more than 16,500 km of federal rivers (rivers crossing more than one state or  neighboring countries) are facing rising conﬂicts in water usage. Local causes for increased water scarcity include the intense (over) pumping of groundwater, especially for irrigation, intense deforestation, uncontrolled urbanization and dumping of waste water into rivers and water ways.78 Intense deforestation and forest ﬁres in the Amazon are altering the country’s precipitation patterns, in which the highly dense forest regions are becoming savannahs due to the loss of an estimated 600 billion trees. Additionally, the Cerrado s crubland highland forests, which hold 43% of the country’s freshwater outside of the Amazon, is experiencing increased aridity due to the area’s intense deforestation. Over 50% of the land area in the Cerrado has been cleared since the 1 950s, primarily for soy production and cattle 73 Br/a.alt/z.altil (2020). Fourth N/a.alttion/a.altl Communic/a.alttion of Br/a.alt/z.altil to th/e.alt UNFCCC. URL: https:/ /unfccc.int/sit/e.alts/d/e.altf/a.altult/ﬁl/e.alts/r/e.altsourc/e.alt/
 (page [23]) 4/a.alt%20Comunic/a.altc/a.alto%20N/a.altcion/a.altl.pdf
 (page [23]) 74 World B/a.altnk (2020). Childr/e.altn /a.altnd Youth — Br/a.alt/z.altil’s invisibl/e.alt victims of in/e.altquit/a.altbl/e.alt /a.altcc/e.altss to w/a.altt/e.altr /a.altnd s/a.altnit/a.alttion. F/e.alt/a.alttur/e.alt Stor/y.alt. [Au/g.altust 25, 2020]. URL: https:/ /www.worldb/a.altnk.or/g.alt//e.altn/n/e.altws/f/e.alt/a.alttur/e.alt/2020/08/25/br/a.altsil-ninos-jov/e.altn/e.alts-d/e.altsi/g.altu/a.altld/a.altd/e.alts-/a.altcc/e.altso-
 (page [23]) s/a.altn/e.alt/a.altmi/e.altnto-covid-19#:~:t/e.altxt=JMP%20d/a.altt/a.alt%20r/e.altv/e.alt/a.altl%20th/a.altt%2015,but%20f/a.altr%20from%20th/e.altir%20hom/e.alts .
 (page [23]) 75 B/a.altrbos/a.alt, M., Al/a.altm, K. /a.altnd Musht/a.altq, S. (2016). W/a.altt/e.altr Polic/y.alt impl/e.altm/e.altnt/a.alttion in th/e.alt st/a.altt/e.alt of S/a.alto P/a.altulo, Br/a.alt/z.altil: K/e.alt/y.alt ch/a.altll/e.altn/g.alt/e.altd /a.altnd opportuniti/e.alts. Environm/e.altnt/a.altl Sci/e.altnc/e.alt & Polic/y.alt, 60. P 11–18. DOI: https:/ /doi.or/g.alt/10.1016/j./e.altnvsci.2016.02.017 76 World B/a.altnk Group (2016). Br/a.alt/z.altil m/a.alt/y.alt b/e.alt th/e.alt Own/e.altr of 20% of th/e.alt World’s W/a.altt/e.altr Suppl/y.alt but it is still V/e.altr/y.alt Thirst/y.alt. Au/g.altust 5, 2016.
 (page [23]) URL: https:/ /www.worldb/a.altnk.or/g.alt//e.altn/n/e.altws/f/e.alt/a.alttur/e.alt/2016/07/27/how-br/a.alt/z.altil-m/a.altn/a.alt/g.altin/g.alt-w/a.altt/e.altr-r/e.altsourc/e.alts-n/e.altw-r/e.altport-scd
 (page [24, 23]) 77 M/e.altrcur/e.alt, J.F. /e.altt /a.altl. (2019). S/y.altst/e.altm compl/e.altxit/y.alt /a.altnd polic/y.alt int/e.alt/g.altr/a.alttion ch/a.altll/e.altn/g.alt/e.alts: Th/e.alt Br/a.alt/z.altili/a.altn En/e.altr/g.alt/y.alt-W/a.altt/e.altr-Food N/e.altxus. R/e.altn/e.altw/a.altbl/e.alt /a.altnd Sust/a.altin/a.altbl/e.alt En/e.altr/g.alt/y.alt R/e.altvi/e.altws, 105. P 230–243. DOI: https:/ /doi.or/g.alt/10.1016/j.rs/e.altr.2019.01.045 78 World B/a.altnk Group (2016). Br/a.alt/z.altil m/a.alt/y.alt b/e.alt th/e.alt Own/e.altr of 20% of th/e.alt World’s W/a.altt/e.altr Suppl/y.alt but it is still V/e.altr/y.alt Thirst/y.alt. Au/g.altust 5, 2016.
 (page [24]) URL: https:/ /www.worldb/a.altnk.or/g.alt//e.altn/n/e.altws/f/e.alt/a.alttur/e.alt/2016/07/27/how-br/a.alt/z.altil-m/a.altn/a.alt/g.altin/g.alt-w/a.altt/e.altr-r/e.altsourc/e.alts-n/e.altw-r/e.altport-scd
 (page [24]) 21 CLIMATE RISK COUNTRY PROFILE: BRAZILcultivation, and since the 1970s, the area has experienced rapid and pronounced infrastructure expansion. This has resulted in signiﬁcant loss of native vegetation cover, especially along riverways and wetland areas, with resulting signiﬁcant impacts to the hydrological and geomorphological systems for the region.79 Changing precipitation patterns and prolonged dry periods have also signiﬁcantly impacted rivers and water recharge in key aquifers. For example, El Niño has had adverse consequences, resulting in greater droughts in the northeast and ﬂoods in southern Brazil. Projections show an increasing water deﬁcit in almost all of Brazil, but primarily in the central and northern regions.80 Rainfall and evaporation changes also impact surface water inﬁltration and recharge rates for groundwater, and a shortage of water storage capacity makes the country vulnerable to unreliable rainfall patterns. Changes in rainfall and evaporation translate directly to changes in surface water inﬁltration and groundwater re-charge. This has the potential to further decrease the reliability of unimproved groundwater sources and surface water sources, exacerbating periods of droughts or prolonged dry seasons. Water pumping mechanisms are facing increased strain and demand, as well as reduced availability, leading to breakdowns if maintenance is neglected. Additionally, temperature rise is increasing soil moisture deﬁcits even
 (page [24]) under conditions of increasing rainfall.81
 (page [24]) Figure 13  shows the projected annual Standardized Precipitation Evapotranspiration Index (SPEI) an index which represents the measure of the given water deﬁcit in a speciﬁc location, accounting for contributions of
 (page [24]) temperature-dependent evapotranspiration and
 (page [24]) providing insight into increasing or decreasing pressure on water resources. Negative values for SPEI represent dry conditions, with values below −2 indicating severe drought conditions, likewise positive values indicate increased wet conditions. This is an important understanding for the water sector in regards to quantity and quality of supply for human consumption and agriculture use as well as for the energy sector as reductions in water availability impacts river ﬂow and the hydropower generating capabilities. At a national scale, Brazil is projected to experience heightened dry conditions and increased drought severity, which will put greater pressure on water resources for the country by mid-century and by end of the century.
 (page [24]) Index
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 (page [24]) RCP 6.0
 (page [24]) RCP 8.5FIGURE 13. Proj/e.altct/e.altd /a.altnnu/a.altl SPEI Drou/g.altht Ind/e.altx in Br/a.alt/z.altil for th/e.alt p/e.altriod, 2080 to 2099
 (page [24]) (R/e.altf/e.altr/e.altnc/e.alt P/e.altriod, 1986–2005)82
 (page [24]) 79 Br/a.alt/z.altil (2020). Fourth N/a.alttion/a.altl Communic/a.alttion of Br/a.alt/z.altil to th/e.alt UNFCCC. URL: https:/ /unfccc.int/sit/e.alts/d/e.altf/a.altult/ﬁl/e.alts/r/e.altsourc/e.alt/
 (page [24]) 4/a.alt%20Comunic/a.altc/a.alto%20N/a.altcion/a.altl.pdf
 (page [24]) 80 Br/a.alt/z.altil (2020). Fourth N/a.alttion/a.altl Communic/a.alttion of Br/a.alt/z.altil to th/e.alt UNFCCC. URL: https:/ /unfccc.int/sit/e.alts/d/e.altf/a.altult/ﬁl/e.alts/r/e.altsourc/e.alt/
 (page [24]) 4/a.alt%20Comunic/a.altc/a.alto%20N/a.altcion/a.altl.pdf
 (page [24, 25]) 81 M/e.altrcur/e.alt, J.F. /e.altt /a.altl. (2019). S/y.altst/e.altm compl/e.altxit/y.alt /a.altnd polic/y.alt int/e.alt/g.altr/a.alttion ch/a.altll/e.altn/g.alt/e.alts: Th/e.alt Br/a.alt/z.altili/a.altn En/e.altr/g.alt/y.alt-W/a.altt/e.altr-Food N/e.altxus. R/e.altn/e.altw/a.altbl/e.alt /a.altnd Sust/a.altin/a.altbl/e.alt En/e.altr/g.alt/y.alt R/e.altvi/e.altws, 105. P 230–243. DOI: https:/ /doi.or/g.alt/10.1016/j.rs/e.altr.2019.01.045 82 WBG Clim/a.altt/e.alt Ch/a.altn/g.alt/e.alt Knowl/e.altd/g.alt/e.alt Port/a.altl (CCKP, 2021). Br/a.alt/z.altil W/a.altt/e.altr S/e.altctor D/a.altshbo/a.altrd. URL: https:/ /clim/a.altt/e.altd/a.altt/a.alt.worldb/a.altnk.or/g.alt/
 (page [25]) CRM/e.altPort/a.altl/w/e.altb/w/a.altt/e.altr/l/a.altnd-us/e.alt-/-w/a.altt/e.altrsh/e.altd-m/a.altn/a.alt/g.alt/e.altm/e.altnt?countr/y.alt=BRA&p/e.altriod=2080-2099
 (page [25]) on
 (page [25]) Key challenged and
 (page [25]) 22 CLIMATE RISK COUNTRY PROFILE: BRAZILAd/a.altpt/a.alttion Industry in Brazil is a major polluter and consumer of the country’s water resources. As such, increased water efﬁciency through improved water usage management and reduced pollution can safeguard the sector and reduce water stress faced by industry operators and communities.83 Brazil has committed to improving water quality and accessibility through the introduction of a National Drinking Water Quality Surveillance Information System and to establish a network of labs to monitor community drinking water. Additionally, irrigation and dam infrastructure should be expanded as well as the country’s sanitation infrastructure.84 Integrated water and land conservation actions within micro-basins in rural areas should be developed in order to demonstrate pilot water conservation measures in selected areas, adding knowledge about successful preventive practices or practices aimed to recover degraded areas. These experiences can subsequently be used to inform and improve public water services and policy.85 Brazil is currently working to enhance its national capacity in water security through the National Water Security Plan to improve sustainable usage and increase water management for conservation and protected areas.86
 (page [25]) En/e.altr/g.alt/y.alt
 (page [25]) Ov/e.altrvi/e.altw
 (page [25]) The main energy source for Brazil is generated from hydropower; other renewable and fossil-fuel energy sources also complement the country’s energy mix. Hydroelectric power is distributed throughout the Brazilian territory, with the main reservoirs and hydroelectric power plants for generation are located in the central south of Brazil. Brazil is one of the largest producers of biofuels and biomass presents another signiﬁcant renewable-energy source for generation of electric power from thermal power plants, fueled by sugar-cane bagasse, located alongside sugar and ethanol mills. The Southeast and Northeast regions of Brazil have the greatest potential for electricity generation
 (page [25]) and ethanol production.87
 (page [25]) Brazil’s share of renewable sources is 79.3%. It is notable that the most predominant energy source in the country is hydro (70.6%), followed by natural gas (11.3%) and biomass (7 .6%). The potential for wind energy has become increasingly popular for an additional source to the country’s hydroelectric mix.88 The country acknowledges its great potential to increase hydro power, and currently relies primarily on large hydroelectric power plants instead of smaller dams. The second largest hydro plant, Itaipu Dam, sits over the Paraná river and shares the border of Paraguay. Due to the lack of precipitation and ﬁnancial support this hydro plant is working at limited capacity. In addition to promoting the use of renewables, the country also promotes energy conservation.89 83 B/a.altrbos/a.alt, M., Al/a.altm, K. /a.altnd Musht/a.altq, S. (2016). W/a.altt/e.altr Polic/y.alt impl/e.altm/e.altnt/a.alttion in th/e.alt st/a.altt/e.alt of S/a.alto P/a.altulo, Br/a.alt/z.altil: K/e.alt/y.alt ch/a.altll/e.altn/g.alt/e.altd /a.altnd opportuniti/e.alts. Environm/e.altnt/a.altl Sci/e.altnc/e.alt & Polic/y.alt, 60. P 11–18. DOI: https:/ /doi.or/g.alt/10.1016/j./e.altnvsci.2016.02.017 84 Ministr/y.alt of Environm/e.altnt (2016). N/a.alttion/a.altl Ad/a.altpt/a.alttion Pl/a.altn to Clim/a.altt/e.alt Ch/a.altn/g.alt/e.alt. Br/a.alt/z.altil. URL: https:/ /www4.unfccc.int/sit/e.alts/NAPC/
 (page [25]) Docum/e.altnts/P/a.altrti/e.alts/Br/a.alt/z.altil%20NAP%20En/g.altlish.pdf
 (page [25]) 85 M/a.alt/y.alt, P. /a.altnd Vinh/a.alt, V. (2012). Ad/a.altpt/a.alttion to clim/a.altt/e.alt ch/a.altn/g.alt/e.alt in Br/a.alt/z.altil: Th/e.alt rol/e.alt of priv/a.altt/e.alt inv/e.altstm/e.altnt.  Estudos Av/a.altnc/a.altdos . 26(74).
 (page [25]) URL: http:/ /www.sci/e.altlo.br/sci/e.altlo.php?script=sci_/a.altrtt/e.altxt&pid=S0103-40142012000100016&ln/g.alt=/e.altn&nrm=iso&tln/g.alt=/e.altn
 (page [25]) 86 Br/a.alt/z.altil (2020). Upd/a.altt/e.altd N/a.alttion/a.altll/y.alt-D/e.altt/e.altrmin/e.altd Contributions. URL: https:/ /www4.unfccc.int/sit/e.alts/ndcst/a.alt/g.altin/g.alt/Publish/e.altdDocum/e.altnts/
 (page [25]) Br/a.alt/z.altil%20First/Br/a.alt/z.altil%20First%20NDC%20(Upd/a.altt/e.altd%20submission).pdf
 (page [25]) 87 Ministr/y.alt of Environm/e.altnt (2016). N/a.alttion/a.altl Ad/a.altpt/a.alttion Pl/a.altn to Clim/a.altt/e.alt Ch/a.altn/g.alt/e.alt. Br/a.alt/z.altil. URL: https:/ /www4.unfccc.int/sit/e.alts/NAPC/
 (page [25]) Docum/e.altnts/P/a.altrti/e.alts/Br/a.alt/z.altil%20NAP%20En/g.altlish.pdf
 (page [25]) 88 Ruﬀ/a.altto-F/e.altrr/e.altir/a.alt, V. /e.altt /a.altl. (2017). A found/a.alttion for th/e.alt str/a.altt/e.alt/g.altic lon/g.alt-t/e.altrm pl/a.altnnin/g.alt of th/e.alt r/e.altn/e.altw/a.altbl/e.alt /e.altn/e.altr/g.alt/y.alt s/e.altctor in Br/a.alt/z.altil: H/y.altdro/e.altl/e.altctricit/y.alt /a.altnd wind /e.altn/e.altr/g.alt/y.alt in th/e.alt f/a.altc/e.alt of clim/a.altt/e.alt ch/a.altn/g.alt/e.alt sc/e.altn/a.altrios. R/e.altn/e.altw/a.altbl/e.alt /a.altnd Sust/a.altin/a.altbl/e.alt En/e.altr/g.alt/y.alt R/e.altvi/e.altws, 72. P1124 — 1137. DOI: https:/ /doi.or/g.alt/
 (page [26]) 10.1016/j.rs/e.altr.2016.10.020
 (page [26]) 89 Br/a.alt/z.altil (2020). Fourth N/a.alttion/a.altl Communic/a.alttion of Br/a.alt/z.altil to th/e.alt UNFCCC. URL: https:/ /unfccc.int/sit/e.alts/d/e.altf/a.altult/ﬁl/e.alts/r/e.altsourc/e.alt/
 (page [26]) 4/a.alt%20Comunic/a.altc/a.alto%20N/a.altcion/a.altl.pdf
 (page [26]) 23 CLIMATE RISK COUNTRY PROFILE: BRAZILClim/a.altt/e.alt Ch/a.altn/g.alt/e.alt Imp/a.altcts Rising temperatures and changing precipitation patterns for Brazil are expected to impact both the country’s energy demand and its supply capacity, particularly in the hydroelectric sector. The Brazilian Water Balance Index highlights a downward trend in hydroelectric production capacity in the watersheds in the north and in the central region of the country. However, additional research is needed to more fully understand the impacts of precipitation changes and water balance for the Amazon Watershed.90 Projections show increasing water deﬁcit in almost all of Brazil, with the most signiﬁcant changes in central and northeastern areas, through the mid to late century.91 The projected decrease in precipitation and change in seasonal rainfall patterns are likely to reduce hydropower generation potential as well as the potential for revenue loss due to overbuilt hydropower facilities, which may be under supplied. Increased evaporation rates from existing water storage facilities will also increase production costs, resulting in increased process for consumers. Increased temperatures and changing rainfall patterns may alter seasonal demand for energy, increasing demand during peak loads with a projected increase in net electricity usage.92 Cooling Degree Days show the relationship between daily heat and cooling demand, typically sourced through a form of active cooling or an evaporative process. The change in cooling degree days provides insight into the potential for extended seasons of power demand or periods in which cooling demand (power demands) might increase. As seen in Figure 14 , seasonal increases for cooling demands are expected throughout the year, with a marked increase from September to November. The Warm Spell Duration Index represents the number of days in a sequence of at least six days in which the daily maximum temperature is greater than the 90th percentile of daily maximum temperature. As shown in Figure 15 , warm spells are also expected to sharply increase in the second half of the century.
 (page [26]) RCP 8.5
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 (page [26]) 55008500
 (page [26]) 5000
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 (page [26]) 4000Temperature (°F)
 (page [26]) Historical RCP 2.6 RCP 4.5 RCP 6.0 RCP 8.5
 (page [26]) 1980
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 (page [26]) YearFIGURE 14. Proj/e.altct/e.altd ch/a.altn/g.alt/e.alt in Coolin/g.alt D/e.alt/g.altr/e.alt/e.alt D/a.alt/y.alts (65°F) in Br/a.alt/z.altil (R/e.altf/e.altr/e.altnc/e.alt
 (page [26]) P/e.altriod, 1986–2005)93
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 (page [26]) 150
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 (page [26]) Historical RCP 2.6 RCP 4.5 RCP 6.0 RCP 8.5
 (page [26]) 1980
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 (page [26]) YearFIGURE 15. Proj/e.altct/e.altd W/a.altrm Sp/e.altll
 (page [26]) Dur/a.alttion Ind/e.altx in Br/a.alt/z.altil (R/e.altf/e.altr/e.altnc/e.alt P/e.altriod,
 (page [26]) 1986–2005)94
 (page [26]) 90 G/a.altlv/a.alto, P., Hir/a.altt/a.alt, R. /a.altnd Conic/e.altlli, B. (2018). Estim/a.altt/e.altd /g.altroundw/a.altt/e.altr r/e.altch/a.altr/g.alt/e.alt usin/g.alt GIS-b/a.alts/e.altd distribut/e.altd w/a.altt/e.altr b/a.altl/a.altnc/e.alt mod/e.altl in /a.altn /e.altnvironm/e.altnt/a.altl prot/e.altction /a.altr/e.alt/a.alt in th/e.alt cit/y.alt of S/e.altt/e.alt L/a.alt/g.alto/a.alts (MG), Br/a.alt/z.altil. Environm/e.altnt/a.altl E/a.altrth Sci/e.altnc/e.alts, 77. URL: https:/ /link.sprin/g.alt/e.altr.
 (page [26]) com//a.altrticl/e.alt/10.1007/s12665-018-7579-/z.alt
 (page [26]) 91 Br/a.alt/z.altil (2020). Fourth N/a.alttion/a.altl Communic/a.alttion of Br/a.alt/z.altil to th/e.alt UNFCCC. URL: https:/ /unfccc.int/sit/e.alts/d/e.altf/a.altult/ﬁl/e.alts/r/e.altsourc/e.alt/
 (page [26]) 4/a.alt%20Comunic/a.altc/a.alto%20N/a.altcion/a.altl.pdf
 (page [26]) 92 Ministr/y.alt of Environm/e.altnt (2016). N/a.alttion/a.altl Ad/a.altpt/a.alttion Pl/a.altn to Clim/a.altt/e.alt Ch/a.altn/g.alt/e.alt. Br/a.alt/z.altil. URL: https:/ /www4.unfccc.int/sit/e.alts/NAPC/
 (page [26]) Docum/e.altnts/P/a.altrti/e.alts/Br/a.alt/z.altil%20NAP%20En/g.altlish.pdf
 (page [26]) 93 WBG Clim/a.altt/e.alt Ch/a.altn/g.alt/e.alt Knowl/e.altd/g.alt/e.alt Port/a.altl (CCKP, 2021). Br/a.alt/z.altil — En/e.altr/g.alt/y.alt. URL: https:/ /clim/a.altt/e.altd/a.altt/a.alt.worldb/a.altnk.or/g.alt/CRM/e.altPort/a.altl/w/e.altb/
 (page [27]) /e.altn/e.altr/g.alt/y.alt/oil-/g.alt/a.alts-/a.altnd-co/a.altl-minin/g.alt?countr/y.alt=BRA&p/e.altriod=2080-2099
 (page [27]) 94 WBG Clim/a.altt/e.alt Ch/a.altn/g.alt/e.alt Knowl/e.altd/g.alt/e.alt Port/a.altl (CCKP, 2021). Br/a.alt/z.altil En/e.altr/g.alt/y.alt S/e.altctor D/a.altshbo/a.altrd. URL: https:/ /clim/a.altt/e.altd/a.altt/a.alt.worldb/a.altnk.or/g.alt/
 (page [27]) CRM/e.altPort/a.altl/w/e.altb//e.altn/e.altr/g.alt/y.alt/oil-/g.alt/a.alts-/a.altnd-co/a.altl-minin/g.alt?countr/y.alt=BRA&p/e.altriod=2080-2099
 (page [27]) 24 CLIMATE RISK COUNTRY PROFILE: BRAZILAd/a.altpt/a.alttion As Brazil’s population grows, so does energy demand in the country, (industrial, agriculture, and domestic), and the government is working to diversify its energy supply and increase the amount of power generated from renewable sources, particularly solar and wind. However, electricity consumption may outpace generation capacity and expansion if hydropower plants are under preforming or unable to produce expected electricity due to a reduction in ﬂow rates.95 The energy sector is a major emission reduction target for the coun try which has committed to increase its renewables in the energy mix by 45% by 2030 [hydro (28%–33%), wind, biomass and solar (23%)]; expand 18% biofuels in the energy mix by 2030; and achieve 10% efﬁciency gains in the electricity sector by 2030.96 Achieving its renewable energy commitments, Brazil is already outpacing its GHG emission reduction commitments and continues to work to not only increase electriﬁcation across the country and meet increasing electricity demand as the country continues to develop, but to meet these goals through an electricity portfolio sourced by renewables.97 The country is in the process of conducting vulnerability assessments of its energy infrastructure to climate risks, and to develop and implement energy conservation strategies as well as improving energy efﬁciency. Brazil is also working to mainstream climate risk management into energy sector planning and operations and create a climate risk platform to support awareness raising and knowledge transfer.98
 (page [27]) For/e.altstr/y.alt
 (page [27]) Ov/e.altrvi/e.altw
 (page [27]) Brazil has the largest expanse of tropical forests in the world and approximately 64% (544 million hectares) of its territory has some form of forest cover. The natural forest area with a high timber potential is approximately 412 million hectares. From this, approximately 124 million hectares are in the public domain and include national forests, indigenous peoples’ lands, national parks and other conservation areas. The other 288 million hectares are privately owned. An estimated 15% of the 12 million hectares of forest with timber potential are under permanent conservation. Forest plantations cover nearly 6 million hectares. Eucalyptus accounts for 59% of production and pine for 37%. Plantation forests have a volume estimated at 775 million m3 and a sustainable production potential of 113 million m3 per year.99 Forest coverage makes up over half of the Brazilian territory, which is mainly located in the Amazon and Atlantic Forest. In 2015, total forest cover of the country amounts to roughly 4.9 million km2. Distributed along the Atlantic coast, the Atlantic Forest has humid tropical climate and abundant biodiversity. It is also home to major cities and more than 20,000 plant species. The habitat in this biome is highly fragmented due to 95 Ruﬀ/a.altto-F/e.altrr/e.altir/a.alt, V. /e.altt /a.altl. (2017). A found/a.alttion for th/e.alt str/a.altt/e.alt/g.altic lon/g.alt-t/e.altrm pl/a.altnnin/g.alt of th/e.alt r/e.altn/e.altw/a.altbl/e.alt /e.altn/e.altr/g.alt/y.alt s/e.altctor in Br/a.alt/z.altil: H/y.altdro/e.altl/e.altctricit/y.alt /a.altnd wind /e.altn/e.altr/g.alt/y.alt in th/e.alt f/a.altc/e.alt of clim/a.altt/e.alt ch/a.altn/g.alt/e.alt sc/e.altn/a.altrios. R/e.altn/e.altw/a.altbl/e.alt /a.altnd Sust/a.altin/a.altbl/e.alt En/e.altr/g.alt/y.alt R/e.altvi/e.altws, 72. P1124–1137.
 (page [27]) DOI: https:/ /doi.or/g.alt/10.1016/j.rs/e.altr.2016.10.020
 (page [27]) 96 Br/a.alt/z.altil (2020). Upd/a.altt/e.altd N/a.alttion/a.altll/y.alt-D/e.altt/e.altrmin/e.altd Contributions. URL: https:/ /www4.unfccc.int/sit/e.alts/ndcst/a.alt/g.altin/g.alt/Publish/e.altdDocum/e.altnts/
 (page [27]) Br/a.alt/z.altil%20First/Br/a.alt/z.altil%20First%20NDC%20(Upd/a.altt/e.altd%20submission).pdf
 (page [27]) 97 Br/a.alt/z.altil (2020). Upd/a.altt/e.altd N/a.alttion/a.altll/y.alt-D/e.altt/e.altrmin/e.altd Contributions. URL: https:/ /www4.unfccc.int/sit/e.alts/ndcst/a.alt/g.altin/g.alt/Publish/e.altdDocum/e.altnts/
 (page [27]) Br/a.alt/z.altil%20First/Br/a.alt/z.altil%20First%20NDC%20(Upd/a.altt/e.altd%20submission).pdf
 (page [28]) 98 Ministr/y.alt of Environm/e.altnt (2016). N/a.alttion/a.altl Ad/a.altpt/a.alttion Pl/a.altn to Clim/a.altt/e.alt Ch/a.altn/g.alt/e.alt. Br/a.alt/z.altil. URL: https:/ /www4.unfccc.int/sit/e.alts/NAPC/
 (page [28]) Docum/e.altnts/P/a.altrti/e.alts/Br/a.alt/z.altil%20NAP%20En/g.altlish.pdf
 (page [28]) 99 FAO (2016). For/e.altsts /a.altnd th/e.alt For/e.altstr/y.alt S/e.altctor — Br/a.alt/z.altil. URL: http:/ /www.f/a.alto.or/g.alt/for/e.altstr/y.alt/countr/y.alt/57478//e.altn/br/a.alt/ 25 CLIMATE RISK COUNTRY PROFILE: BRAZILextensive human activities, which makes it a priority area for protecting biodiversity.100 Known as the largest tropical forest, the Amazon is home to diverse species, and contains enormous amount of biomass. In addition, over 73% of national surface water resources comes from the Amazon Watershed, which makes it the largest riverine basin in the world. Additionally, more than 30 million people, including indigenous groups, live in the Amazon basin and rely on its natural resources for livelihood generation.101
 (page [28]) Clim/a.altt/e.alt Ch/a.altn/g.alt/e.alt Imp/a.altcts
 (page [28]) Brazil’s ecosystems, forests, and the ecosystem services they provide are essential for human well-being, however, these are also under signiﬁcant threat from climate variability and change. Temperatures are projected to rise by 1°C to 2.2°C across the country by the 2060s, with projections pointing to temperature rises by as much as 2°C to 3°C by the 2050s in the Amazon Basin. The Amazon forest ecosystem is not well adapted to extreme high temperature, and temperature increases could ultimately lead to a change in the natural vegetation and biodiversity. High temperatures, prolonged aridity and drought in regions of the Amazon, combined with other drivers such as deforestation, will alter existing ecosystems and the area’s unique biodiversity.102 Additionally, sea level rise threatens Brazil’s vast mangrove forests and is increasingly impacting coastal communities, infrastructure, and ecosystems.103 The southeastern Amazon faces the greatest risk of climate-related changes, with rainfall projected to decrease by nearly 20% and temperature increases anticipated to be the most severe in the area. The greatest impacts are expected to occur in the states of Pará, Mato Grosso, and Rondônia. Drier conditions from prolonged periods of aridity and drought, combined with increased evapotranspiration due to increased temperatures, is likely impact the 20% of the global freshwater contained in the Amazon. Reduced rainfall trends will continue to threaten forest resources while excessive heat and dryness have increased tree mortality along forest edges, contributing to both more invasive species and a rise in forest ﬁres.104 In the Pantanal region, on the border of Bolivia and Paraguay, recent increases in inter-annual variability of ﬂoods and droughts threaten the local species adapted to seasonal ﬂooding, the broader ecosystem, and the humans that rely upon these natural resources. Brazil’s forests also continue to be at risk due to deforestation in relation to the agricultural sector and cattle ranching. Deforestation and land-use change, particularly related to the Amazon, also present a signiﬁcant factor in the country’s emissions, however deforestation rates in Brazil have slowed signiﬁcantly after 2004.105 Figure 16  presents the rate of annual deforestation in the Legal Amazon from 1998 to 2014 (km2) from data sourced from Brazil’s National Institute for Space Research (INPE) and the PRODES research program. 100 World B/a.altnk Group (2017). Br/a.alt/z.altil’s INDC R/e.altstor/a.alttion /a.altnd R/e.altfor/e.altst/a.alttion T/a.altr/g.alt/e.altt — An/a.altl/y.altsis of INDC L/a.altnd-us/e.alt T/a.altr/g.alt/e.altts. WBG Environm/e.altnt & N/a.alttur/a.altl R/e.altsourc/e.alts. URL: http:/ /docum/e.altnts1.worldb/a.altnk.or/g.alt/cur/a.altt/e.altd//e.altn/917511508233889310/pdf/AUS19554-WP-
 (page [28]) P159184-PUBLIC-Br/a.alt/z.altils-INDC-R/e.altstor/a.alttion-/a.altnd-R/e.altfor/e.altst/a.alttion-T/a.altr/g.alt/e.altt.pdf
 (page [28]) 101 Br/a.alt/z.altil (2020). Fourth N/a.alttion/a.altl Communic/a.alttion of Br/a.alt/z.altil to th/e.alt UNFCCC. URL: https:/ /unfccc.int/sit/e.alts/d/e.altf/a.altult/ﬁl/e.alts/r/e.altsourc/e.alt/
 (page [28]) 4/a.alt%20Comunic/a.altc/a.alto%20N/a.altcion/a.altl.pdf
 (page [28]) 102 Ministr/y.alt of th/e.alt Environm/e.altnt (2016). N/a.alttion/a.altl REDD+ Str/a.altt/e.alt/g.alt/y.alt. Br/a.alt/z.altil. URL: https:/ /r/e.altdd.unfccc.int/ﬁl/e.alts/br/a.alt/z.altil_n/a.alttion/a.altl_r/e.altdd__str/a.altt/e.alt/g.alt/y.alt.pdf 103 Br/a.alt/z.altil (2020). Fourth N/a.alttion/a.altl Communic/a.alttion of Br/a.alt/z.altil to th/e.alt UNFCCC. URL: https:/ /unfccc.int/sit/e.alts/d/e.altf/a.altult/ﬁl/e.alts/r/e.altsourc/e.alt/4/a.alt%20
 (page [28]) Comunic/a.altc/a.alto%20N/a.altcion/a.altl.pdf
 (page [28]) 104 World B/a.altnk Group (2017). Br/a.alt/z.altil’s INDC R/e.altstor/a.alttion /a.altnd R/e.altfor/e.altst/a.alttion T/a.altr/g.alt/e.altt — An/a.altl/y.altsis of INDC L/a.altnd-us/e.alt T/a.altr/g.alt/e.altts. WBG Environm/e.altnt & N/a.alttur/a.altl R/e.altsourc/e.alts. URL: http:/ /docum/e.altnts1.worldb/a.altnk.or/g.alt/cur/a.altt/e.altd//e.altn/917511508233889310/pdf/AUS19554-WP-
 (page [29]) P159184-PUBLIC-Br/a.alt/z.altils-INDC-R/e.altstor/a.alttion-/a.altnd-R/e.altfor/e.altst/a.alttion-T/a.altr/g.alt/e.altt.pdf
 (page [29]) 105 T/y.altuk/a.altvin/a.alt, A. /e.altt /a.altl., (2017). T/y.altp/e.alts /a.altnd r/a.altt/e.alts of for/e.altst disturb/a.altnc/e.alt in Br/a.alt/z.altili/a.altn L/e.alt/g.alt/a.altl Am/a.alt/z.alton, 2000–2013. Sci/e.altnc/e.alt Adv/a.altnc/e.alts , 3(4).
 (page [29]) URL: https:/ //a.altdv/a.altnc/e.alts.sci/e.altnc/e.altm/a.alt/g.alt.or/g.alt/cont/e.altnt/3/4//e.alt1601047
 (page [29]) 16.
 (page [29]) 26 CLIMATE RISK COUNTRY PROFILE: BRAZILAd/a.altpt/a.alttion Brazil has made signiﬁcant strides in reducing deforestation and illegal logging practices. Rates of deforestation slowed signiﬁcantly following the introduction of the Brazilian national-satellite based deforestation monitoring systems (PRODES) in 2004.107 The government has also developed the Action Plan for the Prevention and Control of Deforestation in the Amazon Region (PPCDAm) and many states in the Amazon adopted economic instruments, including Payment for Environmental Services, Forest Conservation Grants, as well as REDD+ initiatives, to provide incentives for forest preservation. As a result, the country’s deforestation rate dropped by 82% from 2004 to 2014,108 however, deforestation rates in 2020 were the highest over the past 12 years.109 Brazil also strengthened its 2010– 2020 Low Carbon Emission Agriculture Program (ABC), which allows the country to expand sustainable land and forest management practices and reduce deforestation. Additional efforts include the restoration of an additional 15 million hectares of degraded pasturelands by 2030 and enhance 5 million hectares of integrated cropland- livestock-forestry systems (ICLFS) by 2030.110 Brazil has also committed to strengthening and implementing its Forest Code at federal, state and municipal levels. Efforts have also been made to achieve zero illegal deforestation activities by 2030, and through its NDC, Brazil committed to the restoration of 12 million hectares of forests by 2030. The restoration of native vegetation is also a pillar of sustainable rural development in Brazil and creates cross-beneﬁts through protecting and enhancing biodiversity and ecosystem services conservation to social and economic development. Improvements to sustainable forest management through georeferencing and tracking system technology is expected to improve management capabilities and curb unsustainable practices.111FIGURE 16. R/a.altt/e.alt of /a.altnnu/a.altl d/e.altfor/e.altst/a.alttion in th/e.alt L/e.alt/g.alt/a.altl Am/a.alt/z.alton from 1998 to 2014 (km2)106 106 M/a.alt/y.alt, P.H., G/e.altb/a.altr/a.alt, M.F., B/a.altrc/e.altllos, L.M., Ri/z.alt/e.altk, M., /a.altnd Millik/a.altn, B. (2016). Th/e.alt cont/e.altxt of REDD+ in Br/a.alt/z.altil: Driv/e.altrs, /a.altctors /a.altnd institutions — 3rd Edition. Occ/a.altsion/a.altl P/a.altp/e.altr 160. Bo/g.altor, Indon/e.altsi/a.alt: CIFOR. URL: https:/ /www.cifor.or/g.alt/public/a.alttions/pdf_ﬁl/e.alts/OccP/a.altp/e.altrs/OP-160.pdf 107 T/y.altuk/a.altvin/a.alt, A. /e.altt /a.altl., (2017). T/y.altp/e.alts /a.altnd r/a.altt/e.alts of for/e.altst disturb/a.altnc/e.alt in Br/a.alt/z.altili/a.altn L/e.alt/g.alt/a.altl Am/a.alt/z.alton, 2000–2013. Sci/e.altnc/e.alt Adv/a.altnc/e.alts , 3(4).
 (page [29]) URL: https:/ //a.altdv/a.altnc/e.alts.sci/e.altnc/e.altm/a.alt/g.alt.or/g.alt/cont/e.altnt/3/4//e.alt1601047
 (page [29]) 108 M/a.alt/y.alt, P.H., G/e.altb/a.altr/a.alt, M.F., B/a.altrc/e.altllos, L.M., Ri/z.alt/e.altk, M., /a.altnd Millik/a.altn, B. (2016). Th/e.alt cont/e.altxt of REDD+ in Br/a.alt/z.altil: Driv/e.altrs, /a.altctors /a.altnd institutions — 3rd Edition. Occ/a.altsion/a.altl P/a.altp/e.altr 160. Bo/g.altor, Indon/e.altsi/a.alt: CIFOR. URL: https:/ /www.cifor.or/g.alt/public/a.alttions/pdf_ﬁl/e.alts/OccP/a.altp/e.altrs/OP-160.pdf 109 BBC N/e.altws (2020). Br/a.alt/z.altil’s Am/a.alt/z.alton: D/e.altfor/e.altst/a.alttion ‘sur/g.alt/e.alts to 12-/y.alt/e.alt/a.altr hi/g.alth.’. [Nov/e.altmb/e.altr 30, 2020]. URL: https:/ /www.bbc.com/n/e.altws/
 (page [29]) world-l/a.alttin-/a.altm/e.altric/a.alt-55130304
 (page [29]) 110 Ministr/y.alt of th/e.alt Environm/e.altnt (2016). N/a.alttion/a.altl  REDD+ Str/a.altt/e.alt /g.alt/y.alt. Br/a.alt/z.altil. URL: https:/ /r/e.altdd.unfccc.int/ﬁl/e.alts/br/a.alt/z.altil_n/a.alttion/a.altl_r/e.altdd__ str/a.altt/e.alt/g.alt/y.alt.pdf 111 Br/a.alt/z.altil (2020). Upd/a.altt/e.altd N/a.alttion/a.altll/y.alt-D/e.altt/e.altrmin/e.altd Contributions. URL: https:/ /www4.unfccc.int/sit/e.alts/ndcst/a.alt/g.altin/g.alt/Publish/e.altdDocum/e.altnts/
 (page [29]) Br/a.alt/z.altil%20First/Br/a.alt/z.altil%20First%20NDC%20( Upd/a.altt/e.altd%20submission).pdf35
 (page [29]) 30
 (page [29]) 25
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 (page [29]) 15
 (page [29]) 10
 (page [29]) 5
 (page [29]) 0Deforestation (km2/year)
 (page [29]) 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 201421.050
 (page [29]) 17 .770
 (page [29]) 13.730
 (page [29]) 13.786
 (page [29]) 14.89614.896
 (page [29]) 29.059
 (page [29]) 18.161
 (page [29]) 13.227
 (page [29]) 17 .383
 (page [29]) 17 .259
 (page [29]) 18.165
 (page [29]) 21.651
 (page [29]) 25.396
 (page [29]) 27 .772
 (page [29]) 19.014
 (page [29]) 14.286
 (page [29]) 11.651
 (page [29]) 12.911
 (page [29]) 7 .464
 (page [29]) 7 .0006.418
 (page [30]) 4.571
 (page [30]) 5.891
 (page [30]) 5.01218.22611.030
 (page [30]) 27 CLIMATE RISK COUNTRY PROFILE: BRAZILH/e.alt/a.altlth
 (page [30]) Ov/e.altrvi/e.altw
 (page [30]) Brazil has made substantial progress towards its goal of Universal Health Coverage (UHC) and the country’s health sector has experienced multiple restructuring attempts. Since 2016, the sector has been further impacted by political unrest and economic inequality. Through this time, the economic and political crises in the country, combined with austerity policies, have posed major risks to UHC and health gains achieved, which has had detrimental impact on the poorest and the most vulnerable populations.112 From 2000 to 2014, the country’s total health expenditure rose from 7 .0% to 8.3% of gross domestic product and population coverage with the Family Health Strategy rose from 7 .6% to 58.2%. However, since 2015, public health expenditure per capita has declined in real terms, with 2.9 million people loosing private health plan coverage, violent deaths have increased and there have been outbreaks of infectious diseases.113 Health expenditure as a percentage of GDP reached 9.51% in 2018.114
 (page [30]) Clim/a.altt/e.alt Ch/a.altn/g.alt/e.alt Imp/a.altcts
 (page [30]) Brazil’s population suffers from a high incidence of climate-sensitive diseases. The country’s rising temperatures generally create even more favorable conditions for vector-borne, water-borne and other infectious diseases. Increased incidence of ﬂooding due to heavy rainfall or extreme events, is expected to further exacerbate sanitation challenges and water-borne diseases, such as cholera. Mosquito borne diseases, such as malaria and dengue, are present in the Amazon, northern and central-western regions of Brazil. With changing weather patterns likely to expand malaria zones for the country. The Zika virus, introduced in 2013, is favorable to climate conditions caused by El Niño and despite proactive efforts, is also expected to expand its geographic range.115 Rising temperatures are of increasing concern, especially for vulnerable groups such as children and the elderly. Under high emissions scenarios, heat-related deaths for the elderly are expected to increase to approximately 72 deaths per 100,000 by the 2080s, from 1 death per 100,000 annually currently. The extension of the malaria range will put an approximate 168 million additional people at risk of malaria by the 2070s. Projections pointing to on reduced agricultural productivity will have impacts for the country’s food security, nutrition and malnutrition rates. Brazil’s water accessibility and quality remains a challenge for many communities, which is also expected to decrease due to the presence of ﬂooding and resulting agricultural runoff and mining contamination. Extreme events are expected to exacerbate risks as access to health care in highly vulnerable areas and communities may
 (page [30]) also be limited.116
 (page [30]) 112 M/a.altch/a.altdo, C. /e.altt /a.altl. (2017). H/e.alt/a.altlth polici/e.alts in Br/a.alt/z.altil in tim/e.alts of contr/a.altdiction: p/a.altths /a.altnd pitf/a.altlls in th/e.alt construction of /a.alt univ/e.altrs/a.altl s/y.altst/e.altm. ARTIGO C/a.altd. S/a.altud/e.alt Public/a.alt, 33(2). DOI: https:/ /doi.or/g.alt/10.1590/0102-311X00129616 113 M/a.altssud/a.alt, A. /e.altt /a.altl. (2018). Th/e.alt Br/a.alt/z.altili/a.altn h/e.alt/a.altlth s/y.altst/e.altm /a.altt crossro/a.altds: pro/g.altr/e.altss, crisis /a.altnd r/e.altsili/e.altnc/e.alt. BMJ Glob/a.altl H/e.alt/a.altlth. 3(4): /e.alt000829.
 (page [30]) URL: https:/ /www.ncbi.nlm.nih./g.altov/pmc//a.altrticl/e.alts/PMC6035510/
 (page [30]) 114 World B/a.altnk (2021). Curr/e.altnt H/e.alt/a.altlth Exp/e.altnditur/e.alt (% of GDP). Br/a.alt/z.altil. D/a.altt/a.altB/a.altnk. URL: https:/ /d/a.altt/a.alt.worldb/a.altnk.or/g.alt/indic/a.alttor/SH.XPD.
 (page [30]) CHEX.GD.ZS
 (page [30, 31]) 115 Filho, W. /e.altt /a.altl. (2018). Clim/a.altt/e.alt ch/a.altn/g.alt/e.alt /a.altnd h/e.alt/a.altlth: An /a.altn/a.altl/y.altsis of c/a.altus/a.altl r/e.altl/a.alttions on th/e.alt spr/e.alt/a.altd of v/e.altctor-born/e.alt dis/e.alt/a.alts/e.alts in Br/a.alt/z.altil. J. of Cl/e.alt/a.altn/e.altr Production . 177. DOI: https:/ /doi.or/g.alt/10.1016/j.jcl/e.altpro.2017.12.144 116 WHO (2015). Clim/a.altt/e.alt /a.altnd H/e.alt/a.altlth Countr/y.alt Profil/e.alt — Br/a.alt/z.altil. URL: https:/ //a.altpps.who.int/iris/bitstr/e.alt/a.altm/h/a.altndl/e.alt/10665/208857/
 (page [31]) WHO_FWC_PHE_EPE_15.03_/e.altn/g.alt.pdf?s/e.altqu/e.altnc/e.alt=1
 (page [31]) 28 CLIMATE RISK COUNTRY PROFILE: BRAZILRising temperatures and increased humidity pose a signiﬁcant challenge for heat risks. The annual distribution of days with a high-heat index provides insight into the health hazard of heat. Figure 17  shows the expected Number of Days with a Heat Index >35°C for the 2090s. As seen in this ﬁgure, a sharp increase in these days is already occurring in the 2020s and will continue through the end of the century under a high-emission scenario. It also shows that night-time temperatures ( >20°C), are expected to rapidly rise in a high-emission scenario. The health impacts of heat can be projected and monitored through the frequency of tropical nights. Tropical Nights (Figure 18 ) represents the projected increase in tropical nights for different emission scenarios to demonstrate the difference in expected numbers of tropical nights.
 (page [31]) 300
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 (page [31]) 200
 (page [31]) 150
 (page [31]) 100
 (page [31]) 50
 (page [31]) 0
 (page [31]) –50Days
 (page [31]) Historical RCP 2.6 RCP 4.5 RCP 6.0 RCP 8.5
 (page [31]) 1980
 (page [31]) 2000
 (page [31]) 2020
 (page [31]) 2040
 (page [31]) 2060
 (page [31]) 2080
 (page [31]) 2100
 (page [31]) YearFIGURE 17. Proj/e.altct/e.altd d/a.alt/y.alts with /a.alt H/e.alt/a.altt Ind/e.altx
 (page [31]) >35°C (R/e.altf/e.altr/e.altnc/e.alt P/e.altriod, 1986–2005)117
 (page [31]) 360
 (page [31]) 340
 (page [31]) 320
 (page [31]) 300
 (page [31]) 280
 (page [31]) 260
 (page [31]) 240
 (page [31]) 220
 (page [31]) 200
 (page [31]) 180Nights
 (page [31]) Historical RCP 2.6 RCP 4.5 RCP 6.0 RCP 8.5
 (page [31]) 1980
 (page [31]) 2000
 (page [31]) 2020
 (page [31]) 2040
 (page [31]) 2060
 (page [31]) 2080
 (page [31]) 2100
 (page [31]) YearFIGURE 18. Proj/e.altct/e.altd numb/e.altr of Tropic/a.altl Ni/g.althts
 (page [31]) (Tmin >20°C) (R/e.altf/e.altr/e.altnc/e.alt P/e.altriod, 1986–2005)118
 (page [31]) 117 WBG Clim/a.altt/e.alt Ch/a.altn/g.alt/e.alt Knowl/e.altd/g.alt/e.alt Port/a.altl (CCKP, 2021). Br/a.alt/z.altil H/e.alt/a.altlth S/e.altctor D/a.altshbo/a.altrd. URL: https:/ /clim/a.altt/e.altd/a.altt/a.alt.worldb/a.altnk.or/g.alt/
 (page [31]) CRM/e.altPort/a.altl/w/e.altb/h/e.alt/a.altlth/s/y.altst/e.altms-/a.altnd-s/e.altrvic/e.alt?countr/y.alt=BRA&p/e.altriod=2080-2099
 (page [31]) 118 WBG Clim/a.altt/e.alt Ch/a.altn/g.alt/e.alt Knowl/e.altd/g.alt/e.alt Port/a.altl (CCKP, 2021). Br/a.alt/z.altil H/e.alt/a.altlth S/e.altctor. URL: https:/ /clim/a.altt/e.altknowl/e.altd/g.alt/e.altport/a.altl.worldb/a.altnk.or/g.alt/
 (page [31]) countr/y.alt/br/a.alt/z.altil/clim/a.altt/e.alt-s/e.altctor-h/e.alt/a.altlth
 (page [31]) 119 Br/a.alt/z.altil (2020). Upd/a.altt/e.altd N/a.alttion/a.altll/y.alt-D/e.altt/e.altrmin/e.altd Contributions. URL: https:/ /www4.unfccc.int/sit/e.alts/ndcst/a.alt/g.altin/g.alt/Publish/e.altdDocum/e.altnts/
 (page [31]) Br/a.alt/z.altil%20First/Br/a.alt/z.altil%20First%20NDC%20(Upd/a.altt/e.altd%20submission).pdf
 (page [31]) 120 WHO (2015). Clim/a.altt/e.alt /a.altnd H/e.alt/a.altlth Countr/y.alt Proﬁl/e.alt — Br/a.alt/z.altil. URL: https:/ //a.altpps.who.int/iris/bitstr/e.alt/a.altm/h/a.altndl/e.alt/10665/208857/
 (page [31]) WHO_FWC_PHE_EPE_15.03_/e.altn/g.alt.pdf?s/e.altqu/e.altnc/e.alt=1Ad/a.altpt/a.alttion Options
 (page [32, 31]) Brazil has an approved national heath adaptation strategy and is taking initiatives to implement speciﬁc climate change and health adaptation programs, primarily around the spread of vector-borne diseases and increased risks form ﬂoods. Brazil is implementing actions to build in stitutional and technical capacity to work on climate change and health and has rolled out activities to increase climate resilience of the country’s health infrastructure. Additional efforts are underway to support improved sanitation.119 National assessments of climate change impacts, vulnerability and health-focused adaptation efforts have been conducted, which have supported expanded policy and an improved understanding of the estimated costs to implement health resilience to climate change. Brazil has also developed an Integrated Disease Surveillance and Response system to improve its early warning system and response systems for climate-sensitive health risks. Brazil is also in the process of developing a national strategy for climate change mitigation which considers the health implications of climate change mitigation actions.120
 (page [32]) (2020)
 (page [32]) 29 CLIMATE RISK COUNTRY PROFILE: BRAZILInstitution/a.altl Fr/a.altm/e.altwork for Ad/a.altpt/a.alttion Brazil’s Ministry of Environment (MMA) is responsible for leading the country’s response to climate change and is responsible for developing the country’s policies and strategies for greenhouse gas mitigation and adaptation efforts. The MMA is also responsible for developing and implementing mechanisms and economic and social instruments for sustainable management of water resources, ecosystems, biodiversity and forests. MMA collaborates with the Ministry of Science, Technology and Innovation in order to implement strategies and improve climate modeling services. Within the MMA sits the Brazilian Panel on Climate Change (PBMC), which is a national scientiﬁc body whose role is to provide decision-makers and society with the needed scientiﬁc and technical information about climate change and its impacts for Brazil. The PBMC leads on the development of nation al assessments and technical reports instrumental to supporting appropriate climate-related legislation. Additional, technical bodies which support the MMA also include the Brazilian Research Network on Global Climate Change (Rede CLIMA), the National Institute of Science and Technology, and the National Institute for Space Research (INPE).121 This collaboration also coordinates the National Adaptation Plan (NAP) and is developing the related monitoring and evaluation system. The Brazilian Institute for Agricultural Research is also working to promote leading agricultural research and sustainable development in rural areas in support of the country’s adaptation efforts. Brazil’s Inter- Ministerial Committee on Climate Change, under the Ofﬁce of the President, is responsible for the country’s
 (page [32]) National Policy on Climate Change.122
 (page [32]) Polic/y.alt Fr/a.altm/e.altwork for Ad/a.altpt/a.alttion
 (page [32]) Brazil submitted its Fourth National Communication to the UNFCCC and its Updated Nationally-Determined Contributions to the UNFCCC in 2020, as well as its Third Biennial Update Report in 2019. These documents, in coordination with the country’s National Policy on Climate Change and National Adaptation Plan provide the guidance and policy goals for adaptation and mitigation priorities and efforts. To increase its adaptive capacities and overall development agenda, Brazil is committed to the increase of its renewable energy, improved water resource management, improved public health sector and the implementation of its ecosystem-based adaptation
 (page [32]) and mitigation strategies.123
 (page [32]) National Frameworks and Plans
 (page [32]) • Updated Nationally Determined Contribution  (2020)
 (page [32]) • Fourth National Communication  (2020)
 (page [32]) • Third Biennial Update Report  (2019)
 (page [32]) • Nationally-Determined Contribution  (2016)ADAPTATION
 (page [32]) 121 Br/a.alt/z.altil (2020). Fourth N/a.alttion/a.altl Communic/a.alttion of Br/a.alt/z.altil to th/e.alt UNFCCC. URL: https:/ /unfccc.int/sit/e.alts/d/e.altf/a.altult/ﬁl/e.alts/r/e.altsourc/e.alt/
 (page [32]) 4/a.alt%20Comunic/a.altc/a.alto%20N/a.altcion/a.altl.pdf
 (page [32]) 122 USAID (2018). Clim/a.altt/e.alt Risk Proﬁl/e.alt — Br/a.alt/z.altil. URL: https:/ /www.clim/a.altt/e.altlinks.or/g.alt/sit/e.alts/d/e.altf/a.altult/ﬁl/e.alts//a.altss/e.altt/docum/e.altnt/2018-April-30_
 (page [33]) USAID_C/a.altdmusCISF_Clim/a.altt/e.alt-Risk-Proﬁl/e.alt-Br/a.alt/z.altil.pdf
 (page [33]) 123 Br/a.alt/z.altil (2020). Upd/a.altt/e.altd N/a.alttion/a.altll/y.alt-D/e.altt/e.altrmin/e.altd Contributions. URL: https:/ /www4.unfccc.int/sit/e.alts/ndcst/a.alt/g.altin/g.alt/Publish/e.altdDocum/e.altnts/
 (page [33]) Br/a.alt/z.altil%20First/Br/a.alt/z.altil%20First%20NDC%20(Upd/a.altt/e.altd%20submission).pdf
 (page [33]) (2016)
 (page [33]) (2016)
 (page [33]) (2016)
 (page [33]) 30 CLIMATE RISK COUNTRY PROFILE: BRAZIL• Third National Communication V.1  (2016) • Third National Communication V.2  (2016) • Third National Communication V.3  (2016) • National Adaptation Plan to Climate Change  (2016)
 (page [33]) • Second National Communication  (2010)
 (page [33]) • National Plan on Climate Change  (2008)
 (page [33]) • First National Communication  (2004)
 (page [33]) R/e.altcomm/e.altnd/a.alttions
 (page [33]) R/e.alts/e.alt/a.altrch G/a.altps
 (page [33]) • Increase understanding of the timing and magnitude of incidence for extreme events and natural hazards along Brazil’s coastal areas through the development/ implementation of early-warning systems • Meet the urgent need in developing a national strategy for vulnerability assessment as proposed in Brazil’s
 (page [33]) National Adaptation Plan
 (page [33]) • Ensure a more complete cataloging of biodiversity of the Amazon, Pantanal, and Pampa biomes; existing knowledge gaps increases difﬁculty to conduct comprehensive climate risk analyses124 • Develop monitoring and evaluation systems to observe changes to land cover and land-use change, while also accounting for expanded and intensiﬁed agricultural capabilities. • Develop airborne monitoring capabilities for improved identiﬁcation and tracking of illegal logging activities. • Expand Brazil’s national capacity of development and managements of oceanographic observation systems • Support satellite based and/or remote sensing to enhance monitoring and reporting on sustainable native
 (page [33]) forest management systems
 (page [33]) D/a.altt/a.alt /a.altnd Inform/a.alttion G/a.altps
 (page [33]) • Improve Brazil’s integrated hydro-meteorological database (e.g. downscaled climate modeling) for improved
 (page [33]) forecasting capabilities
 (page [33]) • Ensure that nation-wide climate change and atmospheric monitoring systems are maintained and enhanced where necessary, including through monitoring networks at appropriate spatial density and frequency • Implement georeferencing and tracking programs to support forest management systems to curb illegal and
 (page [33]) unsustainable practices
 (page [33]) • Increase modeling of crop suitability identify appropriateness for future cultivation for vulnerable production
 (page [33]) zones and crops
 (page [33]) • Increased transparency of REDD+ Monitoring, Reporting and Veriﬁcation (MRV) efforts to reduce potential for double-counting and lower leakage risk125 124 Br/a.alt/z.altil (2020). Fourth N/a.alttion/a.altl Communic/a.alttion of Br/a.alt/z.altil to th/e.alt UNFCCC. URL: https:/ /unfccc.int/sit/e.alts/d/e.altf/a.altult/ﬁl/e.alts/r/e.altsourc/e.alt/
 (page [34]) 4/a.alt%20Comunic/a.altc/a.alto%20N/a.altcion/a.altl.pdf
 (page [34]) 125 M/a.alt/y.alt, P.H., G/e.altb/a.altr/a.alt, M.F., B/a.altrc/e.altllos, L.M., Ri/z.alt/e.altk, M., /a.altnd Millik/a.altn, B. (2016). Th/e.alt cont/e.altxt of REDD+ in Br/a.alt/z.altil: Driv/e.altrs, /a.altctors /a.altnd institutions — 3rd Edition. Occ/a.altsion/a.altl P/a.altp/e.altr 160. Bo/g.altor, Indon/e.altsi/a.alt: CIFOR. URL: https:/ /www.cifor.or/g.alt/public/a.alttions/pdf_ﬁl/e.alts/OccP/a.altp/e.altrs/OP-160.pdf 31 CLIMATE RISK COUNTRY PROFILE: BRAZILInstitution/a.altl G/a.altps • Improved development and distribution of sectoral planning, conducted under the PNMC, to ensure buy-in from federal, state and municipal levels. Ensure goals are developed in line with ﬁnancial opportunities with donors • Support the implementation of Brazil’s Forest Code with improved compliance and appropriate enforcement support at federal, state and municipal levels126 • Increase the access to climate ﬁnance through international partnerships for increased investment into
 (page [35]) renewable energies
 (page [35]) 126 Br/a.alt/z.altil (2020). Fourth N/a.alttion/a.altl Communic/a.alttion of Br/a.alt/z.altil to th/e.alt UNFCCC. URL: https:/ /unfccc.int/sit/e.alts/d/e.altf/a.altult/ﬁl/e.alts/r/e.altsourc/e.alt/
 (page [35]) 4/a.alt%20Comunic/a.altc/a.alto%20N/a.altcion/a.altl.pdf
 (page [36]) WORLD BANK GROU
 (page [36]) BRAZIL
 (page [36]) CLIMATE RISK COUNTRY PROFILE
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 data/transition_reports/World Bank Climate Change Country Reports/15722-WB_Djibouti Country Profile-WEB.pdf
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 (page [1]) ii CLIMATE RISK COUNTRY PROFILE: DJIBOUTICOPYRIGHT © 2021 by the World Bank Group 1818 H Street NW, Washington, DC 20433
 (page [1]) Telephone: 202-473-1000; Internet: www.worldbank.org
 (page [1]) This work is a product of the staff of the World Bank Group (WBG) and with external contributions. The opinions, ﬁndings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this work are those of the authors and do not necessarily reﬂect the views or the ofﬁcial policy or position of the WBG, its Board of Executive Directors, or the governments it represents. The WBG does not guarantee the accuracy of the data included in this work and do not make any warranty, express or implied, nor assume any liability or responsibility for any consequence of their use. This publication follows the WBG’s practice in references to member designations, borders, and maps. The boundaries, colors, denominations, and other information shown on any map in this work, or the use of the term “country” do not imply any judgment on the part of the WBG, its Boards, or the governments it represents, concerning the legal status of any territory or geographic area or the endorsement or acceptance
 (page [1]) of such boundaries.
 (page [1]) The mention of any speciﬁc companies or products of manufacturers does not imply that they are endorsed or recommended by the WBG in preference to others of a similar nature that are not mentioned.
 (page [1]) RIGHTS AND PERMISSIONS
 (page [1, 2]) The material in this work is subject to copyright. Because the WBG encourages dissemination of its knowledge, this work may be reproduced, in whole or in part, for noncommercial purposes as long as full attribution to this work is given. Please cite the work as follows: Climate Risk Proﬁle: Djibouti (2021): The World Bank Group. Any queries on rights and licenses, including subsidiary rights, should be addressed to World Bank Publications, The World Bank Group, 1818 H Street NW, Washington, DC 20433, USA; fax: 202-522-2625; e-mail: [email protected] . Cover Photos:  © Foad Al Harazi/World Bank, “ A woman carries bread through the streets of Sanáia ” December 19, 2013 via Flickr, Creative Commons CC BY-NC-ND 2.0. © Foad Al Harazi/World Bank, “ Locals ﬁll their water bottles ” December 19, 2013 via Flickr, Creative Commons CC BY-NCND 2.0. Graphic Design:  Circle Graphics , Reisterstown, MD. iii CLIMATE RISK COUNTRY PROFILE: DJIBOUTIACKNOWLEDGEMENTS This proﬁle is part of a series of Climate Risk Country Proﬁles developed by the World Bank Group (WBG). The country proﬁle synthesizes most relevant data and information on climate change, disaster risk reduction, and adaptation actions and policies at the country level. The country proﬁle series are designed as a quick reference source for development practitioners to better integrate climate resilience in development planning and policy making. This effort is managed and led by Veronique Morin (Senior Climate Change Specialist, WBG) and Ana E. Bucher (Senior Climate Change Specialist, WBG). This proﬁle was written by MacKenzie Dove (Senior Climate Change Consultant, WBG). Additional support was provided by Jason Johnston (Operations Analyst, WBG) and Yunziyi Lang (Climate Change Analyst, WBG). Climate and climate-related information is largely drawn from the Climate Change Knowledge Portal (CCKP) , a WBG online platform with available global climate data and analysis based on the latest Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)  reports and datasets. The team is grateful for all comments and suggestions received from the sector, regional, and country development specialists, as well as climate research scientists and institutions for their advice and guidance on use
 (page [2]) of climate related datasets.
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 (page [3]) iv CLIMATE RISK COUNTRY PROFILE: DJIBOUTIFOREWORD .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 1 COUNTRY OVERVIEW  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 2 CLIMATOLOGY   .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 4
 (page [3]) Climate Baseline                                                                                                                         4
 (page [3]) Overview                                                                                                                               4
 (page [3]) Key Trends                                                                                                                             6
 (page [3]) Climate Future                                                                                                                            7
 (page [3]) Overview                                                                                                                               7
 (page [3]) Key Trends                                                                                                                             9
 (page [3]) CLIMATE RELATED NATURAL HAZARDS  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  10
 (page [3]) Overview                                                                                                                                 10
 (page [3]) Key Trends                                                                                                                                11
 (page [3]) Implications for DRM                                                                                                                 12
 (page [3]) CLIMATE CHANGE IMPACTS TO KEY SECTORS  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  13
 (page [3]) Gender                                                                                                                                    13
 (page [3]) Agriculture                                                                                                                              13
 (page [3]) Water                                                                                                                                     15
 (page [3]) Energy                                                                                                                                    17
 (page [3]) Health                                                                                                                                     19
 (page [3]) Coastal Zones and Sea Level Rise                                                                                                21 ADAPTATION .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  23
 (page [3]) Institutional Framework for Adaptation                                                                                       23
 (page [3]) Policy Framework for Adaptation                                                                                               23
 (page [3]) Recommendations                                                                                                                   24
 (page [3]) Research Gaps                                                                                                                     24
 (page [3]) Data and Information Gaps                                                                                                     24
 (page [3]) Institutional Gaps                                                                                                                 25
 (page [3]) CONTENTS
 (page [4]) 1 CLIMATE RISK COUNTRY PROFILE: DJIBOUTI Climate change is a major risk to good development outcomes, and the World Bank Group is committed to playing an important role in helping countries integrate climate action into their core development agendas. The World Bank Group is committed to supporting client countries to invest in and build a low-carbon, climate-resilient future, helping them to be better prepared to adapt to current and future climate impacts. The World Bank Group is investing in incorporating and systematically managing climate risks in development operations through its individual corporate commitments. A key aspect of the World Bank Group’s Action Plan on Adaptation and Resilience (2019) is to help countries shift from addressing adaptation as an incremental cost and isolated investment to systematically incorporating climate risks and opportunities at every phase of policy planning, investment design, implementation and evaluation of development outcomes. For all International Development Association and International Bank for Reconstruction and Development operations, climate and disaster risk screening is one of the mandatory corporate climate commitments. This is supported by the Bank Group’s Climate and Disaster Risk Screening Tool which enables all Bank staff to assess short- and long-term climate and disaster risks in operations and national or sectoral planning processes. This screening tool draws up-to-date and relevant information from the World Bank’s Climate Change Knowledge Portal, a comprehensive online ‘one-stop shop’ for global, regional, and country data related to climate
 (page [4]) change and development.
 (page [4]) Recognizing the value of consistent, easy-to-use technical resources for client countries as well as to support respective internal climate risk assessment and adaptation planning processes, the World Bank Group’s Climate Change Group has developed this content. Standardizing and pooling expertise facilitates the World Bank Group in conducting initial assessments of climate risks and opportunities across sectors within a country, within institutional portfolios across regions, and acts as a global resource for development practitioners. For developing countries, the climate risk proﬁles are intended to serve as public goods to facilitate upstream country diagnostics, policy dialogue, and strategic planning by providing comprehensive overviews of trends and projected changes in key climate parameters, sector-speciﬁc implications, relevant policies and programs, adaptation priorities and opportunities for further actions. It is my hope that these efforts will spur deepening of long-term risk management in developing countries and our engagement in supporting climate change adaptation planning at operational levels.
 (page [4]) Bernice Van Bronkhorst
 (page [4]) Global Director
 (page [4]) Climate Change Group (CCG)
 (page [4]) The World Bank Group (WBG)
 (page [5]) FOREWORD
 (page [5]) m 155 m below sea level at Lake Assal to over
 (page [5]) astern
 (page [5]) AL K
 (page [5]) 2 CLIMATE RISK COUNTRY PROFILE: DJIBOUTIThe Republic of Djibouti is located in the Horn of Africa along the Gulf of Aden, at the southern entrance to the Red Sea. Djibouti is one of the smallest countries in Africa and shares borders with Eritrea, Ethiopia and Somalia and covers a land area of more than 23,000 square kilometers (km2), with a coastline of 372 km.1 Djibouti is a highly arid country with little arable soil; nearly 90% of the country is classiﬁed as desert, with approximately 9% considered as pasture and about 1% forest. The terrain is comprised of arid lands scattered with shrubs throughout the country’s plateaus, plains, volcanic formations and mountain ranges, some reaching 2,000 meters (m) in height. Across the country, altitude varies from 155 m below sea level at Lake Assal to over 2,000 m at Mount Moussa Ali. The eastern region is dominated by high ridges and relatively deep ravines. Western zones are comprised of regularly deepening plains and depressions marked by fracturing. The coastal plains, in the north of the country, include cliffs falling directly to the sea and pebble and sandy beaches. Djibouti is considered as resource scarce and is prone to natural disasters which can be further exacerbated by water scarcity, poor water
 (page [5]) management and poor land-use planning.2
 (page [5]) The country experiences little precipitation and is largely unsuitable for agriculture and as a result, Djibouti imports nearly all of its food. Djibouti is considered a lower-middle income country and has some economic strength given its strategic location and serving as a bridge between Africa and the Middle East. The country’s port complex, among the most sophisticated in the world, is the economic driver for the country. Djibouti has received signiﬁcant public-debt ﬁnanced investment in infrastructure, which has supported sustained economic growth in recent years; currently the country’s debt stands at an estimated 70% of the country’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP).3 Djibouti has a population of nearly 974,000 people (2019) with an annual population growth rate of 1.5% (2019),4 and is projected to reach 1.1 million people by 2030 and 1.3 million people by 2050. An estimated 78% of the current population resides in urban areas, which is expected to reach 85% in 2050. The country has a Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of $3.3 billion (2019), and has experienced relatively volatile growth rates over the past decade, with a current annual growth rate of 7 .5% in 2019 (Table 1 ).5
 (page [5]) COUNTRY OVERVIEW
 (page [5]) 1  Djibouti (2014). S/e.altcond N/a.alttion/a.altl Communic/a.alttion to th/e.alt UNFCCC. URL: https:/ /unfccc.int/sit/e.alts/d/e.altf/a.altult/ﬁl/e.alts/r/e.altsourc/e.alt/djinc2.pdf 2  UNDP (2020). Clim/a.altt/e.alt Ch/a.altn/g.alt/e.alt Ad/a.altpt/a.alttion – Djibouti. URL: https:/ /www./a.altd/a.altpt/a.alttion-undp.or/g.alt//e.altxplor/e.alt//e.alt/a.altst/e.altrn-/a.altfric/a.alt/djibouti 3  World B/a.altnk (2020). Djibouti – Ov/e.altrvi/e.altw. URL: https:/ /www.worldb/a.altnk.or/g.alt//e.altn/countr/y.alt/djibouti/ov/e.altrvi/e.altw#1 4  World B/a.altnk Op/e.altn D/a.altt/a.alt, D/a.altt/a.alt R/e.alttri/e.altv/e.altd S/e.altpt/e.altmb/e.altr 2020. D/a.altt/a.alt B/a.altnk: World D/e.altv/e.altlopm/e.altnt Indic/a.alttors, Djibouti. URL: https:/ /
 (page [5]) d/a.altt/a.altb/a.altnk.worldb/a.altnk.or/g.alt/sourc/e.alt/world-d/e.altv/e.altlopm/e.altnt-indic/a.alttors
 (page [5]) 5  World B/a.altnk Op/e.altn D/a.altt/a.alt, D/a.altt/a.alt R/e.alttri/e.altv/e.altd S/e.altpt/e.altmb/e.altr 2020. D/a.altt/a.alt B/a.altnk: Popul/a.alttion Estim/a.altt/e.alts /a.altnd Proj/e.altctions, Djibouti. URL: https:/ /d/a.altt/a.altb/a.altnk.worldb/a.altnk.or/g.alt/sourc/e.alt/popul/a.alttion-/e.altstim/a.altt/e.alts-/a.altnd-proj/e.altctionsTABLE 1. Data snapshot: Key development indicators
 (page [5]) Indicator 2018
 (page [5, 6]) Life expectancy at birth, total (years) 66.6 Population density (people per sq. km land area) 41.4 % of Population with access to electricity 60.4% GDP per capita (current US$) $3,141.90
 (page [6]) ution (NDC) to the UNFCCC in 2016, in support of the 3 CLIMATE RISK COUNTRY PROFILE: DJIBOUTIThe ND-GAIN Index6 ranks 181 countries using a score which calculates a country’s vulnerability to climate change and other global challenges as well as their readiness to improve resilience. This Index aims to help businesses and the public sector better identify vulnerability and readiness in order to better prioritize investment for more efﬁcient responses to global challenges. Due to a combination of political, geographic, and social factors, Djibouti is recognized as highly vulnerable to climate change impacts, ranked 117 out of 181 countries in the 2019 ND-GAIN Index. The more vulnerable a country is the lower their score, while the more ready a country is to improve its resilience the higher it will be. Norway has the highest score and is ranked 1st. Figure 1  is a time-series plot of the ND-GAIN Index showing
 (page [6]) Djibouti’s progress
 (page [6]) Djibouti is considered highly vulnerable to climate change and is expected to experience adverse impacts from increased temperatures, increased aridity, reduced precipitation, and rising sea levels. Socio-economic and environmental implications will particularly affect water resources, agricultural and livestock, coastal zones, health,
 (page [6]) and tourism sectors.7
 (page [6]) Djibouti submitted its Nationally-Determined Contribution  (NDC) to the UNFCCC in 2016, in support of the country’s efforts to achieve its economic development goals, reduce its vulnerability to drought, protect the country against rising sea levels, improve water access, protect biodiversity and reinforce the resilience of rural populations. Djibouti’s NDC is consistent with the country’s overall goals of increasing its development, reducing its vulnerability and achieving long-term sustainable, economic development. Key focus is on the sustainability of the environment, water resources, infrastructure, agriculture sectors and costal zones.8 Djibouti published its Second National Communication  (NC2) to the UNFCCC in 2014.
 (page [6]) Green, Inclusive and Resilient Recovery
 (page [6]) The coronavirus disease (COVID-19) pandemic has led to unprecedented adverse social and economic impacts. Further, the pandemic has demonstrated the compounding impacts of adding yet another shock on top of the multiple challenges that vulnerable populations already face in day-to-day life, with the potential to create devastating health, social, economic and environmental crises that can leave a deep, long-lasting mark. However,
 (page [6]) Djibouti
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 (page [6]) Score
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 (page [6]) 38FIGURE 1. ND-GAIN Index for Djibouti 6  Univ/e.altrsit/y.alt of Notr/e.alt D/a.altm/e.alt (2020). Notr/e.alt D/a.altm/e.alt Glob/a.altl Ad/a.altpt/a.alttion Initi/a.alttiv/e.alt. URL: https:/ //g.alt/a.altin.nd./e.altdu/our-work/countr/y.alt-ind/e.altx/ 7  Djibouti (2014). S/e.altcond N/a.alttion/a.altl Communic/a.alttion to th/e.alt UNFCCC. URL: https:/ /unfccc.int/sit/e.alts/d/e.altf/a.altult/ﬁl/e.alts/r/e.altsourc/e.alt/djinc2.pdf 8  Djibouti (2016). N/a.alttion/a.altll/y.alt D/e.altt/e.altrmin/e.altd Contribution. URL: https:/ /www4.unfccc.int/sit/e.alts/ndcst/a.alt/g.altin/g.alt/Publish/e.altdDocum/e.altnts/
 (page [7]) Djibouti%20First/INDC-Djibouti_ENG.pdf
 (page [7]) Climate Change Knowledge Portal (CCKP) (Table 2) shows
 (page [7]) millimeters (mm),
 (page [7]) OQ,
 (page [7]) 4 CLIMATE RISK COUNTRY PROFILE: DJIBOUTIClimate Baseline
 (page [7]) Ov/e.altrvi/e.altw
 (page [7]) Djibouti has an arid tropical climate of semi-desert, except for the mountainous regions of the northern Gulf of Tadjourah. The country is characterized by high temperatures and high evaporation year-round. The country is particularly affected by low and irregular precipitation patterns. The climate is marked by two distinct seasons. The cool season (October-April) has mild temperatures ranging between 22°C and 30°C with relatively high humidity and sea winds. The hot and dry season (May to June and September to October) has high temperatures, which can range between 30°C and 40°C with often violent, hot and dry sand wind (khamsin). This season is
 (page [7]) the driest period.9
 (page [7]) Analysis of data from the World Bank Group’s Climate Change Knowledge Portal  (CCKP) ( Table 2 ) shows historical information for 1901–2019. Mean annual mean temperature for Djibouti is 27 .8°C, with average monthly temperatures ranging between 23°C (January) and 32°C (July). Mean annual precipitation is 244.6 millimeters (mm), with highest rainfall occurring July to September, with relatively very low levels of precipitation occurring nearly all year round ( Figure 2 ).10 Figure 3  shows the spatial variation of observed average annual precipitation and
 (page [7]) temperature across Djibouti.
 (page [7]) CLIMATOLOGY
 (page [7]) TABLE 2. Data snapshot: Summary statistics
 (page [7]) Climate Variables 1901–2019
 (page [7]) Mean Annual Temperature (°C) 27 .8°C Mean Annual Precipitation (mm) 244.6 mm Mean Maximum Annual Temperature (°C) 32.2°C Mean Minimum Annual Temperature (°C) 22.5°C 9  Djibouti (2014). S/e.altcond N/a.alttion/a.altl Communic/a.alttion to th/e.alt UNFCCC. URL: https:/ /unfccc.int/sit/e.alts/d/e.altf/a.altult/ﬁl/e.alts/r/e.altsourc/e.alt/djinc2.pdf 10  WB Clim/a.altt/e.alt Ch/a.altn/g.alt/e.alt Knowl/e.altd/g.alt/e.alt Port/a.altl (CCKP, 2020). Djibouti. URL: https:/ /clim/a.altt/e.altknowl/e.altd/g.alt/e.altport/a.altl.worldb/a.altnk.or/g.alt/countr/y.alt/ djibouti/clim/a.altt/e.alt-d/a.altt/a.alt-historic/a.altlas governments take urgent action and lay the foundations for their ﬁnancial, economic, and social recovery, they have a unique opportunity to create economies that are more sustainable, inclusive and resilient. Short and long- term recovery efforts should prioritize investments that boost jobs and economic activity; have positive impacts on human, social and natural capital; protect biodiversity and ecosystems services; boost resilience; and advance the
 (page [8]) decarbonization of economies.
 (page [8]) QD, BESHRRRLREESIES a
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 (page [8]) 12N —
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 (page [8]) 5 CLIMATE RISK COUNTRY PROFILE: DJIBOUTI
 (page [8]) Temperature Rainfall
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 (page [8]) 60 mmFIGURE 2. Average monthly temperature and rainfall of Djibouti for 1991–201911 FIGURE 3. Map of average annual temperature (left); annual precipitation (right) of Djibouti,
 (page [8]) 1901–201912
 (page [8]) 11  WB Clim/a.altt/e.alt Ch/a.altn/g.alt/e.alt Knowl/e.altd/g.alt/e.alt Port/a.altl (CCKP, 2020). Djibouti. URL: https:/ /clim/a.altt/e.altknowl/e.altd/g.alt/e.altport/a.altl.worldb/a.altnk.or/g.alt/countr/y.alt/
 (page [8]) djibouti/clim/a.altt/e.alt-d/a.altt/a.alt-historic/a.altl
 (page [8]) 12  WB Clim/a.altt/e.alt Ch/a.altn/g.alt/e.alt Knowl/e.altd/g.alt/e.alt Port/a.altl (CCKP, 2020). Djibouti. URL: https:/ /clim/a.altt/e.altknowl/e.altd/g.alt/e.altport/a.altl.worldb/a.altnk.or/g.alt/countr/y.alt/
 (page [9]) djibouti/clim/a.altt/e.alt-d/a.altt/a.alt-historic/a.altl
 (page [9]) 6 CLIMATE RISK COUNTRY PROFILE: DJIBOUTIK/e.alt/y.alt Tr/e.altnds
 (page [9]) Temperature
 (page [9]) Djibouti experienced temperature increase since the 1970s, with the southern and western regions observing the most signiﬁcant temperature rise ( Figure 4 ). The country also experienced extreme high temperature spikes.13 Additionally, the number of warm nights has increased dramatically. The greatest warming was observed during the summer hot season. A reduction in cool nights and increase in warm nights since 1960
 (page [9]) have been observed.14
 (page [9]) FIGURE 4. Observed temperature for Djibouti, 1901–201915
 (page [9]) Temperature
 (page [9]) 27°C
 (page [9]) 28°C
 (page [9]) 29°C
 (page [9]) 30°C
 (page [9]) Annual Mean
 (page [9]) 5 Year Smoothing
 (page [9]) 1901 1926 1941 1956 1971 2001 1986 2016 13  Omondi, P. /e.altt /a.altl., (2013). Ch/a.altn/g.alt/e.alts in t/e.altmp/e.altr/a.alttur/e.alt /a.altnd pr/e.altcipit/a.alttion /e.altxtr/e.altm/e.alts ov/e.altr th/e.alt Gr/e.alt/a.altt/e.altr Horn of Afric/a.alt r/e.alt/g.altion from 1961 to 2010. Int/e.altrn/a.alttion/a.altl Journ/a.altl of Clim/a.alttolo/g.alt/y.alt. 34 (4). URL: https:/ /rm/e.altts.onlin/e.altlibr/a.altr/y.alt.wil/e.alt/y.alt.com/doi//a.altbs/10.1002/joc.3763 14  Djibouti (2014). S/e.altcond N/a.alttion/a.altl Communic/a.alttion to th/e.alt UNFCCC. URL: https:/ /unfccc.int/sit/e.alts/d/e.altf/a.altult/ﬁl/e.alts/r/e.altsourc/e.alt/djinc2.pdf 15  WB Clim/a.altt/e.alt Ch/a.altn/g.alt/e.alt Knowl/e.altd/g.alt/e.alt Port/a.altl (CCKP, 2020). Djibouti URL: https:/ /clim/a.altt/e.altknowl/e.altd/g.alt/e.altport/a.altl.worldb/a.altnk.or/g.alt/countr/y.alt/
 (page [9]) djibouti/clim/a.altt/e.alt-d/a.altt/a.alt-historic/a.altl
 (page [9, 10]) 16  Djibouti (2014). S/e.altcond N/a.alttion/a.altl Communic/a.alttion to th/e.alt UNFCCC. URL: https:/ /unfccc.int/sit/e.alts/d/e.altf/a.altult/ﬁl/e.alts/r/e.altsourc/e.alt/djinc2.pdfPrecipitation Precipitation in Djibouti is highly variable and the country experiences very low levels of annual precipitation. Djibouti has experienced reduced water availability in some areas and increased periods of drought and dry spells. Stronger precipitation events resulting in ﬂash ﬂooding in recent years has also been observed due to an increase in heavy precipitation events. Djibouti has also experienced an increase in aridity across the country and intense droughts, the most signiﬁcant occurring in 1989, 1994, 2004 and 2005.16
 (page [10]) - simplification,
 (page [10]) eses
 (page [10]) 7 CLIMATE RISK COUNTRY PROFILE: DJIBOUTIClimate Future
 (page [10]) Ov/e.altrvi/e.altw
 (page [10]) The main data source for the World Bank Group’s Climate Change Knowledge Portal (CCKP) is the CMIP5 (Coupled Inter-comparison Project Phase 5) data ensemble, which builds the database for the global climate change projections presented in the Fifth Assessment Report (AR5) of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). Four Representative Concentration Pathways (i.e. RCP2.6, RCP4.5, RCP6.0, and RCP8.5) were selected and deﬁned by their total radiative forcing (cumulative measure of GHG emissions from all sources) pathway and level by 2100. The RCP2.6 for example represents a very strong mitigation scenario, whereas the RCP8.5 assumes business-as-usual scenario. For more information, please refer to RCP Database . For simpliﬁcation, these scenarios are referred to as a low (RCP2.6); a medium (RCP4.5) and a high (RCP8.5) emission scenario in this proﬁle. Table 3  provides CMIP5 projections for essential climate variables under high emission scenario (RCP8.5) over 4 different time horizons. Figure 5  presents the multi-model (CMIP5) ensemble of 32 Global Circulation Models (GCMs) showing the projected changes in annual precipitation and temperature for the periods
 (page [10]) 2040–2059 and 2080–2099.
 (page [10]) TABLE 3. Data s napshot: CMIP5 ensemble projection CMIP5 Ensemble Projection 2020–2039 2040–2059 2060–2079 2080–2099
 (page [10]) Annual Temperature
 (page [10]) Anomaly (°C)+0.6°C to +1.4°C
 (page [10]) (+1.0°C)+1.3°C to +2.5°C
 (page [10]) (+1.9°C)+2.1°C to +4.1°C
 (page [10]) (+2.9°C)+2.6°C to +5.4°C
 (page [10]) (+3.8°C)
 (page [10]) Annual Precipitation
 (page [10]) Anomaly (mm)-8.1 to +20.7
 (page [10]) (2.4 mm)-8.7 to +25.6
 (page [10]) (2.0 mm)-10.3 to +38.0
 (page [10]) (3.2 mm)-10.1 to +49.5
 (page [10]) (7 .2 mm)
 (page [10, 11]) Note:  The table shows CMIP5 ensemble projection under RCP8.5. Bold value is the range (10th–90th Percentile) and values in parentheses show the median (or 50th Percentile).
 (page [11]) 12N
 (page [11]) 2N
 (page [11]) 8 CLIMATE RISK COUNTRY PROFILE: DJIBOUTI FIGURE 5. CMIP5 ensemble projected change (32 GCMs) in annual temperature (top) and precipitation (bottom) by 2040–2059 (left) and by 2080–2099 (right), relative to 1986–2005
 (page [11]) baseline under RCP8 517
 (page [11]) 17  WB Clim/a.altt/e.alt Ch/a.altn/g.alt/e.alt Knowl/e.altd/g.alt/e.alt Port/a.altl (CCKP, 2020). Djibouti Proj/e.altct/e.altd Futur/e.alt Clim/a.altt/e.alt. URL: https:/ /clim/a.altt/e.altknowl/e.altd/g.alt/e.altport/a.altl.
 (page [12]) worldb/a.altnk.or/g.alt/countr/y.alt/Djibouti/clim/a.altt/e.alt-d/a.altt/a.alt-proj/e.altctions
 (page [12]) 9 CLIMATE RISK COUNTRY PROFILE: DJIBOUTIK/e.alt/y.alt Tr/e.altnds
 (page [12]) Temperature
 (page [12]) Projections show Djibouti experiencing increased temperatures of approximately 1°C every two decades. Monthly average temperature increases are expected to increase 1.9°C by the 2050s and by as much as 5.4°C by the end of the century.18 This is also likely to result in longer lasting and more intense heat waves with cold nights and cold spells also expected to signiﬁcantly decline. Increase in temperatures are also likely to result in the increase in evaporation and further contribution to the ‘drying’ of the region.19 Across all emission scenarios, temperatures will continue to increase in Djibouti throughout the end of the century. As seen in Figure 6 , under a high-emission scenario, average temperatures are projected to increase rapidly by mid-century. Across the seasonal cycle, temperature increases are likely to occur from November to February with daily temperatures greater than 25°C ( Figure 7 ). Increased heat and extreme heat conditions will result in signiﬁcant implications for human and animal health, water resources, and biodiversity.20
 (page [12]) 1980
 (page [12]) 2000
 (page [12]) 2020
 (page [12]) 2040
 (page [12]) 2060
 (page [12]) 2080
 (page [12]) 2100
 (page [12]) degC
 (page [12]) Historical RCP 2.6 RCP 4.5 RCP 6.0 RCP 8.5
 (page [12]) Year
 (page [12]) 34
 (page [12]) 33
 (page [12]) 32
 (page [12]) 31
 (page [12]) 30
 (page [12]) 29
 (page [12]) 28
 (page [12]) 27FIGURE 6. Historical and projected average temperature for Djibouti from 1986 to 209921
 (page [12]) days
 (page [12]) Jan
 (page [12]) Feb
 (page [12]) Mar
 (page [12]) Apr
 (page [12]) May
 (page [12]) Jun
 (page [12]) Jul
 (page [12]) Aug
 (page [12]) Sep
 (page [12]) Oct
 (page [12]) Nov
 (page [12]) Dec
 (page [12]) 2.0
 (page [12]) 1.5
 (page [12]) 1.0
 (page [12]) 0.5
 (page [12]) 0
 (page [12]) –0.5
 (page [12]) –1.0FIGURE 7. Projected change in summer days
 (page [12]) (Tmax > 25°C)22
 (page [12]) 18  Djibouti (2014). S/e.altcond N/a.alttion/a.altl Communic/a.alttion to th/e.alt UNFCCC. URL: https:/ /unfccc.int/sit/e.alts/d/e.altf/a.altult/ﬁl/e.alts/r/e.altsourc/e.alt/djinc2.pdf 19  Gov/e.altrnm/e.altnt of th/e.alt N/e.altth/e.altrl/a.altnds (2019). Clim/a.altt/e.alt Ch/a.altn/g.alt/e.alt Proﬁl/e.alt – Gr/e.alt/a.altt/e.altr Horn of Afric/a.alt. Ministr/y.alt of For/e.alti/g.altn Aﬀ/a.altirs. URL: https:/ /
 (page [12]) r/e.altli/e.altfw/e.altb.int/r/e.altport/world/clim/a.altt/e.alt-ch/a.altn/g.alt/e.alt-proﬁl/e.alt-/g.altr/e.alt/a.altt/e.altr-horn-/a.altfric/a.alt
 (page [12]) 20  Djibouti (2014). S/e.altcond N/a.alttion/a.altl Communic/a.alttion to th/e.alt UNFCCC. URL: https:/ /unfccc.int/sit/e.alts/d/e.altf/a.altult/ﬁl/e.alts/r/e.altsourc/e.alt/djinc2.pdf 21  WB Clim/a.altt/e.alt Ch/a.altn/g.alt/e.alt Knowl/e.altd/g.alt/e.alt Port/a.altl (CCKP, 2020). Int/e.altr/a.altctiv/e.alt Clim/a.altt/e.alt Indic/a.alttor D/a.altshbo/a.altrd. Djibouti. URL: https:/ /clim/a.altt/e.altd/a.altt/a.alt.
 (page [12]) worldb/a.altnk.or/g.alt/CRM/e.altPort/a.altl/w/e.altb//a.alt/g.altricultur/e.alt/crops-/a.altnd-l/a.altnd-m/a.altn/a.alt/g.alt/e.altm/e.altnt?countr/y.alt=DJ&p/e.altriod=2080-2099
 (page [12]) 22  WB Clim/a.altt/e.alt Ch/a.altn/g.alt/e.alt Knowl/e.altd/g.alt/e.alt Port/a.altl (CCKP, 2020). Int/e.altr/a.altctiv/e.alt Clim/a.altt/e.alt Indic/a.alttor D/a.altshbo/a.altrd. Djibouti. URL https:/ /clim/a.altt/e.altd/a.altt/a.alt.
 (page [12]) worldb/a.altnk.or/g.alt/CRM/e.altPort/a.altl/w/e.altb//a.alt/g.altricultur/e.alt/crops-/a.altnd-l/a.altnd-m/a.altn/a.alt/g.alt/e.altm/e.altnt?countr/y.alt=DJ&p/e.altriod=2080-2099Precipitation
 (page [12, 13]) Rainfall trends in Djibouti are highly variable. Projections sh ow a marginal increase for rainfall at the nationally aggregated level through the end of the century. Overall reductions in rainfall are expected during key grazing periods for livestock, additionally, winter rains (September to February) are expected to decrease, with noticeable impact expected during the country’s primary growing season of September and October. Under high emissions scenarios (RCP8.5) the country is expected experience an increase in the frequency and intensity of extreme rainfall events,
 (page [13]) 10 CLIMATE RISK COUNTRY PROFILE: DJIBOUTIwith the potential for increased periods of aridity. This is also expected to affect the water balance for the country, with the majority of projections indicating a decrease in water balance by the 2080s.23 Figure 8 , shows the change in the projected annual average precipitation for Djibouti. Water routing, storage and other management options can be highly varied depending if the precipitation input comes frequently or with long periods of aridity in between rainfall.24 As seen below, annual average precipitation is already relatively low and is expected to increase marginally, at a national scale, by the of the century under a high
 (page [13]) emissions scenario of RCP8.5.
 (page [13]) 1980
 (page [13]) 2000
 (page [13]) 2020
 (page [13]) 2040
 (page [13]) 2060
 (page [13]) 2080
 (page [13]) 2100
 (page [13]) mm
 (page [13]) Historical RCP 2.6 RCP 4.5 RCP 6.0 RCP 8.5
 (page [13]) Year
 (page [13]) 700
 (page [13]) 600
 (page [13]) 500
 (page [13]) 400
 (page [13]) 300
 (page [13]) 200
 (page [13]) 100
 (page [13]) 0
 (page [13]) –100
 (page [13]) –200FIGURE 8. Annual average precipitation in
 (page [13]) Djibouti for 1986 to 209925
 (page [13]) Overview
 (page [13]) Djibouti has a very high degree of risk to natural hazards and over the last four decades, natural disasters have affected over a half million people. The country is highly vulnerable to ﬂoods, droughts, heat waves and earthquakes. Djibouti is also one of the most water-scarce countries in the world, which is further exacerbated by climate change. Sea-level rise also poses a signiﬁcant threat to the country’s coastline not only due to inundation and salinization increasing risk to port infrastructure and tourism along the coast.26 The extended drought across Djibouti from 2008 to 2011 decreased the country’s GDP by 4% with farmers and livestock herders being the hardest affected. Additionally, the agriculture sector lost 50% of its GDP, directly impacting over 15% of the population. Djibouti has no permanent rivers, streams or fresh water and as a result has extreme evaporation. An estimated 33% of the population lives in high hazard risk zones and 35% of the economy is chronically vulnerable to ﬂoods and drought.27 The region is also impacted by an increase in frequency and intensity of extreme weather events such as heavy rainfall resulting in mudslides, ﬂooding and ﬂash ﬂoods. Additionally, anticipated is an increased frequency of extreme events, such as inter alia droughts, soil erosion and desertiﬁcation. The country is expected CLIMATE RELATED NATURAL HAZARDS 23  Djibouti (2014). Vision Djibouti 2035. URL: http:/ /www.ccd.dj/w2017/wp-cont/e.altnt/uplo/a.altds/2016/01/Vision-N/a.alttion/a.altl/e.alt.pdf 24  WB Clim/a.altt/e.alt Ch/a.altn/g.alt/e.alt Knowl/e.altd/g.alt/e.alt Port/a.altl (CCKP, 2020). Djibouti W/a.altt/e.altr D/a.altshbo/a.altrd. D/a.altt/a.alt D/e.altscription. URL: https:/ /
 (page [13]) clim/a.altt/e.altknowl/e.altd/g.alt/e.altport/a.altl.worldb/a.altnk.or/g.alt/countr/y.alt/djibouti/clim/a.altt/e.alt-s/e.altctor-w/a.altt/e.altr
 (page [13]) 25  WB Clim/a.altt/e.alt Ch/a.altn/g.alt/e.alt Knowl/e.altd/g.alt/e.alt Port/a.altl (CCKP, 2020). Int/e.altr/a.altctiv/e.alt Clim/a.altt/e.alt Indic/a.alttor D/a.altshbo/a.altrd. Djibouti. URL https:/ /clim/a.altt/e.altd/a.altt/a.alt.
 (page [13]) worldb/a.altnk.or/g.alt/CRM/e.altPort/a.altl/w/e.altb//a.alt/g.altricultur/e.alt/crops-/a.altnd-l/a.altnd-m/a.altn/a.alt/g.alt/e.altm/e.altnt?countr/y.alt=DJ&p/e.altriod=2080-2099
 (page [13]) 26  Gov/e.altrnm/e.altnt of th/e.alt N/e.altth/e.altrl/a.altnds (2019). Clim/a.altt/e.alt Ch/a.altn/g.alt/e.alt Proﬁl/e.alt – Gr/e.alt/a.altt/e.altr Horn of Afric/a.alt. Ministr/y.alt of For/e.alti/g.altn Aﬀ/a.altirs. URL:
 (page [13]) https:/ /r/e.altli/e.altfw/e.altb.int/r/e.altport/world/clim/a.altt/e.alt-ch/a.altn/g.alt/e.alt-proﬁl/e.alt-/g.altr/e.alt/a.altt/e.altr-horn-/a.altfric/a.alt
 (page [14]) 27  GFDRR (2016). Countr/y.alt Proﬁl/e.alt – Djibouti. URL: https:/ /www./g.altfdrr.or/g.alt//e.altn/public/a.alttion/countr/y.alt-proﬁl/e.alt-djibouti-0 Table 4, shows the country has endured various
 (page [14]) A,
 (page [14]) SE rT lh
 (page [14]) 11 CLIMATE RISK COUNTRY PROFILE: DJIBOUTIto become generally hotter and drier in projected future climates.28 Sea level rise is projected to lead to the loss of a sizable proportion of the northern and eastern coastlines due to a combination of inundation and erosion, with consequential loss of agricultural land, infrastructure, and urban areas.29 Data from the Emergency Event Database: EM-Dat, presented in Table 4 , shows the country has endured various natural hazards, including ﬂoods, landslides, epidemic diseases, and storms. TABLE 4. Natural disasters in Djibouti, 1900–202030
 (page [14]) Natural Hazard
 (page [14]) 1900–2020 SubtypeEvents
 (page [14]) CountTotal
 (page [14]) Deaths Total AffectedTotal Damage
 (page [14]) (’000 USD)
 (page [14]) Flood Flood 4 33 102,250 2,500 Riverine Flood 3 155 90,000 3,219 Flash Flood 2 62 348,500 — Drought Drought 9 — 1,188,008 —
 (page [14]) Epidemic Bacterial Disease
 (page [14]) (Cholera Outbreak)4 88 3,628 —
 (page [14]) Parasitic Disease 1 43 2,000 — Storm Tropical Cyclone 2 2 25,775 — Insect Infestation Locust Infestation 1 — — —
 (page [14]) Key Trends
 (page [14]) Disaster risk from increased temperatures and water scarcity is expected to exacerbate existing tensions for water resources between agricultural, and livestock and human needs. The existing quality of available water from surface water and groundwater, is also likely to be altered. Water scarcity and changing rainfall patterns are will play a signiﬁcant role for the agricultural sector.31 Increased temperatures and degraded agricultural conditions are expected to adversely impact livelihoods and economic resilience of vulnerable groups. The impacts of sea level rise and coastal erosion is particular concern for the country’s tourism industry and port. Figure 9  presents the risk of coastal ﬂooding and extreme heat for Djibouti.32 Climate change is expected to increase the risk and intensity of water scarcity and drought across the country. The primary sectors affected are water, agriculture, coastal zones, human health, and livestock. Decreased rainfall during critical grazing and planting periods are expected to have signiﬁcant negative consequences for both the country’s agriculture and livestock sector. Additionally, increased frequency of intense precipitation events will 28  GFDRR (2013). Pursuin/g.alt Low R/e.alt/g.altr/e.altt Clim/a.altt/e.alt Ad/a.altpt/a.alttion /a.altnd Dis/a.altst/e.altr Risk R/e.altduction in Djibouti – Proj/e.altct Hi/g.althli/g.althts. URL: https:/ /
 (page [14]) www./g.altfdrr.or/g.alt//e.altn/public/a.alttion/pursuin/g.alt-low-r/e.alt/g.altr/e.altt-clim/a.altt/e.alt-/a.altd/a.altpt/a.alttion-/a.altnd-dis/a.altst/e.altr-risk-r/e.altduction-djibouti
 (page [14]) 29  Djibouti (2014). S/e.altcond N/a.alttion/a.altl Communic/a.alttion to th/e.alt UNFCCC. URL: https:/ /unfccc.int/sit/e.alts/d/e.altf/a.altult/ﬁl/e.alts/r/e.altsourc/e.alt/djinc2.pdf 30  EM-DAT: Th/e.alt Em/e.altr/g.alt/e.altnc/y.alt Ev/e.altnts D/a.altt/a.altb/a.alts/e.alt - Univ/e.altrsit/e.alt c/a.alttholiqu/e.alt d/e.alt Louv/a.altin (UCL) - CRED, D. Guh/a.alt-S/a.altpir, Bruss/e.altls, B/e.altl/g.altium.
 (page [14]) URL: https:/ /public./e.altmd/a.altt.b/e.alt/d/a.altt/a.alt
 (page [14, 15]) 31  GFDRR Innov/a.alttion L/a.altb (2020). Countr/y.alt Ad/a.altpt/a.alttion Proﬁl/e.alt: Djibouti. URL: https:/ /www./g.alt/e.altonod/e.alt-/g.altfdrrl/a.altb.or/g.alt/docum/e.altnts/698 32  Omondi, P. /e.altt /a.altl., (2013). Ch/a.altn/g.alt/e.alts in t/e.altmp/e.altr/a.alttur/e.alt /a.altnd pr/e.altcipit/a.alttion /e.altxtr/e.altm/e.alts ov/e.altr th/e.alt Gr/e.alt/a.altt/e.altr Horn of Afric/a.alt r/e.alt/g.altion from 1961 to 2010. Int/e.altrn/a.alttion/a.altl Journ/a.altl of Clim/a.alttolo/g.alt/y.alt. 34 (4). URL: https:/ /rm/e.altts.onlin/e.altlibr/a.altr/y.alt.wil/e.alt/y.alt.com/doi//a.altbs/10.1002/joc.3763
 (page [15]) Se. {a
 (page [15]) Show data source
 (page [15]) Se. (a
 (page [15]) Show data source
 (page [15]) ibaut, J}IDOUT
 (page [15]) % ead
 (page [15]) fs
 (page [15]) i Low
 (page [15]) i: Very low
 (page [15]) 12 CLIMATE RISK COUNTRY PROFILE: DJIBOUTIlead to a heightened risk of ﬂooding and ﬂash ﬂoods. Higher temperatures with increased aridity may also lead to livestock stress and reduced crop yields.35 This is likely to result in signiﬁcant economic losses, dama ge to agricultural lands and infrastructure as well as human health and mortality. Furthermore, land degradation and soil erosion, exacerbated by recurrent ﬂood and drought adversely impacts agricultural production, further affecting the livelihoods of the rural poor, given the limited resources with which to inﬂuence and increase adaptive capacity.36
 (page [15]) Implications for DRM
 (page [15]) Djibouti is working to improve its ability to monitor and communicate hazards, speciﬁcally for seismic and ﬂood risk, concerns are focused around the capital city of Djibouti City. Th e country is also working to update its preparedness and emergency plans to further support and advance its Disaster Risk Management (DRM) a genda. Djibouti’s DRM priorities include strengthening the preparedness and response capacities at national level, mainstreaming DRM in land-use planning, increasing awareness and improving public understanding of hazard risk across the country and promoting community-based DRM though advocacy and education programs.37 Efforts are also being placed on exploring disaster risk ﬁnancing and insurance mechanisms; enhancing early warning systems; and, building the capacity and ﬁnancial resources Additional investment in the strengthening of early warning systems and integrating resilience into urban infrastructure investments remains a priority.38 FIGURE 9. Risk of Coastal Flood (left),33 Risk of Extreme Heat (right)34 33  ThinkH/a.alt/z.alt/a.altrd! (2020). Djibouti - Co/a.altst/a.altl Floodin/g.alt. URL: https:/ /thinkh/a.alt/z.alt/a.altrd.or/g.alt//e.altn/r/e.altport/70-djibouti/CF 34  ThinkH/a.alt/z.alt/a.altrd! (2020). Djibouti – Extr/e.altm/e.alt H/e.alt/a.altt. URL: https:/ /thinkh/a.alt/z.alt/a.altrd.or/g.alt//e.altn/r/e.altport/70-djibouti/EH 35  ACP-EU (2017). N/a.alttur/a.altl Dis/a.altst/e.altr Risk R/e.altduction Pro/g.altr/a.altm. Djibouti: Drou/g.altht Post Dis/a.altst/e.altr N/e.alt/e.altds Ass/e.altssm/e.altnt. URL: https:/ /
 (page [15]) www./g.altfdrr.or/g.alt//e.altn/djibouti-drou/g.altht-post-dis/a.altst/e.altr-n/e.alt/e.altds-/a.altss/e.altssm/e.altnt
 (page [16, 15]) 36  Djibouti (2013). S/e.altcond N/a.alttion/a.altl Communic/a.alttion to th/e.alt UNFCCC. URL: https:/ /unfccc.int/sit/e.alts/d/e.altf/a.altult/ﬁl/e.alts/r/e.altsourc/e.alt/djinc2.pdf 37  GFDRR (2016). Countr/y.alt Proﬁl/e.alt – Djibouti. URL: https:/ /www./g.altfdrr.or/g.alt//e.altn/public/a.alttion/countr/y.alt-proﬁl/e.alt-djibouti-0 38  Djibouti (2014). Vision Djibouti 2035. URL: http:/ /www.ccd.dj/w2017/wp-cont/e.altnt/uplo/a.altds/2016/01/Vision-N/a.alttion/a.altl/e.alt.pdf 13 CLIMATE RISK COUNTRY PROFILE: DJIBOUTIDjibouti is one of the most at-risk countries to climate change. It faces a range of environmental problems, including water stress and desertiﬁcation. The management of water resources are threatened by strong human pressures (population growth and increasing urbanization). Changes in the hydrological regime, combined with sea level rise, further aggravate the ongoing process of aquifer salinization (speciﬁcally in the Djibouti City area) and water quality degradation. Primary risks such as temperature increases, reduced precipitation, rising sea levels and escalating extreme weather phenomena (extreme rainfall episodes). These risks are likely to result in signiﬁcant environmental and socio-economic vulnerabilities.39 Djibouti remains highly vulnerable to climate variability and change in the immediate as well as longer-term. Impacts are already being experienced across the already highly arid country. Water scarcity and drought conditions are expected to increase risks of food insecurity and are likely to exacerbate conﬂict situations over scarce resources, settlements, and population/ livestock movements. The country faces increased challenges to its small agricultural sector and the resulting loss of livelihoods and increased food insecurity. These are expected to be further compounded by climate stressors, environmental degradation, impacted water resources, and sea level rise presenting signiﬁcant obstacles to the country’s ongoing development and poverty reduction efforts.40
 (page [16]) Gender
 (page [16]) An increasing body of research has shown that climate-related disasters have impacted human populations in many areas including agricultural production, food security, water management and public health. The level of impacts and coping strategies of populations depends heavily on their socio-economic status, socio-cultural norms, access to resources, poverty as well as gender. Research has also provided more evidence that the effects are not gender neutral, as women and children are among the highest risk groups. Key factors that account for the differences between women’s and men’s vulnerability to climate change risks include: gender-based differences in time use; access to assets and credit, treatment by formal institutio ns, which can constrain women’s opportunities, limited access to policy discussions and decision making, and a lack of sex-disaggregated data for policy change.41
 (page [16]) Agriculture
 (page [16]) Ov/e.altrvi/e.altw
 (page [16]) Djibouti’s agriculture sector remains poorly developed. The country has less than 1,000 km2 of arable land and approximately 30% of the population engages in rural farming activities, however this generates just 4% of GDP. As arable land is scarce, the majority of farming activities involve pastoralism. Improving access to water is the main priority for rural communities and for raising livestock production, however, groundwater resources are widely CLIMATE CHANGE IMPACTS TO KEY SECTORS 39  GCCA (2018). R/e.altspondin/g.alt to clim/a.altt/e.alt ch/a.altn/g.alt/e.alt in th/e.alt /e.altn/e.altr/g.alt/y.alt /a.altnd w/a.altt/e.altr s/e.altctors in Djibouti. URL: https:/ /www./g.altcc/a.alt./e.altu/pro/g.altr/a.altmm/e.alts/
 (page [16]) r/e.altspondin/g.alt-clim/a.altt/e.alt-ch/a.altn/g.alt/e.alt-/e.altn/e.altr/g.alt/y.alt-/a.altnd-w/a.altt/e.altr-s/e.altctors-djibouti
 (page [16]) 40  Djibouti (2016). N/a.alttion/a.altll/y.alt D/e.altt/e.altrmin/e.altd Contribution. URL: https:/ /www4.unfccc.int/sit/e.alts/ndcst/a.alt/g.altin/g.alt/Publish/e.altdDocum/e.altnts/
 (page [16]) Djibouti%20First/INDC-Djibouti_ENG.pdf
 (page [16]) 41 World B/a.altnk Group (2016). G/e.altnd/e.altr Equ/a.altlit/y.alt, Pov/e.altrt/y.alt R/e.altduction, /a.altnd Inclusiv/e.alt Growth. URL: https:/ /op/e.altnknowl/e.altd/g.alt/e.alt.worldb/a.altnk.or/g.alt/
 (page [17]) h/a.altndl/e.alt/10986/23425
 (page [17]) 14 CLIMATE RISK COUNTRY PROFILE: DJIBOUTIexploited. Crop production is poorly developed, due to lack of water, limitations in arable land and soil salinity. As such, Djibouti has a chronic food deﬁcit and depends on imports to meet its food needs. This leaves the country highly sensitive to external shocks, including spikes in food and fuel prices.42 Animal husbandry has a long history in Djibouti and is considered a key element of the country’s continued economic development. Efforts are underway to improve conditions for livestock and herders, through improved disease control, increased yields and through the improvement of fodder availability. The livestock sub-sector forms the strongest element in agriculture production. However, Djiboutians involved in animal husbandry are mainly nomadic. Djibouti is well-placed to export livestock and the country is already a center for cattle exports from Ethiopia and Somalia. The World Trade Organization estimates that approximately two million animals pass through
 (page [17]) Djibouti’s trade center each year.43
 (page [17]) Clim/a.altt/e.alt Ch/a.altn/g.alt/e.alt Imp/a.altcts
 (page [17]) The projected climate change impacts to food production, agricultural livelihoods and food security in Djibouti are signiﬁcant national as well as regional concerns. Impacts on food production and food security are linked to projected water supply constraints as well as temperature rise. Djibouti is projected to experience rising temperatures, increasing water scarcity and increased evapotranspiration This is expected to threaten the yields of rainfed crops as well as livestock health.44 Higher temperatures can further negatively impact crops due to an increase in weeds and diseases. Increased temperature, sea level rise, and decreased precipitation will also exacerbate existing water resources challenges for the sector. In Djibouti, ﬂoods and droughts are expected to occur more frequently in coastal as well as inland areas, with urban centers around the coast at risk of ﬂooding due to heavy rainfall, further complicating food security challenges and distribution efforts. The projected increased heat will increase stress on crops and is also likely to alter the length of the growing season. Decreased water availability is likely to reduce yields and the reduction in soil moisture may alter suitable areas for agriculture or the production of speciﬁc crops. Increased heat and water scarcity conditions are likely to increase evapotranspiration, expected to contribute to crop failures and overall yield reductions.45 Figure 10
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 (page [17]) for Djibouti46
 (page [17]) 42  IFAD (2016). Not/e.alt d/e.alt str/a.altté/g.alti/e.alt d/e.alt p/a.alt/y.alts. Djibouti. URL: https:/ /www.if/a.altd.or/g.alt//e.altn/docum/e.altnt-d/e.altt/a.altil//a.altss/e.altt/40146422 43  Oxford Busin/e.altss Group (2020). Pl/a.altns to d/e.altv/e.altlop Djibouti’s /a.alt/g.altricultur/e.alt /a.altnd ﬁshin/g.alt to promot/e.alt food /a.altnd /e.altmplo/y.altm/e.altnt s/e.altcurit/y.alt.
 (page [17]) URL: https:/ /oxfordbusin/e.altss/g.altroup.com//a.altn/a.altl/y.altsis/livin/g.alt-l/a.altnd-/a.altnd-s/e.alt/a.alt-pl/a.altns-d/e.altv/e.altlop-/a.alt/g.altricultur/e.alt-/a.altnd-ﬁshin/g.alt-promot/e.alt-food-/a.altnd-
 (page [17]) /e.altmplo/y.altm/e.altnt-s/e.altcurit/y.alt
 (page [17]) 44  IFAD (2016). Not/e.alt d/e.alt str/a.altté/g.alti/e.alt d/e.alt p/a.alt/y.alts. Djibouti. URL: https:/ /www.if/a.altd.or/g.alt//e.altn/docum/e.altnt-d/e.altt/a.altil//a.altss/e.altt/40146422 45  Djibouti (2015). Str/a.altt/e.alt/g.alt/y.alt of Acc/e.altl/e.altr/a.altt/e.altd Growth /a.altnd Promotion of Emplo/y.altm/e.altnt (SCAPE) 2015–2019. URL: https:/ /pl/a.altnipolis.ii/e.altp.
 (page [17]) un/e.altsco.or/g.alt/sit/e.alts/pl/a.altnipolis/ﬁl/e.alts/r/e.altssourc/e.alts/djibouti_sc/a.altp/e.alt-_/a.altn/g.altl/a.altis.pdf
 (page [17]) 46  WB Clim/a.altt/e.alt Ch/a.altn/g.alt/e.alt Knowl/e.altd/g.alt/e.alt Port/a.altl (CCKP, 2020). Djibouti A/g.altricultur/e.alt. D/a.altshbo/a.altrd URL: https:/ /clim/a.altt/e.altd/a.altt/a.alt.worldb/a.altnk.or/g.alt/
 (page [18]) CRM/e.altPort/a.altl/w/e.altb//a.alt/g.altricultur/e.alt/crops-/a.altnd-l/a.altnd-m/a.altn/a.alt/g.alt/e.altm/e.altnt?countr/y.alt=DJI&p/e.altriod=2080-2099
 (page [18]) kely resulting in increases in
 (page [18]) 15 CLIMATE RISK COUNTRY PROFILE: DJIBOUTIshows the average daily max-temperature across the seasonal cycle. These higher temperatures have implications for impacts to soil moisture and thus crop growth as well as livestock health. As seen in the graph, Djibouti will experience signiﬁcant temperature increases, averaging 4°C, throughout the year.
 (page [18]) Ad/a.altpt/a.alt tion Options
 (page [18]) Djibouti and its donors are investing in projects to improve the country’s agricultural resilience to climate change. Efforts include the improved water management capabilities, particularly in response to the severe water shortages and prolonged periods of drought. Areas of intervention include the Beyya Dader watershed in the Ali Sabieh Region, the Gaggade-Derela watershed in the Dkhil Region, and the Weima watershed in the Toudjourah-Obock Region. Efforts are also ongoing to increase the adaptive capacity and resilience of rural, agro-pastoral communities. Efforts focus on establishing a long-term guaranteed access to water resources, within the context of climate change, introducing shaded agro-pastoral perimeters to support agro-pastoral systems and increase awareness of rural communicates in regards for opportunity to diversity their actions. The government has also committed to increase the capacity building of institutions and sectors to improve understanding of climate change impacts and key adaptation measures required.47 Efforts should also be made to improve farmer and pastoralist knowledge about seasonal variability and longer term climate changes.
 (page [18]) Water
 (page [18]) Ov/e.altrvi/e.altw
 (page [18]) Djibouti is a highly water scarce country. The country does not have a permanent source of surface water such as rivers or fresh water lakes and must rely on deep underground water tables, which are fed by rainwater inﬁltration, where they exist.48 An estimated 95% of drinking water is supplied by groundwater, however underground water tables have been drawn down to approximately half of the normal quantity and annual rainfall does not supply enough for regeneration of water aquifers. Djibouti continues to experience periods of intense aridity and drought and during these periods cisterns and shallow wells dry-up during the dry season, traditionally lasting from April to September. As water scarcity in the country has become more pronounced, many herders and rural dwellers loose sources of livelihood, as a result, have been forced to seek refuge in urban centers, increasing their vulnerability.49 Additionally, given the limited recharge of groundwater and the intensiﬁcation of pumping, and seawater intrusion has been found to contribute to increasing the salinity rate and appearance of brackish water for communities along coastal areas.50
 (page [18]) Clim/a.altt/e.alt Ch/a.altn/g.alt/e.alt Imp/a.altcts
 (page [18]) Djibouti has somewhat highly variable rainfall, however the country is expected to experience and increase in the occurrence and intensity of heavy rainfall events, increasing risks of ﬂoods as well as likely resulting in increases in the intensity and frequency of dry periods and water scarcity. Increases in temperature is also expected to reduce 47  Djibouti (2016). N/a.alttion/a.altll/y.alt D/e.altt/e.altrmin/e.altd Contribution. URL: https:/ /www4.unfccc.int/sit/e.alts/ndcst/a.alt/g.altin/g.alt/Publish/e.altdDocum/e.altnts/
 (page [18]) Djibouti%20First/INDC-Djibouti_ENG.pdf
 (page [18]) 48  Djibouti (2014). S/e.altcond N/a.alttion/a.altl Communic/a.alttion to th/e.alt UNFCCC. URL: https:/ /unfccc.int/sit/e.alts/d/e.altf/a.altult/ﬁl/e.alts/r/e.altsourc/e.alt/djinc2.pdf 49  USAID (2020). W/a.altt/e.altr /a.altnd S/a.altnit/a.alttion – Djibouti. [28 S/e.altpt/e.altmb/e.altr 2020]. URL: https:/ /www.us/a.altid./g.altov/djibouti//g.altlob/a.altl-h/e.alt/a.altlth/
 (page [18]) w/a.altt/e.altr-/a.altnd-s/a.altnit/a.alttion
 (page [19]) 50  Djibouti (2014). S/e.altcond N/a.alttion/a.altl Communic/a.alttion to th/e.alt UNFCCC. URL: https:/ /unfccc.int/sit/e.alts/d/e.altf/a.altult/ﬁl/e.alts/r/e.altsourc/e.alt/djinc2.pdf
 (page [19]) fall.
 (page [19]) 16 CLIMATE RISK COUNTRY PROFILE: DJIBOUTIsoil moisture, surface water, and underground water stocks as well as signiﬁcantly increase desertiﬁcation. These are likely to worsen the increasing water needs, notably for human use, but also for agriculture and livestock activities, given the increase in evapotranspiration and the decrease in soil moisture.51 The drinking water supply for the capital and the main urban centers is provided by the Djibouti National Water Ofﬁce (ONED) is also highly vulnerable. In the majority of rural areas, the lack of ﬁnancial means does not allow sufﬁcient maintenance of existing infrastructure. The well ﬁeld of the city of Djibouti now has nearly 35 boreholes, which are in continuous operation. The main towns in the interior regions are supplied by about ﬁfteen boreholes. Losses in the pipeline network are estimated to account for between 20%–25%. The critical situation of groundwater is exacerbated by climate change inﬂuences, which are amplifying water resource deﬁcits (particularly when considering high population growth and economic development activities.52 Rainfall and evaporation changes also impact degrees of surface water inﬁltration and recharge rates for groundwater and low water storage capacities increases the country’s dependence on unreliable rainfall patterns. Changes in rainfall and evaporation translate directly to changes in surface water inﬁltration and groundwater re-charge. This has the potential for further decreased reliability of unimproved groundwater sources and surface water sources during droughts or prolonged dry seasons. Increased strain on pump mechanisms can lead to breakdowns if maintenance is neglected and the potential for falling water levels in the immediate vicinity of wells or boreholes, particularly in areas of high demand. Additionally, temperature increases have the potential to result in increased soil moisture deﬁcits even under conditions of increasing rain fall. Figure 11  shows the projected annual Standardized
 (page [19]) Precipitation Evapotranspiration Index (SPEI) through
 (page [19]) the end of the century. The SPEI is an index which represents the measure of the given water deﬁcit in a speciﬁc location, accounting for contributions
 (page [19]) of temperature-dependent evapotranspiration and
 (page [19]) providing insight into increasing or decreasing pressure on water resources. Negative values for SPEI represent dry conditions, with values below −2 indicating severe drought conditions, likewise positive values indicate increased wet conditions. This is an important metric in understanding for the water sector in regards to quantity and quality of supply for human consumption and agriculture use as well as for the energy sector as reductions in water availability impacts river ﬂow and the hydropower generating capabilities. At a national scale, Djibouti is projected to experience a slight reduction in rainfall through the end of the century. While coastal areas are expected to maintain current rainfall quantities, in land regions, and particularly the western areas of the county are projected to experience a reduction in rainfall.
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 (page [19]) –3FIGURE 11. Annual SPEI Drought Index in Djibouti for the period, 1986 to 209953 51  Djibouti (2014). Vision Djibouti 2035. URL: http:/ /www.ccd.dj/w2017/wp-cont/e.altnt/uplo/a.altds/2016/01/Vision-N/a.alttion/a.altl/e.alt.pdf 52  Djibouti (2014). S/e.altcond N/a.alttion/a.altl Communic/a.alttion to th/e.alt UNFCCC. URL: https:/ /unfccc.int/sit/e.alts/d/e.altf/a.altult/ﬁl/e.alts/r/e.altsourc/e.alt/djinc2.pdf 53  WB Clim/a.altt/e.alt Ch/a.altn/g.alt/e.alt Knowl/e.altd/g.alt/e.alt Port/a.altl (CCKP, 2020). Djibouti W/a.altt/e.altr S/e.altctor D/a.altshbo/a.altrd. URL: https:/ /clim/a.altt/e.altd/a.altt/a.alt.worldb/a.altnk.or/g.alt/
 (page [20]) CRM/e.altPort/a.altl/w/e.altb/w/a.altt/e.altr/l/a.altnd-us/e.alt-/-w/a.altt/e.altrsh/e.altd-m/a.altn/a.alt/g.alt/e.altm/e.altnt?countr/y.alt=DJI&p/e.altriod=2080-2099
 (page [20]) 17 CLIMATE RISK COUNTRY PROFILE: DJIBOUTIAd/a.altpt/a.alttion Options Efforts are ongoing to increase and ensure more sustainable and affordable access to water resources through improved governance of water points via Community Water Management Committees and Water User Associations, establish an application of payment for water supply services to ensure the continuation of the provision of water, accompanied by speciﬁc measures to ensure affordability for the most vulnerable, and to ensure the efﬁciency and proximity of operating and maintenance services to water users. Greater efforts should be made to improve water management around the capital city, Djibouti City. The government has also committed to building a water pumping plant and aqueducts for the conveyance of water from Ethiopia in order to supply the Ali Sabieh, Dikhil and Arta Regions, along with Djibouti City. this will have a capacity of 100,000 m3/day carried to the border between the two countries. A reservoir of 20,000 m3 will be built in Djibouti. The goals of this project are to provide the populations with access to affordable drinking water. Efforts are also ongoing to improve water management for agro-pastoral resources regarding surface water mobilization as well as sustainable land management. With funding provided by the World Bank, efforts will include the repair and construction of tanks for drinking water and livestock, the construction of two small experimental dams, and sustainable land management with a view to protecting hydraulic infrastructure and regenerating plant cover in the
 (page [20]) surrounding area.54
 (page [20]) Energy
 (page [20]) Ov/e.altrvi/e.altw
 (page [20]) The energy sector is critical to the country’s economic activity, particularly concerning economic activities around its ports as well as its continued economic development. Djibouti relies entirely on imported fossil fuels and electricity to meet its energy needs. A new importer of energy, Djibouti has traditionally relied upon energy generated from heavy fuel oil and diesel power plants. However, since 2011, approximately 65% of Djibouti’s electricity has been supplied through a 150 megawatts (MW) interconnection line from its hydro-electric resource rich neighbor, Ethiopia. Local power production now accounts for around 35% of the energy supply continues to be generated through local heavy fuel oil or diesel thermal power plants. Production is sourced from four key power plants: Boulaos, Marabout, Tadjoura and Obock.55 Djibouti is also endowed with abundant solar, wind, and geothermal natural resources, along with extensive coastline and dedicated port areas. As such, the country has the potential to generate more than 300 MW of electric power from renewable energy sources with the proximity to fuel- producing nations of the Gulf. Djibouti currently has over 100 MW of installed generation capacity, of which only 57 MW is reliably available to serve the population and its key industries. Djibouti’s geothermal resources have been recognized for years, and exploration activities are ongoing to identify economic vapor resources. Despite high resource potential and opportunities for cross-bord er export, Djibouti’s power sector faces signiﬁcant challenges, including overall coherence of planning and goals, infrastructure development, deal ﬂow and market 54  Djibouti (2016). N/a.alttion/a.altll/y.alt D/e.altt/e.altrmin/e.altd Contribution. URL: https:/ /www4.unfccc.int/sit/e.alts/ndcst/a.alt/g.altin/g.alt/Publish/e.altdDocum/e.altnts/
 (page [20]) Djibouti%20First/INDC-Djibouti_ENG.pdf
 (page [20]) 55  Oxford Busin/e.altss Group (2020). Div/e.altrsiﬁc/a.alttion k/e.alt/y.alt to /e.altxp/a.altnsion of Djibouti’s /e.altn/e.altr/g.alt/y.alt s/e.altctor. URL: https:/ /oxfordbusin/e.altss/g.altroup.com/
 (page [21]) ov/e.altrvi/e.altw/fu/e.altl-/g.altrowth-div/e.altrsif/y.altin/g.alt-/e.altn/e.altr/g.alt/y.alt-mix-/a.altnd-s/e.altcurin/g.alt-/a.altd/e.altqu/a.altt/e.alt-suppl/y.alt-/e.alt/y.alt/e.alt-/e.altxp/a.altnsion-c/e.altntr/a.altl-d/e.altv/e.altlopm/e.altnt
 (page [21]) 18 CLIMATE RISK COUNTRY PROFILE: DJIBOUTIentry for independent producers.56 At the household level, speciﬁcally for rural areas, kerosene, charcoal and ﬁrewood comprise the majority of household energy consumption.57
 (page [21]) Clim/a.altt/e.alt Ch/a.altn/g.alt/e.alt Imp/a.altcts
 (page [21]) Increasing temperatures and the increased frequency and intensity of aridity and drought are expected to further increase energy demand as well as increase strain on energy generation and transmission infrastructure. Changes in demand are likely to be through the expansion of peak-hour patterns, air conditioning intensity needs and the increased need for water desalination (used in processing and station cooling). Djibouti’s existing infrastructure and generation capabilities are ill-prepared to cope with the projected effects of climate change and the increased demand. Existing energy systems are at risk of system failures and increased/expanded energy outages.58 Djibouti has planned to increase its renewable energy consumption by 2030, however technology investments
 (page [21]) and infrastructure development are needed.
 (page [21]) Cooling Degree Days shows the relationship between daily heat and cooling demand, typically sourced through a form of active cooling or an evaporative process. The change in cooling degree days provides insight into the potential for extended seasons of power demand or periods in which cooling demand (power demands) might increase. As seen in Figure 12 , seasonal increases for cooling demands (considered for individual households, commercial enterprises and infrastructure) are expected to increase rapidly for the second half of the century, under the high emissions scenario RCP8.5. The Warm Spell Duration Index represents the number of days in a sequence of at least six days in which the daily maximum temperature is greater than the 90th percentile of daily maximum temperature. As shown in Figure 13 , warm spells will increase signiﬁcantly across all emission scenarios.
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 (page [21]) 0FIGURE 12. Change in Cooling Degree Days (65°F) in Djibouti for the period 2040–205959FIGURE 13. Warm Spell Duration Index in Djibouti for the period 1986 to 209960 56  USAID (2020). Pow/e.altr Afric/a.alt F/a.altct Sh/e.alt/e.altt – Djibouti. URL: https:/ /www.us/a.altid./g.altov/pow/e.altr/a.altfric/a.alt/djibouti 57  Djibouti (2014). S/e.altcond N/a.alttion/a.altl Communic/a.alttion to th/e.alt UNFCCC. URL: https:/ /unfccc.int/sit/e.alts/d/e.altf/a.altult/ﬁl/e.alts/r/e.altsourc/e.alt/djinc2.pdf 58  Middl/e.alt E/a.altst Institut/e.alt (2012). Implic/a.alttions of Clim/a.altt/e.alt Ch/a.altn/g.alt/e.alt on En/e.altr/g.alt/y.alt /a.altnd S/e.altcurit/y.alt in th/e.alt MENA R/e.alt/g.altion. URL: https:/ /www.m/e.alti./e.altdu/
 (page [21]) public/a.alttions/implic/a.alttions-clim/a.altt/e.alt-ch/a.altn/g.alt/e.alt-/e.altn/e.altr/g.alt/y.alt-/a.altnd-s/e.altcurit/y.alt-m/e.altn/a.alt-r/e.alt/g.altion
 (page [21]) 59  WB Clim/a.altt/e.alt Ch/a.altn/g.alt/e.alt Knowl/e.altd/g.alt/e.alt Port/a.altl (CCKP, 2020). Djibouti – En/e.altr/g.alt/y.alt. URL: https:/ /clim/a.altt/e.altknowl/e.altd/g.alt/e.altport/a.altl.worldb/a.altnk.or/g.alt/
 (page [21]) countr/y.alt/djibouti/clim/a.altt/e.alt-s/e.altctor-/e.altn/e.altr/g.alt/y.alt
 (page [21]) 60  WB Clim/a.altt/e.alt Ch/a.altn/g.alt/e.alt Knowl/e.altd/g.alt/e.alt Port/a.altl (CCKP, 2020): Djibouti En/e.altr/g.alt/y.alt S/e.altctor D/a.altshbo/a.altrd. URL: https:/ /clim/a.altt/e.altd/a.altt/a.alt.worldb/a.altnk.or/g.alt/
 (page [22]) CRM/e.altPort/a.altl/w/e.altb//e.altn/e.altr/g.alt/y.alt/oil-/g.alt/a.alts-/a.altnd-co/a.altl-minin/g.alt?countr/y.alt=DJI&p/e.altriod=2080-2099
 (page [22]) ch as mosquitoes or sandflies.
 (page [22]) 19 CLIMATE RISK COUNTRY PROFILE: DJIBOUTIAd/a.altpt/a.alttion Options As a result of Djibouti’s growing energy demand, the government is working to diversify its energy supply and to increase the amount of power generated from renewable sources, particularly solar. The government is currently undertaking a project to provide solar electricity to rural  areas as an instrument for poverty reduction. Various mechanisms have been rolled out in Djibouti City and in rural areas, including personal kits, street lights, a mini power plant, drinking water supply and solar-powered light bulbs. Djibouti is also in the processes of sourcing investment for a second desalination plant to meet the country’s drinking water needs.61 Djibouti should continue towards the development and implementation of innovative new regulatory and ﬁnance models to increase efﬁciency, especially for utilities and, ultimately implement customer energy savings programs and new approaches to the delivery of electricity, including renewable energies. The government has committed to build institutional and technical capacities of different units in the energy sector in speciﬁc response to climate change issues. Increased support for research and technological development should also be implemented to enable the electricity sector to deal more effectively with climate change.62
 (page [22]) Health
 (page [22]) Ov/e.altrvi/e.altw
 (page [22]) The dispersion of Djiboutians in concentrated urban areas and sparsely populated rural areas has resulted in differentiated health policies based on region. In order to achieve universal health coverage, the government has committed itself to improving health care access in the inner regions and provide care to vulnerable populations in order to meet the country’s development goals of improving human capital through education and health care.63 The public health proﬁle of Djibouti includes continued challenges of food insecurity and under- and mal-nutrition. With an estimated 30% of children under ﬁve-years suffer from chronic malnutrition. HIV/AIDS, Malaria and Tuberculosis have become increasingly threatening. Incidence rates of malaria have continued to increase.64
 (page [22]) Clim/a.altt/e.alt Ch/a.altn/g.alt/e.alt Imp/a.altcts
 (page [22]) The projected increase in extreme heat, heatwaves, ﬂooding and increasing aridity and drought events are of signiﬁcant concern for the health of Djibouti’s population, particularly poor and rural populations. Given the projection of higher temperatures, a resurgence of vector borne diseases such as malaria and other communicable diseases are expected. Changes in rainfall patterns as well as temperatures may change the geographical distribution of insect vectors of these diseases, such as mosquitoes or sandﬂies.65 61  Djibouti (2016). N/a.alttion/a.altll/y.alt D/e.altt/e.altrmin/e.altd Contribution. URL: https:/ /www4.unfccc.int/sit/e.alts/ndcst/a.alt/g.altin/g.alt/Publish/e.altdDocum/e.altnts/
 (page [22]) Djibouti%20First/INDC-Djibouti_ENG.pdf
 (page [22]) 62  Middl/e.alt E/a.altst Institut/e.alt (2012). Implic/a.alttions of Clim/a.altt/e.alt Ch/a.altn/g.alt/e.alt on En/e.altr/g.alt/y.alt /a.altnd S/e.altcurit/y.alt in th/e.alt MENA R/e.alt/g.altion. URL: https:/ /www.m/e.alti.
 (page [22]) /e.altdu/public/a.alttions/implic/a.alttions-clim/a.altt/e.alt-ch/a.altn/g.alt/e.alt-/e.altn/e.altr/g.alt/y.alt-/a.altnd-s/e.altcurit/y.alt-m/e.altn/a.alt-r/e.alt/g.altion
 (page [22]) 63  Oxford Busin/e.altss Group (2020). Addr/e.altssin/g.alt ch/a.altll/e.altn/g.alt/e.alts /a.altnd f/a.altcilit/a.alttin/g.alt univ/e.altrs/a.altl h/e.alt/a.altlth c/a.altr/e.alt in Djibouti’s urb/a.altn /a.altnd rur/a.altl /a.altr/e.alt/a.alts.
 (page [22]) URL: https:/ /oxfordbusin/e.altss/g.altroup.com/ov/e.altrvi/e.altw/r/e.altn/e.altw/e.altd-focus-/a.altddr/e.altssin/g.alt-ch/a.altll/e.altn/g.alt/e.alts-/a.altnd-f/a.altcilit/a.alttin/g.alt-univ/e.altrs/a.altl-cov/e.altr/a.alt/g.alt/e.alt
 (page [22]) 64  Oxford Busin/e.altss Group (2020). Addr/e.altssin/g.alt ch/a.altll/e.altn/g.alt/e.alts /a.altnd f/a.altcilit/a.alttin/g.alt univ/e.altrs/a.altl h/e.alt/a.altlth c/a.altr/e.alt in Djibouti’s urb/a.altn /a.altnd rur/a.altl /a.altr/e.alt/a.alts.
 (page [22]) URL: https:/ /oxfordbusin/e.altss/g.altroup.com/ov/e.altrvi/e.altw/r/e.altn/e.altw/e.altd-focus-/a.altddr/e.altssin/g.alt-ch/a.altll/e.altn/g.alt/e.alts-/a.altnd-f/a.altcilit/a.alttin/g.alt-univ/e.altrs/a.altl-cov/e.altr/a.alt/g.alt/e.alt
 (page [23]) 65  Djibouti (2014). S/e.altcond N/a.alttion/a.altl Communic/a.alttion to th/e.alt UNFCCC. URL: https:/ /unfccc.int/sit/e.alts/d/e.altf/a.altult/ﬁl/e.alts/r/e.altsourc/e.alt/djinc2.pdf
 (page [23]) 20 CLIMATE RISK COUNTRY PROFILE: DJIBOUTIThe rise in temperature is likely to exacerbate respiratory diseases, and water-borne diseases may spread due to degradation of the quality of water resources. The current deterioration of water quality and related health risks are caused by the lack of access to clean water. Access to drinking water, sanitation and hygiene may become more difﬁcult, resulting in new break outs of pathogenic microorganisms and potential bacteriological contamination.66 Vector borne diseases and water contamination are expected to affect rural areas in particular, where access to drinking water and sanitation is already limited. The increase of heat waves and heat islands could strongly increase respiratory diseases. The increase in droughts and ﬂoods is likely to also destabilize the agricultural sector, which could have a signiﬁcant impact on food security in the country, causing an increase in malnutrition.67 Increasing temperatures are of increasing concern for Djibouti. For the country, the annual distribution of days with a high-heat index provides insight into the health hazard of heat. Figure 14  shows the expected Number of Days with a Heat Index >35°C for the 2090s; showing a steady increase by mid-century and continuing to sharply increase by end of the century, under a high-emission scenario. Night temperatures ( >20°C), are also expected to rapidly increase in a high-emission scenario. Increased health threats can be projected and monitored through the frequency of tropical nights. Tropical Nights ( Figure 15 ) represents the projected increase in tropical nights for different emission scenarios to demonstrate the difference in expected numbers
 (page [23]) of tropical nights.
 (page [23]) degF
 (page [23]) Historical RCP 2.6 RCP 4.5 RCP 6.0 RCP 8.5
 (page [23]) Year
 (page [23]) 1980
 (page [23]) 2000
 (page [23]) 2020
 (page [23]) 2040
 (page [23]) 2060
 (page [23]) 2080
 (page [23]) 2100
 (page [23]) 250
 (page [23]) 200
 (page [23]) 150
 (page [23]) 100
 (page [23]) 50
 (page [23]) 0
 (page [23]) –50
 (page [23]) nights Historical RCP 2.6 RCP 4.5 RCP 6.0 RCP 8.5
 (page [23]) Year
 (page [23]) 1980
 (page [23]) 2000
 (page [23]) 2020
 (page [23]) 2040
 (page [23]) 2060
 (page [23]) 2080
 (page [23]) 2100
 (page [23]) 400
 (page [23]) 380
 (page [23]) 360
 (page [23]) 340
 (page [23]) 320
 (page [23]) 300
 (page [23]) 280
 (page [23]) 260
 (page [23]) 240
 (page [23]) 220
 (page [23]) FIGURE 14. Days with a Heat Index > 35°C68FIGURE 15. Number of Tropical Nights
 (page [23]) (Tmin > 20°C)69
 (page [23]) 66  WHO (2016). Djibouti: H/e.alt/a.altlth S/y.altst/e.altms Proﬁl/e.alt, K/e.alt/y.alt h/e.alt/a.altlth s/y.altst/e.altm indic/a.alttors. URL: https:/ //a.altpplic/a.alttions./e.altmro.who.int/docs/
 (page [23]) Countr/y.alt_proﬁl/e.alt_2013_EN_15385.pdf
 (page [23]) 67  Djibouti (2013). Pl/a.altn N/a.alttion/a.altl d/e.alt D/e.altv/e.altlopp/e.altm/e.altnt S/a.altnit/a.altir/e.alt PNDS 2013–2017. URL: https:/ /www.mindb/a.altnk.info/it/e.altm/3312 68  WB Clim/a.altt/e.alt Ch/a.altn/g.alt/e.alt Knowl/e.altd/g.alt/e.alt Port/a.altl (CCKP, 2020). Djibouti H/e.alt/a.altlth S/e.altctor D/a.altshbo/a.altrd. URL: https:/ /clim/a.altt/e.altd/a.altt/a.alt.worldb/a.altnk.or/g.alt/
 (page [23]) CRM/e.altPort/a.altl/w/e.altb/h/e.alt/a.altlth/s/y.altst/e.altms-/a.altnd-s/e.altrvic/e.alt?countr/y.alt=DJI&p/e.altriod=2080-2099
 (page [23]) 69  WB Clim/a.altt/e.alt Ch/a.altn/g.alt/e.alt Knowl/e.altd/g.alt/e.alt Port/a.altl (CCKP, 2020). Djibouti H/e.alt/a.altlth S/e.altctor. URL: https:/ /clim/a.altt/e.altknowl/e.altd/g.alt/e.altport/a.altl.worldb/a.altnk.or/g.alt/
 (page [24]) countr/y.alt/djibouti/clim/a.altt/e.alt-s/e.altctor-h/e.alt/a.altlth
 (page [24]) gradual inundation. Given
 (page [24]) 21 CLIMATE RISK COUNTRY PROFILE: DJIBOUTIAd/a.altpt/a.alttion Options Djibouti is working to address weaknesses and challenges in its healthcare system in order for critical health services to function on a more sustainable and equitable basis. Establishing its integrated health-system, efforts are focused on combating the ﬁght against HIV/AIDS, tuberculous and malaria as well as working with community- based organizations to increase awareness and support local health services increase uptake.70 Djibouti’s health sector continue to focus on increasing and strengthening its health surveillance and risk mapping, that focus on health-related adverse conditions and a strengthened knowledge management and communication network for information sharing. Efforts should also focus on communication and health education to encourage healthy behaviors and has committed to raising community awareness about climate change induced risks and
 (page [24]) adaptation options.71
 (page [24]) Coastal Zones and Sea Level Rise
 (page [24]) Ov/e.altrvi/e.altw
 (page [24]) Djibouti has a coastline of 372 km with an exclusive maritime area of 7 ,190 km2. Djibouti’s coastal sone houses more than two-thirds of the population as well as socio-economic activities. It is also the location of major investment programs in the port, hotels, livestock transport and mining infrastructure. Djibouti’s coastline is largely narrow and the coast is bordered by ﬂat, low and barren sandy plains. The coastal zone houses fragile ecosystems of coral reefs, mangroves and estuaries, which play a critical role in the subsistence of coastal communities. This area lies in a zone of upwelling with nutrient-rich water where coral reefs are poorly developed. A depth of 200 meters is reached within 8 to 10 kilometers off the coast.
 (page [24]) Clim/a.altt/e.alt Ch/a.altn/g.alt/e.alt Imp/a.altcts
 (page [24]) Djibouti’s coasts are at high risk from sea level rise (SLR), coastal erosion and storm surges and a signiﬁcant retreat of the coastline is expected by the end of the century. The country’s coastal zone is subject to environmental degradation and increasing concerns over the area’s management of water resources as well as the preservation of marine biodiversity (coral reefs, mangroves, ﬁshery resources and marine mammals). Degradation is largely linked with the rapid growth of the port and related economic activities, pollution (wastewater discharges) and pressure along the coastline from the frequent passage of ships. Projections of continued and signiﬁcant sea level rise for the area raises signiﬁcant concerns for the population, housing and infrastructure.72 The coastline around and south of Djibouti city, is considered to have high degree of risk to gradual  inundation. Given the ongoing, but gradual nature, this should still be considered and relevant inclusions in coastal planning processes. Salt water intrusion also presents a high degree of risks, speciﬁcally for low-lying barriers and river mouths along the country’s coastline. The coastline of the estuaries located between the Eritrean border and Gulf of Tadjoura is also 70  USAID (2020). Glob/a.altl H/e.alt/a.altlth – Djibouti. URL: https:/ /www.us/a.altid./g.altov/djibouti//g.altlob/a.altl-h/e.alt/a.altlth 71  WHO (2016). Djibouti: H/e.alt/a.altlth S/y.altst/e.altms Proﬁl/e.alt, K/e.alt/y.alt h/e.alt/a.altlth s/y.altst/e.altm indic/a.alttors. URL: https:/ //a.altpplic/a.alttions./e.altmro.who.int/docs/
 (page [24]) Countr/y.alt_proﬁl/e.alt_2013_EN_15385.pdf
 (page [25]) 72  Djibouti (2014). S/e.altcond N/a.alttion/a.altl Communic/a.alttion to th/e.alt UNFCCC. URL: https:/ /unfccc.int/sit/e.alts/d/e.altf/a.altult/ﬁl/e.alts/r/e.altsourc/e.alt/djinc2.pdf
 (page [25]) 22 CLIMATE RISK COUNTRY PROFILE: DJIBOUTIat risk for coastal zone erosions, speciﬁcally the norther areas of the Gulf of Tadjoura. This is also associated with the dry river-mouths and sedentary coastal plains. Human activities have already degraded coastal areas and ecological habitats along Djibouti’s coastline. These degradations are likely to increase with SLR, the water warming and the increase of its salinity. Figure 16  shows the change in sea level for Djibouti‘s
 (page [25]) coast since 1993.73
 (page [25]) Ad/a.altpt/a.alttion Options
 (page [25]) Djibouti is committed to enhancing the adaptive capacity and resilience of its coastal areas and recognizes that without major efforts, the physical, human and ﬁnancial impacts are expected to be signiﬁcant. In order to address these challenges public authorities have developed an integrated management strategy speciﬁcally for coastal areas; a law establishing land and marine protected areas was presented in 2004. The construction of coastal protection structures should be considered to preserve coastal land and infrastructure. Additional efforts have been made in order to support populations in rural coastal areas to improve resilience and increase appropriate management of marine resources as well as develop ecotourism in the area. Rehabilitation efforts of mangroves are ongoing.75 While coastal protection to sea level rise is often costly, adaptation and mitigation efforts undertaken now are expected to reduce damage and loss in the long-term.76 Efforts should also be made to increase community awareness about the risks of coastal zone erosion, aquifer salinization
 (page [25]) and sea level rise.
 (page [25]) Sea Level Anomaly (mm)
 (page [25]) –25
 (page [25]) 0
 (page [25]) 25
 (page [25]) 50
 (page [25]) 75
 (page [25]) 100
 (page [25]) Year
 (page [25]) Sea Level Anomaly1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 2015FIGURE 16. Sea level anomaly of Djibouti,
 (page [25]) 1993–201574
 (page [25]) 73  App/e.altlquist, L. /a.altnd B/a.altlstrøm, T. (2014). Applic/a.alttion of th/e.alt Co/a.altst/a.altl H/a.alt/z.alt/a.altrd Wh/e.alt/e.altl m/e.altthodolo/g.alt/y.alt for co/a.altst/a.altl multi-h/a.alt/z.alt/a.altrd /a.altss/e.altssm/e.altnts /a.altnd m/a.altn/a.alt/g.alt/e.altm/e.altnt in th/e.alt st/a.altt/e.alt of Djibouti. Clim/a.altt/e.alt Risk M/a.altn/a.alt/g.alt/e.altm/e.altnt. 3(2014). P. 79–95. URL: https:/ /www.sci/e.altnc/e.altdir/e.altct.com/
 (page [25]) sci/e.altnc/e.alt//a.altrticl/e.alt/pii/S2212096314000242
 (page [25]) 74  WBG Clim/a.altt/e.alt Ch/a.altn/g.alt/e.alt Knowl/e.altd/g.alt/e.alt Port/a.altl (CCKP, 2020). Djibouti Imp/a.altcts – S/e.alt/a.alt L/e.altv/e.altl Ris/e.alt. URL: https:/ /clim/a.altt/e.altknowl/e.altd/g.alt/e.altport/a.altl.
 (page [25]) worldb/a.altnk.or/g.alt/countr/y.alt/djibouti/imp/a.altcts-s/e.alt/a.alt-l/e.altv/e.altl-ris/e.alt
 (page [25]) 75  Djibouti (2016). N/a.alttion/a.altll/y.alt D/e.altt/e.altrmin/e.altd Contribution. URL: https:/ /www4.unfccc.int/sit/e.alts/ndcst/a.alt/g.altin/g.alt/Publish/e.altdDocum/e.altnts/
 (page [25]) Djibouti%20First/INDC-Djibouti_ENG.pdf
 (page [25]) 76  Brown, S. /e.altt /a.altl. (2011). S/e.alt/a.alt L/e.altv/e.altl Ris/e.alt /a.altnd Imp/a.altcts in Afric/a.alt. URL: https:/ /www.w/e.alt/a.altd/a.altpt.or/g.alt/sit/e.alts/w/e.alt/a.altd/a.altpt.or/g.alt/ﬁl/e.alts/l/e.alt/g.alt/a.altc/y.alt-n/e.altw/
 (page [26]) pl/a.altc/e.altm/a.altrks/ﬁl/e.alts/536c/e.altc204b2/e.alt/a.alt50585fbd9967d9-s/e.alt/a.alt-l/e.altv/e.altl-ris/e.alt-r/e.altport-j/a.altn-2010.pdf
 (page [26]) (2016)
 (page [26]) (2016)
 (page [26]) (SCAPE) (2015)
 (page [26]) (2014) French
 (page [26]) (2014) French
 (page [26]) (2013) French
 (page [26]) (2002) French
 (page [26]) 23 CLIMATE RISK COUNTRY PROFILE: DJIBOUTIInstitutional Framework for Adaptation Djibouti has taken a proactive stance in its efforts to adapt to climate change and mitigate the effects experienced in Djibouti. Djibouti’s National Climate Change Committee (CNCC) is responsible for climate change related policy, coordination and action. The Secretariat of the CNCC is hosted by the Department of Environment and Sustainable Development, within the Ministry of Housing, Urban Planning and Environment. In 2017 , the CNCC worked to enhance coherence between climate change actions and the countries existing national frameworks as well as to address climate change impacts in the key socio-economic sectors of the country. These efforts are focused on
 (page [26]) six priority areas:
 (page [26]) • Ensuring water access;
 (page [26]) • Promotion of best practices in the agriculture, forestry, ﬁshery and tourism sectors; • Reduce vulnerability to the effects of climate change for the most exposed social, economic or geographic
 (page [26]) sectors;
 (page [26]) • Protect and enhance ecosystems and maintain the services they provide • Ensure the development of sustainable and resilient cities; and • Ensure resilience and sustainability of the country’s key infrastructure.77
 (page [26]) Policy Framework for Adaptation
 (page [26]) Djibouti submitted its Second National Communication in 2014 and its Nationally-Determined Contributions to the UNFCCC in 2016. These strategies also work in parallel with Djibouti’s Vision 2035. The country is committed to increasing its adaptive capacity to climate change and increase sector collaboration, speciﬁcally for water resource management, renewable energy generation and coastal zone protections. To increase its adaptive capacity to projected impacts from climate change, Djibouti is committed to the increased use of renewable energy, capacity building and is in the process of developing a National Strategy for a Green Economy.78
 (page [26]) National Frameworks and Plans
 (page [26]) • Nationally Determined Contributions  (2016)
 (page [26]) • AfDB Country Strategy Paper 2016–2020  (2016) • Strategy of Accelerated Growth and Promotion of Employment  (SCAPE) (2015) • Vision Djibouti 2035  (2014) French • Second National Communication  (2014) French • National Health Development Plan 2013–2017  (2013) French • Initial National Communication  (2002) French
 (page [26]) ADAPTATION
 (page [26]) 77  UNDP (2019). N/a.alttion/a.altl Ad/a.altpt/a.alttion Pl/a.altns in focus: L/e.altssons from Djibouti. URL: https:/ /www./a.altd/a.altpt/a.alttion-undp.or/g.alt/sit/e.alts/d/e.altf/a.altult/
 (page [27]) ﬁl/e.alts/r/e.altsourc/e.alts/n/a.altp_in_focus_l/e.altssons_from_djibouti_/e.altn/g.alt_ﬁn/a.altl_w/e.altb.pdf
 (page [27]) 78  Djibouti (2014). Vision Djibouti 2035. URL: http:/ /www.ccd.dj/w2017/wp-cont/e.altnt/uplo/a.altds/2016/01/Vision-N/a.alttion/a.altl/e.alt.pdf 24 CLIMATE RISK COUNTRY PROFILE: DJIBOUTIRecommendations
 (page [27]) R/e.alts/e.alt/a.altrch G/a.altps
 (page [27]) • Djibouti needs to invest in comprehensive, in-depth risk assess ments across hazards and climate change impacts in order to establish a better understanding of the occurrence and magnitude of climate change events and the related vulnerabilities, development impact, and possible adaptation responses speciﬁcally for water
 (page [27]) resources and sea level rise
 (page [27]) • Water supply, demand and management studies are needed nationwide • Improved cataloging of the ﬁsheries sector is needed to better understand sectoral risks and support local
 (page [27]) livelihoods along coastal zones
 (page [27]) • Djibouti should widen the participation of the public, scientiﬁc institutions, women and local communities in planning and management, accounting for approaches and methods of gender equity • Conduct community-level assessment on hazard risks to improve socio-economic capacity to adapt to climate change impacts and increase community-level resilience • Strengthen environmental and biodiversity monitoring capabilities for more effective environmental resource
 (page [27]) management
 (page [27]) • Increase understanding of impacts to Djibouti’s coastal zones and sea level rise impacts speciﬁcally for port
 (page [27]) infrastructure and tourism sectors79
 (page [27]) D/a.altt/a.alt /a.altnd Inform/a.alttion G/a.altps
 (page [27]) • Develop early warning systems for hydrometeorological phenomena and improved climate risk management, speciﬁcally for sea level rise, water resources and agriculture and livestock impacts • Improve early warning systems speciﬁcally for improved water management techniques and preparedness for
 (page [27]) longer dry seasons
 (page [27]) • Conduct analysis on water transmission infrastructure to determine faults in lines in order to reduce loss during
 (page [27]) transport
 (page [27]) • Engage in technology transfer, speciﬁcally regarding renewable energy and for the construction of geothermal,
 (page [27]) wind or photovoltaic power plant80
 (page [27]) 79  Djibouti (2015). Str/a.altt/e.alt/g.alt/y.alt of Acc/e.altl/e.altr/a.altt/e.altd Growth /a.altnd Promotion of Emplo/y.altm/e.altnt (SCAPE) 2015–2019. URL: https:/ /pl/a.altnipolis.ii/e.altp.
 (page [28]) un/e.altsco.or/g.alt/sit/e.alts/pl/a.altnipolis/ﬁl/e.alts/r/e.altssourc/e.alts/djibouti_sc/a.altp/e.alt-_/a.altn/g.altl/a.altis.pdf
 (page [28]) 80  Djibouti (2014). S/e.altcond N/a.alttion/a.altl Communic/a.alttion to th/e.alt UNFCCC. URL: https:/ /unfccc.int/sit/e.alts/d/e.altf/a.altult/ﬁl/e.alts/r/e.altsourc/e.alt/djinc2.pdf 25 CLIMATE RISK COUNTRY PROFILE: DJIBOUTIInstitution/a.altl G/a.altps • Ensure integration of Djibouti’s National Climate Change Strategy goals support sectoral and regional plans, in line with ﬁnancial opportunities with donors • Develop a national monitoring, reporting and veriﬁcation system • Support facilitation of renewable energy options through i mproved ﬁnancing options and legal backing for
 (page [28]) public-private partnerships
 (page [28]) • Consolidate macroeconomic and budgetary frameworks to determine international restraints and opportunities and potential for further economic investment and growth • Coordinate the collection, analysis and reporting of climate, environmental and economic information across sectors to support integrated solutions and understanding of cross-cutting impacts of climate change • Improve the validation of mechanisms and tools for the continuous evaluation at national, sectoral and
 (page [28]) regional level81
 (page [31]) 81  Djibouti (2015). Str/a.altt/e.alt/g.alt/y.alt of Acc/e.altl/e.altr/a.altt/e.altd Growth /a.altnd Promotion of Emplo/y.altm/e.altnt (SCAPE) 2015–2019. URL: https:/ /pl/a.altnipolis.ii/e.altp.
 (page [31]) un/e.altsco.or/g.alt/sit/e.alts/pl/a.altnipolis/ﬁl/e.alts/r/e.altssourc/e.alts/djibouti_sc/a.altp/e.alt-_/a.altn/g.altl/a.altis.pdf
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 (page [32]) O S
 (page [32]) DJIBOUTI
 (page [32]) CLIMATE RISK COUNTRY PROFILE
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 data/transition_reports/World Bank Climate Change Country Reports/wb_gfdrr_climate_change_country_profile_for_HTI.pdf
 (page [0]) oc | a ©
 (page [0]) GonaïvesGonaïves
 (page [0]) Les CayesLes CayesSaint-MarcSaint-MarcCap-HaïtienCap-Haïtien
 (page [0]) Port-au-PrincePort-au-Prince
 (page [0]) Kilometers50 0 25N
 (page [0]) Key to Map Symbols
 (page [0]) Capital
 (page [0]) City/Town
 (page [0]) Major RoadRiver
 (page [0]) LakeTerrestrial Biomes
 (page [0]) Tropical and Subtropical Dry Broadleaf ForestsTropical and Subtropical Coniferous Forests Tropical and Subtropical Moist Broadleaf Forest
 (page [0]) Flooded Grasslands and SavannasMangroves
 (page [0]) CLIMATE
 (page [0]) ADAPTATIONDISASTER
 (page [0]) RISK
 (page [0]) REDUCTION HAITIVulnerability, Risk Reduction,
 (page [0]) and Adaptation to
 (page [0]) Climate Change
 (page [0]) ENVTeamClimate
 (page [0]) Change Climate
 (page [0]) Investment Funds
 (page [0]) Climate Risk and Adaptation Country Profile April 2011
 (page [1]) 2
 (page [1]) Climate Risk and Adaptation Country Profile Haiti
 (page [1]) COUNTRY OVERVIEW
 (page [1]) Haiti is a small impoverished country occupying the western half of the Island of Hispaniola, which it shares with the Dominican Republic. Haiti’s terrain is dominated by rugged mountains interspersed with river valleys an d coastal flat lands . With its coastline spanning 1,771 km and a population of over 8 million, m uch of this densely populated island resides near the coast. Despite being the first n ation in Latin America to gain independence, Haiti has a long history of poli tical violence and economic imbalance. Haiti ranks 149th out of 182 countries in UNDP’s 2009 Human Development Index and ranks at the top of the Corruption Perception Index.1 Population pressures have led to extreme environmental degradation, with an estimated 98 percent of forests cleared for fuel. These destabilizing forces have left most Hait ian extremely vulnerable to natural disasters. Hurricanes and tropical storms routinely hit Haiti, causing massive flooding and deadly landslides. In January 2010, Haiti was decimated by an unprecedented
 (page [1]) earthquake of magnitude 7.0.
 (page [1]) While Haiti has received a staggering amount of foreign aid and fun ding to develop its economy, to improve basic services, and to rehabilitate its environment, poverty has not subsided.  Compounding dev elopment challenges are the repeated and devastating impacts of natural disasters (hurricanes , flooding, droughts, and earthquakes).  In order to reduce Haiti’s vulnerability to such hazards, adaptation m easures need to be integrated into development planning under the different areas related to water management, agriculture, fish eries, land use, and forestry.
 (page [1]) CLIMATE BASELINE AND CLIMATE FUTURE
 (page [1]) Located in the Caribbean’s Great Antilles, the 27,750 sq km island of Haiti has a hot and humid tropical climate. Daily temperatures typically range between 19:C and  28:C in the winter and 23:C to 33:C during the summer months.  Rainfall varies according to the island’s varied topography,  with the center regions re ceiving more rainfall than the North and West. Northern and windward slopes in the moun tainous regions receive up to three times more precipitation than the leeward side.  Annual precipitation in the  mountains averages 1,200 mm, while the annual precipitation in the lowlands is as low as 550 mm.  The Pl aine du Gonaïves and the eastern part of the Plaine du Cul- de-Sac are the driest regions in the country, where, combined with temperature , evaporation rates are high.2 The island experiences year-round tropical humid conditions and is subject to the variability driven by the El Niño conditions. The wet season is long, particularly in the n orthern and southern regions of the island, with two pronounced peaks occurring between March and November.
 (page [1]) CLIMATE BASELINE
 (page [1]) Major Climate Processes3   Impacts on Climate
 (page [1]) El Niño
 (page [1]) -  Drier and hotter conditions4
 (page [1]) La Niña
 (page [1]) - Colder and wetter conditions
 (page [1]) Sea Level Rise
 (page [1]) Cyclones in the Atlantic
 (page [1]) - Brings heavy rainfall during the wet season
 (page [1]) 1 Transparency International.
 (page [1]) 2 Water Resources Assessment of Haiti. 3 IPCC 4th Assessment Report and UNDP Climate Profiles, Weather and Climate Extremes in a Changing Climate, 2008. US Climate Change Science Program, Synthesis Assessment Product 3.3. 4 El Niño is also known to suppress cyclonic activity in the Atlantic.  Key Sectors
 (page [1]) Agriculture and Food Security
 (page [1]) Coastal Zone Management
 (page [1]) Forestry and Biodiversity
 (page [1]) Water Conservation
 (page [1]) Infrastructure
 (page [1]) Source: Haiti Plan d’Action National
 (page [1]) d’Adaptation (PANA) , 2006.
 (page [2]) Mean Annual Temperature
 (page [2]) Temperature
 (page [2]) in Celcius
 (page [2]) 30+
 (page [2]) 25
 (page [2]) 20
 (page [2]) d Precipitation
 (page [2]) in millimeters
 (page [2]) 10,000+
 (page [2]) 4
 (page [2]) 3
 (page [2]) Climate Risk and Adaptation Country Profile Haiti
 (page [2]) Figure 1: Climate baseline for Haiti
 (page [3]) 4
 (page [3]) Climate Risk and Adaptation Country Profile Haiti
 (page [3]) Climate baseline summary for Haiti (since 1960):5,6 Mean temperatures have increased by 0.45 °C, with warming most rapid in the warmest seasons (June-
 (page [3]) November).
 (page [3]) The frequency of hot days7 and hot nights8 increased by 63 and 48 days per year, respectively, between
 (page [3]) 1960 and 2003.
 (page [3]) The frequency of cold days and cold nights9 has decreased steadily since 1960. Mean annual rainfall has decreased by 5 mm per month per decade since 1960. The intensity of Atlantic hurricanes has increased substantially since 1980.10
 (page [3]) CLIMATE FUTURE
 (page [3]) Climate change summary for Haiti11:
 (page [3]) Temperatures are expected to increase by 0.5 to 2.3 °C by 206012, with warming most rapid in December-
 (page [3]) February.
 (page [3]) The number of hot days and nights are projected to increase throughout the coun try. The number of cold nights  is projected to steadily decrease or become rare. Rainfall projections project decreases in rainfall during June-August,  while rainfall projections during the remainder of the year are less certain. According to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change’s Fourth Assessm ent Report, the Caribbean is vulnerable to sea-level rise, which is projected to be between 0.13 and  0.56 m by 2090.13 The future intensity and frequency of hurricanes in the Atlantic ar e still a subject of research, but according to the US Climate Change Science Program, increases in hurricane rain fall and wind speeds are likely, with simulations showing that for each 1°C increase in s ea surface temperatures, core rainfall may increase by 6-17% and surface wind speeds of the strongest hurricanes will increase between 1- 8%9, with associated increases in storm surge levels. CLIMATE CHANGE IMPACTS ON NATURAL HAZARD VULNERABILITY
 (page [3]) AT A GLANCE
 (page [3]) Haiti’s geographic location, in the path of Atlantic hurricanes combined w ith the steep topography of its western region, from which all major river systems flow to the coast, makes the  country particularly vulnerable to
 (page [3]) 5 IPCC 4th Assessment Report and UNDP Climate Profile for the Dominican Republic. 6 World Bank Climate Change Knowledge Portal, UNDP Climate profile for the Domi nican Republic. 7 Hot days are defined as the temperature exceeded on 10% of days in the current  climate of that region and season. 8 Hot nights are defined as the temperature exceeded on 10% of nights in the curr ent climate of that region and season. 9 Cold nights are defined as the temperature below which 10% of nights are recorded i n the current climate of that region or season. 10 Weather and Climate Extremes in a Changing Climate, 2008.  US Climate Change Science P rogram, Synthesis Assessment Product 3.3.
 (page [3]) 11 Ibid, note 6.
 (page [3]) 12 Haiti’s First National Communication . 13 Christensen et al. (2007) IPCC Working Group I Report: ‘The Physical Science Basis’ , Chapter 11 (Regional Climate projections): Sections 11.6 (South and Central America), and 11.9 (Small Islands).
 (page [4]) Physical Exposure to Flooding Estimate Risk Index for Tropical Cyclone Hazard
 (page [4]) | Annual number of people
 (page [4]) exposed
 (page [4]) mm <2 —S
 (page [4]) M3 -9
 (page [4]) Mi 10 - 50
 (page [4]) MB 51 - 317
 (page [4]) (318 - 2,032
 (page [4]) (9) 2,033 - 13,040
 (page [4]) MB 13,041- 80,000+
 (page [4]) Estimate of Drought Annual Repartition based on SPI
 (page [4]) sli ae
 (page [4]) people expose Se
 (page [4]) mm <2
 (page [4]) 2-3
 (page [4]) Mi 4-17
 (page [4]) MM 18 - 112
 (page [4]) (1) 113 - 758
 (page [4]) (MB 759 - 5,160
 (page [4]) MM 5,161 - 35,000+
 (page [4]) Hazard
 (page [4]) Risk Index
 (page [4]) 10 High ‘ ; —as
 (page [4]) Risk of Landslide Hazard
 (page [4]) Hazard
 (page [4]) | Risk Index oe
 (page [4]) 10 High
 (page [4]) Port-au-Prince
 (page [4]) 5
 (page [4]) Climate Risk and Adaptation Country Profile Haiti hydrometeorological disasters, especially between June and December. La ndslides are common along all river valleys, where years of deforestation have left the upper reaches of the western basins bare.
 (page [4]) Figure 1: Exposure to climate-related hazards across Haiti14
 (page [4]) Hurricanes —Over the past 30 years, Haiti has been hit by six hurricanes, and w hile most of this small island nation is affected, the West and South Departments lie in the path o f the strongest hurricanes15. Impacts from cyclones range across the whole spectrum, including loss o f life, livestock, destruction of agricultural lands, erosion, river siltation, increased incidence of water-borne  diseases, and famine.
 (page [4]) 14 UNEP Global Risk Identification Programme (GRIP), www.gripweb.org. 15 Hurricane Mitch, which hit the country in 1998, had a damaging impact o n between 15 and 20% of crops, 80% of banana plantations and 100,000 small livestock, according to FAO . The storms affecting Haiti in recent years have led to agricultur al losses totaling US$ 61 million countrywide, resulting in reduced food production. According to the  Ministry of Agriculture, Natural Resources, and Rural Developm ent, the storm resulted in the loss of approximately 3% of total livestock in the country, representing around 100,000 livestock.
 (page [5]) 6
 (page [5]) Climate Risk and Adaptation Country Profile Haiti Floods and Storms —Floods are the leading factor of vulnerability in Haiti.
 (page [5]) The country’s  most populated cities
 (page [5]) are all nestled in the valleys along the coast.  When it rains, the steep, often barren hills that surround them flush
 (page [5]) rainwater toward the urban areas.
 (page [5]) Widespread deforestation in the
 (page [5]) upper reaches of  these  valleys,
 (page [5]) coupled  with  lacking  drainage
 (page [5]) infrastructure,   creates an
 (page [5]) environment  conducive  to flooding.
 (page [5]) The capital city of Port- au-Prince is
 (page [5]) particularly vulnerable, with a large
 (page [5]) portion of its inhabitants residing on
 (page [5]) flood plains in poorly constructed
 (page [5]) housing.  Waste management is
 (page [5]) under-developed, leading to increased
 (page [5]) risk from water-borne diseases.16
 (page [5]) Landslides —High deforestation rates, coupled with intense rainfall, make lands lides commonplace and particularly dangerous in the steep sloping lands. Drought —The North-West, Artibonite, North-East, and Centr al departments frequently experience repeated droughts, brought about by a combination of erratic rainfall pat terns coupled with a limited water management infrastructure.17  Droughts have destroyed crops, reduced agricultural production,
 (page [5]) and decreased food security.
 (page [5]) 16 Water Resources Assessment of Haiti, US Army. 17 Haiti Plan d’Action National d’Adaptation (PANA) 2006 . 18 Weather and Climate Extremes in a Changing Climate, North America, Hawaii, Car ibbean and US Pacific Islands, US Climate Change Science Program, Synthesis and Assessment Product 3.3, June 2008. 19 Nature, 4 Sept 2008: The increasing intensity of the strongest tropical cycl ones.  Implications for Disaster Risk Management Missing or poorly managed water infrastructure makes the agricultural region s and hence, the livelihoods that depend on them, particularly vulnerable to a changing climate.  More erratic and unpredictable rainfall patterns will place greater strain on planting choices and ti ming. Projected increases in temperature, coupled with decreases in rainfall du ring the critical summer months (June-August), are likely to intensify drought conditions in the center of the country.  Building resilience in the farming sector to address increased evapotranspirat ion and water scarcity during these months will be critical to efforts to support food security. Increased hurricane intensity as a product of climate change under future cl imate conditions is still a matter of debate among the scientific community. Nevertheless, according to the Intergovernmental Panel’s Fourth Assessment Report, incre ased hurricane wind intensities (5-10% by 2050) are likely, with core precipitation increases of 25%.18,19 Increased wind and rainfall intensities are likely to lead to higher
 (page [5]) and more violent storm surges.
 (page [5]) An effective early warning system to warn and prepare farmers to confront extreme weather events could reduce the impacts of these weather shocks in the farming system. Figure 3: Reported natural disaster distribution in Haiti Source: EM-DAT- Source of data: "EM-DAT: The OFDA/ CRED International Disaster Database, Université Catholique de Louvain, Brussels, Bel ."  Data version: v11.08 .  Drought
 (page [5]) 6%Epidemic
 (page [5]) 1%
 (page [5]) Flood
 (page [5]) 53%
 (page [5]) Landslides
 (page [5]) 1%Storm
 (page [6]) 39%
 (page [6]) 7
 (page [6]) Climate Risk and Adaptation Country Profile Haiti
 (page [6]) SECTORAL CLIMATE RISK REDUCTION RECOMMENDATIONS
 (page [6]) AGRICULTURE
 (page [6]) Haiti ’s economy is based primarily on agriculture, which employ s 66 % of the work force and contributes 27% of the GDP.  Coffee, rope fiber (jute), sugar, and cocoa are the principal exp ort crops grown.20  Food security relies heavily on rainfed, subsistence farming.  Poor farming practice s have degraded a majority of the arable country- side, leading to severe erosion.  Since 1980, agricultural yields have remained stagnant, despite significant increases in land and labor resources allocated to agricultural prod uction.  International food aid has also significantly increased and is required in every season to meet the population’s caloric demands .21    While disasters like hurricanes are hardly new to Haiti, the frequency, m agnitude, and harmful impacts of these storms are expected to increase ; when these weather systems hit land, they wreak havoc on Haiti’s already fragile farms, deforested mountainsides, and eroding critical soil. An eff ective early warning system to warn and prepare farmers to confront extreme weather events could reduce the impacts of these weather shocks on the
 (page [6]) farming system.
 (page [6]) As Haiti’s climate grows increasingly warmer and drier, particularly during the critical summer months, agricultural practices will need to be adjusted for the land to remain productive.   New tools are required by all segments of the population to address the surmounting challenge  of increasing agricultural outputs in the face of a changing climate.   To prevent potentially devastating yield losses, farmers, extensi on agents, and politicians will need guidance on how to restore soil quality and ecosystem  integrity. Priority adaptations include: planting drought-resistant seeds, growing crops in suitable land to prevent d epletion of soil nutrients, raising awareness of land conservation practices, developing a seed bank of drought-resi stant and high-temperature tolerant varieties, installing rainwater-harvesting tanks, improving irrigation  systems, and establishing a weather surveillance system aimed at providing farmers with an early warning of droughts and fires. 22  In fact, as indicated in the figure 3, a reliable irrigation system, coupled w ith improved input management, is an opportunity to increase yields of crops managed under one or both o f these practices.   In order to avoid mal- adaptation, these new activities would need to be coupled with soil conservation and reforestation practices to prevent any further degradation and to restore soil health at the farm level.
 (page [6]) WATER
 (page [6]) Haiti relies on rain water to meet a majority of its water needs.  The country’s 11 main drainage basins provide Haiti’s water supply and are themselves  fed by a variety of interweaving streams carrying fresh water down from the mountains.  The intermittent streams of these systems, p articularly on the windward mountain slopes, are vulnerable to rainfall-induced flash floods durin g the rainy season.  Roughly 92% of the country’s agriculture is rainfed, and the bulk of a existing irrigation infras tructure li es in disrepair and/or was severely damaged by the 2010 earthquake.   The potential irrigable area is more than double the current irrigated are a, and small irrigation schemes, which take advantage of rainwater-harvesti ng structures, could offer great potential for yield sustainability, particularly for rural subsistence farmers. Projected increases in future temperature, coupled with unreliable rain fall patterns (particularly during the summer months), will necessitate the establishment of an eff icient water management system in order to secure a reliable water source and prevent future shortages.  As prev iously noted, one solution to reducing the vulnerability of the critical agriculture sector is to expand and r enovate the country’s aging irrigation system.
 (page [6, 7]) 20 Water Resource Assessment of Haiti. 21 FAO Aquasat Country Profile for Haiti 2000, http://www.fao.org/nr/water/aquastat/countries/haiti/index.stm . 22 Haiti’s Plan d’Action National d’Adaptation (P ANA) 2006.
 (page [7]) =
 (page [7]) Low input, irrigated
 (page [7]) a
 (page [7]) High Input, irrigated
 (page [7]) 150 -100 -50 ®@ 2080s
 (page [7]) 2050s
 (page [7]) 2020s
 (page [7]) er =   2080s
 (page [7]) 2050s
 (page [7]) 2020s
 (page [7]) High Input. irigated
 (page [7]) -100—_ -80 -60 40 89-20 0 20
 (page [7]) Low input,
 (page [7]) @ 2080s
 (page [7]) 2050s
 (page [7]) 2020s
 (page [7]) High input, Irrigated
 (page [7]) -80 40 40 -20 0 20
 (page [7]) 8
 (page [7]) Climate Risk and Adaptation Country Profile Haiti
 (page [7]) Figure 3: Projected yield (%) changes for the “best” cereal in the region in  2020, 2050, and 2080 as compared to the
 (page [7]) period 1970- 199923
 (page [7]) Other stressors that characterize local impact and vulnerability  to climate change Poor quality of housing, transportation networks, communication infrastru cture, and access to health services all exacerbate Haiti’s vulnerability to natural disasters and climate change : Poverty —Haiti is considered by many economic indicators to be the poores t nation in the world. Roughly 80 percent of its population lives below the international poverty line and lacks access to safe drinking water, health care services, and sanitation.
 (page [7]) 23World Bank Climate Change Portal (sdwebx.worldbank.org/climateportal). Data from IIAS A,
 (page [8]) http://sdwebx.worldbank.org/climateportal/doc/Agr_metadata.pdf.
 (page [8]) 9
 (page [8]) Climate Risk and Adaptation Country Profile Haiti Health —Health facilities are largely concentrated in the capital of Port- au-Prince, yet 60% of the population lives in rural areas.  Half of the population can be categorized as ‘food insecure’ and less than half have access to clean water.  Malnutrition and the spread of water -borne diseases during floods pose a significant threat to the country’s population . EXISTING ADAPTATION FRAMEWORK /STRATEGY /POLICY AND INSTITUTIONAL SETUP A sample of the institutions working on climate change adaptation in Haiti is listed in the matrix below:
 (page [8]) Name  Area of Work
 (page [8]) Governmental
 (page [8]) Ministry of Agriculture, Natural
 (page [8]) Resources and Rural Development
 (page [8]) (MARNDR) Promotes agriculture, rural development, conservation and utilization of natural resources; this includes irrigation and drainage.
 (page [8]) Ministry of Interior and Territorial
 (page [8]) Collectives (MICT) Implemented the Natural Risk Disaster Plan (PUGRD) that outlines the roles and responsibilities of government officials at all levels.
 (page [8]) Directorate of Natural Resources
 (page [8]) (DIA) Responsible for soil and forest management. Ministry of the Environment (MDE) Environmental protection authority.  Manages Haiti’s National Agricultu ral Investment Plan —a large-scale project ($772 million) to reconstruct and develop the a gricultural sector.  It focuses on supporting small-scale farmers, sustainable natural resource
 (page [8]) management, and improving food security.
 (page [8]) International
 (page [8]) Lambi Fund of Haiti Provides financial resources, training, and technical assistance to rural communi ties; programs focus on sustainable development, animal husbandry, restoring
 (page [8]) environmental integrity, and reforestation.
 (page [8]) Oxfam Supports agricultural development programs.
 (page [8]) Regional
 (page [8]) Caribbean Community Climate
 (page [8]) Change Center Established in August 2005 as the official coordinating body of the  Caribbean response to climate change. It is the official repository for regional climate ch ange data, providing climate change-related policy advice to the Caribbean Co mmunity
 (page [8]) (CARICOM) member states.
 (page [8]) Caribbean Disaster Emergency
 (page [8]) Response Agency Conducts projects and builds states’ capacity in comprehensive disaster management, vulnerability assessments, community disaster preparedness, and h azard mitigation
 (page [8]) among others.
 (page [8]) Association of Caribbean States Coordinates various projects on disaster preparedness and relief with own and d onor funding, e.g., a Database of Financial Mechanisms for Disasters (a list of all organizations that provide reimbursable and non-reimbursable post-disa ster funding), a Radio Soap Opera on Natural Disasters in the Caribbean , and  assistance to member states in creating National Post-Disaster Funds 9.
 (page [8]) NGOs
 (page [8]) Floresta An NGO working to reverse deforestation and poverty. In Haiti they have establishe d a program where participants have planted 24,318 trees in reforestation projects. Furthermore, 42 miles of anti-erosion barriers and 1036 ravines were constructed to control soil erosion on otherwise vulnerable hillsides, and 674 compos t piles were established, providing healthy organic soil to use as fertilizer for farms and famil y
 (page [8]) gardens.
 (page [8, 9]) Haiti is highly prone to large-scale natural disasters, such as hurricane s, floods, earthquakes, and droughts. Population growth, poverty, environmental degradation, inadequate infras tructure, and a large agricultural sector create and exacerbate the vulnerability of Haiti. Changes in soil quality and rain-storm frequency have already forced farmers to change their methods, but much more is required.   Without doubt the reconstruction and sanitation efforts put in place after the devastating 2010 earthquakes are  of utmost priority in the current
 (page [9]) 10
 (page [9]) Climate Risk and Adaptation Country Profile Haiti
 (page [9]) development framework, but many of
 (page [9]) these efforts themselves will be more sustainable in the long term if climate
 (page [9]) change considerations are
 (page [9]) mainstreamed.  The following are
 (page [9]) examples of strategic institutional gaps
 (page [9]) in the country, for which a
 (page [9]) mainstreaming agenda would be key:
 (page [9]) Address soil erosion and
 (page [9]) damaging floods and
 (page [9]) landslides by strongly
 (page [9]) promoting reforestation
 (page [9]) initiatives, particularly in the
 (page [9]) valleys and streams feeding
 (page [9]) Port- au-Prince, Saint-Marc,
 (page [9]) and Gonaïves where damages
 (page [9]) are substantial.
 (page [9]) Secure livelihoods by
 (page [9]) mainstreaming disaster risk
 (page [9]) management activities into all
 (page [9]) agricultural interventions,
 (page [9]) offering guidance and tools for
 (page [9]) local farmers to turn the tide on land degradation and to engage in sustainable practices, such as the planting of appropriate crops for steep sloped land, particularly arou nd Cap-Haïtien, Fort-Liberite, and the
 (page [9]) basin of the Artibonito.24
 (page [9]) Promote livelihood diversification, particularly in the lowland pl ains where monocultures dominate and where significant malnutrition levels exist, including the areas arou nd Les Cayes, Saint-Marc and
 (page [9]) Gonaïves, and Cap- Haïtien.
 (page [9]) Improve irrigation infrastructure to principal agricultural areas, including east an d west of Port- au-Prince,
 (page [9]) Saint-March, and Gonaïves.
 (page [9]) RESEARCH , DATA, AND INFORMATION GAPS Haiti’s  status as a developing country dependent mainly on agriculture and sus ceptible to a wide variety of natural disasters makes it particularly susceptible to the effects of climate  change.   Added to this is the fact that like most other developing countries, Haiti lacks the requisite monitoring syste ms to understand the dynamics of dangerous climate systems, thus making the task of developing short-term re sponse or disaster mitigation strategies extremely difficult.   Clearly, addressing the impact of the 2010 earthquake is a high priority  activity for the country. However, the opportunity to mainstream climate resilient developm ent under the reconstruction effort is itself an opportunity in adaptation . However, significant challenges in data and research need to be addre ssed in order to climate proof these activities. A proactive approach to address the im pacts of climate variability and change is to reduce the sources of current vulnerability to natural hazards.  Mon itoring, early warning, and response mechanisms need to be integrated as outlined in the adaptation prioritie s noted above.
 (page [9]) 24 Haiti: A gathering storm, Climate Change and Poverty, 2009.  Oxfam International.  Priority Adaptation Sectors and Activities
 (page [9]) Sector Proposed Activities
 (page [9]) Water Management  Construct community cisterns, build new dams, reduce sedimentation, rehabilitate water points (i.e. wells), increase quantity and quality of ground water reserves, increase technical capacity and establish a network of observational points, improve drainage channels, and repair aging public
 (page [9]) water system.
 (page [9]) Agriculture Develop and conserve fertile lands, improve irrigation and water storage (tanks), promote
 (page [9]) resistant crop varieties, integrate appropriate
 (page [9]) technologies, and promote low-impact crops in areas of low fertility, access to micro credits, community associations, and weather early warning
 (page [9]) systems.
 (page [9]) Fisheries Establish an assistance fund, forbid unregulated construction in high-risk areas especially near the
 (page [9]) coast, construct protective barriers, harbor
 (page [9]) constructions, and modernize tackle.
 (page [10]) Biodiversity Monitoring and long-term ecological research. Source: Haiti’s Plan d’Action National d’Adaptation (PANA) 2006
 (page [10]) J J J J |
 (page [10]) 11
 (page [10]) Climate Risk and Adaptation Country Profile Haiti
 (page [10]) RESEARCH GAPS
 (page [10]) Addressing deforestation and the success of reforestation projects w ill both be dependent on finding alternative sources of fuel for a growing population.  Research must be focused on alternative fuel sources, including fast growing crops and the regulation of charcoal producti on, to restore the forest
 (page [10]) cover balance in the country.
 (page [10]) Livelihood diversification is central to the reduction of Haiti’s  vulnerability.  Research and trials are needed to explore sustainable livelihood strategies that can be up -scaled by regions.   Priority regions need to be identified, as for example, in the requirement for ap propriate crops for steeply sloped land in Cap-Haïtien, Fort-Liberite, and the basin of the Artibonito. As noted above, the potential irrigable area is more than double the current irrigated area, and small irrigation schemes, which take advantage of rainwater-harvesting structures,  could offer great potential for yield sustainability, particularly for rural subsistence farme rs.   Identification of priority areas for these investments should be based on current vulnerability assessments , which are themselves lacking. A needs assessment for irrigation infrastructure, particularly for the agri cultural areas in east and west of Port- au-Prince, Saint-March, and Gonaïves, is required.
 (page [10]) DATA AND INFORMATION GAPS
 (page [10]) Downscaled climate information is available in Haiti from the Caribb ean Climate Change Centre in the form of the PRECIS model (UK Met Office), but this information has not been applied to the study of future impacts on the agriculture and water sectors.  These efforts need to be supported a nd the information emerging from these studies disseminated in usable form to th e development community . A timely early warning system, including the installation of weath er stations in key basins is needed. Although several weather stations are actively collecting weather data across Haiti, the country’s varied topography means that many critical regions are left uncovered.  For example,  no meteorological stations exist on the upper reaches of the Artibonito basin, which severely limits the utility of modeled river flows under a changing climate.  Additional analyses are needed to identify critical m onitoring points to secure a
 (page [10]) timely response.
 (page [10]) Awareness-raising and extension activities need to be focused o n providing  agricultural interventions, offering guidance and tools for local farmers to turn the tide on land degradation and to engage in sustainable practices, such as the planting of appropriate crops fo r steep sloped land, particularly around Cap-Haïtien, Fort-Liberite, and the basin of the Artibonito.
 (page [11]) ~) GFDRR
 (page [11]) HAITIMozambique
 (page [11]) © 2011 THE WORLD BANK GROUP
 (page [11]) 1818 H Street, NW
 (page [11]) Washington, DC  20433
 (page [11]) Internet:  www.worldbank.org
 (page [11]) Contact:  Milen Dyoulgerov,
 (page [11]) [email protected]
 (page [11]) All rights reserved.This volume is a product of the World Bank Group. The World Bank Group does not guarantee the accuracy of the data in - cluded in this work. The boundaries, colors, denominations, and other information shown on any map in this work do not imply any judgement on the part of the World Bank Group concerning the legal status of any territory or the endorsement
 (page [11]) or acceptance of such boundaries.
 (page [11]) Climate Risk and Adaptation Country Profile This Country Profile (http://countryadaptationprofiles.gfdrr.org)  is part of a series of 49 priority country briefs developed by the Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery (GFDRR) and the Global Support Program of the Climate Investment Funds (CIF). The profile synthesizes most relevant data and information for Disaster Risk Reduction and Adaptation to Climate Change and is designed as a quick reference source for development practitioners to better integrate climate resilience in development planning and operations. Sources on climate and climate-related information are linked through the country profile’s online dashboard, which is periodically updated to reflect the most recent publicly available climate analysis. Acknowledgments: The Country Profiles were produced through a partnership between the Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery, the Global Support Program of the Climate Investment Funds, and the Climate Change Team of the Environment Department of the World Bank, by a joint task team led by Milen Dyoulgerov (TTL), Ana Bucher (co-TTL), Fernanda Zermoglio, and Claudio Forner. Additional support was provided by Sarah Antos, Michael Swain, Carina Bachofen, Fareeha Iqbal, Iretomiwa Olatunji, Francesca Fusaro, Marilia Magalhaes, Habiba Gitay, Laura-Susan Shuford, Catherine Nakalembe, Manisha Ganeshan, Roshani Dangi, Anupam Anand and Li Xu. IT, GIS, and map production support was provided by Varuna Somaweera, Katie McWilliams, and Alex Stoicof from the Sustain - able Development Network Information Systems Unit (SDNIS). Jim Cantrell provided design. The team is grateful for all comments and suggestions received from the regional and country specialists on disaster risk management and climate change.
 (page [11]) ENVTeamClimate
 (page [12]) Change Climate
 (page [12]) Investment Funds
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 pages: 12
 path: data/transition_reports/World Bank Climate Change Country Reports/wb_gfdrr_climate_change_country_profile_for_HTI.pdf
 author: None
 title: None
 creatione date: 2011-06-17 18:11:25-04:00



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 data/transition_reports/World Bank Climate Change Country Reports/15932-WB_South Africa Country Profile-WEB.pdf
 (page [0]) SOUTH AFRICA
 (page [0]) CLIMATE RISK COUNTRY PROFILE
 (page [1]) na” June 2%, 2017 7 via Flickr, Creative ng frull frees” August 13, 2007 via Flickr, Creative
 (page [1]) , Reisterstown, MD.
 (page [1]) ii CLIMATE RISK COUNTRY PROFILE: SOUTH AFRICACOPYRIGHT © 2021 by the World Bank Group 1818 H Street NW, Washington, DC 20433
 (page [1]) Telephone: 202-473-1000; Internet: www.worldbank.org
 (page [1]) This work is a product of the staff of the World Bank Group (WBG) and with external contributions. The opinions, ﬁndings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this work are those of the authors and do not necessarily reﬂect the views or the ofﬁcial policy or position of the WBG, its Board of Executive Directors, or the governments it represents. The WBG does not guarantee the accuracy of the data included in this work and do not make any warranty, express or implied, nor assume any liability or responsibility for any consequence of their use. This publication follows the WBG’s practice in references to member designations, borders, and maps. The boundaries, colors, denominations, and other information shown on any map in this work, or the use of the term “country” do not imply any judgment on the part of the WBG, its Boards, or the governments it represents, concerning the legal status of any territory or geographic area or the endorsement or acceptance
 (page [1]) of such boundaries.
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 (page [1]) RIGHTS AND PERMISSIONS
 (page [1]) The material in this work is subject to copyright. Because the WBG encourages dissemination of its knowledge, this work may be reproduced, in whole or in part, for noncommercial purposes as long as full attribution to this work is given. Please cite the work as follows: Climate Risk Proﬁle: South Africa (2021): The World Bank Group. Any queries on rights and licenses, including subsidiary rights, should be addressed to World Bank Publications, The World Bank Group, 1818 H Street NW, Washington, DC 20433, USA; fax: 202-522-2625; e-mail: [email protected] . Cover Photos:  © John Hogg/World Bank, “ Hout Bay, Cape Town Western Cape, South Africa ” June 28, 2011 via Flickr, Creative Commons CC BY-NC-ND 2.0. © Trevor Samson/World Bank, “ Worker pruning fruit trees ” August 13, 2007 via Flickr, Creative
 (page [1]) Commons CC BY-NC-ND 2.0.
 (page [1, 2]) Graphic Design:  Circle Graphics, Inc. , Reisterstown, MD. iii CLIMATE RISK COUNTRY PROFILE: SOUTH AFRICAACKNOWLEDGEMENTS This proﬁle is part of a series of Climate Risk Country Proﬁles developed by the World Bank Group (WBG). The country proﬁle synthesizes most relevant data and information on climate change, disaster risk reduction, and adaptation actions and policies at the country level. The country proﬁle series are designed as a quick reference source for development practitioners to better integrate climate resilience in development planning and policy making. This effort is managed and led by Veronique Morin (Senior Climate Change Specialist, WBG) and Ana E. Bucher (Senior Climate Change Specialist, WBG). This proﬁle was written by MacKenzie Dove (Senior Climate Change Consultant, WBG). Additional support was provided by Yunziyi Lang (Climate Change Analyst, WBG), Fernanda Zermoglio (Senior Climate Change Consultant, WBG), Jason Johnston (Operations Analyst, WBG) and Megumi Sato (Junior Professional Ofﬁcer, WBG). Climate and climate-related information is largely drawn from the Climate Change Knowledge Portal (CCKP) , a WBG online platform with available global climate data and analysis based on the latest Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) reports and datasets. The team is grateful for all comments and suggestions received from the sector, regional, and country development specialists, as well as climate research scientists and institutions for their advice and guidance on use of climate
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 (page [3]) iv CLIMATE RISK COUNTRY PROFILE: SOUTH AFRICAFOREWORD .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 1 COUNTRY OVERVIEW  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 2 CLIMATOLOGY   .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 4 Clim/a.altt/e.alt B/a.alts/e.altlin/e.alt  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 4 Ov/e.altrvi/e.altw  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 4 K/e.alt/y.alt Tr/e.altnds   .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 6 Clim/a.altt/e.alt Futur/e.alt  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 7 Summ/a.altr/y.alt St/a.alttistics  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 7 K/e.alt/y.alt Tr/e.altnds   .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 9 CLIMATE RELATED NATURAL HAZARDS  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  10 Ov/e.altrvi/e.altw   .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  10 K/e.alt/y.alt Tr/e.altnds .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  12 Implic/a.alttions for DRM  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  13 CLIMATE CHANGE IMPACTS TO KEY SECTORS  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  14 A/g.altricultur/e.alt   .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  14 W/a.altt/e.altr .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  16 En/e.altr/g.alt/y.alt   .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  19 H/e.alt/a.altlth .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 20 ADAPTATION .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  23 Institution/a.altl Fr/a.altm/e.altwork for Ad/a.altpt/a.alttion .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 23 Polic/y.alt Fr/a.altm/e.altwork for Ad/a.altpt/a.alttion   .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 23 R/e.altcomm/e.altnd/a.alttions .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  24 R/e.alts/e.alt/a.altrch G/a.altps .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 24 D/a.altt/a.alt /a.altnd Inform/a.alttion G/a.altps  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  24 Institution/a.altl G/a.altps  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  24
 (page [3]) CONTENTS
 (page [4]) 1 CLIMATE RISK COUNTRY PROFILE: SOUTH AFRICA Climate change is a major risk to good development outcomes, and the World Bank Group is committed to playing an important role in helping countries integrate climate action into their core development agendas. The World Bank Group is committed to supporting client countries to invest in and build a low-carbon, climate-resilient future, helping them to be better prepared to adapt to current and future climate impacts. The World Bank Group is investing in incorporating and systematically managing climate risks in development operations through its individual corporate commitments. A key aspect of the World Bank Group’s Action Plan on Adaptation and Resilience (2019) is to help countries shift from addressing adaptation as an incremental cost and isolated investment to systematically incorporating climate risks and opportunities at every phase of policy planning, investment design, implementation and evaluation of development outcomes. For all IDA and IBRD operations, climate and disaster risk screening is one of the mandatory corporate climate commitments. This is supported by the Bank Group’s Climate and Disaster Risk Screening Tool which enables all Bank staff to assess short- and long-term climate and disaster risks in operations and national or sectoral planning processes. This screening tool draws up-to-date and relevant information from the World Bank’s Climate Change Knowledge Portal, a comprehensive online ‘one-stop shop’ for global, regional, and country data related to climate change and development. Recognizing the value of consistent, easy-to-use technical resources for client countries as well as to support respective internal climate risk assessment and adaptation planning processes, the World Bank Group’s Climate Change Group has developed this content. Standardizing and pooling expertise facilitates the World Bank Group in conducting initial assessments of climate risks and opportunities across sectors within a country, within institutional portfolios across regions, and acts as a global resource for development practitioners. For developing countries, the climate risk proﬁles are intended to serve as public goods to facilitate upstream country diagnostics, policy dialogue, and strategic planning by providing comprehensive overviews of trends and projected changes in key climate parameters, sector-speciﬁc implications, relevant policies and programs, adaptation priorities and opportunities for further actions. It is my hope that these efforts will spur deepening of long-term risk management in developing countries and our engagement in supporting climate change adaptation planning at operational levels.
 (page [4]) Bernice Van Bronkhorst
 (page [4]) Global Director
 (page [4]) Climate Change Group (CCG)
 (page [4]) The World Bank Group (WBG)
 (page [5]) FOREWORD
 (page [5]) -Natal
 (page [5]) m
 (page [5]) ure 1). Nearly one-fifth of
 (page [5]) tral buffers i Namibia,
 (page [5]) * National capital
 (page [5]) 2 CLIMATE RISK COUNTRY PROFILE: SOUTH AFRICA
 (page [5]) COUNTRY OVERVIEW
 (page [5]) The Republic of South Africa, located in the southern tip of Africa, shares borders with six countries: Namibia, Botswana, Zimbabwe, Mozambique, eSwatini, and Lesotho (the last of which is landlocked by the South African territory). The country’s coastline is extensive, approximately 3,000 kilometers (km) long, and starts at the Mozambican border in the east to the Namibian border in the west. The Indian Ocean lies on the eastern coast of South Africa and the Atlantic Ocean on the western coast, with the two oceans meeting at the country’s southernmost point, Cape Agulhus. South Africa’s land area totals 1,219,602 km2. The Great Escarpment is the country’s most prominent and continuous relief feature. This divides the country into four distinct regions: the interior plateau, the eastern plateau slopes, the Cape Fold belt, and the western plateau slopes. The interior plateau lies at approximately 1,200 meters (m) above sea level and extends from the Kalahari Desert in the west, to the grasslands in the east and the semi-arid Karoo in the south. The Great Escarpment comprises the Roggeveld Scarp in the south west, which sits at an elevation of 1,500 m above sea level and the KwaZulu-Natal Drakensberg in the east, with an elevation of 3,482 m above sea level ( Figure 1 ). Nearly one-ﬁfth of the extensive coast has some form of development within 100 m of the shoreline, where natural buffers against storm surges and rising seas have been degraded. As a result, people and property are at risk to storm surges, and the impacts of climate change.1 South Africa is an upper middle-income country, with a relatively stable political environment. In 2020, it had a population of 59.3 million people, with an annual population growth rate of 1.3%. The country’s population is projected to reach 66.4 million people by 2030 and 72.8 million people by 2050. Over two-thirds of the current population resides in urban areas, a rate expected to increase to 72% and 80% by 2030 and 2050, respectively.3 The country has a Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of US$301.9 billion (2020), experiencing an annual growth rate of 0.2% in 1 D/e.altp/a.altrtm/e.altnt of Environm/e.altnt/a.altl Aﬀ/a.altirs (2018). South Afric/a.alt’s Third N/a.alttion/a.altl Communic/a.alttion und/e.altr th/e.alt Unit/e.altd N/a.alttions Fr/a.altm/e.altwork Conv/e.altntion on Clim/a.altt/e.alt Ch/a.altn/g.alt/e.alt. URL: https:/ /unfccc.int/sit/e.alts/d/e.altf/a.altult/ﬁl/e.alts/r/e.altsourc/e.alt/South%20Afric/a.altn%20TNC%20R/e.altport%20%20
 (page [5]) to%20th/e.alt%20UNFCCC_31%20Au/g.alt.pdf
 (page [5]) 2 World B/a.altnk (2019). Int/e.altrn/a.altl Clim/a.altt/e.alt Mi/g.altr/a.alttion Proﬁl/e.alt – South Afric/a.alt. 3 World B/a.altnk Op/e.altn D/a.altt/a.alt, D/a.altt/a.alt R/e.alttri/e.altv/e.altd April 2021. D/a.altt/a.alt B/a.altnk: Popul/a.alttion Estim/a.altt/e.alts /a.altnd Proj/e.altctions, South Afric/a.alt. URL: https:/ /
 (page [6]) d/a.altt/a.altb/a.altnk.worldb/a.altnk.or/g.alt/d/a.altt/a.alt/r/e.altports./a.altspx?sourc/e.alt=h/e.alt/a.altlth-nutrition-/a.altnd-popul/a.alttion-st/a.alttistics:-popul/a.alttion-/e.altstim/a.altt/e.alts-/a.altnd-proj/e.altctions
 (page [6]) FIGURE 1. El/e.altv/a.alttion  of South Afric/a.alt2
 (page [6]) A, idicators
 (page [6]) (2019)
 (page [6]) (2018)
 (page [6]) (2019)
 (page [6]) -) (2020)
 (page [6]) 3 CLIMATE RISK COUNTRY PROFILE: SOUTH AFRICA2019 and −7 .0% in 2020 ( Table 1 ).4 The impacts of climate change on South Africa’s overall economic growth have been predominantly negative and, in the future climate change in South Africa is anticipated to continue to severely hamper economic growth, energy generation, job creation, and inequality.5 TABLE 1. D/a.altt/a.alt Sn/a.altpshot:  K/e.alt/y.alt D/e.altv/e.altlopm/e.altnt Indic/a.alttors6
 (page [6]) Indicator
 (page [6]) Life Expectancy at Birth, Total (Years)  (2019) 64.1 Population Density (People per sq. km Land Area)  (2018) 47. 6 % of Population with Access to Electricity  (2019) 85.0% GDP per Capita (Current US$ ) (2020) $5,090.70 The ND-GAIN Index7 ranks 181 countries using a score which calculates a country’s vulnerability to climate change and other global challenges as well as their readiness to improve resilience. This Index aims to help businesses and the public sector better identify vulnerability and readiness in order to better prioritize investment for more efﬁcient responses to global challenges. Due to a combination of political, geographic, and social factors, South Africa is recognized as vulnerable to climate change impacts, ranked 92 out of 181 countries in the 2020 ND-GAIN Index. The more vulnerable a country is the lower their score, while the more ready a country is to improve its resilience the higher it will be. Norway has the highest score and is ranked 1st. Figure 2  is a time-series plot of the ND-GAIN Index showing South Africa’s progress through 2018. FIGURE 2. ND-GAIN  Ind/e.altx for South Afric/a.alt
 (page [6]) 46.54747.54848.54949.550Score
 (page [6]) South Africa
 (page [6]) 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018 4 World B/a.altnk Op/e.altn D/a.altt/a.alt, D/a.altt/a.alt R/e.alttri/e.altv/e.altd April 2021. D/a.altt/a.alt B/a.altnk: World D/e.altv/e.altlopm/e.altnt Indic/a.alttors, South Afric/a.alt. URL: https:/ /
 (page [6]) d/a.altt/a.altb/a.altnk.worldb/a.altnk.or/g.alt/d/a.altt/a.alt/r/e.altports./a.altspx?sourc/e.alt=2&countr/y.alt
 (page [6]) 5 D/e.altp/a.altrtm/e.altnt of Environm/e.altnt/a.altl Aﬀ/a.altirs (2018). South Afric/a.alt’s Third N/a.alttion/a.altl Communic/a.alttion und/e.altr th/e.alt Unit/e.altd N/a.alttions Fr/a.altm/e.altwork Conv/e.altntion on Clim/a.altt/e.alt Ch/a.altn/g.alt/e.alt. URL: https:/ /unfccc.int/sit/e.alts/d/e.altf/a.altult/ﬁl/e.alts/r/e.altsourc/e.alt/South%20Afric/a.altn%20TNC%20R/e.altport%20%20
 (page [6]) to%20th/e.alt%20UNFCCC_31%20Au/g.alt.pdf
 (page [6]) 6 World B/a.altnk (2021). D/a.altt/a.altB/a.altnk – World D/e.altv/e.altlopm/e.altnt Indic/a.alttors. URL: https:/ /d/a.altt/a.altb/a.altnk.worldb/a.altnk.or/g.alt/sourc/e.alt/world-d/e.altv/e.altlopm/e.altnt-
 (page [7]) indic/a.alttors
 (page [7]) 7 Univ/e.altrsit/y.alt of Notr/e.alt D/a.altm/e.alt (2020). Notr/e.alt D/a.altm/e.alt Glob/a.altl Ad/a.altpt/a.alttion Initi/a.alttiv/e.alt. URL: https:/ //g.alt/a.altin.nd./e.altdu/our-work/countr/y.alt-ind/e.altx/ ined Contribution to the UNFCCC in 2016 and published its Third
 (page [7]) nent goals and increase
 (page [7]) 4 CLIMATE RISK COUNTRY PROFILE: SOUTH AFRICASouth Africa submitted its Nationally Determined Contribution  to the UNFCCC in 2016 and published its Third National Communication  in 2018, in support of the country’s efforts to realize its development goals and increase its resilience to climate change by enhancing mitigation and adaptation efforts. South Africa is especially vulnerable to climate change given its water and food insecurity, as well as the potential impacts for health, human settlements, infrastructure, and critical ecosystem services. The country has integrated its climate change strategies with its development framework in support of robust plans to eliminate poverty and eradicate inequality. A central strategic focus is on the sustainability of the environment, water resources, land management, agriculture, and health.8 At the time of writing, South Africa was ﬁnalizing the production of its Updated Nationally Determined Contribution.
 (page [7]) Gr/e.alt/e.altn, Inclusiv/e.alt /a.altnd R/e.altsili/e.altnt R/e.altcov/e.altr/y.alt
 (page [7]) The coronavirus disease (COVID-19) pandemic has led to unprecedented adverse social and economic impacts. Further, the pandemic has demonstrated the compounding impacts of adding yet another shock on top of the multiple challenges that vulnerable populations already face in d ay-to-day life, with the potential to create devastating hea lth, social, economic and environmental crises that can leave a deep, long-lasting mark. However, as governments take urgent action and lay the foundations for their ﬁnancial, economic, and social recovery, they have a unique opportunity to create economies that are more sustainable, inclusive and resilient. Short and long-term recovery efforts should prioritize investments that boost jobs and economic activity; have positive impacts on human, social and natural capital; protect biodiversity and ecosystems services; boost resilience; and advance the decarbonization of economies.
 (page [7]) Clim/a.altt/e.alt B/a.alts/e.altlin/e.alt
 (page [7]) Ov/e.altrvi/e.altw
 (page [7]) South Africa is comprised of a large central plateau that is home to extensive grasslands, a continuous escarpment of mountain ranges that surround the plateau on the west, south and east, and a narrow strip of low-lying land along the coastline. The country is located within what is considered a ‘drought belt’ and is the ﬁfth most water scarce country in sub-Saharan Africa. Approximately 50% of the country’s water supplies are used by its extensive industrial agriculture sector. The country’s topography varies from desert to semi-desert in the drier northwestern region to sub-humid and wet along the country’s eastern coast; approximately 50% of the country is classiﬁed as arid or semi-arid.9 South Africa has both sub-tropical and temperate climate conditions, which are inﬂuenced by the ocean along the east and west coasts as well as the interior plateaus, bringing a cool, wet climate in the Drakensberg region, to warm, sub-tropical in the northeast. The country has a Mediterranean climate in the southwest and a warm
 (page [7]) CLIMATOLOGY
 (page [7]) 8 South Afric/a.alt (2016). N/a.alttion/a.altll/y.alt-D/e.altt/e.altrmin/e.altd Contributions. URL: https:/ /www4.unfccc.int/sit/e.alts/ndcst/a.alt/g.altin/g.alt/Publish/e.altdDocum/e.altnts/
 (page [7]) South%20Afric/a.alt%20First/South%20Afric/a.alt.pdf
 (page [8]) 9 Ad/a.altpt/a.alttion P/a.altrtn/e.altrship (2011). R/e.altvi/e.altw of Curr/e.altnt /a.altnd Pl/a.altnn/e.altd Ad/a.altpt/a.alttion Action. South Afric/a.alt. URL: https:/ /www.pr/e.altv/e.altntionw/e.altb.n/e.altt/
 (page [8]) ﬁl/e.alts/25785_south/a.altfric/a.alt.pdf
 (page [8]) OQ, Climate Change Knowledge Portal (CCKP) (Table 2) presents
 (page [8]) sd with extremely low
 (page [8]) Figure 3). 4
 (page [8]) 5 CLIMATE RISK COUNTRY PROFILE: SOUTH AFRICAdry desert environment in the central-west and northwest. Average annual rainfall in South Africa is approximately 456 millimeters (mm), with the Western Cape getting the majority of its rainfall in winter (June to August) and the rest of the country receiving summer (December to February) rainfall. Average temperatures in South Africa range from 15°C to 36°C in the summer and −2°C to 26°C in the winter.10 South Africa is highly vulnerable to climate variability and change due to the country’s high dependence on rain-fed agriculture and natural resources, high levels of poverty, particularly in rural areas, and a low adaptive capacity.11 The high evaporation rate of already dry soils and the virtual absence of permanent surface water over large parts of the country make water a scarce resource, with some projections indicating that even without climate change, the country is likely to run through its existing surface water resources in the near-term future. Primary challenges posed by climate include those related to water resource availability, changing precipitation patterns, and increasing population demands. Further, the climatic and socio-economic environments in semi-arid areas renders these communities vulnerable to food insecurity and unstable liv elihoods and promotes unsustainable agroecological systems which suffer from crop failures and reduce the productivity of rangelands.12 Analysis of data from the World Bank Group’s Climate Change Knowledge Portal  (CCKP) ( Table 2 ) presents information for the current climatology, 1991–2020. Mean annual temperature for Sou th Africa is 18.3°C, with average monthly temperatures ranging between 22°C (December, January) and 11°C (June, July). Mean annual precipitation is 456.0 mm, with highest rainfall occurring November to March, coupled with extremely low precipitation occurring between June to August, for the latest climatology, 1991–2020 ( Figure 3 ).13 Figure 4 shows the spatial representation observed annual precipitation and mean annual temperature across South Africa
 (page [8]) for the latest climatology.
 (page [8]) TABLE 2. D/a.altt/a.alt  Sn/a.altpshot: Summ/a.altr/y.alt St/a.alttistics
 (page [8]) Climate Variables 1991–2020
 (page [8]) Mean Annual Temperature (°C) 18.3°C
 (page [8]) Mean Annual Precipitation (mm) 456.0 mm Mean Maximum Annual Temperature (°C) 26.0°C Mean Minimum Annual Temperature (°C) 10.8°C 10 D/e.altp/a.altrtm/e.altnt of Environm/e.altnt/a.altl Aﬀ/a.altirs (2018). South Afric/a.alt’s Third N/a.alttion/a.altl Communic/a.alttion und/e.altr th/e.alt Unit/e.altd N/a.alttions Fr/a.altm/e.altwork Conv/e.altntion on Clim/a.altt/e.alt Ch/a.altn/g.alt/e.alt. URL: https:/ /unfccc.int/sit/e.alts/d/e.altf/a.altult/ﬁl/e.alts/r/e.altsourc/e.alt/South%20Afric/a.altn%20TNC%20R/e.altport%20%20
 (page [8]) to%20th/e.alt%20UNFCCC_31%20Au/g.alt.pdf
 (page [8]) 11 Ad/a.altpt/a.alttion P/a.altrtn/e.altrship (2011). R/e.altvi/e.altw of Curr/e.altnt /a.altnd Pl/a.altnn/e.altd Ad/a.altpt/a.alttion Action. South Afric/a.alt. URL: https:/ /www.pr/e.altv/e.altntionw/e.altb.n/e.altt/
 (page [8]) ﬁl/e.alts/25785_south/a.altfric/a.alt.pdf
 (page [8]) 12 D/e.altp/a.altrtm/e.altnt of Environm/e.altnt/a.altl Aﬀ/a.altirs (2018). South Afric/a.alt’s Third N/a.alttion/a.altl Communic/a.alttion und/e.altr th/e.alt Unit/e.altd N/a.alttions Fr/a.altm/e.altwork Conv/e.altntion on Clim/a.altt/e.alt Ch/a.altn/g.alt/e.alt. URL: https:/ /unfccc.int/sit/e.alts/d/e.altf/a.altult/ﬁl/e.alts/r/e.altsourc/e.alt/South%20Afric/a.altn%20TNC%20R/e.altport%20%20
 (page [8]) to%20th/e.alt%20UNFCCC_31%20Au/g.alt.pdf
 (page [9]) 13 WBG Clim/a.altt/e.alt Ch/a.altn/g.alt/e.alt Knowl/e.altd/g.alt/e.alt Port/a.altl (CCKP, 2021). South Afric/a.alt URL: https:/ /clim/a.altt/e.altknowl/e.altd/g.alt/e.altport/a.altl.worldb/a.altnk.or/g.alt/countr/y.alt/
 (page [9]) south-/a.altfric/a.alt/clim/a.altt/e.alt-d/a.altt/a.alt-historic/a.altl
 (page [9]) 3.
 (page [9]) SUISSSLRGSRKBS
 (page [9]) 15
 (page [9]) 1125
 (page [9]) Figure 5), when average
 (page [9]) 6 CLIMATE RISK COUNTRY PROFILE: SOUTH AFRICARainfall Temperature
 (page [9]) Temperature (°C)
 (page [9]) Rainfall (mm)
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 (page [9]) 0
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 (page [9]) 90FIGURE 3. Av/e.altr/a.alt/g.alt/e.alt  Monthl/y.alt T /e.altmp/e.altr/a.alttur/e.alt /a.altnd R/a.altinf/a.altll for South Afric/a.alt, 1991–202014 FIGURE 4. M/a.altp of M/e.alt/a.altn Annu/a.altl T /e.altmp/e.altr/a.alttur/e.alt (°C) (l/e.altft); Annu/a.altl Pr/e.altcipit/a.alttion (mm) (ri/g.altht) for
 (page [9]) South Afric/a.alt, 1991–202015
 (page [9]) K/e.alt/y.alt Tr/e.altnds
 (page [9]) Temperature
 (page [9]) South Africa has already seen considerable temperature increases since the 1960s ( Figure 5 ), when average temperatures have increased by 1.5°C, with more marked increases across arid, inland areas of the country. Both maximum and minimum daily temperatures have risen, across all seasons.16 Temperature extremes have also increased signiﬁcantly, both in frequency and intensity, while low particularly in the western and northern interior 14 WBG Clim/a.altt/e.alt Ch/a.altn/g.alt/e.alt Knowl/e.altd/g.alt/e.alt Port/a.altl (CCKP, 2021). South Afric/a.alt URL: https:/ /clim/a.altt/e.altknowl/e.altd/g.alt/e.altport/a.altl.worldb/a.altnk.or/g.alt/countr/y.alt/
 (page [9]) south-/a.altfric/a.alt/clim/a.altt/e.alt-d/a.altt/a.alt-historic/a.altl
 (page [9]) 15 WBG Clim/a.altt/e.alt Ch/a.altn/g.alt/e.alt Knowl/e.altd/g.alt/e.alt Port/a.altl (CCKP, 2021). South Afric/a.alt. URL: https:/ /clim/a.altt/e.altknowl/e.altd/g.alt/e.altport/a.altl.worldb/a.altnk.or/g.alt/countr/y.alt/
 (page [9]) south-/a.altfric/a.alt
 (page [10]) 16 USAID (2018). Buildin/g.alt Urb/a.altn R/e.altsili/e.altnc/e.alt to Clim/a.altt/e.alt Ch/a.altn/g.alt/e.alt – A r/e.altvi/e.altw of South Afric/a.alt. URL: https:/ /www.clim/a.altt/e.altlinks.or/g.alt/sit/e.alts/
 (page [10]) d/e.altf/a.altult/ﬁl/e.alts//a.altss/e.altt/docum/e.altnt/180327_USAID-ATLAS_Buildin/g.alt%20Urb/a.altn%20R/e.altsili/e.altnc/e.alt%20to%20CC_South%20Afric/a.alt_to%20CL_r/e.altv.pdf
 (page [10]) 7 CLIMATE RISK COUNTRY PROFILE: SOUTH AFRICAregions of the country are becoming rarer. Notably, the rate of temperature change has ﬂuctuated, with the highest rates of increase identiﬁed during the mid 1970s to  early 1980s, with highest rates again observed in the late
 (page [10]) 1990s to mid 2000s.17
 (page [10]) FIGURE 5. Obs/e.altrv/e.altd T /e.altmp/e.altr/a.alttur/e.alt for South Afric/a.alt, 1901–202018
 (page [10]) Annual mean
 (page [10]) Smoothed
 (page [10]) 1911 1901 1921 1931 1941 1951 1961 1971 1981 1991 2001 2011 2020Temperature (°C)
 (page [10]) 19
 (page [10]) 20
 (page [10]) 21
 (page [10]) 22
 (page [10]) Precipitation
 (page [10]) Precipitation trends have continued to exert a high degree of interannual variability for South Africa, as they have for southern Africa as a whole. Since the 1960s, a marginal reduction in rainfall was experienced during the autumn months.19 While annual rainfall trends are weak overall, observations appoint to potentially signiﬁcant decreases in the number of rain days across almost all hydrological zones, implying a tendency towards an increase in the intensity of rainfall events, coupled with prolonged dry spells.20 High inter-annual rainfall variability is evident in the historical record, with above average rainfall value received during 1970s, late 1980s and mid-to-late 1990s. However, below average rainfall values were observed in the early 2000s.
 (page [10]) Clim/a.altt/e.alt Futur/e.alt
 (page [10]) Summ/a.altr/y.alt St/a.alttistics
 (page [10]) The main data source for the World Bank Group’s Climate Change Knowledge Portal (CCKP) is the CMIP5 (Coupled Model Inter-comparison Project Phase5) data ensemble, which builds the database for the global climate change projections presented in the Fifth Assessment Report (AR5) of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). Four Representative Concentration Pathways (i.e. RCP2.6, RCP4.5, RCP6.0, and RCP8.5) were selected and deﬁned by their total radiative forcing (cumulative measure of GHG emissions from all sources) pathway and level by 2100. The RCP2.6 for example represents a very strong mitigation scenario, whereas the RCP8.5 assumes 17 D/e.altp/a.altrtm/e.altnt of Environm/e.altnt/a.altl Aﬀ/a.altirs (2018). South Afric/a.alt’s Third N/a.alttion/a.altl Communic/a.alttion und/e.altr th/e.alt Unit/e.altd N/a.alttions Fr/a.altm/e.altwork Conv/e.altntion on Clim/a.altt/e.alt Ch/a.altn/g.alt/e.alt. URL: https:/ /unfccc.int/sit/e.alts/d/e.altf/a.altult/ﬁl/e.alts/r/e.altsourc/e.alt/South%20Afric/a.altn%20TNC%20R/e.altport%20%20
 (page [10]) to%20th/e.alt%20UNFCCC_31%20Au/g.alt.pdf
 (page [10]) 18 WB Clim/a.altt/e.alt Ch/a.altn/g.alt/e.alt Knowl/e.altd/g.alt/e.alt Port/a.altl (CCKP, 2021). South Afric/a.alt URL: https:/ /clim/a.altt/e.altknowl/e.altd/g.alt/e.altport/a.altl.worldb/a.altnk.or/g.alt/countr/y.alt/
 (page [10]) south-/a.altfric/a.alt/clim/a.altt/e.alt-d/a.altt/a.alt-historic/a.altl
 (page [10]) 19 D/e.altp/a.altrtm/e.altnt of Environm/e.altnt/a.altl Aﬀ/a.altirs (2018). South Afric/a.alt’s Third N/a.alttion/a.altl Communic/a.alttion und/e.altr th/e.alt Unit/e.altd N/a.alttions Fr/a.altm/e.altwork Conv/e.altntion on Clim/a.altt/e.alt Ch/a.altn/g.alt/e.alt. URL: https:/ /unfccc.int/sit/e.alts/d/e.altf/a.altult/ﬁl/e.alts/r/e.altsourc/e.alt/South%20Afric/a.altn%20TNC%20R/e.altport%20%20
 (page [10]) to%20th/e.alt%20UNFCCC_31%20Au/g.alt.pdf
 (page [11]) 20 USAID (2018). Buildin/g.alt Urb/a.altn R/e.altsili/e.altnc/e.alt to Clim/a.altt/e.alt Ch/a.altn/g.alt/e.alt – A r/e.altvi/e.altw of South Afric/a.alt. URL: https:/ /www.clim/a.altt/e.altlinks.or/g.alt/sit/e.alts/
 (page [11]) d/e.altf/a.altult/ﬁl/e.alts//a.altss/e.altt/docum/e.altnt/180327_USAID-ATLAS_Buildin/g.alt%20Urb/a.altn%20R/e.altsili/e.altnc/e.alt%20to%20CC_South%20Afric/a.alt_to%20CL_r/e.altv.pdf
 (page [11]) cenarios
 (page [11]) Table 3
 (page [11]) ;
 (page [11]) ima
 (page [11]) 2S
 (page [11]) 1
 (page [11]) 16E 20E ain 28E 32E
 (page [11]) ;
 (page [11]) 3
 (page [11]) .
 (page [11]) l
 (page [11]) 16 20E 24E 28E 22E
 (page [11]) https://climateknowledgeportal. Sas Rsaseeo ae
 (page [11]) SSaeR Se eRO RS
 (page [11]) 8 CLIMATE RISK COUNTRY PROFILE: SOUTH AFRICAbusiness-as-usual scenario. For more information, please refer to the RCP Database . For simpliﬁcation, these scenarios are referred to as a low (RCP2.6); a medium (RCP4.5) and a high (RCP8.5) emission scenario in this proﬁle. Table 3 provides CMIP5 projections for essential climate variables under high emission scenario (RCP8.5) over 4 different time horizons. Figure 6  presents the multi-model (CMIP5) ensemble of 32 Global Circulation Models (GCMs) showing the projected changes in annual precipitation and temperature for the periods 2040–2059 and 2080–2099. TABLE 3. D/a.altt/a.alt  Sn/a.altpshot: CMIP5 Ens/e.altmbl/e.alt Proj/e.altctions CMIP5 Ensemble Projection 2020–2039 2040–2059 2060–2079 2080–2099 Annual Temperature Anomaly (°C) +0.5 to +1.7
 (page [11]) (+1.2°C)+1.4 to +2.9
 (page [11]) (+2.0°C)+2.4 to +4.4
 (page [11]) (+3.2°C)+3.3 to +6.0
 (page [11]) (+4.2°C)
 (page [11]) Annual Precipitation Anomaly (mm) -16.2 to +14.0
 (page [11]) (−1.6 mm)-21.4 to +11.9
 (page [11]) (−3.7 mm)-22.2 to +13.2
 (page [11]) (−4.3 mm)-26.1 to +12.4
 (page [11]) (−5.9 mm)
 (page [11]) Note:  The table shows CMIP5 ensemble projection under RCP8.5. Bold value is the range (10th–90th Percentile) and values in parentheses show the median (or 50th Percentile). FIGURE 6. CMIP5  Ens/e.altmbl/e.alt Proj/e.altct/e.altd Ch/a.altn/g.alt/e.alt (32 GCMs) in M/e.alt/a.altn Annu/a.altl T /e.altmp/e.altr/a.alttur/e.alt (top) /a.altnd Pr/e.altcipit/a.alttion (bottom) b/y.alt 2040–2059 (l/e.altft) /a.altnd b/y.alt 2080–2099 (ri/g.altht), R/e.altl/a.alttiv/e.alt to 1986–2005
 (page [11]) B/a.alts/e.altlin/e.alt Und/e.altr RCP8.521
 (page [12]) 21 WBG Clim/a.altt/e.alt Ch/a.altn/g.alt/e.alt Knowl/e.altd/g.alt/e.alt Port/a.altl (CCKP, 2021). South Afric/a.alt Proj/e.altct/e.altd Futur/e.alt Clim/a.altt/e.alt. URL: https:/ /clim/a.altt/e.altknowl/e.altd/g.alt/e.altport/a.altl.
 (page [12]) worldb/a.altnk.or/g.alt/countr/y.alt/south-/a.altfric/a.alt/clim/a.altt/e.alt-d/a.altt/a.alt-proj/e.altctions
 (page [12]) d-century,
 (page [12]) days per
 (page [12]) days per year across the
 (page [12]) 9 CLIMATE RISK COUNTRY PROFILE: SOUTH AFRICAK/e.alt/y.alt Tr/e.altnds
 (page [12]) Temperature
 (page [12]) Rising temperatures are expected to continue for the region and speciﬁcally for South Africa, with mean monthly temperatures projected to rise 2.0°C by the 2050s and 4.2°C by the 2090s, under a high-emission scenario (RCP8.5). The most pronounced increases in temperature are projected for the summer months, between November to March. As temperatures rise, more intense heat waves and higher rates of evapotranspiration will follow, affecting multiple aspects of local economic development and agricultural productivity.22 Warming is expected to be most pronounced in the western and central interior regions of the country. One of the most serious consequences of increased heat for South Africa is the projected increase in the number of ‘hot days’ (TMax >35°C). By mid-century, the Northern Cape, North West and Limpopo will all likely see an increase of ‘hot days’ of 20 and 40 days per year; while by the end of the century projections that hot days will occur more than 120 days per year across the
 (page [12]) country’s interior.23
 (page [12]) Across all emission scenarios, temperatures will continue to rise in South Africa throughout the end of the century. As seen in Figure 7 , under a high-emission scenario (RCP 8.5), average temperatures are projected to increase rapidly by mid-century. Across the seasonal cycle, temperature increases will be most pronounced between April to September ( Figure 8 ) Rising heat and extreme heat conditions will result in signiﬁcant implications for human and animal health, agriculture, water resources, and ecosystems. Historical RCP 2.6 RCP 4.5 RCP 6.0 RCP 8.5
 (page [12]) 1980
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 (page [12]) Year24
 (page [12]) 23
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 (page [12]) 17Temperature (°C)FIGURE 7. Proj/e.altct/e.altd Av/e.altr/a.alt/g.alt/e.alt T /e.altmp/e.altr/a.alttur/e.alt for
 (page [12]) South Afric/a.alt (R/e.altf/e.altr/e.altnc/e.alt P/e.altriod, 1986–2005)24
 (page [12]) Jan
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 (page [12]) FIGURE 8. Proj/e.altct/e.altd C h/a.altn/g.alt/e.alt in Summ/e.altr D/a.alt/y.alts
 (page [12]) (Tm/a.altx >25°C) (RCP8.5, R/e.altf/e.altr/e.altnc/e.alt P/e.altriod,
 (page [12]) 1986–2005)25
 (page [12]) 22 USAID (2016). Clim/a.altt/e.alt Ch/a.altn/g.alt/e.alt Risk Proﬁl/e.alt – South/e.altrn Afric/a.alt. R/e.alt/g.altion/a.altl F/a.altct Sh/e.alt/e.altt. URL: https:/ /www.clim/a.altt/e.altlinks.or/g.alt/sit/e.alts/d/e.altf/a.altult/
 (page [12]) ﬁl/e.alts//a.altss/e.altt/docum/e.altnt/2016%20CRM%20F/a.altct%20Sh/e.alt/e.altt%20-%20South/e.altrn%20Afric/a.alt.pdf
 (page [12]) 23 D/e.altp/a.altrtm/e.altnt of Environm/e.altnt/a.altl Aﬀ/a.altirs (2018). South Afric/a.alt’s Third N/a.alttion/a.altl Communic/a.alttion und/e.altr th/e.alt Unit/e.altd N/a.alttions Fr/a.altm/e.altwork Conv/e.altntion on Clim/a.altt/e.alt Ch/a.altn/g.alt/e.alt. URL: https:/ /unfccc.int/sit/e.alts/d/e.altf/a.altult/ﬁl/e.alts/r/e.altsourc/e.alt/South%20Afric/a.altn%20TNC%20R/e.altport%20%20
 (page [12]) to%20th/e.alt%20UNFCCC_31%20Au/g.alt.pdf
 (page [12]) 24 WBG Clim/a.altt/e.alt Ch/a.altn/g.alt/e.alt Knowl/e.altd/g.alt/e.alt Port/a.altl (CCKP, 2021). Int/e.altr/a.altctiv/e.alt Clim/a.altt/e.alt Indic/a.alttor D/a.altshbo/a.altrd – A/g.altricultur/e.alt. South Afric/a.alt. URL https:/ /
 (page [12]) clim/a.altt/e.altd/a.altt/a.alt.worldb/a.altnk.or/g.alt/CRM/e.altPort/a.altl/w/e.altb//a.alt/g.altricultur/e.alt/crops-/a.altnd-l/a.altnd-m/a.altn/a.alt/g.alt/e.altm/e.altnt?countr/y.alt=ZAF&p/e.altriod=2080-2099
 (page [13]) 25 WBG Clim/a.altt/e.alt Ch/a.altn/g.alt/e.alt Knowl/e.altd/g.alt/e.alt Port/a.altl (CCKP, 2021). Int/e.altr/a.altctiv/e.alt Clim/a.altt/e.alt Indic/a.alttor D/a.altshbo/a.altrd – A/g.altricultur/e.alt. South Afric/a.alt. URL https:/ /
 (page [13]) clim/a.altt/e.altd/a.altt/a.alt.worldb/a.altnk.or/g.alt/CRM/e.altPort/a.altl/w/e.altb//a.alt/g.altricultur/e.alt/crops-/a.altnd-l/a.altnd-m/a.altn/a.alt/g.alt/e.altm/e.altnt?countr/y.alt=ZAF&p/e.altriod=2080-2099
 (page [13]) attps://climateknowledgeportal.
 (page [13]) 10 CLIMATE RISK COUNTRY PROFILE: SOUTH AFRICAPrecipitation Rainfall in South Africa is highly variable. The southwestern Cape is a rainfall region that receives the bulk of its annual rainfall in the form of frontal rain during (austral) winter, with west coast areas being arid to semi-arid. While rainfall projections remain uncertain, a majority of models point to annual rainfall declines for the country, although winter rainfall amounts are projected to increase along the east coast areas and the eastern escarpment.26 A drier dry-season (April and May) is projected for the cities of Durban, and Cape St. Lucia (Northeastern coast) is expected to receive mixed wetter and drier results for the other months of the year. By mid-century, a drying trend is also projected for western portions of the country, extending into desert areas of Namibia and Botswana by end of the century. The southwestern regions of the country are thought to be at high-risk of severe droughts during this century and beyond. During the austral summer months (November to March), dry conditions are projected for the southwestern region of South Africa. Additionally, austral spring months (August to October) are projected to be drier, implying a delay in the seasonal summer rains.27 Figure 9  shows the projected annual average precipitation for South Africa,28 pointing to projected decrease in average annual precipitation by the of the century under a
 (page [13]) high emissions scenario (RCP8.5).
 (page [13]) Historical RCP 2.6 RCP 4.5 RCP 6.0 RCP 8.5
 (page [13]) 1980
 (page [13]) 2000
 (page [13]) 2020
 (page [13]) 2040
 (page [13]) 2060
 (page [13]) 2080
 (page [13]) 2100
 (page [13]) Year
 (page [13]) Precipitation (mm)1200
 (page [13]) 1100
 (page [13]) 1000
 (page [13]) 900
 (page [13]) 800
 (page [13]) 700
 (page [13]) 600
 (page [13]) 500
 (page [13]) 400FIGURE 9. Proj/e.altct/e.altd Annu/a.altl Av/e.altr/a.alt/g.alt/e.alt
 (page [13]) Pr/e.altcipit/a.alttion in South Afric/a.alt (R/e.altf/e.altr/e.altnc/e.alt
 (page [13]) P/e.altriod, 1986–2005)29
 (page [13]) Ov/e.altrvi/e.altw
 (page [13]) South Africa is likely to become hotter and drier in the future, with rainfall variability continuing and temperatures rising, the country will continue to experience extreme events like droughts, ﬂoods, and other climate-related hazards.30 This will likely result in adverse environmental impacts including soil erosion, deforestation, recurrent droughts, desertiﬁcation, land degradation, and the loss of biodiversity including the country’s unique wildlife populations. Key CLIMATE RELATED NATURAL HAZARDS 26 D/e.altp/a.altrtm/e.altnt of Environm/e.altnt/a.altl Aﬀ/a.altirs (2018). South Afric/a.alt’s Third N/a.alttion/a.altl Communic/a.alttion und/e.altr th/e.alt Unit/e.altd N/a.alttions Fr/a.altm/e.altwork Conv/e.altntion on Clim/a.altt/e.alt Ch/a.altn/g.alt/e.alt. URL: https:/ /unfccc.int/sit/e.alts/d/e.altf/a.altult/ﬁl/e.alts/r/e.altsourc/e.alt/South%20Afric/a.altn%20TNC%20R/e.altport%20%20
 (page [13]) to%20th/e.alt%20UNFCCC_31%20Au/g.alt.pdf
 (page [13]) 27 USAID (2015). Clim/a.altt/e.alt Ch/a.altn/g.alt/e.alt Inform/a.alttion F/a.altct Sh/e.alt/e.altt – South Afric/a.alt. URL: https:/ /www.clim/a.altt/e.altlinks.or/g.alt/sit/e.alts/d/e.altf/a.altult/ﬁl/e.alts//a.altss/e.altt/
 (page [13]) docum/e.altnt/South%20Afric/a.alt%20Clim/a.altt/e.alt%20Info%20F/a.altct%20Sh/e.alt/e.altt_FINAL.pdf
 (page [13]) 28 WBG Clim/a.altt/e.alt Ch/a.altn/g.alt/e.alt Knowl/e.altd/g.alt/e.alt Port/a.altl (CCKP, 2021). South Afric/a.alt W/a.altt/e.altr D/a.altshbo/a.altrd. D/a.altt/a.alt D/e.altscription. URL: https:/ /clim/a.altt/e.altknowl/e.altd/g.alt/e.altport/a.altl.
 (page [13]) worldb/a.altnk.or/g.alt/countr/y.alt/south-/a.altfric/a.alt/clim/a.altt/e.alt-s/e.altctor-w/a.altt/e.altr
 (page [13]) 29 WBG Clim/a.altt/e.alt Ch/a.altn/g.alt/e.alt Knowl/e.altd/g.alt/e.alt Port/a.altl (CCKP, 2021). Clim/a.altt/e.alt D/a.altt/a.alt-Proj/e.altctions. South Afric/a.alt. URL: https:/ /clim/a.altt/e.altknowl/e.altd/g.alt/e.altport/a.altl.
 (page [13]) worldb/a.altnk.or/g.alt/countr/y.alt/south-/a.altfric/a.alt/clim/a.altt/e.alt-s/e.altctor-w/a.altt/e.altr
 (page [13, 14]) 30 D/e.altp/a.altrtm/e.altnt of Environm/e.altnt/a.altl Aﬀ/a.altirs (2018). South Afric/a.alt’s Third N/a.alttion/a.altl Communic/a.alttion und/e.altr th/e.alt Unit/e.altd N/a.alttions Fr/a.altm/e.altwork Conv/e.altntion on Clim/a.altt/e.alt Ch/a.altn/g.alt/e.alt. URL: https:/ /unfccc.int/sit/e.alts/d/e.altf/a.altult/ﬁl/e.alts/r/e.altsourc/e.alt/South%20Afric/a.altn%20TNC%20R/e.altport%20%20
 (page [14]) to%20th/e.alt%20UNFCCC_31%20Au/g.alt.pdf
 (page [14]) Table 4, shows the country has endured
 (page [14]) A, tr aT lh
 (page [14]) 11 CLIMATE RISK COUNTRY PROFILE: SOUTH AFRICAsecto rs including agriculture and livestock, health, water resources, and tourism are increasingly vulnerable. Water resources are likely to be increasingly strained as warmer temperatures accelerate the rate of evapotranspiration for the country. As droughts become more frequent and severe water supplies, biodiversity, and agriculture are likely to suffer. A potentially simultaneous increase in ﬂoods poses a serious threat to water quality, affecting the integrity of wetland ecosystems as well as agriculture and livestock communities.31 South Africa already experiences a high degree of risk from natural hazards and disasters, in particular to droughts, ﬂoods, and storm-related events, such as high winds, coastal storm surges, and hail, all of which are likely to be exacerbated by climate change. Extreme rainfall events already result in costly infrastructure repairs, road closures, limiting access to electricity, and ﬂooding and pollution as sewage and storm water systems are overwhelmed. Temperature anomalies are also already affecting critical infrastructure, such as roads and rail lines. Rainfall and temperature changes will continue to affect agriculture and food security, and extreme weather events can hamper tourism and the livelihoods that depend on the sector. Past ﬂooding has already contaminated water supplies. Additionally, decreased rainfall and higher temperatures (including heat waves) have led to signiﬁcant water restrictions and increased demand for water and energy for cooling across all sectors. Extreme rainfall continues to erode soils, degrade lands, and put ecosystems and the services they provide at risk. Finally, increased sedimentation rates due to more intense rainfall can reduce the storage capacity of critical dams.32 Data from the Emergency Event Database: EM-Dat database, presented in Table 4 , shows the country has endured various natural hazards, including ﬂoods, landslides, epidemic diseases, and storms. TABLE 4. N/a.alttur/a.altl Dis/a.altst/e.altrs in South Afric/a.alt, 1900–202033
 (page [14]) Natural Hazard
 (page [14]) 1900–2020 SubtypeEvents
 (page [14]) CountTotal
 (page [14]) Deaths Total AffectedTotal Damage
 (page [14]) (’000 USD)
 (page [14]) Drought Drought 11 0 20,925,000 2,585,000 Earthquake Ground Movement 5 37 3,112 20,000 EpidemicBacterial Disease 4 323 111,960 0 Viral Disease 1 1 0 0 Extreme TemperaturesCold Wave 2 52 0 0 Heat Wave 1 11 20 0 FloodFlash Flood 6 232 9,212 123,300 Riverine Flood 19 822 509,196 1,651,729 Landslide Landslide 1 34 0 0 WildﬁreForest Fire 2 30 1,600 0
 (page [14]) Land Fire (Brush,
 (page [14]) Bush, Pasture)7 97 5,780 440,000
 (page [14]) StormConvective Storm 20 148 148,558 1,275,041 Tropical Storm 2 64 501,350 92,000 31 USAID (2016). Clim/a.altt/e.alt Ch/a.altn/g.alt/e.alt Risk Proﬁl/e.alt – South/e.altrn Afric/a.alt. R/e.alt/g.altion/a.altl F/a.altct Sh/e.alt/e.altt. URL: https:/ /www.clim/a.altt/e.altlinks.or/g.alt/sit/e.alts/d/e.altf/a.altult/
 (page [14]) ﬁl/e.alts//a.altss/e.altt/docum/e.altnt/2016%20CRM%20F/a.altct%20Sh/e.alt/e.altt%20-%20South/e.altrn%20Afric/a.alt.pdf
 (page [14]) 32 D/e.altp/a.altrtm/e.altnt of Environm/e.altnt/a.altl Aﬀ/a.altirs (2016). South Afric/a.alt N/a.alttion/a.altl Ad/a.altpt/a.alttion Str/a.altt/e.alt/g.alt/y.alt (Dr/a.altft). URL: https:/ /www./e.altnvironm/e.altnt./g.altov./z.alt/a.alt/
 (page [14]) sit/e.alts/d/e.altf/a.altult/ﬁl/e.alts/docs/n/a.alts2016.pdf
 (page [15]) 33 EM-DAT: Th/e.alt Em/e.altr/g.alt/e.altnc/y.alt Ev/e.altnts D/a.altt/a.altb/a.alts/e.alt – Univ/e.altrsit/e.alt c/a.alttholiqu/e.alt d/e.alt Louv/a.altin (UCL) – CRED, D. Guh/a.alt-S/a.altpir, Bruss/e.altls, B/e.altl/g.altium.
 (page [15]) URL: http:/ //e.altmd/a.altt.b/e.alt//e.altmd/a.altt_db/
 (page [15]) uth Africa. URL:
 (page [15]) 12 CLIMATE RISK COUNTRY PROFILE: SOUTH AFRICAK/e.alt/y.alt Tr/e.altnds Climate change is expected to increase the risk and severity of water scarcity and drought across South Africa, affecting all sectors, including water, agriculture and forestry, human health, marine ﬁsheries, and biodiversity. Additionally, the projected increased frequency of intense rainfall events will increase the risk of ﬂoods, both through river bank over ﬂow and ﬂash ﬂooding. Intense rainfall and ﬂooding may also result in soil erosion and water logging of crops, potentially reducing yields and food insecurity; particularly for subsistence farmers. Small rural farmers are more sensitive to impacts of disasters (ﬂoods, dry periods) because they have limited resources with which to inﬂuence and increase adaptive capacity.34 Higher temperatures and the resultant increases in aridity may also lead to livestock stress.35 This is likely to result in signiﬁcant economic losses, damage to agricultural lands, and infrastructure as well as
 (page [15]) human casualties.
 (page [15]) The three most signiﬁcant drivers of climate-related disasters in South Africa are drought, ﬂoods, and wildﬁres. Drought affected an estimated 15 million South Africans betw een 1980 and 2013. The ﬂoods that occurred between1980–2013 affected over 483,000 people. Wildﬁre damage to agriculture and forestry is also signiﬁcant. Coastal storms can impact developments, infrastructure, ﬁshing communities, as well as coastal biodiversity. Annually, these disasters incur approximately Rand 3 billion (US$163.3 million) a year in damages. Increasingly, droughts and ﬂoods, along with rising temperatures and sea levels, are presenting new challenges for municipalities in South Africa. For example, recently, the Western Cape struggled with one of the worst droughts in 100 years, severely limiting water supplies in urban areas. Water scarcity is expected to increase, impacting the central, northern and southwestern regions, potentially constraining development goals and exacerbating conﬂicts between agricultural and urban/industrial users.36 Future ﬂood risk is also likely to increase across the entire  country, but particularly in KwaZulu-Natal, the Eastern Cape and Limpopo. In May 2017 , a storm resulted in very heavy rainfall with over 100 mm of rain occurring in the city of Durban within a 24-hour period, with ﬂoods forcing evacuations, damaging homes, cars and infrastructure.37 As ﬂood risks rise, so too will the incidence of waterborne diseases common in South Africa, such as cholera, dysentery, typhoid, and other rotavirus infections.38 Coastal cities such as Cape Town, Durban and Port Elizabeth are at risk from rising sea levels that could impact infrastructure and important economic sectors, such as tourism and ﬁsheries. Rising temperatures can additionally lead to increased heat-related human health risks, such as heat stress and respiratory illnesses. Disaster risks from rising temperatures are expected to (i) exacerbate existing tensions for water between agricultural and livestock needs as well as human populations needs, especially during the dry season; (ii) alter water quality from available surface and groundwater sources; and (iii) increase pressures on urban zones as urbanization rates grow.39 34 FAO (2018). P/a.altrtn/e.altrin/g.alt for Sust/a.altin/a.altbl/e.alt D/e.altv/e.altlopm/e.altnt /a.altnd R/e.altsili/e.altnt Communiti/e.alts – South Afric/a.alt. URL: http:/ /www.f/a.alto.or/g.alt/3//a.altx279/e.alt/
 (page [15]) AX279E.pdf
 (page [15]) 35 D/e.altp/a.altrtm/e.altnt of Environm/e.altnt/a.altl Aﬀ/a.altirs (2018). South Afric/a.alt’s Third N/a.alttion/a.altl Communic/a.alttion und/e.altr th/e.alt Unit/e.altd N/a.alttions Fr/a.altm/e.altwork Conv/e.altntion on Clim/a.altt/e.alt Ch/a.altn/g.alt/e.alt. URL: https:/ /unfccc.int/sit/e.alts/d/e.altf/a.altult/ﬁl/e.alts/r/e.altsourc/e.alt/South%20Afric/a.altn%20TNC%20R/e.altport%20%20
 (page [15]) to%20th/e.alt%20UNFCCC_31%20Au/g.alt.pdf
 (page [15]) 36 USAID (2018). Buildin/g.alt Urb/a.altn R/e.altsili/e.altnc/e.alt to Clim/a.altt/e.alt Ch/a.altn/g.alt/e.alt – A r/e.altvi/e.altw of South Afric/a.alt. URL: https:/ /www.clim/a.altt/e.altlinks.or/g.alt/sit/e.alts/d/e.altf/a.altult/
 (page [15]) ﬁl/e.alts//a.altss/e.altt/docum/e.altnt/180327_USAID-ATLAS_Buildin/g.alt%20Urb/a.altn%20R/e.altsili/e.altnc/e.alt%20to%20CC_South%20Afric/a.alt_to%20CL_r/e.altv.pdf
 (page [15]) 37 D/a.altvi/e.alts, Rich/a.altrd. (2017). South Afric/a.alt Hundr/e.altds Ev/a.altcu/a.altt/e.altd, 1 F/e.alt/a.altr/e.altd D/e.alt/a.altd Aft/e.altr Floods in Kw/a.altZulu-N/a.altt/a.altl. Flood list. URL: http:/ /
 (page [15]) ﬂoodlist.com//a.altfric/a.alt/south-/a.altfric/a.alt-ﬂoods-kw/a.alt/z.altulu-n/a.altt/a.altl-m/a.alt/y.alt-2017
 (page [15]) 38 D/e.altp/a.altrtm/e.altnt of Environm/e.altnt/a.altl Aﬀ/a.altirs (2018). South Afric/a.alt’s Third N/a.alttion/a.altl Communic/a.alttion und/e.altr th/e.alt Unit/e.altd N/a.alttions Fr/a.altm/e.altwork Conv/e.altntion on Clim/a.altt/e.alt Ch/a.altn/g.alt/e.alt. URL: https:/ /unfccc.int/sit/e.alts/d/e.altf/a.altult/ﬁl/e.alts/r/e.altsourc/e.alt/South%20Afric/a.altn%20TNC%20R/e.altport%20%20
 (page [15]) to%20th/e.alt%20UNFCCC_31%20Au/g.alt.pdf
 (page [16]) 39 USAID (2018). Buildin/g.alt Urb/a.altn R/e.altsili/e.altnc/e.alt to Clim/a.altt/e.alt Ch/a.altn/g.alt/e.alt – A r/e.altvi/e.altw of South Afric/a.alt. URL: https:/ /www.clim/a.altt/e.altlinks.or/g.alt/sit/e.alts/d/e.altf/a.altult/
 (page [16]) ﬁl/e.alts//a.altss/e.altt/docum/e.altnt/180327_USAID-ATLAS_Buildin/g.alt%20Urb/a.altn%20R/e.altsili/e.altnc/e.alt%20to%20CC_South%20Afric/a.alt_to%20CL_r/e.altv.pdf
 (page [16]) } Show data source —
 (page [16]) ou =.
 (page [16]) i High
 (page [16]) @ Medium
 (page [16]) 13 CLIMATE RISK COUNTRY PROFILE: SOUTH AFRICAChanging rainfall patterns will signiﬁcantly alter agricultural productivity and shift harvest seasons, as later rainfall onsets expected to impact crop productivity as well as livestock health. Droughts remain one of the key drivers of food insecurity for the country, with increased aridity and drought resulting in crop damage, loss of pasture and water sources, loss of animals, hunger, disease outbreaks, asset depletions, malnutrition, and migration. Rising temperatures and degraded agricultural conditions are expected to adversely affect ‘working days’, impacting the livelihoods and the economic resilience of vulnerable groups. Figure 10  present the risk of urban ﬂooding and
 (page [16]) wildﬁres for South Africa.
 (page [16]) FIGURE 10. Risk of Urb/a.altn Floodin/g.alt (l/e.altft)40; Risks of Wildﬁr/e.alts (ri/g.altht)41
 (page [16]) Implic/a.alttions for DRM
 (page [16, 17]) The country is currently guided by the Disaster Management Act (2002) and Disaster Management Framework (2005).42 The Government of South Africa is focused on the prevention, mitigation, preparedness, response and recovery to disasters and is working to integrate an effective disaster management strategy into sectoral policies and programs. This work is led by the National Disaster Management Advisory Forum, a technical committee tasked with coordinating and managing disaster recovery and preparedness actions. Currently, South Africa is working to mainstream its disaster risk reduction, adaptation, and management into development activities. Efforts are also ongoing to ensure these tasks are aligned with key policy goals, shifting thinking towards more pro-active risk reduction and adaptation planning from a current largely re-active system. 40 ThinkH/a.alt/z.alt/a.altrd! (2020). South Afric/a.alt – Urb/a.altn Floodin/g.alt. URL: http:/ /thinkh/a.alt/z.alt/a.altrd.or/g.alt//e.altn/r/e.altport/227-south-/a.altfric/a.alt/UF 41 ThinkH/a.alt/z.alt/a.altrd! (2020). South Afric/a.alt – Wild Fir/e.alts. URL: http:/ /thinkh/a.alt/z.alt/a.altrd.or/g.alt//e.altn/r/e.altport/227-south-/a.altfric/a.alt/WF 42 South Afric/a.alt (2005). South Afric/a.alt N/a.alttion/a.altl Dis/a.altst/e.altr M/a.altn/a.alt/g.alt/e.altm/e.altnt Fr/a.altm/e.altwork. URL: https:/ /www./g.altov./z.alt/a.alt/sit/e.alts/d/e.altf/a.altult/ﬁl/e.alts/
 (page [17]) /g.altcis_docum/e.altnt/201409/275340.pdf
 (page [17]) 14 CLIMATE RISK COUNTRY PROFILE: SOUTH AFRICA South Africa’s key economic sectors are highly vulnerable to climate variability and change. The impacts of climate change are already being experienced across the country. Water scarcity and drought conditions are expected to increase the risks of food insecurity, and may exacerbate conﬂict situations over scarce resources, potentially forcing additional population displacement. Sea level rise will also impact much of the country’s coast.43 As urbanization rates grow, so do the challenges facing municipalities in terms of providing critical lifeline services and related infrastructure. These challenges are compounded by climate stressors, such as ﬂoods and droughts, which put additional pressure on service delivery and ﬁnances.44 Environmental degradation, altered quality and quantity of available water resources, and loss of biodiversity and ecosystem services constitute serious obstacles to the country’s continued development and poverty reduction efforts, increasing vulnerability.45
 (page [17]) Gender
 (page [17]) An increasing body of research has shown that climate-related disasters have impacted human populations in many areas including agricultural production, food security, water management, and public health. The level of impacts and coping strategies of populations depends heavily on their socio-economic status, socio-cultural norms, access to resources, poverty as well as gender. Research has also provided more evidence that the effects are not gender neutral, as women and children are among the highest risk groups. Key factors that account for the differences between women’s and men’s vulnerability to climate change risks include: gender-based differences in time use, access to assets and credit, treatment by formal institutions , which can constrain women’s opportunities, limited access to policy discussions and decision making, and a lack of sex-disaggregated data for policy change.46
 (page [17]) A/g.altricultur/e.alt
 (page [17]) Ov/e.altrvi/e.altw
 (page [17]) Agriculture is a critical sector for the South African economy, upon which local livelihoods depend. The sector employs more than 860,000 people, contributes signiﬁcantly to food  security and export revenues. Maize dominates the sector, followed by wheat and to a lesser extent sugar cane and sunﬂower seed. Livestock production is a signiﬁcant part of the sector. While the country’s agriculture sector is diverse, it includes both commercial and subsistence farming systems. Only 14% of the country is considered arable, with just one-ﬁfth of this land characterized as having high agricultural potential. The climate is critical driver of agricultural activities and suitability across the CLIMATE CHANGE IMPACTS TO KEY SECTORS 43 D/e.altp/a.altrtm/e.altnt of Environm/e.altnt/a.altl Aﬀ/a.altirs (2018). South Afric/a.alt’s Third N/a.alttion/a.altl Communic/a.alttion und/e.altr th/e.alt Unit/e.altd N/a.alttions Fr/a.altm/e.altwork Conv/e.altntion on Clim/a.altt/e.alt Ch/a.altn/g.alt/e.alt. URL: https:/ /unfccc.int/sit/e.alts/d/e.altf/a.altult/ﬁl/e.alts/r/e.altsourc/e.alt/South%20Afric/a.altn%20TNC%20R/e.altport%20%20
 (page [17]) to%20th/e.alt%20UNFCCC_31%20Au/g.alt.pdf
 (page [17]) 44 USAID (2018). Buildin/g.alt Urb/a.altn R/e.altsili/e.altnc/e.alt to Clim/a.altt/e.alt Ch/a.altn/g.alt/e.alt – A r/e.altvi/e.altw of South Afric/a.alt. URL: https:/ /www.clim/a.altt/e.altlinks.or/g.alt/sit/e.alts/d/e.altf/a.altult/
 (page [17]) ﬁl/e.alts//a.altss/e.altt/docum/e.altnt/180327_USAID-ATLAS_Buildin/g.alt%20Urb/a.altn%20R/e.altsili/e.altnc/e.alt%20to%20CC_South%20Afric/a.alt_to%20CL_r/e.altv.pdf
 (page [17]) 45 D/e.altp/a.altrtm/e.altnt of Environm/e.altnt/a.altl Aﬀ/a.altirs (2018). South Afric/a.alt’s Third N/a.alttion/a.altl Communic/a.alttion und/e.altr th/e.alt Unit/e.altd N/a.alttions Fr/a.altm/e.altwork Conv/e.altntion on Clim/a.altt/e.alt Ch/a.altn/g.alt/e.alt. URL: https:/ /unfccc.int/sit/e.alts/d/e.altf/a.altult/ﬁl/e.alts/r/e.altsourc/e.alt/South%20Afric/a.altn%20TNC%20R/e.altport%20%20
 (page [17]) to%20th/e.alt%20UNFCCC_31%20Au/g.alt.pdf
 (page [18]) 46 World B/a.altnk Group (2016). G/e.altnd/e.altr Equ/a.altlit/y.alt, Pov/e.altrt/y.alt R/e.altduction, /a.altnd Inclusiv/e.alt Growth. URL: http:/ /docum/e.altnts1.worldb/a.altnk.or/g.alt/cur/a.altt/e.altd/
 (page [18]) /e.altn/820851467992505410/pdf/102114-REVISED-PUBLIC-WBG-G/e.altnd/e.altr-Str/a.altt/e.alt/g.alt/y.alt.pdf
 (page [18]) 15 CLIMATE RISK COUNTRY PROFILE: SOUTH AFRICAcountry. Climate change is expected to have generally adverse impacts on cereal crop production, high value export agricultural production and intensive animal husbandry practices.47 However, climate change trends are likely to positively impact the productivity of key tropical crops, such as sugarcane, though these gains could also be offset by increased pest diversity and distribution.
 (page [18]) Clim/a.altt/e.alt Ch/a.altn/g.alt/e.alt Imp/a.altcts
 (page [18]) The projected impacts from a changing climate to food production, agricultural livelihoods, and food security in South Africa are signiﬁcant national policy concerns. Impacts are crucially linked to future projected water supply constraints. Subsistence, dry-land farmers are more vulnerable to climate change than commercial farmers, as large- scale irrigated production relies heavily on irrigation.48 Increased heat stress is likely to hamper crop productivity and more variable rainfall will likely alter the growing seasons. Reduced water availability will likely also not only reduce yields, but also increase soil moisture deﬁcits, potentially changing the suitable areas for agriculture or the production of speciﬁc crops.49 As droughts and prolonged dry periods become more intense and prolonged, land degradation will likely continue and may further intensify. Rising temperatures, particularly the number of ‘very hot days’ (TMax >35°C) are likely to increase the presence of pests and risks of wildﬁres. As extreme events become more intense and more frequent, ‘regulating services’ such as soil water maintenance, base ﬂows and ﬁltration, will
 (page [18]) likely also suffer.50
 (page [18]) Under present climate conditions, heat stress already poses challenges for heat dissipation in livestock populations, rendering them vulnerable to heat stress during certain periods of the year. Heat stress can reduce milk production and reproduction, particularly for cattle. As heat increase, so is the likelihood of altered growing seasons. Concurrently, as water availability is reduced, so will it likely increase soil moisture deﬁcits and crop yields. Figure 11  shows the projected change in average daily maximum temperatures for South Africa as a whole across the seasonal cycle; higher temperatures are expected
 (page [18]) throughout the year
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 (page [18]) FIGURE 11. Proj/e.altct/e.altd Ch/a.altn/g.alt/e.alt in Av/e.altr/a.alt/g.alt/e.alt D/a.altil/y.alt M/a.altximum T /e.altmp/e.altr/a.alttur/e.alt for South Afric/a.alt
 (page [18]) (RCP8.5, R/e.altf/e.altr/e.altnc/e.alt P/e.altriod, 1986–2005)51
 (page [18]) 47 DEA (2014). Clim/a.altt/e.alt Ch/a.altn/g.alt/e.alt /a.altnd th/e.alt A/g.altricultur/a.altl S/e.altctor.  Clim/a.altt/e.alt /a.altnd Imp/a.altcts F/a.altctsh/e.alt/e.altt S/e.altri/e.alts. Lon/g.alt-T/e.altrm Ad/a.altpt/a.alttion Sc/e.altn/a.altrios Fl/a.alt/g.altship R/e.alts/e.alt/a.altrch Pro/g.altr/a.altmm/e.alt. URL: https:/ /www./e.altnvironm/e.altnt./g.altov./z.alt/a.alt/sit/e.alts/d/e.altf/a.altult/ﬁl/e.alts/docs/clim/a.altt/e.alt_tr/e.altnds_bookV3.pdf 48 D/e.altp/a.altrtm/e.altnt of Environm/e.altnt/a.altl Aﬀ/a.altirs (2018). South Afric/a.alt’s Third N/a.alttion/a.altl Communic/a.alttion und/e.altr th/e.alt Unit/e.altd N/a.alttions Fr/a.altm/e.altwork Conv/e.altntion on Clim/a.altt/e.alt Ch/a.altn/g.alt/e.alt. URL: https:/ /unfccc.int/sit/e.alts/d/e.altf/a.altult/ﬁl/e.alts/r/e.altsourc/e.alt/South%20Afric/a.altn%20TNC%20R/e.altport%20%20
 (page [18]) to%20th/e.alt%20UNFCCC_31%20Au/g.alt.pdf
 (page [18]) 49 USAID (2016). Clim/a.altt/e.alt Ch/a.altn/g.alt/e.alt Risk Proﬁl/e.alt – South/e.altrn Afric/a.alt. R/e.alt/g.altion/a.altl F/a.altct Sh/e.alt/e.altt. URL: https:/ /www.clim/a.altt/e.altlinks.or/g.alt/sit/e.alts/d/e.altf/a.altult/
 (page [18]) ﬁl/e.alts//a.altss/e.altt/docum/e.altnt/2016%20CRM%20F/a.altct%20Sh/e.alt/e.altt%20-%20South/e.altrn%20Afric/a.alt.pdf
 (page [18]) 50 USAID (2016). Clim/a.altt/e.alt Ch/a.altn/g.alt/e.alt Risk Proﬁl/e.alt – South/e.altrn Afric/a.alt. R/e.alt/g.altion/a.altl F/a.altct Sh/e.alt/e.altt. URL: https:/ /www.clim/a.altt/e.altlinks.or/g.alt/sit/e.alts/d/e.altf/a.altult/
 (page [18]) ﬁl/e.alts//a.altss/e.altt/docum/e.altnt/2016%20CRM%20F/a.altct%20Sh/e.alt/e.altt%20-%20South/e.altrn%20Afric/a.alt.pdf
 (page [19]) 51 WBG Clim/a.altt/e.alt Ch/a.altn/g.alt/e.alt Knowl/e.altd/g.alt/e.alt Port/a.altl (CCKP, 2021). South Afric/a.alt A/g.altricultur/e.alt. D/a.altshbo/a.altrd URL: https:/ /clim/a.altt/e.altd/a.altt/a.alt.worldb/a.altnk.or/g.alt/
 (page [19]) CRM/e.altPort/a.altl/w/e.altb//a.alt/g.altricultur/e.alt/crops-/a.altnd-l/a.altnd-m/a.altn/a.alt/g.alt/e.altm/e.altnt?countr/y.alt=ZAF&p/e.altriod=2080-2099
 (page [19]) 16 CLIMATE RISK COUNTRY PROFILE: SOUTH AFRICAAd/a.altpt/a.alttion Options The challenges posed by climate change problems are super-imposed upon the many other stressors that the South African agriculture sector already faces due to environmental degradation, disease outbreaks, and higher input costs, which are themselves compounded by issues of land rights and inequality. Adaptation options for the sector include implementing climate smart agriculture practices, improving water management, monitoring and early warning, the development of knowledge and decision-support systems, and the development of new crop varieties and technologies to support farming systems. Barriers to adaptation are linked to a much-reduced extension service network and a slow uptake of Climate Smart Agriculture and Conservation Agriculture techniques. Conversely, there are clearly potential beneﬁts from a changing climate for some crops as CO2 levels increase, but these are also temperature- and rainfall- dependent.52 Implementing soil and water conservation strategies should be a focus.
 (page [19]) W/a.altt/e.altr
 (page [19]) Ov/e.altrvi/e.altw
 (page [19]) Across South Africa’s arid and semi-arid climate, less than 9% of the annual rainfall received ﬁlters into the region’s rivers and only about 5% goes on to recharge groundwater aquifers. As a result, South Africa is a highly water- stressed country and highly vulnerable to a changing climate. Projected climate change impacts on the water sector in South Africa could exacerbate existing conﬂicts and further increase inequalities regarding as the limited access
 (page [19]) to potable water.53
 (page [19]) Clim/a.altt/e.alt Ch/a.altn/g.alt/e.alt Imp/a.altcts
 (page [19]) Changes in the quality and availability of water will be the dominant challenge for the country through the end of the century. Stream ﬂows for the Limpopo and Okavango catchments are projected to decrease by 35% and 20%, respectively. More variable rainfall is also likely to increase disasters associated with droughts, ﬂoods, and waterborne diseases. For the region, water resources cut across a number of transboundary basins and are unevenly distributed, both seasonally and geographically. This presents a signiﬁcant challenge and concern for the region. Currently, a majority of the region already faces supply deﬁcits during at least part of the year, limiting development goals. Rising water demand and increased pollution across shared water resources are a critical problem. Droughts and ﬂoods are common events, as are a number of natural cycles of climate variability that cause ﬂood pulsing. Infrastructure developments intended to safeguard water supplies have increased the geographical imbalance of water resources, as dams are built to store water 52 D/e.altp/a.altrtm/e.altnt of Environm/e.altnt/a.altl Aﬀ/a.altirs (2018). South Afric/a.alt’s Third N/a.alttion/a.altl Communic/a.alttion und/e.altr th/e.alt Unit/e.altd N/a.alttions Fr/a.altm/e.altwork Conv/e.altntion on Clim/a.altt/e.alt Ch/a.altn/g.alt/e.alt. URL: https:/ /unfccc.int/sit/e.alts/d/e.altf/a.altult/ﬁl/e.alts/r/e.altsourc/e.alt/South%20Afric/a.altn%20TNC%20R/e.altport%20%20
 (page [19]) to%20th/e.alt%20UNFCCC_31%20Au/g.alt.pdf
 (page [19, 20]) 53 D/e.altp/a.altrtm/e.altnt of Environm/e.altnt/a.altl Aﬀ/a.altirs (2018). South Afric/a.alt’s Third N/a.alttion/a.altl Communic/a.alttion und/e.altr th/e.alt Unit/e.altd N/a.alttions Fr/a.altm/e.altwork Conv/e.altntion on Clim/a.altt/e.alt Ch/a.altn/g.alt/e.alt. URL: https:/ /unfccc.int/sit/e.alts/d/e.altf/a.altult/ﬁl/e.alts/r/e.altsourc/e.alt/South%20Afric/a.altn%20TNC%20R/e.altport%20%20
 (page [20]) to%20th/e.alt%20UNFCCC_31%20Au/g.alt.pdf
 (page [20]) 17 CLIMATE RISK COUNTRY PROFILE: SOUTH AFRICAduring the unpredictable and often long dry periods, particularly in South Africa. Currently, South Africa does not have the capacity to expand its water storage or increase its generation of hydropower. Rising temperatures are expected to decrease water availability and thus stream ﬂows, increasing evapotranspiration and reducing runoff. As rainfall events become more intense, there is an increased likelihood of ﬂoods, potentially compromising irrigation potentials.54 Rainfall and evaporative changes can also alter water inﬁltration and groundwater recharge rates This has the potential to further decrease the reliability of unimproved groundwater sources and surface water sources during droughts or prolonged dry periods. These can increase strain on pumping mechanisms, leading to breakdowns if maintenance is neglected.55 Figure 11  shows the projected changes in the annual Standardized Precipitation Evapotranspiration Index (SPEI) for drought across South Africa. SPEI is a drought index which represents the measure of the given water deﬁcit in a speciﬁc location, accounting for contributions of temperature- dependent evapotranspiration and providing insight into increasing or decreasing pressure on water resources. Negative values for SPEI represent dry conditions, with values below −2 indicating severe drought conditions, likewise positive values indicate increased wet conditions. This is an important understanding for the water sector in regards to quantity and quality of supply for human consumption and agriculture use as well as for the energy sector as reductions in water availability impacts river ﬂow and the hydropower generating capabilities. South Africa is projected to experience heightened dry conditions and increased pressure on water resources by mid-century and by end of the century is likely to be experience severe drought conditions and water scarcity. While Figure 12 shows the projected intensity of SPEI for South Africa at a nationally aggregated scale, Figure 13 shows the spatial variation of SPEI for the 2050s and 2090s, under emissions scenario RCP8.5. The southwestern areas of South Africa are projected to experience the most severe drought conditions.
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 (page [20]) IndexFIGURE 12. Proj/e.altct/e.altd A nnu/a.altl SPEI Drou/g.altht Ind/e.altx in South Afric/a.alt (R/e.altf/e.altr/e.altnc/e.alt P/e.altriod,
 (page [20]) 1986–2005)56
 (page [20]) 54 USAID (2016). Clim/a.altt/e.alt Ch/a.altn/g.alt/e.alt Risk Proﬁl/e.alt – South/e.altrn Afric/a.alt. R/e.alt/g.altion/a.altl F/a.altct Sh/e.alt/e.altt. URL: https:/ /www.clim/a.altt/e.altlinks.or/g.alt/sit/e.alts/d/e.altf/a.altult/
 (page [20]) ﬁl/e.alts//a.altss/e.altt/docum/e.altnt/2016%20CRM%20F/a.altct%20Sh/e.alt/e.altt%20-%20South/e.altrn%20Afric/a.alt.pdf
 (page [20]) 55 IOM (2017). Sp/a.altc/e.alts of vuln/e.altr/a.altbilit/y.alt /a.altnd /a.altr/e.alt/a.alts pron/e.alt to n/a.alttur/a.altl dis/a.altst/e.altr /a.altnd crisis in six SADC countri/e.alts. Dis/a.altst/e.altr risks /a.altnd dis/a.altst/e.altr risk m/a.altn/a.alt/g.alt/e.altm/e.altnt c/a.altp/a.altcit/y.alt in Botsw/a.altn/a.alt, M/a.altl/a.altwi, Mo/z.alt/a.altmbiqu/e.alt, South Afric/a.alt, Z/a.altmbi/a.alt /a.altnd Zimb/a.altbw/e.alt. URL: https:/ /public/a.alttions.iom.int/
 (page [20]) s/y.altst/e.altm/ﬁl/e.alts/pdf/sp/a.altc/e.alts_of_vuln/e.altr/a.altbilit/y.alt.pdf
 (page [21]) 56 WBG Clim/a.altt/e.alt Ch/a.altn/g.alt/e.alt Knowl/e.altd/g.alt/e.alt Port/a.altl (CCKP, 2021). South Afric/a.alt W/a.altt/e.altr S/e.altctor D/a.altshbo/a.altrd. URL: https:/ /clim/a.altt/e.altd/a.altt/a.alt.worldb/a.altnk.or/g.alt/
 (page [21]) CRM/e.altPort/a.altl/w/e.altb/w/a.altt/e.altr/l/a.altnd-us/e.alt-/-w/a.altt/e.altrsh/e.altd-m/a.altn/a.alt/g.alt/e.altm/e.altnt?countr/y.alt=ZAF&p/e.altriod=2080-2099
 (page [21]) 18 CLIMATE RISK COUNTRY PROFILE: SOUTH AFRICAAd/a.altpt/a.alttion Options South Africa’s current water usage already exceeds the available resource, and extreme ﬂuctuations in rainfall translate into fairly large water use restrictions during years of drought. Additional water resource capacity is required and needs to be developed in order to meet a growing demand for domestic needs. Water resource management strategies need to incorporate sourcing from catchment and river systems, storage, abstraction, and securing return- ﬂows from irrigation projects. At present, there are 794 large dams in the country (dams are considered to have a wall height ≥15 m, or a wall height between 5 and 15 m and a storage capacity exceeding 3 million m3), with a combined storage capacity in the order of 31 billion m3, and over two-thirds of the country’s mean annual runoff is stored in these dams. As a water-scarce country, the river systems and aquifers are already highly used and developed, though poor maintenance makes them highly degraded.58 Sustainable and reliable storage and use of the water resources of South Africa is a top priority that needs to be guided by a robust water resources management policy that promotes the efﬁcient, equitable, and optimum utilization of the resource. South Africa has integrated water management into all important economic sectors and has developed a National Water Master Plan to support its broader climate change adaptation agenda.59 Planning and adaptation strategies for water resources should also be included within development strategies for agriculture, infrastructure, and energy sectors.FIGURE 13. Proj/e.altct/e.altd SPEI for South Afric/a.alt b/y.alt 2040–2059 (l/e.altft) /a.altnd b/y.alt 2080–2099 (ri/g.altht), R/e.altl/a.alttiv/e.alt to 1986–2005 B/a.alts/e.altlin/e.alt, Und/e.altr RCP8.557 57 WBG Clim/a.altt/e.alt Ch/a.altn/g.alt/e.alt Knowl/e.altd/g.alt/e.alt Port/a.altl (CCKP, 2021). South Afric/a.alt A/g.altricultur/e.alt. D/a.altshbo/a.altrd URL: https:/ /clim/a.altt/e.altd/a.altt/a.alt.worldb/a.altnk.or/g.alt/
 (page [21]) CRM/e.altPort/a.altl/w/e.altb//a.alt/g.altricultur/e.alt/crops-/a.altnd-l/a.altnd-m/a.altn/a.alt/g.alt/e.altm/e.altnt?countr/y.alt=ZAF&p/e.altriod=2080-2099
 (page [21]) 58 D/e.altp/a.altrtm/e.altnt of Environm/e.altnt/a.altl Aﬀ/a.altirs (2018). South Afric/a.alt’s Third N/a.alttion/a.altl Communic/a.alttion und/e.altr th/e.alt Unit/e.altd N/a.alttions Fr/a.altm/e.altwork Conv/e.altntion on Clim/a.altt/e.alt Ch/a.altn/g.alt/e.alt. URL: https:/ /unfccc.int/sit/e.alts/d/e.altf/a.altult/ﬁl/e.alts/r/e.altsourc/e.alt/South%20Afric/a.altn%20TNC%20R/e.altport%20%20
 (page [21]) to%20th/e.alt%20UNFCCC_31%20Au/g.alt.pdf
 (page [22]) 59 South Afric/a.alt (2016). N/a.alttion/a.altll/y.alt-D/e.altt/e.altrmin/e.altd Contributions. URL: https:/ /www4.unfccc.int/sit/e.alts/ndcst/a.alt/g.altin/g.alt/Publish/e.altdDocum/e.altnts/
 (page [22]) South%20Afric/a.alt%20First/South%20Afric/a.alt.pdf
 (page [22]) 19 CLIMATE RISK COUNTRY PROFILE: SOUTH AFRICAEn/e.altr/g.alt/y.alt
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 (page [22]) South African energy is highly dependent on the country’s cheap and abundantly available coal, which comprises roughly 92% of energy generation, which is supplemented through crude oil imports. A limited quantity of natural gas is also available for energy production. Enriched uranium is imported for South Africa’s nuclear power plant, Koeberg. Hydropower is the primary source of renewable energy for the country, however as of 2017 , it comprised just 1% of energy generation, followed by biomass and solar. The government plans to diversify the country’s energy supply by promoting the use of renewable energy technologies and improving efﬁciencies throughout the economy.60 South Africa’s strong economic growth, expanding tourism sector, and population growth will put greater demand on energy production in the near- and long-term future.61
 (page [22]) Clim/a.altt/e.alt Ch/a.altn/g.alt/e.alt Imp/a.altcts
 (page [22]) Rising temperatures already pose limitations to the cooling capacities of power generating stations, reducing outputs. Rising temperatures are likely to alter future demand for electricity, increasing peak load demands during hotter summers. Projected trends in rainfall and temperature are also expected to increase costs of maintenance and repair to power and energy infrastructure, in addition to disrupting supplies and transmission. As runoff and surface water availability is reduced, so will hydropower generation; which is a challenge for South Africa in terms of meeting its
 (page [22]) renewable energy goals.62
 (page [22]) Cooling Degree Days show the relationship between daily heat and cooling demand, typically sourced through a form of active cooling or an evaporative process. The change in cooling degree days provides insight into the potential for extended seasons of power demand or periods in which cooling demand (power demands) might increase. As seen Figure 14 , seasonal increases for cooling demands are expected to increase over an extended summer period (September to April). Warm Spell Duration represents the number of days in a sequence of at least six days in which the daily maximum temperature is greater than the 90th percentile of daily maximum temperature. As shown in Figure 15 , warm spells are expected to sharply increase in the second half of the century. 60 D/e.altp/a.altrtm/e.altnt of Environm/e.altnt/a.altl Aﬀ/a.altirs (2018). South Afric/a.alt’s Third N/a.alttion/a.altl Communic/a.alttion und/e.altr th/e.alt Unit/e.altd N/a.alttions Fr/a.altm/e.altwork Conv/e.altntion on Clim/a.altt/e.alt Ch/a.altn/g.alt/e.alt. URL: https:/ /unfccc.int/sit/e.alts/d/e.altf/a.altult/ﬁl/e.alts/r/e.altsourc/e.alt/South%20Afric/a.altn%20TNC%20R/e.altport%20%20
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 (page [22, 23]) 61 EC-LEDS (2015). D/e.altv/e.altlopm/e.altnt Imp/a.altct Ass/e.altssm/e.altnt C/a.alts/e.alt Stud/y.alt: South Afric/a.alt. URL: https:/ /www.nr/e.altl./g.altov/docs/f/y.alt15osti/61757.pdf 62 USAID (2016). Clim/a.altt/e.alt Ch/a.altn/g.alt/e.alt Risk Proﬁl/e.alt – South/e.altrn Afric/a.alt. R/e.alt/g.altion/a.altl F/a.altct Sh/e.alt/e.altt. URL: https:/ /www.clim/a.altt/e.altlinks.or/g.alt/sit/e.alts/d/e.altf/a.altult/
 (page [23]) ﬁl/e.alts//a.altss/e.altt/docum/e.altnt/2016%20CRM%20F/a.altct%20Sh/e.alt/e.altt%20-%20South/e.altrn%20Afric/a.alt.pdf
 (page [23]) ' n Options
 (page [23]) 20 CLIMATE RISK COUNTRY PROFILE: SOUTH AFRICAAd/a.altpt/a.alttio n Options Energy generation, transmission, and expanded use is critical to the overall development agenda and economic growth of South Africa. Additionally, South Africa is a major e nergy supplier for Southern Africa and reductions in energy generation could result in adverse trickle-down impacts for the region. The country’s Energy Strategy is focused on supporting the country’s transition to a low carbon economy, with major implications for its energy sector. Since 2016, substantial investments have been made in renewable e nergy and two new high-efﬁciency coal-ﬁred power stations are nearing completion as part of the ageing plant replacement program. In addition, programs to increase efﬁciency and reduce emissions across the economy are being rolled out.65
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 (page [23]) While South Africa is a middle-income country, it still faces high poverty and has one of the highest inequality rates in the world, making the health of the country’s population vulnerable to climate change impacts. Climate change projections point to continued rising temperatures, more variable rainfall, rising seas, and more frequent extreme weather events. Impacts are expected in food and water security, human settlements, infrastructure and ecosystems, as well as health. Health impacts are expected to be realized through increasing heat stress, the altered range, seasonality and distribution of vector-borne diseases including malaria, dengue fever and yellow fever, air pollution and associated respiratory illnesses, communicable diseases such as HIV/AIDS, as well as water-borne illnesses such as cholera and diarrheal disease.66
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 (page [23]) RCP 2.6 RCP 4.5 RCP 6.0 RCP 8.5FIGURE 14. Proj/e.altct/e.altd Ch/a.altn/g.alt/e.alt in Coolin/g.alt D/e.alt/g.altr/e.alt/e.alt D/a.alt/y.alts (65°F) in South Afric/a.alt for th/e.alt P/e.altriod
 (page [23]) 2040–2059 (R/e.altf/e.altr/e.altnc/e.alt P/e.altriod, 1986–2005)63
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 (page [23]) –20DaysFIGURE 15. Proj/e.altct/e.altd W/a.altrm Sp/e.altll Dur/a.alttion Ind/e.altx in South Afric/a.alt (R/e.altf/e.altr/e.altnc/e.alt P/e.altriod,
 (page [23]) 1986–2005)64
 (page [23]) 63 WBG Clim/a.altt/e.alt Ch/a.altn/g.alt/e.alt Knowl/e.altd/g.alt/e.alt Port/a.altl (CCKP, 2021). South Afric/a.alt – En/e.altr/g.alt/y.alt. URL: https:/ /clim/a.altt/e.altknowl/e.altd/g.alt/e.altport/a.altl.worldb/a.altnk.or/g.alt/
 (page [23]) countr/y.alt/south-/a.altfric/a.alt/clim/a.altt/e.alt-s/e.altctor-/e.altn/e.altr/g.alt/y.alt
 (page [23]) 64 WBG Clim/a.altt/e.alt Ch/a.altn/g.alt/e.alt Knowl/e.altd/g.alt/e.alt Port/a.altl (CCKP, 2021). South Afric/a.alt En/e.altr/g.alt/y.alt S/e.altctor D/a.altshbo/a.altrd. URL: https:/ /clim/a.altt/e.altd/a.altt/a.alt.worldb/a.altnk.
 (page [23]) or/g.alt/CRM/e.altPort/a.altl/w/e.altb//e.altn/e.altr/g.alt/y.alt/oil-/g.alt/a.alts-/a.altnd-co/a.altl-minin/g.alt?countr/y.alt=ZAF&p/e.altriod=2080-2099
 (page [23]) 65 South Afric/a.alt (2016). N/a.alttion/a.altll/y.alt-D/e.altt/e.altrmin/e.altd Contributions. URL: https:/ /www4.unfccc.int/sit/e.alts/ndcst/a.alt/g.altin/g.alt/Publish/e.altdDocum/e.altnts/
 (page [23]) South%20Afric/a.alt%20First/South%20Afric/a.alt.pdf
 (page [24]) 66 WHO (2015). Clim/a.altt/e.alt /a.altnd H/e.alt/a.altlth Countr/y.alt Proﬁl/e.alt – South Afric/a.alt. URL: https:/ //a.altpps.who.int/iris/bitstr/e.alt/a.altm/h/a.altndl/e.alt/10665/246153/
 (page [24]) WHO-FWC-PHE-EPE-15.44-/e.altn/g.alt.pdf?s/e.altqu/e.altnc/e.alt=1
 (page [24]) 16.
 (page [24]) 21 CLIMATE RISK COUNTRY PROFILE: SOUTH AFRICAClim/a.altt/e.alt Ch/a.altn/g.alt/e.alt Imp/a.altcts In addition to coastal ﬂooding due to rising seas, inland river ﬂoods are common in South Africa. By the 2030s, an additional 8,500 people may be at risk of river ﬂoods annually as a result of climate change and 8,000 due to socio- economic change above the estimated 45,900 annually affected population in 2010. In addition to loss of life from drowning, ﬂooding can have extensive, indirect health effects, including impacts on food production, water provision, ecosystem disruption, infectious disease outbreak and vector distribution. The longer-term effects of ﬂooding may include posttraumatic stress and population displacement. Projected increases of mean annual temperature and the intensity and frequency of heat waves will result in a greater number of people at risk of heat-related medical conditions. The elderly, children, the chronically ill, the socially isolated and at-risk occupational groups are particularly
 (page [24]) vulnerable to heat-related conditions.67
 (page [24]) Additionally, rising temperatures, along with water scarcity, are of increasing concern for South Africa. Under a high emissions scenario for heat-related death in the elderly (65 + years) are projected to increase to about 1deaths per 100,000 by 2080 compared to the estimated baseline of approximately 2 deaths per 100,000 annually between 1961 and 1990. A rapid reduction in emissions could limit heat-related deaths in the elderly to about 20 deaths per 100,000 in 2080 ( Figure 16 ). In South Africa, the annual distribution of days with a high-heat index provides insight into the health hazard of heat. The annual distribution of days with a high-heat index provides insight into the health hazard of heat. Figure 17  shows the expected Number of Days with a Heat Index >35°C through the 2090s; appointing to a sharp increase in the number of very hot days, which will accelerate by mid-century and continue to sharply increase under a high-emission scenario (RCP8.5) through the end of the century. Night-time temperatures ( >20°C), will follow a similar warming, rising rapidly under a high-emission scenario (RCP8.5). Health impacts can be tracked by looking at the changing frequency of tropical nights, which will again, follow similar warming patterns. Tropical Nights ( Figure 18 ) graph represents the projected increase in tropical nights for different emission scenarios to demonstrate the difference in expected numbers of tropical nights.140
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 (page [24]) 65+ yearsFIGURE 16. H/e.alt/a.altt R/e.altl/a.altt/e.altd Mort/a.altlit/y.alt in Popul/a.alttion of 65 Y/e.alt/a.altrs or Old/e.altr in South Afric/a.alt.68 67 WHO (2015). Clim/a.altt/e.alt /a.altnd H/e.alt/a.altlth Countr/y.alt Proﬁl/e.alt – South Afric/a.alt. URL: https:/ //a.altpps.who.int/iris/bitstr/e.alt/a.altm/h/a.altndl/e.alt/10665/246153/
 (page [24]) WHO-FWC-PHE-EPE-15.44-/e.altn/g.alt.pdf?s/e.altqu/e.altnc/e.alt=1
 (page [25]) 68 WHO (2015). Clim/a.altt/e.alt /a.altnd H/e.alt/a.altlth Countr/y.alt Proﬁl/e.alt – South Afric/a.alt. URL: https:/ //a.altpps.who.int/iris/bitstr/e.alt/a.altm/h/a.altndl/e.alt/10665/246153/
 (page [25]) WHO-FWC-PHE-EPE-15.44-/e.altn/g.alt.pdf?s/e.altqu/e.altnc/e.alt=1
 (page [25]) 22 CLIMATE RISK COUNTRY PROFILE: SOUTH AFRICAAd/a.altpt/a.alttion Options A quantitative vulnerability and risk assessment for South Africa’s health sector is an important ﬁrst step in identifying the most critical climate change impacts and the most vulnerable populations and communities. To reduce the impacts of climate change on public health, context speciﬁc actions need to be implemented, particularly ones that align with the realities of the communities affected. As such, there is a need to develop locally-relevant health vulnerability assessments. South Africa’s National Climate Change Response Policy advocates for adaptation measures to reduce the impacts of climate change on human health, such as: reducing certain criteria pollutants (PM, Ozone and Sulphur Dioxide); developing and strengthening existing public awareness campaigns; developing heat-health action plans; improving biosafety; developing a spatial and temporal health data capture system; and integrating food security and sound nutritional policies into all adaptation strategies.71 South Africa’s health-care infrastructure can be upgraded to support more systemic climate change resilience. Capacity needs to be built in the requisite responses across all sectors of the population. Health care system personnel should receive additional training to be better informed of the relationship between climate change, seasonal variability, and health impacts. Building the capacity of the health sector will be instrumental in properly identifying diseases as
 (page [25]) they emerge.72
 (page [25]) Historical RCP 2.6 RCP 4.5 RCP 6.0 RCP 8.5
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 (page [25]) (R/e.altf/e.altr/e.altnc/e.alt P/e.altriod, 1986–2005)69
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 (page [25]) 0NightsFIGURE 18. Proj/e.altct/e.altd Numb/e.altr of Tropic/a.altl Ni/g.althts
 (page [25]) (Tmin >20°C) (R/e.altf/e.altr/e.altnc/e.alt P/e.altriod, 1986–2005)70
 (page [25]) 69 WBG Clim/a.altt/e.alt Ch/a.altn/g.alt/e.alt Knowl/e.altd/g.alt/e.alt Port/a.altl (CCKP, 2021). South Afric/a.alt H/e.alt/a.altlth S/e.altctor D/a.altshbo/a.altrd. URL: https:/ /clim/a.altt/e.altd/a.altt/a.alt.worldb/a.altnk.or/g.alt/
 (page [25]) CRM/e.altPort/a.altl/w/e.altb/h/e.alt/a.altlth/s/y.altst/e.altms-/a.altnd-s/e.altrvic/e.alt?countr/y.alt=ZAF&p/e.altriod=2080-2099
 (page [25]) 70 WBG Clim/a.altt/e.alt Ch/a.altn/g.alt/e.alt Knowl/e.altd/g.alt/e.alt Port/a.altl (CCKP, 2021). South Afric/a.alt H/e.alt/a.altlth S/e.altctor. URL: https:/ /clim/a.altt/e.altknowl/e.altd/g.alt/e.altport/a.altl.worldb/a.altnk.
 (page [25]) or/g.alt/countr/y.alt/south-/a.altfric/a.alt/clim/a.altt/e.alt-s/e.altctor-h/e.alt/a.altlth
 (page [25]) 71 GIZ (2018). Clim/a.altt/e.alt Ch/a.altn/g.alt/e.alt /a.altnd Hum/a.altn H/e.alt/a.altlth – South Afric/a.alt. Clim/a.altt/e.alt /a.altnd Imp/a.altcts F/a.altctsh/e.alt/e.altt S/e.altri/e.alts, F/a.altctsh/e.alt/e.altt 5 of 7. URL: https:/ /
 (page [25]) www./e.altnvironm/e.altnt./g.altov./z.alt/a.alt/sit/e.alts/d/e.altf/a.altult/ﬁl/e.alts/docs/f/a.altctsh/e.alt/e.altt_clim/a.altt/e.altch/a.altn/g.alt/e.alt_h/e.alt/a.altlth.pdf
 (page [25, 26]) 72 D/e.altp/a.altrtm/e.altnt of Environm/e.altnt/a.altl Aﬀ/a.altirs (2018). South Afric/a.alt’s Third N/a.alttion/a.altl Communic/a.alttion und/e.altr th/e.alt Unit/e.altd N/a.alttions Fr/a.altm/e.altwork Conv/e.altntion on Clim/a.altt/e.alt Ch/a.altn/g.alt/e.alt. URL: https:/ /unfccc.int/sit/e.alts/d/e.altf/a.altult/ﬁl/e.alts/r/e.altsourc/e.alt/South%20Afric/a.altn%20TNC%20R/e.altport%20%20
 (page [26]) to%20th/e.alt%20UNFCCC_31%20Au/g.alt.pdf
 (page [26]) 23 CLIMATE RISK COUNTRY PROFILE: SOUTH AFRICA
 (page [26]) Institution/a.altl Fr/a.altm/e.altwork for Ad/a.altpt/a.alttion
 (page [26]) South Africa’s Department of Environmental Affairs serves as the country’s climate change focal point and is responsible for developing and implementing the Climate Change Strategy, and ensuring the country is on track to meet its obligations outlined in its NDC and development plans. In South Africa, climate change is recognized as a cross-cutting issue and policies and implementation include cross-sector efforts and coordination. Cross sector efforts involve actions from national departments of: Energy, Mineral Resources, Basic & Higher Education, Health, Agriculture, Forestry & Fisheries, Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs including the National Disaster & Risk Management Centre, Transport, Science and Technology, Statistics, National Treasury, Trade and Industry, Water Affairs, Human Settlements, International relations & Cooperation, Public Enterprises, and the Presidency.73
 (page [26]) Polic/y.alt Fr/a.altm/e.altwork for Ad/a.altpt/a.alttion
 (page [26]) South Africa submitted its Third National Communication to the UNFCCC in 2018, its Second Biennial Update Report in 2017 , and its Nationally Determined Contributions to the UNFCCC in 2016; South Africa’s Updated Nationally Determined Contribution is expected to be released late 2021. These documents, in conjunction with its National Climate Change Adaptation Strategy (2018) and National Climate Change Response-White Paper (2017), provide the guidance and platform to integrate responsible environmental management with climate change adaptation strategies, in line with the country’s social and economic development targets.74 These strategies focus on the preparation and strengthening of institutional frameworks for improved management of climate change effects and to make available the necessary resources to support strategic adaptation activities and to advance low emission
 (page [26]) and climate resilient development.75
 (page [26]) National Frameworks and Plans
 (page [26]) • Third National Communication to the UNFCCC  (2018) • Second Biennial Update Report  (2017)
 (page [26]) • Nationally Determined Contribution  (2016)
 (page [26]) • Second National Communication to the UNFCCC  (2011) • National Climate Change Adaptation Strategy , draft (2018) • Climate Change Response-White Paper  (2017)
 (page [26]) • National Energy Act  (2008)
 (page [26]) • National Climate Change Response Strategy  (2004)ADAPTATION 73 D/e.altp/a.altrtm/e.altnt of Environm/e.altnt/a.altl Aﬀ/a.altirs (2018). South Afric/a.alt’s Third N/a.alttion/a.altl Communic/a.alttion und/e.altr th/e.alt Unit/e.altd N/a.alttions Fr/a.altm/e.altwork Conv/e.altntion on Clim/a.altt/e.alt Ch/a.altn/g.alt/e.alt. URL: https:/ /unfccc.int/sit/e.alts/d/e.altf/a.altult/ﬁl/e.alts/r/e.altsourc/e.alt/South%20Afric/a.altn%20TNC%20R/e.altport%20%20
 (page [26]) to%20th/e.alt%20UNFCCC_31%20Au/g.alt.pdf
 (page [26]) 74 D/e.altp/a.altrtm/e.altnt of Environm/e.altnt/a.altl Aﬀ/a.altirs (2017). N/a.alttion/a.altl Clim/a.altt/e.alt Ch/a.altn/g.alt/e.alt R/e.altspons/e.alt – Whit/e.alt P/a.altp/e.altr. URL: https:/ /www./e.altnvironm/e.altnt.
 (page [27]) /g.altov./z.alt/a.alt/sit/e.alts/d/e.altf/a.altult/ﬁl/e.alts/l/e.alt/g.altisl/a.alttions/n/a.alttion/a.altl_clim/a.altt/e.altch/a.altn/g.alt/e.alt_r/e.altspons/e.alt_whit/e.altp/a.altp/e.altr.pdf
 (page [27]) 75 South Afric/a.alt (2016). N/a.alttion/a.altll/y.alt-D/e.altt/e.altrmin/e.altd Contributions. URL: https:/ /www4.unfccc.int/sit/e.alts/ndcst/a.alt/g.altin/g.alt/Publish/e.altdDocum/e.altnts/
 (page [27]) South%20Afric/a.alt%20First/South%20Afric/a.alt.pdf
 (page [27]) 24 CLIMATE RISK COUNTRY PROFILE: SOUTH AFRICAR/e.altcomm/e.altnd/a.alttions
 (page [27]) R/e.alts/e.alt/a.altrch G/a.altps
 (page [27]) • Gain a better understanding of the timing and magnitude of incidence of several important indicators of climate change in the future, as well as the key vulnerabilities, development impact, and possible adaptation responses • Widen the participation of the public, scientiﬁc institutions, women, and local communities in planning and management, accounting for approaches and methods of gender equity • Strengthen environmental monitoring capabilities for strengthened and more effective environmental management • South Africa has one of the most advanced research, observation, and climate modeling programs in Africa, however additional investment in weather stations and expanding the country’s national hydro-meteorological monitoring system can further advance networking for the measurement of climate parameters76 • Strengthen the technical capacity to integrate climate-smart agriculture and climate change risk management into farmer’s and the wider agricultural sector77
 (page [27]) D/a.altt/a.alt /a.altnd Inform/a.alttion G/a.altps
 (page [27]) • Develop early warning systems about dangerous hydrometeorological phenomena and climate risk management • Ensure that nation-wide climate change and atmosphere monitoring systems are maintained and enhanced where necessary, including through monitoring networks at appropriate spatial density and frequency78
 (page [27]) Institution/a.altl G/a.altps
 (page [27]) • Ensure integration of National Environmental Strategy goals are developed within sectoral and regional plans79 • Implement cross-sectoral climate-smart solutions at national and subnational levels • Integrate climate change concerns into relevant policies and planning processes at the state and national levels 76 D/e.altp/a.altrtm/e.altnt of Environm/e.altnt/a.altl Aﬀ/a.altirs (2018). South Afric/a.alt’s Third N/a.alttion/a.altl Communic/a.alttion und/e.altr th/e.alt Unit/e.altd N/a.alttions Fr/a.altm/e.altwork Conv/e.altntion on Clim/a.altt/e.alt Ch/a.altn/g.alt/e.alt. URL: https:/ /unfccc.int/sit/e.alts/d/e.altf/a.altult/ﬁl/e.alts/r/e.altsourc/e.alt/South%20Afric/a.altn%20TNC%20R/e.altport%20%20
 (page [27]) to%20th/e.alt%20UNFCCC_31%20Au/g.alt.pdf
 (page [27]) 77 SADC S/e.altcr/e.altt/a.altri/a.altt (2016). Clim/a.altt/e.alt Ch/a.altn/g.alt/e.alt Ad/a.altpt/a.alttion in SADC, A str/a.altt/e.alt/g.alt/y.alt for th/e.alt W/a.altt/e.altr S/e.altctor. URL: https:/ /www.s/a.altdc.int/
 (page [27]) ﬁl/e.alts/2213/5293/3544/SADC_Clim/a.altt/e.alt_Ch/a.altn/g.alt/e.alt_Ad/a.altpt/a.alttion_for_th/e.alt_W/a.altt/e.altr_S/e.altctor_bookl/e.altt.pdf
 (page [27]) 78 D/e.altp/a.altrtm/e.altnt of Environm/e.altnt/a.altl Aﬀ/a.altirs (2018). South Afric/a.alt’s Third N/a.alttion/a.altl Communic/a.alttion und/e.altr th/e.alt Unit/e.altd N/a.alttions Fr/a.altm/e.altwork Conv/e.altntion on Clim/a.altt/e.alt Ch/a.altn/g.alt/e.alt. URL: https:/ /unfccc.int/sit/e.alts/d/e.altf/a.altult/ﬁl/e.alts/r/e.altsourc/e.alt/South%20Afric/a.altn%20TNC%20R/e.altport%20%20
 (page [27]) to%20th/e.alt%20UNFCCC_31%20Au/g.alt.pdf
 (page [31]) 79 D/e.altp/a.altrtm/e.altnt of Environm/e.altnt/a.altl Aﬀ/a.altirs (2018). South Afric/a.alt’s Third N/a.alttion/a.altl Communic/a.alttion und/e.altr th/e.alt Unit/e.altd N/a.alttions Fr/a.altm/e.altwork Conv/e.altntion on Clim/a.altt/e.alt Ch/a.altn/g.alt/e.alt. URL: https:/ /unfccc.int/sit/e.alts/d/e.altf/a.altult/ﬁl/e.alts/r/e.altsourc/e.alt/South%20Afric/a.altn%20TNC%20R/e.altport%20%20
 (page [31]) to%20th/e.alt%20UNFCCC_31%20Au/g.alt.pdf
 (page [32]) SOUTH AFRICA
 (page [32]) CLIMATE RISK COUNTRY PROFILE
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 data/transition_reports/World Bank Climate Change Country Reports/15875-WB_Central Africa Republic Country Profile-WEB.pdf
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 (page [1]) ii CLIMATE RISK COUNTRY PROFILE: CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLICCOPYRIGHT © 2021 by the World Bank Group 1818 H Street NW, Washington, DC 20433
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 (page [1, 2, 3]) The material in this work is subject to copyright. Because the WBG encourages dissemination of its knowledge, this work may be reproduced, in whole or in part, for noncommercial purposes as long as full attribution to this work is given. Please cite the work as follows: Climate Risk Proﬁle: Central African Republic (2021): The World Bank Group. Any queries on rights and licenses, including subsidiary rights, should be addressed to World Bank Publications, The World Bank Group, 1818 H Street NW, Washington, DC 20433, USA; fax: 202-522-2625; e-mail: [email protected] . Cover Photos:  © Flore de Preneuf / World Bank, “ Timber is ﬂoated on Congo river to deport ” May18, 2013 via Flickr, Creative Commons CC BY-NC-ND 2.0. © Dominic Chavez/World Bank, “ Students raise their hands to answer a question ” May 20, 2013 via Flickr, Creative Commons CC BY-NC-ND 2.0. Graphic Design: Circle Graphics , Reisterstown, MD. iii CLIMATE RISK COUNTRY PROFILE: CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLICACKNOWLEDGEMENTS This proﬁle is part of a series of Climate Risk Country Proﬁles developed by the World Bank Group (WBG). The country proﬁle synthesizes most relevant data and information on climate change, disaster risk reduction, and adaptation actions and policies at the country level. The country proﬁle series are designed as a quick reference source for development practitioners to better integrate climate resilience in development planning and policy making. . This effort is managed and led by Veronique Morin (Senior Climate Change Specialist, WBG) and Ana E. Bucher (Senior Climate Change Specialist, WBG). This proﬁle was written by MacKenzie Dove (Senior Climate Change Consultant, WBG). Additional support was provided by Jason Johnston (Operations Analyst, WBG) and Yunziyi Lang (Climate Change Analyst, WBG). Climate and climate-related information is largely drawn from the Climate Change Knowledge Portal (CCKP) , a WBG online platform with available global climate data and analysis based on the latest Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) reports and datasets. The team is grateful for all comments and suggestions received from the sector, regional, and country development specialists, as well as climate research scientists and institutions for their advice a 4 : i ' ' ‘
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 (page [3]) iv CLIMATE RISK COUNTRY PROFILE: CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLICFOREWORD .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 1 COUNTRY OVERVIEW  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 2 CLIMATOLOGY   .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 5 Clim/a.altt/e.alt B/a.alts/e.altlin/e.alt  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 5 Ov/e.altrvi/e.altw  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 5 K/e.alt/y.alt Tr/e.altnds   .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 7 Clim/a.altt/e.alt Futur/e.alt  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 8 Ov/e.altrvi/e.altw  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 8 K/e.alt/y.alt Tr/e.altnds   .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  10 CLIMATE RELATED NATURAL HAZARDS  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  12 Ov/e.altrvi/e.altw   .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  12 K/e.alt/y.alt Tr/e.altnds .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  13 Implic/a.alttions for DRM  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  15 CLIMATE CHANGE IMPACTS TO KEY SECTORS  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  15 A/g.altricultur/e.alt   .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  16 W/a.altt/e.altr .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  18 For/e.altstr/y.alt .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  21 En/e.altr/g.alt/y.alt   .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 22 H/e.alt/a.altlth .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 24 ADAPTATION .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  27 Institution/a.altl Fr/a.altm/e.altwork for Ad/a.altpt/a.alttion .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  27 Polic/y.alt Fr/a.altm/e.altwork for Ad/a.altpt/a.alttion   .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 28 R/e.altcomm/e.altnd/a.alttions .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  28 R/e.alts/e.alt/a.altrch G/a.altps .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 28 D/a.altt/a.alt /a.altnd Inform/a.alttion G/a.altps  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  29 Institution/a.altl G/a.altps  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  29
 (page [3]) CONTENTS
 (page [4]) 1 CLIMATE RISK COUNTRY PROFILE: CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC Climate change is a major risk to good development outcomes, and the World Bank Group is committed to playing an important role in helping countries integrate climate action into their core development agendas. The World Bank Group is committed to supporting client countries to invest in and build a low-carbon, climate-resilient future, helping them to be better prepared to adapt to current and future climate impacts. The World Bank Group is investing in incorporating and systematically managing climate risks in development operations through its individual corporate commitments. A key aspect of the World Bank Group’s Action Plan on Adaptation and Resilience (2019) is to help countries shift from addressing adaptation as an incremental cost and isolated investment to systematically incorporating climate risks and opportunities at every phase of policy planning, investment design, implementation and evaluation of development outcomes. For all IDA and IBRD operations, climate and disaster risk screening is one of the mandatory corporate climate commitments. This is supported by the Bank Group’s Climate and Disaster Risk Screening Tool which enables all Bank staff to assess short- and long-term climate and disaster risks in operations and national or sectoral planning processes. This screening tool draws up-to-date and relevant information from the World Bank’s Climate Change Knowledge Portal, a comprehensive online ‘one-stop shop’ for global, regional, and country data related to climate change and development. Recognizing the value of consistent, easy-to-use technical resources for client countries as well as to support respective internal climate risk assessment and adaptation planning processes, the World Bank Group’s Climate Change Group has developed this content. Standardizing and pooling expertise facilitates the World Bank Group in conducting initial assessments of climate risks and opportunities across sectors within a country, within institutional portfolios across regions, and acts as a global resource for development practitioners. For developing countries, the climate risk proﬁles are intended to serve as public goods to facilitate upstream country diagnostics, policy dialogue, and strategic planning by providing comprehensive overviews of trends and projected changes in key climate parameters, sector-speciﬁc implications, relevant policies and programs, adaptation priorities and opportunities for further actions. It is my hope that these efforts will spur deepening of long-term risk management in developing countries and our engagement in supporting climate change adaptation planning at operational levels.
 (page [4]) Bernice Van Bronkhorst
 (page [4]) Global Director
 (page [4]) Climate Change Group (CCG)
 (page [4]) The World Bank Group (WBG)
 (page [5]) FOREWORD
 (page [5]) * National capital
 (page [5]) 2 CLIMATE RISK COUNTRY PROFILE: CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC
 (page [5]) COUNTRY OVERVIEW
 (page [5]) The Central African Republic, herein CAR, is a landlocked country in Central Africa, located between 2° and 11° latitude north, and 13° and 27° longitude east. It has a total land area of 623,000 km2 and shares borders to the north with Chad, to the northeast with Sudan, to the east with South Sudan, in the south by the Congo and Democratic Republic of Congo, and to the west with Cameroon.1 The country’s terrain consists of a vast peneplain dominated by two mountain ranges at the eastern and western ends. These are joined by a central ‘spine’, which separates the two principal drainage sources for the country: the Chari-Longue Basin in the north, and Congo Basin in the south. Due to the country’s location, CAR has a relatively favorable climate conditions, that are primarily hot and humid, characterized by a dry and rainy season. CAR has a high degree of biological diversity and is composed of ﬁve large phytogeographic zones, each characterized by a speciﬁc fauna: the Guinean forest zone of dense humid forests in the south; the Sudano-Ubangian zone, sheltering dense semi-humid, as well as open and dry forests; the Sudano-Guinean and Sudano- Sahelian zones, composed of various types of savannahs; and the Sahelian zone, consisting of steppes in the north ( Figure 1 ).2 The country is endowed with rich agricultural lands and enormous natural resources, such as wood, gold, and diamonds, the exploitation of which remains rudimentary and artisanal,3 however intense poverty, conﬂict, and a stagnated economy has resulted in CAR ranked 188 out of 189 countries on the UNDP’s Human
 (page [5]) Development Index (2019).4
 (page [5]) CAR is a least-developed country and one of the poorest countries in the world and continues to be impacted by its long history of conﬂict, poor governance, weak institutions. It is still recovering from the latest series of conﬂicts that broke out in 2013. The country held its ﬁrst democratic elections in 1993 with the accession of Ange Félix Patassé and the establishment of the country’s new National Assembly. However, the country continues to be plagues by violence, conﬂict and internal displacement. At the time of writing, it is estimated that, there are currently over 729,000 internally displaced persons in the Central African Republic6 and 575,000 refugees in neighboring 1  UNDP (2019). C/e.altntr/a.altl Afric/a.altn R/e.altpublic — Clim/a.altt/e.alt Ch/a.altn/g.alt/e.alt Ad/a.altpt/a.alttion Ov/e.altrvi/e.altw. URL: https:/ /www./a.altd/a.altpt/a.alttion-undp.or/g.alt//e.altxplor/e.alt/
 (page [5]) middl/e.alt-/a.altfric/a.alt/c/e.altntr/a.altl-/a.altfric/a.altn-r/e.altpublic
 (page [5]) 2  C/e.altntr/a.altl Afric/a.altn R/e.altpublic (2016). N/a.alttion/a.altll/y.alt-D/e.altt/e.altrmin/e.altd Contributions. URL: https:/ /www4.unfccc.int/sit/e.alts/ndcst/a.alt/g.altin/g.alt/
 (page [5]) Publish/e.altdDocum/e.altnts/C/e.altntr/a.altl%20Afric/a.altn%20R/e.altpublic%20First/INDC_R%C3%A9publiqu/e.alt%20C/e.altntr/a.altfric/a.altin/e.alt_EN.pdf
 (page [5]) 3  UNDP (2019). C/e.altntr/a.altl Afric/a.altn R/e.altpublic — Clim/a.altt/e.alt Ch/a.altn/g.alt/e.alt Ad/a.altpt/a.alttion Ov/e.altrvi/e.altw. URL: https:/ /www./a.altd/a.altpt/a.alttion-undp.or/g.alt//e.altxplor/e.alt/
 (page [5]) middl/e.alt-/a.altfric/a.alt/c/e.altntr/a.altl-/a.altfric/a.altn-r/e.altpublic
 (page [5]) 4  UNDP (2020). Hum/a.altn D/e.altv/e.altlopm/e.altnt R/e.altports — Hum/a.altn D/e.altv/e.altlopm/e.altnt Ind/e.altx. URL: http:/ /hdr.undp.or/g.alt//e.altn/d/a.altt/a.alt 5  World B/a.altnk (2019). Int/e.altrn/a.altl Clim/a.altt/e.alt Mi/g.altr/a.alttion Proﬁl/e.alt — CAR. 6  UNHCR (20201). Op/e.altr/a.alttion/a.altl Port/a.alt — C/e.altntr/a.altl Afric/a.altn R/e.altpublic R/e.alt/g.altion/a.altl R/e.altspons/e.alt. D/a.altt/a.alt /a.altcc/e.altss/e.altd M/a.alt/y.alt 2021. URL: https:/ /www.
 (page [6]) worldb/a.altnk.or/g.alt//e.altn/countr/y.alt/c/e.altntr/a.altl/a.altfric/a.altnr/e.altpublic/ov/e.altrvi/e.altw
 (page [6]) FIGURE 1. El/e.altv/a.alttion of C/e.altntr/a.altl Afric/a.altn R/e.altpublic5
 (page [6]) (2019)
 (page [6]) (2018)
 (page [6]) (2018)
 (page [6]) -) (2019)
 (page [6]) 3 CLIMATE RISK COUNTRY PROFILE: CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLICcountries. Conﬂict and political instability continue to undermine the country’s development agenda. On February 6, 2019, the Government of the Central African Republic signed an African Union-mediated peace agreement with
 (page [6]) 14 armed groups.7
 (page [6]) CAR has a population of just over 4.7 million people (2019) with an annual population growth rate of 1.7%.8 The country has a Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of $2.2 billion (2019) and a current annual growth rate of 3.0% (2019) ( Table 1 ).9 Approximately 41.4% of the population currently lives in urban areas. This is projected to increase to 48% and 60% of the population by 2030 and 2050, respectively.10 Despite its relatively recent positive growth, poverty remains pervasive and elevated and as of 2019 it is estimated that approximately 71% of the population lives below the extreme poverty rate ( <$1.90 per day); up from 66%.11 The high levels of poverty and low-degree of development in CAR limits capacity of poor households and communities to manage climate risk, increasing their vulnerability to climate-related shocks. Impacts of climate change will affect the poorest and most vulnerable the most and also hinder CAR’s development agenda and efforts at economic sustainability and political stability, further impacting poor and vulnerable groups. While the most recent estimates show that more than 71% of the population is poor, there have been improvements in the provision of key public services in the country’s southwestern region.12 TABLE 1. D/a.altt/a.alt sn/a.altpshot: K/e.alt/y.alt d/e.altv/e.altlopm/e.altnt indic/a.alttors13
 (page [6]) Indicator
 (page [6]) Life Expectancy at Birth, Total (Years)  (2019) 53.3 Population Density (People per sq. km Land Area)  (2018) 7. 2 % of Population with Access to Electricity  (2018) 32.4% GDP per Capita (Current US$ ) (2019) $467 .90 7  World B/a.altnk (2021). CAR — Ov/e.altrvi/e.altw. URL: https:/ /www.worldb/a.altnk.or/g.alt//e.altn/countr/y.alt/c/e.altntr/a.altl/a.altfric/a.altnr/e.altpublic/ov/e.altrvi/e.altw 8  World B/a.altnk D/a.altt/a.alt B/a.altnk (2021). World D/e.altv/e.altlopm/e.altnt Indic/a.alttors, CAR. URL: https:/ /d/a.altt/a.altb/a.altnk.worldb/a.altnk.or/g.alt/sourc/e.alt/world-d/e.altv/e.altlopm/e.altnt-
 (page [6]) indic/a.alttors
 (page [6]) 9  World B/a.altnk (2021). CAR — Ov/e.altrvi/e.altw. URL: https:/ /www.worldb/a.altnk.or/g.alt//e.altn/countr/y.alt/c/e.altntr/a.altl/a.altfric/a.altnr/e.altpublic/ov/e.altrvi/e.altw 10  World B/a.altnk D/a.altt/a.alt B/a.altnk (2021). Popul/a.alttion /e.altstim/a.altt/e.alts /a.altnd proj/e.altctions, CAR. URL: https:/ /d/a.altt/a.altb/a.altnk.worldb/a.altnk.or/g.alt/sourc/e.alt/popul/a.alttion-
 (page [6]) /e.altstim/a.altt/e.alts-/a.altnd-proj/e.altctions
 (page [6, 7]) 11  World B/a.altnk (2021). CAR — Ov/e.altrvi/e.altw. URL: https:/ /www.worldb/a.altnk.or/g.alt//e.altn/countr/y.alt/c/e.altntr/a.altl/a.altfric/a.altnr/e.altpublic/ov/e.altrvi/e.altw 12 World B/a.altnk (2021). CAR — Ov/e.altrvi/e.altw. URL: https:/ /www.worldb/a.altnk.or/g.alt//e.altn/countr/y.alt/c/e.altntr/a.altl/a.altfric/a.altnr/e.altpublic/ov/e.altrvi/e.altw 13  World B/a.altnk (2021). D/a.altt/a.altB/a.altnk — World D/e.altv/e.altlopm/e.altnt Indic/a.alttors. URL: https:/ /d/a.altt/a.altb/a.altnk.worldb/a.altnk.or/g.alt/sourc/e.alt/world-d/e.altv/e.altlopm/e.altnt-
 (page [7]) indic/a.alttors
 (page [7]) oe
 (page [7]) Jetermined Contribution to the UNFCCC in 2016 and its Second Nationa! 1g an economy that is diversified 4 CLIMATE RISK COUNTRY PROFILE: CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLICThe ND-GAIN Index14 ranks 181 countries using a score which calculates a country’s vulnerability to climate change and other global challenges as well as their readiness to improve resilience. This Index aims to help businesses and the public sector better identify vulnerability and readiness in order to better prioritize investment for more efﬁcient responses to global challenges. Due to a combination of political, geographic, and social factors, Central African Republic is recognized as highly vulnerable to climate change impacts, ranked 180 out of 181 countries in the 2020 ND-GAIN Index. The more vulnerable a country is the lower their score, while the more ready a country is to improve its resilience the higher it will be. Norway has the highest score and is ranked 1st. Figure 2  is a time-series plot of the ND-GAIN Index showing the CAR’s progress over time. The CAR submitted its Nationally-Determined Contribution  to the UNFCCC in 2016 and its Second National Communication to the UNFCCC  (2015), which outlines the country’s vision in building an economy that is diversiﬁed and sustainable, which also adheres to the country’s needs to protect its environmental resources. It is focused on a low-carbon development approach to build and diversify the country’s economy, committed to technological innovation. Key adaptation priorities include the country’s agricultural, forestry, livestock, land use planning, energy security, water resources management, and public health sectors.15
 (page [7]) Gr/e.alt/e.altn, Inclusiv/e.alt /a.altnd R/e.altsili/e.altnt R/e.altcov/e.altr/y.alt
 (page [7]) The coronavirus disease (COVID-19) pandemic has led to unprecedented adverse social and economic impacts. Further, the pandemic has demonstrated the compounding impacts of adding yet another shock on top of the multiple challenges that vulnerable populations already face in day-to-day life, with the potential to create devastating health, social, economic and environmental crises that can leave a deep, long-lasting mark. However, as governments take urgent action and lay the foundations for their ﬁnancial, economic, and social recovery, they have a unique opportunity to create economies that are more sustainable, inclusive and resilient. Short and long- term recovery efforts should prioritize investments that boost jobs and economic activity; have positive impacts on human, social and natural capital; protect biodiversity and ecosystems services; boost resilience; and advance the decarbonization of economies.FIGURE 2. ND-GAIN Ind/e.altx for th/e.alt C/e.altntr/a.altl
 (page [7]) Afric/a.altn R/e.altpublic
 (page [7]) Central African Republic
 (page [7]) 1995
 (page [7]) 1998
 (page [7]) 2001
 (page [7]) 2004
 (page [7]) 2007
 (page [7]) 2010
 (page [7]) 2013
 (page [7]) 2016
 (page [7]) Score
 (page [7]) 27293133
 (page [7]) 2537
 (page [7]) 35
 (page [8, 7]) 14  Univ/e.altrsit/y.alt of Notr/e.alt D/a.altm/e.alt (2020). Notr/e.alt D/a.altm/e.alt Glob/a.altl Ad/a.altpt/a.alttion Initi/a.alttiv/e.alt. URL: https:/ //g.alt/a.altin.nd./e.altdu/our-work/countr/y.alt-ind/e.altx/ 15  C/e.altntr/a.altl Afric/a.altn R/e.altpublic (2016). N/a.alttion/a.altll/y.alt-D/e.altt/e.altrmin/e.altd Contributions. URL: https:/ /www4.unfccc.int/sit/e.alts/ndcst/a.alt/g.altin/g.alt/
 (page [8]) Publish/e.altdDocum/e.altnts/C/e.altntr/a.altl%20Afric/a.altn%20R/e.altpublic%20First/INDC_R%C3%A9publiqu/e.alt%20C/e.altntr/a.altfric/a.altin/e.alt_EN.pdf
 (page [8]) e. The Sudano-Ubangian zone
 (page [8]) 5 CLIMATE RISK COUNTRY PROFILE: CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLICClim/a.altt/e.alt B/a.alts/e.altlin/e.alt
 (page [8]) Ov/e.altrvi/e.altw
 (page [8]) CAR has a tropical, humid equatorial climate in the south and a Sahelo-Sudanian climate in the north. The country experiences hot, dry winters and mild to hot, wet summers (June to August). Only the northernmost part of the country, near the borders to Chad and Sudan, have a hot semi-arid climate. CAR is a relatively homogenous territory, which receives abundant rainfall. Across the country, annual average temperatures range from 23°C in the south to 26°C in the north. The country’s altitude does play a role in temperature variation. Highest temperatures are typically observed in march and the lowest in July during the rainy season.16 Two high pressure zones are responsible for the alternation between rainy and dry seasons in CAR. In winter (December to March) the Libyan anticyclone in the north brings dry air to the country together with the north-east wind (Harmattan). In the northern summer, the St. Helena high pressure zone pushes moist air from south-west to north-east across the country, bringing decreasing amounts of rainfall towards the north-east. The dry season is typically from November to February but is longer in the north, and with little to no rainfall from October to April. The rainy season varies in length from over 300 days in the south to about 125 days in the north-east.17 CAR has ﬁve main regions, with differing climate characteristics. The Guinean forest zone is characterized in the western band, with nine months of rainy season and one dry season. In its eastern band total precipitation is almost everywhere higher than 1,600 mm. This area has the area of largest forest coverage. The Sudano-Ubangian zone occupies a narrow band between Bossembélé and Baboua and a small section of Bambari and Yalinga. The area has semi-humid forests with less coverage. The Sudano-Guinean zone is dominated by savannas and a noticeable deterioration of the rainy season. The Sudano-Sahelian zone extends from Paoua to Ouadda-Djallé, is characterized by relative humidity and more annual sunshine. It is dominated by the country’s savanna. And the Sahel zone centers around Birao and is experiences longer dry seasons than rainy seasons, with rainfall less than 700 mm per year.18 Climate variability and longer-term change are likely to exacerbate the country’s existing vulnerabilities of high poverty rates, food insecurity, political instability and conﬂict. Food security is of primary concern as the majority of the country’s agriculture is rain-fed and produced by small-holder farmers.19
 (page [8]) CLIMATOLOGY
 (page [8]) 16  Ministr/y.alt of Environm/e.altnt, Ecolo/g.alt/y.alt /a.altnd Sust/a.altin/a.altbl/e.alt D/e.altv/e.altlopm/e.altnt (2015). S/e.altcond N/a.alttion/a.altl Communic/a.alttion to th/e.alt UNFCCC — C/e.altntr/a.altl
 (page [8]) Afric/a.altn R/e.altpublic. URL: https:/ /unfccc.int/sit/e.alts/d/e.altf/a.altult/ﬁl/e.alts/r/e.altsourc/e.alt/c/a.altfnc2.pdf
 (page [8]) 17  GERICS (2015). Clim/a.altt/e.alt-F/a.altct-Sh/e.alt/e.altt, C/e.altntr/a.altl Afric/a.altn R/e.altpublic. 18  Ministr/y.alt of Environm/e.altnt, Ecolo/g.alt/y.alt /a.altnd Sust/a.altin/a.altbl/e.alt D/e.altv/e.altlopm/e.altnt (2015). S/e.altcond N/a.alttion/a.altl Communic/a.alttion to th/e.alt UNFCCC — C/e.altntr/a.altl
 (page [9]) Afric/a.altn R/e.altpublic. URL: https:/ /unfccc.int/sit/e.alts/d/e.altf/a.altult/ﬁl/e.alts/r/e.altsourc/e.alt/c/a.altfnc2.pdf
 (page [9]) 19  C/e.altntr/a.altl Afric/a.altn R/e.altpublic (2016). N/a.alttion/a.altll/y.alt-D/e.altt/e.altrmin/e.altd Contributions. URL: https:/ /www4.unfccc.int/sit/e.alts/ndcst/a.alt/g.altin/g.alt/
 (page [9]) Publish/e.altdDocum/e.altnts/C/e.altntr/a.altl%20Afric/a.altn%20R/e.altpublic%20First/INDC_R%C3%A9publiqu/e.alt%20C/e.altntr/a.altfric/a.altin/e.alt_EN.pdf
 (page [9]) ~ Table 2) shows historical
 (page [9]) mm. Most significant rainfall is experienced in
 (page [9]) 6 CLIMATE RISK COUNTRY PROFILE: CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLICAnalysis of data from the World Bank Group’s Climate Change Knowledge Portal (CCKP) ( Table 2 ) shows historical information for 1901–2020. Mean annual temperature for CAR is 25.1°C, with average monthly temperatures ranging between 27 (August). Mean annual precipitation is 1,369.6 mm. Most signiﬁcant rainfall is experienced in the country from May to October as shown in the seasonal cycle for the country’s latest climatology, 1991–2020 (Figure 3 ).20 Figure 4  shows the spatial variation of observed average annual precipitation and temperature
 (page [9]) across CAR.
 (page [9]) TABLE 2. D/a.altt/a.alt sn/a.altpshot: Summ/a.altr/y.alt st/a.alttistics
 (page [9]) Climate Variables 1901–2020
 (page [9]) Mean Annual Temperature (°C) 25.1°C
 (page [9]) Mean Annual Precipitation (mm) 1396.6 mm Mean Maximum Annual Temperature (°C) 31.6°C Mean Minimum Annual Temperature (°C) 18.6°C
 (page [9]) Rainfall Temperature
 (page [9]) Jan
 (page [9]) Feb
 (page [9]) Mar
 (page [9]) Apr
 (page [9]) May
 (page [9]) Jun
 (page [9]) Jul
 (page [9]) Aug
 (page [9]) Sep
 (page [9]) Oct
 (page [9]) Nov
 (page [9]) Dec
 (page [9]) Temperature (°C)
 (page [9]) Rainfall (mm)
 (page [9]) 24
 (page [9]) 21
 (page [9]) 27
 (page [9]) 30
 (page [9]) 0
 (page [9]) 100
 (page [9]) 200
 (page [9]) 300FIGURE 3. Av/e.altr/a.alt/g.alt/e.alt monthl/y.alt t/e.altmp/e.altr/a.alttur/e.alt /a.altnd r/a.altinf/a.altll for CAR, 1991–202021 20  WBG Clim/a.altt/e.alt Ch/a.altn/g.alt/e.alt Knowl/e.altd/g.alt/e.alt Port/a.altl (CCKP, 2021). CAR. URL: https:/ /clim/a.altt/e.altknowl/e.altd/g.alt/e.altport/a.altl.worldb/a.altnk.or/g.alt/countr/y.alt/
 (page [10]) c/e.altntr/a.altl-/a.altfric/a.altn-r/e.altpublic/clim/a.altt/e.alt-d/a.altt/a.alt-historic/a.altl
 (page [10]) 21  WBG Clim/a.altt/e.alt Ch/a.altn/g.alt/e.alt Knowl/e.altd/g.alt/e.alt Port/a.altl (CCKP, 2021). CAR. URL: https:/ /clim/a.altt/e.altknowl/e.altd/g.alt/e.altport/a.altl.worldb/a.altnk.or/g.alt/countr/y.alt/
 (page [10]) c/e.altntr/a.altl-/a.altfric/a.altn-r/e.altpublic
 (page [10]) 1100
 (page [10]) Figure 5).
 (page [10]) 7 CLIMATE RISK COUNTRY PROFILE: CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLICK/e.alt/y.alt Tr/e.altnds
 (page [10]) Temperature
 (page [10]) Since the 1970s, mean annual temperature has signiﬁcantly increased at a rate of 0.35°C per decade ( Figure 5 ). In the south-western areas of the country, signiﬁcant increase in maximum temperature has been observed since the 1950s.23 Between 1955 and 2006, warming trends were observed across the central regions. Very hot days were observed to have increased by 0.25°C per decade with very hot nights increasing by 0.21°C per decade.24FIGURE 4. M/a.altp of /a.altv/e.altr/a.alt/g.alt/e.alt /a.altnnu/a.altl t/e.altmp/e.altr/a.alttur/e.alt (°C) (l/e.altft); /a.altnnu/a.altl pr/e.altcipit/a.alttion (mm) (ri/g.altht) of CAR
 (page [10]) for 1991–202022
 (page [10]) FIGURE 5. Obs/e.altrv/e.altd t/e.altmp/e.altr/a.alttur/e.alt for C/e.altntr/a.altl Afric/a.altn R/e.altpublic, 1901–202025
 (page [10]) Annual mean
 (page [10]) Smoothed
 (page [10]) Temperature (°C)
 (page [10]) 24
 (page [10]) 24.5
 (page [10]) 25
 (page [10]) 25.5
 (page [10]) 26
 (page [10]) 1901
 (page [10]) 1911
 (page [10]) 1921
 (page [10]) 1931
 (page [10]) 1941
 (page [10]) 1951
 (page [10]) 1961
 (page [10]) 1971
 (page [10]) 1981
 (page [10]) 1991
 (page [10]) 2001
 (page [10]) 2011
 (page [10]) 2020
 (page [10]) 22  WBG Clim/a.altt/e.alt Ch/a.altn/g.alt/e.alt Knowl/e.altd/g.alt/e.alt Port/a.altl (CCKP, 2021). CAR, Historic/a.altl Clim/a.altt/e.alt. URL: https:/ /clim/a.altt/e.altknowl/e.altd/g.alt/e.altport/a.altl.worldb/a.altnk.or/g.alt/
 (page [10]) countr/y.alt/c/e.altntr/a.altl-/a.altfric/a.altn-r/e.altpublic/clim/a.altt/e.alt-d/a.altt/a.alt-historic/a.altl
 (page [10]) 23  GERICS (2015). Clim/a.altt/e.alt-F/a.altct-Sh/e.alt/e.altt, C/e.altntr/a.altl Afric/a.altn R/e.altpublic. 24  Sonw/a.alt, D. /e.altt /a.altl. (2014). Clim/a.altt/e.alt Ch/a.altn/g.alt/e.alt /a.altnd Ad/a.altpt/a.alttion in C/e.altntr/a.altl Afric/a.alt: P/a.altst, Sc/e.altn/a.altrios /a.altnd Options for th/e.alt Futur/e.alt. URL: https:/ /
 (page [10]) www.r/e.alts/e.alt/a.altrch/g.alt/a.altt/e.alt.n/e.altt/public/a.alttion/268871188_Clim/a.altt/e.alt_ch/a.altn/g.alt/e.alt_/a.altnd_Ad/a.altpt/a.alttion_in_C/e.altntr/a.altl_Afric/a.alt_P/a.altst_Sc/e.altn/a.altrios_/a.altnd_Options_
 (page [11]) for_th/e.alt_Futur/e.alt
 (page [11]) 25  WB Clim/a.altt/e.alt Ch/a.altn/g.alt/e.alt Knowl/e.altd/g.alt/e.alt Port/a.altl (CCKP, 2021). C/e.altntr/a.altl Afric/a.altn R/e.altpublic URL: https:/ /clim/a.altt/e.altknowl/e.altd/g.alt/e.altport/a.altl.worldb/a.altnk.or/g.alt/
 (page [11]) countr/y.alt/c/e.altntr/a.altl-/a.altfric/a.altn-r/e.altpublic/clim/a.altt/e.alt-d/a.altt/a.alt-historic/a.altl
 (page [11]) Table 3 provides CMIP5
 (page [11]) 8 CLIMATE RISK COUNTRY PROFILE: CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLICPrecipitation CAR’s precipitation regime is variable and while over the last century, there has been no substantial observed increase in precipitation trends, however over the last 30 years precipitation has been observed to have increased approximately 8%.26 Reduction in the number of consecutive days with 1 mm of precipitation has decreased and the number of days with precipitation of 10 mm has increased. This indicates not only an increase in precipitation received, but an increase of rainfall received through intense and extreme rainfall events.27 Multiple signiﬁcant ﬂood events have occurred in CAR over the past decade and while many go unreported, the most commonly reported ﬂood events occur around the capital city of Bangui. Heavy, near continuous rains in August — September of 2012, affected nearly 14,000 people and destroyed property and infrastructure and farmland in ﬁve localities surrounding Bangui and Begoua.28 2017 ﬂooding destroyed homes and infrastructure in Kouango (415 km form Bangui) and destroyed over 350 houses, affecting mover 1,750 people.29 Most recent ﬂooding occurred in August 2019 near the city of Paoua and Poumadji village causing signiﬁcant material and human damage. Perhaps most impactful is the destruction of water and sanitation infrastructure resulting in the damage or complete destruction of 94 water
 (page [11]) wells and 107 latrines.30
 (page [11]) Clim/a.altt/e.alt Futur/e.alt
 (page [11]) Ov/e.altrvi/e.altw
 (page [11]) The main data source for the World Bank Group’s CCKP is the CMIP5 (Coupled Inter-comparison Project Phase5) data ensemble, which builds the database for the global climate change projections presented in the Fifth Assessment Report (AR5) of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). Four Representative Concentration Pathways (i.e. RCP2.6, RCP4.5, RCP6.0, and RCP8.5) were selected and deﬁned by their total radiative forcing (cumulative measure of GHG emissions from all sources) pathway and level by 2100. The RCP2.6 for example represents a very strong mitigation scenario, whereas the RCP8.5 assumes business-as-usual scenario. For more information, please refer to the RCP Database . For simpliﬁcation, these scenarios are referred to as a low (RCP2.6); a medium (RCP4.5) and a high (RCP8.5) emission scenario in this proﬁle. Table 3  provides CMIP5 projections for essential climate variables under high emission scenario (RCP 8.5) over 4 different time horizons. Figure 6  presents the multi-model (CMIP5) ensemble of 32 Global Circulation Models (GCMs) showing the projected changes in annual precipitation and temperature for the periods 2040–2059 and 2080–2099. 26  GERICS (2015). Clim/a.altt/e.alt-F/a.altct-Sh/e.alt/e.altt, C/e.altntr/a.altl Afric/a.altn R/e.altpublic. 27  Sonw/a.alt, D. /e.altt /a.altl. (2014). Clim/a.altt/e.alt Ch/a.altn/g.alt/e.alt /a.altnd Ad/a.altpt/a.alttion in C/e.altntr/a.altl Afric/a.alt: P/a.altst, Sc/e.altn/a.altrios /a.altnd Options for th/e.alt Futur/e.alt. URL: https:/ /
 (page [11]) www.r/e.alts/e.alt/a.altrch/g.alt/a.altt/e.alt.n/e.altt/public/a.alttion/268871188_Clim/a.altt/e.alt_ch/a.altn/g.alt/e.alt_/a.altnd_Ad/a.altpt/a.alttion_in_C/e.altntr/a.altl_Afric/a.alt_P/a.altst_Sc/e.altn/a.altrios_/a.altnd_Options_
 (page [11]) for_th/e.alt_Futur/e.alt
 (page [11]) 28  UNHCR (2020). UNHCR /a.altssistin/g.alt displ/a.altc/e.altd f/a.altmili/e.alts /a.altﬀ/e.altct/e.altd b/y.alt ﬂoods in th/e.alt S/a.alth/e.altl. [24 S/e.altpt/e.altmb/e.altr, 2020]. URL: https:/ /www.
 (page [11]) unhcr.or/g.alt//e.altn-us/n/e.altws/pr/e.altss/2020/9/5f6b79f44/unhcr-/a.altssistin/g.alt-displ/a.altc/e.altd-f/a.altmili/e.alts-/a.altﬀ/e.altct/e.altd-ﬂoods-s/a.alth/e.altl.html
 (page [11]) 29  OCHA S/e.altrvic/e.alts (2019). Hum/a.altnit/a.altri/a.altn R/e.altspons/e.alt — C/e.altntr/a.altl Afric/a.altn R/e.altpublic. URL: https:/ /www.hum/a.altnit/a.altri/a.altnr/e.altspons/e.alt.info/ru/
 (page [12]) dis/a.altst/e.altr/ﬂ-2017-000134-c/a.altf
 (page [12]) 30  IFRC (2019). Em/e.altr/g.alt/e.altnc/y.alt Pl/a.altn of Action — C/e.altntr/a.altl Afric/a.altn R/e.altpublic: Floods in P/a.altou/a.alt. URL: https:/ /r/e.altli/e.altfw/e.altb.int/sit/e.alts/r/e.altli/e.altfw/e.altb.int/
 (page [12]) ﬁl/e.alts/r/e.altsourc/e.alts/CAR_2.pdf
 (page [12]) 9 CLIMATE RISK COUNTRY PROFILE: CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLICTABLE 3. D/a.altt/a.alt sn/a.altpshot: CMIP5 /e.altns/e.altmbl/e.alt proj/e.altction Cmip5 Ensemble Projection 2020–2039 2040–2059 2060–2079 2080–2099 Annual Temperature Anomaly (°C) +0.7 to +1.5
 (page [12]) (+1.1°C)+1.4 to +2.7
 (page [12]) (+1.9°C)+2.3 to +4.2
 (page [12]) (+2.8°C)+3.1 to +5.7
 (page [12]) (+3.8°C)
 (page [12]) Annual Precipitation Anomaly (mm) -18.4 to +21.9
 (page [12]) (0.8 mm)-21.0 to +29.6
 (page [12]) (1.7 mm)-21.5 to +38.5
 (page [12]) (5.5 mm)-28.2 to +50.4
 (page [12]) (6.6 mm)
 (page [12]) Note:  The table shows CMIP5 ensemble projection under RCP8.5. Bold value is the range (10th–90th Percentile) and values in parentheses show the median (or 50th Percentile). FIGURE 6. Multi-mod/e.altl (CMIP5) /e.altns/e.altmbl/e.alt proj/e.altct/e.altd ch/a.altn/g.alt/e.alts (32 GCMs) in /a.altnnu/a.altl t/e.altmp/e.altr/a.alttur/e.alt (top) /a.altnd pr/e.altcipit/a.alttion (bottom)b/y.alt 2040–2059 (l/e.altft) /a.altnd b/y.alt 2080–2099 (ri/g.altht), r/e.altl/a.alttiv/e.alt to
 (page [13]) 1986–2005 b/a.alts/e.altlin/e.alt und/e.altr RCP8.531
 (page [13]) 31  WBG Clim/a.altt/e.alt Ch/a.altn/g.alt/e.alt Knowl/e.altd/g.alt/e.alt Port/a.altl (CCKP, 2021). C/e.altntr/a.altl Afric/a.altn R/e.altpublic Proj/e.altct/e.altd Futur/e.alt Clim/a.altt/e.alt. URL: https:/ /clim/a.altt/e.altd/a.altt/a.alt.
 (page [13]) worldb/a.altnk.or/g.alt/CRM/e.altPort/a.altl/w/e.altb//a.alt/g.altricultur/e.alt/crops-/a.altnd-l/a.altnd-m/a.altn/a.alt/g.alt/e.altm/e.altnt?countr/y.alt=CAF&p/e.altriod=2080-2099
 (page [13]) ne change
 (page [13]) Figure 8)
 (page [13]) 10 CLIMATE RISK COUNTRY PROFILE: CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLICK/e.alt/y.alt Tr/e.altnds
 (page [13]) Temperature
 (page [13]) Temperatures across CAR are expected to increase and projections show a change in annual mean temperature from 3.1°C to 5.7°C by end of the century. An increase in the nu mber of hot days, extreme temperatures are projected as well as a strong increase in the duration of heat waves; a signiﬁcant decrease in cold spell length is projected.32 The projected change in the duration of long-lasting heat waves is expected to be an additional 7 to 81 days by 2085, with cold spells likely to decrease by 1 to as much as 13 days.33 Across all emission scenarios, temperature increase for CAR are projected throughout the end of the century. As seen in Figure 7 , under a high-emission scenario, average temperatures are expected to increase rapidly by mid-century. An increase is also expected for the change in the number of hot days (Tmax >35°C), and the change in number of days across the seasonal cycle. The most signiﬁcant increase in the number of hot days ( Figure 8 ) are expected to come in the late summer and fall, a time coinciding with rainfall and planting seasons for much of the country. Increased heat and extreme heat conditions will result in signiﬁcant implications for human and animal health, agriculture, and ecosystems. The increasing number of hot days (Tmax >35°C) are expected to be most pronounced in the northern and central regions of the country ( Figure 9 ). Historical RCP 2.6 RCP 4.5 RCP 6.0 RCP 8.5
 (page [13]) 1980
 (page [13]) 2000
 (page [13]) 2020
 (page [13]) 2040
 (page [13]) 2060
 (page [13]) 2080
 (page [13]) 2100
 (page [13]) Year
 (page [13]) 31
 (page [13]) 30
 (page [13]) 29
 (page [13]) 28
 (page [13]) 27
 (page [13]) 26
 (page [13]) 25
 (page [13]) 24
 (page [13]) Temperature (°C)FIGURE 7. Historic/a.altl /a.altnd proj/e.altct/e.altd /a.altv/e.altr/a.alt/g.alt/e.alt t/e.altmp/e.altr/a.alttur/e.alt for CAR from 1986 to 2099
 (page [13]) (R/e.altf/e.altr/e.altnc/e.alt P/e.altriod, 1986–2005)34
 (page [13]) 30
 (page [13]) 25
 (page [13]) 20
 (page [13]) 15
 (page [13]) 10
 (page [13]) 5
 (page [13]) 0
 (page [13]) Days
 (page [13]) Jan
 (page [13]) Feb
 (page [13]) Mar
 (page [13]) Apr
 (page [13]) May
 (page [13]) Jun
 (page [13]) Jul
 (page [13]) Aug
 (page [13]) Sep
 (page [13]) Oct
 (page [13]) Nov
 (page [13]) DecFIGURE 8. Proj/e.altct/e.altd Ch/a.altn/g.alt/e.alt in hot d/a.alt/y.alt
 (page [13]) (Tm/a.altx >35°C) (RCP8.5, R/e.altf/e.altr/e.altnc/e.alt P/e.altriod,
 (page [13]) 1986–2005)35
 (page [13]) 32  Dosio, A. (2016). Proj/e.altction of t/e.altmp/e.altr/a.alttur/e.alt /a.altnd h/e.alt/a.altt w/a.altv/e.alts for Afric/a.alt with /a.altn /e.altns/e.altmbl/e.alt of CORDEX R/e.alt/g.altion/a.altl Clim/a.altt/e.alt Mod/e.altls. Clim/a.altt/e.alt D/y.altn/a.altmics . 49. pp. 493–519. URL: https:/ /link.sprin/g.alt/e.altr.com//a.altrticl/e.alt/10.1007/s00382-016-3355-5 33  GERICS (2015). Clim/a.altt/e.alt-F/a.altct-Sh/e.alt/e.altt, C/e.altntr/a.altl Afric/a.altn R/e.altpublic. 34  WBG Clim/a.altt/e.alt Ch/a.altn/g.alt/e.alt Knowl/e.altd/g.alt/e.alt Port/a.altl (CCKP, 2021). CAR A/g.altricultur/e.alt D/a.altshbo/a.altrd. URL: https:/ /clim/a.altt/e.altd/a.altt/a.alt.worldb/a.altnk.or/g.alt/
 (page [14]) CRM/e.altPort/a.altl/w/e.altb//a.alt/g.altricultur/e.alt/crops-/a.altnd-l/a.altnd-m/a.altn/a.alt/g.alt/e.altm/e.altnt?countr/y.alt=CAF&p/e.altriod=2080-2099
 (page [14]) 35  WBG Clim/a.altt/e.alt Ch/a.altn/g.alt/e.alt Knowl/e.altd/g.alt/e.alt Port/a.altl (CCKP, 2021). CAR Clim/a.altt/e.alt D/a.altt/a.alt — Proj/e.altctions. URL: https:/ /clim/a.altt/e.altknowl/e.altd/g.alt/e.altport/a.altl.
 (page [14]) worldb/a.altnk.or/g.alt/countr/y.alt/c/e.altntr/a.altl-/a.altfric/a.altn-r/e.altpublic/clim/a.altt/e.alt-d/a.altt/a.alt-proj/e.altctions
 (page [14]) RRSESRISESSssesReRRee
 (page [14]) RBSESSISREESEReReRReeo
 (page [14]) |
 (page [14]) 11 CLIMATE RISK COUNTRY PROFILE: CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLICPrecipitation Meteorological observations and meteorological station networks across CAR are scarce, providing limited information and making projections on future rainfall levels more difﬁcult. However, it is generally understood that although annual total precipitation amounts for CAR are not likely to change dramatically, however rainfall is projected to become substantially more variable and with a likely increase in frequency and intensity of extreme rainfall events. The country’s drought risk will decrease.37 This is expected to signiﬁcantly impact agriculture, water, energy, forestry, and health sectors, as well as agricultural land and freshwater resources and ecosystems.38 While precipitation trends in CAR are highly variable, mean annual rainfall is expected increase across the country throughout the end of the century. More rainfall amounts are expected to be received through these intense and more frequent rainfall events. According to analysis from the German Climate Service Center (GERICS) of 32 Global Climate Models (GCMs), rainfall is expected to increase by 12% to as much as 19% by the end of the century. However, the projected change in precipitation throughout the year does not have a clear trend. Only for the dry months of November and December is a distinct increase tendency shown. There is also a likely increase in the intensity of heavy rain events, which are also likely to lead to increased ﬂood events.39 Heavy precipitation events are expected to coincide with an additional occurrence of extreme rainfall and extreme events with ﬂooding are  FIGURE 9. Proj/e.altct/e.altd ch/a.altn/g.alt/e.alt in th/e.alt numb/e.altr of hot d/a.alt/y.alts (Tm/a.altx  >35°C) in CAR for th/e.alt p/e.altriod 2040–2059 /a.altnd 2080–2099, /a.alt/g.alt/a.altinst th/e.alt b/a.alts/e.altlin/e.alt 1986–2005, und/e.altr RCP8.536 36  WBG Clim/a.altt/e.alt Ch/a.altn/g.alt/e.alt Knowl/e.altd/g.alt/e.alt Port/a.altl (CCKP, 2021). CAR Clim/a.altt/e.alt D/a.altt/a.alt — Proj/e.altctions. URL: https:/ /clim/a.altt/e.altknowl/e.altd/g.alt/e.altport/a.altl.
 (page [14]) worldb/a.altnk.or/g.alt/countr/y.alt/c/e.altntr/a.altl-/a.altfric/a.altn-r/e.altpublic/clim/a.altt/e.alt-d/a.altt/a.alt-proj/e.altctions
 (page [14, 15]) 37  Ahm/a.altd/a.altlipour, A. /e.altt /a.altl. (2019). Futur/e.alt drou/g.altht risk in Afric/a.alt: Int/e.alt/g.altr/a.alttin/g.alt vuln/e.altr/a.altbilit/y.alt, clim/a.altt/e.alt ch/a.altn/g.alt/e.alt, /a.altnd popul/a.alttion /g.altrowth. Sci/e.altnc/e.alt of th/e.alt Tot/a.altl Environm/e.altnt . 662. pp. 672–686. DOI: https:/ /doi.or/g.alt/10.1016/j.scitot/e.altnv.2019.01.278 38  S/e.altr/g.alt/e.alt, S.B. /e.altt /a.altl. (2017). Imp/a.altcts of Clim/a.altt/e.alt ch/a.altn/g.alt/e.alt in C/e.altntr/a.altl Afric/a.altn R/e.altpublic. Journ/a.altl of Sci/e.altnc/e.alt /a.altnd En/g.altin/e.alt/e.altrin/g.alt T/e.altchnolo/g.alt/y.alt.  5,
 (page [15]) pp. 52–63. E-ISSN: 2311-8741/17
 (page [15]) 39  GERICS (2015). Clim/a.altt/e.alt-F/a.altct-Sh/e.alt/e.altt, C/e.altntr/a.altl Afric/a.altn R/e.altpublic.
 (page [15]) million, with losses
 (page [15]) 12 CLIMATE RISK COUNTRY PROFILE: CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLICexpected to impact rivers and surface water runoff during the summer rainy seasons. Natural disasters due to the increase in the frequency and intensity of ﬂoods and droughts are also expected to increase. The Figure 10  shows the projected average precipitation in CAR across all emission scenarios, through the end of the century. Water routing and storage and other management options, are often very different if the precipitation input comes as many weak or a series of heavy rainfall events.40 While precipitation is expected to increase across all scenarios, under the highest emissions scenario, RCP8.5, precipitation rates are projected to increase, but at a slower rate than lower emission scenarios.Historical RCP 2.6 RCP 4.5 RCP 6.0 RCP 8.5
 (page [15]) 1980
 (page [15]) 2000
 (page [15]) 2020
 (page [15]) 2040
 (page [15]) 2060
 (page [15]) 2080
 (page [15]) 2100
 (page [15]) Year
 (page [15]) 2200
 (page [15]) 2000
 (page [15]) 1800
 (page [15]) 1600
 (page [15]) 1400
 (page [15]) 1200
 (page [15]) 1000
 (page [15]) Precipitation (mm)
 (page [15]) FIGURE 10. Annu/a.altl /a.altv/e.altr/a.alt/g.alt/e.alt pr/e.altcipit/a.alttion
 (page [15]) in CAR for 1986 to 2099 (R/e.altf/e.altr/e.altnc/e.alt P/e.altriod,
 (page [15]) 1986–2005)41
 (page [15]) Ov/e.altrvi/e.altw
 (page [15]) The Central African Republic is at risk to numerous natural hazards, which are dominated by ﬂoods, wildﬁres and droughts. Vulnerability to these hazards is exacerbated in the country by poverty and political insecurity. This has also heightened the country’s vulnerability and ability to recover from natural disasters. Excess rainfall is expected to be strongest felt in the central and southern areas of the country.42 Heavy rainfall is also expected to result in ﬂooding, causing riverbank erosion and/or overﬂows, landslides and waterlogging of agricultural ﬁelds leading to likely crop failures. Recent disasters from ﬂoods in the s outhwest areas surrounding the urban areas of the capital city Bangui left over 14,500 people homeless in 2009 and is estimated to have cost $6 million, with losses
 (page [15]) estimated at $2.6 million.
 (page [15]) Increased food insecurity is also of speciﬁc concern following disasters which result in land and infrastructure degradation due to erosion, direct crop failure due to ﬂoods and heavy rains, and possible nutrient leaching and fungal growth due to increased humidity.43 Water availability will be affected by possible periods of drought in CLIMATE RELATED NATURAL HAZARDS 40  B/a.altlo/g.altun, R. A. /e.altt /a.altl. (2019). Intr/a.alt-s/e.alt/a.altson/a.altl /a.altnd s/e.alt/a.altson/a.altl v/a.altri/a.altbilit/y.alt of conv/e.altctiv/e.alt prop/e.altrti/e.alts of monsoon pr/e.altcipit/a.alttion s/y.altst/e.altms ov/e.altr W/e.altst /a.altnd C/e.altntr/a.altl Afric/a.alt. Th/e.altor/e.alttic/a.altl /a.altnd Appli/e.altd Clim/a.alttolo/g.alt/y.alt.  137. pp. 1715–1728. URL: https:/ /link.sprin/g.alt/e.altr.com//a.altrticl/e.alt/10.1007/
 (page [15]) s00704-018-2692-1
 (page [15]) 41  WBG Clim/a.altt/e.alt Ch/a.altn/g.alt/e.alt Knowl/e.altd/g.alt/e.alt Port/a.altl (CCKP, 2021). CAR W/a.altt/e.altr D/a.altshbo/a.altrd. URL: https:/ /clim/a.altt/e.altknowl/e.altd/g.alt/e.altport/a.altl.worldb/a.altnk.or/g.alt/
 (page [15]) countr/y.alt/c/e.altntr/a.altl-/a.altfric/a.altn-r/e.altpublic/clim/a.altt/e.alt-s/e.altctor-w/a.altt/e.altr
 (page [15]) 42  UNHCR (2020). UNHCR /a.altssistin/g.alt displ/a.altc/e.altd f/a.altmili/e.alts /a.altﬀ/e.altct/e.altd b/y.alt ﬂoods in th/e.alt S/a.alth/e.altl. [24 S/e.altpt/e.altmb/e.altr, 2020]. URL: https:/ /www.unhcr.or/g.alt/
 (page [16]) /e.altn-us/n/e.altws/pr/e.altss/2020/9/5f6b79f44/unhcr-/a.altssistin/g.alt-displ/a.altc/e.altd-f/a.altmili/e.alts-/a.altﬀ/e.altct/e.altd-ﬂoods-s/a.alth/e.altl.html
 (page [16]) 43  GFDRR (2019). C/e.altntr/a.altl Afric/a.altn R/e.altpublic — Floods. URL: https:/ /www./g.altfdrr.or/g.alt//e.altn/c/e.altntr/a.altl-/a.altfric/a.altn-r/e.altpublic-2009-subs/e.altqu/e.altnt-
 (page [16]) ﬂoods-b/a.altn/g.altui-which-l/e.altft-14500-p/e.altopl/e.alt-hom/e.altl/e.altss-/g.altfdrr
 (page [16]) 13 CLIMATE RISK COUNTRY PROFILE: CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLICsouthern zones, but no serious water stress is expected for agriculture. While the country is focused on increasing infrastructure for water access, increasing population density combined with erratic rainfall does make these efforts
 (page [16]) at wider coverage more challenging.44
 (page [16]) Data from the Emergency Event Database: EM-Dat,45 presented in Table 4 , shows the country has endured various natural hazards, including ﬂoods, landslides, wildﬁres, and storms. TABLE 4. N/a.alttur/a.altl Dis/a.altst/e.altrs in CAR, 1900–2020
 (page [16]) Natural Hazard
 (page [16]) 1900–2020 SubtypeEvents
 (page [16]) CountTotal
 (page [16]) Deaths Total AffectedTotal Damage
 (page [16]) (’000 USD)
 (page [16]) Drought Drought 1 0 0 0 EpidemicBacterial Disease 7 607 3,580 0 Viral Disease 4 307 2,609 0 FloodFlash Flood 3 3 15,873 0 Riverine Flood 6 6 77 ,990 0 Storm Convective Storm 8 5 32,246 0 Wildﬁre Forest Fire 2 1 835 0
 (page [16]) K/e.alt/y.alt Tr/e.altnds
 (page [16]) Climate change trends in CAR are expected to increase the risk and intensity of ﬂooding, increase the amount of heavy rainfall received during heavy rainfall events as well as increase the likelihood of aridity water scarcity for some areas, particularly the country’s northeast zones. Increased incidence of extreme rainfall may also result in soil erosion and water logging of crops, thus decreasing yields and increasing food insecurity. Increases in temperature is also likely to increase the periods of extreme heat in northern areas. Importantly, higher temperatures and aridity threatens to reduce water storage capacities. This may result in signiﬁcant economic losses, damage to agricultural lands and infrastructure as well as human casualties.46 Land degradation and soil erosion, exacerbated by recurrent ﬂood adversely impacts agricultural production, disproportionately affecting the livelihoods of the rural poor. The country’s underpinning political instability and poverty  will further exacerbate these issues with potential to also exacerbate potential for violence and conﬂict.47 Climate change, deforestation, watershed degradation, land use, urbanization and poor management of settlements, and slash and burn agricultural techniques have exacerbated issues and impacts from ﬂooding and droughts and increased the risk of wildﬁres. Heavy rainfall can also trig ger riverine and ﬂash ﬂoods. Heavy rainfall and ﬂash ﬂoods 44  World B/a.altnk (2011). W/a.altt/e.altr Suppl/y.alt /a.altnd S/a.altnit/a.alttion in C/e.altntr/a.altl Afric/a.altn R/e.altpublic — Turnin/g.alt ﬁn/a.altnc/e.alt into s/e.altrvic/e.alts for 2015 /a.altnd b/e.alt/y.altond.
 (page [16]) URL: https:/ /op/e.altnknowl/e.altd/g.alt/e.alt.worldb/a.altnk.or/g.alt/bitstr/e.alt/a.altm/h/a.altndl/e.alt/10986/17754/7240900REPLACE0box00PUBLIC00CSO0CAR.
 (page [16]) pdf?s/e.altqu/e.altnc/e.alt=1&isAllow/e.altd=/y.alt
 (page [16]) 45  EM-DAT: Th/e.alt Em/e.altr/g.alt/e.altnc/y.alt Ev/e.altnts D/a.altt/a.altb/a.alts/e.alt — Univ/e.altrsit/e.alt c/a.alttholiqu/e.alt d/e.alt Louv/a.altin (UCL) — CRED, D. Guh/a.alt-S/a.altpir, Bruss/e.altls, B/e.altl/g.altium.
 (page [16]) URL: http:/ //e.altmd/a.altt.b/e.alt//e.altmd/a.altt_db/
 (page [16]) 46  S/e.altr/g.alt/e.alt, S.B. /e.altt /a.altl. (2017). Imp/a.altcts of Clim/a.altt/e.alt ch/a.altn/g.alt/e.alt in C/e.altntr/a.altl Afric/a.altn R/e.altpublic. Journ/a.altl of Sci/e.altnc/e.alt /a.altnd En/g.altin/e.alt/e.altrin/g.alt T/e.altchnolo/g.alt/y.alt.  5,
 (page [17]) pp. 52–63. E-ISSN: 2311-8741/17
 (page [17]) 47  IFRC (2019). C/e.altntr/a.altl Afric/a.altn R/e.altpublic. URL: https:/ /www.ifrc.or/g.alt/wh/a.altt-w/e.alt-do/dis/a.altst/e.altr-m/a.altn/a.alt/g.alt/e.altm/e.altnt/r/e.altspondin/g.alt/on/g.altoin/g.alt-op/e.altr/a.alttions/
 (page [17]) c/e.altntr/a.altl-/a.altfric/a.altn-r/e.altpublic/
 (page [17]) ttom left); ‘tom right
 (page [17]) SS TS a ene & . STOPS sori es Dea ee nee eee ae ed See eee ee EEE e
 (page [17]) .
 (page [17]) te SO a nS Rees ene Tee eS 14 CLIMATE RISK COUNTRY PROFILE: CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLICare common in the country’s mountain areas and can also trigger landslides and mudslides.48 Additionally, in CAR water stress during the traditional dry periods (November-February) may be further exacerbated with competing demands from household consumption and agriculture. Infrastructure projects are being developed to enable the construction of dams and irrigation networks. Increased heat will further strain existing water resources and impacts from changing rainfall patterns.49 Figure 11  below shows different risk ratings from river ﬂooding, water scarcity,
 (page [17]) extreme heat, and wildﬁres respectively.
 (page [17]) 48  N/g.altulm/a.altl/e.altt, C.R. (2018). Comp/a.altrison of communit/y.alt-b/a.alts/e.altd /a.altd/a.altpt/a.alttion str/a.altt/e.alt/g.alti/e.alts for drou/g.althts /a.altnd ﬂoods in K/e.altn/y.alt/a.alt /a.altnd th/e.alt C/e.altntr/a.altl Afric/a.altn R/e.altpublic. W/a.altt/e.altr Int/e.altrn/a.alttion/a.altl.  43(2). pp. 183–204. URL: https:/ /www.t/a.altndfonlin/e.alt.com/doi/full/10.1080/02508060.2017.1393713 49  World B/a.altnk (2011). W/a.altt/e.altr Suppl/y.alt /a.altnd S/a.altnit/a.alttion in C/e.altntr/a.altl Afric/a.altn R/e.altpublic — Turnin/g.alt ﬁn/a.altnc/e.alt into s/e.altrvic/e.alts for 2015 /a.altnd b/e.alt/y.altond.
 (page [17]) URL: https:/ /op/e.altnknowl/e.altd/g.alt/e.alt.worldb/a.altnk.or/g.alt/bitstr/e.alt/a.altm/h/a.altndl/e.alt/10986/17754/7240900REPLACE0box00PUBLIC00CSO0CAR.
 (page [17]) pdf?s/e.altqu/e.altnc/e.alt=1&isAllow/e.altd=/y.alt
 (page [18]) 50  ThinkH/a.alt/z.alt/a.altrd! (2020). CAR W/a.altt/e.altr Sc/a.altrcit/y.alt. URL: http:/ /thinkh/a.alt/z.alt/a.altrd.or/g.alt//e.altn/r/e.altport/49-c/e.altntr/a.altl-/a.altfric/a.altn-r/e.altpublic/DG 51  ThinkH/a.alt/z.alt/a.altrd! (2020). CAR Wildﬁr/e.alts. URL: http:/ /thinkh/a.alt/z.alt/a.altrd.or/g.alt//e.altn/r/e.altport/49-c/e.altntr/a.altl-/a.altfric/a.altn-r/e.altpublic/WFFIGURE 11. Risk of riv/e.altr ﬂood (top l/e.altft); risk of w/a.altt/e.altr sc/a.altrcit/y.alt (top ri/g.altht);50 risk of /e.altxtr/e.altm/e.alt h /e.alt/a.altt (bottom l /e.altft); r isk of wildﬁr/e.alts (bottom ri/g.altht )51 15 CLIMATE RISK COUNTRY PROFILE: CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLICImplic/a.alttions for DRM The government of the Central African Republic does not have a speciﬁc disaster risk management entity wholly responsible for disaster preparedness, response and recovery. Following the 2009 Bangui ﬂoods, the government established a team across different government departments under the leadership of the Ministry of Planning, Economy and International Cooperation. CAR has also partnered with the World Bank and received resources from the Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery (GFDRR) which has helped to develop and conduct risk assessments and institutional capacity building efforts to improve the country’s ability to prepare for and respond to natural disasters, especially ﬂoods. A primary element of this work is the implementation of short- and medium- term ﬂood mitigation programs which combines community education measures with infrastructure works and public management reforms across key urban areas.52 CAR would also greatly beneﬁt from the improved quality of hydro-meteorological services through the expansion of observation and forecasting infrastructure, which can increase the accuracy and quality of forecasted natural disaster events.53 As part of the country’s adaptation efforts, CAR has committed to integrating climate change related activities into development plans and strategies, including its disaster risk management efforts. To increase its capacity to prepare for and respond to natural disasters, the country has committed to implementing a national early warning program, ﬂood and drought management programs, riverbank development projects and a national investment program for agriculture to improve the country’s food security situation, especially after disaster events.54 The CAR is highly vulnerable to seasonal variability and long-term climate change. Increasing vulnerability is expected to result in cumulative impacts across the country’s political, security, social, economic, and environmental structures. Heavy rainfall and ﬂoods in particular are likely to have signiﬁcant consequences on the environment, society, food security situation, and the wider economy. Signiﬁcant impacts are expected for the country’s water resources, agriculture, health, an d forestry sectors. Extreme heat, ﬂooding, increased aridity, and soil erosion puts both urban and rural communities at risk, particularly for poor and vulnerable groups. Environmental degradation, impacted water resources, and loss of biodiversity and ecosystem services constitute serious obstacles to the country’s continued development and responsible management of its natural resources. In addition, the increase in temperature will also have a negative impact on key parts of the economy, e.g. forestry, agriculture and livestock. Changes in precipitation parameters can have far-reaching consequences for ecosystems and biodiversity, food production, the water industry and rivers.55CLIMATE CHANGE IMPACTS TO KEY SECTORS 52  GFDRR (2019). C/e.altntr/a.altl Afric/a.altn R/e.altpublic. URL: https:/ /www./g.altfdrr.or/g.alt//e.altn/c/e.altntr/a.altl-/a.altfric/a.altn-r/e.altpublic-2009-subs/e.altqu/e.altnt-ﬂoods-b/a.altn/g.altui-
 (page [18]) which-l/e.altft-14500-p/e.altopl/e.alt-hom/e.altl/e.altss-/g.altfdrr
 (page [18]) 53  N/g.altulm/a.altl/e.altt, C.R. (2018). Comp/a.altrison of communit/y.alt-b/a.alts/e.altd /a.altd/a.altpt/a.alttion str/a.altt/e.alt/g.alti/e.alts for drou/g.althts /a.altnd ﬂoods in K/e.altn/y.alt/a.alt /a.altnd th/e.alt C/e.altntr/a.altl Afric/a.altn R/e.altpublic. W/a.altt/e.altr Int/e.altrn/a.alttion/a.altl.  43(2). pp. 183–204. URL: https:/ /www.t/a.altndfonlin/e.alt.com/doi/full/10.1080/02508060.2017.1393713 54  C/e.altntr/a.altl Afric/a.altn R/e.altpublic (2016). N/a.alttion/a.altll/y.alt-D/e.altt/e.altrmin/e.altd Contributions. URL: https:/ /www4.unfccc.int/sit/e.alts/ndcst/a.alt/g.altin/g.alt/
 (page [19]) Publish/e.altdDocum/e.altnts/C/e.altntr/a.altl%20Afric/a.altn%20R/e.altpublic%20First/INDC_R%C3%A9publiqu/e.alt%20C/e.altntr/a.altfric/a.altin/e.alt_EN.pdf
 (page [19]) 55  World B/a.altnk (2013). D/e.altfor/e.altst/a.alttion Tr/e.altnds in th/e.alt Con/g.alto B/a.altsin — R/e.altconcilin/g.alt Economic Growth /a.altnd For/e.altst Prot/e.altction. URL: https:/ /
 (page [19]) op/e.altnknowl/e.altd/g.alt/e.alt.worldb/a.altnk.or/g.alt/bitstr/e.alt/a.altm/h/a.altndl/e.alt/10986/12477/9780821397428.pdf?s/e.altqu/e.altnc/e.alt=1&isAllow/e.altd=/y.alt
 (page [19]) tares per
 (page [19]) 16 CLIMATE RISK COUNTRY PROFILE: CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLICProjected trends of climate variability and longer-term change are likely to exacerbate these concerns, as the majority of agricultural production is rainfed, and provides livelihoods for the majority of the population.56 Increased temperatures and variable rainfall will also impact the country’s forests, also critical to livelihoods and ecosystem services, which are already under threat from land use change and growing demand for charcoal and tropical forest products. More extreme weather events such as intense rainfall after prolonged dry spells can lead to erosion and ﬂash ﬂooding, damage roads and infrastructure, wipe out crops and put additional lives at risk.57
 (page [19]) Gender
 (page [19]) An increasing body of research has shown that climate-related disasters have impacted human populations in many areas including agricultural production, food security, water management and public health. The level of impacts and coping strategies of populations depends heavily on their socio-economic status, socio-cultural norms, access to resources, poverty as well as gender. Research has also provided more evidence that the effects are not gender neutral, as women and children are among the highest risk groups. Key factors that account for the differences between women’s and men’s vulnerability to climate change risks include: gender-based differences in time use; access to assets and credit, treatment by formal institutio ns, which can constrain women’s opportunities, limited access to policy discussions and decision making, and a lack of sex-disaggregated data for policy change.58
 (page [19]) A/g.altricultur/e.alt
 (page [19]) Ov/e.altrvi/e.altw
 (page [19]) The agricultural sector is critical to CAR’s economy and food security situation and is considered to be one of the most vulnerable sectors to projected climate change trends. The agricultural sector accounts for employment of approximately 72% of the country’s population and is the primary source of income and food sourcing for most people. Agricultural activities are mainly rainfed and subsistence, combining farming, hunting/gathering/ﬁshing and small animal husbandry. Crop production varies by region , with beans, maize and cassava considered major staples.59 Of the approximately 15 million hectares of suitable agricultural land in the country, only an estimated 7 ,000 km2 are cultivated each year. The pastoral area of 160,000 km2 is recognized to be signiﬁcantly underutilized. The country’s primary agriculture zone is concentrated in the south-west due to the drier the north-east and central Savannah areas. Less than 5% of this area is occupied by smallholder farms, which average 1.7 hectares per household of 5 people. Food crops represent 75% of cultivated areas and are typically self-consumed.60 56  B/a.altoto, S., Son/g.alt, S. /a.altnd F/a.alt/g.alt/a.altrib/a.alt, C. (2018). Clim/a.altt/e.alt Ch/a.altn/g.alt/e.alt Ad/a.altpt/a.alttion /a.altnd A/g.altricultur/a.altl D/e.altv/e.altlopm/e.altnt in C/e.altntr/a.altl Afric/a.alt R/e.altpublic- Evid/e.altnc/e.alt of North-W/e.altst. J. of Food Proc/e.altssin/g.alt /a.altnd T/e.altchnolo/g.alt/y.alt.  9(11). DOI: 10.4172/2157-7110.1000761 57  USAID (2018). Clim/a.altt/e.alt Risks in th/e.alt C/e.altntr/a.altl Afric/a.altn R/e.alt/g.altion/a.altl Pro/g.altr/a.altm for th/e.alt Environm/e.altnt (CARPE) /a.altnd Con/g.alto B/a.altsin. URL: https:/ /
 (page [19]) www.clim/a.altt/e.altlinks.or/g.alt/sit/e.alts/d/e.altf/a.altult/ﬁl/e.alts//a.altss/e.altt/docum/e.altnt/20180604_USAID-ATLAS_Clim/a.altt/e.altRiskProﬁl/e.alt_CARPE.pdf
 (page [19]) 58  World B/a.altnk Group (2016). G/e.altnd/e.altr Equ/a.altlit/y.alt, Pov/e.altrt/y.alt R/e.altduction, /a.altnd Inclusiv/e.alt Growth. URL: http:/ /docum/e.altnts1.worldb/a.altnk.or/g.alt/
 (page [19]) cur/a.altt/e.altd//e.altn/820851467992505410/pdf/102114-REVISED-PUBLIC-WBG-G/e.altnd/e.altr-Str/a.altt/e.alt/g.alt/y.alt.pdf
 (page [19]) 59  USAID (2018). Clim/a.altt/e.alt Risks in th/e.alt C/e.altntr/a.altl Afric/a.altn R/e.alt/g.altion/a.altl Pro/g.altr/a.altm for th/e.alt Environm/e.altnt (CARPE) /a.altnd Con/g.alto B/a.altsin. URL: https:/ /
 (page [20]) www.clim/a.altt/e.altlinks.or/g.alt/sit/e.alts/d/e.altf/a.altult/ﬁl/e.alts//a.altss/e.altt/docum/e.altnt/20180604_USAID-ATLAS_Clim/a.altt/e.altRiskProﬁl/e.alt_CARPE.pdf
 (page [20]) 60  S/e.altr/g.alt/e.alt, S.B. /e.altt /a.altl. (2017). Imp/a.altcts of Clim/a.altt/e.alt ch/a.altn/g.alt/e.alt in C/e.altntr/a.altl Afric/a.altn R/e.altpublic. Journ/a.altl of Sci/e.altnc/e.alt /a.altnd En/g.altin/e.alt/e.altrin/g.alt T/e.altchnolo/g.alt/y.alt.  5,
 (page [20]) pp. 52–63. E-ISSN: 2311-8741/17
 (page [20]) 17 CLIMATE RISK COUNTRY PROFILE: CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLICArmed conﬂict remains a major driver for food insecurity in CAR and a major disruption to the country’s agricultural potential. Basic services are dysfunctional or non-existent in many areas and the disruption of already limited services further hinders people’s access to livelihood opportunities. Trans-human movements remain difﬁcult, particularly in northwestern areas, generating tensions between pastoralists and farmers. This has exacerbated existing intercommunal tensions; leading to armed conﬂict. As households and communities have been unable to engage in agricultural and livestock activities it has resulted in a depletion of food stocks, rising prices, the adoption of negative coping mechanisms by nearly half of the population and increased dependency on food aid.61
 (page [20]) Clim/a.altt/e.alt Ch/a.altn/g.alt/e.alt Imp/a.altcts
 (page [20]) Projected climate change trends for the region are expected to result in increased rainfall through more frequent and intense extreme rainfall events as well as prolonged dry spells and rising temperatures, which will impact crop selection and productivity, alter farming practices and put increased pressure on farmers to expand their cropland into forests.62 Rising temperatures may also alter pest and pathogen existence, with particular concern for the cassava mosaic virus. Additionally, increasing temperatures and humidity may negatively impact the ability to effectively process agricultural products and safely store seeds, grains and other perishable products.63 Damage to the region’s already severely
 (page [20]) limited ground transportation infrastructure from
 (page [20]) ﬂoods and heavy rains (as well as political instability and conﬂict) is likely to lead to increased erosion, raising transport costs and/or prevent products from reaching market before spoilage, negatively
 (page [20]) impacting farmers. Increased and/or prolonged
 (page [20]) dry spells are also likely to alter planting timelines.64 Figure 12  shows the average daily max-temperature across seasonal cycles. These higher temperatures have implications for impacts to soil moisture and crop growth. Precipitation is also expected to increase, but marginally, in the southern and southeast areas.
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 (page [20]) Temperature (°C)
 (page [20]) FIGURE 12. Av/e.altr/a.alt/g.alt/e.alt d/a.altil/y.alt m/a.altx t/e.altmp/e.altr/a.alttur/e.alt
 (page [20]) for CAR (RCP8.5, R/e.altf/e.altr/e.altnc/e.alt P/e.altriod,
 (page [20]) 1986–2005)65
 (page [20]) 61  FAO (2019). C/e.altntr/a.altl Afric/a.altn R/e.altpublic — Situ/a.alttion R/e.altport, Jul/y.alt 2019. URL: http:/ /www.f/a.alto.or/g.alt/ﬁl/e.alt/a.altdmin/us/e.altr_uplo/a.altd//e.altm/e.altr/g.alt/e.altnci/e.alts/
 (page [20]) docs/FAOCARsitr/e.altp_Jul/y.alt2019.pdf
 (page [20]) 62  B/a.altoto, S., Son/g.alt, S. /a.altnd F/a.alt/g.alt/a.altrib/a.alt, C. (2018). Clim/a.altt/e.alt Ch/a.altn/g.alt/e.alt Ad/a.altpt/a.alttion /a.altnd A/g.altricultur/a.altl D/e.altv/e.altlopm/e.altnt in C/e.altntr/a.altl Afric/a.alt R/e.altpublic- Evid/e.altnc/e.alt of North-W/e.altst. J. of Food Proc/e.altssin/g.alt /a.altnd T/e.altchnolo/g.alt/y.alt.  9(11). DOI: 10.4172/2157-7110.1000761 63  USAID (2018). Clim/a.altt/e.alt Risks in th/e.alt C/e.altntr/a.altl Afric/a.altn R/e.alt/g.altion/a.altl Pro/g.altr/a.altm for th/e.alt Environm/e.altnt (CARPE) /a.altnd Con/g.alto B/a.altsin. URL: https:/ /
 (page [20]) www.clim/a.altt/e.altlinks.or/g.alt/sit/e.alts/d/e.altf/a.altult/ﬁl/e.alts//a.altss/e.altt/docum/e.altnt/20180604_USAID-ATLAS_Clim/a.altt/e.altRiskProﬁl/e.alt_CARPE.pdf
 (page [20]) 64  World B/a.altnk (2018). Br/e.alt/a.altkin/g.alt down b/a.altrri/e.altrs to r/e.alt/g.altion/a.altl /a.alt/g.altricultur/a.altl tr/a.altd/e.alt in C/e.altntr/a.altl Afric/a.alt. URL: https:/ /op/e.altnknowl/e.altd/g.alt/e.alt.worldb/a.altnk.or/g.alt/
 (page [21]) bitstr/e.alt/a.altm/h/a.altndl/e.alt/10986/30397/127883-REPORT-CEMAC-A/g.altricultur/e.alt.pdf?s/e.altqu/e.altnc/e.alt=1&isAllow/e.altd=/y.alt
 (page [21]) 65  WBG Clim/a.altt/e.alt Ch/a.altn/g.alt/e.alt Knowl/e.altd/g.alt/e.alt Port/a.altl (CCKP, 2021). CAR A/g.altricultur/e.alt D/a.altshbo/a.altrd. URL: https:/ /clim/a.altt/e.altknowl/e.altd/g.alt/e.altport/a.altl.
 (page [21]) worldb/a.altnk.or/g.alt/countr/y.alt/c/e.altntr/a.altl-/a.altfric/a.altn-r/e.altpublic/clim/a.altt/e.alt-s/e.altctor-/a.alt/g.altricultur/e.alt
 (page [21]) 18 CLIMATE RISK COUNTRY PROFILE: CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLICAd/a.altpt/a.alttion Options Both the sensitivity of the agricultural sector to the climate and the high reliance of this sector on rainfall and water resources have important implications for the CAR’s farmers, livestock owners, ﬁsheries, its wider economy, and political stability. The structure of the economy, which is fragile and based mainly on natural resources, particularly agriculture (80% of the active population, 50% of GDP and 95% of food sources) and forests, depends heavily on variability and climate change. Improved development and implementation of environment and agricultural protection policies should be put in place. Improved ﬁnancing mechanisms can help small-scale farmers and commercial industries re-start investment and production following displacement and conﬂict. The sector would beneﬁt from targeted research to increase knowledge on speciﬁc climate change related impacts to the agriculture sector. Improved access to seasonal information is necessary to better inform farmers regarding planting. The sector should target the preservation of the natural ecosystems in relation to its various functions: habitats for ﬂora and fauna, support for agriculture, maintenance for soil conservation and fertility. Improved training and awareness raising of local farmers can be used to improve sowings, and soil enrichment techniques; increased agricultural support should be provided through increased and reinforced agricultural extension programs. Increased involvement from local communities, including farmers, should be sought in the improved management of local forest ecosystems. Improved roads and transport networks can improve market access.66 CAR has also committed to improving the resilience of its agriculture sector through the introduction o f new varieties more suited to climate extremes, diversifying its crops and varieties grown, establishing a seed bank, promoting more sustainable soil management that is linked with forest management systems which can also support the reforestation of degraded landscapes.67
 (page [21]) W/a.altt/e.altr
 (page [21]) Ov/e.altrvi/e.altw
 (page [21]) The CAR has a dense hydrological network spread throughout the country, which are distributed primarily between the two watersheds, the Eastern Logone basin to the west and the Chari in the center and east. The Central African Basin of Chari covers 202,351 km2. The Congolese watershed covers the southern two-thirds of the country and consists of two major sub-basins: Oubangui and Sangha. The main rivers in the Chari-Logone basin are, the Pendé, the Lim and the Ngou which, ﬂow in to Mount Ngaoui. The Central African basin of Chari, which covers 202,351 km2 is subdivided into two parts, the Ouham and its tributaries, and the Aouk-Bamingui complex a nd their tributaries, with the western branch of the Chari consisting of the Ouham-Bahr Sara and the Eastern Chari from Gribingui Bamingui and Bahr Aouk. The Congolese hydrographic basin, covers the southern two-thirds of the country on 404,004 km2. It is made up of two major sub-basins, those of the Ubangi and the Sangha. The basin of Ubangui occupies more than three quarters of the Congo Basin. It stretches from east to west over 350,684 km2, up to the DRC with Uélé which is the main contributor. The Ubangi is made up of the union of the Uélé and Mbomou 66  Ministr/y.alt of Environm/e.altnt, Ecolo/g.alt/y.alt /a.altnd Sust/a.altin/a.altbl/e.alt D/e.altv/e.altlopm/e.altnt (2015). S/e.altcond N/a.alttion/a.altl Communic/a.alttion to th/e.alt UNFCCC — C/e.altntr/a.altl
 (page [22]) Afric/a.altn R/e.altpublic. URL: https:/ /unfccc.int/sit/e.alts/d/e.altf/a.altult/ﬁl/e.alts/r/e.altsourc/e.alt/c/a.altfnc2.pdf
 (page [22]) 67  C/e.altntr/a.altl Afric/a.altn R/e.altpublic (2016). N/a.alttion/a.altll/y.alt-D/e.altt/e.altrmin/e.altd Contributions. URL: https:/ /www4.unfccc.int/sit/e.alts/ndcst/a.alt/g.altin/g.alt/
 (page [22]) Publish/e.altdDocum/e.altnts/C/e.altntr/a.altl%20Afric/a.altn%20R/e.altpublic%20First/INDC_R%C3%A9publiqu/e.alt%20C/e.altntr/a.altfric/a.altin/e.alt_EN.pdf
 (page [22]) 19 CLIMATE RISK COUNTRY PROFILE: CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLICdownstream from the city of Ouango. Upstream to downstream, the Central African part of this basin includes major tributaries, such as the Mbomou, Kotto, Ouaka, Kémo, Ombella, M’Poko and Lobaye.68 However, despite the large availability of water resources, the country has little institutionalized water supply infrastructure, impacting urban and rural supply as well as water sanitation and hygiene for local populations.69
 (page [22]) Clim/a.altt/e.alt Ch/a.altn/g.alt/e.alt Imp/a.altcts
 (page [22]) Most of the CAR’s population depends on groundwater and local springs largely located in dense gallery and equatorial forests for drinking water. However, the changing characteristics of annual and seasonal precipitation is expected to alter the Congo Basin’s dynamics across the central African region, also impacting CAR, could affect water availability for both household and commercial consumption. The reliability of existing and potential irrigation schemes (although currently limited) may be affected given climate impacts on the hydrological system, especially in savannas and in drier zones. Additionally, the increased frequency of intense rainfall events can exacerbate poor water quality, especially in urban areas, and increase the risk of ﬂooding in rivers, streams and drainage ditches. The pollution and contamination of drinking water is also a signiﬁcant public health concern.70 Furthermore, ﬂoods on navigable rivers can be dangerous and disrupt transportation of people and goods.71 For CAR increased aridity and drought is also expected to result in land degradation a loss in biodiversity and surface water, adverse impacts to crop production (including yield and quality) and increase the likelihood of wildﬁres. Heavy rainfall events are also expected to lead to increased ﬂooding and water logging in agricultural areas, impacting crop production, especially for tuber crops (cassava, taro, yam) with changing rainfall patterns.72 Changes in rainfall and evaporation translate directly to changes in surface water inﬁltration and groundwater re-charge. This has the potential for further decreased reliability of unimproved groundwater sources and surface water sources during droughts or prolonged dry seasons. Increased strain on pumping mechanisms leading to breakdowns if maintenance is neglected and the potential for falling water levels in the immediate vicinity of well or borehole, particularly in areas of high demand. Additionally, te mperature increases have the potential to result in increased soil moisture deﬁcits even under conditions of increasing rainfall. The ﬁgure below shows the projected annual Standardized Precipitation Evapotranspiration Index (SPEI) for drought through the end of the century. The SPEI is an index which represents the measure of the given water deﬁcit in a speciﬁc location, accounting for contributions of temperature-dependent evapotranspiration and providing insight into increasing or decreasing 68  Ministr/y.alt of Environm/e.altnt, Ecolo/g.alt/y.alt /a.altnd Sust/a.altin/a.altbl/e.alt D/e.altv/e.altlopm/e.altnt (2015). S/e.altcond N/a.alttion/a.altl Communic/a.alttion to th/e.alt UNFCCC — C/e.altntr/a.altl
 (page [22]) Afric/a.altn R/e.altpublic. URL: https:/ /unfccc.int/sit/e.alts/d/e.altf/a.altult/ﬁl/e.alts/r/e.altsourc/e.alt/c/a.altfnc2.pdf
 (page [22]) 69  Ministr/y.alt of Environm/e.altnt, Ecolo/g.alt/y.alt /a.altnd Sust/a.altin/a.altbl/e.alt D/e.altv/e.altlopm/e.altnt (2015). S/e.altcond N/a.alttion/a.altl Communic/a.alttion to th/e.alt UNFCCC — C/e.altntr/a.altl
 (page [22]) Afric/a.altn R/e.altpublic. URL: https:/ /unfccc.int/sit/e.alts/d/e.altf/a.altult/ﬁl/e.alts/r/e.altsourc/e.alt/c/a.altfnc2.pdf
 (page [22]) 70  K/a.altmb/a.alt, F. /a.altnd S/a.altn/g.altij/a.alt, F. (2016). Imp/a.altct of W/a.altt/e.altr Pollution on Hum/a.altn H/e.alt/a.altlth in th/e.alt C/e.altntr/a.altl Afric/a.altn R/e.altpublic. Adv/a.altnc/e.alts in Soci/a.altl Sci/e.altnc/e.alts R/e.alts/e.alt/a.altrch Journ/a.altl. 3(1). DOI: 10.14738//a.altssrj.31.1764 71  USAID (2018). Clim/a.altt/e.alt Risks in th/e.alt C/e.altntr/a.altl Afric/a.altn R/e.alt/g.altion/a.altl Pro/g.altr/a.altm for th/e.alt Environm/e.altnt (CARPE) /a.altnd Con/g.alto B/a.altsin. URL: https:/ /
 (page [23]) www.clim/a.altt/e.altlinks.or/g.alt/sit/e.alts/d/e.altf/a.altult/ﬁl/e.alts//a.altss/e.altt/docum/e.altnt/20180604_USAID-ATLAS_Clim/a.altt/e.altRiskProﬁl/e.alt_CARPE.pdf
 (page [23]) 72  S/e.altr/g.alt/e.alt, S.B. /e.altt /a.altl. (2017). Imp/a.altcts of Clim/a.altt/e.alt ch/a.altn/g.alt/e.alt in C/e.altntr/a.altl Afric/a.altn R/e.altpublic. Journ/a.altl of Sci/e.altnc/e.alt /a.altnd En/g.altin/e.alt/e.altrin/g.alt T/e.altchnolo/g.alt/y.alt.  5,
 (page [23]) pp. 52–63. E-ISSN: 2311-8741/17
 (page [23]) 20 CLIMATE RISK COUNTRY PROFILE: CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLICpressure on water resources. Negative values for SPEI represent dry conditions, with values below −2 indicating severe drought conditions, likewise positive values indicate increased wet conditions. This is an important understanding for the water sector in regards to quantity and quality of supply for human consumption and agriculture use as well as for the energy sector as reductions in water availability impacts river ﬂow and the hydropower generating capabilities. As seen in Figure 13 , CAR is projected to experience signiﬁcantly reduced dry conditions by
 (page [23]) end of the century.
 (page [23]) Ad/a.altpt/a.alttion Options
 (page [23]) The CAR Government recognizes the importance of water resource management and is working to ensure the viability and sustainability of the sector. In recent years a roadmap for the promotion of integrated water resources management (2005) was developed as well as the development of a national water policy and water code. Efforts include more effective coordination of programs across public, private and local actions and more effective mobilization of ﬁnancial investment opportunities to support key infrastructural investment in water access, irrigation and the potential for hydropower generation. Comparative assessments remain ongoing and well as collaborative efforts to support public-private partnerships of sector m anagement. Improvements of hydro-meteorological forecasting will greatly enhance planning and investment capabilities as well as the ability to more effectively plan and prepare for major rainfall events and the likelihood of ﬂooding. Research should also be undertaken concerning the quality of the surface and underground water for enhanced resource allocation (and conservation) planning.74 Adaptation infrastructure should be developed, which is capable of supporting the projected hydrological variations and river ﬂow. Improved infrastructure can also reduce ﬂooding disasters and improve transport networks. Improved water management and usage will beneﬁt agriculture, water quality and availability and help to ensure adequate food security and water access. Improved efﬁciency in water management practices, currently considered to be low, will beneﬁt households and communities.75 CAR is also committed to improving the country’s supply of potable water and establishing systems for monitoring water quality as well as underground and surface water resources.76
 (page [23]) Historical
 (page [23]) RCP 2.6
 (page [23]) RCP 4.5
 (page [23]) RCP 6.0
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 (page [23]) IndexFIGURE 13. Annu/a.altl SPEI Drou/g.altht Ind/e.altx in CAR for th/e.alt p/e.altriod, 1986 to 2099
 (page [23]) (R/e.altf/e.altr/e.altnc/e.alt P/e.altriod, 1986–2005)73
 (page [23]) 73  WBG Clim/a.altt/e.alt Ch/a.altn/g.alt/e.alt Knowl/e.altd/g.alt/e.alt Port/a.altl (CCKP, 2021). CAR W/a.altt/e.altr Portl/e.altt. URL: https:/ /clim/a.altt/e.altknowl/e.altd/g.alt/e.altport/a.altl.worldb/a.altnk.or/g.alt/
 (page [23]) countr/y.alt/c/e.altntr/a.altl-/a.altfric/a.altn-r/e.altpublic/clim/a.altt/e.alt-s/e.altctor-w/a.altt/e.altr
 (page [23]) 74  C/e.altntr/a.altl Afric/a.altn R/e.altpublic (2016): N/a.alttion/a.altll/y.alt-D/e.altt/e.altrmin/e.altd Contributions. URL: https:/ /www4.unfccc.int/sit/e.alts/ndcst/a.alt/g.altin/g.alt/
 (page [23]) Publish/e.altdDocum/e.altnts/C/e.altntr/a.altl%20Afric/a.altn%20R/e.altpublic%20First/INDC_R%C3%A9publiqu/e.alt%20C/e.altntr/a.altfric/a.altin/e.alt_EN.pdf
 (page [23]) 75  Ministr/y.alt of Environm/e.altnt, Ecolo/g.alt/y.alt /a.altnd Sust/a.altin/a.altbl/e.alt D/e.altv/e.altlopm/e.altnt (2015): S/e.altcond N/a.alttion/a.altl Communic/a.alttion to th/e.alt UNFCCC — C/e.altntr/a.altl
 (page [24]) Afric/a.altn R/e.altpublic. URL: https:/ /unfccc.int/sit/e.alts/d/e.altf/a.altult/ﬁl/e.alts/r/e.altsourc/e.alt/c/a.altfnc2.pdf
 (page [24]) 76  C/e.altntr/a.altl Afric/a.altn R/e.altpublic (2016): N/a.alttion/a.altll/y.alt-D/e.altt/e.altrmin/e.altd Contributions. URL: https:/ /www4.unfccc.int/sit/e.alts/ndcst/a.alt/g.altin/g.alt/
 (page [24]) Publish/e.altdDocum/e.altnts/C/e.altntr/a.altl%20Afric/a.altn%20R/e.altpublic%20First/INDC_R%C3%A9publiqu/e.alt%20C/e.altntr/a.altfric/a.altin/e.alt_EN.pdf
 (page [24]) 21 CLIMATE RISK COUNTRY PROFILE: CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLICFor/e.altstr/y.alt
 (page [24]) Ov/e.altrvi/e.altw
 (page [24]) CAR has signiﬁcant amounts of forest coverage which is used not only for products extracted and used by humans (timber, fuel wood, palm oil, etc.), but also serves as habitat for wildlife and for the environmental services they provide, such as carbon sinks, controlling erosion and ﬁltering water (and regulating water ﬂow). The forest heritage in CAR consists of natural forest formations, trees outside forests and block plantations, which have undergone changes due to human activities.77 Primary impacts to the country’s forests are the conversion of forests and grasslands and the abandonment of exploited land and soils used for agriculture. Furthermore, increasing pressure is being placed on CAR’s forest lands due to socio-economic and agricultural pressures, most signiﬁcantly in the
 (page [24]) south-western areas of the country.78
 (page [24]) Clim/a.altt/e.alt Ch/a.altn/g.alt/e.alt Imp/a.altcts
 (page [24]) Climate change trends in CAR is expected to have a range of imp acts on its forest ecosystems. With increased temperatures and more variable rainfall and heavy precipitation events increasing in intensity and frequency as well as the increase in dry spells biodiversity and soil health will be impacted. This may shrink the physical extent of habitats that currently have protected status or shift the distribution of speciﬁc plant species upon which endangered species depend to areas outside of protection. Additionally, this could lead animals to stray farther away from the relative security of protected areas in search of preferred habitat, putting endangered species at greater risk of conﬂict with human settlements, and put both humans and wildlife at risk from disease transmission, and negatively impact local livelihoods dependent on tourism revenue.79 For CAR’s forest ecosystems, the increase in temperature may, overall, improve the plant productivity despite the extinction of heat-sensitive species. However, extreme events (heat waves, ﬂoods, storms, etc.) may lead to changes in breeding periods of certain species, in the duration of the seasons of plant cultivation. Additionally, the mortality of sensitive animal and plant species may increase leading to a ﬂuctuation of populations and a variation in the speciﬁc composition of communities. Importantly, changes will affect the forest industry, ecotourism, product supply non-timber forest, traditional pharmacopoeia, etc. and therefore reduce the means livelihoods of people mainly in rural areas where poverty predominates. Weak governance and weak/limited institutional capacity to control deforestation and enforce regulations is also an underlying challenge.80 77  Junior, D. /e.altt /a.altl. (2016). For/e.altst M/a.altn/a.alt/g.alt/e.altm/e.altnt /a.altnd D/e.altfor/e.altst/a.alttion in C/e.altntr/a.altl Afric/a.altn R/e.altpublic. Am/e.altric/a.altn Journ/a.altl od En/g.altin/e.alt/e.altrin/g.alt R/e.alts/e.alt/a.altrch . 5(4). pp. 79–90. URL: http:/ /www./a.altj/e.altr.or/g.alt/p/a.altp/e.altrs/v5(04)/I0504079090.pdf 78  Ministr/y.alt of Environm/e.altnt, Ecolo/g.alt/y.alt /a.altnd Sust/a.altin/a.altbl/e.alt D/e.altv/e.altlopm/e.altnt (2015). S/e.altcond N/a.alttion/a.altl Communic/a.alttion to th/e.alt UNFCCC — C/e.altntr/a.altl
 (page [24]) Afric/a.altn R/e.altpublic. URL: https:/ /unfccc.int/sit/e.alts/d/e.altf/a.altult/ﬁl/e.alts/r/e.altsourc/e.alt/c/a.altfnc2.pdf
 (page [24]) 79  USAID (2018). Clim/a.altt/e.alt Risks in th/e.alt C/e.altntr/a.altl Afric/a.altn R/e.alt/g.altion/a.altl Pro/g.altr/a.altm for th/e.alt Environm/e.altnt (CARPE) /a.altnd Con/g.alto B/a.altsin. URL: https:/ /
 (page [25]) www.clim/a.altt/e.altlinks.or/g.alt/sit/e.alts/d/e.altf/a.altult/ﬁl/e.alts//a.altss/e.altt/docum/e.altnt/20180604_USAID-ATLAS_Clim/a.altt/e.altRiskProﬁl/e.alt_CARPE.pdf
 (page [25]) 80  Ministr/y.alt of Environm/e.altnt, Ecolo/g.alt/y.alt /a.altnd Sust/a.altin/a.altbl/e.alt D/e.altv/e.altlopm/e.altnt (2015). S/e.altcond N/a.alttion/a.altl Communic/a.alttion to th/e.alt UNFCCC — C/e.altntr/a.altl
 (page [25]) Afric/a.altn R/e.altpublic. URL: https:/ /unfccc.int/sit/e.alts/d/e.altf/a.altult/ﬁl/e.alts/r/e.altsourc/e.alt/c/a.altfnc2.pdf
 (page [25]) 22 CLIMATE RISK COUNTRY PROFILE: CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLICAd/a.altpt/a.alttion Options Within CAR, strategic options for adapting forests and biodiversity to change climate change is focused on improved spatial planning, strengthening the country’s sustainable forest management, establishing seed banks for reforestation activities, extending the network of protected areas on land and in the wetlands and strategic investment to restore the country’s degraded ecosystems.81 CAR is also looking to promote more sustainable agricultural as well as forest systems management for impro ved and sustainable soil management. The country is also committed to restoring degraded forest landscapes and improve its land-use planning especially for forest
 (page [25]) areas and natural preserves.82
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 (page [25]) Access to electricity is one of the lowest in Africa. In CAR, the Department of Energy and Hydraulics administers the electricity sub-sector, as well as new and renewable energy opportunities. In CAR, the majority of energy, more than 90% is sourced through wood energy, with 7% by imported petroleum and 2% by electricity. Only 14% of the population has access to electricity, mainly in the capital Bangui. As of 2015, 88% of electricity was generated by hydropower. The capital city of Bangui is supplied by two hydroelectric generators and one thermal plant. A new dam on the Mbali River (a joint project with the Democratic Republic of the Congo), which permits year-round hydroelectric generation, opened in late 1991. The country’s low levels of energy generation and access are due to a number of reasons, notable slow sector growth, hindered by weak institutions, low population density, the country’s large size and years of unrest.83
 (page [25]) Clim/a.altt/e.alt Ch/a.altn/g.alt/e.alt Imp/a.altcts
 (page [25]) Energy generation and access is critical for CAR’s development agenda and continued efforts to improve its population’s standard of living. Constraints in the current energy supply exist and include limited generation, low access to modern services, high cost, irregular supply and high cost for energy investments. Biomass (including wood fuel, charcoal, and agricultural waste), continues to be the main sources of energy in the country and fuelwood is the dominant source of energy for cooking. Traditional biomass used for heating and lighting is prevalent. As over 50% of the country is covered with some form of forest and approximately 10% is currently being used as an energy resource, the continued use of biomass for energy generation is considered sustainable. However, increasing demands from agriculture and slash and burn practices is cause for concern about proper forest resource management. 81  Ministr/y.alt of Environm/e.altnt, Ecolo/g.alt/y.alt /a.altnd Sust/a.altin/a.altbl/e.alt D/e.altv/e.altlopm/e.altnt (2015). S/e.altcond N/a.alttion/a.altl Communic/a.alttion to th/e.alt UNFCCC — C/e.altntr/a.altl
 (page [25]) Afric/a.altn R/e.altpublic. URL: https:/ /unfccc.int/sit/e.alts/d/e.altf/a.altult/ﬁl/e.alts/r/e.altsourc/e.alt/c/a.altfnc2.pdf
 (page [25]) 82  C/e.altntr/a.altl Afric/a.altn R/e.altpublic (2016). N/a.alttion/a.altll/y.alt-D/e.altt/e.altrmin/e.altd Contributions. URL: https:/ /www4.unfccc.int/sit/e.alts/ndcst/a.alt/g.altin/g.alt/
 (page [26]) Publish/e.altdDocum/e.altnts/C/e.altntr/a.altl%20Afric/a.altn%20R/e.altpublic%20First/INDC_R%C3%A9publiqu/e.alt%20C/e.altntr/a.altfric/a.altin/e.alt_EN.pdf
 (page [26]) 83  SEA4All (2016): C/e.altntr/a.altl Afric/a.altn R/e.altpublic. URL: https:/ /w/e.altdocs.un/e.altp.or/g.alt/bitstr/e.alt/a.altm/h/a.altndl/e.alt/20.500.11822/20497/En/e.altr/g.alt/y.alt_proﬁl/e.alt_
 (page [26]) C/e.altntr/a.altlAfric/a.altnR/e.altp.pdf?s/e.altqu/e.altnc/e.alt=1&isAllow/e.altd=/y.alt
 (page [26]) km north of Bangui, initially proposed as part of a
 (page [26]) w since the initial proposal.
 (page [26]) 23 CLIMATE RISK COUNTRY PROFILE: CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLICHydropower is considered as a primary opportunity for expanded energy generation for the country. Currently the Mbali River, a tributary of the Oubangui in the Boali region north-east of Bangui, is considered to have signiﬁcant hydro-electric potential. This region is also the main center for hydropower production in the country. Additional potential priorities for small or micro hydro development include: Bocaranga, Paoua, Baboua, Bossangoa; Sibut, Bangassou, Bria, Kembe, Bambari, Bouar, Carnot, Berbeacute, Kaga-Bandoro and Mba. Major potential large- hydropower developments include the 300 MW Palambo project, 65 km north of Bangui, initially proposed as part of a wider project to improve water ﬂow into Lake Chad. However, the necessary investment for this project was estimated at approximately US$ 450 million, and further project development has been slow since the initial proposal.84 While hydro and micro-hydropower facilities present promising opportunities for needed electricity generation across the region, given the abundance of surface water resources and the likely increase in precipitation. However, the changing characteristics of annual and seasonal precipitation as well as the increase in heavy rainfall events can disrupt river ﬂow, increase investment and construction costs, and increase challenges to sustained energy generation. Extreme weather events such as heavy rains can damage infrastructure, roads, communication networks and disrupt supply lines. An increase in the frequency and intensity of heavy rains and ﬂooding is also likely to impact fragile infrastructure systems which can also hydro-power generation.85 The CAR does, however, have high potential for other renewables such as solar and wind to expand the country’s clean energy portfolio. This would require signiﬁcant investment opportunities and improved business regulation to promote private sector action and to support optimal action on developing renewable energy infrastructure.86 Cooling Degree Days show the relationship between daily heat and cooling demand, typically sourced through a form of active cooling or an evaporative process. The change in cooling degree days provides insight into the potential for extended seasons of power demand or periods in which cooling demand (power demands) might increase ( Figure 14) . Seasonal increases for cooling demands are expected to increase throughout the year. Warm Spell Duration represents the number of days in a sequence of at least six days in which the daily maximum temperature is greater than the 90th percentile of daily maximum temperature. As shown Figure 15 , warm spells are expected to sharply increase in the second half of the century. 84  REEP (2013): C/e.altntr/a.altl Afric/a.altn R/e.altpublic. URL: https:/ /www.r/e.alt/e.alt/e.altp.or/g.alt/c/e.altntr/a.altl-/a.altfric/a.altn-r/e.altpublic-2012 85  USAID (2018). Clim/a.altt/e.alt Risks in th/e.alt C/e.altntr/a.altl Afric/a.altn R/e.alt/g.altion/a.altl Pro/g.altr/a.altm for th/e.alt Environm/e.altnt (CARPE) /a.altnd Con/g.alto B/a.altsin. URL: https:/ /
 (page [27]) www.clim/a.altt/e.altlinks.or/g.alt/sit/e.alts/d/e.altf/a.altult/ﬁl/e.alts//a.altss/e.altt/docum/e.altnt/20180604_USAID-ATLAS_Clim/a.altt/e.altRiskProﬁl/e.alt_CARPE.pdf
 (page [27]) 86  K/e.altnf/a.altck, J. /e.altt /a.altl. (2017). How c/a.altn w/e.alt promot/e.alt r/e.altn/e.altw/a.altbl/e.alt /e.altn/e.altr/g.alt/y.alt /a.altnd /e.altn/e.altr/g.alt/y.alt /e.altﬃci/e.altnc/y.alt in C/e.altntr/a.altl Afric/a.alt? A C/a.altm/e.altroon c/a.alts/e.alt stud/y.alt. R/e.altn/e.altw/a.altbl/e.alt /a.altnd Sust/a.altin/a.altbl/e.alt En/e.altr/g.alt/y.alt R/e.altvi/e.altws . 75. pp. 1217–1224. DOI: https:/ /doi.or/g.alt/10.1016/j.rs/e.altr.2016.11.108 24 CLIMATE RISK COUNTRY PROFILE: CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC Historical RCP 2.6 RCP 4.5 RCP 6.0 RCP 8.5
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 (page [27]) Temperature (°F)FIGURE 14. Proj/e.altct/e.altd Coolin/g.alt D/e.alt/g.altr/e.alt/e.alt D/a.alt/y.alts (65°F) in CAR for th/e.alt p/e.altriod 1986-2099,
 (page [27]) (R/e.altf/e.altr/e.altnc/e.alt P/e.altriod, 1986–2005)87
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 (page [27]) FIGURE 15. W/a.altrm Sp/e.altll Dur/a.alttion Ind/e.altx in CAR for th/e.alt p/e.altriod 1986 to 2099 (R/e.altf/e.altr/e.altnc/e.alt
 (page [27]) P/e.altriod, 1986–2005)88
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 (page [27]) Wood fuel consumption in CAR is expected to stay at very high levels in future decades and charcoal consumption is also expected to grow.89 While CAR is committed to diversifying its energy sources it  should also focus on the implementation of improved environmental protection schemes and sustainable land and forest use. The country is focused on the development of hydroelectric installations (including micro-dams), which should improve energy access and availability for urban areas. Multiple projects (from the World Bank, the European Union and the Central African Forest Commission[COMIFAC] have invested in the sector to improve sustainable forest management. Efforts are ongoing to increase awareness regarding use of efﬁcient cookstove technology and increased communication around this behavior change should be promoted. Additional efforts include the promotion of the use of wood waste as fuel for forestry companies and the promotion of the use of improved and more efﬁcient cook stoves for household cooking needs. The country is committed to diversifying its energy sources and is prioritizing hydro-electric installations, including micro-dams as well as expand its renewable energy generation potential and usage.90
 (page [27]) H/e.alt/a.altlth
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 (page [27]) The health situation in CAR has deteriorated as a result of the multiple crises affecting the country. The HIV/AIDS epidemic in the Central African Republic, together with signiﬁcantly worsening living conditions and the fragile state of the health system (owing to violence and staff dislocation) are some factors that explain the worsening rates of 87  WBG Clim/a.altt/e.alt Ch/a.altn/g.alt/e.alt Knowl/e.altd/g.alt/e.alt Port/a.altl (CCKP, 2021). CAR W/a.altt/e.altr S/e.altctor. URL: https:/ /clim/a.altt/e.altknowl/e.altd/g.alt/e.altport/a.altl.worldb/a.altnk.or/g.alt/
 (page [27]) countr/y.alt/c/e.altntr/a.altl-/a.altfric/a.altn-r/e.altpublic/clim/a.altt/e.alt-s/e.altctor-/e.altn/e.altr/g.alt/y.alt
 (page [27]) 88  WBG Clim/a.altt/e.alt Ch/a.altn/g.alt/e.alt Knowl/e.altd/g.alt/e.alt Port/a.altl (CCKP, 2021). CAR En/e.altr/g.alt/y.alt S/e.altctor. URL: https:/ /clim/a.altt/e.altknowl/e.altd/g.alt/e.altport/a.altl.worldb/a.altnk.or/g.alt/
 (page [27]) countr/y.alt/c/e.altntr/a.altl-/a.altfric/a.altn-r/e.altpublic/clim/a.altt/e.alt-s/e.altctor-/e.altn/e.altr/g.alt/y.alt
 (page [27]) 89  World B/a.altnk (2013): D/e.altfor/e.altst/a.alttion Tr/e.altnds in th/e.alt Con/g.alto B/a.altsin — R/e.altconcilin/g.alt /e.altconomic /g.altrowth /a.altnd for/e.altst prot/e.altction. URL: http:/ /
 (page [28]) www./z.alt/a.altr/a.alt/g.alto/z.alt/a.alt./e.alts/cont/e.altnidos/m/e.altdio/a.altmbi/e.altnt/e.alt/onu/n/e.altwsl/e.alttt/e.altr15/970-/e.altn/g.alt.pdf
 (page [28]) 90  C/e.altntr/a.altl Afric/a.altn R/e.altpublic (2016): N/a.alttion/a.altll/y.alt-D/e.altt/e.altrmin/e.altd Contributions. URL: https:/ /www4.unfccc.int/sit/e.alts/ndcst/a.alt/g.altin/g.alt/
 (page [28]) Publish/e.altdDocum/e.altnts/C/e.altntr/a.altl%20Afric/a.altn%20R/e.altpublic%20First/INDC_R%C3%A9publiqu/e.alt%20C/e.altntr/a.altfric/a.altin/e.alt_EN.pdf
 (page [28]) https://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/nandle/10665/250223/
 (page [28]) 25 CLIMATE RISK COUNTRY PROFILE: CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLICneonatal, infant and maternal mortality. The primary health challenges for the country are its poor governance; high maternal mortality (882 per 100,000 live births in 2015) and morality in children under 5 (130.1 per 1000); the high prevalence of communicable diseases, speciﬁcally malaria and diarrheal diseases, and of noncommunicable diseases such as high blood pressure and diabetes; the failing health system, speciﬁcally in terms of governance, extremely limited supply of medicines, facilities and human resources; and health-sector ﬁnancing remains strongly dependent on external aid and is poorly coordinated, thereby limiting its efﬁciency and effectiveness.91 Additionally, food insecurity, under-nutrition, and mal-nutrition are of critical concern for the country. Currently, 40% of children
 (page [28]) under 5 years’ experience stunting.92
 (page [28]) Clim/a.altt/e.alt Ch/a.altn/g.alt/e.alt Imp/a.altcts
 (page [28]) CAR is vulnerable to adverse health impacts due to increasing temperatures and altered precipitation trends. Projected trends are expected to impact bacteria, disease and virus trends in the country, with a concern of an increase in epidemics due to transference into new areas. Given the implications for increased temperature and precipitation on the lifecycle and habitat of malaria-carrying mosquito and parasite species, warmer temperatures may open up new locations suitable for transmission.93 However, in drier areas in CAR such as in the country’s savannah zones, malaria transmission is likely to be shorter (7–9 months compared with 10–12 months). In addition, increases in temperature and episodes of more intense rainfall, are likely to impa ct the spread of waterborne diseases and emerging infectious diseases. Although this is one of the wettest regions of the world, the majority of its people do not have access to safe drinking water and sanitation. As such, diarrheal diseases already represent a signiﬁcant public health burden in CAR and are likely to increase. Higher temperatures, water scarcity, ﬂooding, drought, conﬂict, and displacement, will negatively impact agricultural production, causing further breakdown in food systems. Thi s will disproportionally affect most vulnerable people at risk to hunger and can lead to increased food insecurity nationwide. This is especially critical for CAR as the majority of the population is reliant upon subsistence agriculture, which is reliant upon rainfall, making it highly vulnerable to changing weather patterns and long-term climate change trends. Poor and vulnerable groups risk further deterioration into food and nutrition crises i f exposed to extreme climate events. Furthermore, more severe and frequent ﬂooding may displace communities and increase the risk of water-borne diseases, and higher temperatures may threaten food and nutritional security, agricultural livelihoods, and increase heat-related deaths, speciﬁcally in children and the elderly. Vulnerable groups risk further deterioration into food and nutrition crises if exposed to extreme climate events of ﬂooding, drought and extreme heat. Increasing temperatures also remain of signiﬁcant concern, although is often overlooked as a public health risk.94 91  WHO (2016): Countr/y.alt Coop/e.altr/a.alttion Str/a.altt/e.alt/g.alt/y.alt — C/e.altntr/a.altl Afric/a.altn R/e.altpublic. URL: https:/ //a.altpps.who.int/iris/bitstr/e.alt/a.altm/h/a.altndl/e.alt/10665/250223/
 (page [28]) ccsbri/e.altf_c/a.altf_/e.altn.pdf?s/e.altqu/e.altnc/e.alt=1
 (page [28]) 92  WHO (2019): Glob/a.altl Nutrition Monitorin/g.alt Fr/a.altm/e.altwork Countr/y.alt Proﬁl/e.alt: C/e.altntr/a.altl Afric/a.altn R/e.altpublic. Nutrition L/a.altndsc/a.altp/e.alt Inform/a.alttion
 (page [28]) S/y.altst/e.altm. URL: http:/ //a.altpps.who.int/nutrition/l/a.altndsc/a.altp/e.alt//g.altlob/a.altl-monitorin/g.alt-fr/a.altm/e.altwork?ISO=c/a.altf
 (page [28]) 93  Ruckstuhl, L. /e.altt /a.altl. (2017). M/a.altl/a.altri/a.alt c/a.alts/e.alt m/a.altn/a.alt/g.alt/e.altm/e.altnt b/y.alt communit/y.alt h/e.alt/a.altlth work/e.altrs in th/e.alt C/e.altntr/a.altl Afric/a.altn R/e.altpublic from 20092014: ov/e.altrcomin/g.alt ch/a.altll/e.altn/g.alt/e.alts of /a.altcc/e.altss /a.altnd inst/a.altbilit/y.alt du/e.alt to conﬂict. M/a.altl/a.altri/a.alt Journ/a.altl . 16. URL: https:/ /link.sprin/g.alt/e.altr.com//a.altrticl/e.alt/10.1186/
 (page [29]) s12936-017-2005-7
 (page [29]) 94  Ministr/y.alt of Environm/e.altnt, Ecolo/g.alt/y.alt /a.altnd Sust/a.altin/a.altbl/e.alt D/e.altv/e.altlopm/e.altnt (2015). S/e.altcond N/a.alttion/a.altl Communic/a.alttion to th/e.alt UNFCCC — C/e.altntr/a.altl
 (page [29]) Afric/a.altn R/e.altpublic. URL: https:/ /unfccc.int/sit/e.alts/d/e.altf/a.altult/ﬁl/e.alts/r/e.altsourc/e.alt/c/a.altfnc2.pdf
 (page [29]) 26 CLIMATE RISK COUNTRY PROFILE: CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLICRising temperatures are of increasing concern. The annual distribution of days with a high-heat index provides insight into the health hazard of heat. Figure 16  shows the expected Number of Days with a Heat Index >35°C for the 2090s; showing a sharp increase in very hot days, starting to accelerate by mid-century and continuing to sharply increase under a high-emission scenario by end of the century. It also shows night temperatures ( >20°C), which are expected to rapidly increase in a high-emission scenario. Increased health threats can be projected and monitored through the frequency of tropical nights. Tropical Nights ( Figure 17 ) represents the projected increase in tropical nights for different emission scenarios to demonstrate the difference in expected numbers of tropical nights. Historical RCP 2.6 RCP 4.5 RCP 6.0 RCP 8.5
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 (page [29]) FIGURE 17. Numb/e.altr of Tropic/a.altl Ni/g.althts
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 (page [29]) The CAR’s limited access, expansion and availability of its health care system remains a signiﬁcant challenge to the country’s development goals and improved public health status. Health ﬁnancing, including the supply of medicines, is a priority. The WHO and the European Union have made international experts available to work with local healthcare services regarding issues around supplying medicines in the context of a lacking central pharmaceutical facility. However, identiﬁcation of health service mechanisms to ensure access to essential services for the most vulnerable groups of the population, speciﬁcally children and mothers, remains a major challenge. Technical support is being provided to strengthen institutional governance and improve availability of technical assistance through the Ministry of Health to operationalize health districts, strengthen capacity to manage the district and regional health teams, and organize the monitoring and evaluation of service delivery in health facilities at health-district level. An Integrated Disease Surveillance and Response mechanism is being reviewed and established along with the establishment of a human resources observatory and provision of technical and ﬁnancial assistance to develop a human resources plan, including reform of the Health Sciences Faculty and its annexes in the short and longer term.97 95  WBG Clim/a.altt/e.alt Ch/a.altn/g.alt/e.alt Knowl/e.altd/g.alt/e.alt Port/a.altl (CCKP, 2021). CAR H/e.alt/a.altlth S/e.altctor D/a.altshbo/a.altrd. URL: https:/ /clim/a.altt/e.altd/a.altt/a.alt.worldb/a.altnk.or/g.alt/
 (page [29]) CRM/e.altPort/a.altl/w/e.altb/h/e.alt/a.altlth/s/y.altst/e.altms-/a.altnd-s/e.altrvic/e.alt?countr/y.alt=CAF&p/e.altriod=2080-2099
 (page [29]) 96  WBG Clim/a.altt/e.alt Ch/a.altn/g.alt/e.alt Knowl/e.altd/g.alt/e.alt Port/a.altl (CCKP, 2021). CAR H/e.alt/a.altlth S/e.altctor D/a.altshbo/a.altrd. URL: https:/ /clim/a.altt/e.altd/a.altt/a.alt.worldb/a.altnk.or/g.alt/
 (page [30]) CRM/e.altPort/a.altl/w/e.altb/h/e.alt/a.altlth/s/y.altst/e.altms-/a.altnd-s/e.altrvic/e.alt?countr/y.alt=CAF&p/e.altriod=2080-2099
 (page [30]) 97  WHO (2019). Glob/a.altl Nutrition Monitorin/g.alt Fr/a.altm/e.altwork Countr/y.alt Proﬁl/e.alt: C/e.altntr/a.altl Afric/a.altn R/e.altpublic. Nutrition L/a.altndsc/a.altp/e.alt Inform/a.alttion
 (page [30]) S/y.altst/e.altm. URL: http:/ //a.altpps.who.int/nutrition/l/a.altndsc/a.altp/e.alt//g.altlob/a.altl-monitorin/g.alt-fr/a.altm/e.altwork?ISO=c/a.altf
 (page [30]) 27 CLIMATE RISK COUNTRY PROFILE: CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLICImpacts on water quality, water resources, changes in habitat, increasing exposure of vulnerable groups, sanitation and drainage, and vector-borne diseases are all areas for concern. These impacts require not only continued investment and focus on climate sensitive health issues, but also full integration of climate change into the CAR’s planning to strengthen and expand its healthcare services. The government should undertake a climate vulnerability and risk assessment regarding the impacts of climate change and variability on human health. Investments should also be made into data collection and database development in support of epidemiological tracking of risks and to implement appropriate measures for surveillance and monitoring of climate change related diseases in order to enhance health early warning systems.98 National adaptation plans for the healthcare sector were established in the Second-Generation National Health Development Plan (2006–2015). Priority elements include, improving the knowledge of pathologies across CAR, strengthening the national health service, establishing an epidemiological surveillance and information system, and increase the involvement of NGOs, civil society and the private sector actors in CAR’s healthcare services nationwide.99 Additionally, health care system personnel may not be fully aware of the relationship between climate change, seasonal variability and health impacts. Increases in training and capacity can improve the level of knowledge and skills to prevent diseases connected with climatic factors, however this knowledge remains relatively limited among the general population. CAR is also committed to improve its public health system by developing systems in order to monitor, prevent and effectively respond to human diseases associated with climate change, establish a waste management plan with oversight from a waste management unit. Interest exists in the exploration of ﬁnding and developing uses for waste, such as energy generation, however more research is needed.100
 (page [30]) Institution/a.altl Fr/a.altm/e.altwork for Ad/a.altpt/a.alttion
 (page [30]) CAR is at the same time in a post-conﬂict situation and in political transition, which exposes it to a considerable level of socio-economic vulnerability. As such, the country’s adaptation initiatives are focused on development needs and ensuring environmental sustainability and appropriate natural resource management in line with a low-carbon development path. Adaptation options are focused on the integration of climate change adaptation into the policies and programs for the development of the most vulnerable and priority sectors and to improve awareness, education and communication regarding adaptation needs and the risks associated with climate change across the country and through public and private sectors. The Ministry of Environment, Ecology and Sustainable Development is responsible for guiding the country’s environment sustainability plans and climate change responsibilities and it has the mandate to administer the country’s National Adaptation Plan of Action, which was adopted in 2008.101 CAR is a member of ADAPTATION 98  Ruckstuhl, L. /e.altt /a.altl. (2017). M/a.altl/a.altri/a.alt c/a.alts/e.alt m/a.altn/a.alt/g.alt/e.altm/e.altnt b/y.alt communit/y.alt h/e.alt/a.altlth work/e.altrs in th/e.alt C/e.altntr/a.altl Afric/a.altn R/e.altpublic from 20092014: ov/e.altrcomin/g.alt ch/a.altll/e.altn/g.alt/e.alts of /a.altcc/e.altss /a.altnd inst/a.altbilit/y.alt du/e.alt to conﬂict. M/a.altl/a.altri/a.alt Journ/a.altl . 16. URL: https:/ /link.sprin/g.alt/e.altr.com//a.altrticl/e.alt/10.1186/
 (page [30]) s12936-017-2005-7
 (page [30]) 99  Ministr/y.alt of Environm/e.altnt, Ecolo/g.alt/y.alt /a.altnd Sust/a.altin/a.altbl/e.alt D/e.altv/e.altlopm/e.altnt (2015). S/e.altcond N/a.alttion/a.altl Communic/a.alttion to th/e.alt UNFCCC — C/e.altntr/a.altl
 (page [30]) Afric/a.altn R/e.altpublic. URL: https:/ /unfccc.int/sit/e.alts/d/e.altf/a.altult/ﬁl/e.alts/r/e.altsourc/e.alt/c/a.altfnc2.pdf
 (page [30]) 100  C/e.altntr/a.altl Afric/a.altn R/e.altpublic (2016). N/a.alttion/a.altll/y.alt-D/e.altt/e.altrmin/e.altd Contributions. URL: https:/ /www4.unfccc.int/sit/e.alts/ndcst/a.alt/g.altin/g.alt/
 (page [31]) Publish/e.altdDocum/e.altnts/C/e.altntr/a.altl%20Afric/a.altn%20R/e.altpublic%20First/INDC_R%C3%A9publiqu/e.alt%20C/e.altntr/a.altfric/a.altin/e.alt_EN.pdf
 (page [31]) 101  USAID (2018). Clim/a.altt/e.alt Risks in th/e.alt C/e.altntr/a.altl Afric/a.altn R/e.alt/g.altion/a.altl Pro/g.altr/a.altm for th/e.alt Environm/e.altnt (CARPE) /a.altnd Con/g.alto B/a.altsin. URL: https:/ /
 (page [31]) www.clim/a.altt/e.altlinks.or/g.alt/sit/e.alts/d/e.altf/a.altult/ﬁl/e.alts//a.altss/e.altt/docum/e.altnt/20180604_USAID-ATLAS_Clim/a.altt/e.altRiskProﬁl/e.alt_CARPE.pdf
 (page [31]) —'016)
 (page [31]) 5), French
 (page [31]) L), French
 (page [31]) , French
 (page [31]) (2008), French
 (page [31]) )7)
 (page [31]) 28 CLIMATE RISK COUNTRY PROFILE: CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLICthe Central African Forest Commission (COMIFAC), a treaty organization established to harmonize regional policies on forestry and biodiversity conservation. CAR has also ratiﬁed two climate change adaptation and mitigation regarding biofuels and the establishment of the country’s Forestry Code.102 To date, progress has been limited and the CAR’s ability to engage with the development process and implement laws over the medium term has often been challenged by instability, uprising conﬂict, weak institutions and extreme poverty.103
 (page [31]) Polic/y.alt Fr/a.altm/e.altwork for Ad/a.altpt/a.alttion
 (page [31]) The CAR submitted its Second National Communication to the UNFCCC in 2016 and its Nationally Determined Contributions in 2016. Its National Adaptation Plan of Action was ﬁnalized in 2008. CAR is committed to integrating climate change into its development plans and strategies, to develop a National Climate Change Adaptation Plan, and to prepare the country’s eligibility for the Green Climate Fund. To reach its adaptation goals, CAR envisages a holistic approach, integrating adjustment of national policies and strategies, improvement of the legislative and regulatory frameworks, and capacity development and transfer of technology in certain priority areas. Continued adaptation efforts are focused on its most vulnerable sectors, agricultural, forestry, water, health, and land-use, and on increasing the country’s resilience capabilities, and strengthen the country’s social and economic structures
 (page [31]) against vulnerability.104
 (page [31]) National Frameworks and Plans
 (page [31]) • Nationally Determined Contributions  (2016)
 (page [31]) • Second National Communication  (2015), French • Law on the Protection of Nature  (2014), French • Environmental Law on Biofuels  (2008), French
 (page [31]) • Forestry Code  (2008), French
 (page [31]) • National Adaptation Program of Action  (2008), French • Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper  (2007)
 (page [31]) R/e.altcomm/e.altnd/a.alttions
 (page [31]) R/e.alts/e.alt/a.altrch G/a.altps
 (page [31]) • Improve, support and reinforce the teaching of meteorology, climatology and general hydrology in the higher education and university channels of natural sciences • Enhance capabilities for collecting, analyzing and managing climate change data at the national, regional and
 (page [31]) local levels105
 (page [31]) 102  Ministr/y.alt of Environm/e.altnt, Ecolo/g.alt/y.alt /a.altnd Sust/a.altin/a.altbl/e.alt D/e.altv/e.altlopm/e.altnt (2015). S/e.altcond N/a.alttion/a.altl Communic/a.alttion to th/e.alt UNFCCC — C/e.altntr/a.altl
 (page [31]) Afric/a.altn R/e.altpublic. URL: https:/ /unfccc.int/sit/e.alts/d/e.altf/a.altult/ﬁl/e.alts/r/e.altsourc/e.alt/c/a.altfnc2.pdf
 (page [31]) 103  LSE Gr/a.altnth/a.altm Institut/e.alt (2019). CAR — Ov/e.altrvi/e.altw, Appro/a.altch to Clim/a.altt/e.alt Ch/a.altn/g.alt/e.alt. URL: http:/ /www.ls/e.alt./a.altc.uk/Gr/a.altnth/a.altmInstitut/e.alt/
 (page [31]) countr/y.alt-proﬁl/e.alts/c/e.altntr/a.altl-/a.altfric/a.altn-r/e.altpublic/
 (page [31]) 104  C/e.altntr/a.altl Afric/a.altn R/e.altpublic (2016). N/a.alttion/a.altll/y.alt-D/e.altt/e.altrmin/e.altd Contributions. URL: https:/ /www4.unfccc.int/sit/e.alts/ndcst/a.alt/g.altin/g.alt/
 (page [32]) Publish/e.altdDocum/e.altnts/C/e.altntr/a.altl%20Afric/a.altn%20R/e.altpublic%20First/INDC_R%C3%A9publiqu/e.alt%20C/e.altntr/a.altfric/a.altin/e.alt_EN.pdf
 (page [32]) 105  C/e.altntr/a.altl Afric/a.altn R/e.altpublic (2016). N/a.alttion/a.altll/y.alt-D/e.altt/e.altrmin/e.altd Contributions. URL: https:/ /www4.unfccc.int/sit/e.alts/ndcst/a.alt/g.altin/g.alt/
 (page [32]) Publish/e.altdDocum/e.altnts/C/e.altntr/a.altl%20Afric/a.altn%20R/e.altpublic%20First/INDC_R%C3%A9publiqu/e.alt%20C/e.altntr/a.altfric/a.altin/e.alt_EN.pdf
 (page [32]) 29 CLIMATE RISK COUNTRY PROFILE: CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC• Conduct dedicated research into the existing resilience mechanisms of the energy, agriculture, forestry and animal husbandry systems in the country • Develop a system for monitoring underground and surface water resources and establish an early warning network for ﬂooding and hydrologic hazards • Strengthen environmental monitoring capabilities for strengthened and more effective environmental
 (page [32]) management
 (page [32]) • Rehabilitate the network for collecting meteorological, climatological and hydrological data throughout the
 (page [32]) national territory106
 (page [32]) • Evaluate needs and develop a national strategy for technology transfer to support NDC adaptation measures
 (page [32]) D/a.altt/a.alt /a.altnd Inform/a.alttion G/a.altps
 (page [32]) • Improve technical capacity to analyze hydro-met data and project impacts across sectors; speciﬁcally, regarding
 (page [32]) health and natural disaster events
 (page [32]) • Improve the standards for infrastructure construction107 • Establish institutional capacity for providing timely early warning systems to farmers for improved decision making and understanding seasonal variability for key agricultural zones • Increase understanding of water resource threats and groundwater risks to improve long term management and improve water use efﬁciency in agriculture and urban management • Improve regulation and enforcement to protect forests, rainforests and protected areas • Improve data collection and analysis on forest loss and land  degradation, to establish a national REDD and
 (page [32]) REDD+ programs108
 (page [32]) Institution/a.altl G/a.altps
 (page [32]) • Establish land-use plans by type of use (road infrastructure, mines/petroleum, agriculture, animal husbandry, forests, protected areas or wildlife reserves, urban spaces etc.). • Integrate climate change concerns into relevant policies and planning processes at the state and national levels • Finalize and adopt the framework bill on the environment as well as outstanding nature conservation bills • Finalize regulations to fund and implement impact studies regarding climate change impacts for the country
 (page [32]) and key sectors109
 (page [32]) 106  C/e.altntr/a.altl Afric/a.altn R/e.altpublic (2016). N/a.alttion/a.altll/y.alt-D/e.altt/e.altrmin/e.altd Contributions. URL: https:/ /www4.unfccc.int/sit/e.alts/ndcst/a.alt/g.altin/g.alt/
 (page [32]) Publish/e.altdDocum/e.altnts/C/e.altntr/a.altl%20Afric/a.altn%20R/e.altpublic%20First/INDC_R%C3%A9publiqu/e.alt%20C/e.altntr/a.altfric/a.altin/e.alt_EN.pdf
 (page [32]) 107  C/e.altntr/a.altl Afric/a.altn R/e.altpublic (2016). N/a.alttion/a.altll/y.alt-D/e.altt/e.altrmin/e.altd Contributions. URL: https:/ /www4.unfccc.int/sit/e.alts/ndcst/a.alt/g.altin/g.alt/
 (page [32]) Publish/e.altdDocum/e.altnts/C/e.altntr/a.altl%20Afric/a.altn%20R/e.altpublic%20First/INDC_R%C3%A9publiqu/e.alt%20C/e.altntr/a.altfric/a.altin/e.alt_EN.pdf
 (page [32]) 108  World B/a.altnk (2013). D/e.altfor/e.altst/a.alttion Tr/e.altnds in th/e.alt Con/g.alto B/a.altsin — R/e.altconcilin/g.alt Economic Growth /a.altnd For/e.altst Prot/e.altction. URL: https:/ /
 (page [35]) op/e.altnknowl/e.altd/g.alt/e.alt.worldb/a.altnk.or/g.alt/bitstr/e.alt/a.altm/h/a.altndl/e.alt/10986/12477/9780821397428.pdf?s/e.altqu/e.altnc/e.alt=1&isAllow/e.altd=/y.alt
 (page [35]) 109  C/e.altntr/a.altl Afric/a.altn R/e.altpublic (2016). N/a.alttion/a.altll/y.alt-D/e.altt/e.altrmin/e.altd Contributions. URL: https:/ /www4.unfccc.int/sit/e.alts/ndcst/a.alt/g.altin/g.alt/
 (page [35]) Publish/e.altdDocum/e.altnts/C/e.altntr/a.altl%20Afric/a.altn%20R/e.altpublic%20First/INDC_R%C3%A9publiqu/e.alt%20C/e.altntr/a.altfric/a.altin/e.alt_EN.pdf
 (page [36]) CENTRAL AFRICAN
 (page [36]) REPUBLIC
 (page [36]) CLIMATE RISK COUNTRY PROFILE
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 data/transition_reports/World Bank Climate Change Country Reports/15724-WB_Kenya Country Profile-WEB.pdf
 (page [0]) KENYA
 (page [0]) CLIMATE RISK COUNTRY PROFILE
 (page [0]) ad work” January 25, 2071 via
 (page [1]) tovia” March
 (page [1]) isterstown, MD,
 (page [1]) ii CLIMATE RISK COUNTRY PROFILE: KENYACOPYRIGHT © 2021 by the World Bank Group 1818 H Street NW, Washington, DC 20433
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 (page [1]) This work is a product of the staff of the World Bank Group (WBG) and with external contributions. The opinions, ﬁndings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this work are those of the authors and do not necessarily reﬂect the views or the ofﬁcial policy or position of the WBG, its Board of Executive Directors, or the governments it represents. The WBG does not guarantee the accuracy of the data included in this work and do not make any warranty, express or implied, nor assume any liability or responsibility for any consequence of their use. This publication follows the WBG’s practice in references to member designations, borders, and maps. The boundaries, colors, denominations, and other information shown on any map in this work, or the use of the term “country” do not imply any judgment on the part of the WBG, its Boards, or the governments it represents, concerning the legal status of any territory or geographic area or the endorsement or acceptance
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 (page [1, 2]) The material in this work is subject to copyright. Because the WBG encourages dissemination of its knowledge, this work may be reproduced, in whole or in part, for noncommercial purposes as long as full attribution to this work is given. Please cite the work as follows: Climate Risk Proﬁle: Kenya (2021): The World Bank Group. Any queries on rights and licenses, including subsidiary rights, should be addressed to World Bank Publications, The World Bank Group, 1818 H Street NW, Washington, DC 20433, USA; fax: 202-522-2625; e-mail: [email protected] . Cover Photos:  © Georgina Goodwin/World Bank, “ Maasai women make, sell and display their bead work ” January 25, 2011  via Flickr, Creative Commons CC BY-NC-ND 2.0. © Peter Kapuscinski/World Bank, “ Fishing boats on Lake Victoria ” March 12, 2015 via Flickr, Creative Commons CC BY-NC-ND 2.0. Graphic Design:  Circle Graphics , Reisterstown, MD. iii CLIMATE RISK COUNTRY PROFILE: KENYAACKNOWLEDGEMENTS This proﬁle is part of a series of Climate Risk Country Proﬁles developed by the World Bank Group (WBG). The country proﬁle synthesizes most relevant data and information on climate change, disaster risk reduction, and adaptation actions and policies at the country level. The country proﬁle series are designed as a quick reference source for development practitioners to better integrate climate resilience in development planning and policy making. This effort is managed and led by Veronique Morin (Senior Climate Change Specialist, WBG) and Ana E. Bucher (Senior Climate Change Specialist, WBG). This proﬁle was written by MacKenzie Dove (Senior Climate Change Consultant, WBG). Additional support was provided by Fernanda Zermoglio (Senior Climate Change Consultant, WBG), Yunziyi Lang (Climate Change Analyst, WBG) and Jason
 (page [2]) Johnston (Operations Analyst, WBG).
 (page [2]) Climate and climate-related information is largely drawn from the Climate Change Knowledge Portal (CCKP) , a WBG online platform with available global climate data and analysis based on the latest  Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) reports and datasets. The team is grateful for all comments and suggestions received from the sector, regional, and country development specialists, as well as climate research scientists and institutions for their advice and guidance on use of climate
 (page [2]) related datasets.
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 (page [3]) i ' 1 1
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 (page [3]) iv CLIMATE RISK COUNTRY PROFILE: KENYAFOREWORD .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 1 COUNTRY OVERVIEW  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 2 CLIMATOLOGY   .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 4 Clim/a.altt/e.alt B/a.alts/e.altlin/e.alt  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 4 Ov/e.altrvi/e.altw  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 4 K/e.alt/y.alt Tr/e.altnds   .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 6 Clim/a.altt/e.alt Futur/e.alt  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 7 Ov/e.altrvi/e.altw  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 7 K/e.alt/y.alt Tr/e.altnds   .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 9 CLIMATE RELATED NATURAL HAZARDS  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  10 Ov/e.altrvi/e.altw   .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  10 K/e.alt/y.alt Tr/e.altnds .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 11 Implic/a.alttions for DRM  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  13 CLIMATE CHANGE IMPACTS TO KEY SECTORS  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  13 G/e.altnd/e.altr   .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  14 A/g.altricultur/e.alt   .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  14 W/a.altt/e.altr .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  16 Co/a.altst/a.altl Zon/e.alt /a.altnd S/e.alt/a.alt L/e.altv/e.altl Ris/e.alt  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  18 En/e.altr/g.alt/y.alt   .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 20 H/e.alt/a.altlth .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 22 ADAPTATION .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  24 Institution/a.altl Fr/a.altm/e.altwork for Ad/a.altpt/a.alttion .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 24 Polic/y.alt Fr/a.altm/e.altwork for Ad/a.altpt/a.alttion   .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 25 R/e.altcomm/e.altnd/a.alttions .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  25 R/e.alts/e.alt/a.altrch G/a.altps .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 25 D/a.altt/a.alt /a.altnd Inform/a.alttion G/a.altps  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  26 Institution/a.altl G/a.altps  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  26
 (page [3]) CONTENTS
 (page [4]) 1 CLIMATE RISK COUNTRY PROFILE: KENYA Climate change is a major risk to good development outcomes, and the World Bank Group is committed to playing an important role in helping countries integrate climate action into their core development agendas. The World Bank Group is committed to supporting client countries to invest in and build a low-carbon, climate-resilient future, helping them to be better prepared to adapt to current and future climate impacts. The World Bank Group is investing in incorporating and systematically managing climate risks in development operations through its individual corporate commitments. A key aspect of the World Bank Group’s Action Plan on Adaptation and Resilience (2019) is to help countries shift from addressing adaptation as an incremental cost and isolated investment to systematically incorporating climate risks and opportunities at every phase of policy planning, investment design, implementation and evaluation of development outcomes. For all IDA and IBRD operations, climate and disaster risk screening is one of the mandatory corporate climate commitments. This is supported by the Bank Group’s Climate and Disaster Risk Screening Tool which enables all Bank staff to assess short- and long-term climate and disaster risks in operations and national or sectoral planning processes. This screening tool draws up-to-date and relevant information from the World Bank’s Climate Change Knowledge Portal, a comprehensive online ‘one-stop shop’ for global, regional, and country data related to climate change and development. Recognizing the value of consistent, easy-to-use technical resources for client countries as well as to support respective internal climate risk assessment and adaptation planning processes, the World Bank Group’s Climate Change Group has developed this content. Standardizing and pooling expertise facilitates the World Bank Group in conducting initial assessments of climate risks and opportunities across sectors within a country, within institutional portfolios across regions, and acts as a global resource for development practitioners. For developing countries, the climate risk proﬁles are intended to serve as public goods to facilitate upstream country diagnostics, policy dialogue, and strategic planning by providing comprehensive overviews of trends and projected changes in key climate parameters, sector-speciﬁc implications, relevant policies and programs, adaptation priorities and opportunities for further actions. It is my hope that these efforts will spur deepening of long-term risk management in developing countries and our engagement in supporting climate change adaptation planning at operational levels.
 (page [4]) Bernice Van Bronkhorst
 (page [4]) Global Director
 (page [4]) Climate Change Group (CCG)
 (page [4]) The World Bank Group (WBG)
 (page [4]) FOREWORD
 (page [5]) 2 CLIMATE RISK COUNTRY PROFILE: KENYAThe Republic of Kenya, located in East Africa, covers a total land area of 582,646 kilometers square (km2), which includes varied formations of plains, escarpments, and hills, as well as low and high mountains. Starting east along the coast, low plateaus run inland (west) to an elevated plateau and mountain ranges, marked by the Kenyan highlands in the southwest corner of the country. Kenya shares borders with Ethiopia to the north, South Sudan and Uganda to the northwest and west, and Tanzania to the south. The country’s southeast coastline borders the Indian Ocean. Approximately 85% of Kenya’s land area is classiﬁed as a fragile arid and semi-arid ecosystem, which is largely pastoral.1 The country’s highlands are home to the majority of the population and also host signiﬁcant farm lands. Kenya’s nature-based tourism industry is also a major land user, with wildlife protected areas covering 8.2% of the; and area. Protected land areas are also included as conservancies.2 Highlands are relatively cool and agriculturally rich, and are largely dominated by commercial and small-holder farms. Principal cash crops include tea, coffee, ﬂowers, vegetables, pyrethrum. Wheat and maize, as well as livestock production is also practiced across the highlands, which lie at 1,500 to 3,000 meters (m) above sea level. The Great Rift Valley bisects the highlands into an east and west region forming a steep sided trench of 48 to 64 km wide and 600 to 900 m deep3 (Figure 1 ). Kenya, while considered a lower middle-income country, has the largest economy in East Africa. It has a population of 52.6 million people (2019) and an annual population growth rate at 2.3%.5 Approximately 27% of Kenya’s population currently lives in urban areas. This is projected to increase to 33% and 46% of the population by 2030 and 2050, respectively.6 Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in 2018 was US$95.5 billion and the economic annual growth rate 5.4% (2019).7 Kenya had continued to implement signiﬁcant economic and structural reforms, which have helped to sustain economic growth and political gains over the past decade. Key challenges continue to be seen in the country’s inequality and poverty levels, which has increased the country’s economic vulnerability
 (page [5]) to shocks8 (Table 1 ).
 (page [5]) COUNTRY OVERVIEW
 (page [5]) FIGURE 1. T opo/g.altr/a.altph/y.alt  of K/e.altn/y.alt/a.alt4 1 N/a.alttion/a.altl Environm/e.altnt M/a.altn/a.alt/g.alt/e.altm/e.altnt Authorit/y.alt (2015). K/e.altn/y.alt/a.alt- S/e.altcond N/a.alttion/a.altl Communic/a.alttion to th/e.alt Unit/e.altd N/a.alttion/a.altl Fr/a.altm/e.altwork Conv/e.altntion on Clim/a.altt/e.alt Ch/a.altn/g.alt/e.alt, Ex/e.altcutiv/e.alt Summ/a.altr/y.alt. URL: https:/ /unfccc.int/sit/e.alts/d/e.altf/a.altult/ﬁl/e.alts/r/e.altsourc/e.alt/K/e.altn/y.alt/a.alt%20SNC_
 (page [5]) Ex/e.altcutiv/e.alt%20Summ/a.altr/y.alt.pdf
 (page [5]) 2 K/e.altn/y.alt/a.alt Wildlif/e.alt S/e.altrvic/e.alt (2021). P/a.altrks/R/e.alts/e.altrv/e.alts – Ov/e.altrvi/e.altw. URL: http:/ /www.kws./g.alto.k/e.alt/cont/e.altnt/ov/e.altrvi/e.altw-0 3 N/a.alttion/a.altl Environm/e.altnt M/a.altn/a.alt/g.alt/e.altm/e.altnt Authorit/y.alt (2015). K/e.altn/y.alt/a.alt- S/e.altcond N/a.alttion/a.altl Communic/a.alttion to th/e.alt Unit/e.altd N/a.alttion/a.altl Fr/a.altm/e.altwork Conv/e.altntion on Clim/a.altt/e.alt Ch/a.altn/g.alt/e.alt. URL: https:/ /unfccc.int/sit/e.alts/d/e.altf/a.altult/ﬁl/e.alts/r/e.altsourc/e.alt/K/e.altnnc2.pdf 4  World B/a.altnk (2019). Int/e.altrn/a.altl Clim/a.altt/e.alt Mi/g.altr/a.alttion Proﬁl/e.alt – K/e.altn/y.alt/a.alt. 5  World B/a.altnk D/a.altt/a.alt B/a.altnk (2020). World D/e.altv/e.altlopm/e.altnt Indic/a.alttors, K/e.altn/y.alt/a.alt. URL: https:/ /d/a.altt/a.altb/a.altnk.worldb/a.altnk.or/g.alt/sourc/e.alt/world-
 (page [5]) d/e.altv/e.altlopm/e.altnt-indic/a.alttors
 (page [5]) 6  World B/a.altnk D/a.altt/a.alt B/a.altnk (2020). Popul/a.alttion /e.altstim/a.altt/e.alts /a.altnd proj/e.altctions, K/e.altn/y.alt/a.alt. URL: https:/ /d/a.altt/a.altb/a.altnk.worldb/a.altnk.or/g.alt/sourc/e.alt/
 (page [5]) popul/a.alttion-/e.altstim/a.altt/e.alts-/a.altnd-proj/e.altctions
 (page [5]) 7  World B/a.altnk D/a.altt/a.alt B/a.altnk (2020). World D/e.altv/e.altlopm/e.altnt Indic/a.alttors, K/e.altn/y.alt/a.alt. URL: https:/ /d/a.altt/a.altb/a.altnk.worldb/a.altnk.or/g.alt/sourc/e.alt/world-
 (page [5]) d/e.altv/e.altlopm/e.altnt-indic/a.alttors
 (page [6]) 8  World B/a.altnk (2019). K/e.altn/y.alt/a.alt Ov/e.altrvi/e.altw. URL: https:/ /www.worldb/a.altnk.or/g.alt//e.altn/countr/y.alt/k/e.altn/y.alt/a.alt/ov/e.altrvi/e.altw
 (page [6]) onal Communication in 2015 and submitted its Updated Nationally-Determined
 (page [6]) e country’s
 (page [6]) 3 CLIMATE RISK COUNTRY PROFILE: KENYAThe ND-GAIN Index10 ranks 181 countries using a score which calculates a country’s vulnerability to climate change and other global challenges as well as their readiness to improve resilience. This Index aims to help businesses and the public sector better identify vulnerability and readiness in order to better prioritize investment for more efﬁcient responses to global challenges. Due to a combination of political, geographic, and social factors, Kenya is recognized as highly vulnerable to climate change impacts, ranked 152 out of 181 countries in the 2019 ND-GAIN Index. The more vulnerable a country is the lower their score, while the more ready a country is to improve its resilience the higher it will be. For example, Norway has the highest score and is ranked 1st. Figure 2 is a time-series plot of the ND-GAIN Index showing
 (page [6]) Kenya’s progress.
 (page [6]) Kenya published its Second National Communication  in 2015 and submitted its Updated Nationally-Determined Contribution  to the UNFCCC in 2020, in support of adaptation and mitigation efforts, to improve the country’s ability to prepare for and respond to natural disasters and increase its resilience to climate change. Additionally, Kenya aims to become a newly industrialized country by 2030, which will require expanding climate change resilience efforts while also increasing its domestic energy production; including through the use of renewable sources. Adaptation efforts are focused on the country’s energy, infrastructure, land use and environment, health, water and irrigation, agriculture and tourism sectors. Kenya is working to meet these goals and adhere to its climate change strategies by investing in strategic actions such as afforestation and reforestation, geothermal energy production and other clean energy development, as well as climate smart agriculture, and drought management.11 TABLE 1. D/a.altt/a.alt sn/a.altpshot: K/e.alt/y.alt d/e.altv/e.altlopm/e.altnt indic/a.alttors9
 (page [6]) Indicator
 (page [6]) Life expectancy at birth, total (2019) 66.7 Population density (people per sq. km land area) (2018) 90.3 % of Population with access to electricity (2018) 75% GDP per capita (current US$) (2019) $1,816.50
 (page [6]) KenyaScore
 (page [6]) 36.5
 (page [6]) 37
 (page [6]) 37 .5
 (page [6]) 38
 (page [6]) 38.5
 (page [6]) 36
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 (page [6]) 2013FIGURE 2. ND-GAIN  Ind/e.altx for K/e.altn/y.alt/a.alt 9  World B/a.altnk (2020). D/a.altt/a.altB/a.altnk – World D/e.altv/e.altlopm/e.altnt Indic/a.alttors. URL: https:/ /d/a.altt/a.altb/a.altnk.worldb/a.altnk.or/g.alt/sourc/e.alt/world-d/e.altv/e.altlopm/e.altnt-
 (page [6]) indic/a.alttors
 (page [6]) 10  Univ/e.altrsit/y.alt of Notr/e.alt D/a.altm/e.alt (2020). Notr/e.alt D/a.altm/e.alt Glob/a.altl Ad/a.altpt/a.alttion Initi/a.alttiv/e.alt. URL: https:/ //g.alt/a.altin.nd./e.altdu/our-work/countr/y.alt-ind/e.altx/ 11  Ministr/y.alt of Environm/e.altnt /a.altnd N/a.alttur/a.altl R/e.altsourc/e.alts (2016). K/e.altn/y.alt/a.alt’s N/a.alttion/a.altll/y.alt D/e.altt/e.altrmin/e.altd Contribution. URL: https:/ /www4.unfccc.
 (page [7]) int/sit/e.alts/ndcst/a.alt/g.altin/g.alt/Publish/e.altdDocum/e.altnts/K/e.altn/y.alt/a.alt%20First/K/e.altn/y.alt/a.alt_NDC_20150723.pdf
 (page [7]) sre the majority of agriculture takes place, 4 CLIMATE RISK COUNTRY PROFILE: KENYAClim/a.altt/e.alt B/a.alts/e.altlin/e.alt
 (page [7]) Ov/e.altrvi/e.altw
 (page [7]) Kenya’s diverse topography results in a wide range of climates. While the coast is typically hot and humid, inland areas are more temperate. The country’s northern and north eastern areas are generally very hot and arid, the central highlands are cooler and are formed of a mix of tropical highlands, which become increasingly arid towards the country’s interior. Kenya’s climate is strongly inﬂuenced by the Inter Tropical Convergence Zone (ITCZ),12 which drives rainfall in the country. The western, central and coastal regions, which occupy less than 20% of the country, houses nearly 90% of the country’s population, and includes productive agricultural land which is principally rainfed. Kenya also has a diverse natural resource base, which includes forests, wetlands, dry lands, aquatic and marine resources. Kenya’s natural resource base is under increasing strain due to population pressures, coastal erosion, deforestation, poor land management as well as seasonal variability and climate change. These pressures also threaten the country’s unique biodiversity, as well as local livelihoods and long-term food security for a signiﬁcant segment of the Kenyan population. Given its diverse topography, temperatures across the country vary signiﬁcantly, with the highlands experiencing much cooler temperatures than coastal and lowland zones.13 Little seasonal variation in temperatures has been observed, with average temperatures ranging between 18°C at the higher elevations to 26°C along the coast. Rainfall varies considerably across the country, with less than 250 millimeters (mm) falling in the arid zones of north, to over 2,000 mm per year in the west annually. Highland areas, where the majority of agriculture takes place,
 (page [7]) CLIMATOLOGY
 (page [7]) 12  Th/e.alt Int/e.altrtropic/a.altl Conv/e.altr/g.alt/e.altnc/e.alt Zon/e.alt, is th/e.alt r/e.alt/g.altion th/a.altt circl/e.alts th/e.alt E/a.altrth, n/e.alt/a.altr th/e.alt /e.altqu/a.alttor, wh/e.altr/e.alt th/e.alt tr/a.altd/e.alt winds of th/e.alt North/e.altrn /a.altnd South/e.altrn H/e.altmisph/e.altr/e.alts com/e.alt to/g.alt/e.altth/e.altr. Th/e.alt int/e.altns/e.alt sun /a.altnd w/a.altrm w/a.altt/e.altr of th/e.alt /e.altqu/a.alttor h/e.alt/a.altts th/e.alt /a.altir in th/e.alt ITCZ, r/a.altisin/g.alt its humidit/y.alt /a.altnd m/a.altkin/g.alt it buo/y.alt/a.altnt. Aid/e.altd b/y.alt th/e.alt conv/e.altr/g.alt/e.altnc/e.alt of th/e.alt tr/a.altd/e.alt winds, th/e.alt buo/y.alt/a.altnt /a.altir ris/e.alts. As th/e.alt /a.altir ris/e.alts it /e.altxp/a.altnds /a.altnd cools, r/e.altl/e.alt/a.altsin/g.alt th/e.alt /a.altccumul/a.altt/e.altd moistur/e.alt in /a.altn /a.altlmost p/e.altrp/e.alttu/a.altl s/e.altri/e.alts of thund/e.altrstorms. S/e.alt/a.altson/a.altl shifts in th/e.alt loc/a.alttion of th/e.alt ITCZ dr/a.altstic/a.altll/y.alt /a.altﬀ/e.altcts r/a.altinf/a.altll in m/a.altn/y.alt /e.altqu/a.alttori/a.altl n/a.alttions, r/e.altsultin/g.alt in th/e.alt w/e.altt /a.altnd dr/y.alt s/e.alt/a.altsons of th/e.alt tropics r/a.altth/e.altr th/a.altn th/e.alt cold /a.altnd w/a.altrm s/e.alt/a.altsons of hi/g.alth/e.altr l/a.alttitud/e.alts. Lon/g.alt/e.altr t/e.altrm ch/a.altn/g.alt/e.alts in th/e.alt ITCZ c/a.altn r/e.altsult in s/e.altv/e.altr/e.alt drou/g.althts or ﬂoodin/g.alt in n/e.alt/a.altrb/y.alt /a.altr/e.alt/a.alts. 13  R/e.altpublic of K/e.altn/y.alt/a.alt (2013). N/a.alttion/a.altl Clim/a.altt/e.alt Ch/a.altn/g.alt/e.alt Action Pl/a.altn, 2013–2017: Vision 2030. URL: https:/ /cdkn.or/g.alt/wp-cont/e.altnt/
 (page [7]) uplo/a.altds/2013/03/K/e.altn/y.alt/a.alt-N/a.alttion/a.altl-Clim/a.altt/e.alt-Ch/a.altn/g.alt/e.alt-Action-Pl/a.altn.pdfGr/e.alt/e.altn, Inclusiv/e.alt /a.altnd R/e.altsili/e.altnt R/e.altcov/e.altr/y.alt
 (page [7]) The coronavirus disease (COVID-19) pandemic has led to unprecedented adverse social and economic impacts. Further, the pandemic has demonstrated the compounding impacts of adding yet another shock on top of the multiple challenges that vulnerable populations already face in day-to-day life, with the potential to create devastating health, social, economic and environmental crises that can leave a deep, long-lasting mark. However, as governments take urgent action and lay the foundations for their ﬁnancial, economic, and social recovery, they have a unique opportunity to create economies that are more sustainable, inclusive and resilient. Short and long- term recovery efforts should prioritize investments that boost jobs and economic activity; have positive impacts on human, social and natural capital; protect biodiversity and ecosystems services; boost resilience; and advance the
 (page [8]) decarbonization of economies.
 (page [8]) OQ,
 (page [8]) rature across Kenya.
 (page [8]) 5 CLIMATE RISK COUNTRY PROFILE: KENYA FIGURE 3. Av/e.altr/a.alt/g.alt/e.alt  monthl/y.alt t/e.altmp/e.altr/a.alttur/e.alt /a.altnd r/a.altinf/a.altll for K/e.altn/y.alt/a.alt, 1991–202017
 (page [8]) Month
 (page [8]) Temperature (°C)
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 (page [8]) Rainfall Temperature
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 (page [8]) Oct
 (page [8]) Nov
 (page [8]) Dec
 (page [8]) 24
 (page [8]) 27
 (page [8]) 22.5
 (page [8]) 25.5
 (page [8]) 0
 (page [8]) 50
 (page [8]) 100
 (page [8]) 150TABLE 2. D/a.altt/a.alt sn/a.altpshot: Summ/a.altr/y.alt st/a.alttistics
 (page [8]) Climate Variables 1901–2020
 (page [8]) Mean Annual Temperature (°C) 24.3°C
 (page [8]) Mean Annual Precipitation (mm) 668.6 mm Mean Maximum Annual Temperature (°C) 30.3°C Mean Minimum Annual Temperature (°C) 18.3°C 14  N/a.alttion/a.altl  Environm/e.altnt M/a.altn/a.alt/g.alt/e.altm/e.altnt Authorit/y.alt (2015). K/e.altn/y.alt/a.alt- S/e.altcond N/a.alttion/a.altl Communic/a.alttion to th/e.alt Unit/e.altd N/a.alttion/a.altl Fr/a.altm/e.altwork Conv/e.altntion on Clim/a.altt/e.alt Ch/a.altn/g.alt/e.alt. URL: https:/ /unfccc.int/sit/e.alts/d/e.altf/a.altult/ﬁl/e.alts/r/e.altsourc/e.alt/K/e.altnnc2.pdf 15  WBG Clim/a.altt/e.alt Ch/a.altn/g.alt/e.alt Knowl/e.altd/g.alt/e.alt Port/a.altl (CCKP, 2020). K/e.altn/y.alt/a.alt URL: https:/ /clim/a.altt/e.altknowl/e.altd/g.alt/e.altport/a.altl.worldb/a.altnk.or/g.alt/countr/y.alt/k/e.altn/y.alt/a.alt/
 (page [8]) clim/a.altt/e.alt-d/a.altt/a.alt-historic/a.altl
 (page [8]) 16  WBG Clim/a.altt/e.alt Ch/a.altn/g.alt/e.alt Knowl/e.altd/g.alt/e.alt Port/a.altl (CCKP, 2020). K/e.altn/y.alt/a.alt URL: https:/ /clim/a.altt/e.altknowl/e.altd/g.alt/e.altport/a.altl.worldb/a.altnk.or/g.alt/countr/y.alt/k/e.altn/y.alt/a.alt/
 (page [8]) clim/a.altt/e.alt-d/a.altt/a.alt-historic/a.altl
 (page [8, 9]) 17  WBG Clim/a.altt/e.alt Ch/a.altn/g.alt/e.alt Knowl/e.altd/g.alt/e.alt Port/a.altl (CCKP, 2020). K/e.altn/y.alt/a.alt URL: https:/ /clim/a.altt/e.altknowl/e.altd/g.alt/e.altport/a.altl.worldb/a.altnk.or/g.alt/countr/y.alt/k/e.altn/y.alt/a.alt/ clim/a.altt/e.alt-d/a.altt/a.alt-historic/a.altlreceives approximately 1,000 mm of rainfall each year.14 The seasonal migration of the ITCZ deﬁne four distinct seasons in Kenya, dominated by two rainfall periods: January to March, which is generally considered the ‘warm dry season’, April to June known as the ‘long wet season’, July to September the ‘cool dry season’, and October to December as the ‘short wet season’. Analysis of data from the World Bank Group’s Climate Change Knowledge Portal (CCKP) ( Table 2 )15 shows Kenya’s seasonal cycle for the latest climatology, 1991–2020. Mean annual mean temperatures for Kenya is 24.3°C, with average monthly temperatures ranging between 22°C (July) and 25.6°C (March). Mean annual rainfall is 668.6 mm. While rainfall does occur throughout the year, depending on area, the majority of rainfall is received between March and June and October to December ( Figure 3 ).16 Figure 4  shows the spatial variation of observed average annual precipitation and temperature across Kenya.
 (page [9]) a 150¢
 (page [9]) 2 4nN — 1425
 (page [9]) 2a 135¢
 (page [9]) 27 1278
 (page [9]) 26 120€
 (page [9]) 26 on 1126
 (page [9]) 24 105¢
 (page [9]) 2 975
 (page [9]) 22 900
 (page [9]) 21 825
 (page [9]) 20 o— 750
 (page [9]) 9 675
 (page [9]) 18 600
 (page [9]) 17 525
 (page [9]) 16 450
 (page [9]) 18 7 375
 (page [9]) 14 300
 (page [9]) 14 225
 (page [9]) 12 150
 (page [9]) 11 4s 75
 (page [9]) 10 0
 (page [9]) ] | | _
 (page [9]) 34E 36E 38E 40E 34E 36E 38E 40E
 (page [9]) dB
 (page [9]) https://climateknowledgeportal.worldbank.org/country/kenya/
 (page [9]) 6 CLIMATE RISK COUNTRY PROFILE: KENYAK/e.alt/y.alt Tr/e.altnds
 (page [9]) Temperature
 (page [9]) While temperatures vary across Kenya, a distinct warming trend is evident, particularly since the 1960s, ( Figure 5 ) with inland areas registering larger increases in minimum a nd maximum temperatures. During this time the annual mean increase has risen by approximately 1.0°C, at an estimated average rate of 0.21°C per decade.19 The most signiﬁcant rise in temperature was observed for the start to the primary rainy and humid, spring season (March to May), in the arid and semi-arid regions of the country.20FIGURE 4. M/a.altp of /a.altv/e.altr/a.alt/g.alt/e.alt /a.altnnu/a.altl t/e.altmp/e.altr/a.alttur/e.alt (l/e.altft); /a.altnnu/a.altl pr/e.altcipit/a.alttion (ri/g.altht) of K/e.altn/y.alt/a.alt, 1991–202018 18  WBG Clim/a.altt/e.alt Ch/a.altn/g.alt/e.alt Knowl/e.altd/g.alt/e.alt Port/a.altl (CCKP, 2020). K/e.altn/y.alt/a.alt, Historic/a.altl Clim/a.altt/e.alt. URL: https:/ /clim/a.altt/e.altknowl/e.altd/g.alt/e.altport/a.altl.worldb/a.altnk.
 (page [9]) or/g.alt/countr/y.alt/k/e.altn/y.alt/a.alt/clim/a.altt/e.alt-d/a.altt/a.alt-historic/a.altl
 (page [9]) 19  N/a.alttion/a.altl Environm/e.altnt M/a.altn/a.alt/g.alt/e.altm/e.altnt Authorit/y.alt (2015). K/e.altn/y.alt/a.alt- S/e.altcond N/a.alttion/a.altl Communic/a.alttion to th/e.alt Unit/e.altd N/a.alttion/a.altl Fr/a.altm/e.altwork Conv/e.altntion on Clim/a.altt/e.alt Ch/a.altn/g.alt/e.alt. URL: https:/ /unfccc.int/sit/e.alts/d/e.altf/a.altult/ﬁl/e.alts/r/e.altsourc/e.alt/K/e.altnnc2.pdf 20  USAID (2018). Clim/a.altt/e.alt Ch/a.altn/g.alt/e.alt Risk Proﬁl/e.alt – K/e.altn/y.alt/a.alt. URL: https:/ /www.clim/a.altt/e.altlinks.or/g.alt/sit/e.alts/d/e.altf/a.altult/ﬁl/e.alts//a.altss/e.altt/docum/e.altnt/2018_
 (page [9]) USAID-ATLAS-Proj/e.altct_Clim/a.altt/e.alt-Risk-Proﬁl/e.alt-K/e.altn/y.alt/a.alt.pdf
 (page [9]) 21  WB Clim/a.altt/e.alt Ch/a.altn/g.alt/e.alt Knowl/e.altd/g.alt/e.alt Port/a.altl (CCKP, 2020). K/e.altn/y.alt/a.alt URL: https:/ /clim/a.altt/e.altknowl/e.altd/g.alt/e.altport/a.altl.worldb/a.altnk.or/g.alt/countr/y.alt/k/e.altn/y.alt/a.alt/ clim/a.altt/e.alt-d/a.altt/a.alt-historic/a.altlFIGURE 5. Obs/e.altrv/e.altd t/e.altmp/e.altr/a.alttur/e.alt for K/e.altn/y.alt/a.alt, 1901–202021
 (page [9]) Annual Mean
 (page [9]) 5 Year Smoothing
 (page [9]) 1901 1926 1941 1956 1971 2001 1986 2016Temperature
 (page [9]) 22°C
 (page [9]) 23°C
 (page [9]) 24°C
 (page [9]) 25°C
 (page [10]) 26°C
 (page [10]) come more common.
 (page [10]) »+34.0 »+44.0
 (page [10]) eses
 (page [10]) 7 CLIMATE RISK COUNTRY PROFILE: KENYAPrecipitation Precipit ation trends for Kenya are highly variable, however there is signiﬁcant geographical diversity in observed rainfall trends. Northern areas have become wetter, and southern areas have become drier since the 1960s, although this has had a high degree of variability. Extreme rainfall events are occurring with greater frequency and intensity. Increased aridity and droughts have also been observed, with moderate drought events recorded on average every three to four years and major droughts every ten years. Since 2000, prolonged droughts have become more common.22
 (page [10]) Clim/a.altt/e.alt Futur/e.alt
 (page [10]) Ov/e.altrvi/e.alt w
 (page [10]) The main data source for the World Bank Group’s Climate Change Knowledge Portal  (CCKP) is the CMIP5 (Coupled Inter-comparison Project No.5) data ensemble, which builds the database for the global climate change projections presented in the Fifth Assessment Report (AR5) of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). Four Representative Concentration Pathways (i.e. RCP2.6, RCP4.5, RCP6.0, and RCP8.5) were selected and deﬁned by their total radiative forcing (cumulative measure of GHG emissions from all sources) pathway and level by 2100. The RCP2.6 for example represents a very strong mitigation scenario, whereas the RCP8.5 assumes business- as-usual scenario. For more information, please refer to the RCP Database . For simpliﬁcation, these scenarios are referred to as a low (RCP2.6); a medium (RCP4.5) and a high (RCP8.5) emission scenario in this proﬁle. Table 3 provides CMIP5 projections for essential climate variables under high emission scenario (RCP8.5) over four different time horizons. Figure 6  presents the multi-model (CMIP5) ensemble of 32 Global Circulation Models (GCMs) showing the projected changes in annual preci pitation and temperature for the periods
 (page [10]) 2040–2059 and 2080–2099.
 (page [10]) 22  N/a.alttion/a.altl Environm/e.altnt M/a.altn/a.alt/g.alt/e.altm/e.altnt Authorit/y.alt (2015). K/e.altn/y.alt/a.alt- S/e.altcond N/a.alttion/a.altl Communic/a.alttion to th/e.alt Unit/e.altd N/a.alttion/a.altl Fr/a.altm/e.altwork Conv/e.altntion on Clim/a.altt/e.alt Ch/a.altn/g.alt/e.alt. URL: https:/ /unfccc.int/sit/e.alts/d/e.altf/a.altult/ﬁl/e.alts/r/e.altsourc/e.alt/K/e.altnnc2.pdfTABLE 3. D/a.altt/a.alt sn/a.altpshot: CMIP5 /e.altns/e.altmbl/e.alt proj/e.altctions CMIP5 Ensemble Projection 2020–2039 2040–2059 2060–2079 2080–2099 Annual Temperature Anomaly (°C) +0.5 to +1.4
 (page [10]) (+1.0°C)+1.2 to +2.4
 (page [10]) (+1.7°C)+2.0 to +3.7
 (page [10]) (+2.5°C)+2.7 to +5.1
 (page [10]) (+3.5°C)
 (page [10]) Annual Precipitation Anomaly (mm) -13.7 to +21.6
 (page [10]) (2.6 mm)-17 .1 to +25.2
 (page [10]) (3.5 mm)-17 .0 to +34.0
 (page [10]) (6.7 mm)-17 .8 to +44.0
 (page [10]) (10.5 mm)
 (page [10, 11]) Note:  The table shows CMIP5 ensemble projection under RCP8.5. Bold value is the range (10th–90th Percentile) and values in parentheses show the median (or 50th Percentile).
 (page [11]) g
 (page [11]) 4n
 (page [11]) 1.76
 (page [11]) 15
 (page [11]) 4Nn 8 8 8 8 &
 (page [11]) 175
 (page [11]) 5a
 (page [11]) 25
 (page [11]) »
 (page [11]) 88
 (page [11]) 8
 (page [11]) 8
 (page [11]) &
 (page [11]) § See
 (page [11]) 8
 (page [11]) o
 (page [11]) 8
 (page [11]) 4
 (page [11]) 4N
 (page [11]) 0
 (page [11]) 4S
 (page [11]) 40E
 (page [11]) 8 CLIMATE RISK COUNTRY PROFILE: KENYA FIGURE 6. CMIP5 /e.altns/e.altmbl/e.alt proj/e.altct/e.altd ch/a.altn/g.alt/e.alt (32 GCMs) in /a.altnnu/a.altl t/e.altmp/e.altr/a.alttur/e.alt (top) /a.altnd pr/e.altcipit/a.alttion (bottom) b/y.alt 2040–2059 (l/e.altft) /a.altnd b/y.alt 2080–2099 (ri/g.altht), r/e.altl/a.alttiv/e.alt to 1986–2005
 (page [11]) b/a.alts/e.altlin/e.alt und/e.altr RCP8.523
 (page [11]) 23  WBG Clim/a.altt/e.alt Ch/a.altn/g.alt/e.alt Knowl/e.altd/g.alt/e.alt Port/a.altl (CCKP, 2020). K/e.altn/y.alt/a.alt Proj/e.altct/e.altd Futur/e.alt Clim/a.altt/e.alt. URL: https:/ /clim/a.altt/e.altknowl/e.altd/g.alt/e.altport/a.altl.
 (page [12]) worldb/a.altnk.or/g.alt/countr/y.alt/k/e.altn/y.alt/a.alt/clim/a.altt/e.alt-d/a.altt/a.alt-proj/e.altctions
 (page [12]) 9 CLIMATE RISK COUNTRY PROFILE: KENYAK/e.alt/y.alt Tr/e.altnds
 (page [12]) Temperature
 (page [12]) Temperatures in Kenya are projected to continue rising by 1.7 °C by the 2050s and by approximately 3.5 °C at the end of the century.24 Additionally, the number of hot days and nights will increase, with ‘hot days’ projected to occur on 19%–45% of days by mid-century. Hot nights are expected to increase more quickly, projected to occur on 45%–75% of nights by mid-century and on 64%–93% of nights by end of century. Cold days and nights are
 (page [12]) expected to become increasingly rare.25
 (page [12]) Across all emissions scenarios, temperatures in Kenya will continue to rise. As shown in Figures 7  and 8 below, under a high-emission scenario (RCP 8.5), average temperatures are expected to increase rapidly by mid-century. Increased heat and extreme heat conditions will result in signiﬁcant implications for human and animal health,
 (page [12]) agriculture, and ecosystems.
 (page [12]) 1980
 (page [12]) 2000
 (page [12]) 2020
 (page [12]) 2040
 (page [12]) 2060
 (page [12]) 2080
 (page [12]) 2100
 (page [12]) 30
 (page [12]) 29
 (page [12]) 28
 (page [12]) 27
 (page [12]) 26
 (page [12]) 24
 (page [12]) 25
 (page [12]) degC
 (page [12]) Historical RCP 2.6 RCP 4.5 RCP 6.0 RCP 8.5
 (page [12]) Year
 (page [12]) FIGURE 7. Historic/a.altl /a.altnd proj/e.altct/e.altd /a.altv/e.altr/a.alt/g.alt/e.alt t/e.altmp/e.altr/a.alttur/e.alt for K/e.altn/y.alt/a.alt from 1986 to 209926
 (page [12]) 4.5
 (page [12]) 4.0
 (page [12]) 3.5
 (page [12]) 3.0
 (page [12]) 2.5
 (page [12]) 2.0
 (page [12]) 1.5
 (page [12]) 1.0
 (page [12]) 0.5
 (page [12]) 0
 (page [12]) –0.5
 (page [12]) days
 (page [12]) Jan
 (page [12]) Feb
 (page [12]) Mar
 (page [12]) Apr
 (page [12]) May
 (page [12]) Jun
 (page [12]) Jul
 (page [12]) Aug
 (page [12]) Sep
 (page [12]) Oct
 (page [12]) Nov
 (page [12]) Dec
 (page [12]) FIGURE 8. Proj/e.altct/e.altd ch/a.altn/g.alt/e.alt in summ/e.altr d/a.alt/y.alts
 (page [12]) (Tm/a.altx >25°C) 27
 (page [12]) 24  Ministr/y.alt of Environm/e.altnt /a.altnd N/a.alttur/a.altl R/e.altsourc/e.alts (2016). K/e.altn/y.alt/a.alt N/a.alttion/a.altl Ad/a.altpt/a.alttion Pl/a.altn, 2015–2030. URL: https:/ /www4.unfccc.
 (page [12]) int/sit/e.alts/NAPC/Docum/e.altnts%20NAP/K/e.altn/y.alt/a.alt_NAP_Fin/a.altl.pdf .
 (page [12]) 25  N/a.alttion/a.altl Environm/e.altnt M/a.altn/a.alt/g.alt/e.altm/e.altnt Authorit/y.alt (2015). K/e.altn/y.alt/a.alt- S/e.altcond N/a.alttion/a.altl Communic/a.alttion to th/e.alt Unit/e.altd N/a.alttion/a.altl Fr/a.altm/e.altwork Conv/e.altntion on Clim/a.altt/e.alt Ch/a.altn/g.alt/e.alt. URL: https:/ /unfccc.int/sit/e.alts/d/e.altf/a.altult/ﬁl/e.alts/r/e.altsourc/e.alt/K/e.altnnc2.pdf 26  WBG Clim/a.altt/e.alt Ch/a.altn/g.alt/e.alt Knowl/e.altd/g.alt/e.alt Port/a.altl (CCKP, 2020). K/e.altn/y.alt/a.alt A/g.altricultur/e.alt D/a.altshbo/a.altrd. URL: https:/ /clim/a.altt/e.altd/a.altt/a.alt.worldb/a.altnk.or/g.alt/
 (page [12]) CRM/e.altPort/a.altl/w/e.altb//a.alt/g.altricultur/e.alt/crops-/a.altnd-l/a.altnd-m/a.altn/a.alt/g.alt/e.altm/e.altnt?countr/y.alt=KEN&p/e.altriod=2080-2099
 (page [12]) 27  WBG Clim/a.altt/e.alt Ch/a.altn/g.alt/e.alt Knowl/e.altd/g.alt/e.alt Port/a.altl (CCKP, 2020). K/e.altn/y.alt/a.alt A/g.altricultur/e.alt D/a.altshbo/a.altrd. URL: https:/ /clim/a.altt/e.altd/a.altt/a.alt.worldb/a.altnk.or/g.alt/
 (page [13]) CRM/e.altPort/a.altl/w/e.altb//a.alt/g.altricultur/e.alt/crops-/a.altnd-l/a.altnd-m/a.altn/a.alt/g.alt/e.altm/e.altnt?countr/y.alt=KEN&p/e.altriod=2080-2099
 (page [13]) 10 CLIMATE RISK COUNTRY PROFILE: KENYAPrecipitation Precipitation in Kenya is projected to remain highly variable and uncertain, however average rainfall is expected to increase by mid-century, particularly during the ‘short rains’, which occur between October and December. Extreme rainfall events are also expected to increase in frequency, duration and intensity and the proportion of heavy rainfall that occurs in heavy events will increase. However, the period between heavy rainfall events may increase. Importantly, rainfall in the arid zones are generally projected to decrease.28 As seen in Figure 9 , annual average precipitation is expected to increase slightly by the of the century under a high emissions scenario
 (page [13]) (RCP8.5).
 (page [13]) 1980
 (page [13]) 2000
 (page [13]) 2020
 (page [13]) 2040
 (page [13]) 2060
 (page [13]) 2080
 (page [13]) 2100
 (page [13]) 1100
 (page [13]) 1000
 (page [13]) 900
 (page [13]) 800
 (page [13]) 700
 (page [13]) 600
 (page [13]) 500
 (page [13]) 400
 (page [13]) 300
 (page [13]) mm
 (page [13]) Historical RCP 2.6 RCP 4.5 RCP 6.0 RCP 8.5 YearFIGURE 9. Annu/a.altl /a.altv/e.altr/a.alt/g.alt/e.alt pr/e.altcipit/a.alttion tr/e.altnds /a.altnd proj/e.altctions for K/e.altn/y.alt/a.alt, for 1986 to 209929
 (page [13]) Ov/e.altrvi/e.altw
 (page [13]) Kenya is highly exposed to many natural hazards, the most common being ﬂoods and droughts. It is estimated that over 70% of natural disasters in Kenya are attributable to extreme climatic events. T ypically, major droughts occur approximately every ten years, and moderate droughts or ﬂoods every three to four years. Repeating patterns of ﬂoods and droughts in the country have had large socio-economic impacts and high economic costs. For example, the 1998 to 2000 drought cost an estimated $2.8 billion, principally due to crops and livestock loss, as well as forest ﬁres, damage to ﬁsheries, reduced hydropower generation, reduced industrial production and reduced water supplies.30 Droughts have affected more people and had the greatest economic impact (8% of GDP every ﬁve years). As many as 28 droughts have been recorded in the past 100 years, and these appear to be increasing in frequency. Droughts are often nation-wide, but normally have the most severe impacts in the country’s highly arid zones.31 Drought also remains a signiﬁcant concern to Kenya’s agricultural sector.32 Arid and semi-arid areas comprise 18 or the 20 poorest counties and are particularly at risk from increased aridity and periods of drought.33 While droughts CLIMATE RELATED NATURAL HAZARDS 28  WBG Clim/a.altt/e.alt Ch/a.altn/g.alt/e.alt Knowl/e.altd/g.alt/e.alt Port/a.altl (CCKP, 2020). K/e.altn/y.alt/a.alt W/a.altt/e.altr D/a.altshbo/a.altrd. D/a.altt/a.alt D/e.altscription. URL: https:/ /
 (page [13]) clim/a.altt/e.altknowl/e.altd/g.alt/e.altport/a.altl.worldb/a.altnk.or/g.alt/countr/y.alt/k/e.altn/y.alt/a.alt/clim/a.altt/e.alt-s/e.altctor-w/a.altt/e.altr
 (page [13]) 29  WBG Clim/a.altt/e.alt Ch/a.altn/g.alt/e.alt Knowl/e.altd/g.alt/e.alt Port/a.altl (CCKP, 2020). Clim/a.altt/e.alt D/a.altt/a.alt-Proj/e.altctions. K/e.altn/y.alt/a.alt. URL: https:/ /clim/a.altt/e.altknowl/e.altd/g.alt/e.altport/a.altl.
 (page [13]) worldb/a.altnk.or/g.alt/countr/y.alt/k/e.altn/y.alt/a.alt/clim/a.altt/e.alt-s/e.altctor-w/a.altt/e.altr
 (page [13]) 30  N/a.alttion/a.altl Environm/e.altnt M/a.altn/a.alt/g.alt/e.altm/e.altnt Authorit/y.alt (2015). K/e.altn/y.alt/a.alt- S/e.altcond N/a.alttion/a.altl Communic/a.alttion to th/e.alt Unit/e.altd N/a.alttion/a.altl Fr/a.altm/e.altwork Conv/e.altntion on Clim/a.altt/e.alt Ch/a.altn/g.alt/e.alt. URL: https:/ /unfccc.int/sit/e.alts/d/e.altf/a.altult/ﬁl/e.alts/r/e.altsourc/e.alt/K/e.altnnc2.pdf 31  R/e.altpublic of K/e.altn/y.alt/a.alt (2013). S/e.altctor pl/a.altn for drou/g.altht risk m/a.altn/a.alt/g.alt/e.altm/e.altnt /a.altnd /e.altndin/g.alt drou/g.altht /e.altm/e.altr/g.alt/e.altnci/e.alts, S/e.altcond m/e.altdium-t/e.altrm pl/a.altn:
 (page [13]) 2013–2017. URL: https:/ /www.ndm/a.alt./g.alto.k/e.alt/ind/e.altx.php/r/e.altsourc/e.alt-c/e.altnt/e.altr/s/e.altnd/43-/e.altndin/g.alt-drou/g.altht-/e.altm/e.altr/g.alt/e.altnci/e.alts/4271-/e.altd/e.alt-m/e.altdium-
 (page [13]) t/e.altrm-pl/a.altn-2013-2017
 (page [13]) 32  R/e.altpublic of K/e.altn/y.alt/a.alt (2013). N/a.alttion/a.altl Clim/a.altt/e.alt Ch/a.altn/g.alt/e.alt Action Pl/a.altn, 2013–2017: Vision 2030. URL: https:/ /cdkn.or/g.alt/wp-cont/e.altnt/
 (page [13]) uplo/a.altds/2013/03/K/e.altn/y.alt/a.alt-N/a.alttion/a.altl-Clim/a.altt/e.alt-Ch/a.altn/g.alt/e.alt-Action-Pl/a.altn.pdf
 (page [13]) 33  World B/a.altnk (2018). Dis/a.altst/e.altr Risk M/a.altn/a.alt/g.alt/e.altm/e.altnt D/e.altv/e.altlopm/e.altnt Polic/y.alt Fin/a.altncin/g.alt with /a.alt C/a.altt/a.altstroph/e.alt D/e.altf/e.altrr/e.altd Dr/a.altwdown Option.
 (page [14]) URL: http:/ /docum/e.altnts.worldb/a.altnk.or/g.alt/cur/a.altt/e.altd//e.altn/131661529811034069/pdf/KENYA-DDO-NEWPAD-2-05312018.pdf
 (page [14]) Table 4, shows the country has endured
 (page [14]) A, TT
 (page [14]) 11 CLIMATE RISK COUNTRY PROFILE: KENYAaffect the most people, ﬂoods have caused the greatest losses in terms of human lives. The districts of Baringo, West Pokot, Kisumu and Laikipia are some of the country’s most disaster-prone areas and have required signiﬁcant disaster risk investment.34 Vulnerability from these hazards poses major challenges for economic stability and ﬁscal sustainability and have had adverse social and ﬁscal consequences. Indeed, lower-income populations reside in more hazard prone locations, with high potential for signiﬁcantly increased exposure of
 (page [14]) already vulnerable populations.35
 (page [14]) Data from the Emergency Event Database: EM-Dat database, presented in Table 4 , shows the country has endured various natural hazards, including ﬂoods, landslides, wildﬁres, and storms. TABLE 4. N/a.alttur/a.altl Dis/a.altst/e.altrs in K/e.altn/y.alt/a.alt, 1900–202036
 (page [14]) Natural Hazard
 (page [14]) 1900–2020 Subtype Events Count Total Deaths Total AffectedTotal Damage
 (page [14]) (‘000 USD)
 (page [14]) Drought Drought 16 196 52,911,500 1,500 Earthquake Ground Movement 1 0 0 0
 (page [14]) Tsunami 1 1 0 100,000
 (page [14]) Epidemic Bacterial Disease 20 1,576 59,801 0 Parasitic Disease 5 1,595 6,807 ,533 0 Viral Disease 7 514 3,850 0 Flood Flash Flood 8 245 193,500 500 Riverine Flood 37 1,150 2,232,222 136,038 Landslide Landslide 4 133 140 0
 (page [14]) Mudslide 1 20 6 0
 (page [14]) Storm Convective Storm 1 50 0 0 34  D/e.altv/e.altlopm/e.altnt Initi/a.alttiv/e.alts K/e.altn/y.alt/a.alt (2019). Tr/a.altckin/g.alt subn/a.alttion/a.altl /g.altov/e.altrnm/e.altnt inv/e.altstm/e.altnts in dis/a.altst/e.altr risk r/e.altduction in K/e.altn/y.alt/a.alt. URL:
 (page [14]) https:/ /r/e.altli/e.altfw/e.altb.int/sit/e.alts/r/e.altli/e.altfw/e.altb.int/ﬁl/e.alts/r/e.altsourc/e.alts/Tr/a.altckin/g.alt-subn/a.alttion/a.altl-/g.altov/e.altrnm/e.altnt-inv/e.altstm/e.altnts-in-dis/a.altst/e.altr-risk-r/e.altduction-
 (page [14]) in-K/e.altn/y.alt/a.alt.pdf
 (page [14]) 35  Ministr/y.alt of For/e.alti/g.altn Aﬀ/a.altirs (2018). Clim/a.altt/e.alt Ch/a.altn/g.alt/e.alt Proﬁl/e.alt, K/e.altn/y.alt/a.alt. URL: https:/ /r/e.altli/e.altfw/e.altb.int/sit/e.alts/r/e.altli/e.altfw/e.altb.int/ﬁl/e.alts/r/e.altsourc/e.alts/
 (page [14]) K/e.altn/y.alt/a.alt_2.pdf
 (page [14]) 36  EM-DAT: Th/e.alt Em/e.altr/g.alt/e.altnc/y.alt Ev/e.altnts D/a.altt/a.altb/a.alts/e.alt - Univ/e.altrsit/e.alt c/a.alttholiqu/e.alt d/e.alt Louv/a.altin (UCL) - CRED, D. Guh/a.alt-S/a.altpir, Bruss/e.altls, B/e.altl/g.altium.
 (page [14]) URL: http:/ //e.altmd/a.altt.b/e.alt//e.altmd/a.altt_db/
 (page [14]) 37  Ministr/y.alt of Environm/e.altnt /a.altnd N/a.alttur/a.altl R/e.altsourc/e.alts (2016). K/e.altn/y.alt/a.alt N/a.alttion/a.altl Ad/a.altpt/a.alttion Pl/a.altn, 2015–2030. URL: https:/ /www4.unfccc.
 (page [14]) int/sit/e.alts/NAPC/Docum/e.altnts%20NAP/K/e.altn/y.alt/a.alt_NAP_Fin/a.altl.pdf .K/e.alt/y.alt Tr/e.altnds
 (page [14, 15]) Climate change is expected to increase the risk and intensity of ﬂood events, as well as increase average annual rainfall amounts, while also furthering drought likelihoods for some areas across Kenya. Intense rainfall and ﬂooding may increase the likelihood of mudslides and landslides, particularly in mountainous areas. As the incidence of extreme rainfall rises, additional soil erosion and water logging of crops is likely to reduce yields and increase food insecurity. Rising temperatures are also likely to increase the periods of aridity in the northwest regions. Furthermore, as temperatures rise and droughts are prolonged, water storage capacities will likely be reduced. This may result in signiﬁcant economic losses, damage to agricultural lands and infrastructure as well as human casualties. Additionally, land degradation and soil erosion, exacerbated by recurrent ﬂoods, will negatively impact agricultural productivity, disproportionately affecting the livelihoods of the rural poor. 37 . severe and prolonged drought from 2008-201 1 ST ~ Z ne —— ne is
 (page [15]) aes )UTH SUDAN (eT,
 (page [15]) ns f fr | Show data source 3 is Z rr Show data source .
 (page [15]) if High Bich
 (page [15]) BB medium Wyery low
 (page [15]) 12 CLIMATE RISK COUNTRY PROFILE: KENYARecurring disasters, particularly droughts and ﬂoods, have signiﬁcantly impacted livelihoods and the country’s economic development agenda. Flood and drought events are becoming more frequent, with drought cycles occurring every 2–3 years instead of every 5–10 years. A severe and prolonged drought from 2008–2011 affected 3.7 million people, caused $12.1 billion in damages and losses, and cost over $1.7 billion in recovery and
 (page [15]) reconstruction needs.38
 (page [15]) Additionally, deforestation, watershed degradation, land use changes, urbanization and poor management of settlements have exacerbated the likelihood of and impact from ﬂoods and droughts. These conditions contribute to water scarcity and pollution, which limit water for drinking, agriculture, and other uses. Heavy rainfall can also trigger riverine, coastal and ﬂash ﬂoods. Flash ﬂoods are common in the country’s high plateau areas and can also trigger mudﬂows. Increasing urbanization, particularly into ﬂood plains and/or low-lying areas also has increased ﬂood risk, as water drainage systems fail. Water stress may be further exacerbated as household consumption and agriculture continue to compete for limited supply. Increased heat will further strain water resources and impacts from changing rainfall patterns.39 Figure 10  shows different risks from river ﬂooding and water scarcity. FIGURE 10. Risk of riv/e.altr ﬂood (L/e.altft)40; risk of w/a.altt/e.altr sc/a.altrcit/y.alt (R)41 38  GFDRR (2020). K/e.altn/y.alt/a.alt Ov/e.altrvi/e.altw. URL: https:/ /www./g.altfdrr.or/g.alt//e.altn/k/e.altn/y.alt/a.alt 39  R/e.altpublic of K/e.altn/y.alt/a.alt (2013). S/e.altctor pl/a.altn for drou/g.altht risk m/a.altn/a.alt/g.alt/e.altm/e.altnt /a.altnd /e.altndin/g.alt drou/g.altht /e.altm/e.altr/g.alt/e.altnci/e.alts, S/e.altcond m/e.altdium-t/e.altrm pl/a.altn:
 (page [15]) 2013–2017. URL: https:/ /www.ndm/a.alt./g.alto.k/e.alt/ind/e.altx.php/r/e.altsourc/e.alt-c/e.altnt/e.altr/s/e.altnd/43-/e.altndin/g.alt-drou/g.altht-/e.altm/e.altr/g.alt/e.altnci/e.alts/4271-/e.altd/e.alt-m/e.altdium-
 (page [15]) t/e.altrm-pl/a.altn-2013-2017
 (page [16, 15]) 40  ThinkH/a.alt/z.alt/a.altrd! (2020). K/e.altn/y.alt/a.alt Riv/e.altr Flood. URL: http:/ /thinkh/a.alt/z.alt/a.altrd.or/g.alt//e.altn/r/e.altport/133-k/e.altn/y.alt/a.alt/FL 41  ThinkH/a.alt/z.alt/a.altrd! (2020). K/e.altn/y.alt/a.alt W/a.altt/e.altr Sc/a.altrcit/y.alt. URL: http:/ /thinkh/a.alt/z.alt/a.altrd.or/g.alt//e.altn/r/e.altport/133-k/e.altn/y.alt/a.alt/DG 13 CLIMATE RISK COUNTRY PROFILE: KENYAImplic/a.alttions for DRM The Government of Kenya is committed to increasing its coping capacity and resilience to natural hazards, reducing the potential impacts from climate change, and strengthening its disaster risk management strategies. Kenya’s Disaster Risk Management (DRM) Authority is working at both the national and sub-national level to implement actions outlined in its Vision 2030 strategy.42 The DRM Authority is responsible for DRM preparedness and response, however the Authority is also actively involved in bridging the gap between academic researchers and government departments, integrating research applications to appropriate ministries in an effort to better prepare for climate change adaptation.43 All levels of the government in Kenya are also, at times, required to reallocate planed capital expenditures towards ﬁnancing post-disaster reconstruction efforts. However, budget reallocations create delays and can often result in the scaling back of investment programs, while also slowing deployment of funds for recovery efforts. In order to support the government, key international donor support mechanisms have included damage and loss assessment after major disaster events. Speciﬁcally, following the 2008–2011 drought, the Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery (GFDRR), the World Bank, the EU, the UN, and other partners supported the Government of Kenya in conducting an assessment to estimate the drought’s impact and provided recommendations for recovery and long-term resilience. Furthermore, GFDRR helped the Government of Kenya provide ﬁnancial protection to vulnerable households affected. Kenya continues to strengthen the capacity of its DRM Authority, with a focus on increasing the resilience of poor segments of the population, especially communities reliant on agriculture and livestock.44 Kenya is highly vulnerable to seasonal variability and long-term climate change. Increasing vulnerability is expected to result in cumulative impacts across the country’s social, economic and environmental systems, with a high likelihood to reverse much of the positive development progress the country has made. Droughts and ﬂoods can have devastating consequences on the environment, society and the wider economy. Signiﬁcant impacts are expected for the country’s water resources, agriculture, health, and forestry sectors, as well its coastal zones. Heavy rains, ﬂoods, droughts, soil erosion, and sea level rise put both urban and rural infrastructure at risk, particularly for poor and vulnerable groups. Environmental degradation, altered water resources, and loss of biodiversity and ecosystem services constitute serious obstacles to the country’s continued development, of particular relevance to the country’s tourism sector. In addition, rising temperatures will have a negative impact on key parts of the economy, e.g. forestry, agriculture, and livestock. Changes in precipitation patterns can have far-reaching consequences for ecosystems and biodiversity, food production, the water industry and rivers.45CLIMATE CHANGE IMPACTS TO KEY SECTORS 42  R/e.altpublic of K/e.altn/y.alt/a.alt (2013). S/e.altctor pl/a.altn for drou/g.altht risk m/a.altn/a.alt/g.alt/e.altm/e.altnt /a.altnd /e.altndin/g.alt drou/g.altht /e.altm/e.altr/g.alt/e.altnci/e.alts, S/e.altcond m/e.altdium-t/e.altrm pl/a.altn:
 (page [16]) 2013–2017. URL: https:/ /www.ndm/a.alt./g.alto.k/e.alt/ind/e.altx.php/r/e.altsourc/e.alt-c/e.altnt/e.altr/s/e.altnd/43-/e.altndin/g.alt-drou/g.altht-/e.altm/e.altr/g.alt/e.altnci/e.alts/4271-/e.altd/e.alt-m/e.altdium-
 (page [16]) t/e.altrm-pl/a.altn-2013-2017
 (page [16, 17]) 43  N/a.alttion/a.altl Environm/e.altnt M/a.altn/a.alt/g.alt/e.altm/e.altnt Authorit/y.alt (2015). K/e.altn/y.alt/a.alt- S/e.altcond N/a.alttion/a.altl Communic/a.alttion to th/e.alt Unit/e.altd N/a.alttion/a.altl Fr/a.altm/e.altwork Conv/e.altntion on Clim/a.altt/e.alt Ch/a.altn/g.alt/e.alt. URL: https:/ /unfccc.int/sit/e.alts/d/e.altf/a.altult/ﬁl/e.alts/r/e.altsourc/e.alt/K/e.altnnc2.pdf 44  GFDRR (2020). K/e.altn/y.alt/a.alt Ov/e.altrvi/e.altw. URL: https:/ /www./g.altfdrr.or/g.alt//e.altn/k/e.altn/y.alt/a.alt 45  N/a.alttion/a.altl Environm/e.altnt M/a.altn/a.alt/g.alt/e.altm/e.altnt Authorit/y.alt (2015). K/e.altn/y.alt/a.alt- S/e.altcond N/a.alttion/a.altl Communic/a.alttion to th/e.alt Unit/e.altd N/a.alttion/a.altl Fr/a.altm/e.altwork Conv/e.altntion on Clim/a.altt/e.alt Ch/a.altn/g.alt/e.alt. URL: https:/ /unfccc.int/sit/e.alts/d/e.altf/a.altult/ﬁl/e.alts/r/e.altsourc/e.alt/K/e.altnnc2.pdf 14 CLIMATE RISK COUNTRY PROFILE: KENYAG/e.altnd/e.altr An increasing body of research has shown that climate-related disasters have impacted human populations in many areas including agricultural production, food security, water management and public health. The level of impacts and coping strategies of populations depends heavily on their socio-economic status, socio-cultural norms, access to resources, poverty as well as gender. Research has also provided more evidence that the effects are not gender neutral, as women and children are among the highest risk groups. Key factors that account for the differences between women’s and men’s vulnerability to climate change risks include: gender-based differences in time use; access to assets and credit, treatment by formal institutio ns, which can constrain women’s opportunities, limited access to policy discussions and decision making, and a lack of sex-disaggregated data for policy change.46
 (page [17]) A/g.altricultur/e.alt
 (page [17]) Ov/e.altrvi/e.altw
 (page [17]) The agricultural sector is critical to Kenya’s economy and food security and is considered to be one of the most vulnerable to climate risks. The sector contributes approximately 28% of Kenya’s GDP and accounts for more than 65% of exports, with crop, livestock, and ﬁsheries sub-sectors contributing approximately 78%, 20% and 2% to the agricultural GDP, respectively. As of 2015, the agricultural sector provides about 80% of total employment and supports over 80% of the rural population.47 Four sub-sectors are recognized: crops, livestock, ﬁsheries and forestry.48 The country’s reliance on agriculture and dependence on imports (especially of wheat, maize, and rice, among others) underscores the need for sustainable, resilient increases in agricultural productivity for food
 (page [17]) security and economic growth.49
 (page [17]) Clim/a.altt/e.alt Ch/a.altn/g.alt/e.alt Imp/a.altcts
 (page [17]) Climate change poses a serious negative impact on agriculture-based livelihoods in Kenya, challenging the sustainability of current arable, pastoral and ﬁshing practices. The majority of Kenyan agriculture relies on seasonal rains for production and the projected changes in precipitation patterns are expected to directly increase the likelihood of short-term crop failures and long-term production declines. Rain-fed agriculture remains the dominant source of staple food production and is the foundation of livelihoods for the majority of the rural poor in Kenya.50 The high inter-annual variability of precipitation is already having devastating consequences on rural livelihoods, with droughts and ﬂoods a frequent occurrence in both the arid and semi-arid lands and key agricultural zones. Additionally, indirect impacts, such as increased rates of runoff and soil erosion, and increased crop losses 46 World B/a.altnk Group (2016). G/e.altnd/e.altr Equ/a.altlit/y.alt, Pov/e.altrt/y.alt R/e.altduction, /a.altnd Inclusiv/e.alt Growth. URL: http:/ /docum/e.altnts1.worldb/a.altnk.or/g.alt/
 (page [17]) cur/a.altt/e.altd//e.altn/820851467992505410/pdf/102114-REVISED-PUBLIC-WBG-G/e.altnd/e.altr-Str/a.altt/e.alt/g.alt/y.alt.pdf
 (page [17]) 47  World B/a.altnk; CIAT (2015). Clim/a.altt/e.alt-Sm/a.altrt A/g.altricultur/e.alt in K/e.altn/y.alt/a.alt. CSA Countr/y.alt Proﬁl/e.alts for Afric/a.alt, Asi/a.alt, /a.altnd L/a.alttin Am/e.altric/a.alt /a.altnd th/e.alt C/a.altribb/e.alt/a.altn S/e.altri/e.alts. W/a.altshin/g.altton D.C.: Th/e.alt World B/a.altnk Group. URL: https:/ /clim/a.altt/e.altknowl/e.altd/g.alt/e.altport/a.altl.worldb/a.altnk.or/g.alt/sit/e.alts/d/e.altf/a.altult/
 (page [17]) ﬁl/e.alts/2019-06/CSA%20KENYA%20NOV%2018%202015.pdf
 (page [17]) 48  Ministr/y.alt of A/g.altricultur/e.alt, Liv/e.altstock /a.altnd Fish/e.altri/e.alts (2017). K/e.altn/y.alt/a.alt Clim/a.altt/e.alt Sm/a.altrt A/g.altricultur/e.alt Str/a.altt/e.alt/g.alt/y.alt, 2017–2026. URL: https:/ /www.
 (page [17]) /a.altd/a.altpt/a.alttion-undp.or/g.alt/sit/e.alts/d/e.altf/a.altult/ﬁl/e.alts/r/e.altsourc/e.alts/k/e.altn/y.alt/a.alt_clim/a.altt/e.alt_sm/a.altrt_/a.alt/g.altricultur/e.alt_str/a.altt/e.alt/g.alt/y.alt.pdf
 (page [17]) 49  World B/a.altnk; CIAT (2015). Clim/a.altt/e.alt-Sm/a.altrt A/g.altricultur/e.alt in K/e.altn/y.alt/a.alt. CSA Countr/y.alt Proﬁl/e.alts for Afric/a.alt, Asi/a.alt, /a.altnd L/a.alttin Am/e.altric/a.alt /a.altnd th/e.alt C/a.altribb/e.alt/a.altn S/e.altri/e.alts. W/a.altshin/g.altton D.C.: Th/e.alt World B/a.altnk Group. URL: https:/ /clim/a.altt/e.altknowl/e.altd/g.alt/e.altport/a.altl.worldb/a.altnk.or/g.alt/sit/e.alts/d/e.altf/a.altult/
 (page [17]) ﬁl/e.alts/2019-06/CSA%20KENYA%20NOV%2018%202015.pdf
 (page [17]) 50  R/e.altpublic of K/e.altn/y.alt/a.alt (2013). N/a.alttion/a.altl Clim/a.altt/e.alt Ch/a.altn/g.alt/e.alt Action Pl/a.altn, 2013–2017: Vision 2030. URL: https:/ /cdkn.or/g.alt/wp-cont/e.altnt/
 (page [18]) uplo/a.altds/2013/03/K/e.altn/y.alt/a.alt-N/a.alttion/a.altl-Clim/a.altt/e.alt-Ch/a.altn/g.alt/e.alt-Action-Pl/a.altn.pdf
 (page [18]) 15 CLIMATE RISK COUNTRY PROFILE: KENYAfrom wildlife migrations, rising and novel infestations from insects, diseases and weeds, could signiﬁcantly magnify
 (page [18]) production losses.51
 (page [18]) Some regions of Kenya may see a beneﬁt from a changing climate, speciﬁcally the temperate and tropical highlands, the Rift Valley and high plateaus, as projected increases in rainfall and slightly warmer temperatures are likely to raise crop yields. However, the country’s large semi-arid and arid land areas are projected to see a signiﬁcant decline in agricultural productivity and livestock numbers, as water resources become increasingly scarce.52 Given its exposure and sensitivity, the agriculture sector is one of the most vulnerable to climate change. Rising temperatures will likely alter the mix and distribution of agriculture and livestock pests, while the increased incidence of droughts, coupled with reduced rainfall projections for the arid and semi-arid regions, is expected to reduce yields in key crops: maize, wheat, rice, livestock and ﬁsheries. Key cash crops such as coffee and tea are also likely to be highly affected due to temperature increases as well as the increased presence of pests and diseases.53 Warm temperatures during the day are critical to crop growth, however, there are temperature thresholds beyond which crop productivity is reduced or stalled. This threshold is different with each crop type. As temperatures rise, local trends in daily maximum temperatures may offer insights on these upper thresholds for speciﬁc crops, translating these potentially into changing yields ( Figure 11 ). This is a critical indicator for agriculture, particularly given that the majority of agriculture is rain-fed. Reduced water availability could also reduce yields and reduce soil moisture availability, potentially altering the distribution of areas suitable for agriculture or
 (page [18]) the production of speciﬁc crops.
 (page [18]) Ad/a.altpt/a.alttion Options
 (page [18]) Both the sensitivity of the agricultural sector to a changing climate and the high reliance of this sector on rainfall and limited water resources have important implications for Kenya’s farmers, ﬁshermen, women, and the wider economy. The sector will beneﬁt from targeted research aimed at improving the knowledge base of speciﬁc climate change related impacts. Improved access to seasonal information is necessary to better inform farms and ﬁsher-folk on decisions regarding planting and the timing of ﬁshing activity. Improved water resources management, speciﬁcally increasing use of irrigation as an adaptive strategy, could improve production during reduced rainfall periods.55
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 (page [18]) FIGURE 11. Av/e.altr/a.alt/g.alt/e.alt d/a.altil/y.alt m/a.altx t/e.altmp/e.altr/a.alttur/e.alt
 (page [18]) /a.altnom/a.altl/y.alt for K/e.altn/y.alt/a.alt54
 (page [18]) 51  N/a.alttion/a.altl Environm/e.altnt M/a.altn/a.alt/g.alt/e.altm/e.altnt Authorit/y.alt (2015). K/e.altn/y.alt/a.alt- S/e.altcond N/a.alttion/a.altl Communic/a.alttion to th/e.alt Unit/e.altd N/a.alttion/a.altl Fr/a.altm/e.altwork Conv/e.altntion on Clim/a.altt/e.alt Ch/a.altn/g.alt/e.alt. URL: https:/ /unfccc.int/sit/e.alts/d/e.altf/a.altult/ﬁl/e.alts/r/e.altsourc/e.alt/K/e.altnnc2.pdf 52  N/a.alttion/a.altl Environm/e.altnt M/a.altn/a.alt/g.alt/e.altm/e.altnt Authorit/y.alt (2015). K/e.altn/y.alt/a.alt- S/e.altcond N/a.alttion/a.altl Communic/a.alttion to th/e.alt Unit/e.altd N/a.alttion/a.altl Fr/a.altm/e.altwork Conv/e.altntion on Clim/a.altt/e.alt Ch/a.altn/g.alt/e.alt. URL: https:/ /unfccc.int/sit/e.alts/d/e.altf/a.altult/ﬁl/e.alts/r/e.altsourc/e.alt/K/e.altnnc2.pdf 53  Ministr/y.alt of Environm/e.altnt /a.altnd N/a.alttur/a.altl R/e.altsourc/e.alts (2016). K/e.altn/y.alt/a.alt N/a.alttion/a.altl Ad/a.altpt/a.alttion Pl/a.altn, 2015–2030. URL: https:/ /www4.unfccc.
 (page [18]) int/sit/e.alts/NAPC/Docum/e.altnts%20NAP/K/e.altn/y.alt/a.alt_NAP_Fin/a.altl.pdf .
 (page [18]) 54  WBG Clim/a.altt/e.alt Ch/a.altn/g.alt/e.alt Knowl/e.altd/g.alt/e.alt Port/a.altl (CCKP, 2020). K/e.altn/y.alt/a.alt A/g.altricultur/e.alt. D/a.altshbo/a.altrd URL: https:/ /clim/a.altt/e.altd/a.altt/a.alt.worldb/a.altnk.or/g.alt/
 (page [18]) CRM/e.altPort/a.altl/w/e.altb//a.alt/g.altricultur/e.alt/crops-/a.altnd-l/a.altnd-m/a.altn/a.alt/g.alt/e.altm/e.altnt?countr/y.alt=KEN&p/e.altriod=2080-2099
 (page [18]) 55  World B/a.altnk (2015). Clim/a.altt/e.alt Sm/a.altrt A/g.altricultur/e.alt – K/e.altn/y.alt/a.alt. URL: https:/ /clim/a.altt/e.altknowl/e.altd/g.alt/e.altport/a.altl.worldb/a.altnk.or/g.alt/sit/e.alts/d/e.altf/a.altult/
 (page [19]) ﬁl/e.alts/2019-06/CSA%20KENYA%20NOV%2018%202015.pdf
 (page [19]) 16 CLIMATE RISK COUNTRY PROFILE: KENYAAn opportunity exists to improve the horizontal integration of producers regarding the management of water, prioritizing the development of water management models at  basin scales to improve water management tools. Implementing sustainable land management actions, as well as seasonally-appropriate cropping sequences, and livestock production systems that are environmentally sound can support the conservation of natural grasslands and native forests. Encouraging the use of both new agriculture technologies that are water and resource efﬁcient (e.g. drip irrigation), or more resilient crop varieties would support a shift away from water-intensive crops and can also help farmers produce more food with fewer inputs.56
 (page [19]) W/a.altt/e.altr
 (page [19]) Ov/e.altrvi/e.altw
 (page [19]) In 1992, Kenya was categorized as a water scarce country, as available water resources were calculated at 647 m3 per capita; below the international acceptable threshold of 1,000 m3. The country’s water scarcity index has worsened alongside its rapid population growth, and is expected to fall from approximately 586 m3 per capita in 2010 to as low as 293 m3 per capita by 2050. Kenya is thus critically exposed to the adverse effects of climate change. This has serious implications for Kenya’s Vision 2030 as these impacts will be detrimental to the country’s tourism, agriculture, industry, and energy sectors.57 Freshwater resources in Kenya are already highly subject to the large inter-and intra-annual rainfall variability, including the extremes of ﬂoods and droughts ( Figure 12 ). As rainfall patterns are further altered, and rising temperatures increase soil moisture deﬁcits and lower lake levels.58
 (page [19]) Clim/a.altt/e.alt Ch/a.altn/g.alt/e.alt Imp/a.altcts
 (page [19]) Already, cities in Kenya face signiﬁcant challenges in water availability. For example, the city of Mombasa currently has only half of the water required to meet its needs, leading to rationing and the continued use of private sources. Rising temperatures and more variable rainfall will exacerbate these conditions.60 In coastal locations, sea level rise FIGURE 12. Distribution of
 (page [19]) r/e.altn/e.altw/a.altbl/e.alt surf/a.altc/e.alt w/a.altt/e.altr r/e.altsourc/e.alts
 (page [19]) /a.altcross K/e.altn/y.alt/a.alt59
 (page [19]) 56  Ministr/y.alt of A/g.altricultur/e.alt, Liv/e.altstock /a.altnd Fish/e.altri/e.alts (2017). K/e.altn/y.alt/a.alt Clim/a.altt/e.alt Sm/a.altrt A/g.altricultur/e.alt Str/a.altt/e.alt/g.alt/y.alt, 2017–2026. URL: https:/ /www.
 (page [19]) /a.altd/a.altpt/a.alttion-undp.or/g.alt/sit/e.alts/d/e.altf/a.altult/ﬁl/e.alts/r/e.altsourc/e.alts/k/e.altn/y.alt/a.alt_clim/a.altt/e.alt_sm/a.altrt_/a.alt/g.altricultur/e.alt_str/a.altt/e.alt/g.alt/y.alt.pdf
 (page [19]) 57  R/e.altpublic of K/e.altn/y.alt/a.alt (2013). S/e.altctor pl/a.altn for drou/g.altht risk m/a.altn/a.alt/g.alt/e.altm/e.altnt /a.altnd /e.altndin/g.alt drou/g.altht /e.altm/e.altr/g.alt/e.altnci/e.alts, S/e.altcond m/e.altdium-t/e.altrm pl/a.altn:
 (page [19]) 2013–2017. URL: https:/ /www.ndm/a.alt./g.alto.k/e.alt/ind/e.altx.php/r/e.altsourc/e.alt-c/e.altnt/e.altr/s/e.altnd/43-/e.altndin/g.alt-drou/g.altht-/e.altm/e.altr/g.alt/e.altnci/e.alts/4271-/e.altd/e.alt-m/e.altdium-
 (page [19]) t/e.altrm-pl/a.altn-2013-2017
 (page [19]) 58  N/a.alttion/a.altl Environm/e.altnt M/a.altn/a.alt/g.alt/e.altm/e.altnt Authorit/y.alt (2015). K/e.altn/y.alt/a.alt- S/e.altcond N/a.alttion/a.altl Communic/a.alttion to th/e.alt Unit/e.altd N/a.alttion/a.altl Fr/a.altm/e.altwork Conv/e.altntion on Clim/a.altt/e.alt Ch/a.altn/g.alt/e.alt. URL: https:/ /unfccc.int/sit/e.alts/d/e.altf/a.altult/ﬁl/e.alts/r/e.altsourc/e.alt/K/e.altnnc2.pdf 59  N/a.alttion/a.altl Environm/e.altnt M/a.altn/a.alt/g.alt/e.altm/e.altnt Authorit/y.alt (2015). K/e.altn/y.alt/a.alt- S/e.altcond N/a.alttion/a.altl Communic/a.alttion to th/e.alt Unit/e.altd N/a.alttion/a.altl Fr/a.altm/e.altwork Conv/e.altntion on Clim/a.altt/e.alt Ch/a.altn/g.alt/e.alt. p. 28. URL: https:/ /unfccc.int/sit/e.alts/d/e.altf/a.altult/ﬁl/e.alts/r/e.altsourc/e.alt/K/e.altnnc2.pdf 60  R/e.altpublic of K/e.altn/y.alt/a.alt (2013). N/a.alttion/a.altl Clim/a.altt/e.alt Ch/a.altn/g.alt/e.alt Action Pl/a.altn, 2013–2017: Vision 2030. URL: https:/ /cdkn.or/g.alt/wp-cont/e.altnt/
 (page [20]) uplo/a.altds/2013/03/K/e.altn/y.alt/a.alt-N/a.alttion/a.altl-Clim/a.altt/e.alt-Ch/a.altn/g.alt/e.alt-Action-Pl/a.altn.pdf
 (page [20]) 17 CLIMATE RISK COUNTRY PROFILE: KENYAis likely to lead to even more acute water supply and salinization problems, as freshwater aquifers are contaminated. Changes projected in climate will increase water scarcity, particularly in the arid and semi-arid areas of the country. Rising temperatures will also likely exacerbate the drought conditions and may have a signiﬁcant impact on water
 (page [20]) availability and general human well-being.61
 (page [20]) The expected changes in rainfall, coupled with increased aridity and more severe droughts, are anticipated to increase existing vulnerabilities in agriculture, forests,  urban areas, as well as in livestock and dryland water resource management. Conﬂict in Kenya’s arid and semi-arid zones over limited water resources, which are already signiﬁcant, are likely to increase. Rising temperatures are furthermore leading to accelerated glacial loss on Mount Kenya, further straining water resources and the ﬂows of glacially-fed rivers.62 Changes in precipitation patterns, particularly the projected annual decreases in rainfall will impact river ﬂows, irrigation potential as well as water
 (page [20]) management and ﬂooding.
 (page [20]) Kenya’s limited water storage capacity increases the country’s dependence on unreliable rainfall patterns. As rainfall and evaporation rates change, so will rates of surface water inﬁltration and groundwater recharge. These changes can further reduce the reliability of unimproved groundwater sources and surface water sources during droughts or prolonged dry period. These can increase strain on pumping mechanisms, leading to breakdowns if maintenance is neglected. The ﬁgure below shows the projected annual Standardized Precipitation Evapotranspiration Index (SPEI) through the end of the century. The SPEI is an index which represents the measure of the given water deﬁcit in a speciﬁc location, accounting for contributions of temperature- dependent evapotranspiration and providing insight into in creasing or decreasing pressure on water resources. Negative values for SPEI represent dry conditions, with values below −2 indicating severe drought conditions, likewise positive values indicate increased wet conditions. This is an important understanding for the water sector in regards to quantity and quality of supply for human consumption and agriculture use as well as for the energy sector as reductions in water availability impacts river ﬂow and the hydropower generating capabilities. As seen in Figure 13 , Kenya, at a nationally aggregated scale is expected to experience an increase in rainfall, however this is likely to result from intense rainfall events for some areas as well as increased aridity for other
 (page [20]) areas of the country.
 (page [20]) Historical
 (page [20]) RCP 2.6
 (page [20]) RCP 4.5
 (page [20]) RCP 6.0
 (page [20]) RCP 8.5
 (page [20]) 2.5
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 (page [20]) 1.5
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 (page [20]) 0.5
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 (page [20]) –0.5
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 (page [20]) unitlessFIGURE 13. Annu/a.altl SPEI drou/g.altht ind/e.altx in K/e.altn/y.alt/a.alt for th/e.alt p/e.altriod, 1986 to 209963 61  N/a.alttion/a.altl Environm/e.altnt M/a.altn/a.alt/g.alt/e.altm/e.altnt Authorit/y.alt (2015). K/e.altn/y.alt/a.alt- S/e.altcond N/a.alttion/a.altl Communic/a.alttion to th/e.alt Unit/e.altd N/a.alttion/a.altl Fr/a.altm/e.altwork Conv/e.altntion on Clim/a.altt/e.alt Ch/a.altn/g.alt/e.alt. URL: https:/ /unfccc.int/sit/e.alts/d/e.altf/a.altult/ﬁl/e.alts/r/e.altsourc/e.alt/K/e.altnnc2.pdf 62  K/e.altn/y.alt/a.alt (2015). Common Pro/g.altr/a.altm Fr/a.altm/e.altwork for Endin/g.alt Drou/g.altht Em/e.altr/g.alt/e.altnci/e.alts. URL: http:/ //e.altxtwprl/e.alt/g.alts1.f/a.alto.or/g.alt/docs/pdf/
 (page [20]) k/e.altn152740.pdf
 (page [20]) 63  WBG Clim/a.altt/e.alt Ch/a.altn/g.alt/e.alt Knowl/e.altd/g.alt/e.alt Port/a.altl (CCKP, 2020). K/e.altn/y.alt/a.alt W/a.altt/e.altr S/e.altctor D/a.altshbo/a.altrd. URL: https:/ /clim/a.altt/e.altd/a.altt/a.alt.worldb/a.altnk.or/g.alt/
 (page [21]) CRM/e.altPort/a.altl/w/e.altb/w/a.altt/e.altr/l/a.altnd-us/e.alt-/-w/a.altt/e.altrsh/e.altd-m/a.altn/a.alt/g.alt/e.altm/e.altnt?countr/y.alt=KEN&p/e.altriod=2080-2099
 (page [21]) ons
 (page [21]) ocations, sea level rise is likely 18 CLIMATE RISK COUNTRY PROFILE: KENYAAd/a.altpt/a.alttion Opti ons Promoting improved efﬁciencies in the use of water resources will contribute to the restoration of critical regenerative ecological and physical functions of water bodies in the near to long term and this can be done through improved water resource management. Currently the government is encouraging states, via Kenya’s devolution structure, to enact adaptation strategies alongside sub-basin management plans.64 These plans undoubtedly should take into account the sector’s current and future needs and vulnerabilities. Targeted research should be undertaken to identify water resource challenges at community and regional level, with results used to inform adaptation efforts. Large-scale irrigation projects should use existing vulnerability assessments in order to appropriately coordinate
 (page [21]) with adaptation measures.65
 (page [21]) Improved water management will likely provide a wide range of beneﬁts for various sectors, including agriculture, safeguarding food security and water access. Implementing guidelines and mainstreaming activities identiﬁed in the National Water Master Plan further will support the joint work between institutions in charge of water resource management and to ensure there is available water for development and continued quality water for domestic
 (page [21]) consumption.66
 (page [21]) Co/a.altst/a.altl Zon/e.alt /a.altnd S/e.alt/a.alt L/e.altv/e.altl Ris/e.alt
 (page [21]) Ov/e.altrvi/e.altw
 (page [21]) As sea surface temperatures rise alongside rising sea levels and coasts continue to erode, Kenya’s coastal ecosystems, estuaries, beaches, coral reefs and marine biodiversity – including its ﬁsheries sector - are at risk. Ports and transport infrastructure are particularly exposed to ﬂooding, as are critical tourism assets and settlements situated close to the coast. Sea level rise is likely to affect coastal cities and low-lying land that may be under cultivation. The impact from sea level rise can be sign iﬁcantly compounded as storm surges become more pronounced, increasing the risks to coastal populations and infrastructure. Sea level rise in combination with extreme weather events is likely to intensify ﬂooding as the majority of the coastland, including key tourism areas, cities, ports and infrastructure is low-lying.67
 (page [21]) Clim/a.altt/e.alt Ch/a.altn/g.alt/e.alt Imp/a.altcts
 (page [21]) Sea level rise presents a risk to the ﬁve coastal counties (Kwale, Mombasa, Kiliﬁ, Tana River, Lamu) and their populations. Sea level rise in combination with extreme weather events is likely to intensify ﬂooding as most of the coastland is low-lying. The coastal city of Mombasa is particularly exposed, with an estimated area of 4-6 km2 likely to be submerged with a rise in sea level of only 0.3 meters. In other coastal locations, sea level rise is likely 64  R/e.altpublic of K/e.altn/y.alt/a.alt (2013). S/e.altctor pl/a.altn for drou/g.altht risk m/a.altn/a.alt/g.alt/e.altm/e.altnt /a.altnd /e.altndin/g.alt drou/g.altht /e.altm/e.altr/g.alt/e.altnci/e.alts, S/e.altcond m/e.altdium-t/e.altrm pl/a.altn:
 (page [21]) 2013–2017. URL: https:/ /www.ndm/a.alt./g.alto.k/e.alt/ind/e.altx.php/r/e.altsourc/e.alt-c/e.altnt/e.altr/s/e.altnd/43-/e.altndin/g.alt-drou/g.altht-/e.altm/e.altr/g.alt/e.altnci/e.alts/4271-/e.altd/e.alt-m/e.altdium-
 (page [21]) t/e.altrm-pl/a.altn-2013-2017
 (page [21]) 65  K/e.altn/y.alt/a.alt (2015). Common  Pro/g.altr/a.altm Fr/a.altm/e.altwork for Endin/g.alt Drou/g.altht Em/e.altr/g.alt/e.altnci/e.alts. URL: http:/ //e.altxtwprl/e.alt/g.alts1.f/a.alto.or/g.alt/docs/pdf/
 (page [21]) k/e.altn152740.pdf
 (page [21, 22]) 66  N/a.alttion/a.altl Environm/e.altnt M/a.altn/a.alt/g.alt/e.altm/e.altnt Authorit/y.alt (2015). K/e.altn/y.alt/a.alt- S/e.altcond N/a.alttion/a.altl Communic/a.alttion to th/e.alt Unit/e.altd N/a.alttion/a.altl Fr/a.altm/e.altwork Conv/e.altntion on Clim/a.altt/e.alt Ch/a.altn/g.alt/e.alt. URL: https:/ /unfccc.int/sit/e.alts/d/e.altf/a.altult/ﬁl/e.alts/r/e.altsourc/e.alt/K/e.altnnc2.pdf 67  N/a.alttion/a.altl Environm/e.altnt M/a.altn/a.alt/g.alt/e.altm/e.altnt Authorit/y.alt (2015). K/e.altn/y.alt/a.alt- S/e.altcond N/a.alttion/a.altl Communic/a.alttion to th/e.alt Unit/e.altd N/a.alttion/a.altl Fr/a.altm/e.altwork Conv/e.altntion on Clim/a.altt/e.alt Ch/a.altn/g.alt/e.alt. URL: https:/ /unfccc.int/sit/e.alts/d/e.altf/a.altult/ﬁl/e.alts/r/e.altsourc/e.alt/K/e.altnnc2.pdf
 (page [22]) 0. URL:
 (page [22]) 19 CLIMATE RISK COUNTRY PROFILE: KENYAto render more acute the current water supply and salinization problems, as freshwater aquifers are contaminated with saline water. Water logging of soils and the resulting salt stress might reduce crop production. Additionally, the health of coastal populations is at risk as saline intrusion affects coastal aquifers, and the permanent inundation of low-lying areas renders them uninhabitable. Kenya’s broader eco nomy is also at risk from rising seas as coastal and marine resources, all critical to economic development through tourism, ﬁsheries, shipping and port activities, suffer. Tourism and shipping are the highest contributors to the coastal economy, while small scale ﬁshing contributes 95% of the total marine catch. Rising sea levels will likely lead to damage and destruction of infrastructure including ship docking ports and industries located in the coast if no adaptation strategies are implemented. The agriculture sector along the coast will also be impacted with the loss of income of $ 472.8 million as exported mango, cashew nut and coconut harvests will be affected by a one-meter sea level rise.68 Figure 14  shows the change in sea level for Kenya since 1993.
 (page [22]) Year
 (page [22]) Sea Level Anomaly (mm)
 (page [22]) Sea Level Anomaly
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 (page [22]) 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 2015FIGURE 14. S/e.alt/a.alt l/e.altv/e.altl /a.altnom/a.altl/y.alt of K/e.altn/y.alt/a.alt, 1993–201569 68  Ministr/y.alt  of Environm/e.altnt /a.altnd N/a.alttur/a.altl R/e.altsourc/e.alts (2016). K/e.altn/y.alt/a.alt N/a.alttion/a.altl Ad/a.altpt/a.alttion Pl/a.altn, 2015–2030. URL: https:/ /www4.unfccc.
 (page [22]) int/sit/e.alts/NAPC/Docum/e.altnts%20NAP/K/e.altn/y.alt/a.alt_NAP_Fin/a.altl.pdf
 (page [22]) 69  WBG Clim/a.altt/e.alt Ch/a.altn/g.alt/e.alt Knowl/e.altd/g.alt/e.alt Port/a.altl (CCKP, 2020). K/e.altn/y.alt/a.alt Imp/a.altcts – S/e.alt/a.alt L/e.altv/e.altl Ris/e.alt. URL: https:/ /clim/a.altt/e.altknowl/e.altd/g.alt/e.altport/a.altl.
 (page [22]) worldb/a.altnk.or/g.alt/countr/y.alt/k/e.altn/y.alt/a.alt/imp/a.altcts-s/e.alt/a.alt-l/e.altv/e.altl-ris/e.alt
 (page [22]) 70  Ministr/y.alt of Environm/e.altnt /a.altnd N/a.alttur/a.altl R/e.altsourc/e.alts (2016). K/e.altn/y.alt/a.alt N/a.alttion/a.altl Ad/a.altpt/a.alttion Pl/a.altn, 2015–2030. URL: https:/ /www4.unfccc.
 (page [22]) int/sit/e.alts/NAPC/Docum/e.altnts%20NAP/K/e.altn/y.alt/a.alt_NAP_Fin/a.altl.pdfAd/a.altpt/a.alttion Options
 (page [22, 23]) Improving coastal zone management strategies is critical to safeguarding the coastal economies, communities and infrastructure. Capacity-building initiatives for ecosystem-based adaptation, both at national and local levels, would strengthen and hopefully restore coastal ecosystems, restoring the critical buffering and wave energy dissipation services they provide during extreme climate events. Vulnerability maps of coastal areas should be undertaken to pinpoint hotspots of risk along the coast. Adaptation strategies should be implemented to protect the port of Mombasa in light of its criticality with respect to the economy and livelihoods. Land use planning should be integrated with local infrastructure and development plans in order to incorporate climate change concerns into state policies for coastal protection and management.70 20 CLIMATE RISK COUNTRY PROFILE: KENYAEn/e.altr/g.alt/y.alt
 (page [23]) Ov/e.altrvi/e.altw
 (page [23]) Energy is a key component for the Kenyan economy, its development agenda and continued efforts to improve the population’s standard of living. Kenya has achieved remarkable success in expanding generation capacity and overcoming the generation and energy shortfall that had plagued the country for several decades. The country has developed a well-diversiﬁed energy mix with close to 90% of energy being generated from clean sources (mainly geothermal, hydro, wind and solar). About 30% of installed generation capacity is owned and operated by independent power producers (IPPs) with mobilization of at least US$4 billion in private capital. Kenya has also been implementing one of the most successful electriﬁcation programs in Africa  that has increased access to electricity increased to 70% in 2019 from both grid and off-grid options, from just 25% in 2010. Biomass (including wood fuel, charcoal, and agricultural waste), petroleum and electricity are the three main sources of primary energy consumption in the country. Biomass accounts for 68% of the country’s domestic energy demand especially for cooking and heating, while petroleum accounts for 22% and electricity accounts for 9%. There is signiﬁcant disparity between urban and rural households, with woodfuel and charcoal accounting for 63% and 86% of households’ primary fuels respectively. The need for wood fuel has led to substantial deforestation and land degradation, and Kenya’s forest cover of 4.22 million hectares (Ha) is less than 10% of its total land mass. Access to modern energy services is essential in reducing wood fuel dependency.71 The main challenges facing the energy sector in Kenya include: improving the sector’s competitiveness, reliability and quality of supply; risk of generation capacity surplus  due to the large new generation capacity at various stages of  development, which is not harmonized with realistic demand growth estimates, high initial capital outlay to continue electriﬁcation program as well as expand and strengthen the transmission and distribution network, high technical and commercial losses, weakening ﬁnancial position of the Kenya Power & Lighting Company Ltd, which is the only distribution company and corner stone of the energy sector,72 high cost of energy, low per capita incomes, and low levels of industrialization and of energy consumption.73
 (page [23]) Clim/a.altt/e.alt Ch/a.altn/g.alt/e.alt Imp/a.altcts
 (page [23]) In the last 10 years, Kenya has developed adequate generation capacity that includes considerable renewable energy sources mainly geothermal, wind and solar. The installed generation capacity as at FY19/20 comprised hydro (30%), geothermal (28%), thermal (27%), wind (12%) and solar (2%). Kenya’s successful development of geothermal resource for power generation stands at 820 MW has not only placed the country in the 8th position globally with geothermal development but has also transformed the country’s generation mix that was dominated by hydro and thermal sources. Being baseload, geothermal and hydro account for (46.7%) and 32% of generated energy while the other renewable energy source-wind and solar contributed to 11% and 0.8% respectively. Thermal contributes to less than 8% of generated energy. Going forward, continued development of geothermal resources, wind and solar sources  provide a unique opportunity for Kenya to meet its electricity needs fully from renewable energy sources.74 71  Ministr/y.alt of En/e.altr/g.alt/y.alt (2020). Bio/e.altn/e.altr/g.alt/y.alt Str/a.altt/e.alt/g.alt/y.alt 2020–2027. K/e.altn/y.alt/a.alt. 72  N/a.alttion/a.altll/y.alt Appropri/a.altt/e.alt Miti/g.alt/a.alttion Action Pl/a.altn (2015). N/a.alttion/a.altll/y.alt Appropri/a.altt/e.alt Miti/g.alt/a.alttion Action for Acc/e.altl/e.altr/a.altt/e.altd G/e.altoth/e.altrm/a.altl El/e.altctricit/y.alt D/e.altv/e.altlopm/e.altnt in K/e.altn/y.alt/a.alt, NAMA Proﬁl/e.alt #5. URL: https:/ /unfccc.int/ﬁl/e.alts/coop/e.altr/a.alttion_support/n/a.altm/a.alt//a.altpplic/a.alttion/pdf/
 (page [23]) k/e.altn/y.alt/a.altnp.pdf
 (page [23]) 73  Ministr/y.alt of En/e.altr/g.alt/y.alt /a.altnd P/e.alttrol/e.altum (2015). N/a.alttion/a.altl En/e.altr/g.alt/y.alt /a.altnd P/e.alttrol/e.altum Polic/y.alt. URL: https:/ /www.k/e.alttr/a.altco.co.k/e.alt/op/e.altncms//e.altxport/
 (page [23]) sit/e.alts/k/e.alttr/a.altco/l/e.alt/a.altrn/m/a.altps/L/e.alt/g.alt/a.altl_Docum/e.altnts/N/a.alttion/a.altl_En/e.altr/g.alt/y.alt_/a.altnd_P/e.alttrol/e.altum_Polic/y.alt.pdf
 (page [23]) 74  Wood, J. (2018). K/e.altn/y.alt/a.alt is /a.altimin/g.alt to b/e.alt pow/e.altr/e.altd /e.altntir/e.altl/y.alt b/y.alt /g.altr/e.alt/e.altn /e.altn/e.altr/g.alt/y.alt b/y.alt 2020. World Economic Forum. [D/e.altc/e.altmb/e.altr 5, 2018].
 (page [24]) URL: https:/ /www.w/e.altforum.or/g.alt//a.alt/g.alt/e.altnd/a.alt/2018/12/k/e.altn/y.alt/a.alt-w/a.altnts-to-run-/e.altntir/e.altl/y.alt-on-/g.altr/e.alt/e.altn-/e.altn/e.altr/g.alt/y.alt-b/y.alt-2020/
 (page [24]) 21 CLIMATE RISK COUNTRY PROFILE: KENYAExtreme weather events such as heavy rains can damage infrastructure, roads, communication networks and disrupt supply lines. An increase in the frequency of heat waves in urban centers like Nairobi or Mombasa could translate into higher demand for air conditioning and cooling systems, putting power plants under severe stress and reducing their efﬁciency. In coastal areas, sea level rise and storm surge threaten water and electricity infrastructure with inundation and salinity damage.75 Given increasing temperatures and the increased energy demand that will coincide, change in cooling degree days provides insight into the potential for extended seasons of power demand or periods in which cooling demand (power demands) might increase. Cooling Degree Days ( Figure 15 ) show the relationship between daily heat and cooling demand, typically sourced through a form of active cooling or an evaporative process. The change in cooling degree days provides insight into the potential for extended demands for power or periods in which cooling demand (power demands) might increase. As seen in Figure 16 , seasonal increases for cooling demands are projected, extending cooling demands in the hot season. The Warm Spell Duration Index represents the number of days in a sequence of at least six days in which the daily maximum temperature is greater than the 90th percentile of daily maximum temperature. As shown in the ﬁgure below, warm spells are expected to sharply increase in the second half of the century.
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 (page [24]) 2100FIGURE 15. Ch/a.altn/g.alt/e.alt in coolin/g.alt d/e.alt/g.altr/e.alt/e.alt d/a.alt/y.alts (65°F) in K/e.altn/y.alt/a.alt for th/e.alt p/e.altriod 2040–205976FIGURE 16. W/a.altrm sp/e.altll dur/a.alttion ind/e.altx in K/e.altn/y.alt/a.alt for th/e.alt p/e.altriod 1986 to 209977 75  Ministr/y.alt of For/e.alti/g.altn Aﬀ/a.altirs (2018). Clim/a.altt/e.alt Ch/a.altn/g.alt/e.alt Proﬁl/e.alt, K/e.altn/y.alt/a.alt. URL: https:/ /r/e.altli/e.altfw/e.altb.int/sit/e.alts/r/e.altli/e.altfw/e.altb.int/ﬁl/e.alts/r/e.altsourc/e.alts/
 (page [24]) K/e.altn/y.alt/a.alt_2.pdf
 (page [24]) 76  WBG Clim/a.altt/e.alt Ch/a.altn/g.alt/e.alt Knowl/e.altd/g.alt/e.alt Port/a.altl (CCKP, 2020). K/e.altn/y.alt/a.alt – En/e.altr/g.alt/y.alt. URL: https:/ /clim/a.altt/e.altknowl/e.altd/g.alt/e.altport/a.altl.worldb/a.altnk.or/g.alt/
 (page [24]) countr/y.alt/k/e.altn/y.alt/a.alt/clim/a.altt/e.alt-s/e.altctor-/e.altn/e.altr/g.alt/y.alt
 (page [24]) 77  WBG Clim/a.altt/e.alt Ch/a.altn/g.alt/e.alt Knowl/e.altd/g.alt/e.alt Port/a.altl (CCKP, 2020). K/e.altn/y.alt/a.alt En/e.altr/g.alt/y.alt S/e.altctor D/a.altshbo/a.altrd. URL: https:/ /clim/a.altt/e.altd/a.altt/a.alt.worldb/a.altnk.or/g.alt/
 (page [24]) CRM/e.altPort/a.altl/w/e.altb//e.altn/e.altr/g.alt/y.alt/oil-/g.alt/a.alts-/a.altnd-co/a.altl-minin/g.alt?countr/y.alt=KEN&p/e.altriod=2080-2099Ad/a.altpt/a.alttion Options
 (page [24, 25]) Electricity generation in Kenya is liberalized with several licensed electric power producers, although KenGen accounts for approximately 70% of all installed capacity. Kenya’s National Energy Policy (2014), formulated within the framework of Vision 2030, encourages diversiﬁcation of electricity sources. Kenya has developed a Least Cost Power Development Plan (LCPDP) that is periodically updated. However, the demand for growth assumed under the recent LCPDPs has proven to be overly ambitious – based on new development projects (mining and processing of iron and steel, irrigation by electricity, electriﬁcation of trains, and the development of new economic
 (page [25]) looding may displace communities
 (page [25]) 22 CLIMATE RISK COUNTRY PROFILE: KENYAzones), which have not materialized as expected. However, generation capacity has continued to be contracted, exposing the sector to a high risk of large generation capacity surplus that is not sustainable. The Ministry of Energy is currently reviewing the LCPDP and the generation capacity pipeline to harmonize generation expansion with realistic demand growth. The review presents an opportunity for Kenya to assess and drop the planned development of 1,920 MW coal plant given the successes already being made with development of renewable energy sources (geothermal, wind, and solar) and advancement of these technologies including in battery storage.78 Kenya has also developed a National Energy Efﬁciency and Conservation Strategy (KNEECS) and Bioenergy Strategy, both launched in 2020 as part of its roadmap towards climate change adaptation. Previously the government launched the Kenya National Electriﬁcation Strategy (KNES) in 2018, as a roadmap for electriﬁcation
 (page [25]) through on-grid and off-grid options.
 (page [25]) These strategies collectively target: (i) adoption of energy efﬁciency technologies that require less energy for the same functionality; (ii) energy conservation by encouraging change in the behavior of electricity consumers behaviors; (iii) adaptive policy, planning and investments for sustainable bioenergy use; and (iv) deployment of solar PV systems in off-grid electriﬁcation towards universal electricity access through renewable-energy based distributed systems, which may include productive uses (reducing and/or avoiding diesel-based power supply options).79
 (page [25]) H/e.alt/a.altlth
 (page [25]) Ov/e.altrvi/e.altw
 (page [25]) Kenya is highly vulnerable to adverse impacts on the health of its citizens as temperatures rise and rainfall patterns change. While the country has made progress tackling communicable diseases such as HIV-AIDS, tuberculosis and malaria, this is likely to be undermined by projected changes in climate. The government has identiﬁed malaria, Rift Valley fever, malnutrition, water borne diseases (such as cholera), scabies, jiggers and lice infestations as some of the most negative impacts in Kenya’s near to long term future. Additionally, the incidence and seasonality of other critical stressors including: heat stress, air pollution, asthma, vector-borne diseases (i.e. malaria, dengue, schistosomiasis, and tick-borne diseases), water-borne and food-borne diseases, and diarrheal diseases are also expected to increase.80
 (page [25]) Clim/a.altt/e.alt Ch/a.altn/g.alt/e.alt Imp/a.altcts
 (page [25]) Higher temperatures, land and water scarcity, ﬂooding, drought and displacement, will negatively impact agricultural production, causing breakdown in food systems. This will di sproportionally affect most vulnerable people, who are already face hunger and food insecurity. Vulnerable groups risk further deterioration of available food and nutrition when exposed to extreme climate events. More severe and frequent ﬂooding may displace communities and increase the risk of water-borne diseases, and higher temperatures may threaten food and nutritional security, agricultural livelihoods, and increase heat-related death s, speciﬁcally in the elderly.81 Rising temperatures also 78  Ministr/y.alt of En/e.altr/g.alt/y.alt /a.altnd P/e.alttrol/e.altum (2015). N/a.alttion/a.altl En/e.altr/g.alt/y.alt /a.altnd P/e.alttrol/e.altum Polic/y.alt (Dr/a.altft). URL: https:/ /r/e.altn/e.altw/a.altbl/e.alt/e.altn/e.altr/g.alt/y.alt./g.alto.k/e.alt//a.altss/e.altt_
 (page [25]) uplds/ﬁl/e.alts/N/a.alttion/a.altl%20En/e.altr/g.alt/y.alt%20/a.altnd%20P/e.alttrol/e.altum%20Polic/y.alt%20Au/g.altust%202015.pdf
 (page [25]) 79  Ministr/y.alt of En/e.altr/g.alt/y.alt (2020). Bio/e.altn/e.altr/g.alt/y.alt Str/a.altt/e.alt/g.alt/y.alt 2020–2027. K/e.altn/y.alt/a.alt. 80  N/a.alttion/a.altl Environm/e.altnt M/a.altn/a.alt/g.alt/e.altm/e.altnt Authorit/y.alt (2015). K/e.altn/y.alt/a.alt- S/e.altcond N/a.alttion/a.altl Communic/a.alttion to th/e.alt Unit/e.altd N/a.alttion/a.altl Fr/a.altm/e.altwork Conv/e.altntion on Clim/a.altt/e.alt Ch/a.altn/g.alt/e.alt. URL: https:/ /unfccc.int/sit/e.alts/d/e.altf/a.altult/ﬁl/e.alts/r/e.altsourc/e.alt/K/e.altnnc2.pdf 81  Ministr/y.alt of H/e.alt/a.altlth (2014). K/e.altn/y.alt/a.alt H/e.alt/a.altlth Polic/y.alt 201–2030. URL: http:/ /public/a.alttions.univ/e.altrs/a.altlh/e.alt/a.altlth2030.or/g.alt/uplo/a.altds/k/e.altn/y.alt/a.alt_
 (page [26]) h/e.alt/a.altlth_polic/y.alt_2014_to_2030.pdf
 (page [26]) |
 (page [26]) 23 CLIMATE RISK COUNTRY PROFILE: KENYAremain of signiﬁcant concern, although it is often overlooked as a public health risk. Under a high emissions scenario (RCP 8.5), heat-related deaths in the elderly (65 + years) are projected to increase to about 45 deaths per 100,000 by 2080 compared to the estimated baseline of under 2 deaths per 100,000 annually between 1961 and 1990.82 Warmer and drier conditions can lead to a rise in respiratory illnesses and speciﬁcally urban air pollution
 (page [26]) (Nairobi, Mombasa) causing respiratory problems.
 (page [26]) In Kenya, rising temperatures are of increasing concern. The annual distribution of days with a high-heat index provides insight into the potential health hazard of heat. Figure 17  shows the expected Number of Days with a Heat Index >35°C for the 2090s; showing a sharp increase under a high-emission scenario by end of the century. It also shows that tropical nights, or the night-time temperatures ( >20°C) are expected to rapidly increase in a high-emission scenario. Increased health threats can be projected and monitored through the frequency of tropical nights. Tropical Nights ( Figure 18 ) represents the projected increase in tropical nights for different emission scenarios to demonstrate the difference in expected numbers of tropical nights.
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 (page [26]) nights Historical RCP 2.6 RCP 4.5 RCP 6.0 RCP 8.5 YearFIGURE 17. D/a.alt/y.alts with /a.alt h/e.alt/a.altt ind/e.altx >35°C83FIGURE 18. Numb/e.altr of tropic/a.altl ni/g.althts
 (page [26]) (Tmin >20°C)84
 (page [26]) 82  WHO (2015). Clim/a.altt/e.alt /a.altnd H/e.alt/a.altlth Countr/y.alt Proﬁl/e.alt – K/e.altn/y.alt/a.alt. URL: https:/ //a.altpps.who.int/iris/bitstr/e.alt/a.altm/h/a.altndl/e.alt/10665/246133/WHO-
 (page [26]) FWC-PHE-EPE-15.23-/e.altn/g.alt.pdf?s/e.altqu/e.altnc/e.alt=1
 (page [26]) 83  WBG Clim/a.altt/e.alt Ch/a.altn/g.alt/e.alt Knowl/e.altd/g.alt/e.alt Port/a.altl (CCKP, 2020). K/e.altn/y.alt/a.alt H/e.alt/a.altlth S/e.altctor D/a.altshbo/a.altrd. URL: https:/ /clim/a.altt/e.altd/a.altt/a.alt.worldb/a.altnk.or/g.alt/
 (page [26]) CRM/e.altPort/a.altl/w/e.altb/h/e.alt/a.altlth/s/y.altst/e.altms-/a.altnd-s/e.altrvic/e.alt?countr/y.alt=KEN&p/e.altriod=2080-2099
 (page [26]) 84  WBG Clim/a.altt/e.alt Ch/a.altn/g.alt/e.alt Knowl/e.altd/g.alt/e.alt Port/a.altl (CCKP, 2020). K/e.altn/y.alt/a.alt H/e.alt/a.altlth S/e.altctor. URL: https:/ /clim/a.altt/e.altknowl/e.altd/g.alt/e.altport/a.altl.worldb/a.altnk.or/g.alt/
 (page [26]) countr/y.alt/k/e.altn/y.alt/a.alt/clim/a.altt/e.alt-s/e.altctor-h/e.alt/a.altlth
 (page [26]) 85 Ministr/y.alt of H/e.alt/a.altlth (2014). K/e.altn/y.alt/a.alt H/e.alt/a.altlth Polic/y.alt 2014–2030. URL: http:/ /public/a.alttions.univ/e.altrs/a.altlh/e.alt/a.altlth2030.or/g.alt/uplo/a.altds/k/e.altn/y.alt/a.alt_
 (page [26]) h/e.alt/a.altlth_polic/y.alt_2014_to_2030.pdfAd/a.altpt/a.alttion Options
 (page [26]) Kenya’s recent improvements in malaria control, water-borne diseases, infant mortality and malnutrition are vulnerable to set backs as the climate changes. Impacts on water quality, water resources, changes in disease and vector habitat, as well as the prolonged exposure of vulnerable groups who suffer from limited access to improved sanitation are all areas for concern. These impacts require not only continued investment and focus on climate sensitive health issues, but also full integration of climate change into Kenya’s many existing health programs and policies. More action and support are required to achieve Kenya’s development goals and protect
 (page [27]) vulnerable populations.85
 (page [27]) 24 CLIMATE RISK COUNTRY PROFILE: KENYAInstitution/a.altl Fr/a.altm/e.altwork for Ad/a.altpt/a.alttion The Government of Kenya is developing a policy and institutional framework to support the country reach its low carbon, climate resilient goals. The government has implemented a number of actions in the National Climate Change Action Plan 2013–2017 , including improved drought management and the promotion of renewable energy. The Ministry of Planning and Devolution has included indicators to track progress in mainstreaming climate change in its Second Handbook of National Reporting.88 The National Climate Change Council, established in 2016 and housed in the Ministry of Environment and Forestry, is responsible for the coordination of climate change actions, including mainstreaming climate change in national and county budgets, plans and programs. The Kenya Meteorological Department, a semi-autonomous government department, is responsible for generating national and subnational information regarding forecasts, seasonal variability, early warnings and agrometeorological bulletins. This information is delivered to the general public and to the climate Change Council and key government institutions such as the Disaster Risk Management Authority.89 The drafted Climate Change Framework Policy and a National Policy on Climate Finance are expected to provide guidance on mainstreaming to national departments and country governments.90 To support climate change adaptation, mitigation and resilience pathways, the country can access climate ﬁnancing through the National Environment Management Authority, which is a National Implementing Entity for the Adaptation Fund and accredited by the UNFCCC Green Climate Fund.91
 (page [27]) ADAPTATION
 (page [27]) 86  Ministr/y.alt of Environm/e.altnt /a.altnd N/a.alttur/a.altl R/e.altsourc/e.alts (2016). K/e.altn/y.alt/a.alt N/a.alttion/a.altl Ad/a.altpt/a.alttion Pl/a.altn, 2015–2030. URL: https:/ /www4.unfccc.
 (page [27]) int/sit/e.alts/NAPC/Docum/e.altnts%20NAP/K/e.altn/y.alt/a.alt_NAP_Fin/a.altl.pdf
 (page [27]) 87  N/a.alttion/a.altl Environm/e.altnt M/a.altn/a.alt/g.alt/e.altm/e.altnt Authorit/y.alt (2015). K/e.altn/y.alt/a.alt- S/e.altcond N/a.alttion/a.altl Communic/a.alttion to th/e.alt Unit/e.altd N/a.alttion/a.altl Fr/a.altm/e.altwork Conv/e.altntion on Clim/a.altt/e.alt Ch/a.altn/g.alt/e.alt. URL: https:/ /unfccc.int/sit/e.alts/d/e.altf/a.altult/ﬁl/e.alts/r/e.altsourc/e.alt/K/e.altnnc2.pdf 88  R/e.altpublic of K/e.altn/y.alt/a.alt (2013). N/a.alttion/a.altl Clim/a.altt/e.alt Ch/a.altn/g.alt/e.alt Action Pl/a.altn, 2013–2017: Vision 2030. URL: https:/ /cdkn.or/g.alt/wp-cont/e.altnt/
 (page [27]) uplo/a.altds/2013/03/K/e.altn/y.alt/a.alt-N/a.alttion/a.altl-Clim/a.altt/e.alt-Ch/a.altn/g.alt/e.alt-Action-Pl/a.altn.pdf
 (page [27]) 89  CDKN (2012). N/a.alttion/a.altl Clim/a.altt/e.alt Ch/a.altn/g.alt/e.alt Action Pl/a.altn – Ad/a.altpt/a.alttion - T/e.altchnic/a.altl An/a.altl/y.altsis R/e.altport. URL: ﬁl/e.alt:/ / /Us/e.altrs/cmdov/e.alt/
 (page [27]) Downlo/a.altds/1.-/a.altd/a.altpt/a.alttion-t/e.altchnic/a.altl-/a.altn/a.altl/y.altsis-r/e.altport%20(2).pdf
 (page [27]) 90  N/a.alttion/a.altl Environm/e.altnt M/a.altn/a.alt/g.alt/e.altm/e.altnt Authorit/y.alt (2015). K/e.altn/y.alt/a.alt- S/e.altcond N/a.alttion/a.altl Communic/a.alttion to th/e.alt Unit/e.altd N/a.alttion/a.altl Fr/a.altm/e.altwork Conv/e.altntion on Clim/a.altt/e.alt Ch/a.altn/g.alt/e.alt. URL: https:/ /unfccc.int/sit/e.alts/d/e.altf/a.altult/ﬁl/e.alts/r/e.altsourc/e.alt/K/e.altnnc2.pdf 91  USAID (2018). Clim/a.altt/e.alt Ch/a.altn/g.alt/e.alt Risk Proﬁl/e.alt – K/e.altn/y.alt/a.alt. URL: https:/ /www.clim/a.altt/e.altlinks.or/g.alt/sit/e.alts/d/e.altf/a.altult/ﬁl/e.alts//a.altss/e.altt/docum/e.altnt/2018_ USAID-ATLAS-Proj/e.altct_Clim/a.altt/e.alt-Risk-Proﬁl/e.alt-K/e.altn/y.alt/a.alt.pdfThe government is currently undertaking a climate vulnerability and risk assessment of the impacts of climate change and variability on human health. Efforts are ongoing to increase public awareness on climate change and impacts on health. Kenya has also undertaken efforts to design and implement appropriate measures for surveillance and monitoring of climate change related diseases in order to enhance health early warning systems. These systems should include the enhancement of existing databases on health sector indicators amongst others.86 Additionally, health care system personnel are not fully aware of the relationship between climate change, seasonal variability and health impacts. Increases in training and capacity can improve the level of knowledge and skills to prevent diseases connected with climatic factors, however this knowledge remains relatively limited among
 (page [28]) the general population.87
 (page [28]) (2018)
 (page [28]) 15)
 (page [28]) 3)
 (page [28]) 13)
 (page [28]) (2012)
 (page [28]) 25 CLIMATE RISK COUNTRY PROFILE: KENYAPolic/y.alt Fr/a.altm/e.altw ork for Ad/a.altpt/a.alttion Kenya has served as a leader in addressing climate change issues nationally and across the region and was one of the ﬁrst countries in Africa to enact a comprehensive law and policy to guide national and subnational climate action. The Climate Change Act and the National Climate Change Policy Framework of 2016 provide guidance for low-carbon and climate-resilient development. These efforts are reinforced by the country’s Second National Communication to the UNFCCC, submitted in 2015, its Nationally-Determined Contributions to the UNFCCC submitted in 2016, and its National Adaptation Plan was completed in 2016.92 Kenya’s climate change adaptation strategies focus on the preparation and strengthening of institutional frameworks for responsible environmental management, improved management of climate change effects and economic development targets. Furthermore, established institutions and mechanisms are in place to monitor the reduction in greenhouse gas emissions, to address vulnerabilities which will be exacerbated by climate change, and to strengthen the country’s social and
 (page [28]) economic structures against vulnerability.93
 (page [28]) National Frameworks and Plans
 (page [28]) • The Landscape of Climate Finance in Kenya  (2021)
 (page [28]) • Updated Nationally-Determined Contribution (2020)
 (page [28]) • Climate Smart Agriculture Implementation Framework 2018–2027  (2018) • National Climate Change Proﬁle  (2018)
 (page [28]) • National Adaptation Plan  (2016)
 (page [28]) • Nationally Determined Contributions  (2016)
 (page [28]) • Second National Communication on Climate Change  (2015) • National Energy and Petroleum Policy  (2015) • Common Program Framework for Ending Drought Emergencies  (2015) • National Health Policy 2014–2030  (2014) • Second Medium Term Plan (2013–2017), Transforming Kenya  (2013) • National Climate Change Action Plan 2013–2017 , Vision 2030  (2013) • National Climate Change Action Plan: Adaptation Technical Analysis  (2012) • National Policy for Disaster Risk Management  (2009)
 (page [28]) R/e.altcomm/e.altnd/a.alttions
 (page [28]) R/e.alts/e.alt/a.altrch G/a.altps
 (page [28]) • Develop a better understanding of the occurrence and magnitude of climate change events and natural hazards • Increase understanding of climate change related impacts on key vulnerabilities, related developmental impacts, and the country’s possible adaptation responses • Strengthen environmental monitoring capabilities for strengthened and more effective environmental
 (page [28]) management94
 (page [28]) 92 Ministr/y.alt of Environm/e.altnt /a.altnd N/a.alttur/a.altl R/e.altsourc/e.alts (2016). K/e.altn/y.alt/a.alt’s N/a.alttion/a.altll/y.alt D/e.altt/e.altrmin/e.altd Contribution. URL: https:/ /www4.unfccc.
 (page [28]) int/sit/e.alts/ndcst/a.alt/g.altin/g.alt/Publish/e.altdDocum/e.altnts/K/e.altn/y.alt/a.alt%20First/K/e.altn/y.alt/a.alt_NDC_20150723.pdf
 (page [28]) 93  Ministr/y.alt of Environm/e.altnt /a.altnd N/a.alttur/a.altl R/e.altsourc/e.alts (2016). K/e.altn/y.alt/a.alt N/a.alttion/a.altl Ad/a.altpt/a.alttion Pl/a.altn, 2015–2030. URL: https:/ /www4.unfccc.
 (page [28]) int/sit/e.alts/NAPC/Docum/e.altnts%20NAP/K/e.altn/y.alt/a.alt_NAP_Fin/a.altl.pdf
 (page [28]) 94  Ministr/y.alt of Environm/e.altnt /a.altnd N/a.alttur/a.altl R/e.altsourc/e.alts (2016). K/e.altn/y.alt/a.alt N/a.alttion/a.altl Ad/a.altpt/a.alttion Pl/a.altn, 2015–2030. URL: https:/ /www4.unfccc.
 (page [29]) int/sit/e.alts/NAPC/Docum/e.altnts%20NAP/K/e.altn/y.alt/a.alt_NAP_Fin/a.altl.pdf
 (page [29]) 26 CLIMATE RISK COUNTRY PROFILE: KENYA• Enhance Kenya’s adaptive capacity through continuing investment in weather stations and expanding the Kenya Meteorological Department’s (KMD) national hydro-meteorological and seismological monitoring system for improved networking for the measurement of climate parameters95 • Improve awareness and understanding of projected climate change impacts within key sectors and with policy makers, commission risk assessments, and expand early warning systems, speciﬁcally for public health96
 (page [29]) D/a.altt/a.alt /a.altnd Inform/a.alttion G/a.altps
 (page [29]) • Improve observational data through by acquiring weather stations and hydro-meteorological, seismological
 (page [29]) instrumentation and mapping97
 (page [29]) • Improve technical capacity to analyze and interpret hydro-met data in support of impact assessments across sectors; speciﬁcally monitoring sea level rise • Establish institutional capacity for providing timely early warning systems to farmers for improved decision making and understanding seasonal variability throughout Kenya’s key agricultural zones. This should be
 (page [29]) coordinated with KMD’s agrometeorological bulletins98
 (page [29]) • Increase understanding of water resource threats and groundwater risks to improve long term management and improve water use efﬁciency in agriculture and urban management99
 (page [29]) Institution/a.altl G/a.altps
 (page [29]) • Ensure integration of National Energy Strategy goals are developed within sectoral and regional plans • Implementation of cross-sectoral climate-smart solutions at national and subnational levels • Integrate climate change concerns into relevant policies and planning processes at the state and national
 (page [29]) levels100
 (page [29]) • Integrate seasonal forecasts and long-term climate change trends into healthcare policy and planning for improved and more prepared public health service in Kenya101 95  R/e.altpublic of K/e.altn/y.alt/a.alt (2013). N/a.alttion/a.altl Clim/a.altt/e.alt Ch/a.altn/g.alt/e.alt Action Pl/a.altn, 2013–2017: Vision 2030. URL: https:/ /cdkn.or/g.alt/wp-cont/e.altnt/
 (page [29]) uplo/a.altds/2013/03/K/e.altn/y.alt/a.alt-N/a.alttion/a.altl-Clim/a.altt/e.alt-Ch/a.altn/g.alt/e.alt-Action-Pl/a.altn.pdf
 (page [29]) 96  N/a.alttion/a.altl Environm/e.altnt M/a.altn/a.alt/g.alt/e.altm/e.altnt Authorit/y.alt (2015). K/e.altn/y.alt/a.alt- S/e.altcond N/a.alttion/a.altl Communic/a.alttion to th/e.alt Unit/e.altd N/a.alttion/a.altl Fr/a.altm/e.altwork Conv/e.altntion on Clim/a.altt/e.alt Ch/a.altn/g.alt/e.alt. URL: https:/ /unfccc.int/sit/e.alts/d/e.altf/a.altult/ﬁl/e.alts/r/e.altsourc/e.alt/K/e.altnnc2.pdf 97  Ministr/y.alt of Environm/e.altnt /a.altnd N/a.alttur/a.altl R/e.altsourc/e.alts (2016). K/e.altn/y.alt/a.alt N/a.alttion/a.altl Ad/a.altpt/a.alttion Pl/a.altn, 2015–2030. URL: https:/ /www4.unfccc.
 (page [29]) int/sit/e.alts/NAPC/Docum/e.altnts%20NAP/K/e.altn/y.alt/a.alt_NAP_Fin/a.altl.pdf
 (page [29]) 98  Ministr/y.alt of A/g.altricultur/e.alt, Liv/e.altstock /a.altnd Fish/e.altri/e.alts (2017). K/e.altn/y.alt/a.alt Clim/a.altt/e.alt Sm/a.altrt A/g.altricultur/e.alt Str/a.altt/e.alt/g.alt/y.alt, 2017–2026. URL: https:/ /www.
 (page [29]) /a.altd/a.altpt/a.alttion-undp.or/g.alt/sit/e.alts/d/e.altf/a.altult/ﬁl/e.alts/r/e.altsourc/e.alts/k/e.altn/y.alt/a.alt_clim/a.altt/e.alt_sm/a.altrt_/a.alt/g.altricultur/e.alt_str/a.altt/e.alt/g.alt/y.alt.pdf
 (page [29]) 99  R/e.altpublic of K/e.altn/y.alt/a.alt (2013). N/a.alttion/a.altl Clim/a.altt/e.alt Ch/a.altn/g.alt/e.alt Action Pl/a.altn, 2013–2017: Vision 2030. URL: https:/ /cdkn.or/g.alt/wp-cont/e.altnt/
 (page [29]) uplo/a.altds/2013/03/K/e.altn/y.alt/a.alt-N/a.alttion/a.altl-Clim/a.altt/e.alt-Ch/a.altn/g.alt/e.alt-Action-Pl/a.altn.pdf
 (page [29]) 100  N/a.alttion/a.altl Environm/e.altnt M/a.altn/a.alt/g.alt/e.altm/e.altnt Authorit/y.alt (2015). K/e.altn/y.alt/a.alt- S/e.altcond N/a.alttion/a.altl Communic/a.alttion to th/e.alt Unit/e.altd N/a.alttion/a.altl Fr/a.altm/e.altwork Conv/e.altntion on Clim/a.altt/e.alt Ch/a.altn/g.alt/e.alt. URL: https:/ /unfccc.int/sit/e.alts/d/e.altf/a.altult/ﬁl/e.alts/r/e.altsourc/e.alt/K/e.altnnc2.pdf 101  Ministr/y.alt of H/e.alt/a.altlth (2014). K/e.altn/y.alt/a.alt H/e.alt/a.altlth Polic/y.alt 2014–2030. URL: http:/ /public/a.alttions.univ/e.altrs/a.altlh/e.alt/a.altlth2030.or/g.alt/uplo/a.altds/k/e.altn/y.alt/a.alt_
 (page [31]) h/e.alt/a.altlth_polic/y.alt_2014_to_2030.pdf
 (page [32]) KENYA
 (page [32]) CLIMATE RISK COUNTRY PROFILE
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 data/transition_reports/World Bank Climate Change Country Reports/15916-WB_Chile Country Profile-WEB (1).pdf
 (page [0]) He AON vee
 (page [0]) TES
 (page [0]) Gy WORLD BANK GROUP
 (page [0]) CHILE
 (page [0]) CLIMATE RISK COUNTRY PROFILE
 (page [1]) , Reisterstown, MD.
 (page [1]) ii CLIMATE RISK COUNTRY PROFILE: CHILECOPYRIGHT © 2021 by the World Bank Group 1818 H Street NW, Washington, DC 20433
 (page [1]) Telephone: 202-473-1000; Internet: www.worldbank.org
 (page [1]) This work is a product of the staff of the World Bank Group (WBG) and with external contributions. The opinions, ﬁndings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this work are those of the authors and do not necessarily reﬂect the views or the ofﬁcial policy or position of the WBG, its Board of Executive Directors, or the governments it represents. The WBG does not guarantee the accuracy of the data included in this work and do not make any warranty, express or implied, nor assume any liability or responsibility for any consequence of their use. This publication follows the WBG’s practice in references to member designations, borders, and maps. The boundaries, colors, denominations, and other information shown on any map in this work, or the use of the term “country” do not imply any judgment on the part of the WBG, its Boards, or the governments it represents, concerning the legal status of any territory or geographic area or the endorsement or acceptance
 (page [1]) of such boundaries.
 (page [1]) The mention of any speciﬁc companies or products of manufacturers does not imply that they are endorsed or recommended by the WBG in preference to others of a similar nature that are not mentioned.
 (page [1]) RIGHTS AND PERMISSIONS
 (page [1, 2]) The material in this work is subject to copyright. Because the WBG encourages dissemination of its knowledge, this work may be reproduced, in whole or in part, for noncommercial purposes as long as full attribution to this work is given. Please cite the work as follows: Climate Risk Proﬁle: Chile (2021): The World Bank Group. Any queries on rights and licenses, including subsidiary rights, should be addressed to World Bank Publications, The World Bank Group, 1818 H Street NW, Washington, DC 20433, USA; fax: 202-522-2625; e-mail: [email protected] . Cover Photos:  © Mariano Mantel, “ Montañas del altiplano ” Marc 29, 2014 via Flickr, Creative Commons CC BY-NC-ND 2.0. © Ieosoueu, “ Sky Costanera, Santiago, Chile ” January 1, 2018 via Flickr, Creative Commons CC BY-NCND 2.0. Graphic Design:  Circle Graphics, Inc. , Reisterstown, MD. iii CLIMATE RISK COUNTRY PROFILE: CHILEACKNOWLEDGEMENTS This proﬁle is part of a series of Climate Risk Country Proﬁles developed by the World Bank Group (WBG). The country proﬁle synthesizes most relevant data and information on climate change, disaster risk reduction, and adaptation actions and policies at the country level. The country proﬁle series are designed as a quick reference source for development practitioners to better integrate climate resilience in development planning and policy making. This effort is managed and led by Veronique Morin (Senior Climate Change Specialist, WBG) and Ana E. Bucher (Senior Climate Change Specialist, WBG). The Chile proﬁle was written by Andrea Cristina Ruiz (Climate Change Consultant, WBG) and MacKenzie Dove (Senior Climate Change Consultant, WBG). Additional support was provided by provided by Jason Johnston (Operations Analyst, WBG) and Yunziyi Lang (Climate Change Analyst, WBG). Climate and climate-related information is largely drawn from the Climate Change Knowledge Portal (CCKP) , a WBG online platform with available global climate data and analysis based on the latest Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) reports and datasets. The team is grateful for all comments and suggestions received from the sector, regional, and country development specialists, as well as climate research scientists and institutions for their advice and guidance on use of climate
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 (page [3]) ° t ‘ : ' : ! : % t i i i 4 ' iv CLIMATE RISK COUNTRY PROFILE: CHILEFOREWORD .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 1 COUNTRY OVERVIEW  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 2 CLIMATOLOGY   .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 5 Clim/a.altt/e.alt B/a.alts/e.altlin/e.alt  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 5 Ov/e.altrvi/e.altw  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 5 K/e.alt/y.alt Tr/e.alt nds  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 7 Clim/a.altt/e.alt Futur/e.alt  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 8 Ov/e.altrvi/e.altw  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 8 K/e.alt/y.alt Tr/e.altnds   .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  10 CLIMATE RELATED NATURAL HAZARDS  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 11 Ov/e.altrvi/e.altw  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .11 K/e.alt/y.alt Tr/e.altnds .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  13 Implic/a.alttions for DRM  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  14 CLIMATE CHANGE IMPACTS TO KEY SECTORS  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  15 A/g.altricultur/e.alt   .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  15 W/a.altt/e.altr .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  18 En/e.altr/g.alt/y.alt   .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  21 H/e.alt/a.altlth .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 24 Co/a.altst/a.altl Zon/e.alts  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  26 ADAPTATION .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  28 Institution/a.altl Fr/a.altm/e.altwork for Ad/a.altpt/a.alttion .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 28 Polic/y.alt Fr/a.altm/e.altwork for Ad/a.altpt/a.alttion   .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 29 R/e.altcomm/e.altnd/a.alttions .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  30 R/e.alts/e.alt/a.altrch G/a.altps .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 30 D/a.altt/a.alt /a.altnd Inform/a.alttion G/a.altps  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  31 Institution/a.altl G/a.altps  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  31
 (page [3]) CONTENTS
 (page [4]) 1 CLIMATE RISK COUNTRY PROFILE: CHILE Climate change is a major risk to good development outcomes, and the World Bank Group is committed to playing an important role in helping countries integrate climate action into their core development agendas. The World Bank Group is committed to supporting client countries to invest in and build a low-carbon, climate-resilient future, helping them to be better prepared to adapt to current and future climate impacts. The World Bank Group is investing in incorporating and systematically managing climate risks in development operations through its individual corporate commitments. A key aspect of the World Bank Group’s Action Plan on Adaptation and Resilience (2019) is to help countries shift from addressing adaptation as an incremental cost and isolated investment to systematically incorporating climate risks and opportunities at every phase of policy planning, investment design, implementation and evaluation of development outcomes. For all IDA and IBRD operations, climate and disaster risk screening is one of the mandatory corporate climate commitments. This is supported by the Bank Group’s Climate and Disaster Risk Screening Tool which enables all Bank staff to assess short- and long-term climate and disaster risks in operations and national or sectoral planning processes. This screening tool draws up-to-date and relevant information from the World Bank’s Climate Change Knowledge Portal, a comprehensive online ‘one-stop shop’ for global, regional, and country data related to climate change and development. Recognizing the value of consistent, easy-to-use technical resources for client countries as well as to support respective internal climate risk assessment and adaptation planning processes, the World Bank Group’s Climate Change Group has developed this content. Standardizing and pooling expertise facilitates the World Bank Group in conducting initial assessments of climate risks and opportunities across sectors within a country, within institutional portfolios across regions, and acts as a global resource for development practitioners. For developing countries, the climate risk proﬁles are intended to serve as public goods to facilitate upstream country diagnostics, policy dialogue, and strategic planning by providing comprehensive overviews of trends and projected changes in key climate parameters, sector-speciﬁc implications, relevant policies and programs, adaptation priorities and opportunities for further actions. It is my hope that these efforts will spur deepening of long-term risk management in developing countries and our engagement in supporting climate change adaptation planning at operational levels.
 (page [4]) Bernice Van Bronkhorst
 (page [4]) Global Director
 (page [4]) Climate Change Group (CCG)
 (page [4]) The World Bank Group (WBG)
 (page [5]) FOREWORD
 (page [5]) A
 (page [5]) Elevation in Meters
 (page [5]) 4, $368
 (page [5]) + 3,000 ide-ranging -100
 (page [5]) is across the -i0
 (page [5]) * National capital
 (page [5]) 2 CLIMATE RISK COUNTRY PROFILE: CHILE
 (page [5]) COUNTRY OVERVIEW
 (page [5]) Chile is located in western South America, with a total land area of 2,006,096 square kilometers (km2) and is neighbored by Peru to the north, Bolivia to the northeast, Argentina to the east and south, and the Paciﬁc Ocean, with coasts that extend over 8,000 km. Chile experiences a wide-ranging topography ( Figure 1 ) and its area extends across the western and southern part of South America, spreads in to the oceanic region via Easter Island, and extends south towards Antarctica. Chile’s has four macro-
 (page [5]) bioclimates: tropical, Mediterranean, temperate, and
 (page [5]) antiborealis, which are produced primarily due to the country’s latitude and altitude. Within these climates are a diverse 127 terrestrial ecosystems, with 96 marine ecosystems along the country’s coast.1 Chile experiences mostly dry southern hemisphere summers (November and January) and wet winters (May and August). 29.21% of the land area does not have vegetation, 38.74% of the land is grassland and scrub, 25.55% is forest, 4.57% is agricultural land; only 0.75% of the Chile’s
 (page [5]) area is urban or industrial.2
 (page [5]) Chile is a high-income country and has been one of Latin America’s fastest growing economies over recent decades.4 Chile has a population of 19.1 million people (2020) that has been growing at a rate of 0.9%. 89.7% of the population lives in urban areas concentrated in the center of the country near the capital city of Santiago, which is home to 40.1% of urban population. It is one of three Latin American countries that are members of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD),5 with a Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of $252.94 billion and growth rate of 1.1% in 2019. In 2020, GDP contracted 6.0% and more than one million jobs were lost, affecting mostly women and workers in commerce, agriculture, and hospitality, further undermining the country’s fragile middle class. In conjunction with the economic contraction, the ﬁscal deﬁcit increased to 7 .5% of 1 Chil/e.alt (2016). Third N/a.alttion/a.altl Communic/a.alttion to th/e.alt UNFCCC. URL: https:/ /unfccc.int/sit/e.alts/d/e.altf/a.altult/ﬁl/e.alts/r/e.altsourc/e.alt/NC3%20Chil/e.alt_
 (page [5]) 19%20D/e.altc/e.altmb/e.altr%202016.pdf
 (page [5]) 2 Minist/e.altrio d/e.alt A/g.altricultur/a.alt (2020). Anu/a.altrio For/e.altst/a.altl. Chil/e.alt/a.altn St/a.alttistic/a.altl Y/e.alt/a.altrbook of For/e.altstr/y.alt 2020. URL: https:/ /w/e.altf.infor.cl/public/a.altcion/e.alts/
 (page [5]) /a.altnu/a.altrio/2020/Anu/a.altrio2020.pdf
 (page [5]) 3 World B/a.altnk (2021). Clim/a.altt/e.alt Mi/g.altr/a.alttion Proﬁl/e.alt – Chil/e.alt. 4 World B/a.altnk (2021). Ov/e.altrvi/e.altw – Chil/e.alt. URL: https:/ /www.worldb/a.altnk.or/g.alt//e.altn/countr/y.alt/chil/e.alt/ov/e.altrvi/e.altw 5 M/e.altrco Pr/e.altss (2020). Cost/a.alt Ric/a.alt b/e.altcom/e.alts 38th M/e.altmb/e.altr of OECD. [M/a.alt/y.alt 19, 2020]. URL: https:/ //e.altn.m/e.altrcopr/e.altss.com/2020/05/19/
 (page [6]) cost/a.alt-ric/a.alt-b/e.altcom/e.alts-38th-m/e.altmb/e.altr-of-o/e.altcd
 (page [6]) FIGURE 1. El/e.altv/a.alttion  of Chil/e.alt3
 (page [6]) A, dicators
 (page [6]) (2019)
 (page [6]) (2018)
 (page [6]) (2019)
 (page [6]) -) (2020)
 (page [6]) 3 CLIMATE RISK COUNTRY PROFILE: CHILEGDP in 2020, the largest in over three decades. Although the authorities tapped into ﬁscal buffers, public debt rose from 28% in 2019 to 33% in 2020. Poverty is expected to have increased from 8.1% to 12%, with approximately an additional 780,000 people expected to have fallen into poverty during this time.6 Chile is primarily a service economy, as of 2020, services producing 56.5% of value added as a percentage of GDP and 68.8% of employment.7 Industry, mainly represented by mining, provides 31.4% value added as a percentage of GDP and 22.8% of employment. Agriculture contributes 3.9% of value added as a percentage of GDP and 9.6% of employment. Growth in recent years has been driven by commodity markets, primarily mining activity.8 In 2019, total natural resource rents represented 2.3% of GDP, of which mineral rents was the largest natural resource, comprising 9.82% of GDP ( Table 1 ). Despite economic growth and the country’s strong poverty reduction efforts, more than 30% of the population is recognized as economically vulnerable and the country’s inequality remains high.9 TABLE 1. D/a.altt/a.alt  Sn/a.altpshot : K/e.alt/y.alt D/e.altv/e.altlopm/e.altnt Indic/a.alttors10
 (page [6]) Indicator
 (page [6]) Life Expectancy at Birth, Total (Years)  (2019) 80.2 Population Density (People per sq. km Land Area)  (2018) 25.2 % of Population with Access to Electricity  (2019) 100% GDP per Capita (Current US$ ) (2020) $13,231.70 The ND-GAIN Index11 ranks 181 countries using a score which calculates a country’s vulnerability to climate change and other global challenges as well as their readiness to improve resilience. This Index aims to help businesses and the public sector better identify vulnerability and readiness in order to better prioritize investment for more efﬁcient responses to global challenges. Due to a combination of political, geographic, and social factors, Chile is recognized as vulnerable to climate change impacts, and overall, is ranked 29th out of 181 countries in the 2020 ND-GAIN Index. Within the Index, Chile is also ranked 22nd in terms of vulnerability and 36th in terms of readiness. The more vulnerable a country is the lower their score, while the more ready a country is to improve its resilience the higher it will be. Norway has the highest score and is ranked 1st. Figure 2  is a time-series plot of the ND-GAIN Index showing Chile’s progress in relation to the two other Latin American countries that are also OECD members, Costa Rica and Mexico. 6 World B/a.altnk (2021). Ov/e.altrvi/e.altw – Chil/e.alt. URL: https:/ /www.worldb/a.altnk.or/g.alt//e.altn/countr/y.alt/chil/e.alt/ov/e.altrvi/e.altw 7 World B/a.altnk (2021). World D/e.altv/e.altlopm/e.altnt Indic/a.alttors. D/a.altt/a.altB/a.altnk. URL: https:/ /d/a.altt/a.altb/a.altnk.worldb/a.altnk.or/g.alt/sourc/e.alt/world-d/e.altv/e.altlopm/e.altnt-
 (page [6]) indic/a.alttors
 (page [6]) 8 World B/a.altnk Op/e.altn D/a.altt/a.alt (2021). D/a.altt/a.alt B/a.altnk: Popul/a.alttion Estim/a.altt/e.alts /a.altnd Proj/e.altctions, Chil/e.alt. URL: https:/ /d/a.altt/a.altb/a.altnk.worldb/a.altnk.or/g.alt/d/a.altt/a.alt/
 (page [6]) r/e.altports./a.altspx?sourc/e.alt=h/e.alt/a.altlth-nutrition-/a.altnd-popul/a.alttion-st/a.alttistics:-popul/a.alttion-/e.altstim/a.altt/e.alts-/a.altnd-proj/e.altctions
 (page [6]) 9 World B/a.altnk (2021). Ov/e.altrvi/e.altw – Chil/e.alt. URL: https:/ /www.worldb/a.altnk.or/g.alt//e.altn/countr/y.alt/chil/e.alt/ov/e.altrvi/e.altw 10 World B/a.altnk (2021). D/a.altt/a.altB/a.altnk – World D/e.altv/e.altlopm/e.altnt Indic/a.alttors. URL: https:/ /d/a.altt/a.altb/a.altnk.worldb/a.altnk.or/g.alt/sourc/e.alt/world-d/e.altv/e.altlopm/e.altnt-
 (page [7]) indic/a.alttors
 (page [7]) 11 Univ/e.altrsit/y.alt of Notr/e.alt D/a.altm/e.alt (2020). Notr/e.alt D/a.altm/e.alt Glob/a.altl Ad/a.altpt/a.alttion Initi/a.alttiv/e.alt. URL: https:/ //g.alt/a.altin.nd./e.altdu/our-work/countr/y.alt-ind/e.altx/
 (page [7]) https://www4.unfecc.int/sites/ndestaging/PublisnedDocuments/
 (page [7]) https://www4.unfecce.int/sites/ndestaging/PublisnedDocuments/
 (page [7]) 4 CLIMATE RISK COUNTRY PROFILE: CHILEChile is highly vulnerable to the impacts of climate change, with key sectors such as ﬁsheries and aquaculture, forestry, agriculture and livestock, and the country’s water resources identiﬁed as vulnerable sectors.12 Chile’s Third National Communication on Climate Change  (NC3) (2016) also includes energy, infrastructure, cities, and tourism as additional important sections.13 Chile submitted its Initial Nationally Determined Contribution  in 2015 and its Updated Nationally Determined Contribution  (NDC) in 2020. Through these documents, Chile has conﬁrmed its commitment to climate actions and support to international climate agreements and identiﬁed key mitigation and adaptation efforts. Chile is also working to increase the country’s resilience by improving water management and sanitation, and its disaster risk management, identiﬁed through its National Climate Change Adaptation Plan (2014). Chile’s Updated NDC highlights sectoral plans for key sectors, identifying ﬁnancing sources to implement sectoral plans, build synergies between adaptation and mitigation, strengthen institutional capacity on adaptation, and prepare metrics to evaluate sectoral planning.14
 (page [7]) Gr/e.alt/e.altn, Inclusiv/e.alt /a.altnd R/e.altsili/e.altnt R/e.altcov/e.altr/y.alt
 (page [7]) The coronavirus disease (COVID-19) pandemic has led to unprecedented adverse social and economic impacts. Further, the pandemic has demonstrated the compounding impacts of adding yet another shock on top of the multiple challenges that vulnerable populations already face in day-to-day life, with the potential to create devastating health, social, economic and environmental crises that can leave a deep, long-lasting mark. However, as governments take urgent action and lay the foundations for their ﬁnancial, economic, and social recovery, they have a unique opportunity to create economies that are more sustainable, inclusive and resilient. Short and long-term recovery efforts should prioritize investments that boost jobs and economic activity; have positive impacts on human, social and natural capital; protect biodiversity and ecosystems services; boost resilience; and advance the decarbonization of economies.FIGURE 2. ND-GAIN  Ind/e.altx for Chil/e.alt
 (page [7]) 40424446485052545658606264Score
 (page [7]) 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2009 2011 2013 2015 2017
 (page [7]) Mexico
 (page [7]) Chile
 (page [7]) Costa Rica
 (page [7]) 12 Chil/e.alt (2020). N/a.alttion/a.altll/y.alt-D/e.altt/e.altrmin/e.altd Contribution – Upd/a.altt/e.altd 2020. URL: https:/ /www4.unfccc.int/sit/e.alts/ndcst/a.alt/g.altin/g.alt/Publish/e.altdDocum/e.altnts/
 (page [7]) Chil/e.alt%20First/Chil/e.alt%27s_NDC_2020_/e.altn/g.altlish.pdf
 (page [7]) 13 Chil/e.alt (2016). Third N/a.alttion/a.altl Communic/a.alttion to th/e.alt UNFCCC. URL: https:/ /unfccc.int/sit/e.alts/d/e.altf/a.altult/ﬁl/e.alts/r/e.altsourc/e.alt/NC3%20Chil/e.alt_
 (page [7]) 19%20D/e.altc/e.altmb/e.altr%202016.pdf
 (page [8]) 14 Chil/e.alt (2020). N/a.alttion/a.altll/y.alt-D/e.altt/e.altrmin/e.altd Contribution – Upd/a.altt/e.altd 2020. URL: https:/ /www4.unfccc.int/sit/e.alts/ndcst/a.alt/g.altin/g.alt/Publish/e.altdDocum/e.altnts/
 (page [8]) Chil/e.alt%20First/Chil/e.alt%27s_NDC_2020_/e.altn/g.altlish.pdf
 (page [8]) 5 CLIMATE RISK COUNTRY PROFILE: CHILEClim/a.altt/e.alt B/a.alts/e.altlin/e.alt
 (page [8]) Ov/e.altrvi/e.altw
 (page [8]) Chile’s unique geography and topographical features result in a wide range of climates and environments. Chile has the Atacama Desert in the north, one of the most arid deserts in the world, the ice-capped Andes mountains in the east, the Paciﬁc Ocean on the west, and Antarctic region in the south. Thus, Chile’s unique climate zones range from tropical in the north, Mediterranean in the center, and Antarctic (antiboreal oceanic) in the South, with unique regional climates such as the arid Atacama Desert or the high peaks of the Andean mountains. On average, Chile experiences mild southern hemispheric summers between November and January, with mean annual temperatures of 10°C–12°C, and wet winters between May and August, with precipitation of 72 millimeters (mm) to 90 mm per month.15 Chile’s climate is primarily inﬂuenced by the El Niño Southern Oscillation (ENSO), Paciﬁc Decadal Oscillation (PDO), and the Antarctic Oscillation (AAO). In Chile, years with ENSO have higher probability of precipitation; together with PDO, ENSO considerably affects snow accumulation and mountain ﬂow regimes.16 The Andean mountains inﬂuence precipitation patterns across the country, affecting both temperature and precipitation. Chile’s extensive coast beneﬁts from upwelling, the movement of dense, cool, and nutrient rich water to the surface, is also inﬂuenced by wind and ocean temperature patterns.17 Temperatures in Chile vary depending on latitude and altitude, with higher temperatures occurring during southern summer months (November-February). Temperatures tend to b e lower in areas with high elevations and close to the Antarctic south and warmer in areas with tropical climates. Precipitation follows a seasonal pattern; most precipitation occurs during winter and more arid conditions are experienced in the summer. Some areas, such as the Atacama Desert, seldom receive rainfall, often during winter months. Southern areas have more precipitation, primarily during the southern winter. In the central region, near Santiago, there is a large range in precipitation with most of the precipitation falling during May and July and almost no precipitation between October and March. The country is highly vulnerable to climate change as its long coastline is exposed to sea level rise, with historically high exposure to natural disasters, drought-prone areas, mountain glaciers and river systems affected by rising temperatures, forests and fragile ecosystems. Additionally, several sectors and industries remain closely tied to changes in ocean and environmental health.
 (page [8]) CLIMATOLOGY
 (page [8]) 15 WBG Clim/a.altt/e.alt Ch/a.altn/g.alt/e.alt Knowl/e.altd/g.alt/e.alt Port/a.altl (CCKP, 2021). Chil/e.alt – Historic/a.altl D/a.altt/a.alt. URL: https:/ /clim/a.altt/e.altknowl/e.altd/g.alt/e.altport/a.altl.worldb/a.altnk.or/g.alt/
 (page [8]) countr/y.alt/chil/e.alt/clim/a.altt/e.alt-d/a.altt/a.alt-historic/a.altl
 (page [8]) 16 Chil/e.alt (2016). Third N/a.alttion/a.altl Communic/a.alttion to th/e.alt UNFCCC. URL: https:/ /unfccc.int/sit/e.alts/d/e.altf/a.altult/ﬁl/e.alts/r/e.altsourc/e.alt/NC3%20Chil/e.alt_
 (page [9]) 19%20D/e.altc/e.altmb/e.altr%202016.pdf
 (page [9]) 17 K/adieresis.altmpf, J. /a.altnd Pi/e.altrs C. (2016). Th/e.alt P/e.altruvi/a.altn-Chil/e.alt/a.altn Co/a.altst/a.altl Upw/e.altllin/g.alt S/y.altst/e.altm. Ch/a.altpt/e.altr 5. Upw/e.altllin/g.alt S/y.altst/e.altms of th/e.alt World . Sprin/g.alt/e.altr, Ch/a.altm, 2016. 161–201. W/e.altb. URL: https:/ /link.sprin/g.alt/e.altr.com/cont/e.altnt/pdf/10.1007%2F978-3-319-42524-5_5.pdf
 (page [9]) OQ, (CCKP) (Table ©
 (page [9]) Ww
 (page [9]) mm,
 (page [9]) yatial
 (page [9]) 6 CLIMATE RISK COUNTRY PROFILE: CHILETABLE 2. D/a.altt/a.alt Sn/a.altpshot: Summ/a.altr/y.alt St/a.alttistics
 (page [9]) Climate Variables 1991–2020
 (page [9]) Mean Annual Temperature (°C)  9.0°C
 (page [9]) Mean Annual Precipitation (mm) 530.1 mm Mean Maximum Annual Temperature (°C) 14.3°C Mean Minimum Annual Temperature (°C)  3.8°C FIGURE 3. Av/e.altr/a.alt/g.alt/e.alt Monthl/y.alt T /e.altmp/e.altr/a.alttur/e.alt /a.altnd R/a.altinf/a.altll of Chil/e.alt for 1991–202019Temperature (°C)Rainfall (mm)
 (page [9]) Rainfall Temperature
 (page [9]) Jan
 (page [9]) Feb
 (page [9]) Mar
 (page [9]) Apr
 (page [9]) May
 (page [9]) Jun
 (page [9]) Jul
 (page [9]) Aug
 (page [9]) Sep
 (page [9]) Oct
 (page [9]) Nov
 (page [9]) Dec
 (page [9]) 0
 (page [9]) 5
 (page [9]) 10
 (page [9]) 15
 (page [9]) 20
 (page [9]) 0
 (page [9]) 25
 (page [9]) 50
 (page [9]) 75
 (page [9]) 100Analysis of data from the World Bank Group’s Climate Change Knowledge Portal  (CCKP) ( Table 2 ) shows the most recent historical climatology, 1991–2020. Mean annual mean temperature for Chile is 8.3°C, with average monthly temperatures ranging between 11°C (December) and 4°C (July). Mean annual precipitation is 647 .4 mm, with rainfall occurring throughout the year, peaking from May to August. ( Figure 3 ).18 Figure 4  presents the spatial variation of observed average annual precipitation and temperature across Chile. 18 WBG Clim/a.altt/e.alt Ch/a.altn/g.alt/e.alt Knowl/e.altd/g.alt/e.alt Port/a.altl (CCKP, 2021). Chil/e.alt. URL: https:/ /clim/a.altt/e.altknowl/e.altd/g.alt/e.altport/a.altl.worldb/a.altnk.or/g.alt/countr/y.alt/chil/e.alt/
 (page [10]) clim/a.altt/e.alt-d/a.altt/a.alt-historic/a.altl
 (page [10]) 19 WBG Clim/a.altt/e.alt Ch/a.altn/g.alt/e.alt Knowl/e.altd/g.alt/e.alt Port/a.altl (CCKP, 2021). Chil/e.alt. URL: https:/ /clim/a.altt/e.altknowl/e.altd/g.alt/e.altport/a.altl.worldb/a.altnk.or/g.alt/countr/y.alt/chil/e.alt/
 (page [10]) clim/a.altt/e.alt-d/a.altt/a.alt-historic/a.altl
 (page [10]) nds
 (page [10]) 1500
 (page [10]) 20S 1425
 (page [10]) 1350
 (page [10]) 1275
 (page [10]) 25S - 1200
 (page [10]) 1125
 (page [10]) 1050 20S
 (page [10]) 25S
 (page [10]) 30S 30S -
 (page [10]) 35S
 (page [10]) 40S
 (page [10]) 45S
 (page [10]) Fy 225
 (page [10]) ~ 150
 (page [10]) 75 50S
 (page [10]) 55S -
 (page [10]) 75W 7OW 75W 70W
 (page [10]) oo B
 (page [10]) 7 CLIMATE RISK COUNTRY PROFILE: CHILEK/e.alt/y.alt Tr/e.alt nds
 (page [10]) Temperature
 (page [10]) The range of climates in Chile make it important to consider regional variations in climate change. Observations in the northern regions show warming in the central valley and Andes and a cooling in the coastal regions associated with changes in the surface temperature of the Paciﬁc Ocean.21 Mountain glaciers have also been adversely
 (page [10]) impacted by increasing temperature, changing
 (page [10]) snow melt and runoff. The number of ‘hot nights’ in Chile increased approximately by 20.3 nights per year between 1960 and 2006.22 Figure 5  shows mean annual observed temperature for the country.
 (page [10]) Precipitation
 (page [10]) Rainfall patterns vary by region. The Northern (18–30°S) and Central (30–35°S) zones show
 (page [10]) signiﬁcant inter-decadal and intra-decadal variation,
 (page [10]) respectively, while the Southern (37–43°S) has experienced a decrease in precipitation. Recent research suggests that historical changes have altered the ﬂow of low elevation rivers, a trend FIGURE 4. M/a.altp of Av/e.altr/a.alt/g.alt/e.alt Annu/a.altl T /e.altmp/e.altr/a.alttur/e.alt (°C) (l/e.altft); Annu/a.altl Pr/e.altcipit/a.alttion (mm) (ri/g.altht) of
 (page [10]) Chil/e.alt, 1991–202020
 (page [10]) 20 WBG Clim/a.altt/e.alt Ch/a.altn/g.alt/e.alt Knowl/e.altd/g.alt/e.alt Port/a.altl (CCKP, 2021). Chil/e.alt. URL: https:/ /clim/a.altt/e.altknowl/e.altd/g.alt/e.altport/a.altl.worldb/a.altnk.or/g.alt/countr/y.alt/chil/e.alt/
 (page [10]) clim/a.altt/e.alt-d/a.altt/a.alt-historic/a.altl
 (page [10]) 21 Chil/e.alt (2016). Third N/a.alttion/a.altl Communic/a.alttion to th/e.alt UNFCCC. URL: https:/ /unfccc.int/sit/e.alts/d/e.altf/a.altult/ﬁl/e.alts/r/e.altsourc/e.alt/NC3%20Chil/e.alt_
 (page [10]) 19%20D/e.altc/e.altmb/e.altr%202016.pdf
 (page [10]) 22 UNDP (2012). Clim/a.altt/e.alt Ch/a.altn/g.alt/e.alt Countr/y.alt Proﬁl/e.alts – Chil/e.alt. URL: https:/ /www./g.alt/e.alto/g.alt.ox./a.altc.uk/r/e.alts/e.alt/a.altrch/clim/a.altt/e.alt/proj/e.altcts/undp-cp/
 (page [10]) UNDP_r/e.altports/Chil/e.alt/Chil/e.alt.hir/e.alts.r/e.altport.pdf
 (page [10]) 23 WB Clim/a.altt/e.alt Ch/a.altn/g.alt/e.alt Knowl/e.altd/g.alt/e.alt Port/a.altl (CCKP, 2021). Chil/e.alt. URL: https:/ /clim/a.altt/e.altknowl/e.altd/g.alt/e.altport/a.altl.worldb/a.altnk.or/g.alt/countr/y.alt/chil/e.alt/ clim/a.altt/e.alt-d/a.altt/a.alt-historic/a.altlFIGURE 5. Obs/e.altrv/e.altd  T /e.altmp/e.altr/a.alttur/e.alt for Chil/e.alt, 1901–202023Temperature (°C)
 (page [10]) Annual mean
 (page [10]) Smoothed
 (page [10]) 1911 1901 1921 1931 1941 1951 1961 1971 1981 1991 2001 2011 2020
 (page [10]) 7. 5
 (page [10]) 8
 (page [11]) 8.5
 (page [11]) 9
 (page [11]) 9.5
 (page [11]) 3. (concentrated near the Coquimbo province). The
 (page [11]) RCP Database. For simplification,
 (page [11]) 8 CLIMATE RISK COUNTRY PROFILE: CHILEtoward a decrease in glacial cover.24 Annual precipitation in coastal regions has decreased by 15% to 30% in the last century. Chile experienced a severe drought again in 2008–2015 with an average deﬁcit of 50%, however, several regions experienced deﬁcits between 75% to 100% (concentrated near the Coquimbo province). The Atacama Desert has become more arid and advanced, gaining 0.4 km each year during the twentieth century.25
 (page [11]) Clim/a.altt/e.alt Futur/e.alt
 (page [11]) Ov/e.altrvi/e.altw
 (page [11]) The main data source for the World Bank Group’s Climate Change Knowledge Portal (CCKP) is the CMIP5 (Coupled Inter-comparison Project No.5) data ensemble, which builds the database for the global climate change projections presented in the Fifth Assessment Report (AR5) of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). Four Representative Concentration Pathways (i.e. RCP2.6, RCP4.5, RCP6.0, and RCP8.5) were selected and deﬁned by their total radiative forcing (cumulative measure of GHG emissions from all sources) pathway and level by 2100. The RCP2.6 for example represents a very strong mitigation scenario, whereas the RCP8.5 assumes business-as-usual scenario. For more information, please refer to the RCP Database . For simpliﬁcation, these scenarios are referred to as a low (RCP2.6); a medium (RCP4.5) and a high (RCP8.5) emission scenario in this proﬁle. Table 3  provides CMIP5 projections for essential climate variables under high emission scenario (RCP 8.5) over 4 different time horizons. Figure 6  presents the multi-model (CMIP5) ensemble of 32 Global Circulation Models (GCMs) showing the projected changes in annual precipitation and temperature for the periods
 (page [11]) 2040–2059 and 2080–2099.
 (page [11]) TABLE 3. D/a.altt/a.alt Sn/a.altpshot: CMIP5 Ens/e.altmbl/e.alt Proj/e.altction CMIP5 Ensemble Projection 2020–2039 2040–2059 2060–2079 2080–2099 Annual Temperature Anomaly (°C) 0.40 to 1.43
 (page [11]) (+0.87°C)0.95 to 2.32
 (page [11]) (+1.54°C)1.64 to 3.47
 (page [11]) (+2.38°C)2.21 to 4.69
 (page [11]) (+3.26°C)
 (page [11]) Annual Precipitation Anomaly (mm) -19.73 to 15.47
 (page [11]) (−2.04 mm)-22.84 to 16.08
 (page [11]) (−4.36 mm)-27 .58 to 17 .56
 (page [11]) (−6.41 mm)-32.84 to 19.30
 (page [11]) (−8.85 mm)
 (page [11]) Note:  The table shows CMIP5 ensemble projection under RCP8.5. Bold value is the range (10th–90th Percentile) and values in parentheses show the median (or 50th Percentile). 24 Chil/e.alt (2016). Third N/a.alttion/a.altl Communic/a.alttion to th/e.alt UNFCCC. URL: https:/ /unfccc.int/sit/e.alts/d/e.altf/a.altult/ﬁl/e.alts/r/e.altsourc/e.alt/NC3%20Chil/e.alt_
 (page [12]) 19%20D/e.altc/e.altmb/e.altr%202016.pdf
 (page [12]) 25 Minist/e.altrio d/e.alt A/g.altricultur/a.alt (2016). Oﬁcin/a.alt /y.alt Polític/a.alts A/g.altr/a.altri/a.alts. El c/a.altmbio clim/aacute.alttico /y.alt los r/e.altcursos hídricos d/e.alt Chil/e.alt . D/e.altc/e.altmb/e.altr 2016.
 (page [12]) W/e.altb. URL: https:/ /www.od/e.altp/a.alt./g.altob.cl/wp-cont/e.altnt/uplo/a.altds/2016/12/R/e.altcursosHidricosC/a.altmbioClim/a.alttico.pdf
 (page [12]) 15S
 (page [12]) 20S
 (page [12]) 25S
 (page [12]) 30S
 (page [12]) 35S
 (page [12]) 40S
 (page [12]) 45S
 (page [12]) 50S
 (page [12]) 55S
 (page [12]) 60S
 (page [12]) 15S
 (page [12]) 20S
 (page [12]) 50S
 (page [12]) 60S
 (page [12]) 5.5
 (page [12]) 45
 (page [12]) 3.5
 (page [12]) 2.5
 (page [12]) 100
 (page [12]) -10
 (page [12]) -40 20S -
 (page [12]) 25S
 (page [12]) 30S
 (page [12]) 35S
 (page [12]) 45S
 (page [12]) 50S
 (page [12]) 55S
 (page [12]) 60S
 (page [12]) 20S
 (page [12]) 30S
 (page [12]) 35S -
 (page [12]) 45S
 (page [12]) 55S
 (page [12]) 60S
 (page [12]) wo ao '
 (page [12]) 1.5
 (page [12]) 9 CLIMATE RISK COUNTRY PROFILE: CHILEFIGURE 6. CMIP5 Ens/e.altmbl/e.alt Proj/e.altct/e.altd Ch/a.altn/g.alt/e.alt (32 GCMs) in Annu/a.altlT /e.altmp/e.altr/a.alttur/e.alt (top) /a.altnd Pr/e.altcipit/a.alttion (bottom) b/y.alt 2040–2059 (l/e.altft) /a.altnd b/y.alt 2080–2099 (ri/g.altht), R/e.altl/a.alttiv/e.alt to 1986–2005
 (page [13]) B/a.alts/e.altlin/e.alt Und/e.altr RCP8.526
 (page [13]) 26 WBG Clim/a.altt/e.alt Ch/a.altn/g.alt/e.alt Knowl/e.altd/g.alt/e.alt Port/a.altl (CCKP, 2021) Chil/e.alt Proj/e.altct/e.altd Futur/e.alt Clim/a.altt/e.alt. URL: https:/ /clim/a.altt/e.altknowl/e.altd/g.alt/e.altport/a.altl.
 (page [13]) worldb/a.altnk.or/g.alt/countr/y.alt/chil/e.alt/clim/a.altt/e.alt-d/a.altt/a.alt-proj/e.altctions
 (page [13]) erence Period,
 (page [13]) mm to 9.3 mm per month
 (page [13]) ratures and expected increased
 (page [13]) 10 CLIMATE RISK COUNTRY PROFILE: CHILEK/e.alt/y.alt Tr/e.altnds
 (page [13]) Temperature
 (page [13]) In Chile, average annual temperatures are expected to increase by 1.4°C–1.7°C by mid-century and by as much as 3°C–3.5°C by the end of the century. Northern areas of the country that currently experience tropical climates are expected to see a greater increase in temperature compared to the southern regions. Regional climate models project that temperature increases will be highest in the central regions.27 The number of frost days, days when the minimal temperature is below 0°C, is projected to decrease by 12–42 days by the 2050s and 37–69 days by the 2090s. Effects are projected to occur during winter months and be most pronounced in July and August. The number of summer days (maximum temperature above 25°C) are expected to begin earlier and increase by 2–27 days by the 2050s and 17–61 days by 2090s. Across all emission scenarios, temperatures will continue to increase for Chile throughout the end of the century. As seen in Figure 7 , under a high-emission scenario, average temperatures will increase rapidly by mid-century. Across the seasonal cycle ( Figure 8 ), temperature increases will be felt from October to April. Increased heat and heat conditions will result in signiﬁcant implications for human and animal health, agriculture, w ater and energy
 (page [13]) resources, and ecosystems.
 (page [13]) Historical RCP 2.6 RCP 4.5 RCP 6.0 RCP 8.5
 (page [13]) 1980
 (page [13]) 2000
 (page [13]) 2020
 (page [13]) 2040
 (page [13]) 2060
 (page [13]) 2080
 (page [13]) 2100
 (page [13]) Year
 (page [13]) 13.0
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 (page [13]) Temperature (°C)FIGURE 7. Proj/e.altct/e.altd Av/e.altr/a.alt/g.alt/e.alt T /e.altmp/e.altr/a.alttur/e.alt
 (page [13]) for Chil/e.alt (R/e.altf/e.altr/e.altnc/e.alt P/e.altriod, 1986–2005)28
 (page [13]) Jan
 (page [13]) Feb
 (page [13]) Mar
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 (page [13]) 14
 (page [13]) 12
 (page [13]) 10
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 (page [13]) 4
 (page [13]) 2
 (page [13]) 0
 (page [13]) Days
 (page [13]) FIGURE 8. Proj/e.altct/e.altd Ch/a.altn/g.alt/e.alt in Summ/e.altr D/a.alt/y.alts
 (page [13]) (Tm/a.altx >25°C) (RCP8.5, R/e.altf/e.altr/e.altnc/e.alt P/e.altriod,
 (page [13]) 1986–2005)29
 (page [13]) 27 Chil/e.alt (2016). Third N/a.alttion/a.altl Communic/a.alttion to th/e.alt UNFCCC. URL: https:/ /unfccc.int/sit/e.alts/d/e.altf/a.altult/ﬁl/e.alts/r/e.altsourc/e.alt/NC3%20Chil/e.alt_
 (page [13]) 19%20D/e.altc/e.altmb/e.altr%202016.pdf
 (page [13]) 28 WBG Clim/a.altt/e.alt Ch/a.altn/g.alt/e.alt Knowl/e.altd/g.alt/e.alt Port/a.altl (CCKP, 2021). Int/e.altr/a.altctiv/e.alt Clim/a.altt/e.alt Indic/a.alttor D/a.altshbo/a.altrd - A/g.altricultur/e.alt. Chil/e.alt. URL https:/ /
 (page [13]) clim/a.altt/e.altd/a.altt/a.alt.worldb/a.altnk.or/g.alt/CRM/e.altPort/a.altl/w/e.altb//a.alt/g.altricultur/e.alt/crops-/a.altnd-l/a.altnd-m/a.altn/a.alt/g.alt/e.altm/e.altnt?countr/y.alt=CHL&p/e.altriod=2080-2099
 (page [13]) 29 WBG Clim/a.altt/e.alt Ch/a.altn/g.alt/e.alt Knowl/e.altd/g.alt/e.alt Port/a.altl (CCKP, 2021). Int/e.altr/a.altctiv/e.alt Clim/a.altt/e.alt Indic/a.alttor D/a.altshbo/a.altrd - A/g.altricultur/e.alt. Chil/e.alt. URL https:/ /
 (page [13]) clim/a.altt/e.altd/a.altt/a.alt.worldb/a.altnk.or/g.alt/CRM/e.altPort/a.altl/w/e.altb//a.alt/g.altricultur/e.alt/crops-/a.altnd-l/a.altnd-m/a.altn/a.alt/g.alt/e.altm/e.altnt?countr/y.alt=CHL&p/e.altriod=2080-2099Precipitation
 (page [13, 14]) While precipitation in Chile is highly variable, it is projected to decrease consistently by 1.5 mm to 9.3 mm per month by the 2050s, to 5.5 mm to 11 mm by the 2090s. Together with growing temperatures and expected increased intensity in winds, there could be an increase in evapotranspiration pressures, which would impact surface water reservoirs. Chile’s central region is expected to experience signiﬁcantly greater degrees of a reduction in
 (page [14]) 11 CLIMATE RISK COUNTRY PROFILE: CHILEprecipitation than other regions.30 Expected reduced precipitation and increased temperature are expected to impact evaporation, water balance as well as drought conditions. Water access, storage and other management options can be highly varied depending if the precipitation input comes frequently or with long periods of aridity in between rainfall. Overall, annual mean precipitation is expected to decrease through the end of the century. This is also likely to impact reservoirs from hydroelectric plants, which have already decreased energy generation due to increased aridity and drought conditions. It is highly likely, under these conditions that fossil fuels will replace a considerable share of hydroelectric generation, and thus increase emission and electricity prices. Figure 9  below, shows the change in the projected annual average
 (page [14]) precipitation for Chile.31
 (page [14]) Historical RCP 2.6 RCP 4.5 RCP 6.0 RCP 8.5
 (page [14]) 1980
 (page [14]) 2000
 (page [14]) 2020
 (page [14]) 2040
 (page [14]) 2060
 (page [14]) 2080
 (page [14]) 2100
 (page [14]) Year14001500
 (page [14]) 1300
 (page [14]) 1200
 (page [14]) 1100
 (page [14]) 1000
 (page [14]) 900
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 (page [14]) 600Precipitation (mm)FIGURE 9. Proj/e.altct/e.altd Annu/a.altl Av/e.altr/a.alt/g.alt/e.alt
 (page [14]) Pr/e.altcipit/a.alttion in Chil/e.alt (R/e.altf/e.altr/e.altnc/e.alt P/e.altriod,
 (page [14]) 1986–2005)32
 (page [14]) Ov/e.altrvi/e.altw
 (page [14]) Chile is highly exposed and vulnerable to multiple hazards such as earthquakes, volcanic activity, and tsunamis as well as hazards which can change due to climate impacts, such as wildﬁres, ﬂoods, landslides, and droughts. Chile is a part of the ‘Paciﬁc Ring of Fire’ and is highly exposed to the occurrence of geological and hydrometeorological disasters.33 Chile has suffered many instances of drought. Over the period, 1965–2019, there were four major droughts with losses that, on average exceeded US $1,000 million in losses for each occurrence. Their macroeconomic impact was relevant, to the point that in the most severe case it represented 0.77% of the GDP for the year. The social and economic development of the country has not only been affected by precipitation shortages but also by ﬂoods. Over the same period, Chile has lost over US $ 5 billion from 37 events, the most important representing a loss of approximately US $ 2 billion, equivalent to 0.62% of GDP for the year.34CLIMATE RELATED NATURAL HAZARDS 30 Minist/e.altrio d/e.alt A/g.altricultur/a.alt (2016). Oﬁcin/a.alt /y.alt Polític/a.alts A/g.altr/a.altri/a.alts. El c/a.altmbio clim/aacute.alttico /y.alt los r/e.altcursos hídricos d/e.alt Chil/e.alt . D/e.altc/e.altmb/e.altr 2016.
 (page [14]) W/e.altb. URL: https:/ /www.od/e.altp/a.alt./g.altob.cl/wp-cont/e.altnt/uplo/a.altds/2016/12/R/e.altcursosHidricosC/a.altmbioClim/a.alttico.pdf
 (page [14]) 31 WBG Clim/a.altt/e.alt Ch/a.altn/g.alt/e.alt Knowl/e.altd/g.alt/e.alt Port/a.altl (CCKP, 2021): Chil/e.alt W/a.altt/e.altr D/a.altshbo/a.altrd. D/a.altt/a.alt D/e.altscription. URL: https:/ /clim/a.altt/e.altknowl/e.altd/g.alt/e.altport/a.altl.
 (page [14]) worldb/a.altnk.or/g.alt/countr/y.alt/chil/e.alt/clim/a.altt/e.alt-s/e.altctor-w/a.altt/e.altr
 (page [14]) 32 WBG Clim/a.altt/e.alt Ch/a.altn/g.alt/e.alt Knowl/e.altd/g.alt/e.alt Port/a.altl (CCKP, 2021): Clim/a.altt/e.alt D/a.altt/a.alt-Proj/e.altctions. Chil/e.alt. URL: https:/ /clim/a.altt/e.altknowl/e.altd/g.alt/e.altport/a.altl.
 (page [14]) worldb/a.altnk.or/g.alt/countr/y.alt/chil/e.alt/clim/a.altt/e.alt-s/e.altctor-w/a.altt/e.altr
 (page [14, 15]) 33 Vill/a.altlobos, J.A. /a.altnd P/e.altr/e.alt/z.alt, A. (2021). P/a.altciﬁc Alli/a.altnc/e.alt countri/e.alts /a.altn/a.altl/y.alt/z.alt/e.alt th/e.alt h/y.altdrom/e.altt/e.altorolo/g.altic/a.altl risk imp/a.altcts. World B/a.altnk Blo/g.alts, [6 J/a.altnu/a.altr/y.alt, 2021]. URL: https:/ /blo/g.alts.worldb/a.altnk.or/g.alt/l/a.alttin/a.altm/e.altric/a.alt/p/a.altciﬁc-/a.altlli/a.altnc/e.alt-countri/e.alts-/a.altn/a.altl/y.alt/z.alt/e.alt-h/y.altdrom/e.altt/e.altorolo/g.altic/a.altl-risk-imp/a.altcts 34 World B/a.altnk (2020). C/a.altt/a.altstrophic risk mod/e.altlin/g.alt /a.altnd /a.altn/a.altl/y.altsis for th/e.alt P/a.altciﬁc Alli/a.altnc/e.alt (Chil/e.alt, Colombi/a.alt, P/e.altru, M/e.altxico). Compon/e.altnt 1, St/a.alt/g.alt/e.alt 1. D/a.altt/a.altb/a.alts/e.alt on historic/a.altl /e.altv/e.altnts of h/y.altdrom/e.altt/e.altorolo/g.altic/a.altl ori/g.altin – Chil/e.alt. (Unpublish/e.altd). Table 4, shows the country has endured various
 (page [15]) A, a tra ll
 (page [15]) 12 CLIMATE RISK COUNTRY PROFILE: CHILEChanges in precipitation and water management can leave forested areas vulnerable to wildﬁres during the ﬁre season which ranges from October to April/ May. The area between Santiago and Puerto Montt is most exposed to ﬁre with an average 3,000–5,000 ﬁres each season.35 Chile was recently affected by extensive wildﬁres in 2017 which impacted approximately 1,000,000 acres of vegetation and reached record proportions. Precipitation patterns, land use, wind, glacial and snow melt, and other climatic conditions will affect the country’s river systems, impacting in other sector such as irrigation for agriculture, water for human consumption, and hydroelectric generation. Most ﬂooding occurs during the rainy season between April and September. However, Chile has recently experienced ﬂash ﬂooding in connection to temperature changes and snow melt. Coastal areas are also vulnerable to ﬂooding from sea level rise, though impacts will vary along the countries’ coast and can range between 0.2–0.3 meters by the end of the century.36 Temperature related hazards are mostly connected with cold temperatures and cold fronts; in 2011, a cold front impacted an estimated 25,000 people in vulnerable conditions.37 Flooding and wildﬁre events occur with higher frequency while earthquakes, the third most frequent disaster, represents a signiﬁcant percentage of mortality and economic damages caused by natural disasters. Data from the Emergency Event Database: EM-Dat, presented in Table 4 , shows the country has endured various natural hazards, including ﬂoods, landslides, epidemic diseases, and storms. TABLE 4. N/a.alttur/a.altl Dis/a.altst/e.altrs in Chil/e.alt, 1900–202038
 (page [15]) Natural Hazard
 (page [15]) 1900–2020 SubtypeEvents
 (page [15]) CountTotal
 (page [15]) Deaths Total AffectedTotal Damage
 (page [15]) (Million USD)
 (page [15]) Drought Drought 2 0  120,000  255,000 EarthquakeGround movement 27 58,852 6,568,929  4,712,070
 (page [15]) Tsunami 3 591 3,353,055 30,800,000
 (page [15]) Extreme temperatureCold wave 5  2  35,150  20,000
 (page [15]) Severe winter
 (page [15]) conditions4  6  50,950  1,000,000
 (page [15]) FloodFlash ﬂood 3  195  336,548  1,530,000 Riverine ﬂood 19  352  875,144  736,700
 (page [15]) LandslideAvalanche 1  32  30 —
 (page [15]) Landslide 3  78  142 —
 (page [15]) Mudslide 1  141  82,811  6,000
 (page [15]) Storm Convective storm 6  156  276,451 — Volcanic activity Ash fall 9  110  86,650  615,000 Epidemic Bacterial Disease 1 1 40 0 35 CONAF (2021). For/e.altst Fir/e.alts in Chil/e.alt. Historic/a.altl St/a.alttistics – N/a.alttion/a.altl Summ/a.altr/y.alt Occurr/e.altnc/e.alt /a.altnd D/a.altm/a.alt/g.alt/e.alt. URL: https:/ /www.con/a.altf.cl/
 (page [15]) inc/e.altndios-for/e.altst/a.altl/e.alts/inc/e.altndios-for/e.altst/a.altl/e.alts-/e.altn-chil/e.alt//e.altst/a.altdistic/a.alts-historic/a.alts/
 (page [15]) 36 Chil/e.alt (2016). Third N/a.alttion/a.altl Communic/a.alttion to th/e.alt UNFCCC. URL: https:/ /unfccc.int/sit/e.alts/d/e.altf/a.altult/ﬁl/e.alts/r/e.altsourc/e.alt/NC3%20Chil/e.alt_
 (page [15]) 19%20D/e.altc/e.altmb/e.altr%202016.pdf
 (page [15]) 37 C/e.altnt/e.altr for Exc/e.altll/e.altnc/e.alt in Dis/a.altst/e.altr M/a.altn/a.alt/g.alt/e.altm/e.altnt & Hum/a.altnit/a.altri/a.altn Assist/a.altnc/e.alt (2017). Chil/e.alt – Dis/a.altst/e.altr M/a.altn/a.alt/g.alt/e.altm/e.altnt R/e.altf/e.altr/e.altnc/e.alt
 (page [16]) H/a.altndbook. URL: https:/ /www.cf/e.alt-dmh/a.alt.or/g.alt/LinkClick./a.altspx?ﬁl/e.alttick/e.altt=XALlrf4ItF/g.alt%3d&port/a.altlid=0
 (page [16]) 38 EM-DAT: Th/e.alt Em/e.altr/g.alt/e.altnc/y.alt Ev/e.altnts D/a.altt/a.altb/a.alts/e.alt – Univ/e.altrsit/e.alt c/a.alttholiqu/e.alt d/e.alt Louv/a.altin (UCL) – CRED, D. Guh/a.alt-S/a.altpir, Bruss/e.altls, B/e.altl/g.altium.
 (page [16]) URL: http:/ //e.altmd/a.altt.b/e.alt//e.altmd/a.altt_db/
 (page [16]) 10
 (page [16]) ei)
 (page [16]) Baigh
 (page [16]) BB aigh       HB Medium Bivery low BB Medium 13 CLIMATE RISK COUNTRY PROFILE: CHILEK/e.alt/y.alt Tr/e.altnds As discussed, climate change is expected to change the frequency, intensity, exposure, and magnitude of multiple hazards that have historically affected Chile, namely, wildﬁres, ﬂoods and landslides, droughts, and impacts of sea level rise. Existing trends indicate population growth will occur in vulnerable areas such as the Central region of the country, further exacerbating impacts. Changes in the frequency of El Niño events could impact temperatures and generate increased precipitation that could expose the country to extreme precipitation events and ﬂooding as well as increased winds.39 Projected decreases in precipitation levels, heightened during La Niña years, in the northern and central areas of the country could expose Chile to increased periods of drought. A more arid climate and changes in land use can also expose these parts of the country to higher risk for wildﬁres. Reductions or wider ranges in seasonal precipitation can also change traditional river ﬂows and increase the risk of ﬂooding. Changes in land use, land affected by wildﬁres, and areas with steep slopes are most vulnerable to landslides. Models estimate that temperatures will increase, changing the isothermal lines causing changes in river ﬂow and potentially instances of ﬂash ﬂooding. Changes in snowmelt and glaciers can affect existing water systems and reservoirs. The accumulation of risks, exposure, and multiple hazards can have important implications for economic growth and achieving development, disproportionately affecting vulnerable populations. Figure 10  presents the risk of coastal ﬂooding and water scarcity for Chile. FIGURE 10. Risk  of Urb/a.altn Flood (l/e.altft)40; Risks of Wildﬁr/e.alts (ri/g.altht)41 39 Minist/e.altrio d/e.altl Int/e.altrior /y.alt S/e.alt/g.alturid/a.altd Públic/a.alt (2016). Pl/a.altn Estr/a.altté/g.altico N/a.altcion/a.altl p/a.altr/a.altp l/a.alt G/e.altstión d/e.altl Ri/e.alts/g.alto d/e.alt D/e.alts/a.altstr/e.alts 2015–2018.
 (page [17]) URL: https:/ /si/a.altc.on/e.altmi./g.altov.cl/docum/e.altntos/PLAN_ESTRATEGICO_BAJA.pdf
 (page [17]) 40 ThinkH/a.alt/z.alt/a.altrd! (2020). Chil/e.alt – Urb/a.altn Floodin/g.alt. URL: http:/ /thinkh/a.alt/z.alt/a.altrd.or/g.alt//e.altn/r/e.altport/51-chil/e.alt/UF 41 ThinkH/a.alt/z.alt/a.altrd! (2020). Chil/e.alt – Wildﬁr/e.alt. URL: http:/ /thinkh/a.alt/z.alt/a.altrd.or/g.alt//e.altn/r/e.altport/51-chil/e.alt/WF 14 CLIMATE RISK COUNTRY PROFILE: CHILEImplic/a.alttions for DRM Chile has extensive experience and institutional capacity with disaster risk management (DRM) due to the historical abundance of seismic based natural disasters. The National Ofﬁce of Emergency (ONEMI), within the Ministry of Interior and Public Safety, is the Chilean lead institution for the governance of critical risks. The ONEMI’s mission is to plan, promote, coordinate, and implement preventive actions, response, and rehabilitation against collective risk situations, emergencies, and disasters caused by natural or human action.42 ONEMI coordinates the functioning of the National Civil Protection System activities at national and local level, and the National Platform for Disaster Risk Reduction (PNRRD). ONEMI is in charge of elaborating the National Policy for Disaster Risk Management (PNGRD). Chile’s strategic plan to address disaster risk focuses on four pillars that include institutional strengthening, strengthening monitoring and early warning systems, developing a culture of prevention and resilience building, addressing transversal aspects of disaster risk (including climate change) and investing in preparedness to achieve an effective response when disasters arrive.43 Additionally, risk management is included in sectoral plans as is the case with the National Energy Strategy, National Water Strategy, and the National Strategy for Climate Change and Vegetation Resources (Forestry). While Chile has taken important steps to address disaster risk, it recognizes the importance of addressing social, economic, and other underlying risk factors that lead to vulnerability. It also identiﬁes the need to invest in local capacity as well as train and retain experts that can support technical data collection, analysis, and research needs
 (page [17]) for disaster risk management.
 (page [17]) Disaster Risk Finance is one of the pillars within a comprehensive approach to Disaster Risk Management. Financial protection public policy and ﬁnancial instruments support governments to become effective risk managers and help ﬁscal and macroeconomic goals protect lives, livelihoods, investments, and development progress. Direct and indirect ﬁnancial effects of disasters can seriously affect the government ﬁnances, as the government ﬁscal balance become more weak expenditures rises and taxes base shrinks, the ﬁscal deﬁcit increases. Disaster Risk Finance enables the country (at regional, national and subnational levels) to understand their contingent liabilities and be prepared ex ante. Based on the timeliness of the needs of funds, the sovereigns can access different sources for facing the event in each stage, depending on the costs of use, amount available and speed of access. This is a tradeoff between cost and risks to the government. Therefore, they need to combine different instruments in a risk layer approach to protect themselves against disasters depending in the frequency and severity. This will ensure value for money as all ﬁnancial instruments bear a cost. For example, Chile issued in 2018 within the Paciﬁc Alliance (PA) framework, a seismic cat bond in 2018 (already due), as part of their ﬁnancial strategy. Currently, the PA countries are seeking a way to protect themselves against the economic and social impact of hydrometeorological risks, through a transfer instrument that could become the ﬁrst Hydrometeorological Cat Bond or, if the seismic risk is included, in the ﬁrst Multi-Risk Cat Bond.44,45 42 ONEMI (2014). N/a.alttion/a.altl Pl/a.alttform for Dis/a.altst/e.altr Risk R/e.altduction, ONEMI. URL: https:/ /www.on/e.altmi./g.altov.cl/pl/a.altt/a.altform/a.alt-d/e.alt-r/e.altduccion-
 (page [17]) d/e.alt-ri/e.alts/g.altos-d/e.alt-d/e.alts/a.altstr/e.alts/
 (page [17]) 43 Minist/e.altrio d/e.altl Int/e.altrior /y.alt S/e.alt/g.alturid/a.altd Públic/a.alt (2016). Pl/a.altn Estr/a.altté/g.altico N/a.altcion/a.altl p/a.altr/a.altp l/a.alt G/e.altstión d/e.altl Ri/e.alts/g.alto d/e.alt D/e.alts/a.altstr/e.alts 2015–2018.
 (page [17]) URL: https:/ /si/a.altc.on/e.altmi./g.altov.cl/docum/e.altntos/PLAN_ESTRATEGICO_BAJA.pdf
 (page [17]) 44 Gom/e.alt/z.alt, J.P., Hu/e.altrt/a.alt, M. J. /a.altnd M/a.altrtín/e.alt/z.alt, G. (2020). Contin/g.alt/e.altnt Li/a.altbiliti/e.alts R/e.altport, 2020. Public/a.alttion of th/e.alt Dir/e.altctor/a.altt/e.alt of Bud/g.alt/e.altts of
 (page [18]) th/e.alt Ministr/y.alt of Fin/a.altnc/e.alt. (Unpublish/e.altd).
 (page [18]) 45 Vill/a.altlobos, J. A. /a.altnd Pér/e.alt/z.alt, A. (2021). P/a.altciﬁc Alli/a.altnc/e.alt countri/e.alts /a.altn/a.altl/y.alt/z.alt/e.alt th/e.alt h/y.altdrom/e.altt/e.altorolo/g.altic/a.altl risk imp/a.altcts. [J/a.altnu/a.altr/y.alt 06, 2021]. World
 (page [18]) B/a.altnk Blo/g.alts. URL: https:/ /blo/g.alts.worldb/a.altnk.or/g.alt/l/a.alttin/a.altm/e.altric/a.alt/p/a.altciﬁc-/a.altlli/a.altnc/e.alt-countri/e.alts-/a.altn/a.altl/y.alt/z.alt/e.alt-h/y.altdrom/e.altt/e.altorolo/g.altic/a.altl-risk-imp/a.altcts
 (page [18]) 15 CLIMATE RISK COUNTRY PROFILE: CHILEChile is highly vulnerable to climate variability and change in the immediate as well as longer-term, particularly for the country’s water, agriculture, energy, and health sectors as well as its coastal zones. Water scarcity and increased aridity for many areas are expected to continue to increase risks of food insecurity and increase needs for appropriate resource management. The country faces increasing challenges to agriculture, health, and the tourism sector, which are expected to be further compounded by climate stressors Furthermore, environmental degradation, impacted water resources, and loss of biodiversity and the increased vulnerability to risks and natural hazards constitute signiﬁcant obstacles to the country’s continued development and poverty reduction efforts and increases the importance for sustainable adaptation and resilience measures.46
 (page [18]) Gender
 (page [18]) An increasing body of research has shown that climate-related disasters have impacted human populations in many areas including agricultural production, food security, water management and public health. The level of impacts and coping strategies of populations depends heavily on their socio-economic status, socio-cultural norms, access to resources, poverty as well as gender. Research has also provided more evidence that the effects are not gender neutral, as women and children are among the highest risk groups. Key factors that account for the differences between women’s and men’s vulnerability to climate change risks include: gender-based differences in time use; access to assets and credit, treatment by formal institutio ns, which can constrain women’s opportunities, limited access to policy discussions and decision making, and a lack of sex-disaggregated data for policy change.47
 (page [18]) A/g.altricultur/e.alt
 (page [18]) Ov/e.altrvi/e.altw
 (page [18]) Agriculture is a priority sector for the Chilean economy. The country’s diverse climate allows it to produce a wide range of crops and is one of the largest exporters of agricultural products, as of 2019, valued at over $15.6 billion in food exports. Chile is the world leading exporter of fresh blueberries, cherries, grapes, and dehydrated plums and apples.48 While innovation in the sector is relatively low, Chile has made strategic investments in its agricultural value chains with signiﬁcant advances in efﬁciencies in the agroindustry.49. Agricultural production has been a consistent key element of GDP and the sector employs approximately 6.3% of the population.50 On average, agricultural income is lower than average country incomes.51 Agricultural employment and GDP contributions are concentrated in52 the O’Higgins, Maule and Bio-Bio region, where agriculture accounts for 18%, 13.8% and 15.6% of regional GDP  CLIMATE CHANGE IMPACTS TO KEY SECTORS 46 Chil/e.alt (2016). Third N/a.alttion/a.altl Communic/a.alttion to th/e.alt UNFCCC. URL: https:/ /unfccc.int/sit/e.alts/d/e.altf/a.altult/ﬁl/e.alts/r/e.altsourc/e.alt/NC3%20Chil/e.alt_
 (page [18]) 19%20D/e.altc/e.altmb/e.altr%202016.pdf
 (page [18]) 47 World B/a.altnk Group (2016). G/e.altnd/e.altr Equ/a.altlit/y.alt, Pov/e.altrt/y.alt R/e.altduction, /a.altnd Inclusiv/e.alt Growth. URL: https:/ /op/e.altnknowl/e.altd/g.alt/e.alt.worldb/a.altnk.or/g.alt/
 (page [18]) h/a.altndl/e.alt/10986/23425
 (page [18]) 48 FAO (2019). Chil/e.alt Countr/y.alt Proﬁl/e.alt. URL: http:/ /www.f/a.alto.or/g.alt/countr/y.altproﬁl/e.alts/ind/e.altx//e.altn/?iso3=CHL 49 Inv/e.altstChil/e.alt (2019). Food Industr/y.alt – For/e.alti/g.altn Inv/e.altstor’s Guid/e.alt. URL: https:/ /inv/e.altstchil/e.alt./g.altob.cl/k/e.alt/y.alt-industri/e.alts/food-industr/y.alt/ 50 World B/a.altnk Op/e.altn D/a.altt/a.alt (2021). D/a.altt/a.alt B/a.altnk: Popul/a.alttion Estim/a.altt/e.alts /a.altnd Proj/e.altctions, Chil/e.alt. URL: https:/ /d/a.altt/a.altb/a.altnk.worldb/a.altnk.or/g.alt/d/a.altt/a.alt/
 (page [18]) r/e.altports./a.altspx?sourc/e.alt=h/e.alt/a.altlth-nutrition-/a.altnd-popul/a.alttion-st/a.alttistics:-popul/a.alttion-/e.altstim/a.altt/e.alts-/a.altnd-proj/e.altctions
 (page [19]) 51 R/e.altform/a.alt A/g.altr/a.altri/a.alt (2018). S/e.altctor Contribution to th/e.alt Econom/y.alt of Chil/e.alt b/y.alt 2030 – First S/e.altction R/e.altﬂ/e.altction /a.altnd Ch/a.altll/e.altn/g.alt/e.alts b/y.alt 2030: Institution/a.altl P/e.altrsp/e.altctiv/e.alt of PASO. URL: https:/ /www.od/e.altp/a.alt./g.altob.cl/wp-cont/e.altnt/uplo/a.altds/2018/01//e.altconomi/a.alt4p/a.altrt/e.alt.pdf 52 Th/e.alts/e.alt st/a.alttistics do not /a.altccount for Chil/e.alt’s n/e.altwl/y.alt /a.altdd/e.altd Ñubl/e.alt R/e.alt/g.altion, /e.altst/a.altblish/e.altd in 2017. mm by the end of the century. Days of consecutive 16 CLIMATE RISK COUNTRY PROFILE: CHILEand 13.9%, 18.3%, and 15.9% of employment, respectively;53 for the center-south, agriculture represents 6%–11% of GDP.54 Agricultural production and forestry are responsible for 73% of water extraction used to irrigate approximately 1.1 million hectares located almost completely between the Coquimbo and Los Lagos regions.55 The agricultural sector has been affected by episodes of drought, particularly in 2013, which led to updates to the National Commission on Irrigation which incentivized private investments in irrigation technology and advance water management infrastructure.56 In addition to managing water to ensure availability for irrigation, the sector is challenged by the need to manage contaminated water and runoff from agricultural land.57
 (page [19]) Clim/a.altt/e.alt Ch/a.altn/g.alt/e.alt Imp/a.altcts
 (page [19]) Climate change is expected to not only change climatic conditions and the seasonality suitable for agriculture, but also increase the occurrence of extreme events, such as the extreme rainfall in the 2020–2021 season estimated to have impacted more that 50% of fruit harvests.58 Climate change models predict that the average daily maximum temperatures in Chile will increase by around 2C° by the 2050s. Precipitation patterns are also predicted to vary across north and south of the country, with decreases in precipitation in the north and minimal to positive changes in precipitation in the south. Projected change in annual rainfall seasonality for the country is expected to remain unchanged by mid-century and increase slightly to 0.06 mm by the end of the century. Days of consecutive dry spells are expected to be higher in the central-north compared to the south, with stronger effects between November and March. Changes in temperature is likely to also reduce risks of freeze, while also challenging crops and livestock who are sensitive to high temperatures, particularly in northern, arid regions. Northern and central regions face the challenge of decreased precipitation, which could challenge both rain-fed and irrigated agriculture. In southern regions of the country, where temperatures are colder on average, increases in temperature could make these regions more suitable for agricultural production. Southern areas of the country are also expected to experience minimal to positive changes in precipitation patterns. Climate models project that the average growing season length in Chile will grow by 26 days by the 2040s and 54 days by the 2090s.59 Changes in ocean currents, such as the Humboldt current, are resulting in lower sea surface temperatures, which reduced precipitation in coastal areas by 15–30% in the last century.60 Changing climatic conditions are also predicted to impact erosion levels by increasing erosion particularly in the Bío-Bío region, where agricultural practices are increasing pressure
 (page [19]) on soil health.61
 (page [19]) 53 Fich/a.alt N/a.altcion/a.altl (2020). N/a.alttion/a.altl /a.altnd R/e.alt/g.altion/a.altl St/a.alttistics. Oﬁcin/a.alt d/e.alt Estudios /y.alt Polïtic/a.alts A/g.altr/a.altri/a.alts. URL: https:/ /www.od/e.altp/a.alt./g.altob.cl/
 (page [19]) /e.altst/a.altdistic/a.alts-d/e.altl-s/e.altctor/ﬁch/a.alt-n/a.altcion/a.altl-/y.alt-r/e.alt/g.altion/a.altl/e.alts
 (page [19]) 54 R/e.altform/a.alt A/g.altr/a.altri/a.alt (2018). S/e.altctor Contribution to th/e.alt Econom/y.alt of Chil/e.alt b/y.alt 2030 – First S/e.altction R/e.altﬂ/e.altction /a.altnd Ch/a.altll/e.altn/g.alt/e.alts b/y.alt 2030: Institution/a.altl P/e.altrsp/e.altctiv/e.alt of PASO. URL: https:/ /www.od/e.altp/a.alt./g.altob.cl/wp-cont/e.altnt/uplo/a.altds/2018/01//e.altconomi/a.alt4p/a.altrt/e.alt.pdf 55 Chil/e.alt (2013). Chil/e.alt Cuid/a.alt su A/g.altu/a.alt, Estr/a.altt/e.alt/g.alti/a.alt n/a.altcion/a.altl d/e.alt R/e.altcursos Hídricos 2012–2025 (N/a.alttion/a.altl W/a.altt/e.altr R/e.altsourc/e.alts Str/a.altt/e.alt/g.alt/y.alt).
 (page [19]) URL: https:/ /www.mop.cl/Docum/e.altnts/ENRH_2013_OK.pdf
 (page [19]) 56 FAO (2015). Countr/y.alt Pro/g.altr/a.altmmin/g.alt Fr/a.altm/e.altwork. FAO T/e.altchnic/a.altl Assist/a.altnc/e.alt (2015–2018). URL: http:/ /www.f/a.alto.or/g.alt/3//a.alt-bp548s.pdf 57 Chil/e.alt (2013). Chil/e.alt Cuid/a.alt su A/g.altu/a.alt, Estr/a.altt/e.alt/g.alti/a.alt n/a.altcion/a.altl d/e.alt R/e.altcursos Hídricos 2012–2025 (N/a.alttion/a.altl W/a.altt/e.altr R/e.altsourc/e.alts Str/a.altt/e.alt/g.alt/y.alt).
 (page [19]) URL: https:/ /www.mop.cl/Docum/e.altnts/ENRH_2013_OK.pdf
 (page [19]) 58 Vill/e.altn/a.alt, M. (2021). R/a.altins imp/a.altct mor/e.alt th/a.altn 50% of th3 h/a.altrv/e.altsts of som/e.alt fruits in th/e.alt c/e.altntr/a.altl /z.alton/e.alt. PULSE. [J/a.altnu/a.altr/y.alt 31, 2021].
 (page [19]) URL: https:/ /www.l/a.altt/e.altrc/e.altr/a.alt.com/pulso/notici/a.alt/lluvi/a.alts-imp/a.altct/a.altn-m/a.alts-d/e.alt-50-d/e.alt-l/a.alt-cos/e.altch/a.alt-d/e.alt-/a.altl/g.altun/a.alts-frut/a.alts-/e.altn-l/a.alt-/z.alton/a.alt-c/e.altntro/
 (page [19]) AM2Z56UBWBERTL56NGKB5NQVPA/
 (page [19]) 59 WBG Clim/a.altt/e.alt Ch/a.altn/g.alt/e.alt Knowl/e.altd/g.alt/e.alt Port/a.altl (CCKP, 2021). Chil/e.alt Proj/e.altctions. URL: https:/ /clim/a.altt/e.altknowl/e.altd/g.alt/e.altport/a.altl.worldb/a.altnk.or/g.alt/countr/y.alt/
 (page [19]) chil/e.alt/clim/a.altt/e.alt-d/a.altt/a.alt-proj/e.altctions
 (page [19]) 60 R/e.altform/a.alt A/g.altr/a.altri/a.alt (2018). Chil/e.alt/a.altn A/g.altricultur/e.alt R/e.altﬂ/e.altctions /a.altnd Ch/a.altll/e.altn/g.alt/e.alts b/y.alt 2030 – S/e.altcond S/e.altction R/e.altﬂ/e.altctions /a.altnd Ch/a.altll/e.altn/g.alt/e.alts b/y.alt
 (page [20]) 2030. URL: https:/ /www.od/e.altp/a.alt./g.altob.cl/wp-cont/e.altnt/uplo/a.altds/2018/01/c/a.altmbioClim12p/a.altrt/e.alt.pdf
 (page [20]) 61 Chil/e.alt (2013). Pl/a.altn d/e.alt Ad/a.altpt/a.altcion /a.altl C/a.altmbio Clim/a.alttico d/e.altl S/e.altctor. URL: https:/ /www.scribd.com/docum/e.altnt/176284308/Pl/a.altn-Ad/a.altpt/a.altcion-
 (page [20]) CC-S-Silvo/a.alt/g.altrop/e.altcu/a.altrio
 (page [20]) 17 CLIMATE RISK COUNTRY PROFILE: CHILEDecreased water availability is likely to reduce yields and the reduction in soil moisture may alter suitable areas for agriculture or the production of speciﬁc crops. Increased heat and water scarcity conditions are likely to increase evapotranspiration, expected to contribute to crop failure and overall yield reductions. This may also result in the need for increased cooling and cold chain management to preserve and maintain feedstock at points of production as well as at ports while awaiting export. Figure 9  shows the average daily max temperature across the seasonal cycle. These higher temperatures have implications for impacts to soil moisture and crop growth and as seen in Figure 11 , Chile will experience increased average
 (page [20]) temperatures of approximately 3.5°C throughout
 (page [20]) the year.
 (page [20]) Ad/a.altpt/a.alttion Options
 (page [20]) While climate change impacts present a source of risk to agricultural production, these changes could also result in opportunities for diversiﬁcation as well as the adoption of Climate Smart Agriculture Technologies. Changes in climatic conditions are expected to have a strong impact in agricultural production in southern regions of the country which currently have low population density and little economic activity.63 In response to agricultural emergencies such as extreme temperature, precipitation events, or other natural stressors, the government established a National Advisory Commission for Agricultural Emergencies, which supports the implementation of agrometeorological and early warning systems. This commission supports coordination with the private sector as well as ministries to develop policies that reduce risk and damages from such events.64 Additionally, the Department for Risk Management in the Ministry of Agriculture connects the public to updated information with agricultural relevant information,65 risk sharing products, early warnings, capacity building, and dissemination of preventive and adaptive measures through sharing best practices and agricultural extension.66 The proposed climate change sectoral adaptation plans for both ﬁsheries and agricultural production, introduces more efﬁcient use in natural resources, especially in the case of water, energy, and fertilizer usage. Increasing the diversity of agricultural production, an increase use of local inputs, and diversifying approaches to pest management are also proposed. The proposal also considers the
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 (page [20]) FIGURE 11. Proj/e.altct/e.altd Ch/a.alt n/g.alt/e.alt in Av/e.altr/a.alt/g.alt/e.alt D/a.altil/y.alt M/a.altx imum  T /e.altmp/e.altr/a.alttur/e.alt for Chil/e.alt
 (page [20]) (RCP8.5, (R/e.altf/e.altr/e.altnc/e.alt P/e.altriod, 1986–2005)62
 (page [20]) 62 WBG Clim/a.altt/e.alt Ch/a.altn/g.alt/e.alt Knowl/e.altd/g.alt/e.alt Port/a.altl (CCKP, 2021). Chil/e.alt A/g.altricultur/e.alt. D/a.altshbo/a.altrd URL: https:/ /clim/a.altt/e.altd/a.altt/a.alt.worldb/a.altnk.or/g.alt/CRM/e.altPort/a.altl/
 (page [20]) w/e.altb//a.alt/g.altricultur/e.alt/crops-/a.altnd-l/a.altnd-m/a.altn/a.alt/g.alt/e.altm/e.altnt?countr/y.alt=CHL&p/e.altriod=2080-2099
 (page [20]) 63 R/e.altform/a.alt A/g.altr/a.altri/a.alt (2018). Chil/e.alt/a.altn A/g.altricultur/e.alt R/e.altﬂ/e.altctions /a.altnd Ch/a.altll/e.altn/g.alt/e.alts b/y.alt 2030 – S/e.altcond S/e.altction R/e.altﬂ/e.altctions /a.altnd Ch/a.altll/e.altn/g.alt/e.alts b/y.alt
 (page [20]) 2030. URL: https:/ /www.od/e.altp/a.alt./g.altob.cl/wp-cont/e.altnt/uplo/a.altds/2018/01/c/a.altmbioClim12p/a.altrt/e.alt.pdf
 (page [20]) 64 Ministr/y.alt of A/g.altricultur/e.alt (2019). A/g.altricultur/e.alt Em/e.altr/g.alt/e.altnc/y.alt Unit, Chil/e.alt. URL: https:/ /www.od/e.altp/a.alt./g.altob.cl//e.altm/e.altr/g.alt/e.altnci/a.alt-/a.alt/g.altricol/a.alt 65 Th/e.alt Ministr/y.alt h/a.alts d/e.altv/e.altlop/e.altd th/e.alt Atl/a.alts d/e.alt R/e.altis/g.altos Clim/a.altticos (ARCLIM), l/a.altunch/e.altd in 2020, which /a.altn/a.altl/y.alt/z.alt/e.alts thr/e.alt/a.altts, /e.altxposition /a.altnd crop suit/a.altbilit/y.alt for 14 /a.alt/g.altricultur/a.altl v/a.altlu/e.alt ch/a.altins. ARCLIM c/a.altn b/e.alt found /a.altt this link: https:/ //a.altrclim.mm/a.alt./g.altob.cl//a.alttl/a.alts/s/e.altctor_ind/e.altx/
 (page [20]) /a.alt/g.altricultur/a.alt/
 (page [21]) 66 Ministr/y.alt of A/g.altricultur/e.alt (2018). Soil /a.altnd W/a.altt/e.altr Cons/e.altrv/a.alttion Pr/a.altctic/e.alts /a.altnd th/e.altir Ad/a.altptiv/e.alt Eﬀ/e.altcts on Imp/a.altcts of Clim/a.altt/e.alt Ch/a.altn/g.alt/e.alt in th/e.alt Dr/y.altl/a.altnds of Chil/e.alt. URL: http:/ /d/g.altir.min/a.alt/g.altri./g.altob.cl/wp-cont/e.altnt/uplo/a.altds/2017/05/Pr%C3%A1ctic/a.alts-Cons/e.altrv/a.altcionist/a.alts-d/e.alt-Su/e.altlo-
 (page [21]) /y.alt-A/g.altu/a.alt-/y.alt-sus-Ef/e.altctos-Ad/a.altpt/a.alttivos-sobr/e.alt-los-Imp/a.altctos-d/e.altl-C/a.altmbio-Clim%C3%A1tico-/e.altn-/e.altl-S/e.altc/a.altno-d/e.alt-Chil/e.alt.pdf
 (page [21]) 18 CLIMATE RISK COUNTRY PROFILE: CHILEimportance of sustainable soil use practices and measures to reduce erosion as well as investing in crops that are resilient to extreme heat, water, or salinity conditions. In regard to extreme events, the proposal highlights a focus on emergency response and early warning systems.
 (page [21]) W/a.altt/e.altr
 (page [21]) Ov/e.altrvi/e.altw
 (page [21]) Chile is endowed with abundant water resources with 1,251 rivers, 101 watersheds, and 15,000 lakes and ponds. Water systems in Chile are as diverse as the number of ecosystems and environments in the country. The country has an annual per capita water availability of 53,000 m3/year; however, availability varies regionally with ranges from 52 m3/year to 2.9 million m3/year in others.67 The Atacama Desert in Northern Chile is one of the most arid areas of the world. Water availability increases gradually toward southern latitudes and becomes abundant near Aysén. Chile is currently in the midst a mega-drought, with Chile’s recurring drought scenarios becoming the new normal. Central Chile has experienced an uninterrupted sequence of dry years since 2010, with mean rainfall deﬁcits of 20% to 40%. This has resulted in direct consequences for water security, with growing conﬂict over accessibility, supply and ultimately livelihoods. Furthermore, the droughts have in turn impacted forest ﬁres.68 Additionally, water scarcity in Chile has also impacted electricity prices and increase in emissions. Energy is already the highest emitting sector, and decreased precipitation and/or increased drought conditions impact hydroelectric generation being replaced by fossil fuels. National water usage in 2010 amounted to 4,710 m2 annually. An estimated 99% of urban and 87% of rural populations in 2015 had access to running water (98% country wide) and 99% of urban and 79% of rural areas had access to sanitation services.69 The agricultural sector requires the most water resources (approximately 73% of extracted water), followed by industry (12%), mining (9%), and sanitation (6%).70 Chile uses water resources to produce hydroelectricity with reservoirs, and run-of-of river plants, with a hydroelectric energy potential of 9GW/h. Water is a strategic input to productive sectors and forms the backbone of the country’s water-intensive economy. As such, the Chilean economy that has shifted towards a water intensive, export-orientated economy. Historical trends point to challenges of water distributio n and availability between regions which may become more pronounced with a changing climate. Precipitation and water availability in Chile are closely connected to the El Niño Southern Oscillation cycle. La Niña years tend to experience higher precipitation while El Niño years are associated with lower levels of precipitation. The Paciﬁc Decadal Oscillation can also inﬂuence sea surface 67 Chil/e.alt (2013). Chil/e.alt Cuid/a.alt su A/g.altu/a.alt, Estr/a.altt/e.alt/g.alti/a.alt n/a.altcion/a.altl d/e.alt R/e.altcursos Hídricos 2012–2025 (N/a.alttion/a.altl W/a.altt/e.altr R/e.altsourc/e.alts Str/a.altt/e.alt/g.alt/y.alt).
 (page [21]) URL: https:/ /www.mop.cl/Docum/e.altnts/ENRH_2013_OK.pdf
 (page [21]) 68 G/a.altrr/e.alt/a.altud, R. /e.altt /a.altl. (2020). Th/e.alt C/e.altntr/a.altl Chil/e.alt M/e.alt/g.alt/a.alt Drou/g.altht (2010–2018): A clim/a.altt/e.alt d/y.altn/a.altmics p/e.altrsp/e.altctiv/e.alt. Int/e.altrn/a.alttion/a.altl Journ/a.altl of
 (page [21]) Clim/a.alttolo/g.alt/y.alt. DOI:  https:/ /doi.or/g.alt/10.1002/joc.6219
 (page [21]) 69 Chil/e.alt (2017). A/g.alt/e.altnd/a.alt 2030 Obj/e.alttivos d/e.alt D/e.alts/a.altrrollo Sust/e.altnt/a.altbl/e.alt. Sust/a.altin/a.altbl/e.alt D/e.altv/e.altlopm/e.altnt Go/a.altl R/e.altport, S/e.altpt/e.altmb/e.altr 2017.
 (page [22]) URL: www.cl.undp.or/g.alt/cont/e.altnt/d/a.altm/chil/e.alt/docs/ods/undp_cl_ODS_Inform/e.alt_ODS_Chil/e.alt_/a.altnt/e.alt_NU_S/e.altpti/e.altmbr/e.alt2017.pdf
 (page [22]) 70 Chil/e.alt (2013). Chil/e.alt Cuid/a.alt su A/g.altu/a.alt, Estr/a.altt/e.alt/g.alti/a.alt n/a.altcion/a.altl d/e.alt R/e.altcursos Hídricos 2012–2025 (N/a.alttion/a.altl W/a.altt/e.altr R/e.altsourc/e.alts Str/a.altt/e.alt/g.alt/y.alt).
 (page [22]) URL: https:/ /www.mop.cl/Docum/e.altnts/ENRH_2013_OK.pdf
 (page [22]) 19 CLIMATE RISK COUNTRY PROFILE: CHILEtemperature and through this, affect precipitation trends particularly in the central and northern regions of Chile.71 The Antarctic Oscillation also has an incidence in Chilean climate, particularly in southern sub-Antarctic zones.72 Recent years have shown trends toward a 20–30% decrease in precipitation in the regions between Coquimbo
 (page [22]) and Valdivia.73
 (page [22]) Clim/a.altt/e.alt Ch/a.altn/g.alt/e.alt Imp/a.altcts
 (page [22]) Climate change is expected to change water availability and seasonality as well as temperatures, which could also impact snowmelt and accumulation in the Andes. Changing temperatures are expected to have the highest impacts on the water systems in the Andean regions, especially in latitudes 30–40° and decrease in intensity from north to south.74 The majority of the population is concentrated in the center north while the southernmost areas of the country are sparsely populated, in large part due to historically challenging climatic conditions. Ensemble projection models estimate that annual severe drought likelihood for the country will increase by 34% by mid-century and by 63% by the end of the century.75 Some regions of the country are expected to experience desertiﬁcation as the Atacama grows in surface area while other regions may experience scarcity. The areas between Coquimbo and O’Higgins are projected to see a 20%–25% decrease in precipitation by mid-century. Concurrently, the southern regions of the country may experience consistent or increased water availabilit y on an annual basis with light decreases in spring and summer. The Chilean government estimates that precipitation in the Antiplano and regions of Arica and Parinacota could experience a 15%–25% increase in precipitation by the 2050s.76 The Standardized Precipitation Evapotranspiration Index (SPEI) is an index which represents the measure of the given water deﬁcit in a speciﬁc location, accounting for contributions of temperature-dependent evapotranspiration and providing insight into increasing or decreasing pressure on water resources. Negative values for SPEI represent dry conditions, with values below −2 indicating severe drought conditions, likewise positive values indicate increased wet conditions. This is an important understanding for the water sector in regards to quantity and quality of supply for human consumption and agriculture use as well as for the energy sector as reductions in water availability impacts river ﬂow and the hydropower generating capabilities. Drought and water scarcity are projected to be concentrated in the central and northern regions compared to southern regions. SPEI projections estimate that precipitation in Chile will be −1.42 standard deviations from the historical mean by the 2050s. However, while projections estimate a 71 V/a.altldés-Pin/e.altd/a.alt, R., C/a.altñón, R., /a.altnd V/a.altldés, J.B. (2018).”Multi-d/e.altc/a.altd/a.altl 40-to 60-/y.alt/e.alt/a.altr c/y.altcl/e.alts of pr/e.altcipit/a.alttion v/a.altri/a.altbilit/y.alt in Chil/e.alt (South Am/e.altric/a.alt) /a.altnd th/e.altir r/e.altl/a.alttionship to th/e.alt AMO /a.altnd PDO si/g.altn/a.altls. Journ/a.altl of H/y.altdrolo/g.alt/y.alt  556 (2018): 1153–13. URL: https:/ /doi.or/g.alt/10.1016/
 (page [22]) j.jh/y.altdrol.2017.01.031
 (page [22]) 72 V/a.altldés-Pin/e.altd/a.alt, R., C/a.altñón, R., /a.altnd V/a.altldés, J.B. (2018).”Multi-d/e.altc/a.altd/a.altl 40-to 60-/y.alt/e.alt/a.altr c/y.altcl/e.alts of pr/e.altcipit/a.alttion v/a.altri/a.altbilit/y.alt in Chil/e.alt (South Am/e.altric/a.alt) /a.altnd th/e.altir r/e.altl/a.alttionship to th/e.alt AMO /a.altnd PDO si/g.altn/a.altls. Journ/a.altl of H/y.altdrolo/g.alt/y.alt  556 (2018): 1153–13. URL: https:/ /doi.or/g.alt/10.1016/
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 (page [22]) 73 WBG (2015). Int/e.alt/g.altr/a.altt/e.altd W/a.altt/e.altr R/e.altsourc/e.alts M/a.altn/a.alt/g.alt/e.altm/e.altnt /a.altnd Infr/a.altstructur/e.alt D/e.altv/e.altlopm/e.altnt Proj/e.altct. URL: http:/ /docum/e.altnts.worldb/a.altnk.or/g.alt/
 (page [22]) cur/a.altt/e.altd//e.altn/881091467998209964/pdf/PAD1275-PAD-P152319-R2015-0205-1-Box393228B-OUO-9.pdf
 (page [22]) 74 Chil/e.alt (2013). Chil/e.alt Cuid/a.alt su A/g.altu/a.alt, Estr/a.altt/e.alt/g.alti/a.alt n/a.altcion/a.altl d/e.alt R/e.altcursos Hídricos 2012–2025 (N/a.alttion/a.altl W/a.altt/e.altr R/e.altsourc/e.alts Str/a.altt/e.alt/g.alt/y.alt).
 (page [22]) URL: https:/ /www.mop.cl/Docum/e.altnts/ENRH_2013_OK.pdf
 (page [22]) 75 WBG Clim/a.altt/e.alt Ch/a.altn/g.alt/e.alt Knowl/e.altd/g.alt/e.alt Port/a.altl (CCKP, 2021): Chil/e.alt Proj/e.altctions. URL: https:/ /clim/a.altt/e.altknowl/e.altd/g.alt/e.altport/a.altl.worldb/a.altnk.or/g.alt/countr/y.alt/
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