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December 31, 2019 21:52
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Rebuttal of "[36C3] The ecosystem is moving" | |
============================================ | |
abstract | |
-------- | |
Moxie is wrong about a lot of things in this talk. Here I'll discuss | |
my rebuttals and of course I will provide plenty of useful information | |
and informative citations which you can follow up on. | |
To be clear I am responding to the recording of Moxie's talk although I heard | |
he did not wish it to be recorded, nevertheless it is extremely important | |
to debunk the myriad of falsehoods presented in his talk: | |
https://tube.ksl-bmx.de/videos/watch/12be5396-2a25-4ec8-a92a-674b1cb6b270 | |
Although there is a hacker-news discussion about this talk: | |
https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=21904041 | |
My feeling is that the past forty years of academic literature on | |
anonymous communication networks are not adequately represented in | |
this public discussion. | |
a brief introduction to decentralized systems | |
--------------------------------------------- | |
What we really mean by decentralized systems is a system which | |
provides assurances which are dependent on multiple security domains. | |
However there are obviously possible decentralized system designs | |
which grant each security domain the full authority of the system; in | |
computer science this is known as "ambient authority" and it is of | |
course not a desireable property. Least authority or least privilege | |
on the other hand is the design property where each security domain | |
has the least amount of privilege necessary to perform it's task or | |
function. [SECNOTSEP]_ This design principle has been applied to | |
programming language design, operating system design, program design | |
and decentralized system design. [MARKMTHESIS]_ | |
a brief introduction to anonymous communication networks | |
-------------------------------------------------------- | |
The academic research into so called metadata protection started | |
with David Chaum's 1979 paper also published as his 1981 PHD thesis | |
entitled: "Untraceable electronic mail, return addresses, and digital pseudonyms" | |
[CHAUM81]_. In the abstract of this paper Chaum states: | |
"A technique based on public key cryptography is presented that allows an | |
electronic mail system to hide who a participant communicates with as | |
well as the content of the communication--in spite of an unsecured | |
underlying telecommunication system. The technique does not require a | |
universally trusted authority. " | |
Not requiring a universally trusted authority essentially means not | |
depending on a single security domain. This implies that the system | |
will have multiple security domains. Later on in Chaum's paper he says: | |
"The use of a cascade, or series of mixes, offers the advantage that | |
any single constituent mix is able to provide the secrecy of the | |
correspondence between the inputs and the outputs of the entire | |
cascade." | |
This concept is later reiterated by Byron Ford et al in their | |
[ANYTRUST]_ paper where they state: | |
"Anytrust is a decentralized client/server network model, in which each | |
of many clients—representing group members—trust only that at least | |
one of a smaller but diverse set of “servers” or “super-peers” behaves | |
honestly, but clients need not know which server to trust." | |
Another way to state this concept in terms of mix networks is to say: | |
There must be at least one honest mix in the mix network routes used. | |
This more flexible definition allows for various topologies besides a cascade. | |
Claudia Diaz et al discuss the benefits of the stratified topology in their | |
paper. [MIXTOPO10]_ | |
In terms of the principles of least authority, a mixnet with only one | |
mix implies a mix which has excess authority. This single mix has the | |
authority to link input and output messages whereas this is not the case | |
if there are multiple mixes in each route where each mix is operated by | |
a different entity, thus using multiple security domains. | |
There are of course many other decentralized models which also avoid | |
deep pockets of excess authority. For example some multi party computation | |
based systems can withstand up to one third of the nodes becoming | |
compromised. | |
Anonymous communication networks offer users metadata protections which are | |
formally known as privacy notions and the best and latest paper on the subject is: | |
On Privacy Notions in Anonymous Communication [PRIVNOTIONS]_ | |
citations | |
--------- | |
.. [SECNOTSEP] | |
The Structure of Authority: Why Security Is not a Separable Concern | |
by Mark S. Miller, Bill Tulloh, and Jonathan S. Shapiro | |
http://www.erights.org/talks/no-sep/secnotsep.pdf | |
.. [MARKMTHESIS] | |
Robust Composition: | |
Towards a Unified Approach to Access Control and Concurrency Control | |
May 2006 | |
by Mark Samuel Miller | |
http://erights.org/talks/thesis/markm-thesis.pdf | |
.. [CHAUM81] | |
Untraceable electronic mail, return addresses, and digital pseudonyms | |
February 1981 | |
by David Chaum | |
https://www.freehaven.net/anonbib/cache/chaum-mix.pdf | |
.. [ANYTRUST] | |
Scalable Anonymous Group Communication in the Anytrust Model | |
by David Isaac Wolinsky, Henry Corrigan-Gibbs, Bryan Ford and, Aaron Johnson | |
https://www.ohmygodel.com/publications/d3-eurosec12.pdf | |
.. [MIXTOPO10] | |
"Impact of Network Topology on Anonymity | |
and Overhead in Low-Latency Anonymity Networks", PETS, July 2010, | |
Diaz, C., Murdoch, S., Troncoso, C. | |
https://www.esat.kuleuven.be/cosic/publications/article-1230.pdf | |
.. [PRIVNOTIONS] | |
On Privacy Notions in Anonymous Communication | |
by Christiane Kuhn, Martin Beck, Stefan Schiffner, Eduard Jorswieck, Thorsten Strufe | |
https://arxiv.org/abs/1812.05638 |
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