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# frozen_string_literal: true | |
require "ipaddr" | |
module ActionDispatch | |
# This middleware calculates the IP address of the remote client that is | |
# making the request. It does this by checking various headers that could | |
# contain the address, and then picking the last-set address that is not | |
# on the list of trusted IPs. This follows the precedent set by e.g. | |
# {the Tomcat server}[https://issues.apache.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=50453], | |
# with {reasoning explained at length}[http://blog.gingerlime.com/2012/rails-ip-spoofing-vulnerabilities-and-protection] | |
# by @gingerlime. A more detailed explanation of the algorithm is given | |
# at GetIp#calculate_ip. | |
# | |
# Some Rack servers concatenate repeated headers, like {HTTP RFC 2616}[https://www.w3.org/Protocols/rfc2616/rfc2616-sec4.html#sec4.2] | |
# requires. Some Rack servers simply drop preceding headers, and only report | |
# the value that was {given in the last header}[http://andre.arko.net/2011/12/26/repeated-headers-and-ruby-web-servers]. | |
# If you are behind multiple proxy servers (like NGINX to HAProxy to Unicorn) | |
# then you should test your Rack server to make sure your data is good. | |
# | |
# IF YOU DON'T USE A PROXY, THIS MAKES YOU VULNERABLE TO IP SPOOFING. | |
# This middleware assumes that there is at least one proxy sitting around | |
# and setting headers with the client's remote IP address. If you don't use | |
# a proxy, because you are hosted on e.g. Heroku without SSL, any client can | |
# claim to have any IP address by setting the X-Forwarded-For header. If you | |
# care about that, then you need to explicitly drop or ignore those headers | |
# sometime before this middleware runs. | |
class RemoteIp | |
class IpSpoofAttackError < StandardError; end | |
# The default trusted IPs list simply includes IP addresses that are | |
# guaranteed by the IP specification to be private addresses. Those will | |
# not be the ultimate client IP in production, and so are discarded. See | |
# https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Private_network for details. | |
TRUSTED_PROXIES = [ | |
"127.0.0.1", # localhost IPv4 | |
"::1", # localhost IPv6 | |
"fc00::/7", # private IPv6 range fc00::/7 | |
"10.0.0.0/8", # private IPv4 range 10.x.x.x | |
"172.16.0.0/12", # private IPv4 range 172.16.0.0 .. 172.31.255.255 | |
"192.168.0.0/16", # private IPv4 range 192.168.x.x | |
].map { |proxy| IPAddr.new(proxy) } | |
attr_reader :check_ip, :proxies | |
# Create a new +RemoteIp+ middleware instance. | |
# | |
# The +ip_spoofing_check+ option is on by default. When on, an exception | |
# is raised if it looks like the client is trying to lie about its own IP | |
# address. It makes sense to turn off this check on sites aimed at non-IP | |
# clients (like WAP devices), or behind proxies that set headers in an | |
# incorrect or confusing way (like AWS ELB). | |
# | |
# The +custom_proxies+ argument can take an Array of string, IPAddr, or | |
# Regexp objects which will be used instead of +TRUSTED_PROXIES+. If a | |
# single string, IPAddr, or Regexp object is provided, it will be used in | |
# addition to +TRUSTED_PROXIES+. Any proxy setup will put the value you | |
# want in the middle (or at the beginning) of the X-Forwarded-For list, | |
# with your proxy servers after it. If your proxies aren't removed, pass | |
# them in via the +custom_proxies+ parameter. That way, the middleware will | |
# ignore those IP addresses, and return the one that you want. | |
def initialize(app, ip_spoofing_check = true, custom_proxies = nil) | |
@app = app | |
@check_ip = ip_spoofing_check | |
@proxies = if custom_proxies.blank? | |
TRUSTED_PROXIES | |
elsif custom_proxies.respond_to?(:any?) | |
custom_proxies | |
else | |
Array(custom_proxies) + TRUSTED_PROXIES | |
end | |
end | |
# Since the IP address may not be needed, we store the object here | |
# without calculating the IP to keep from slowing down the majority of | |
# requests. For those requests that do need to know the IP, the | |
# GetIp#calculate_ip method will calculate the memoized client IP address. | |
def call(env) | |
req = ActionDispatch::Request.new env | |
req.remote_ip = GetIp.new(req, check_ip, proxies) | |
@app.call(req.env) | |
end | |
# The GetIp class exists as a way to defer processing of the request data | |
# into an actual IP address. If the ActionDispatch::Request#remote_ip method | |
# is called, this class will calculate the value and then memoize it. | |
class GetIp | |
def initialize(req, check_ip, proxies) | |
@req = req | |
@check_ip = check_ip | |
@proxies = proxies | |
end | |
# Sort through the various IP address headers, looking for the IP most | |
# likely to be the address of the actual remote client making this | |
# request. | |
# | |
# REMOTE_ADDR will be correct if the request is made directly against the | |
# Ruby process, on e.g. Heroku. When the request is proxied by another | |
# server like HAProxy or NGINX, the IP address that made the original | |
# request will be put in an X-Forwarded-For header. If there are multiple | |
# proxies, that header may contain a list of IPs. Other proxy services | |
# set the Client-Ip header instead, so we check that too. | |
# | |
# As discussed in {this post about Rails IP Spoofing}[http://blog.gingerlime.com/2012/rails-ip-spoofing-vulnerabilities-and-protection/], | |
# while the first IP in the list is likely to be the "originating" IP, | |
# it could also have been set by the client maliciously. | |
# | |
# In order to find the first address that is (probably) accurate, we | |
# take the list of IPs, remove known and trusted proxies, and then take | |
# the last address left, which was presumably set by one of those proxies. | |
def calculate_ip | |
# Set by the Rack web server, this is a single value. | |
remote_addr = ips_from(@req.remote_addr).last | |
# Could be a CSV list and/or repeated headers that were concatenated. | |
client_ips = ips_from(@req.client_ip).reverse | |
forwarded_ips = ips_from(@req.x_forwarded_for).reverse | |
# +Client-Ip+ and +X-Forwarded-For+ should not, generally, both be set. | |
# If they are both set, it means that either: | |
# | |
# 1) This request passed through two proxies with incompatible IP header | |
# conventions. | |
# 2) The client passed one of +Client-Ip+ or +X-Forwarded-For+ | |
# (whichever the proxy servers weren't using) themselves. | |
# | |
# Either way, there is no way for us to determine which header is the | |
# right one after the fact. Since we have no idea, if we are concerned | |
# about IP spoofing we need to give up and explode. (If you're not | |
# concerned about IP spoofing you can turn the +ip_spoofing_check+ | |
# option off.) | |
should_check_ip = @check_ip && client_ips.last && forwarded_ips.last | |
if should_check_ip && !forwarded_ips.include?(client_ips.last) | |
# We don't know which came from the proxy, and which from the user | |
raise IpSpoofAttackError, "IP spoofing attack?! " \ | |
"HTTP_CLIENT_IP=#{@req.client_ip.inspect} " \ | |
"HTTP_X_FORWARDED_FOR=#{@req.x_forwarded_for.inspect}" | |
end | |
# We assume these things about the IP headers: | |
# | |
# - X-Forwarded-For will be a list of IPs, one per proxy, or blank | |
# - Client-Ip is propagated from the outermost proxy, or is blank | |
# - REMOTE_ADDR will be the IP that made the request to Rack | |
ips = [forwarded_ips, client_ips, remote_addr].flatten.compact | |
# If every single IP option is in the trusted list, just return REMOTE_ADDR | |
filter_proxies(ips).first || remote_addr | |
end | |
# Memoizes the value returned by #calculate_ip and returns it for | |
# ActionDispatch::Request to use. | |
def to_s | |
@ip ||= calculate_ip | |
end | |
private | |
def ips_from(header) # :doc: | |
return [] unless header | |
# Split the comma-separated list into an array of strings. | |
ips = header.strip.split(/[,\s]+/) | |
ips.select do |ip| | |
# Only return IPs that are valid according to the IPAddr#new method. | |
range = IPAddr.new(ip).to_range | |
# We want to make sure nobody is sneaking a netmask in. | |
range.begin == range.end | |
rescue ArgumentError | |
nil | |
end | |
end | |
def filter_proxies(ips) # :doc: | |
ips.reject do |ip| | |
@proxies.any? { |proxy| proxy === ip } | |
end | |
end | |
end | |
end | |
end |
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