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Senate Select Comiiiittee on Infelligeoee
Committee Study ofthe CentralIntelligenceAgmcy's Detention and Interrogation Program
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Foreword by Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Chairman Bianne Feinstein Findings and Concliisioiis
Executive Summary
Approved Deeember 13,,2012 Updatedfor Release April 3, 2014 Deciassificatiori Revisions December 3, M l 4
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Foreword
On April 3, 2014, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence voted to send the Findings and Conclusions and the Executive Summary of its final Study on the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program to the President for declassification and subsequent public release.
This action marked the culmination of a monumental effort that officially began with the Committee's decision to initiate the Study in March 2009, but which had its roots in an investigation into the CIA's destruction of videotapes of CIA detainee interrogations that began in December 2007.
The full Committee Study, which totals more than 6,700 pages, remains classified butisnowanofficialSenatereport. ThefullreporthasbeenprovidedtotheWhite House, the CIA, the Department of Justice, the Department of Defense, the Department of State, and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence in the hopes that it will prevent future coercive interrogation practices and inform the management of other covert action programs.
As the Chairman of the Committee since 2009,1 write to offer some additional views, context, and history.
IbeganmyserviceontheSenateIntelligenceCommitteeinJanuary2001. I remember testimony that summer from George Tenet, the Director of Central Intelligence, that warned of a possible major terrorist event against the United States, but without specifics on the time, location, or method of attack. On September 11, 2001, the world learned the answers to those questions that had consumed the CIA and other parts of the U.S. Intelligence Community.^
I recall vividly watching the horror of that day, to include the television footage of innocent men and women jumping out of the World Trade Center towers to escape thefire. Theimages,andthesoundsastheirbodieshitthepavementfarbelow, will remain with me for the rest of my life.
It is against that backdrop - the largest attack against the American homeland in our history - that the events described in this report were undertaken.
' For information on the events at the CIA prior to September 11, 2001, see the Final Report ofthe National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States (9/11 Commission) and Office of the Inspector General Report on CIA Accountability With Respect to the 9/11 Attacks.
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Nearly 13 years later, the Executive Summary and Findings and Conclusions of this report are being released. They are highly critical of the CIA's actions, and rightfullyso. Readingthem,itiseasytoforgetthecontextinwhichtheprogram began- notthatthecontextshouldserveasanexcuse,butratherasawarningfor the future.
It is worth remembering the pervasive fear in late 2001 and how immediate the threat felt. Just a week after the September 11 attacks, powdered anthrax was sent to various news organizations and to two U.S. Senators. The American public was shocked by news of new terrorist plots and elevations of the color-coded threat level of the Homeland Security Advisory System. We expected further attacks against the nation.
I have attempted throughout to remember the impact on the nation and to the CIA workforce from the attacks of September 11, 2001. I can understand the CIA's impulse to consider the use of every possible tool to gather intelligence and remove terrorists from the battlefield,^ and CIA was encouraged by political leaders and
the public to do whatever it could to prevent another attack.
The Intelligence Committee as well often pushes intelligence agencies to act quickly in response to threats and world events.
Nevertheless, such pressure, fear, and expectation of further terrorist plots do not justify, temper, or excuse improper actions taken by individuals or organizations in
the name of national security. The major lesson of this report is that regardless of the pressures and the need to act, the Intelligence Community's actions must always reflect who we are as a nation, and adhere to our laws and standards. It is precisely at these times of national crisis that our government must be guided by the lessons of our history and subject decisions to internal and external review.
Instead, CIA personnel, aided by two outside contractors, decided to initiate a program of indefinite secret detention and the use of brutal interrogation techniques in violation of U.S. law, treaty obligations, and our values.
This Conomittee Study documents the abuses and countless mistakes made between late 2001 and early 2009. The Executive Summary of the Study provides
^It is worth repeating that the covert action authorities approved by the President in September 2001 did not provide any authorization or contemplate coercive interrogations.
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a significant amount of new information, based on CIA and other documents, to what has already been made public by the Bush and Obama Administrations,' as well as non-governmental organizations and the press.
The Committee's full Study is more than ten times the length of the Executive Sununaryandincludescomprehensiveandexcruciatingdetail. TheStudy describes the history ofthe CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program from its inception to its termination, including a review of each of the 119 known individuals who were held in CIA custody.
The full Conmiittee Study also provides substantially more detail than what is included in the Executive Summary on the CIA's justification and defense of its interrogation program on the basis that it was necessary and critical to the disruptionofspecificterroristplotsandthecaptureofspecificterrorists. Whilethe Executive Summary provides sufficient detail to demonstrate the inaccuracies of each of these claims, the information in the full Committee Study is far more extensive.
IchosenottoseekdeclassificationofthefullCommitteeStudyatthistime. I believe that the Executive Summary includes enough information to adequately describe the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program, and the Committee's FindingsandConclusionscovertheentiretyoftheprogram. Seeking declassification of the more than six thousand page report would have significantly delayedthereleaseoftheExecutiveSummary. Decisionswillbemadelateronthe declassification and release of the full 6,700 page Study.
In 2009, when this effort began, I stated (in a press release co-authored with the Vice Chairman of the Committee, Senator Kit Bond) that "the purpose is to review the program and to shape detention and interrogation policies in the future." The reviewisnowdone. Itismysincereanddeephopethatthroughthereleaseof these Findings and Conclusions and Executive Summary that U.S. policy will never again allow for secret indefinite detention and the use of coercive interrogations. As the Study describes, prior to the attacks of September 2001, the CIA itself determined from its own experience with coercive interrogations, that such techniques "do not produce intelligence," "will probably result in false answers," and had historically proven to be ineffective. Yet these conclusions wereignored. Wecannotagainallowhistorytobeforgottenandgrievouspast mistakes to be repeated.
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President Obama signed Executive Order 13491 in January 2009 to prohibit the CIA from holding detainees other than on a "short-term, transitory basis" and to limit interrogation techniques to those included in the Army Field Manual. However, these limitations are not part of U.S. law and could be overturned by a future president with the stroke of a pen. They should be enshrined in legislation.
Even so, existing U.S. law and treaty obligations should have prevented many of theabusesandmistakesmadeduringthisprogram. WhiletheOfficeofLegal Counsel found otherwise between 2002 and 2007, it is my personal conclusion that, under any common meaning of the term, CIA detainees were tortured. I also believe that the conditions of confinement and the use of authorized and unauthorized interrogation and conditioning techniques were cruel, inhuman, and degrading. I believe the evidence of this is overwhelming and incontrovertible.
While the Conmiittee did not make specific recommendations, several emerge from the Committee's review. The CIA, in its June 2013 response to the Committee's Study from December 2012, has also already made and begun to implement its own recommendations. I intend to work with Senate colleagues to produce recommendations and to solicit views from the readers of the Committee Study.
I would also like to take this opportunity to describe the process of this study.
As noted previously, the Committee approved the Terms of Reference for the Study in March 2009 and began requesting information from the CIA and other federal departments. The Committee, through its staff, had already reviewed in 2008 thousands of CIA cables describing the interrogations of the CIA detainees Abu Zubaydah and 'Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri, whose interrogations were the subject of videotapes that were destroyed by the CIA in 2005.
The 2008 review was complicated by the existence of a Department of Justice investigation, opened by Attorney Geiieral Michael Mukasey, into the destruction of the videotapes and expanded by Attomey General Holder in August 2009. In particular, CIA employees and contractors who would otherwise have been interviewed by the Committee staff were under potential legal jeopardy, and therefore the CIA would not compel its workforce to appear before the Committee. This constraint lasted until the Committee's research and documentary review were completed and the Committee Study had largely been finalized.
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Furthermore, given the volume and internal nature of relevant CIA documents, the CIA insisted that the Committee enter into an arrangement where our staff would revie^ocuments and conduct research at a CIA-leased facility |
rather than at the Committee's offices on Capitol Hill.
From early 2009 to late 2012, a small group of Committee staffreviewed the more than six million pages of CIA materials, to include operational cables, intelligence reports, internal memoranda and emails, briefing materials, interview transcripts, contracts,andotherrecords. DraftsectionsoftheStudywerepreparedand distributed to the full Committee membership beginning in October 2011 and this
process continued through to the Committee's vote to approve the full Committee Study on December 13,2012.
The breadth of documentary material on which the Study relied and which the CommitteeStudycitesisunprecedented. WhiletheCommitteedidnotinterview CIA officials in the context of the Committee Study, it had access to and drew from the interviews ofnumerous CIA officials conducted by the CIA's Inspector General and the CIA Oral History program on subjects that lie at the heart of the Committee Study, as well as past testimony to the Committee.
Following the December 2012 vote, the Committee Study was sent to the President and appropriate parts of the Executive Branch for comments by February 15, 2013. The CIA responded in late June 2013 with extensive comments on the Findings and Conclusions, based in part on the responses of CIA officials involved in the program. Atmydirection,theCommitteestaffmetwithCIArepresentativesin order to fully understand the CIA's comments, and then incorporated suggested edits or comments as appropriate.
The Committee Study, including the now-declassified Executive Summary and Findings and Conclusions, as updated is now final and represents the official views oftheCommittee. ThisandfutureAdministrationsshouldusethisStudytoguide future programs, correct past mistakes, increase oversight of CIA representations to policymakers, and ensure coercive interrogation practices are not used by our government again.
Finally, I want to recognize the members of the staff who have endured years of long hours poring through the difficult details of one of the lowest points in our nation'shistory. Theyhaveproducedthemostsignificantandcomprehensive oversight report in the Committee's history, and perhaps in that of the U.S. Senate, and their contributions should be recognized and praised.
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Daniel Jones has managed and led the Committee's review effort from its inception. Dan has devoted more than six years to this effort, has personally written thousands o f its pages, and has been integrally involved in every Study decision. Evan Gottesman, Chad Tanner, and Alissa Starzak have also played integral roles in the Committee Study and have spent considerable years researching and drafting specific sections of the Committee Study.
Other Comumittee staff members have also assisted in the review and provided valuable contributions at the direction of our Committee Members. They include, among others, Jennifer Barrett, Nick Basciano, Michael Buchwald, Jim Catella, Eric Chapman, John Dickas, Lorenzo Goco, Andrew Grotto, Tressa Guenov, Clete Johnson, Michael Noblet, Michael Pevzner, Tonmiy Ross, Caroline Tess, and JamesWolfe. TheConmiittee'sStaffDirectorthroughoutthereview,David Grannis, has played a central role in assisting me and guiding the Conmiittee through this entire process. Without the expertise, patience, and work ethic of our able staff, our Members would not have been able to complete this most important work.
Dianne Feinstein
Chairman
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
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Senate Select Committee on IntelHgence
Committee Study ofthe CIA*s Detention and Interrogation Program
Findings! and Conclusions
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Approved December 13, 2012 Updatedfor Release April 3, 2014 Deelassiftcatipri Revisions December 3, 2014
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The Committee makes the following findings and conclusions:
#1: The CIA's use of its enhanced interrogation techniques was not an effective means of acquiring intelligence or gaining cooperation from detainees.
The Committee fmds, based on a review of CIA interrogation records, that the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques was not an effective means of obtaining accurate information or gaining detainee cooperation.
For example, according to CIA records, seven of the 39 CIA detainees known to have been subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques produced no intelligence while in CIA custody.* CIAdetaineeswhoweresubjectedtotheCIA'senhancedinterrogationtechniques were usually subjected to the techniques immediately after being rendered to CIA custody. Other detainees provided significant accurate intelligence prior to, or without having been subjected to these techniques.
While being subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques and afterwards, multiple CIA detainees fabricated information, resulting in faulty intelligence. Detainees provided fabricated information on critical intelligence issues, including the terrorist threats which the CIA identified as its highest priorities.
At numerous times thi'oughoutthe CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program, CIA personnel assessed that the most effective method for acquiring intelligence from detainees, including from detainees the CIA considered to be the most "high-value," was to confront the detainees with information already acquired by the Intelligence Community. CIA officers regularly called into question whether the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques were effective, assessing that the use of the techniques failed to elicit detainee cooperation or produce accurate intelligence.
#2: The CIA's justification for the use of its enhanced interrogation techniques rested on inaccurate claims of their effectiveness.
The CIA represented to the White House, the National Security Council, the Department of Justice, the CIA Office of Inspector General, the Congress, and the public that the best measure of effectiveness of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques was examples of specific terrorist plots "thwarted" and specific terrorists captured as a result of the use of the techniques. The CIA used these examples to claim that its enhanced interrogation techniques were not only effective, but also necessary to acquire "otherwise unavailable" actionable intelligence that "saved lives."
The Committee reviewed 20 of the most frequent and prominent examples of purported counterterrorism successes that the CIA has attributed to the use of its enhanced interrogation techniques, and found them to be wrong in fundamental respects. In some cases, there was no relationship between the cited counterterrorism success and any information provided by detainees during or after the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. In the
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remaining cases, the CIA inaccurately claimed that specific, otherwise unavailable information was acquired from a CIA detainee "as a result" of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, when in fact the information was either: (1) corroborative of information already available to the CIA or other elements of the U.S. Intelligence Community from sources other than the CIA detainee, and was therefore not "otherwise unavailable"; or (2) acquired from the CIA detainee prior to the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. The examples provided by the CIA included numerous factual inaccuracies.
In providing the "effectiveness" examples to policymakers, the Department of Justice, and others, the CIA consistently omitted the significant amount of relevant intelligence obtained from sources other than CIA detainees who had been subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques—leaving the false impression the CIA was acquiring unique information from the use of the techniques.
Some of the plots that the CIA claimed to have "disrupted" as a result of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques were assessed by intelligence and law enforcement officials as being infeasible or ideas that were never operationalized.
#3: The interrogations of CIA detainees were brutal and far worse than the CIA represented to policymakers and others.
Beginning with the CIA's first detainee, Abu Zubaydah, and continuing with numerous others, the CIA applied its enhanced interrogation techniques with significant repetition for days or weeks at a time. Interrogation techniques such as slaps and "wallings" (slamming detainees against a wall) were used in combination, frequently concurrent with sleep deprivation and nudity. Records do not support CIA representations that the CIA initially used an "an open, non- threatening approach,"^ or that interrogations began with the "least coercive technique possible"^ and escalated to more coercive techniques only as necessary.
The waterboarding technique was physically harmful, inducing convulsions and vomiting. Abu Zubaydah, for example, became "completely unresponsive, with bubbles rising through his open, fullmouth.'"^ InternalCIArecordsdescribethewaterboardingofKhalidShaykhMohammadas evolving into a "series of near drownings."^
Sleep deprivation involved keeping detainees awake for up to 180 hours, usually standing or in stress positions, at times with their hands shackled above their heads. At least five detainees experienced disturbing hallucinations during prolonged sleep deprivation and, in at least two of those cases, the CIA nonetheless continued the sleep deprivation.
Contrary to CIA representations to the Department of Justice, the CIA instructed personnel that the interrogation of Abu Zubaydah would take "precedence" over his medical care,^ resulting in the deterioration of a bullet wound Abu Zubaydah incurred during his capture. In at least two other cases, the CIA used its enhanced interrogation techniques despite warnings from CIA medical personnel that the techniques could exacerbate physical injuries. CIA medical personnel
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treated at least one detainee for swelling in order to allow the continued use of standing sleep deprivation.
At least five CIA detainees were subjected to "rectal rehydration" or rectal feeding without documented medical necessity. The CIA placed detainees in ice water "baths." The CIA led several detainees to believe they would never be allowed to leave CIA custody alive, suggesting toonedetaineethathewouldonlyleaveinacoffin-shapedbox.^ Oneinterrogatortoldanother detainee that he would never go to court, because "we can never let the world know what I have donetoyou."^ CIAofficersalsothreatenedatleastthreedetaineeswithharmtotheirfamilies— to include threats to harm the children of a detainee, threats to sexually abuse the mother of a detainee, and a threat to "cut [a detainee's] mother's throat."^
#4: The conditions of confinement for CIA detainees were harsher than the CIA had represented to policymakers and others.
Conditions at CIA detention sites were poor, and were especially bleak early in the program. CIA detainees at the COBALT detention facility were kept in complete darkness and constantly shackled in isolated cells with loud noise or music and only a bucket to use for human waste. Lack of heat at the facility likely contributed to the death of a detainee. The chief of interrogationsdescribedCOBALTasa"dungeon."^^ AnotherseniorCIAofficerstatedthat COBALTwasitselfanenhancedinterrogationtechnique.^'
At times, the detainees at COBALT were walked around naked or were shackled with their hands above their heads for extended periods of time. Other times, the detainees at COBAL T were subjected to what was described as a "rough takedown," in which approximately five CIA officers would scream at a detainee, drag him outside of his cell, cut his clothes off, and secure him with Mylar tape. The detainee would then be hooded and dragged up and down a long corridor while being slapped and punched.
Even after the conditions of confinement improved with the construction of new detention facilities, detainees were held in total isolation except when being interrogated or debriefed by CIA personnel.
Throughout the program, multiple CIA detainees who were subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques and extended isolation exhibited psychological and behavioral issues, including hallucinations, paranoia, insomnia, and attempts at self-harm and self-mutilation. Multiple psychologists identified the lack of human contact experienced by detainees as a cause of psychiatric problems.
#5: The CIA repeatedly provided inaccurate information to the Department of Justice, impeding a proper legal analysis of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program.
From 2002 to 2007, the Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) within the Department of Justice relied on CIA representations regarding: (1) the conditions of confinement for detainees, (2) the
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application of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, (3) the physical effects of the techniquesondetainees,and(4)theeffectivenessofthetechniques. Thoserepresentationswere inaccurate in material respects.
The Department of Justice did not conduct independent analysis or verification of the information it received from the CIA. The department warned, however, that if the facts provided by the CIA were to change, its legal conclusions might not apply. When the CIA determined that information it had provided to the Department of Justice was incorrect, the CIA rarely informed the department.
Prior to the initiation of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program and throughout the life of the program, the legal justifications for the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques relied on the CIA's claim that the techniques were necessary to save lives. In late 2001 and early 2002, senior attorneys at the CIA Office of General Counsel first examined the legal implications of using coercive interrogation techniques. CIA attorneys stated that "a novel application of the necessity defense" could be used "to avoid prosecution of U.S. officials who tortured to obtain information that saved many lives."^^^
Having reviewed information provided by the CIA, the OLC included the "necessity defense" in its August 1, 2002, memorandum to the White House counsel on Standards of Conduct for Interrogation. The OLC determined that "under the cun*ent circumstances, necessity or self- defense may justify interrogation methods that might violate" the criminal prohibition against torture.
On the same day, a second OLC opinion approved, for the first time, the use of 10 specific coercive interrogation techniques against Abu Zubaydah—subsequently referred to as the CIA's "enhanced interrogation techniques." The OLC relied on inaccurate CIA representations about Abu Zubaydah's status in al-Qa'ida and the interrogation team's "certain[ty]" that Abu Zubaydah was withholding information about planned terrorist attacks. The CIA's representations to the OLC about the techniques were also inconsistent with how the techniques would later be applied.
In March 2005, the CIA submitted to the Department of Justice various examples of the "effectiveness" of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques that were inaccurate. OLC memoranda signed on May 30, 2005, and July 20, 2007, relied on these representations, determining that the techniques were legal in part because they produced "specific, actionable intelHgence" and "substantial quantities of otherwise unavailable intelligence" that saved lives.
#6: The CIA has actively avoided or impeded congressional oversight of the program.
The CIA did not brief the leadership of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence on the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques until September 2002, after the techniques had been approved and used. The CIA did not respond to Chairman Bob Graham's requests for additional information in 2002, noting in its own internal communications that he would be leaving the Committee in Januai-y 2003. The CIA subsequently resisted efforts by Vice Chairman John D.
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RockefellerIV,toinvestigatetheprogram,includingbyrefusingin2006toproviderequested documents to the full Committee.
The CIA restricted access to information about the program from members of the Committee beyond the chairman and vice chairman until September 6, 2006, the day the president publicly acknowledged the program, by which time 117 of the 119 known detainees had already entered CIA custody. Until then, the CIA had declined to answer questions fi"om other Committee members that related to CIA inteiTogation activities.
Prior to September 6, 2006, the CIA provided inaccurate information to the leadership of the Committee. Briefings to the full Conmiittee beginning on September 6, 2006, also contained numerous inaccui*acies, including inaccurate descriptions of how interrogation techniques were applied and what information was obtained from CIA detainees. The CIA misrepresented the views of members of Congress on a number of occasions. After multiple senators had been critical of the program and written letters expressing concerns to CIA Director Michael Hayden, Director Hayden nonetheless told a meeting of foreign ambassadors to the United States that every Committee member was "fully briefed," and that "[t]his is not CIA's program. This is not the President's program. This is America's program."^^ The CIA also provided inaccurate information describing the views of U.S. senators about the program to the Department of Justice.
A year after being briefed on the program, the House and Senate Conference Committee considering the Fiscal Year 2008 Intelligence Authorization bill voted to limit the CIA to using only interrogation techniques authorized by the Army Field Manual. That legislation was approved by the Senate and the House of Representatives in Febniary 2008, and was vetoed by President Bush on March 8, 2008.
#7: The CIA impeded effective White House oversight and decision-making.
The CIA provided extensive amounts of inaccurate and incomplete information related to the operation and effectiveness of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program to the White House, the National Security Council principals, and their staffs. This prevented an accurate and complete understanding of the program by Executive Branch officials, thereby impeding oversight and decision-making.
According to CIA records, no CIA officer, up to and including CIA Directors George Tenet and Porter Goss, briefed the president on the specific CIA enhanced interrogation techniques before April 2006. By that time, 38 of the 39 detainees identified as having been subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques had already been subjected to the techniques.The CIA did not inform the president or vice president of the location of CIA detention facilities other than Country
At the direction of the White House, the secretaries of state and defense - both principals on the National Security Council - were not briefed on program specifics until September 2003. An internal CIA email from July 2003 noted that "... the WH [White House] is extremely concerned
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[Secretary] Powell would blow his stack if he were to be briefed on what's been going on."^^ Deputy Secretary of State Armitage complained that he and Secretary Powell were "cut out" of the National Security Council coordination process.^®
The CIA repeatedly provided incomplete and inaccurate information to White House personnel regarding the operation and effectiveness of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program. This includes the provision of inaccurate statements similar to those provided to other elements of the U.S. Government and later to the public, as well as instances in which specific questions from White House officials were not answered truthfully or fully. In briefings for the National Security Council principals and White House officials, the CIA advocated for the continued use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, warning that "[tjermination of this program will result in loss of life, possibly extensive."^^
#8: The CIA's operation and management of the program complicated, and in some cases impeded, the national security missions of other Executive Branch agencies.
The CIA, in the conduct of its Detention and Interrogation Program, complicated, and in some cases impeded, the national security missions of other Executive Branch agencies, including the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the State Department, and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI). The CIA withheld or restricted information relevant to these agencies' missions and responsibilities, denied access to detainees, and provided inaccurate information on the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program to these agencies.
The use of coercive interrogation techniques and covert detention facilities that did not meet traditional U.S. standards resulted in the FBI and the Department of Defense limiting their involvement in CIA interrogation and detention activities. This reduced the ability of the U.S. Government to deploy available resources and expert personnel to interrogate detainees and operate detention facilities. The CIA denied specific requests from FBI Director Robert Mueller III for FBI access to CIA detainees that the FBI believed was necessary to understand CIA detainee reporting on threats to the U.S. Homeland. Information obtained from CIA detainees was restricted within the Intelhgence Community, leading to concerns among senior CIA officers that Hmitations on sharing information undermined government-wide counterterrorism analysis.
The CIA blocked State Department leadership from access to information crucial to foreign policy decision-making and diplomatic activities. The CIA did not inform two secretaries of state of locations of CIA detention facilities, despite the significant foreign policy implications related to the hosting of clandestine CIA detention sites and the fact that the political leaders of host countries were generally informed of their existence. Moreover, CIA officers told U.S. ambassadors not to discuss the CIA program with State Department officials, preventing the ambassadors from seeking guidance on the policy implications of establishing CIA detention facilities in the countries in which they served.
In two countries, U.S. ambassadors were informed of plans to establish a CIA detention site in the countries where they were serving after the CIA had already entered into agreements with the
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countries to host the detention sites. In two other countries where negotiations on hosting new CIA detention facilities were taking place,the CIA told local government officials not to inform the U.S. ambassadors.
The ODNI was provided with inaccurate and incomplete information about the program, preventing the director of national intelligence from effectively carrying out the director's statutory responsibility to serve as the principal advisor to the president on intelligence matters. The inaccurate information provided to the ODNI by the CIA resulted in the ODNI releasing inaccurate information to the public in September 2006.
#9; The CIA impeded oversight by the CIA's Office of Inspector General.
The CIA avoided, resisted, and otherwise impeded oversight of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program by the CIA's Office oHnspector General (OIG). The CIA did not brief the OIG on the program until after the death of a detainee, by which time the CIA had held at least 22 detainees at two different CIA detention sites. Once notified, the OIG reviewed the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program and issued several reports, including an important May 2004 "Special Review" of the program that identified significant concerns and deficiencies.
During the OIG reviews, CIA personnel provided OIG with inaccurate information on the operation and management of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program, as well as on the effectiveness of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. The inaccurate information was included in the final May 2004 Special Review, which was later declassified and released publicly, and remains uncorrected.
In 2005, CIA Director Goss requested in writing that the inspector general not initiate further reviews of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program until reviews already underway were completed. In 2007, Director Hayden ordered an unprecedented review of the OIG itself in response to the OIG's inquiries into the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program.
#10: The CIA coordinated the release of classified information to the media, including inaccurate information concerning the effectiveness of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques.
The CIA's Office of Public Affairs and senior CIA officials coordinated to share classified information on the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program to select members of the media to counter public criticism, shape public opinion, and avoid potential congressional action to restrict the CIA's detention and inteiTogationauthorities and budget. These disclosures occurred when the program was a classified covert action program, and before the CIA had briefed the full Committee membership on the program.
The deputy director of the CIA's Counterterrorism Center wrote to a colleague in 2005, shortly before being interviewed by a media outlet, that "we either get out and sell, or we get hammered, which has implications beyond the media. [C]ongress reads it, cuts our authorities, messes up
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our budget... we either put out our story or we get eaten. [T]here is no middle ground."^ The same CIA officer explained to a colleague that "when the [Washington Post]/[New York Tjimes quotes 'senior intelligence official,' it's us... authorized and directed by opa [CIA's Office of Public Affairs].
Much of the information the CIA provided to the media on the operation of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program and the effectiveness of its enhanced inteiTogation techniques was inaccurate and was similar to the inaccurate information provided by the CIA to the Congress, the Department of Justice, and the White House.
#11: The CIA was unprepared as it began operating its Detention and Interrogation Program more than six months after being granted detention authorities.
On September 17, 2001, the President signed a covert action Memorandum of Notification (MON) granting the CIA unprecedented counterterrorism authorities, including the authority to covertly capture and detain individuals "posing a continuing, serious threat of violence or death to U.S. persons and interests or planning terrorist activities." The MON made no reference to interrogations or coercive interrogation techniques.
The CIA was not prepared to take custody of its first detainee. In the fall of 2001, the CIA explored the possibility of establishing clandestine detention facilities in several countries. The CIA's review identified risks associated with clandestine detention that led it to conclude that U.S. military bases were the best option for the CIA to detain individuals under the MON authorities. In late March 2002, the imminent capture of Abu Zubaydah prompted the CIA to again consider various detention options. In part to avoid declaring Abu Zubaydah to the International Committee of the Red Cross, which would be required if he were detained at a U.S. militaiy base, the CIA decided to seek authorization to clandestinely detain Abu Zubaydah at a facility in Country | — a country that had not previously been considered as a potential host for a CIA detention site. A senior CIA officer indicated that the CIA "will have to acknowledge certain gaps in our planning/preparations,""^ but stated that this plan would be presented to the president. At a Presidential Daily Briefing session that day, the president approved CIA's proposal to detain Abu Zubaydah in Country | .
The CIA lacked a plan for the eventual disposition of its detainees. After taking custody of Abu Zubaydah, CIA officers concluded that he "should remain incommunicado for the remainder of his life," which "may preclude [Abu Zubaydah] from being turned over to another country.
The CIA did not review its past experience with coercive interrogations, or its previous statement to Congress that "inhumane physical or psychological techniques are counterproductive because they do not produce intelligence and will probably result in false answers."-^ The CIA also did not contact other elements of the U.S. Government with interrogation expertise.
In July 2002, on the basis of consultations with contract psychologists, and with very limited internal deliberation, the CIA requested approval from the Department of Justice to use a set of coercive interrogation techniques. The techniques were adapted from the training of U.S.
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military personnel at the U.S. Air Force Survival, Evasion, Resistance and Escape (SERE) school, which was designed to prepare U.S. military personnel for the conditions and treatment to which they might be subjected if taken prisoner by countries that do not adhere to the Geneva Conventions.
As it began detention and interrogation operations, the CIA deployed personnel who lacked relevanttrainingandexperience. TheCIAbeganinterrogationtrainingmorethansevenmonths after taking custody of Abu Zubaydah, and more than thi'ee months after the CIA began using its "enhancedinteiTogationtechniques." CIADirectorGeorgeTenetissuedformalguidelinesfor interrogations and conditions of confinement at detention sites in January 2003, by which time 40 of the 119 known detainees had been detained by the CIA.
#12: The CIA's management and operation of its Detention and Interrogation Program was deeply flawed throughout the program's duration, particularly so in 2002 and early 2003.
The CIA's COBALT detention facility in Country | began operations in September 2002 and ultimatelyhousedmorethanhalfofthe119CIAdetaineesidentifiedinthisStudy. TheCIA kept few formal records of the detainees in its custody at COBALT. Untrained CIA officers at the facility conducted frequent, unauthorized, and unsupervised interrogations of detainees using harsh physical interrogation techniques that were not—and never became—part of the CIA's formal"enhanced"interrogationprogram. TheCI^)lacedajuniorofficerwithnorelevant experienceinchargeofCOBALT. OnNovemberjf,2002,adetaineewhohadbeenheld partially nude and chained to a concrete floor died from suspected hypothermia at the facility.
At the time, no single unit at CIA Headquarters had clear responsibility for CIA detention and interrogation operations. In interviews conducted in 2003 with the Office of Inspector General, CIA's leadership and senior attorneys acknowledged that they had little or no awareness of operations at COBALT, and some believed that enhanced interrogation techniques were not used there.
Although CIA Director Tenet in January 2003 issued guidance for detention and interrogation activities, serious management problems persisted. For example, in December 2003, CIA personnel reported that they had made the "unsettling discovery" that the CIA had been "holding a number of detainees about whom" the CIA knew "very litde" at multiple detention sites in Countryi.-'
Divergent lines of authority for interrogationactivities persisted through at least 2003. Tensions among interrogators extended to complaints about the safety and effectiveness of each other's interrogation practices.
The CIA placed individuals with no applicable experience or training in senior detention and interrogation roles, and provided inadequate linguistic and analytical support to conduct effective questioningofCIAdetainees,resultingindiminishedintelligence. ThelackofCIApersonnel available to question detainees, which the CIA inspector general referred to as "an ongoing problem,persisted throughout the program.
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In 2005, the chief of the CIA's BLACK detention site, where many of the detainees the CIA assessed as "high-value" were held, complained that CIA Headquarters "managers seem to be selecting either problem, underperforming officers, new, totally inexperienced officers or whomever seems to be willing and able to deploy at any given time," resulting in "the production of mediocre or, I dare say, useless intelligence.
Numerous CIA officers had serious documented personal and professional problems—including histories of violence and records of abusive ti'eatment of others—that should have called into question their suitability to participate in the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program, their employmentwiththeCIA,andtheircontinuedaccesstoclassifiedinformation. Innearlyall cases, these problems were known to the CIA prior to the assignment of these officers to detention and interrogation positions.
#13: Two contract psychologists devised the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques and played a central role in the operation, assessments, and management of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program. By 2005, the CIA had overwhelmingly outsourced operations related to the program.
The CIA contracted with two psychologists to develop, operate, and assess its interrogation operations. The psychologists' prior experience was at the U.S. Air Force Survival, Evasion, Resistance and Escape (SERE) school. Neither psychologist had any experience as an interrogator, nor did either have specialized knowledge of al-Qa'ida, a background in counterterrorism, or any relevant cultural or linguistic expertise.
On the CIA's behalf, the contract psychologists developed theories of interrogation based on "learned helplessness,"^^ and developed the list of enhanced inteiTogation techniques that was approved for use against Abu Zubaydah and subsequent CIA detainees. The psychologists personally conducted interrogations of some of the CIA's most significant detainees using these techniques. They also evaluated whether detainees' psychological state allowed for the continued use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, including some detainees whom they were themselves interrogating or had interrogated. The psychologists carried out inherently governmental functions, such as acting as liaison between the CIA and foreign intelligence services, assessing the effectiveness of the interrogation program, and participating in the interrogation of detainees in held in foreign government custody.
In 2005, the psychologists formed a company specifically for the purpose of conducting their work with the CIA. Shortly thereafter, the CIA outsourced vktually all aspects of the program.
In 2006, the value of the CIA's base conti"actwith the company formed by the psychologists with all options exercised was in excess of $180 million; the contractors received $81 million prior to the contract's termination in 2009. In 2007, the CIA provided a multi-year indemnification agreement to protect the company and its employees from legal liability arising out of the program. The CIA has since paid out more than $1 million pursuant to the agreement.
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In 2008, the CIA's Rendition, Detention, and Interrogation Group, the lead unit for detention and interrogation opera^ns at the CIA, had atotal of positions, which were filled with | CIA staff officers and contractors, meaning that contractors made up 85% of the workforce for detention and interrogation operations.
#14: CIA detainees were subjected to coercive interrogation techniques that had not been approved by the Department of Justice or had not been authorized by CIA Headquarters.
Prior to mid-2004, the CIA routinely subjected detainees to nudity and dietary manipulation. The CIA also used abdominal slaps and cold water dousing on several detainees during that period. None of these techniques had been approved by the Department of Justice.
At least 17 detainees were subjected to CIA enhanced interrogation techniques without authorizationfromCIAHeadquarters. Additionally,multipledetaineesweresubjectedto techniques that were applied in ways that diverged from the specific authorization, or were subjected to enhanced interrogation techniques by interrogators who had not been authorized to use them. Although these incidents were recorded in CIA cables and, in at least some cases were identified at the time by supervisors at CIA Headquarters as being inappropriate, corrective action was rarely taken against the interrogators involved.
#15: The CIA did not conduct a comprehensive or accurate accounting of the number of individuals it detained, and held individuals who did not meet the legal standard for detention. The CIA's claims about the number of detainees held and subjected to its enhanced Interrogation techniques were inaccurate.
The CIA never conducted a comprehensive audit or developed a complete and accurate list of the individuals it had detained or subjected to its enhanced interrogation techniques. CIA statements to the Committee and later to the public that the CIA detained fewer than 100 individuals, and that less than a third of those 100 detainees were subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, were inaccurate. The Committee's review of CIA records determined that the CIA detained at least 119 individuals, of whom at least 39 were subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques.
Of the 119 known detainees, at least 26 were wrongfully held and did not meet the detention standard in the September 2001 Memorandum of Notification (MON). These included an "intellectually challenged" man whose CIA detention was used solely as leverage to get a family member to provide information, two individuals who were intelligence sources for foreign liaison services and were former CIA sources, and two individuals whom the CIA assessed to be connected to al-Qa'ida based solely on information fabricated by a CIA detainee subjected to the CIA'senhancedinterrogationtechniques. Detaineesoftenremainedincustodyformonthsafter the CIA determined that they did not meet the MON standard. CIA records provide insufficient information to justify the detention of many other detainees.
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CIA Headquarters instructed that at least four CIA detainees be placed in host country detention facilities because the individuals did not meet the MON standard for CIA detention. The host country had no independent reason to hold the detainees.
A full accounting of CIA detentions and interrogations may be impossible, as records in some cases are non-existent, and, in many other cases, are spai'se and insufficient. There were almost no detailed records of the detentions and interrogations at the CIA's COBALT detention facility in 2002, and almost no such records for the CIA's GRAY detention site, also in Country At CIA detention facilities outside of Country the CIA kept increasingly less-detailed records of its interrogation activities over the course of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program.
#16: The CIA failed to adequately evaluate the effectiveness of its enhanced interrogation techniques.
The CIA never conducted a credible, comprehensive analysis of the effectiveness of its enhanced interrogation techniques, despite a recommendation by the CIA inspector general and similar requests by the national security advisor and the leadership of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence.
Internal assessments of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program were conducted by CIA personnel who participated in the development and management of the program, as well as by CIA contractors who had a financial interest in its continuation and expansion. An "informal operational assessment" of the program, led by two senior CIA officers who were not part of the CIA's Counterterrorism Center, determined that it would not be possible to assess the effectiveness of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques without violating "Federal Policy for the Protection of Human Subjects" regarding human experimentation. The CIA officers, whose review relied on briefings with CIA officers and contractors running the program, concluded only that the "CIA Detainee Program" was a "success" without addressing the effectiveness of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques.^^
In 2005, in response to the recommendation by the inspector general for a review of the effectiveness of each of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, the CIA asked two individuals not employed by the CIA to conduct a broader review of "the entirety o f the "rendition,detentionandinterrogationprogram."^"^ Accordingtooneindividual,thereviewwas "heavily reliant on the willingness of [CIA CounterteiTorismCenter] staff to provide us with the factual material that forms the basis of our conclusions." That individual acknowledged lacking the requisite expertise to review the effectiveness of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, and concluded only that "the program," meaning all CIA detainee reporting regardless of whether it was connected to the use of the CIA's enhanced inteiTogation techniques,wasa"greatsuccess."^'' Thesecondreviewerconcludedthat"thereisnoobjective way to answer the question of efficacy" of the techniques.
There are no CIA records to indicate that any of the reviews independently validated the "effectiveness" claims presented by the CIA, to include basic confirmation that the intelligence cited by the CIA was acquired from CIA detainees during or after the use of the CIA's enhanced
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interrogationtechniques. Nordidthereviewsseektoconfirmwhethertheintelligencecitedby the CIA as being obtained "as a result" of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques was unique and "otherwise unavailable," as claimed by the CIA, and not previously obtained from other sources.
#17: The CIA rarely reprimanded or held personnel accountable for serious and significant violations, inappropriate activities, and systemic and individual management failures.
CIA officers and CIA contractors who were found to have violated CIA policies or performed poorly were rarely held accountable or removed from positions of responsibility.
Significant events, to include the death and injury of CIA detainees, the detention of individuals who did not meet the legal standard to be held, the use of unauthorized interrogation techniques against CIA detainees, and the provision of inaccurate information on the CIA program did not result in appropriate, effective, or in many eases, any corrective actions. CIA managers who were aware of failings and shortcomings in the program but did not intervene, or who failed to provide proper leadership and management, were also not held to account.
On two occasions in which the CIA inspector general identified wrongdoing, accountability recommendations were ovennled by senior CIA leadership. In one instance, involving the death of a CIA detainee at COBALT, CIA Headquarters decided not to take disciplinary action against an officer involved because, at the time, CIA Headquarters had been "motivated to extract any and all operational information" from the detainee.^^ In another instance related to a wrongful detention, no action was taken against a CIA officer because, "[t]he Director strongly believes that mistakes should be expected in a business filled with uncertainty," and "the Director believes the scale tips decisively in favor of accepting mistakes that over connect the dots against those that under connect them."^^ In neither case was administrative action taken against CIA management personnel.
#18: The CIA marginalized and ignored numerous internal critiques, criticisms, and objections concerning the operation and management of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program.
Critiques, criticisms, and objections were expressed by numerous CIA officers, including senior personnel overseeing and managing the program, as well as analysts, interrogators, and medical officers involved in or supporting CIA detention and interrogation operations.
Examples of these concerns include CIA officers questioning the effectiveness of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, interrogators disagreeing with the use of such techniques against detainees whom they determined were not withholding information, psychologists recommending less isolated conditions, and Office of Medical Services personnel questioning boththeeffectivenessandsafetyofthetechniques. Theseconcernswereregularlyoverriddenby CIA management, and the CIA made few corrective changes to its policies governing the
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program. At times, CIA officers were instructed by supervisors not to put their concerns or observations in written communications.
In several instances, CIA officers identified inaccuracies in CIA representations about the program and its effectiveness to the Office of Inspector General, the White House, the Department of Justice, the Congress, and the American public. The CIA nonetheless failed to take action to correct these representations, and allowed inaccurate information to remain as the CIA's official position.
The CIA was also resistant to, and highly critical of more formal critiques. The deputy director for operations stated that the CIA inspector general's draft Special Review should have come to the "conclusion that our efforts have thwarted attacks and saved lives,"^^ while the CIA general counsel accused the inspector general of presenting "an imbalanced and inaccurate picmre" of theprogram.'^^ AFebruary2007reportfromtheInternationalCommitteeoftheRedCross (ICRC), which the CIA acting general counsel initially stated "actually does not sound that far removed from the r e a l i t y w a s also criticized. CIA officers prepared documents indicating that "critical portions of the Report are patently false or misleading, especially certain key factual c l a i m s . . C I A Director Hayden testified to the Committee that "numerous false allegations of physical and threatened abuse and faulty legal assumptions and analysis in the [ICRC] report undermine its overall credibility.'"^^
#19; The CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program was inherently unsustainable and had effectively ended by 2006 due to unauthorized press disclosures, reduced cooperation from other nations, and legal and oversight concerns.
The CIA required secrecy and cooperation from other nations in order to operate clandestine detention facilities, and both had eroded significantly before President Bush publicly disclosed the program on September 6, 2006. From the beginning of the program, the CIA faced significant challenges in finding nations willing to host CIA clandestine detention sites. These challenges became increasingly difficult over time. With the exception of Country the CIA was forced to relocate detainees out of every country in which it established a detention facility because of pressure from the host government or public revelations about the program. Beginning in early 2005, the CIA sought unsuccessfully to convince the U.S. Department of Defense to allow the transfer of numerous CIA detainees to U.S. military custody. By 2006, the CIA admitted in its own talking points for CIA Director Porter Goss that, absent an Administration decision on an "endgame" for detainees, the CIA was "stymied" and "the program could collapse of its own weight.""^
Lack of access to adequate medical care for detainees in countries hosting the CIA's detention facilities caused recunring problems. The refusal of one host country to admit a severely ill detainee into a local hospital due to security concerns contributed to the closing of the CIA's detention facility in that country. The U.S. Department of Defense also declined to provide medical care to detainees upon CIA request.
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In mid-2003, a statement by the president for the United Nations International Day in Support of Victims of Torture and a pubHc statement by the White House that prisoners in U.S. custody are treated "humanely" caused the CIA to question whether there was continued policy support for theprogramandseekreauthorizationfromtheWhiteHouse. Inmid-2004,theCIAtemporarily suspended the use of its enhanced interrogation techniques after the CIA inspector general recommendedthattheCIAseekanupdatedlegalopinionfromtheOfficeofLegalCounsel. In early 2004, the U.S. Supreme Court decision to grant certiorari in the case of Rasul v. Bush prompted the CIA to move detainees out of a CIA detention facility at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. In late 2005 and in 2006, the Detainee Treatment Act and then the U.S. Supreme Couit decision in Hamdan v. Rumsfeldcaused the CIA to again temporarily suspend the use of its enhanced interrogation techniques.
By 2006, press disclosures, the unwillingness of other countries to host existing or new detention sites, and legal and oversight concerns had largely ended the CIA's ability to operate clandestine detention facilities.
After detaining at least 113 individuals through 2004, the CIA brought only six additional detainees into its custody: four in 2005, one in 2006, and one in 2007. By March 2006, the program was operating in only one country. The CIA last used its enhanced interrogation techniques on November 8, 2007. The CIA did not hold any detainees after April 2008.
#20; The CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program damaged the United States' standing in the world, and resulted in other significant monetary and non-monetary costs.
The CIA's Detention and Interrogation Pi-ogram created tensions with U.S. partners and allies, leading to formal demarches to the United States, and damaging and complicating bilateral inteUigence relationships.
In one example, inJune 2004, the secretary ofstate ordered the U.S. ambassador inCountry | to deliverademarchetoCounteyB/li^ssencedemanding[Country| Government]providefull access to all [Country | detainees" to the International Committee of the Red Cross. At the time, however, the detainees Country | was holding included detainees being held in secret at the CIA's behest."^^
More broadly, the program caused immeasurable damage to the United States' public standing, as well as to the United States' longstanding global leadership on human rights in general and the prevention of torture in particular.
CIA records indicate that the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program cost well over $300 million in non-personnel costs. This included funding for the CIA to construct and maintain detention facilities, including two facilities costing nearly $ | million that were never used, in part due to host country political concerns.
To encourage governments to clandestinely host CIA detention sites, or to increase support for existing sites, the CIA provided millions of dollars in cash payments to foreign government
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officials. CIA Headquaiters ciicQiira^^ financial assistance to
"thinlc bigf' in terms of that assistance.'*^
Stations to eonstruct "wish lists" of iproposedi I[enttties of foreign govemments|, iand to
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'Asmeasuredbythenumberofdisseminatedintelligencereports. Tlierefore,zerointelligencereportswere disseminated based on information provided by seven of the 39 detainees known to have been subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques.
- May 30, 2005, Memorandum for John A. Rizzo, Senior Deputy General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, from Steven G. Bradbiury, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, Department of Justice, re; Application of United States Obligations Under Article 16 of tlie Convention Against Torture to Certain Techniques that May Be Used in the Interrogation of High Value al Qaeda Detainees.
^ Transcript of Senate Select Committee on Intelligence briefing, September 6, 2006.
This episode was not described in CIA cables, but was described in internal emails sent by personnel in the CIA
Office ofMedical Services andtheCIAOffice ofGeneral Counsel. Areview ofthevideotapes oftheinterrogations ofAbuZubaydahbytheCIAOfficeofInspectorGeneral(OIG)didnotnotetheincident. Areviewofthecatalog of videotapes, however, found that recordings of a 21-hourperiod, which included two waterboarding sessions, were missing.
from to cc: ^H|||HHIiHilH> More. Throughout the Committee Study, last names in all capitalized letters are pseudonyms.
^ ALEC (182321Z JUL 02)
^Atthe time, confining adetainee inabox with tlie dimensions ofacoffin was an approved CIA enhanced interrogation technique.
8[REDACTED] 1324 a61^Z SEP 03), referring to Hambali.
^ Interview of by [REDACTED] and [REDACTED], Office of the Inspector General, June 17, 2003
In one case, interrogators informed a detainee that he could earn a bucket if he cooperated. " Interview Report, 2003-7123-IG, Review of Interrogations for Counterterrorism Purposes, 2003, p. 12.
Interview Report, 2003-7123-IG, Review of Interrogations for Counterterrorism Purposes, 2003, p. 9.
April 7, May 8,
November 26, 2001, Draft of Legal Appendix, Paragraph 5, "Hostile InteiTogations: Legal Considerations for CIA Officers," at 1.
May 30, 2005, Memorandum for John A. Rizzo, Senior Deputy General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, fromStevenG. Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Officeof LegalCounsel, Department of Justice, re: Application of United States Obligations Under Article 16 of tlie Convention Against Torture to Certain Techniques that May Be Used in the Interrogation of High Value al Qaeda Detainees. July 20, 2007, Memorandum for John A. Rizzo, Acting General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, fi-om Steven G. Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, Department of Justice, re: Application of War Crimes Act, the Detainee Treatment Act, and Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions to Certain Techniques that May be Used by tlie CIA in the Interrogation of High Value al Qaeda Detainees.
The CIA's June 27, 2013, Response to the Committee Study of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program states that these limitations were dictated by the White House. The CIA's June 2013 Response then acknowledges that the CIA was^|comfortable" with this decision.
DIRECTOR • • (152227Z MAR 07)
The Committee's conclusion is based on CIA records, including statements from CIA Directors George Tenet and Porter Goss to the CIA inspector general, that the directors had not briefed the president on the CIA's interrogation program. AccordingtoCIArecords,whenbriefedinApril2006,thepresidentexpresseddiscomfortwiththe "image of a detainee, chained to the ceiling, clothed in a diaper, and forced to go to the bathroom on himself." The CIA's June2013Response doesnotdispute theCIArecords,butstatesthat"[w]hileAgencyrecordsonthesubject are admittedly incomplete, fonner President Bush has stated in his autobiography that he discussed the program, includingtheuseofenhancedtechniques,withthen-DCIATenetin2002,priortoapplicationofthetechniqueson Abu Zubaydah, and personally approved tlie techniques." A memoir by fonner Acting CIA General Counsel John Rizzo disputes this account.
CIA records indicate that the CIA had not informed policymakers of the presence of CIA detention facilities in Counti-ies |,| and|. ItislessclearwhetherpolicymakerswereawareofthedetentionfacilitiesinCountry| andatGuantanamoBay,Cuba. TlieCIArequestedthatcountrynamesandinfonnationdirectlyorindirectly
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identifying countries be redacted. The Study therefore lists the countries by letter. The Study uses the same designations consistently, so "Country J," forexample^|efers to the same country throughout the Study.
July 31, 2003, email from John Rizzo to re Rump PC on interrogations.
Lotus Notes message from Chief of the CIA Station in Countiy | to D/CTC, COPS; copied in: email from
I to [REDACTED], [REDACTED], cc: [REDACTED],
|, subj: ADCI Talking Points forCall toDepSec Armitage, date9/23/2004, at7:40:43 PM
Briefing slides, CIA Interrogation Program, July 29, 2003
" No CIA detention facilities were established in these two countries.
U.S. law (22 U.S.C. § 3927) requires that chiefs of mission "shall be kept fully and cuirently infonned with respect to all activities and operations of the Government witliin tliat country," including tlie activities and operations of the CIA.
Sametime communication, between John P. Mudd and April 13, 2005. Sametime communication, betweenJohnRN^dd April 13, 2005. jVlarch 29,2002, email from to ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ l i r e A ^ Interrogation Plan. ALEC (182321Z JUL 02)
Januai-y 8,1989, Letter from John L. Helgerson, Director ofCongressiona^^irs, to Vice Chairman William S. Cohen, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, re: SSCI Questions on at 7-8.
[REDACTED] 1528 (191903Z DEC 03)
Report of Audit, CIA-controlled Detention Facilities Operated Under the 17 September 2001 Memorandum of Notification, Report No. 2005-0017-AS, June 14, 2006.
April 15, 2005, email f ^ [REDACTED] (Chief ofBase of DETENTION SITE BLACK), to m , i m i l l l l , re General Comments.
"Learned helplessness" in this context was the theory that detainees might become passive and depressed in responsetoadverseoruncontrollableevents,andwouldthuscooperateandprovideinformation. Memofrom GraysonSWIGERT,Ph.D.,February 1,2003,"Qualifications toprovidespecial missioninterrogation consultation."
They also concluded that the CIA "should not bein the business of running prisonsor^tempora^detention facilities.'" May 12, 2004, Memorandumfor Deputy Dkector for Operationsfrom Chief, Infonnation Operations Center, and Henry Crumpton, Chief, National Resources Division via Associate Deputy Director for Operations, with the subject line, "Operational Review of CIA Detainee Program."
March 21, 2005, Memorandum for Deputy Diiector for Operations from Robert L. Grenier, Director DCI Counterterrorism Center, re Proposal for Full-Scope Independent Study of the CTC Rendition, Detention, and Interrogation Programs.
September2, 2005, Memorandum from to DirectorPorterGoss, CIA, "Assessmentof EITs Effectiveness."
September 23, 2005, Memorandum from to The Honorable Porter Goss, Director, Central Intelligence Agency, "Response to request from Director for Assessment of EIT effectiveness."
Febmary 10, 2006, Memorandum for [ | H i l l ^ ^ ^ ^ H OFFICER 1], CounterTerrorist Center, National Clandestine Service, from Executive Director re: Accountability Decision.
Congressional notification, CIA Response to OIG Investigation Regarding the Rendition and Detention of German Citizen Khalid al-Masri, October 9, 2007.
Memorandum for Inspector General; from: James Pavitt, Deputy Director for Operations; subject: re Comments to Draft IG Special Review, "Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Program" (2003-7123-IG); date: Februaiy 27, 2004; attachment: February 24,2004, Memorandum re Successes of CIA's Counterten-orism Detention and Interrogation Activities.
Februaiy 24, 2004, Memorandum from Scott W. Muller, General Counsel, to Inspector General re Inten'ogation Program Special Review (2003-7123-IG).
November 9, 2006, email from John A. Rizzo, to Michael V. Hayden, Stephen R. Kappes, cc: Michael Morell, subject: Fw: 5 December 2006 Meeting with ICRC Rep. CIA Comments on the February 2007 ICRC Report on tlie Treatment of Fourteen "High Value Detainees" in CIA
Custody."
Senate Select Committee on Litelligence hearing transcript for April 12, 2007.
DCIA Talking Points for 12 January 2006 Meeting with the President,re: Way Forwai'don Counterterrorist
Rendition, Detention and Intenogation Program. HEADQUARTERS JUN 04) [REDACTED] 5759 03); ALEC
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Senate Select Committee oii Inteffigeiice
Committee Study ofthe CIA's Detention andInterrogation Program
Executive Summary
Approved December 13, 2012 Updatedfor Release April 3, 2014
Declassification Revisions Deceniber 3, 2014
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Interrogation in Country | and the January 2003 Guidelines 49
7. The CIA Establishes DETENTION SITE COBALT, Places Inexperienced First-Tour Officer in Charge
49
2. CIA Records Lack Information on CIA Detainees and Details of Interrogations in Country^ 50
3. CIA Headquarters Recommends That Untrained Interrogators in Countiy | Use the CIA ^ Enhanced
1.
2.
3. 4.
5. 6.
7.
8. 9. 10. 11.
Past Experience Led the CIA to Assess that Coercive Interrogation Techniques Were "Counterproductive" and "Ineffective"; After Issuance o f the MON, CIA Attorneys Research Possible Legal Defensefor Using Techniques Considered Torture; the CIA Conducts No Research on Effective Interrogations, Relies on Contractors with No Relevant Experience 17
The CIA Renders Abu Zubaydah to a Covert Facility, Obtains Presidential Approval Without Inter- Agency Deliberation 21 TensionswithHost CountryLeadershipand Media AttentionForeshadow Future Challenges 23 FBI Officers Are the First to Question Abu Zubaydah, Who States He Intends to Cooperate; Abu Zubaydah is Taken to a Hospital Where He Provides Information the CIA Later Describes as
"Important" and "Vital" 24 While Abu Zubaydah is Hospitalized, CIA Headquarters Discusses the Use of Coercive Interrogation Techniques Against Abu Zubaydah 25 New CIA Interrogation Plan Focuses on Abu Zubaydalis "Most Important Secret"; FBI Temporarily Barredfrom the Questioning of AbuZubaydah; Abu Zubaydah then Placed in Isolation for 47 Days Without Questioning 27 Proposal by CIA Contract Personnel to Use SERE-Based Interrogation Techniques Leads to the Development ofthe CIA's Enhanced Interrogation Techniques; The CIA Determines that "the Interrogation Process Takes Precedence Over Preventative Medical Procedures" 31 The CIA Obtains Legal and Policy Approvalfor Its Enhanced Interrogation Techniques; The CIA Does Not Briefthe President 37 The CIA Uses the Waterboardand Other Enhanced Interrogation TechniquesAgainst AbuZubaydah
! 40
A CIA Presidential Daily Brief Provides Inaccurate Information on the Interrogation ofAbu Zubaydah 47 The CIA Does Not Brief the Committee on the Interrogation o f Abu Zubaydah 48
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Table of Contents
I. Background on the Committee Study 8
II. Overall History and Operation of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program 11
A.
B.
September 17, 2001, Memorandum of Notification (MON) Autliorizes the CIA to Capture and Detain a Specific Category of Individuals 11
1. After Considering Various Clandestine Detention Locations, the CIA Determines That a U.S. Military Bas^f^h^'Best Option'; the CIA Delegates "Blanket" Detention Approvals to CIA Officers in
•••• 11 2. The CIA Holds at Least 21 More Detainees Than It Has Represented; At Least 26 CIA Detainees
Wrongly Detained 14
The Detention of Abu Zubaydah and the Development and Authorization of the CIA's Enhanced Interrogation Techniques 17
Interrogation Techniques on Ridha al-Najjar
4. Death ofGul Rahman Leads CIA Headquarters to Leam of Unreported Coercive Interrogation
51
Techniques at DETENTION SITE COBALT; CIA Inspector General ReviewReveals Lack of Oversight
ofthe Detention Site 54
5. The CIA Begins TrainingNew Interrogators; Interrogation Techniques Not Reviewed by the
Department ofJustice Included in the Training Syllabus 57
6. Despite Recommendation from CIA Attorneys, the CIA Fails to Adequately Screen Potential
Interrogators in 2002 and 2003 58
7. Bureau ofPrisons "WOW'ed" byLevelofDeprivation at CIA's COBALTDetention Site 59
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8. TheCIAPlacesCIADetaineesinCountry| FacilitiesBecauseTheyDidNotMeettheMON Standardfor Detention 61
9. DCI Tenet Establishes First Guidelines on Detention Conditions and Interrogation; Formal Consolidation ofProgram Administration at CIA Headquarters Does Not Resolve Disagreements Among CIA Personnel 62
The Detention and Interrogation of 'Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri 66
1. CIA Interrogators Disagree with CIA Headquarters About Al-Nashiri's Level of Cooperation; Interrogators Oppose Continued Use of the CIA's Enhanced Interrogation Techniques 66
2. CIA Headquarters Sends Untrained Interrogator to Resume Al-Nashiri's Interrogations; Interrogator Threatens al-Nashiri with a Gun and a Drill 68
3. CIA Contractor Recommends Continued Use ofthe CIA's Enhanced Interrogation Techniques Against
Al-Nashiri; Chief Interrogator Threatens to Quit Because Additional Techniques Might "Push [Al- Nashiri] Over The Edge Psychologically," Refers to the CIA Program Aj' a "Train Wreak [sic] Waiting to Happen" 70
Tensions with Country | Relating to the CIA Detention Facility and the Arrival of New Detainees 73
The Detention and Interrogation of Ramzi Bin Al-Shibh 75
1. Ramzi Bin Al-Shibh Provides Information While in Foreign Government Custody, Prior to Rendition to CIA Custody 75
2. Interrogation Plan for Ramzi Bin Al-Shibh Proposes Immediate Use of Nudity and Shackling with Hands Above the Head; Plan Becomes Templatefor Future Detainees 76
3. CIA Headquarters Urges Continued Use ofthe CIA's Enhanced Interrogation Techniques, Despite Interrogators' Assessment That Ramzi Bin Al-Shibh Was Cooperative 78
4. Information Already Provided by Ramzi Bin Al-Shibh in the Custody ofa Foreign Government Inaccurately Attributed to CIA Interrogations; Interrogators Apply the CIA's Enhanced Interrogation Techniques to Bin Al-Shibh When Not Addressed A.v "Sir" and When Bin Al-Shibh Complains of Stomach Pain 79
The Detention and Intenogation of IGialid Shaykh Muhammad 81
G.
H.
Tlie Growth of tlie CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program 96
1. Fifty-Three CIA Detainees Enter the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program in 2003 96
2. TheCIAEstablishesDETENTIONSITEBLACKinCountry| andDETENTIONSITEVIOLETin
Country^ 97
3. At Least 17 CIA Detainees Subjected to the CIA's Enhanced Interrogation Techniques Without CIA
Headquarters Authorization 99
4. CIA Headquarters Authorizes Water Dousing WithoutDepartment ofJustice Approval; Application of Technique Reported as Approximating Waterboarding 105
5. Hambali Fabricates Information While Being Subjected to the CIA's Enhanced Interrogation Techniques 108
6. After the Use of the CIA's Enhanced Interrogation Techniques, CIA Headquarters Questions Detention ofDetainee and Recommends Release; Detainee Transferred to U.S. Military Custody and
L
2. 3. 4.
KSM Held in Pakistani Custody, Provides Limited Information; Rendered to CIA Custody at DETENTION SITE COBALT, KSM Is Immediately Subjected to the CIA's Enhanced Interrogation Techniques 81 The CIA Transfers KSMto DETENTIONSITEBLUE,Anticipates Use ofthe Waterboard Prior to His Arrival 83 The CIA Waterboards KSM at Least 183 Times; KSM's Reporting Includes Significant Fabricated Information 85 After the Use of the CIA's Enhanced Interrogation Techniques Against KSM Ends, the CIA Continues to Assess That KSM Is Withholding and Fabricating Information 93
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7. AYearAfterDETENTIONSITECOBALTOpens,theCIAReports"UnsettlingDiscoveryThatWe Are Holding a Number of Detainees About Whom We Know Very Little"
8. CIA Detention Sites in Country | Lack Sufficient Personnel and Translators to Support the Interrogations ofDetainees
Other Medical, Psychological, and Behavioral Issues
1. CIA Interrogations Take Precedence Over Medical Care
2. CIA Detainees Exhibit Psychological and Behavioral Issues
The CIA Seeks Reaffmiiation of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program in 2003
1. Administration Statements About the Humane Treatment of Detainees Raise Concerns at the CIA About Possible Lack ofPolicy Supportfor CIA Interrogation Activities
2. The CIA Provides Inaccurate Information to Select Members of the National Security Council, Represents that "Termination of This Program Will Result in Loss of Life, Possibly Extensive"; Policymakers Reauthorize Program
Additional Oversight and Outside Pressure in 2004; ICRC, Inspector General, Congress, and the U.S. Supreme Court
110
HI
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115
115
117
119
L.
M.
The Pace of CIA Operations Slows; Chief of Base Concerned About "Inexperienced, Marginal, Underperforming" CIA Personnel; Inspector General Describes Lack of Debriefers As "Ongoing Problem"
143
Legal and Operational Challenges in 2005 145
1.
2.
3. 4. 5. 6.
7.
8. 9.
ICRC Pressure Leads to Detainee Transfers; Department of Defense Official Informs the CIA that the U.S. Government "Should Not Be in the Position of Causing People to Disappear"; the CIA Provides Inaccurate Information on CIA Detainee to the Department of Defense 119 CIA Leadership Calls Draft Inspector General Special Review of the Program "Imbalanced and
Inaccurate," Responds with Inaccurate Information; CIA Seeks to Limit Further Reviewof the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program by the Inspector General 121 The CIA Does Not Satisfy Inspector General Special ReviewRecommendation to Assess the Effectiveness of the CIA's Enhanced Interrogation Techniques 124 The CIA Wrongfully Detains KhalidAl-Masri; CIA Director Rejects Accountabilityfor Officer Involved 128 Hassan Ghul Provides Substantial Information—IncludingInformation on a Key UBLFacilitator- Prior to the CIA's Use ofEnhanced Interrogation Techniques 130 Other Detainees Wrongfully Held in 2004; CIA Sources Subjected to the CIA's Enhanced Interrogation Techniques; CIA Officer Testifies that the CIA Is "Not Authorized" "to Do Anything Like What YouHave Seen" in Abu Ghraib Photographs 133 The CIA Suspends the Use o f its Enhanced Interrogation Techniques, Resumes Use o f the Techniques on an Individual Basis; Interrogations are Based on Fabricated, Single Source Information 134 Country ^petahis Individuals on the CIA's Behalf 139 U.S. Supreme Court Action in the Case ofRasul v. Bush Forces Transfer of CIA Detainees from Guantanamo Bay to Country^j/^ 140
1. 2.
3. 4.
5.
DepartmentofJusticeRenewsApprovalfor theUseoftheCIA'sEnhancedInterrogationTechniques in May 2005 145
AbuFarajAl-LibiSubjectedtotheCIA'sEnhancedInterrogationTechniques Prior toDepartmentof Justice Memorandumon U.S. Obligations Under the Convention Against Torture; CIA Subjects Abu FarajAl-LibitotheCIA'sEnhancedInterrogation TechniquesWhenHeComplainsofHearing Problems 146 CIA Acquires Two Detaineesfrom the U.S. Military 148 The CIA Seeks "End Game"for Detainees in Early 2005 Due to LimitedSupport From Liaison Partners 149 Press Stories and the CIA's Inability to Provide Emergency Medical Care to Detainees Result in the ClosingofCIADetentionFacilitiesinCountries| and^ 151
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6. The CIA Considers Changes to the CIA Detention and Interrogation Program Following the Detainee Treatment Act, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld 157
The Final Disposition of CIA Detainees and tlie End of the CIA's Detention and Jntenogation Program... 159
1. President Bush Publicly Acknowledges the Existence of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program 159
2. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) Gains Access to CIA Detainees After Their Transfer to U.S. Military Custody in September 2006 160
3. TheCIAConsidersFutureoftheProgramFollowingtheMilitaryCommissionsAct 161
4. The CIA Develops Modified Enhanced Interrogation Program After Passage of the Military Commissions Act 162
5. MuhammadRahim,theCIA'sLastDetainee, isSubjectedtoExtensive UseoftheCIA'sEnhanced Interrogation Techniques, Provides No Intelligence 163
6. CIA After-Action Review o f Rahim Interrogation Calls f o r Study o f Effectiveness o f Interrogation Techniques and Recommends Greater Use of Rapport-Building Techniques in Fu ture CIA Interrogations 167
7. CIA Contracting E.xpenses Related to Company Formed by SWIGERT and DUNBAR 168
8. The CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program Ends 170
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III. Intelligence Acquired and CIA Representations on the Effectivenessof the CIA's Enhanced Interrogation Techniques to Multiple Constituencies 172
A. Background on CIA Effectiveness Representations 172
B. Past Efforts to Review the Effectiveness of the CIA's Enhanced Interrogation Techniques 178
C. The Origins of CIA Representations Regarding the Effectiveness of the CIA's Enhanced Interrogation Techniques AsHaving"SavedLives,""Thwarted Plots," and"Captured Terrorists" 179
D. CIA Representations About the Effectiveness of Its Enhanced Interrogation Techniques Against Specific CIA Detainees 204
1. Abu Zubaydah 204
2. Khalid SliaykhMuhammad (KSM) 210
E. CIAEffectivenessClaimsRegardinga"HighVolumeofCriticalIntelligence" 216
F.
The Eight Primary CIA Effectiveness Representations—tlie Use of the CIA's Enhanced Intenogation Techniques "Enabled the CIA to DisruptTeiTorist Plots" and "Capture AdditionalTerrorists" 217
1. The Thwarting of the Dirty Bomb/TallBuildingsPlot and the Capture ofJose Padilla 225
2. The Thwarting of the Karachi Plots 239
3. The Thwarting of the Second Wave Plot and the Discovery of the Al-Ghuraba Group 246
4. The Thwarting of the United Kingdom Urban Targets Plot and the Capture of Dhiren Barot, aka Issa
al-Hindi 258
5. The Identification, Capture, and Arrest oflyman Faris 276
6. The Identification, Capture, and Arrest o f Sajid Badat 284
7. The Thwarting of the Heathrow Airport and Canary WharfPlotting 294
8. The Capture ofHambali 301
CIA Secondary Effectiveness Representations—Less Frequently Cited Disrupted Plots, Captures, and Intelligence that the CIA Has Provided As Evidencefor the Effectiveness of the CIA's Enhanced Interrogation Techniques 311
1. The Identification ofKlialid SliaykhMohammad {KSM) as the Mastermind ofthe September 11, 2001, Attacks 312
2. The Identification of KSM's "Mukhtar" Alias 315
3. The Capture ofRamzi bin al-Shibh 316
4. The Capture o f Khalid Sliaykh Mohammad (KSM) 326
5. The Capture ofMajid Khan 334
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IV.
Overview of CIA Representations to tlie Media While the Program Was Classified 401
A. The CIA Piovides Information on the Still-Classified Detention and Interrogation Program to Journalists Who then Publish Classified Information; CIA Does Not File Crimes Reports in Connection with the Stories
401
B. Senior CIA Officials Discuss Need to "Put Out Our Story" to Shape Public and Congressional Opinion Prior to the Full Committee Being Briefed 402
C. CIA Attorneys Caution that Classified Information Provided to the Media Should Not Be Attributed to the CIA 404
D. The CIA Engages with Journalists and Conveys an Inaccurate Account of the Interrogation of Abu Zubaydah 405
Review of CIA Representations to the Department of Justice 409
A. August 1, 2002, OLC Memorandum Relies on Inaccurate Information Regarding Abu Zubaydah 409
B. The CIA Interprets the August 1, 2002, Memorandum to Apply to Other Detainees, Despite Language of the Memorandum; Intenogations of Abu Zubaydah and Other Detainees Diverge from the CIA's Representations to the OLC 411
C. Following Suspension of the Use of the CIA's Enhanced Inten'ogation Techniques, the CIA Obtains Approval from the OLC for die InteiTogationof Three Individual Detainees 413
D. May 2005 OLC Memoranda Rely on Inaccurate Representations from the CIA Regarding the Interrogation Process, the CIA's Enhanced Intenogation Techniques, and the Effectiveness of the Techniques 419
E. After Passage of the Detainee Treatment Act, OLC Issues Opinion on CIA Conditions of Confinement, WithdrawsDraftOpinionon theCIA's Enhanced Interrogation TechniquesAfterthe U.S.SupremeCourt Case of Hamdan v. Rumsfeld 428
F. July 2007 OLC Memorandum Relies on Inaccurate CIA Representations Regarding CIA Interrogations and the Effectiveness of the CIA's Enhanced Interrogation Techniques; CIA Misrepresents Congressional Views to the Department of Justice 431
Review of CIA Representations to the Congress 437
A. After Memorandum of Notification, the CIA Disavows Torture and Assures the Committee Will Be Notified of Every Individual Detained by the CIA 437
B. The CIA Notifies Committee of the Detention of Abu Zubaydah, but Mtikes No Reference to Coercive Interrogation Techniques; the CIA Briefs Chairman and Vice Chairman After die Use of the CIA's EnhancedInterrogation Techniques; the CIA Discusses Sti-ategy to Avoid the Chairman's Request for More Information 437
C. No Detailed Records Exist of CIA Briefings of Committee Leadership; the CIA Declines to Answer Questions from Committee Members or Provide Requested Materials 439
D. Vice Chairman Rockefeller Seeks Committee Investigation 441
E. In Response to DetaineeTreatment Act, the CIA Briefs Senators Not on the Committee; Proposal from SenatorLevin for an Independent Commission Prompts Renewed Calls Within the CIA to Destroy Interrogation Videotapes 443
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V.
VI.
6. 7.
8. 9. 10. 11. 12.
The Thwarting of the Camp Lemonier Plotting 336 The Assertion that CIA Detainees Subjected to Enhanced Interrogation Techniques Help Validate CIA Sources 342 The Identification and Arrests of Uihair and Saifullah Paracha 352 Critical Intelligence Alerting the CIA to Jajfar al-Tayyar 358 The Identification and Arrest ofSaleh al-Marri 366 The Collection ofCritical Tactical Intelligence on Shkai, Pakistan 368 Information on the Facilitator that Led to the UBL Operation 378
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F. CIA Director Goss Seeks Committee Support for the Program After the Detainee Treatment Act; CIA Declines to Answer Questions for the Record 444
G. Full Committee First Briefed on the CIA's Intenogation Program Hours Before It Is Publicly Acknowledged on September 6,2006 446
H. Tlie CIA Provides Additional Information to the Full Committee and Staff, Much of It Inaccurate; Intelligence Authorization Act Passes Limiting CIA Interrogations to Techniques Authorized by the Army Field Manual 449
I. President Vetoes Legislation Based on Effectiveness Claims Provided by tlie CIA; CIA DecUnes to Answer Committee Questions for the Record About the CIA Interrogation Program 452
VII. CIA Destruction of Interrogation Videotapes Leads to Committee Investigation; Committee Votes 14-1 for Expansive Terms of Reference to Study the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program 455
VIII.Appendix1: TermsofReference 457 IX. Appendix 2: CIA Detainees from 2002- 2008 458 X. Appendix 3: Example of Inaccurate CIA Testimony to the Committee-April 12,2007 462
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I. Background on the Committee Study
(U) On December 11, 2007, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence ("the Committee") initiated a review of the destruction of videotapes related to the interrogations of CIA detainees Abu Zubaydah and 'Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri after receiving a briefing that day on the matter by CIADirectorMichaelHayden. Atthatbriefing,DirectorHaydenstatedthatcontemporaneous CIA operational cables were "a more than adequate representation of the tapes," and he agreed to provide the Committee with limited access to these cables at CIA Headquarters.
(U) On February 11, 2009, after the Committee was presented with a staff-prepared summary of the operational cables detailing the interrogations of Abu Zubaydah and al-Nashiri, the Committee began considering a broader review of the CIA's detention and interrogation practices. OnMarch5,2009,inavoteof14to1,theCommitteeapprovedTermsofReference for a study of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program.^
(U) The Committee Study of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program is a lengthy, higlily detailed report exceeding 6,700 pages, including approximately 38,000 footnotes. It is divided into three volumes;
I. History and Operation of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program. This volume is divided chronologically into sections addressing the establishment, development, and evolution of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program. It includes an addendum on CIA Clandestine Detention Sites and the Arrangements Made with Foreign Entities in Relation to the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program.
II. Intelligence Acquired and CIA Representations on the Effectiveness of the CIA's Enhanced Interrogation Techniques. This volume addresses the intelligence the CIA attributed to CIA detainees and the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, specifically focusing on CIA representations regarding the effectiveness of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, as well as how the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program was operated and managed. It includes sections on CIA representations to the media, the Department of Justice, and the Congress.
ni. Detention and Interrogation of CIA Detainees. This volume addresses the detention and interrogation of 119 CIA detainees, from the program's authorization on September 17, 2001, to its official end on January 22, 2009, to include information on their capture, detention, interrogation, and conditions of confinement. It also includes extensive information on the CIA's management, oversight, and day-to-day operation of its Detention and Interrogation Program.
(U) On December 13, 2012, the Senate Select Committee on InteUigence approved the CommitteeStudy ofthe CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program ("Committee Study") by a bipartisan vote of 9-6. The Committee Study included 20 findings and conclusions. The
' See Appendix 1: "Terms of Reference, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Study of the Central Intelligence Agency's Detention and Interrogation Program."
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Committee requested that specific executive branch agencies review and provide comment on
the Committee Study prior to Committee action to seek declassification and public release of the Committee Study. On June 27, 2013, the CIA provided a written response, which was followed by a series of meetings between the CIA and the Committee that concluded in September 2013. Following these meetings and the receipt of Minority views, the Committee revised the findings and conclusions and updated the Committee Study. On April 3, 2014, by a bipartisan vote of 11- 3, the Committee agreed to send the revised findings and conclusions, and the updated Executive Summary of the Committee Study, to the president for declassification and public release.
(U) The Committee's Study is the most comprehensive review ever conducted of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program. The CIA has informed the Committee that it has provided the Committee with all CIA records related to the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program.^ The document production phase lasted more than three years, produced more than six million pages of material, and was completed in July 2012. The Committee Study is based primarily on a review of these documents,^ which include CIA operational cables, reports, memoranda, intelligence products, and numerous interviews conducted of CIA personnel by various entities within the CIA, in particular the CIA's Office of Inspector General and the CIA's Oral History Program, as well as internal email"^ and other communications.^
(U) The Executive Summary is divided into two pai'ts. The first describes the establishment, development, operation, and evolution of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program. The second part provides information on the effectiveness of the CIA's Detention and InteiTogation Program, to include information acquired from CIA detainees, before, during, and after the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques; as well as CIA representations on the effectiveness and operation of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program to the media, the Department of Justice, and the Congress. The Executive Summary does not include a
^ The Committee did not have access to approximately 9,400 CIA documents related to the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program that were withheld by the White House pending a determination and claim of executive privilege. TheCommitteerequestedaccesstothesedocumentsoverseveralyears,includinginwritingonJanuary 3, 2013, May 22, 2013, and December 19,2013. The Committee received no response from the White House.
^ From January 2, 2008, to August 30, 2012, the Department of Justice conducted a separate investigation into various aspects of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program, witli tlie possibility of criminal prosecutions of CIA personnel and contractors. On October 9, 2009, the CIA informed the Committee that it would not compel CIA personnel to participate in interviews with the Committee due to concerns related to the pending Department of Justice investigations. (See DTS #2009-4064.) While the Committee did not conduct interviews with CIA personnel during the course of this review, the Committee utilized previous interview reports of CIA personnel and CIA contractors conducted by tlie CIA's Office of the Inspector General and the CIA's Oral History Program. In addition to CIA materials, the Committee reviewed a much smaller quantity of documents from the Department of Justice, the Department of Defense, and the Department of State, as well as documents that had separately been provided to the Committee outside of this review. Inconsistent spellings found within the Committee Study reflect the inconsistencies found in the underlying documents reviewed.
The CIA informed tiie Committee that due to CIA record retention policies, the CIA could not produce all CIA email communications requested by the Committee. As a result, in a few cases, the text of an email cited in the Study was not available in its original format, but was embedded in a larger email chain. For tliis reason, the Committee, in some limited cases, cites to an email chain that contains the original email, ratlier than the original email itself.
The report does not review CIA renditions for individuals who were not ultimately detained by tlie CIA, CIA interrogation of detainees in U.S. military custody, or tlie treatment of detainees in the custody of foreign governments, as these topics were not included in the Committee's Terms of Reference.
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description of the detention and interrogations of all 119 known CIA detainees. Details on each of these detainees are included in Volume in.
(U) Throughout this summary and the entire report, non-supervisory CIA personnel have been listedbypseudonym. Thepseudonymsfortheseofficersareusedthroughoutthereport. To distinguish CIA officers in pseudonym from those in true name, pseudonyms in this report are denoted by last names in upper case letters. Additionally, the CIA requested that the names of countries that hosted CIA detention sites, or with which the CIA negotiated the hosting of sites, as well as information directly or indirectly identifying such countries, be redacted from the classifiedversionprovidedtoCommitteemembers. Thereportthereforeliststhesecountriesby letter. Thereportusesthesamedesignationsconsistently,so"CountryJ,"forexample,refersto the same country throughout the Committee Study. Further, the CIA requested that the Committee replace the original code names for CIA detention sites with new identifiers.^
^On April 7,2014, the Executive Summary ofthe Committee Study ofthe CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program wasprovided to theexecutive branch fordeclassification andpublic release. On August 1,2014, theCIA returnedtotheCommitteetheExecutiveSummarywithitsproposedredactions. Overtheensuingmonths,the Committee engaged in deliberations with the CIA and the White House to ensure that the Committee's narrative— andsupportfortheCommittee'sfindingsandconclusions—remainedintact. Significantalterationshavebeenmade totheExecutiveSummaryinordertoreachagreementonapubliclyreleasableversionofthedocument. For example, the CIA requested that in select passages, the Committee replace specific dates with more general time frames. The Committee also replaced the true names of some senior non-undercover CIA officials with pseudonyms. TheexecutivebranchthenredactedallpseudonymsforCIApersonnel,andinsomecasesthetitlesof positions held bytheCIA personnel. Further, while the classified Executive Summaiy and full Committee Study lists specific countries by letter (for example "Country J"), and uses the same letter to designate the specific country throughout the Committee Study, the letter^iav^eei^edacte^^ieexecuti^ branch for this public release.
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II. Overall History and Operation of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program
A. September 17, 2001, Memorandum of Notification (MON) Authorizes the CIA to Capture and Detain a Specific Category of Individuals
1. After Considering Various Clandestine Detention Locations, the CIA Determines That a U.S. Military Base Is the "Best Option": the CIA Delegates "Blanket" Detention
Approvals to CIA Ojficers in
September 17, 2001, six days after the teiTorist attacks of September 11, 2001, President George W. Bush signed a covert action Memorandum of Notification (MON) to authorize the director of central intelligence (DCI) to "undertake
operations designed to capture and detain persons who pose a continuing, serious threat of violence or death to U.S. persons and interests or who are planning terrorist activities."^ Although the CIA had previously been provided limited authorities to detain specific, named individuals pending the issuance of formal criminal charges, the MON provided unprecedented authorities, granting the CIA significant discretion in determining whom to detain, the factual basisforthedetention,andthelengthofthedetention.^ TheMONmadenoreferenceto interrogations or interrogation techniques.^
On Septemberl4^00Mhrcj days before the issuance of the MON, the chief ofoperations ofthe CIA's based on an urgent requh^ent from
the chief ofthe Counterterrorism Center (CTC), sent an email to CIA Stations in H I seeking input on appropriate locations for potential CIA detention facilities. Over the courseoftiie next month, CIA officers considered at least four countries in |||||||||| and one in H H H B as possible hosts for detention facilities and at least three proposed site locations. ^^
September 26, 2001, senior CTC personnelji^ to discuss the captureanddetainauthoritiesintheMON. OnSeptember28,2001,[^^^HCTCLegal,
sent an email describing the meeting and a number of policy decisions. The
^ September 17, 2001, Memorandum of Notification, for Members of the National Security Council, re. Rm^So^?7iratparag^^
®Attachment 5 to May 14, 2002, letter from Stanley Moskowitz, CIA Office of Coni gressional Affairs, to A1 Cumming, Staff Dinrector, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, transmitting the^| Memoranda ofNotification (DTS #2002-2175).
®September 17, 2001, Memorandum of Notification, for Members of the National Security Council, re.
(DTS #2002-0371)^a^aragraph4.
DIRECTOR ( I B i H I H ) ; email from: [REDACTED]; to: [REDACTED]; subject; Cable re
Country | ; date: January 29, 2009.
" Memorandum for DCI from J. Cofer Black, Director of Counterterrorism, via Deputy Duector of Central Intelligence, General Counsel, Executive Director, Deputy Director for Operations and Associate Director of Central Intelligence/Militaiy Support, entitled, "Approval to Establish a Detention Facility for Terrorists."
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email stated that covert facilities would be operated "in a manner consistent with, but not pursuant to, the formal provision of appropriately comparable Federal instructions for the operation of prison facilitie^n^he incarceration of inmates held under the maximum lawful securitymechanisms." I^H^I'semailrecognizedtheCIA'slackofexperienceinnmning detention facilities, and stated that the CIA would consider acquiring cleared personnel from the Department of Defense or the Bureau of Prisons with specialized expertise to assist the CIA in operating the facilities.On September27, 2001, CIA Headquarters informed CIA Stations that any future CIA detention facility would have to meet "U.S. POW Standards.
early November 2001, CIA Headquarters further determined that any future CIA detention facility would have to meet U.S. prison standards and that CIA
detention and interrogation operations should be tailored to "meet the requirements of U.S. law and the federal rules of criminal procedure," adding that "[s]pecific methods of interrogation w[ould] be permissible so long as they generally comport with commonly accepted practices deemed lawful by U.S. c o u r t s . T h e CIA's search for detention site locations was then put on hold and an internal memorandum from senior CIA officials explained that detention at a U.S. militarybaseoutsideoftheUnitedStateswasthe"bestoption."'^ Thememorandumthusurged the DCI to "[pjress DOD and the US military, at highest levels, to have the US Military agree to host a long-term facility, and have them identify an agreeable location," specifically requesting that the DCI "[s]eek to have the US Naval Base at Guantanamo Bay designated as a long-term detention facility.
Addressing the risks associated with the CIA maintaining a detention facility, the CIA memorandum warned that "[a]s captured terrorists may be held days,
months, or years, the likelihood of exposure will grow over time," and that "[m]edia exposure could inflame public opinion against a host government and the U.S., thereby threatening the continuedoperationofthefacility." Thememorandumalsoanticipatedthat,"[i]naforeign country,closecooperationwiththehostgovernmentwillentailintensivenegotiations."^^ The CIA memorandum warned that "any foreign country poses uncontrollable risks that could create incidents, vulnerability to the security of the facility, bilateral problems, and uncertainty over maintainingthefacility."^^ Thememorandumrecommendedtheestablishmentofa"short-term" facilityinwhichtheCIA'srolewouldbelimitedto"oversight,fundingandresponsibility." The
Emailfrom: to:[REDACTED];subject:EYESONLY-CaptureandDetention;date: September 28, 2001, at 09:29:24 AM.
'3DIRECTOR (272119ZSEP 01)
November7,2001,DraftofLegalAppendix,"HandlingInterrogation."SeealsoVolumeI. Memorandum for DCI from J. Cofer Black, Director of Counterterrorism, via Deputy Director of Central
Intelligence, General Counsel, Executive Director, Deputy Director for Operations and Associate Director of Central Intelligence/Military Support,entitled,"Approval to Establish a Detention Facilityfor Terrorists."
Memorandum for DCI from J. Cofer Black, Director of Counterterrorism, via Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, General Counsel, Executive Director, Deputy Director for Operations and Associate Director of Central Intelligence/Military Support, entitled, "Approval to Establish a Detention Facilityfor Terrorists."
" Memorandum for DCI from J. Cofer Black, Director of Counterterrorism, via Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, General Counsel, Executive Director, Deputy Director for Operations and Associate Director of Central Intelligence/Military Support, entitled, "Approval to Establish a Detention Facility for Teixorists."
Memorandum for DCI from J. Cofer Black, Director of Counterterrorism, via Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, General Counsel, Executive Director, Deputy Director for Operations and Associate Director of Central Intelligence/Military Support, entitled, "ApprovaltoEstablisl^Deten^^ for Terrorists."
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CIA would "contract out all other requirements to other US Government organizations, commercial companies, and, as appropriate, foreign governments."'^
October 8, 2001, DCI George Tenet delegated the management and oversight of the capture and detention authorities provided by the MON to the CIA's deputy director for operations (DDO), James Pavitt, and the CIA's chief of the Counterterrorism Center,
CoferBlack.^^ TheDCIalsodirectedthatallrequestsandapprovalsforcaptureanddetentionbe documented inwriting. On December 17, 2001, however, the DDO rescinded these^^^^ requirements and issued via a CIA cable "blanket approval" for CIA officers in j H H H to "determine [who poses] the requisite 'continuing serious threat of violence or death to US personsandinterestsorwhoareplanningterroristactivities.'"^' ByMarch2002,CIA Headquarters had expanded the authority beyond the language of the MON and instructed CIA personnel that it would be appropriate to detain individuals who might not be high-value targets in their own right, but could provide information on high-value targets.
On April 7, 2003, ^ ^ I H C T C Legal,
sent a cable to CIA Stations and Bases stating that "at this stage in the war [we] believe there is
sufficient opportunity in advance to document the key aspects of many, if not most, of our captureanddetainoperations.cable alsoprovidedguidanceastowhocould be detained under the MON, stating:
"there must be an articulable basis on which to conclude that the actions of a specific person whom we propose to capture and/or detain pose a 'continuing serious threat' of violence or death to U.S. persons or interests or that the person is planning a terrorist activity.
.. .We are not permitted to detain someone merely upon a suspicion that he or she has valuable information about teiTorists or planned acts of ten'orism.... Similarly, the mere membership in a particular group, or the mere existence of a particular familial tie, does not ncccssarily connote that the threshold of 'continuing, serious threat' has been satisfied."^"^
Memorandum for DCI from J. Cofer Black, Director of Counterterrorism, via Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, General Counsel, Executive Director, Deputy Director for Operations and Associate Director of Central Intelligence/Military Support, entitled, "Approval to Establish a Detention Facility for Tenorists."
Memorandum from George Tenet, Director of Central Intelligence, to Deputy Director for Operations, October 8, 2001, Subject: (U) Delegations of Authorities.
2' DIRECTORHljimUlOZDEC01)
22 WASHINGTOnHIH (272040Z MAR 02)
23DIRECTOR{{^•(072216Z APR03)
2'*DIRECTOR (072216ZAPR03). InalatermeetingwithCommitteestaff,Hi^HCTCLegal,
stated that the prospect that the CIA "could hold [detainees] forever" was "teiTifying," adding, "[n]o one wants to be in a position of being called back from retirement in however many years to go figure out what do youdowithsoandsowhostillposesatlueat." SeeNovember13,2001,TranscriptofStaffBriefingonCovert Action Legal Issues (DTS #2002-0629).
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2. The CIA Holds at Least 21 More Detainees Than It Has Represented; At Least 26 CIA Detainees Wrongly Detained
While the CIA has represented in public and classified settings that it detained "fewer than one hundred" individuals,-^ the Committee's review of CIA records
indicates that the total number of CIA detainees was at least 119.^^ Internal CIA documents indicate that inadequate record keeping made it impossible for the CIA to determine how many individuals it had detained. In December2003, a CIA Station overseeing CIA detention operations in Country | informed CIA Headquarters that it had made the "unsettling discovery" thattheCIAwas"holdinganumberofdetaineesaboutwhom"itknew"verylittle,"^^ Nearly five years later, in late 2008, the CIA attempted to determine how many individuals the CIA had detained. At the completion of the review, CIA leaders, including CIA Director Michael Hayden, were informed that the review found that the CIA had detained at least 112 individuals, andpossiblymore.^^ Accordingtoanemailsummarizingthemeeting,CIADirectorHayden
CIADirectorHaydentypicallydescribedtheprogramasholding"fewerthanahundred"detainees. Forexample, in testimony before the Committee on February 4, 2008, in response to a question from Chairman Rockefeller during an open hearing, Hayden stated, "[i]n the life of the CIA detention program we have held fewer than a hundred people." {See DTS #2008-1140.) Specific references to "98" detainees were included in a May 5, 2006, House Permanent Select Committee on IntelUgence (HPSCI) report on Renditions, Detentions and Interrogations. See also Memorandum for John A. Rizzo, Acting General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, from Steven G. Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, July 20, 2007, Re: Application of the War Crimes Act, the Detainee Treatment Act, and Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions to Certain Techniques thatMayBeUsedbytheCIAintheInterrogationoniigl^alu^lQaedaDetainees. OtherexamplesofthisCIA representatioi^nclu^ a statement to the HPSCI on February 15, 2006, and a statementby^^^CTCLegalB^H^HtotheSSO^June10,2008. SeeDTS#2008-2698.
The Committee's accountingof the numberof CIA detainees is conservative and only includesindividuals for whom there is clear evidence of detention in CIA custody. The Committee thus did not count, among the 119 detainee^ix ofthe 31 individuals listed in a memo entitled "Updated List of Detainees In |
attached to a March 2003 email sent by DETENTION SITE COBALT site manager |
[CIA OFFICER 1], because they were no^xplicitl^esc^ed as CIA detainees andbecausethe^idnoto^ appea^i^IA record^(5^^mail from: ^HH|||Hm[CIAOFnCER 1]; t o : | | | m ^ ^ , H H
and subjectr^^^HP^^^^IDETAINEES;date:March13,2003.) An
additional individual is the subjectof CIA cablesdescribing a plannedtransferfrom U.S. military to CIA custody at
DETENTION SITE COBALT. He was likewise not included among the 119 CIA detainees because of a lack of
CIA records confiraiing either his transfer to, or his presence at, DETENTION SITE COBALT. As detailed in this
summary, in December 2008, the CIA attempted to identify the total number ofCIA detainees^nag^h prepared
for CIA leadership, the CIA repre^nted the number of CIA detainees as "112+ ?" See {HHIHUHM 12417
(101719Z OCT 02); ALEC (232056Z OCT 02); 190159 (240508Z OCT 02); and ALEC l l l l
(301226ZOCT 02). 27
As of June 27, 2013, when the CIA provided its Response to the Committee Study of tlie CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program (hereinafter, the "CIA's June 2013 Response"), the CIA had not yet made an independent determinationofthenumberofindividualsithaddetained. TheCIA'sJune2013Responsedoesnotaddressthe number of detainees determined by the Committee to be held by the CIA, other than to assert that the discrepancy between past CIA representations, that there were fewer than 100 detainees, and the Committee's determination of therebeingatleast119CIAdetainees,wasnot"substantivelymeaningful." TheCIA'sJune2013Responsestates that the discrepancy "does not impact the previously known scale of the program," and that "[i]t remains true that approximately 100 detainees were pjirt of the program; not 10 and not 200." The CIA's June 2013 Response also states that, "[t]he Study leaves unarticulated what impact the relatively small discrepancy might have had on policymakers or Congressional overseers." The CIA's June 2013 Response further asserts that, at the time Director Hayden was representing there had been fewer than 100 detainees (2007-2009), the CIA's internal research
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instructed a CIA officer to devise a way to keep the number of CIA detainees at the same number the CIA had previously briefed to Congress. The email, which the briefer sent only to himself, stated:
"I briefed the additional CIA detainees that could be included in RDI"^ numbers. DCIA instructed me to keep the detainee number at 98 ~ pick whatever date i [sic] needed to make that happen but the number is 98."^^
While the CIA acknowledged to the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI) in February 2006 that it had wrongly detained five
individuals throughout the course of its detention program, a review of CIA records indicates
"indicate[d] the total number of detainees could have been as high as 112," and that "uncertainty existed within CIA about whether a group of additional detainees were actually part of the program, partially because some of tliem had passed tlirough [DETENTION SITE COBALT] prior to the formal establishment of tlie program under CTC auspiceson3December2002"(emphasisadded). ThisJune27,2013,CIAstatementisinaccurate: theCIA's determination at the time was that there had been at least 112 CIA detainees and that the inclusion of detainees held prior to December 3, 2002, would make that number higher. On December20, 2008, a CTC officer informed the chief of CTC that "112 were detained by CIA since September 11, 2001," noting "[t]hese revised statistics do not include any detainees at [DETENTION SITE COBALT] (other than Gul Rahman) who departed [DETENTION SITE COBA^Jprior to RDG assuming authority of[DETENTION SITE COBALT] as of03 Deceiver 2002." {See "||||^^mH|||||||numbersbri£fdoc/*at^he^^inaiHiromJ||||^^^|||||^^ to: I H l
|, [REDACTED], Revised Rendition andDetention Statistics; date: December 20, 2008.) By December 23, 2008, CTC had created a giaph that identified the total number of CIA detainees, excluding Gul Rahman, "Post 12/3/02" as 111. The graph identified the total number includingGulRahman,butexcludingotlierdetainees"pre-12/3/02"as"112+?." (SeeCIA-producedPowerPoint Slide, RDG Numbers, dated December 23, 2008.) Witli regard to the Committee's inclusion of detainees held at DETENTION SITE COBALT prior to December 3, 2002, the CIA does not dispute that they were held by the CIA pursuant to the same MON authorities as detainees held after that date. Moreover, the CIA has regularly counted amongitsdetaineesanumberofindividualswhowereheldsolelyatDETENTIONSITECOBALTpriorto December 3,2002, as well as several who were held exclusively at Country ^^^m||m|p:'acilities on behalf of the CIA. In discussing the role of DETENTION SITE COBALT in the CIA's Detention and Intenogation Program, tlien Deputy Director of Operations James Pavitt told the CIA Office of Inspector General in August 2003 that "there are those who say that [DETENTION SITE COBALT] is not a CIA facility, but that is 'bullshit.'" (See Interview Report, 2003-7123-IG, Review of Interrogations for Counterterrorism Purposes, James Pavitt, August 21, 2003.)
The "Renditions and Inteirogations Group," is also referred to as the "Renditions Group," the "Rendition, Detention, and Intenj^gatiot^roi^ "RDI/^n^|RD^ in CIA records.
Email from; subject: Meeting with DCIA; date: Januaiy 5, 2009. AccordingtotlieCIA'sJune2013Response,"Haydendidnotviewthediscrepancy,ifitexisted,as particularly significant given that, if true, it would increase the total number by just over 10 percent."
They include Sayed Habib, who was detained duetofobrications made by KSM wliile_KSM_was_beinf subiected to the CIA's enhanced inteiTogation techniques 1281 (130801Z JUN 04)
3031
2817
Saeed Awadh, the subject of mistaken identity (ALEC |
ModinNik Muhammed, whom the CIA determinedhadbeenpu^sefiil^ misidentified b^^ourc^u^^i blood feud
143701 DIRECTOR
Khalid al-Masri, whose "prolonged detention" was determined by the CIA
152893
Inspector General to be "unjustified" (CIA Office of Inspector General, Report of Investigation, The Rendition and Detention of German Citizen Khalid al-MasrH200^60^[G)^ul^6^007^ 83); and Zarmein, who was one of
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that at least 21 additional individuals, or a total of 26 of the 119 (22 percent) CIA detainees identified in this Study, did not meet the MON standard for detention.^" This is a conservative calculation and includes only CIA detainees whom the CIA itself determined did not meet the standard for detention. It does not include individuals about whom there was internal disagreement within the CIA over whether the detainee met the standard or not, or the numerous detainees who, following their detention and interrogation, were found not to "pose a continuing threat of violence or death to U.S. persons and interests" or to be "planning terrorist activities" as required by the September 17, 2001, With one known exception, there ai'e no CIA
'a number of detainees about whom" the CIA knew "veiy httle" (|
1528
They include Abu Hudhaifa, who was subjected to ice water baths and 66 hours of standing sleep deprivation before being released because the CIA discovered he was likely not the person he was believed to be
(W ASHINGTON 51303 Muhammad Khan, who, like Zarmein, was among detainees about whom the CIA acknowledged knowing "very little"
1528 another case of mistaken identity (HEADQUARTERS l l i m ); Shaistah Habi^llahKl^^ his brother, Sayed Habib, was the subject of fabrications
by KSM (HEADQUARTER^^^^HH^^^^^^^^I); Hai^Ghalgi^lKM^is detained as "useful leverage" against a family member Naz^ir Ali, an "intellectually challenged" individual whose taped crying was used as leverage against his family member
13065
xivment of $||||| mil |iillii i iiiin in I 33693
33693HHIIII^^^^^^ft^Hayatullal^^
wrong place the wrong time^jflBHI^I^^BH 33322 Jan, whowasde^ for using a satellite phone, traces on which "revealed no derogatory information^jlHH 1542
two individuals —Mohammad al-Shomaila and Salah Nasir Salim Ali—on whom derogatory information was "speculative" (email from: [REDACTED]Uo: [REDACTEDl, 1REDACTED], and [REDACTED]; subjety: Backgrounders; date: April 19, 2006;|^^^^^| 17411 ALEC
|; undated document titled. "Talking Points for HPSCI about Former CIA Detainees"); two individuals who were discovered to be foreign government sources prior to being rendered to CIA custody, and later determined to be former CIA 2185 ([REDACTED]); ALEC| ([REDACTED]); HEADQUARTERS B||H(IrS)ACTED])); seven individuals
thought to be travelling to Iraq to join al-Qa'ida who were detained based on claims that were "thin but cannot be ignore£^en^^ to: [REDACTED|; cc: [REDACTED], [REDACTED],
[REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED]; subject: Request Chief/CTC Approval to Apprehend and Detain Individuals Departing Imminently for Iraq to Fight Against US Forces; date: September 16, 2003); and Bismullah, who was mistakenly arrested |
and later released with $ H [ and told not to speak about his experience 46620
For example, the Committee did not include among the 26 individuals wrongfully detained: Dr. Hikmat Nafi Shaukat, even though it was determined that he was not involved in CBRN efforts and his involvement with al-
QaMda members was limited to perst)nal relationships with former neighbors
30414 Karim, cika Asat Sar Jan, about whom uiestions
he may have been slandered by a rival tribal faction (|
IHIIII^H 27931
detainees); Arsala Khan, who suffered disturbing hallucinations after 56 hours of standing sleep deprivation, after which the CIA determined thath^|doefuiot^^ the subject involved in... cuiTent plans or activities against l^M^e^<>;ineU^cilities" (^^^IHIHlliiiHH (20I006Z OCT 03); HEADQUARTERS UtM (lll^mmillllllll); and Janat Gul, who also suffered "frightful" hallucinations following sleep deprivation and about whom the chief of the detention facility wrote, "[t]here simply is no 'smoking gun' that we can refer to that would justify our continued holding of [Janat Gul] at a site such as [DETENTION SITE BLACK]"
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DIRECTOR wererai^ within theCIAaboiU
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liiiiiii ( ml ii'liii was released with a
whomtheCIAdeterm^ "mayhavebeeninthe
[REDACTED] Memo, SUBJECT: getting a handle on
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records to indicate that the CIA held personnel accountable for the detention of individuals the CIA itself determined were wrongfully detained.
occasions, the CIA used host country detention sites in Country | to detain individuals on behalf of the CIA who did not meet the MON
standard for capture and detention. ALEC Station officers at CIA Headquarters explicitly acknowledged that these detainees did not meet the MON standard for detention, and recommended placing the individuals in host country detention facilities because they did not meet the standard. The host country had no independent reason to detain these individuals and held them solely at the behest of the CIA.^^
B. The Detention of Abu Zubaydah and the Development and Authorization of the CIA's Enhanced Interrogation Techniques
1. Past Experience Led the CIA to Assess that Coercive Interrogation Techniques Were ''Counterproductive " and "Ineffective After Issuance of the MON, CIA Attorneys
Research Possible Legal Defensefor Using Techniques Considered Torture; the CIA Conducts No Research on Effective Interrogations, Relies on Contractors with No
Relevant Experience
At the time of the issuance of the September 17, 2001, MON- which, as noted, did not reference interrogation techniques—the CIA had in place long-standing
formal standards for conducting interrogations. The CIA had shared these standards with the
1530 04); 1537 04) 04); email from: [REDACTED] (COB [DETENTIONSITEBLACK]); to:
|; subject: re date: April 30,2005).
The CIA's June 2013 Response "acknowledge[s] that there were cases in which errors were made," but points
only to the case of Khalid al-Masri, whose wrongful detention was the subject of an Inspector General review. The CIA's June 2013 Response does not quantify the number of wrongfully detained individuals, other than to assert that it was "far fewer" than the 26 documented by the Committee. The CIA's June 2013 Response acknowledges that "the Agency frequently moved too slowly to release detainees," and that "[o]f the 26 cases cited by the Study, we adjudicated only three cases in less than 31 days. Most took tliree to six months. CIA should have acted sooner." As detailed in the Study, there was no accountability for personnel responsible for the extended detention of individuals determined by the CIA tohave been wmng^l^etained^^^^^
ALEC^^•J^^B^^H^IRECTOR ••••••I; DIRECTOR B;ALEC^^Ifm^^^^Hi. DespitetheCIA'sconclusionthattheseindividualsdidnotmeetthe standard for detention, these individuals were included in tlie list of 26 wrongfully detained if they were released, but not if they were transferred to the custody of another country. The list thus does not include Hamid Aich, although CIA Headquartereiecognize^hat Aich did not meet the threshold for unilateral CIA custody, and sougl^ toplacehiminCountry||||||^g|g||||||mcustodywheretheCIAcouldstilldebriefhim. {SeeDIRECTORmH
Hamid Aich was transferred to Country ^m||||^n|||m custod^i^pn^B^003^nd transferredto^^^rtifanothercountry's]custodymorethanamonthlater. (See 36682
38836HIIIHIi^HH)- ^helistalsodoesnotinclude Mohammad Dinshah, despite a detemiination prior to his capture that the CIA "does not view Dinshah as meeting
the 'continuing serious threat' threshold required for this operation to be conducted pursuant to [CIA] authority," and a detennination, after his capture, that "he does not meet the strict standards requiredto^ to [DETENTION SITECOBALT]." {SeeDlRECTOR^^lHEADQUAKrERS_H|UHiiHil^B)- Dinshali was transferred to IHIii^^^V^tody. See HEADQUARTERS
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Committee. In January 1989, the CIA informed the Committee that "inhumane physical or psychological techniques are counterproductive because they do not produce intelligence and will probably result in false answers."^^ Testimony of the CIA deputy director of operations in 1988 denounced coercive interrogation techniques, stating, "[pjhysical abuse or other degrading treatment was rejected not only because it is wrong, but because it has historically proven to be ineffective."^^ By October 2001, CIA policy was to comply with the Department of the Army FieldManual"IntelligenceInterrogation."^^ ACIADirectorateofOperationsHandbookfrom October 2001 states that the CIA does not engage in "human rights violations," which it defined as: "Torture, cruel, inhuman, degrading treatment or punishment, or prolonged detention without chargesortrial." Thehandbookfurtherstatedthat"[i]tisCIApolicytoneitherparticipate directly in nor encourage interrogation which involves the use of force, mental or physical torture, extremely demeaning indignities or exposure to inhumane treatment of any kind as an aid to interrogation."^^
(U) The CIA did, however, have historical experience using coercive forms of interrogation. In 1963, the CIA produced the KUBARK Counterintelligence InteiTogation Manual, intended as a manual for Cold War inteiTogations, which included the "principal coercive techniques of interrogation: arrest, detention, deprivation of sensory stimuli through solitary confinement or similar methods, threats and fear, debility, pain, heightened suggestibility and hypnosis, narcosis andinducedregression."'^® In1978,DCIStansfieldTurneraskedformerCIAofficerJohn LimondHarttoinvestigatetheCIAinterrogationofSovietKGBofficerYuriNosenko"^^using the KUBARK methods—to include sensory deprivation techniques and forced standing."^^ In Hart's testimony before the House Select Committee on Assassinations on September 15, 1978, he noted that in his 31 years of government service:
"It has never fallen to my lot to be involved with any experience as unpleasant in every possible way as, first, the investigation of this case, and, second, the necessity of lecturing upon it and testifying. To me it is an abomination, and I
January 8, 1989, Letter from John L. Helgerson, Director ofCongressionalA^irs, to Vice Chairman William S. Cohen, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, re: SSCI Questions on H H i i > ^-8 (DTS #1989-0131).
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Transcript of Richard Stolz, Deputy Director for Operations, Central Intelligence Agency (June 17, 1988), p. 15 (DTS #1988-2302).
Attachment to Memorandum entitled, "Approval to Establish a Detention Facility for Tenorists," CTC: 1026(138)701 fromJ.CoferBlack,DirectorofDCICounterterroristCenter,toDirectorofCentralIntelligencevia multipleparties,October25,2001; DraftofLegalAppendix,"HandlingInterrogations."
Directorate of Operations Handbook, 50-2, Section XX(l)(a), updated October 9,2001.
KUBARK Counterintelligence Interrogation, July 1963, at 85. Accordingtopublicrecords,inthemid-1960s,theCIAimprisonedandinterrogatedYuriNosenko,aSovietKGB
officer who defected to the U.S. in early 1964,for three years (April 1964 to September 1967). Senior CIA officers at the time did not believe Nosenko was an actual defectorand orderedhis imprisonment and interrogation. Nosenko was confined in a specially constructed "jail," with nothing but a cot, and was subjected to a series of sensory deprivation techniques and forced standing.
Among other documents, see CIA "Family Jewels" Memorandum, 16 May 1973, pp. 5, 23-24, available at www.gwu .edu/~nsarchiv/NS AEBB/NSAEBB222^rail^ewel^^all^crpdf
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am happy to say that... it is not in my memory typical of what my colleagues and I did in the agency during the time I was connected with it.'"^^
Notwithstanding the Hart investigation findings, just five years later, in 1983, a CIA officer incorporated significant portions of the KUBARK manual into the
Human Resource Exploitation (HRE) Training Manual, which the same officer used to provide interrogation training inLatin America in the early 1980s, and which was used tomjovid^^^^ interrogation training to the 1981."^ CIA officer
was involved in the HRE training and conducted interrogations. The CIA inspector general later recommended that he be orally admonished for inappropriate use of interrogation techniques.'^^ In the fall of 2002, became the CIA's chief of interrogations in the CIA's Renditions Group,the officer in charge of CIA interrogations."^^
Despite the CIA's previous statements that coercive physical and psychological interrogation techniques "result in false answers'"^^ and have "proven to be
ineffective,'"^^ as well as the aforementioned eai'ly November 2001 determination that "[sjpecific methods of interrogation w[ould] be permissible so long as they generally comport with commonly accepted practices deemed lawful by U.S. courts,"^^ by the end of November 2001, CIA officers had begun researching potential legal defenses for using interrogation techniques that were considered torture by foreign governments and a non-governmental organization. On November 26, 2001, attorneys in the CIA's Office of General Counsel circulated a draft legal memorandum describing the criminal prohibition on torture and a potential "novel" legal defense for CIA officers who engaged in torture. The memorandum stated that the "CIA could argue that the torture was necessary to prevent imminent, significant, physical harm to persons, where there is no other available means to prevent the harm," adding that "states may be very unwilling to calltheU.S.totaskfortorturewhenitresultedinsavingthousandsoflives,"^^ AnAugust1,
"Investigation of the Assassination of President John F. Kennedy," Hearings before the Select Committee on Assassinations of U.S. House of Representatives, 95"^ Congress, Second Session, September 11-15, 1978. Testimony ofJohn Hart, pp. 487-536 (Septeml^ 15, 1978) (DTS #Q04761).
Transcript of Committee Hearing on Interrogation Manual, June 17, 1988, pp. 3-4 (DTS #1988-2302).
April 13, 1989, Memorandum from CIA Inspecto^eneral William F. Donnelly to Jim Currie and John Nelson, SSCI Staff, re: Answers to SSCI Questions o n ^ ^ | ^ | , attachment Mto Memorandum to Chairman and Vice Chairman, re: Inquiry into Interrogation Training, July 10, 1989 (DTS # 1989-0675). See also |H|l984^Meniorandum for Inspector General from [REDACTED], Inspector, via Deputy Inspector General, re:
IO-III84.
As noted, the Renditions Group was also known during the program as the "Renditions and Interrogations
Group," as well as the "Rendition, Detention, and Interrogation Group," and by the initials, "RDI" and "RDG." December 4, 2002, Training ReportjRevise^ersion, High Value Target Interrogation and Exploitation (HVTIE)
Training Seminar 12-18 Nov 02 ( " [ H U H ] was recently assigned to tlie CTC/RG to manage the HVT Interrogation and Exploitation (HVTIE) mission, assuming tlie role as HVT interrogator/Team Chief.").
January 8, 1989, Letter from John L. Helgerson, Director ofCongressionalA^irs to Vice Chairman William S. Cohen, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence re: SSCI Questions on ^H||||||, at7-8 (DTS #1989-0131).
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Transcript of Richard Stolz, Deputy Director for Operations, Central
Intelligence Agency (June 17, 1988), at 15 (DTS #1988-2302). 50November7,2001,DraftofLegalAppendix,"HandlingIntenogation."SeealsoVolumeI.
November 26, 2001, Draft of Legal Appendix, "Hostile Interrogations: Legal Considerations for CIA Officers." The draft memo cited the "Israeli example" as a possible basis for arguing that "torture was necessary to prevent imminent, significant, physical hann to persons, where there is no other available means to prevent the harm."
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2002, OLC memorandum to the White House Counsel includes a similar analysis of the "necessity defense" in response to potential charges of torture.^^
January 2002, the National Security Council principals began to debate whether to apply the protections of the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War of August 12, 1949 ("Geneva") to the conflict with al-Qa'ida and the Taliban.
A letter drafted for DCI Tenet to the presidenturged that the CIA be exempt from any application of these protections, arguing that application of Geneva would "significantly hamper theabilityofCIAtoobtaincriticalthreatinformationnecessarytosaveAmericanlives."^^ On February 1, 2002—approximately two months prior to the detention of the CIA's first detainee— a CIA attorney wrote that if CIA detainees were covered by Geneva there would be "few alternatives to simply asking questions." The attorney concluded that, if that were the case, "then the optic becomes how legally defensible is a particular act that probably violates the convention, but ultimately saves lives.
On February 7, 2002, President Bush issued a memorandum stating that neither al-Qa'ida nor Taliban detainees qualified as prisoners of war under Geneva, and that
Common Article 3 of Geneva, requiring humane treatment of individuals in a conflict, did not apply to al-Qa'ida or Taliban detainees.^^
From the issuance of the MON to early 2002, there are no indications in CIA records that the CIA conducted significant research to identify effective
interrogation practices, such as conferring with experienced U.S. military or law enforcement interrogators, or with the intelligence, military, or law enforcement services of other countries with experience in counterten-orismand the interrogation of terrorist suspects.Nor are there CIA records referencing any review of the CIA's past use of coercive interrogation techniques andassociatedlessonslearned. TheonlyresearchdocumentedinCIArecordsduringthistime on the issue of interrogation was the preparation of a report on an al-Qa'ida manual that was
Memorandum for Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President, re: Standards of Conduct for Interrogation under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340A. Like the November 26, 2001, draft memo, the OLC memorandum addressed the Israeh example.
-'3 Email fromj^^H||^^H; to: [REDACTED] cc: [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], Jose Rodi-iguez, ^^^^^••^[REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED]; subject: For OOB Wednesday - Draft Letter to the President; date: January 29, 2002. No records
have been identified to indicate that this letter was or was not sent.
Email from: [REDACTED]; to: [REDACTED]; subject: POW's and Questioning; date:
Februaiy 1, 2002, at 01:02:12 PM.
February 7, 2002, Memorandum for the Vice President, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the
Attorney General, chief of staff to the President, Director of Central Intelligence, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, and Chainnan of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, re. Humane Treatment of al Qaeda and Taliban Detainees.
After the CIA was unsuccessful in acquiring information from its last detainee, Muhammad Rahim, using the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, an after-action review in April 2008 suggested that the CIA conduct a survey of interrogation techniques used by other U.S. government agencies and other countries in an effort to developeffectiveinterrogationtechniques. SeeundatedCIAMemorandum,titledH^H||After-ActionReview, author [REDACTED], and undated CIA Memorandum, titled [Rahim] After Action Review: HVDI Assessment, with attached addendum, [Rahim] Lessons Learned Review Panel Recommendations Concerning the Modification ofSleep Deprivation and Reinstatement ofWallin^^i^IT^Foradditionalinfor^^ see Volume I.
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initially assessed by the CIA to include strategies to resist interrogation. This report was commissioned by the CIA's Office of Technical Services (OTS) and drafted by two CIA contractors, Dr. Grayson SWIGERT and Dr. Hammond DUNBAR.^^
Both SWIGERT and DUNBAR had been psychologists with the U.S. Air Force Survival, Evasion, Resistance and Escape (SERE) school, which exposes select
U.S. military personnel to, among other things, coercive interrogation techniques that they might besubjectedtoiftakenprisonerbycountriesthatdidnotadheretoGenevaprotections. Neither psychologist had experience as an interrogator, nor did either have specialized knowledge of al- Qa'ida, a background in terrorism, or any relevant regional, cultural, or linguistic expertise. SWIGERT had reviewed research on "learned helplessness," in which individuals might become passiveanddepressedinresponsetoadverseoruncontrollableevents.^^ Hetheorizedthat inducing such a state could encourage a detainee to cooperate and provide information.^^
2. The CIA Renders Abu Zubaydah to a Covert Facility, Obtains Presidential Approval Without Inter-Agency Deliberation
March 2002, Pakistani government authorities, working with the CIA, captured al-Qa'ida facilitator Abu Zubaydah in a raid during which Abu Zubaydah
suffered bullet wounds. At that time, Abu Zubaydah was assessed by CIA officers in ALEC Station, the office within the CIA with specific responsibility for al-Qa'ida, to possess detailed knowledge of al-Qa'ida terrorist attack plans. However, as is described in greater detail in the full Committee Study, this assessment significantly overstated Abu Zubaydah's role in al-Qa'ida and the information he was likely to possess.^®
Grayson SWIGERT and Hammond DUNBAR, Recognizing and Developing Countenneasures to A1 Qaeda Resistance to Intenogation Techniques: A Resistance Training Perspective (undated). See also Memorandum for the Record, November 15, 2007, SSCI Staff Briefing with Grayson SWIGERT and Hammond DUNBAR (DTS #2009-0572).
See, for example, Memo from Grayson SWIGERT,subject, "Qualifications to provide special mission intenogation consultation"; Undated^mtitle^iem^tating^^^^ollowin^nf^^ by a telephone [REDACTED],
|, Interrogator Training, Lesson Plan, Title: A Scientific Approach to Successful Intenogation; DIR 1(031227Z APR 02).
See, for example, Memo from Grayson SWIGERT, subject: "Qualifications to provide special mission intenogation consultation."
See detainee review of Abu Zubaydah in Volume III. See also CIA Intelligence Assessment, August 16, 2006, "Countering Misconceptions About Training Camps in Afghanistan, 1990-2001." The document states: "Khaldan NotAffiliatedWithAl-Qa'ida. AcommonmisperceptioninoutsidearticlesistliatKhaldancampwasmnbyal- Qa'ida. Pre-11 September 2001 reporting miscast Abu Zubaydah as a 'senior al-Qa'ida lieutenant,' which led to the inferencetliattheI^aldancamphewasadministeringwastiedtoUsamabinLaden. Thegroup'sflagsliipcamp,al- Faruq, reportedly was created in the late 1980s so tliat bin Laden's new organization could have a training infrastructure independent of 'Abdullah Azzam's Maktab al-Kliidamat, the nongovernmental organization that supported Khaldan. Al-Qa'ida rejected Abu Zubaydah's request in 1993 to join the group and Khaldan was not overseen by bin Laden's organization. There were relations between the al-Qa'ida camps and Klialdan. Trainees, particularly Saudis, who had finished basic training at Klialdan were refened to al-Qa'ida camps for advanced courses, and Khaldan staff observed al-Qa'idatraining^Ti^w^roupsJ^ did not exchange trainers."
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On the day that Abu Zubaydah was captured, CIA attorneys discussed interpretations of the criminal prohibition on torture that might permit CIA officers to
engageincertaininterrogationactiviti^®' AnattorneyinCTC^sos^anemailwiththe subject line "TorUire Update" to Legal listing, without commentary, the restrictions on interrogation in the Geneva Conventions, the Convention Against Torture, and the criminal prohibition on torture.^-
March 2002, anticipating its eventual custody of Abu Zubaydah, the CIA began considering options for his transfer to CIA custody and detention
undertheMON. TheCIArejectedU.S.militarycustody^H|||||||H,inlargepartbecauseof the lack of security and the fact that Abu Zubaydah would have to be declared to the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC).^^ The CIA's concerns about custody at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, included the general lack of secrecy and the "possible loss of control to US military and/or FBI."^"^ Rendition to Country | was rejected because of the perception that the results of that country's recent interrogations had been disappointing, as well as the intense interest in Abu Zubaydah from CIA leadership. As ALEC Station wrote, the CIA needed to participate directly in the interrogation, "[n]ot because we believe necessarily we can improve on [Country | ] performance, but because the reasons for the lack of progress will be transparent and reportable up die line."^^
Over the course of four days, the CIA settled on a detention site in Country | because of that country's
and the lack of U.S. court jurisdiction. The only disadvantages identified by the CIA with detention in Country | were that it would not be a "USG-controlled facility" and that "diplomatic/policydecisions"wouldberequired.^^ AsaMarch28,2002,CIAdocument acknowledged, the proposal to render Abu Zubaydah to Country | had not yet been broached with that country's officials. The document also warned: "[w]e can't guarantee security. If AZ's presencedoesbecomeknown, notclearwhattheimpactwould be."^^
The decision to detain Abu Zubaydah at a covert detention facility in Country | did not involve the input of the National Security Council Principals Committee,
the Department of State, the U.S. ambassador, or the CIA chief of Station in Country On March 29, 2002, an email from the Office of the Deputy DCI stated that "[w]e will have to
March 29, 2002, email from [REDACTED] cc: John Rizzo, [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], subject, NEW INFO; A-Z Interrogation Plan ("I have thought about the 18 USC sect. 2340 issues we briefly discussed yesterday.").
Email from: [REDACTED]; to: subject; Torture Update; date: March 28, 2002, at 11:28:17 AM.
19595 (281106Z MAR 02). PowerPoint presentation, Options for Incarcerating Abu Zubaydah, March 27,
2002.
^ PowerPoint presentation, Options for Incarcerating Abu Zubaydah, March 27, 2002. PowerPoint presentation, Options for Incarcerating Abu Zubaydah, March 28, 2002.
ALEC I H I (282105Z MAR 02)
^ PowerPoint presentation. Options for Incarcerating Abu Zubaydah, March 27, 2002.
PowerPoint presentation. Options for Incarcerating Abu Zubaydah, March 28, 2002.
Email from: [REDACTED] B H H ; Pavitt; subject; DCI Decision on [DETENTION SITE GREEN] Briefing for Armitage; date: Septembe^6^002^IRECTO|^^^H MAR 02).
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acknowledge certain gaps in our planning/preparations, but this is the option the DDCI will lead with for POTUS consideration."^^ That morni^, the president approved moving forward with the plan to transfer Abu Zubaydah to Country During the same Presidential Daily Brief (PDB) session, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld suggested exploring the option of putting Abu Zubaydah on a ship; however, CIA records do not indicate any further input from the
)rincipals7^ Thatday,theCIAStationinCountry| obtainedtheapprovalofCountry|'s officialsfortheCIAdetentionsite7^ TheU.S.deputychiefofmissionin Country | , who was notified by the CIA Station after Country B's leadership, concurred in the
absence of the ambassador, Shortly thereafter, Abu Zubaydah was rendered from Pakistan to Country^ where he was held at the first CIA detention site, referred to in this summary as "DETENTION SITE GREEN."^"^ CIA records indicate that Country | was the last location of a CIA detention facility known to the president or the vice president, as subsequent locations were kept from the principals as a matter of White House policy to avoid inadvertent disclosures of the location of the CIA detention sites.^^
3. Tensions with Host Country Leadership and Media Attention Foreshadow Future Challenges
(TS//H[^^(^HB||^^J^^^h^a^fte^h^2ndition of Abu Zubaydah to DETENTION III (il' II II 11II which was responsible for the security of
the detention facility, linked its support for the CIA's detention site to a request for supportfronrtheCIAjjU^^^^HI^^^^H^^^^H^I. TheCIAeventuallyprovidedthe requested ^^^^^|support7
According to CIA cables and internal documents.
Email from: HIIIHHHI' subject: A-Z Inteirogation Plan; date: March 29, 2002. POTUS is an abbreviation for President of the United States.
Email fiom: [REDACTED]; to: subject: NEW INFO: A-Z Intenogation Plan; date: March 29, 2002.
Email from: [REDACTED]; to: ilHHIilll^l> subject: A-Z Interrogation Plan; email from: [REDACTED] to: James Pavitt; subject: DCI Decision on [DETENTION SITE GREEN^n^ng for Armitage; date: September 26, 2002. After the PDB session, the assistant secretary of state was briefed. The assistant secretary indicated that he would brief the secretary and deputy secretary of state. An internal CIA email stated that at the NSC, only National Security Advisor Rice and Deputy National SecurityAdvi^r Hadleywerebriefed. SeeDIRECTOR (|||^|||MAR02);emailfroin: [REDACTED] to: James Pavitt; date: September 26, 2002.
^2 [REDACTED] 69132 MAR 02) ^3 [REDACTED] 69132 MAR 02)
For additional infonnation on the rendition of Abu Zubaydah and the estabhsliment of DETENTION SITE GREEN, see Volume I.
HEADQUARTERS [REDACTED]; HEADQUARTERS CIA records indicate that the CIA had not informed policymakers oftlie presence ofCIA detention facilities in Countries | and Itisless clear whether policymakers were aware ofthe detention facilities in Country | and atGuantanamo Bay, Cuba.
See, for example, [REDACTED] 70240 (300614Z APR 02); [REDACTED] 70112 (250929Z APR 02); [REDACTED] 70459 (080545Z MAY 02); Congressional Notification: Intelligence Support to|
ll| Ill I MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence; FROM:
|;SUBJECT: Yourmeet^with| 12002;coverpag^ate^
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romoted
to replace
individuals responsible for supporting
UNCLASSIFIED
the CIA's detention facilityThose officials were replaced by different officials whom the CIA believed were not supportive of the CIA's detention site7^ Despite considerable effort by the C^l^tation in Counti'^^^etaii^upport for DETENTION SITE GREEN from its new
partners, called for the closing of the CIA detention facility within three weeksContinued lobbying by the chief of Station, however, eventually led Country | to reverse this decision, allowing DETENTION SITE GREEN to remain operational.^^
On April 2002, the CIA Station in Country | attempted to list thenumberofCountry| officerswho,"[t]othebestofStation'sknowledge,"had"knowledge
of the presence of Abu Zubaydah" in a specific city in Country The list included eight individuals^jef^^ personnel "staff of|H
andconcluded"[djoubtlessmanyothers."^^ ByAprilB,2002, a media organization had learned that Abu Zubaydah was in Country | , prompting the CIA to
explaintothemediaorganizationthe"securityimplications"ofrevealingtheinformation.^^ The CIA Station in Country | also expressed concern that press inquiries "would do nothing for our liaison and bilateral relations, possibly diminishing chances that [the of Country
| ] will permit [Abu Zubaydah] to remain in country or that he would accept other [Abu Zubaydah]-like renderees in the future."^-^ In November 2002, after the CIA learned that a major U.S. newspaper knew that Abu Zubaydah was in Country | , senior CIA officials, as well as Vice President Cheney, urged the news^per not to publish the information.^"^ While the U.S. newspaper did not reveal Country | as the location of Abu Zubaydah, the fact that it had the information, combined with previous media interest, resulted in the decision to close DETENTION SITE GREEN.^^
4. FBI Officers Are the First to Question Abu Zubaydah, Who States He Intends to Cooperate; Abu Zubaydah is Taken to a Hospital Where He Provides Infonnation the CIA Later Describes as "Important" and "Vital"
(TS/. 'm¥-) After Abu Zubaydah was rendered to DETENTION SITE GREEN o n M a r c h 2002, he was questioned by special agents from the Federal Bureau of
See, for example. [REDACTED] 74636
[REDACTED] 76975
[REDACTED] 77115
[REDACTED] 77281 The CIA's June 2013 Response states that "[i]t was only as leaks
detailing the program began to emerge that foreign partners felt compelled to alter the scope of their involvement.' Asdescribed,however,thetensionswithCountry| wereunrelatedtopublicrevelationsabouttheprogram.
[REDACTED] 69626
Email from: William Harlow, Directorof the CIA Office of PubUc Affairs; to: John McLaughlin, Buzzy Krongard, John Moseman, John Rizzo, James Pavitt, [REDACTED], Stanley Moskowitz; subject: [REDACTED] call Re: Abu Zubaydah; date: April 25, 2002,12:06:33 PM.
83 [REDACTED] 701681
^ ALEC
Detainees Group.
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Chief, Renditions and
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Investigation (FBI) who spoke Arabic and had experience interrogating members of al-Qa'ida. Abu Zubaydah confirmed his identity to the FBI officers, informed the FBI officers he wanted to cooperate, and provided background information on his activities. That evening, Abu Zubaydah's medical condition deteriorated rapidly and he required immediate hospitalization. Although Abu Zubaydah was largely unable to communicate because of a breathing tube, he continued to provide information to FBI and CIA officials at the hospital using an Arabic alphabetchart. Accordingtorecords,theFBIofficersremainedatAbuZubaydah'sbedside du'oughout this ordeal and assisted in his medical care. When Abu Zubaydah's breathing tube was removed on April 8, 2002, Abu Zubaydah provided additional intelligence and reiterated his intention to cooperate.^^
During an April 10, 2002, debriefing session, conducted in the hospital's intensive care unit, Abu Zubaydah revealed to the FBI officers that an individual
named "Mukhtar" was the al-Qa'ida "mastermind" of the 9/11 attacks. Abu Zubaydah identified a picture of Mukhtar provided by the FBI from the FBI's Most Wanted list. The picture was of Khalid Shaykh Mohammad (KSM), who had been indicted in 1996 for his role in Ramzi Yousef's terrorist plotting to detonate explosives on 12 United States-flagged aircraft and destroy themmid-flightoverthePacificOcean.^^ AbuZubaydahtoldtheinterrogatorsthat"Mukhtar" was related to Ramzi Yousef, whom Abu Zubaydah said was in an American jail (Yousef had been convicted for the aforementioned terrorist plotting and was involved in the 1993 World Trade Center terrorist attack).^^
Zubaydah told the FBI officers that "Mukhtar" trained the 9/11 hijackers and also provided additional information on KSM's background, to include diat KSM spoke fluent English, was approximately 34 yeai*s old, and was responsible for al-Qa'ida
operationsoutsideofAfghanistan.^^ SubsequentrepresentationsonthesuccessoftheCIA's Detention and Interrogation Program consistently describe Abu Zubaydah's identification of KSM's role in the September 11, 2001, attacks, as well as his identification of KSM's alias ("Mukhtar"), as being "important" and "vital" information.^'^ A review of CIA records found that this information was corroborative of information already in CIA databases.^^
5. While Abu Zubaydah is Hospitalized, CIA Headquarters Discusses the Use o f Coercive Interrogation Techniques Against Abu Zubaydah
10005 (092316Z APR 02). See Abu Zubaydah detainee review in Volume HI for additional
information.
See United States Court ofAppeals^ugus^^n, 2001, U.S. vRamzi Ahmed Yousef, and DIRECTOR
HJAN 02). See also••••••ciA MAR02).
10022 (121216Z APR 02). CIA records include the variant spelling, "Muhktar." KSM was placed on
the FBI's public "Most Wanted Terrorist" list on October 10,2001. See also U.S. Department of Justice materials related to Ramzi Ahmed Yousef.
• m 10022 (I21216Z APR 02); 18334 (261703Z MAR 02)
See, for example. President Bush's September 6, 2006, speech, based on CIA information and vetted by the CIA,
which stated tliat Abu Zubaydah provided "quite important" infomiation and "disclosed Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, or KSM, was the mastermind behind the 9/11 attacks and used the alias Muklitar. This was a vital piece of the puzzle that helped our intelligence community pursue KSM."
See information later in tliis summary and Volume II for additional details. III! 11 III I
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While Abu Zubaydah was still hospitalized, personnel at CIA Headquarters began discussing how CIA officers would interrogate Abu Zubaydah upon his
return to DETENTION SITE GREEN. The initial CIA interrogation proposal recommended that the interrogators engage with Abu Zubaydah to get him to provide information, and suggested that a "hard approach," involving foreign gov^jjmen^ersonnel, be t^cei^|onlyasala£ resort."^^ Atameetingaboutthisproposal,^H^^hCTCLegal,
recommended that a psychologist working on contract in the CIA's Office of Technical Services (OTS), Grayson SWIGERT, be used by CTC to "provide real-time recommendations to overcome Abu Zubaydahl^^sistan^ to interrogation."^^ SWIGERT had come to attentionthrough whoworkedinOTS. Shortlythereafter,CIA Headquarters formally proposed that Abu Zubaydah be kept in an all-white room that was lit 24 hours a day, that Abu Zubaydah not be provided any amenities, that his sleep be disrupted, that loud noise be constantly fed into his cell, and that only a small number of people interact with him. CIA records indicate that these proposals were based on the idea that such conditions would lead Abu Zubaydah to develop a sense of "learned helplessness."^"^ CIA Headquarters then sent an interrogation team to Country | , including SWIGERT, whose initial role was to consult on the psychological aspects of the interrogation.^^
DCI Tenet was provided an update on the Abu Zubaydah interrogationplansonApril12,2002. TheupdatestatedthattheCIAteamwaspreparingfor
Abu Zubaydah's transfer back to DETENTION SITE GREEN, and noted the CIA interrogation team intended to "set the stage" and increase control over Abu Zubaydah.^^ The update stated:
"Our [CIA] lead interrogator will require Abu Zubaydah to reveal the most sensitive secret he knows we are seeking; if he dissembles or diverts the conversation, the interview will stop and resume at a later time.... In accordance with the strategy, and with concurrence from FBI Headquarters, the two on-site FBI agents wiU no longer directly participate in the interview/debriefing sessions."^^
Attachment to email from: [REDACTED REDACTED]; to: subject: Interrogation Strategy, Powerpoint on [Abu Zubaydah] Interrogation Strategy, 01 April 2002; date: March 31, 2002.
Email from [REDACTED] to [REDACTED], cc: April 1, 2002, re: POC for [Grayson
SWIGERT]- consultant who drafted al-Qa'ida resistance to interrogation backgrounder (noting that CTC/LGL
woul^jea^outtoSWIGERT). Accordingtotlieemail,afterthemeeting,HBillUCTCLegal,
H I H H ' provided SWIGERT's contact information to ALEC Station officers, noting that it was SWIGERT who composed an OTS assessment on al-Qa'ida resistance techniques.
On the evening ofApril 1, 2002, "at the request ofCTC/OP^nd ALEC" Station, acable from OTS with a proposed interrogation strategy was sent to Country | ( H H I 1 7 8 9 5 5 (012236Z APR 02). The information in this cable was consistent with a subsequent cable, which was coordinated with SWIGERT, that proposed "several environmental modifications tocreate anatmosphere thatenhances thestrategic interrogation process." Thecable noted, "[t]he deliberate manipulation of the environment is intended to cause psychological disorientation, and reduced psychological wherewithal for the interrogation," as well as "tlie deliberate establishment of psychological dependenceupontheinterrogator,"and"anincreasedsenseoflearnedhelplessness." (See[REDACTED]69500 (070009ZAPR02).) Fordetailedinfonnation,seeVolumeIandtheAbuZubaydahdetaineereviewinVolumeHI.
DIRECTOR• • APR 02)
CIA Sensitive Addendum "Update on the Abu Zubaydah Operation," dated 12 April 2002, "1630Hours." CIA Sensitive Addendum "Update on th^Abi^ubayd^^peration/^^ April 2002, "1630 Hours."
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The FBI special agents questioning Abu Zubaydah at the hospital objected to the CIA's plans. In a message to FBI Headquarters, an FBI special agent wrote that
the CIA psychologists had acquired "tremendous influence.The message further stated:
"AZ's health has improved over the last two days and Agency[CIA]is ready to move [Abu Zubaydah] out of the hospital and back toUH^^Ion
in an elaborate plan to change AZ's environment. Agency [CIA] advised this day that they will be immediately changing tactics in all future AZ interviews by having only there [sic] [CIA officer] interact with AZ (there will be no FBI presence in interview room). This change contradicts all conversations had to date.... They believe AZ is offering, 'throw away information' and holding back from providing threat information (It should be note [sic] that we have obtained critical information regarding AZ thus far and have now got him speaking about threat information, albeit from his hospital bed and not [an] appropriate interview environment for full follow-up (due to his health). Suddenly the psychiatric team here wants AZ to only interact with their [CIA officer, and the CIA sees this] as being the best way to get the threat information.... We offered several compromise solutions... all suggestions wereimmediatelydeclinedwithoutfurtherdiscussion. ...Thisagainisquite odd as all information obtained from AZ has come from FBI lead interviewers and questioning.... I have spent an un-calculable amount of hours at [Abu Zubaydah's] bedside assisting with medical help, holding his hand and comforting hum through various medical procedures, even assisting him in going[to]thebatliroom.... Wehavebuilttremendousreport[sic]withAZand now that we are on the eve of 'regular'' interviews to get threat information, we have been 'written out' of future interviews.
6. New CIA Interrogation Plan Focuses on Abu Zubaydah's "Most Important Secret"; FBI Temporarily Barredfrom the Questioning of Abu Zubaydah; Abu Zubaydah then Placed in Isolationfor 47 Days Without Questioning
On April 13, 2002, while Abu Zubaydah was still at the hospital, the CIA implemented the "new interrogation program."^®" This initial meeting was held with
justoneinterrogatorintheroomandlasted11minutes. AcablestatedthattheCIAinterrogator wascoachedbythe"psychologicalteam."'^^ TheCIAinterrogatoradvisedAbuZubaydahthat he (Abu Zubaydah) "had a most important secret that [the interrogator] needed to know." According to the cable, Abu Zubaydah "amazingly" nodded in agreement about the secret, but
Federal Bureau of Investigation documents pertaining "to the interrogation of detainee Zayn A1 Abideen Abu Zabaidah" and provided to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence by cover letter dated July 20, 2010 (DTS #2010-2939).
Federal Bureau of Investigation documents pertaining "to the interrogation of detainee Zayn A1 Abideen Abu Zabaidali" and provided to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence by cover letter dated July 20, 2010 (DTS #2010-2939).
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"did not divulge any information, as [the interrogation team] expected."'^- A cable further explained that Abu Zubaydah indicated that he understood that the key question was about "impending future terrorist plans against the United States,"'^'' and that the CIA officer told Abu Zubaydah to signal for him "when he decides to discuss that 'one key item he knows he is keeping from the [interrogator]."'^^ The FBI officers provided a similar account to FBI Headquarters,addingthat: "Wespenttherestofthedayintheadjoiningroomwith[theCIA officer] and one of the psychiatrists [REDACTED] waiting for [Abu Zubaydah] to signal he was ready to talk. [Abu Zubaydiili] apparcnt[y went to sleep... they did not approach [Abu Zubaydah]therestoftheday."'"'' IntheircommunicationswithFBIHeadquarters,theFBI officers wrote that they explained their rapport-building approaches to the CIA interrogation team and "tried to explain that we have used this approach before on other Al-Qaeda members with much success (al-Owhali,^"^ KKM, Jandal, Badawi etc.). We tried to politely suggest that valuable time was passing where we could attempt to solicit threat information...."''^^
Ori April 15, 2002, per a scripted plan, the same CIA interrogator delivered what a CIA cable described as "the pre-move message" to Abu Zubaydah; that "time is
mnning out," that his situation had changcd, and that the interrogator was disappointed that Abu Zubaydahdidnotsignal"todiscusstheonethinghewashiding."^"®^ AbuZubaydiihwassedated and moved from the hospital to DETENTION SITE GREEN. When Abu Zubaydah awoke at
11:00 PM, four hours after his arrival, he was described as surprised and disturbed by his new situation. AnApril16,2002,cablestatesthe"objectiveistoensurethat[AbuZubaydah]isat his most vulnerable state."
a cable described Abu Zubaydah's cell as white with no natural lightingorwindows,butwithfourhalogenlightspointedintothecell."" Anairconditionerwas
also in the room. A white curtain separated the interrogation room from the cell. The interrogation cell had three padlocks. Abu Zubaydah was also provided with one of two chairs that were rotated based on his level of cooperation (one described as more comfortable tlian the other). Security officers wore all black uniforms, including boots, gloves, balaclavas, and goggles to keep Abu Zubaydah from identifying the officers, as well as to prevent Abu Zubaydah "from seeing the security guards as individuals who he may attempt to establish a relationship or dialogue with.""' The security officers communicated by hand signals when they were with
10026(131233Z APR 02) 10029 (131505Z APR 02) 10029 (131505Z APR 02)
Federal Bureau of Investigation documents pertaining "to the interrogation of detainee Zayn A1 Abideen Abu Zabaidah" and provided to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence by cover leUer dated July 20, 2010 (DTS #2010-2939).
See Intelligence Science Board "Intelligence Interviewing: Teaching Papers and Case Studies" for additional details on the FBI's interrogation of Mohamed Rashed Daoud al-Owhali.
Federal Bureau of Investigation documents pertaining "to the interrogation of detainee Zayn A1 Abideen Abu Zabaidiili" and provided to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence by cover letter dated July 20, 2010 (DTS #2010-2939).
10043 (151614Z APR 02) 10047 (161406Z APR 02) 10116 (250731Z APR 02)
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Abu Zubaydah and used hand-cuffs and leg shackles to maintain control. In addition, either loud rock music was played or noise generators were used to enhance Abu Zubaydah's "sense of hopelessness."'^^ AbuZubaydahwastypicallykeptnakedandsleepdeprived.'
An April 16, 2002, cable explained that the interrogation strategy had shifted since Abu Zubaydah's medical condition prevented "total isolation as originally
planned." According to the cable, a 24-hour interrogation strategy was now "deemed to be the best approach" for acquiring information. As a result, the FBI officers were once again allowed toquestionAbuZubaydah.''"^ OnApril17,2002,anFBIofficermetwithAbuZubaydahforsix h o u r s . ' F B I records state that Abu Zubaydah had "not seen the interviewing (FBI) agent" since April11,2002,butthatAbuZubaydahgreetedtheagentbyname.''^ Duringthequestioning Abu Zubaydah denied any knowledge related to specific tai*gets for a pending attack and "advised that many of the brothers on the front lines (nfi) [no further information] talked about all types of attacks against America but that for the most part this was usually just talk and that [the United States] should not be concerned about this type of talk,""^ Abu Zubaydah provided information on al-Qa'ida, KSM, his past ti-avel to the United States, as well as general information on extremists in Pakistan."^
Zubaydah continued to provide information to interrogators thi'oughout April 2002, but not information on pending attacks against the United States. On the
evening of April 20, 2002, Abu Zubaydah told the FBI officers about two men who approached him with a plan to detonate a uranium-based explosive device in the United States. Abu Zubaydah stated he did not believe the plan was viable and did not know the names of the two individuals, but provided physical descriptions of the pair.''^ This information was acquired after Abu Zubaydah was confronted with emails indicating that he had sent the two individuals toKSM.'^® TheCIAwouldlaterrepresentthatthisinformationwasacquired"asaresult"ofthe use of the CIA's enhanced inteiTogation techniques, and that the information acquired resulted in
10116 (25073IZ APR 02). CIA recoi^sindic^ tliat Abu Zubaydah was nude, butgiven a towel to coverhimselfwheninterrogated. See,forexampleJ|BB||||H|10080(200735ZAPR02). '1310053(162029ZAPR02);H1BBh10094(211905ZAPR02). AsdetailedinVolumeIII,theFBI Special Agents only questioned Abu Zubaydah when he was covered with a towel. Sleep deprivation during this period also differed from how sleep deprivation was implemented after the Department of Justice approved the CIA's enhanced inteiTogation techniques in August 2002. Ratlier than being placed in a stress position during sleep deprivation, Abu Zubaydah was kept awake by being questioned nearly non-stop by CIA and FBI intenogators. Records further indicate that during breaks in the interrogations at this time, Abu Zubaydah was allowed to briefly sleep. See, forexample,•••I 10116(25073IZAPR02).
10047 (161406Z APR 02)
10058 (171904Z APR 02)
Federal Bureau of Investigation documents pertaining "to the intenogation of detainee Zayn A1 Abideen Abu
Zabaidah" and provided to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence by cover letter dated July 20, 2010 (DTS #2010-2939).
10058 (171904Z APR 02)
See Abu Zubaydali detainee review in Volume III for additional information.
10090 (210703Z APR 02). As described in more detail in Volume II, Abu Zubaydah did provide kimyas for the pair.
llllllflllllim10063(180515ZAPR02). AsdescribedindetailinVolumeIIandVolumeIII,aswellasmore briefly in this summary, Abu Zubaydah providedthisinfori^^ to sleep.
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thethwartingofthe"DirtyBombPlot"andthecaptureofJosePadilla.^^^ However,thechiefof the Abu Zubaydah Task Force stated that "AZ's info alone would never have allowed us to find them," while another CIA officer stated that the CIA was already "alert" to the threat posed by Jose Padilla, and that the CIA's "suspicion" was only "enhanced during the debriefings of Abu Zubaydah."^^^ Additional information on the "Dirty Bomb Plot" and the capture of Jose Padilla is provided later in this summary.
During the month of April 2002, which included a period during which Abu Zubaydah was hospitalized, on life support, and unable to speak, the CIA
disseminated39intelligencereportsbasedonhisinterrogations.'^^ AttheendofApril2002,the DETENTION SITE GREEN interrogation team provided CIA Headquarters with three interrogation strategies. CIA Headquarters chose the most coercive interrogation option, which was proposed and supported by CIA contractor SWIGERT.^^"^ This coercive interrogation option—which included sensory deprivation—was again opposed by the FBI special agents at the detention site.'^^ The interrogation proposal was to engage in "only a single-minded, consistent, totally focused questioning ofcurrentthreat information."'^^ Once implemented, this approach failed to produce the information CIA Headquarters believed Abu Zubaydah possessed: threats to the United States and information about al-Qa'ida operatives located in the United States. Nonetheless, Abu Zubaydah continued to provide other intelligence. In May 2002, the CIA disseminated 56 intelligence reports based on the interrogations.
In early June 2002, the CIA interrogation team recommended that Abu Zubaydah spend several weeks in isolation while the interrogation team members departed
the facility "as a means of keeping [Abu Zubaydah] off-balance and to allow the team needed time off for a break and to attend to personal matters as well as to discuss "the endgame"ofAbuZubaydahjjjjHIHwithofficersfromCIAHeadquarters.'^^ Asaresult,from June 18, 2002, through August 4, 2002, Abu Zubaydah spent 47 days in isolation without being
SeeinformationinthissummaryandVolumeIIforadditionaldetailsontheCIA'srepresentationsonthe effectiveness of the CW^nhancedh^rrogationtech^ makers and the Depaitment of Justice.
CIA email from: to: subject: AZ information; date: July 10, 2002, at 01:18:50PM. Theemailstates:"Theonlywayweputthistogedieris^atPakiliaisonmentionedto thearrestoftwoindividuals(onebeinganAmerican)andjKIHmiputtwoandtwotogether. Therefore,AZ's info alone would never have allowed us to find them." See also SSCI Transcript "Detention of Jose Padilla," dated June 12, 2002 (DTS #2002-2603), in which a CIA officer states, "the Pakistani liaison felt it was important to bring [Padilla] to our attention, given the recent raids...there was enough infoiTnation indicating that his travel was suspicious, to put us on alert. This suspicion was enhanced during the debriefings of Abu Zubaydah, which occurred on 21 April."
^2^ee analysis provided to the Committee on April 18, 2011, by the CIA, based on CIA searches in 2011 of the Hjjjdatabase. The titles ofspecific intelligence reports resulting from information provided by Abu Zubaydah are listed in the Abu Zubaydahdetainee review in Volume III.
ALEC • • • MAY 02)
See email exchange from: [REDACTED]; to [REDACTED]; with multipleccs; subject: Turning Up the Heat in the AZ Interrogations; date: April 30, 2002, at 12:02:47 PM.
See email exchange from: [REDACTED]; to [REDACTED]; with multiple ccs; subject: Turning Up the Heat in the AZ Intenogations; date: April 30,2002, at 12:02:47 PM.
analysis provided to the Committee on April 18, 2011, by the CIA, based on CIA searches in 2011 of the database. ThetitlesofspecificintelligencereportsresultingfrominformationprovidedbyAbuZubaydahare
listed in the Abu Zubaydah detainee review in Volume III. '28 10424 (070814Z JUN 02)
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asked any questions. Despite the fact that Abu Zubaydah was in isolation for nearly half of the month, the CIA disseminated 37 intelligence reports based on the interrogations of Abu Zubaydah in June 2002. The CIA would later represent publicly—as well as in classified settings—that during the use of "established US Government interrogation techniques," Abu Zubaydah "stopped all cooperation" in June 2002, requiring the development of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques.CIA records do not support this assertion.
Prior to Abu Zubaydah's 47-day isolation period, Abu Zubaydah provided information on al-Qa'ida activities, plans, capabilities, and relationships, in addition to
information on its leadership structure, including personalities, decision-making processes, training, and t a c t i c s . A s described in more detail in the full Committee Study, Abu Zubaydah's inability to provide information on the next attack in the United States and operatives in the United States served as the basis for CIA representations that Abu Zubaydah was "uncooperative," as well as for the CIA's determination that Abu Zubaydah required the use of what would later be known as the CIA's "enhanced interrogation techniques" to become "compliant" and reveal the information the CIA believed he was withholding. Abu Zubaydah never provided this information, and CIA officers later concluded this was information Abu Zubaydah did not possess.
After Abu Zubaydah was placed in isolation, the Abu Zubaydah iiiliiiii| iliiiiili III! [depaitedCountry|]. Securityandmedical
personnel remained at the detention site. The FBI special agents did not return to DETENTION SITE GREEN.
7. Proposal by CIA Contract Personnel to Use SERE-Based Interrogation Techniques Leads to the Development of the CIA's Enhanced Interrogation Techniques; The CIA Determines that "the Interrogation Process Takes Precedence Over Preventative Medical Procedures "
See analysis provided to the Committee on April 18, 2011, by tlie CIA, based on CIA searches in 2011 of the
IIB database. The titles ofspecific intelligence reports resulting from information provided by Abu Zubaydah are listed in the Abu Zubaydah detainee review in Volume III of the Committee Study.
See Presidential Speech on September 6,2006, based on CIA information and vetted by CIA personnel. See also ODNI September 2006 Unclassified Public Release: "During initial interrogation, Abu Zubaydah gave some information tliat he probably viewed as nominal. Some was important, however, including that Khalid Shaykh Mohammad (KSM) was the 9/11 mastermind and used the moniker 'Muklitar.' Tliis identification allowed us to comb previously collected intelligence for both names, opening up new leads to tliis tenorist plotter—leads that eventuallyresultedinliiscapture. ItwascleartohisintenogatorstliatAbuZubaydahpossessedagreatdealof information about al-Qa'ida; however, he soon stopped all cooperation. Over the ensuing months, the CIA designed a new interrogation program that would be safe, effective, and legal." See also CIA Director Michael Hayden, Classified Statement for the Record, Hearing on the Central Intelligence Agency Detention and Interrogation Program, April 12,2007 (DTS #2007-1563) ("...FBI and CIA continued unsuccessfully to try to glean information from Abu Zubaydah using established US Government intenogation techniques....").
' See reporting charts in Abu Zubaydah detainee review in Volume III, as well as CIA paper entitled "Abu Zubaydah," dated March 2005. Tlie same information is included in an "Abu Zubaydah Bio" document "Prepared on 9 August 2006."
See Abu Zubaydah detainee review in Volume III for additional details. See Abu Zubaydah detainee review in Volume HI for additional details.
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In early July 2002, CIA officers held several meetings at CIA Headquarters to discuss the possible use of "novel interrogation methods" on Abu Zubaydah.'^"^
During the course of those meetings SWIGERT proposed using techniques derived from the U.S. military's SERE (Survival, Evasion, Resistance and Escape) s c h o o l . S W I G E R T provided a list of 12 SERE techniques for possible use by the CIA: (1) the attention grasp, (2) walling, (3) facial hold, (4) facial slap, (5) cramped confinement, (6) waU standing, (7) stress positions, (8) sleep deprivation, (9) waterboard, (10) use of diapers, (11) use of insects, and (12) mock burial.SWIGERT also recommended that the CIA enterinto a contract with Hammond DUNBAR, his co-author of the CIA report on potential al-Qa'ida interrogation resistance training, to aid in the CIA interrogation process.Like SWIGERT, DUNBAR had never participated in a real-world interrogation. His interrogation experience was limited to the paper he authored with SWIGERT and his work with U.S. Air Force personnel at the SERE school.
See CIA document dated, July 3, 2002, 1630 Hours, titled, "CIA Operational Update Memorandum for CIA Leadership, SENSITIVE ADDENDUM: Update on the Abu Zubaydah Operation and | m | Raid "
For more information on the SERE program, see the Senate Armed Services Committee Inquiry into the Treatment of Detainees in U.S. Custody, December2008. See also statement of Senator Carl Levin on the inquiry, December 11, 2008; "SERE training is intended to be used to teach our soldiers how to resist interrogation by enemies that refuse to follow the Geneva Conventions and international law. In SERE school, our troops who are at risk of capture are exposed in a controlled environment with great protections and caution - to techniques adapted from abusive tactics used against American soldiers by enemies such as the Communist Chinese during the Korean War. SEREtrainingtechniques include stresspositions, forcednudity,useoffear,sleepdeprivation and,until recently,theNavySEREschoolusedthewaterboard. Thesetechniquesweredesignedtogiveourstudentsataste of what they might be subjected to if captured by a ruthless, lawless enemy so that they would be better prepared to resist. ThetechniqueswereneverintendedtobeusedagainstdetaineesinU.S.custody. Asone[JointPersonnel Recovery Agency (JPRA)] instructorexplained,SERE training is based on illegal exploitation (under the rules listed in the 1949 GenevaConvention RelativetotheTreati^nt of Prisoners of War) of prisoners over the last 50 years."
Email from: subject: Description of Physical Pressures; date: July 8, 2002, at 04:15:15 PM.
ALEC • • (051724Z JUL 02)
See Resume, Hammond DUNBAR, submitted to the CIA in March 2003. In a section on "Interrogation and Debriefing Experience," DUNBAR's 2003 resume noted that he had been a "debriefer for all USG DOD and Civilian
|.)." All other experience in the section related to his interrogation experience as a contractor for the Cl^beginningin^ DUNBAR's resume did state that he had participated in an interrogation training course in 1992, and that he had taken a one-week
Defense Interrogation Course at some point in 2002, although his resume does not indicate whether this was prior to, orafter,theinterrogationofAbuZubaydah. TheCIA'sJune2013ResponsestatesthattheCommitteeStudywas "incorrect...inassertingthatthecontractorsselectedhadnorelevantexperience." TheCIA'sJune2013Response notes SWIGERT and DUNBAR's experience at the Department of Defense SERE school, and SWIGERT's "academicresearch"and"researchpapers"on"suchtopicsasresistancetraining,captivityfamiliarization, and learned helplessness - all of which were relevant to the development of the program." The CIA's June 2013 Response does not describe any experience related to actual interrogations or counterterrorism, or any relevant cultural, geographic, or linguistic expertise. TheCIA'sJune2013 Response provides tliefollowing explanation: "Drs. [SWIGERT] and [DUNBAR] had the closest proximate expertise CIA sought at the beginning of the program, specifically in the area of non-standard means of interrogation. Experts on traditional interrogation methods did not meetthisrequirement. Non-standardinterrogationmethodologieswerenotanareaofexpertiseofCIAofficersorof the US Government generally. We believe their expertise was so unique that we would have been derelict had we not sought them out when it became clear that CIA would be heading into the uncharted territory of the program" (italics and emphasis in original). As noted above, the CIA did not seek out SWIGERT and DUNBAR after a decision was made to use coercive interrogation techniques; rather, SWIGERT and DUNBAR played a role in convincing the CIA to adopt such a policy.
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In May 2003, a senior CIA interrogator would tell personnel from the CIA's Office of Inspector General that SWIGERT and DUNBAR's SERE school model was based on resisting North Vietnamese "physical torture" and was designed to extract "confessions
for propaganda purposes" from U.S. airmen "who possessed little actionable intelligence." The CIA, he believed, "need[ed] a different working model for interrogating terrorists where confessions are not the ultimate goal."^^^
^/NF) AftertheJuly2002meetings,theCIA's|^^|CTCLegal,
|, drafted a letter to Attorney General John Ashcroft asking the Department of
Justice for "a formal declination of prosecution, in advance, for any employees of the United States, as well as any other personnel acting on behalf of the United States, who may employ methods in the interrogation of Abu Zubaydah that otherwise might subject those individuals to prosecution."^"^® Theletterfurtherindicatedthat"theinterrogationteamhadconcluded"that "the use of more aggressive methods is required to persuade Abu Zubaydah to provide the critical information we need to safeguard the lives of innumerable innocent men, women and children within the United States and abroad." The letter added that these "aggressive methods" would otherwise be prohibited by the torture statute, "apart from potential reliance upon the doctrinesofnecessityorofself-defense."^"^^ ThisletterwascirculatedinternallyattheCIA, including to SWIGERT; however, there are no records to indicate it was provided to the attorney general.
On July 13, 2002, HI^HCTC Legal,
and the CIA's acting general counsel, John Rizzo, met with attorneys from the National Security
Council and the Department of Justice Office of Legal Counsel (OLC), as well as with Michael Chertoff, the head of the Department of Justice Criminal Division, and Daniel Levin, the chief of staff to the FBI director, to provide an overview of the CIA's proposed interrogation techniques and to ask for a formal, definitive DOJ opinion regarding the lawfulness of employing the specific CIA inten'ogation techniques against Abu Zubaydah.
The CIA attorneys described the 12 proposed interrogation techniques and told the Department of Justice and National Security Council attorneys that Abu
Zubaydah continued to withhold critical intelligence on the identities of al-Qa'ida personnel in the United States and planned al-Qa'ida attacks. The CIA attorneys also told the gi-oup that CIA officers were complemented by:
"expert personnel retained on contract who possess extensive experience, gained within the Department of Defense, on the psychological and physical
Interview of by [REDACTED] and [REDACTED], Office of the Inspector General, October 22,2003. TheseniorinterrogatorhadparticipatedindieuseoftheCIA'senhancedinterrogationtechniqueswith SWIGERT and DUNBAR.
Email from: Email from; Email from:
'"3 DIRECTOR
I;to: I; to: |;to:
|(031357Z AUG 02 TOP SECRET/.
subject: EYES ONLY- DRAFT; date: July 8, 2002.
subject: EYES ONLY- DRAFT; date: July 8, 2002. ;subject: EYES ONLY- DRAFT; date: July 8, 2002.
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methods of interrogation and the resistance techniques employed as countermeasures to such interrogation."^"^
According to the CIA cable describing the meeting, the representatives from the OLC, includingDeputy Assistant Attorney General John Yoo, advised
that the criminal prohibition on torture would not prohibit the methods proposed by the interrogation team because of the absence of any specific intent to inflict severe physical or mentalpainorsufferingJ"^^ OnJuly13,2002,YoosentanunclassifiedlettertotheCIA'sacting general counsel describing his interpretation of the statute.
Despite the initial view expressed by Yoo that the use of the proposed CIA interrogation techniques would be lawful, on July 17, 2002, National Security
Advisor Condoleezza Rice requested a delay in the approval of the interrogation techniques for Abu Zubaydah's interrogation until the attorney general issued an o p i n i o n . T h e following day. Rice and Deputy National Security Advisor Stephen Hadley requested that the Department of Justice "delay the approval of the memo detailing the next phase of interrogations" until the CIA provided specific details on its proposed interrogation techniques and "an explanation of why the CIA is confident these techniques will not cause lasting and irreparable harm to Abu Zubaydah."'"^'^ Rice asked the CIA to provide the OLC with a description of each of the planned interrogation techniques, and to "gather and provide any available empirical data on the reactions and likelihood of prolonged mental harm from the use of the 'water board' and the staged burial."'^^
On July 15, 2002, a cable providing details on the proposed interrogation phase stated that only the DETENTION SITE GREEN chief of Base would be
allowed to interrupt or stop an inteiTogation in process, and that the chief of Base would be the final decision-making authority as to whether the CIA's interrogation techniques applied to Abu Zubaydahwouldbediscontinued.^^® TheCIAofficersatthedetentionsiteadded:
"If [Abu Zubaydah] develops a serious medical condition which may involve a host of conditions including a heart attack or another catastrophic type of condition, all efforts will be made to ensure that proper medical care will be provided to [him]. In the event [Abu Zubaydah] dies, we need to be prepared to act accordingly, keeping in mind the liaison equities involving our hosts.
DIRECTORlim (031357ZAUG02)
DIRECTOR m (031357Z AUG 02)
July 13,2002,LetterfromJohnYoo,Deputy AssistantAttorneyGeneraltoJohnRizzo,ActingGeneralCounsel,
C L \.
Memorandumfor the RecordfromJohnH. Moseman, Chiefof Staff,re: NSCWeeklyMeeting, July 17,2002. July 19, 2002, 1630 Hours, CIA Operational Update Memorandim for CI^L^ership, SENSITIVE
ADDENDUM: Update on the Abu Zubaydah Operation and Raid
July 21, 2002, 1630 Hours, CIA Operational Update Memorandi^ for CI^L^ership, SENSITIVE
ADDENDUM: Update on the Abu Zubaydah Operation and m H Raid H H - 10536 (151006ZJUL 02)
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To address these issues, the cable stated that if Abu Zubaydah were to die during the interrogation, he would be cremated.The interrogation team closed the cable
by stating:
"regardless which [disposition] option we follow however, and especially in light of the planned psychological pressure techniques to be implemented, we need to get reasonable assurances that [Abu Zubaydah] will remain in isolation and incommunicado for the remainder of his life,"^^^
Officers from the CIA's ALEC Station responded to the interrogation team's comments several days later. Their cable noted that the interrogation team
was correct in its "understanding that the interrogation process takes precedence over preventative medical procedures."ALEC Station further observed:
"There is a fairly unanimous sentiment witiiin HQS that [Abu Zubaydah] will never be placed in a siaiation where he has any significant contact with others and/or has the opportunity to be released. While it is difficult to discuss specifics at this point, all major players are in concurrence that [Abu Zubaydah] should remain incommunicado for the remainder of his life. This may preclude [Abu Zubaydah] from being turned over to another country, but a final decision regarding his future incarceration condition has yet to be made."^^^
^ result of the request by National Security Advisor Rice for additional research on the CIA's proposed interrogation techniques, CIA and DOJ personnel
contacted individuals at the Department of Defense's Joint Personnel Recovery Agency (JPRA), the agency that administers the SERE school, to gather information about the effects of using the techniques in training exercises.According to CIA officer who had
m i l l joined the CIA's OTS after ( j at JPRA, an individual with SERE school experience commented that "information gleaned via harsh treatment may not be accurate, as the prisoner may say anything to avoid further pain," and that "[c]urrent doctrine for interrogations conducted in the permanent phase of capture may lean towards 'soft' or 'indirect' rounds of
"157
Pursuant to National Security Advisor Rice's request, CIA Headquarters personnel also requested information from the interrogation team—particularly
10536 (151006ZJUL 02)
10536 (151006Z JUL 02) ALEC (182321Z JUL 02)
'55 ALEC^•(182321ZJ^02)
'5'' Email ACTED]; subject: Request for JPRA information; date: July 19, 2002; July24,2002,faxfrom^^|J||^H|^HtoJohi^^ an^REDACTED^rovidinginformationfromthe OTS/OA^T^hologistsTemail^omr^^Blj^^l; to: [REDACTED], [REDACTED],
with JPRA Chief of Staff; date: July 24, 2002.
'5'^ Email &omr|j||||H to: [REDACTED]; subject: Request for JPRA infonnation; date: July 19, 2002.
Recordsindicatethat|||||||||||^|^noteswerenotprovidedtotheDepartmentofJustice. InNovember2002, along with Chief of InterrogationsH^BH^B;l£dthefirstCI^nterrogator training course.
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SWIGERT and DUNBAR—aboutthe psychologicaleffects of the use of the waterboard and mockburial. ThechiefofBaseatDETENTIONSITEGREENrespondedbycablenotingthat:
"We are a nation of laws and we do not wish to parse words. A bottom line in considering the new measures proposed is that [Abu Zubaydah] is being held in solitary confinement, against his will, without legal representation, as an enemy of our country, our society and our people. Therefore, while the techniques described in Headquarters meetings and below are administered to student volunteers in the U.S. in a harmless way, with no measurable impact
on the psyche of the volunteer, we do not believe we can assure the same here for a man forced through these processes and who will be made to believe this is the future course of the remainder of his life. Station, [DETENTION SITE GREEN chief of Base] and [DETENTION SITE GREEN] personnel will make every effort possible to insure [sic] that subject is not permanently physically or mental harmed but we should not say at the outset of this process that there is no risk."^^^
As former psychologists for the United States Air Force, SWIGERT and DUNBAR had no direct experience with the waterboard, as it was not used in
AirForceSEREtraining. Nonetheless,theyindicatedthatthewaterboard—whichthey described as an "absolutely convincing technique"—was necessary to overwhelm Abu Zubaydah's ability to resist.^^^ They also responded that they were aware that the Navy—which used the waterboard technique in training—had not reported any significant long-term consequences on individuals from its use. Unlike the CIA's subsequent use of the waterboard, however, the Navy's use of the technique was a single training exercise and did not extend to multiple sessions. SWIGERT and DUNBAR wrote:
"any physical pressure applied to exti'emes can cause severe mental pain or suffering. Hooding,theuseofloudmusic,sleepdeprivation,controlling darkness and light, slapping, walling, or the use of stress positions taken to extreme can have the same outcome. The safety of any technique lies primarily in how it is applied and monitored.'^^^
On July 24, 2002, the attorney general verbally approved the use of 10 interrogation techniques, which included: the attention grasp, walling, the facial hold, the
facial slap (insult slap), cramped confinement, wall standing, stress positions, sleep deprivation, use of diapers, and use of i n s e c t s . T h e interrogation team, however, indicated that they intended to wait for the approval to use the waterboard before proceeding with their interrogation of Abu Zubaydah. On July 26, 2002, the attorney general verbally approved the
[REDACTED] 73208 (231043Z JUL 02) •^•110568 (261 lOlZ JUL 02)
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useofthewaterboardJ^^ TheOLCfinalizeditsclassifiedwrittenlegalopiniononAugust1, 2002. TheearlierCIArequesttoconductamockburialwasnotformallyconsideredbythe OLC. The approved interrogation techniques, along with other CIA interrogation techniques that were subsequently identified and used by the CIA, are referred to as the CIA's "enhanced interrogation techniques," or more commonly by the CIA as "EITs."
course of seeking approval to use the techniques, CIA Headquarters advised the Depaitment of Justice and the national security advisor that "countless
more Americans may die unless we can persuade AZ to tell us what he knows." CIA Headquarters further represented that the DETENTION SITE GREEN interrogation team believed "Abu Zubaydah continues to withhold critical threat information," and "that in order to persuade him to provide" that information, "the use of more aggressive techniques is required."^^^ ThecabletoDETENTIONSITEGREENfromCIAHeadquartersdocumenting the information CIA Headquarters had provided to the Department of Justice warned that "[t]he legal conclusions are predicated upon the determinations by the interrogation team that Abu Zubaydahcontinuestowithholdcriticalthreatinformation."^^"^ Accordingtocables,however, the CIA interrogators at the detention site had not determined that "the use of more aggressive techniqueswasrequired"to"persuade"AbuZubaydahtoprovidethreatinformation. Rather, the interrogation team believed the objective of the coercive inten-ogation techniques was to confirm Abu Zubaydah did not have additional information on threats to the United States, writing:
"Our assumption is the objective of this operation is to achieve a high degree of confidence that [Abu Zubaydah] is not holding back actionable information concerning threats to the United States beyond that which [Abu Zubaydah] has already provided."^^^
described in this summary, and in more detail in the full Committee Study, the interrogation team later deemed the use of the CIA's enhanced
interrogation techniques a success, not because it resulted in critical threat information, but because it provided further evidence that Abu Zubaydah had not been withholding the aforementioned information from the interrogators.
8. The CIA Obtains Legal and Policy Approval for Its Enhanced Interrogation Techniques: The CIA Does Not Briefthe President
Email from: Rodriguez, [REDACTED], [ [REDACTED]; subject:EYESONLY-Wherewestandre:AbuZubaydah;date:July26,2002.Seealso 10568 (261101ZJUL 02).
DIRECTOR I H I I I (031357Z AUG 02)
DIRECTOR (031357Z AUG 02)
'65 [REDACTED] 73208 (231043Z JUL 02) and email from: to: [REDACTED], [REDACTED], and subject: Addendum from [DETENTION SITE GREEN], [REDACTED] 73208 (231043Z JUL 02); date: July 23, 2002, at 07:56:49 PM.
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As described, CIA officers represented to National Security Advisor Rice that Abu Zubaydah was withholding information on pending attacks and operatives
in the United States. On July 31, 2002, Rice informed Deputy DCI John McLaughlin that, in balancing the application of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques against the possible loss of American lives, she would not object to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques if the attorney general determined them to be legal.
louring the month of July 2002, the CIA anticipated diat the president would need to approve the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques before
they could be used. Therefore, in late July 2002, the CIA prepared talking points for a briefing of the president. These draft talking points indicated that the CIA was planning to use inteiTogation techniques beyond what was normally permitted by law enforcement, and included a brief description of the waterboard interrogation technique. On August 1, 2002, based on comments from White House Counsel Alberto Gonzales, the talking points were revised to eliminate references to the waterboard.CIA records indicate, however, that the talking points were not used to brief the president. On August 2, 2002, the National Security Council legal advisor informed the DCI's chief of staff that "Dr. Rice had been informed that there would be no briefing of the President on this m atter,but that the DCI had policy approval to employ the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques.
records state that prior to the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques on Abu Zubaydah in 2002, the CIA did not brief Secretary of State
Colin Powell or Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, two members of the National Security Council, on the techniques.The Committee, including the chairman and vice chairman, was also not briefed on the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques prior to their use.'^^
Approximately a year later, on July 31, 2003, senior CIA personnel believed the president had still not been briefed on the CIA's enhanced interrogation
techniques.In August 2003, DCI Tenet told the CIA Office of Inspector General that "he had never spoken to the President regarding the detention and interrogation program or EITs, nor was
Memorandum for the Record from John Moseman, Chief of Staff, re: NSC Weekly Meeting, July 31, 2002.
July 26, 2001, DCI Talking Points with the President- Next Phase of the Abu Zubaydah Interrogation; July 31, 2001, DCI Talking Points with the President- Next Phase of the Abu Zubaydah Interrogation. Note that the draft document lists the incorrect year.
CIA records do not indicate who informed National Security Advisor Rice "that there would be no briefing of the President on this matter."
Email from: John Moseman; to: John McLaughlin, Jose Rodriguez, [REDACTED], John Rizzo, [REDACTED]; subject: Abu-Z Interrogation; datejAueust2j2002.
Email from: John Rizzo; to: subject: Rump PC on interrogations; date: July 31, 2003.
See Volume II for additional information on congressional briefings.
An email from CIA Senior Deputy General Counsel John Rizzo stated that "the President will be briefed as part
of the regular annual [covert action] review. Briefing (by Rice or VP or Counsel to the President or some combination thereof) will describe the interrogation program, the fact that some aggressive but AG-approved techniques have been used, but will not apparently get into the details of the techniques themselves." See email from: John Rizzo; to: H H H H ; subject^um^^orMnte^oeations^^ July 31, 2003.
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heawareofwhetherthePresidenthadbeenbriefedbyhisstaff,"^^"^ TheMay2004CIA Inspector General Special Review included a recommendation for the DCI to:
"Brief the President regarding the implementation of the Agency's detention and inten-ogation activities pursuant to the MON of 17 September 2001 or any other authorities, including the use of EITs and the fact that detainees have died. ThisRecommendationissignificant."^^^
In transmitting the Special Review to the Committee, DCI Tenet responded to the recommendation, noting only that "[t]he DCI will determine whether and to
whatextentthePresidentrequiresabriefingontheProgram."^^^ OnApril6,2006,CIA Inspector General Helgerson responded to a request from Committee Vice Chairman John D. Rockefeller IV on the status of con-ective actions taken in response to the Special Review recommendations. With regard to a briefing for the president, Helgerson wrote: "Consistent with this recommendation, DCI Tenet, before he left office, and Director Goss, shortly after taking office, both advised me that they had made requests to brief the President."^^^ Prepared "Questions and Answers" for the National Security Council principals in connection with the disclosure of the program in September 2006 and subsequent media outreach also suggest that the president was not briefed at the outset about the CIA's interrogation techniques. In response to the potential question: "What role did the President play.. .Was he briefed on the interrogation techniques, and if so when?" the proposed answer did not assert that the president was briefed, but rather that the "President was not of course involved in CIA's day to day operations - including who should be held by CIA and how they should be questioned - these decisions are made or overseen by CIA Directors.
'''• Office of General Counsel Comments on Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Program Special Review, at 23 C'[i]n August 2003, the DCI advised OIG..."); CIA Office of Inspector General, Interview of George Tenet, memorandum dated 8 September 2003, Subject; 2003-7123-IG, Review of Interrogation for Countertemorism Purposes.
Inspector General, Special Review, Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Activities (September 2001- October 2003), May 7, 2004 (DTS #2004-2710).
Letter from George J. Tenet to Chairman Pat Roberts, June 22, 2004 (DTS #2004-2710).
Helgerson then added, "Additionally, public disclosure of many of these activities ensured wide awareness. In light of tliese developments, I consider the matter closed." The Helgerson letter does not indicate to whom Directors Tenet and Goss, who met regularly with the President, submitted requests to brief the President about the program. See letter from John L. Helgerson to Vice Chairman John D. Rockefeller IV, April 5, 2006 (DTS #2006-1564). The CIA's June 2013 Response does not dispute these records. It states, however, that "[w]hile Agency records on the subject are admittedly incomplete, former President Bush has stated in his autobiography that he discussed the program, including the use of enhanced techniques, with DCIA Tenet in 2002, prior to application of the techniques on Abu Zubaydah, and personally approved the techniques." A subsequent memoir by former CIA Acting General Counsel John Rizzo (published January 7, 2014) states, "The one senior U.S. Government national security official during this time—from August 2002 through 2003—who I did not believe was knowledgeable about the E.I.T.s was President Bush himself. He was not present at any of the Principal Committee meetings ... and none of the principals at any of the E.I.T. sessions during this period ever alluded to the President knowing anything about them."
Included in the packet of CIA infomiation was tlie following: "Question: 'What role did the President play in authorizing this program? Did he select detainees held by CIA or direct their intenogation? Was he briefed on the interrogation techniques, and if so when?' Answer: 'In the days after 9/11, the President directed that all the instruments of national power, including tlie resources of our intelligence, military, and law enforcement communities, beemployed tofight and winthewaragamstalQaedaandi^^ within the bounds ofthe law.
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(TS/f^HlfllHIIIIII^/NF) CIA records indicate that the first CIA briefing for the president on theCIA'senhancedinterrogationtechniquesoccurredonApril8,2006.^^^ CIArecordsstatethat when the president was briefed, he expressed discomfort with the "image of a detainee, chained to the ceiling, clothed in a diaper, and forced to go to the bathroom on himself."^^'^
9. The CIA Uses the Waterboardand Other Enhanced Interrogation Techniques Against Abu Zubaydah
On August 3, 2002, CIA Headquarters informed the interrogation team at DETENTION SITE GREEN that it had formal approval to apply the CIA's enhanced
interrogationtechniques,includingthewaterboard,againstAbuZubaydah. AccordingtoCIA records, only the two CIA contractors, SWIGERT and DUNBAR, were to have contact with Abu Zubaydah. Other CIA personnel at DETENTION SITE GREEN - including CIA medical personnel and other CIA "interrogators with whom he is familiar" - were only to observe.
From August 4, 2002, through August 23, 2002, the CIA subjected AbuZubaydahtoitsenhancedinteiTogationtechniquesonanear24-hour-per-daybasis. After
Abu Zubaydah had been in complete isolation for 47 days, the most aggressive interrogation phase began at approximately 11:50 AM on August 4, 2002.^^- Security personnel entered the cell, shackled and hooded Abu Zubaydah, and removed his towel (Abu Zubaydah was then naked). Without asking any questions, the interrogators placed a rolled towel around his neck as a collar, and backed him up into the cell wall (an interrogator later acknowledged the collai' was
Thisincludedimportant,newrolesforCIAindetainingandquestioningterrorists. [Hewasperiodicallyupdatedby CIA Directors on significant captures of tenorists, and information obtained that helped stop attacks and led to captureofotherterrorists.] [ThePresidentwasnotofcourseinvolvedinCIA'sdaytodayoperations-including who should be held by CIA and how they should be questioned - these decisions are made or overseen by CIA Directors]."' SeeDraftQuestionsandProposedAnswers,attachedtoMemorandumfromNationalSecurityAdvisor Stephen J. Hadley; for; the Vice President, Secretaries of State and Defense, the Attorney General, Director of National Intelligence and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; cc: chief of staff to the President, Counsel to the President, Assistant tothePresident forNational Security, WhiteHouseSpokesman, datedSeptember2,2006. Brackets in the original.
See April 16, 2008, CIA "Backgrounder: Chronology of Interrogation Approvals, 2001-2003" (noting that "CIA documentation and discussions with Presidential briefers and individuals involved with the interrogation program at the time suggest that details on enhanced interrogation techniques (EITs) were not shared with the President" in the 2001-2003 timeframe); CIA Q&A, Topic: Waterboarding ("The information we have indicates the President was not briefed by CIA regarding the specific interrogation techniques until April 2006, and at that time DCIA Goss briefed himonthesevenEITsproposedatthattimeforthepost-DetaineeTreatmentActCIAinterrogationprogram."). As described, in the April 2006 briefing the President "expresseddiscomfort" with the "image of a detainee, chained to the ceiling, clothed in a diaper^n^or^d to go to the bathroom on himself." See email from: Grayson SWIGERT; to: [REDACTED]; cc: subject: Dr. SWIGERT's 7 June meeting with DCI; date: June 7, 2006.
Email from: Grayson SWIGERT; to: [REDACTED]; cc: subject: Dr. SWIGERT's 7 June meeting with DCI; date: June 7, 2006.
Increased Pressure intheNext PhaseoftheAbuZuba^ah Interrogations, Attachment toemail from: [REDACTED]; to: [REDACTED]; cc: [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED^^I; subject: Increased Pressure Phase - for DCI Sensitive Addendum; date: July 10, 2002.
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used to slam Abu Zubaydah against a concrete wall).'^^ The interrogators then removed the hood, performed an attention grab, and had Abu Zubaydah watch while a large confinement box was brought into the cell and laid on the f l o o r . A cable states Abu Zubaydah "was unhooded and the large confinement box was carried into the interrogation room and paced [sic] on the floorsoastoappearasacoffin."^^^ Theinterrogatorsthendemandeddetailedandverifiable information on terrorist operations planned against the United States, including the names, phone numbers, email addresses, weapon caches, and safe houses of anyone involved. CIA records describe Abu Zubaydah as appearing apprehensive. Each time Abu Zubaydah denied having additional information, the interrogators would perform a facial slap or face grab.^^^ At approximately 6:20 PM, Abu Zubaydah was waterboarded for the first time. Over a two-and-a- half-hour period, Abu Zubaydah coughed, vomited, and had "involuntary spasms of the torso and extremities" during waterboarding.^^^ Detention site personnel noted that "throughout the process [Abu Zubaydah] was asked and given the opportunity to respond to questions about threats" to the United States, but Abu Zubaydah continued to maintain that he did not have any additional information to provide,In an email to OMS leadership entitled, "So it begins," a medical officer wrote:
"The sessions accelerated rapidly progressing quickly to the water board after large box, walling, and small box periods. [Abu Zubaydali] seems very resistant to the water board. Longest time with the cloth over his face so far has been 17 seconds. This is sure to increase shortly. NO useful information
See email from: [REDACTED]; to: subject: Subject detainee allegation - per our telcon of today; date: March 28, 2007, at 04:42 PM, which states Abu Zubaydah claims "a collar was used to slam him against a concrete wall. While we do not have a record that this occurred, one inteiTogator at the site at the time confirmed that tliis did indeed happen. For the record, a plywood 'wall' was immediately constructed at the site after the walling on the concrete wall."
10644 (201235Z AUG 02)
10586 (041559Z AUG 02)
10586 (041559Z AUG 02); • • • 10644 (201235Z AUG 02)
10644 (201235Z AUG 02)
10586 (041559Z AUG 02). CIA contractor DUNBAR later told the CIA OIG that "[tjheir
instRictions from [chief of Base] were to focus on only one issue, that is, Zubaydah's knowledge of plans to attack tlieU.S." AccordingtotheOIG'srecordoftheinterview,"[DUNBAR]and[SWIGERT]couldaskthatquestionin a number of ways, but it was the only theme they were authorized by [chief of Base] to use with [Abu] Zubaydah." {See February 10, 2003, interview report of Hammond DUNBAR, Office of the Inspector General.) The acting chief of Station in Country | , in an interview with the CIA OIG, stated that "there were days at [DETENTION
SITE GREEN] when the team had no requirements from Headquarters," and that CTC did not give the chief of Base (COB) the "flexibility as COBtoaskotherques^ besides those related to threats to the United States. {See May 28,2003,interviewreportof||||||m||||m|,OfficeoftlieInspectorGeneral.) ThechiefofSupport Services at the CIA Station stated that "[SWIGERT] and [DUNBAR] were fmstrated that they kept beating Zubaydah up on th^am^uestioi^Wl^etting the same physiologic response from him." {See May 21, 2003, interview report of Office of the Inspector General.) Other interviewees described how analytical assumptions about Abu Zubaydah drove the interrogation process. {See May 22, 2003, inter^w report of
|, Office ofthe Inspector General; and February 27, 2003, interview report ofm |,OfficeoftheInspectorGeneral.) ChiefofCTC,JoseRodriguez,toldtheOIGthat"CTCsubject
matter experts" pointed to intelligence that they said indicated that Abu Zubaydah knew more than he was admitting and thus disagreed with the assessment from DETENTION SITE GREEN that Abu Zubaydah was "compliant." According to the OIG's record of die Jose Rodriguez interview, "disagreement between the analysts and interrogators can be healthy, but in this case Rodriguez believes that the analysts were wrong." {See interview of Jose Rodriguez, Office of tlie Inspector General^March6j2003^^^^^^^^^
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so far.. ..He did vomit a couple of times during the water board with some beans and rice. It's been 10 hours since he ate so this is surprising and disturbing. We plan to only feed Ensure for a while now. Fm head[ing] back for another water board session."^^^
//NF) The use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques-
including "walling, attention grasps, slapping, facial hold, stress positions, cramped confinement, white noise and sleep deprivation"—continued in "varying combinations, 24 hours a day" for 17 straight days, through August 20, 2002}^^ When Abu Zubaydah was left alone during this period, he was placed in a stress position, left on the waterboard with a cloth over his face, or lockedinoneoftwoconfinementboxes. Accordingtothecables,AbuZubaydahwasalso subjected to the waterboard "2-4 times a day...with multiple iterations of the watering cycle during each application."'^^
The "aggressive phase of interrogation" continued until August 23, 2002.^^^ Overthecourseoftheentire20day"aggressivephaseofinterrogation,"AbuZubaydah
spent a total of 266 hours (11 days, 2 hours) in the large (coffin size) confinement box and 29 hours in a small confinement box, which had a width of 21 inches, a depth of 2.5 feet, and a height of 2.5 feet. The CIA interrogators told Abu Zubaydah that the only way he would leave the facility was in the coffin-shaped confinement box.'^^
According to the daily cables from DETENTION SITE GREEN, Abu Zubaydah frequently "cried," "begged," "pleaded," and "whimpered," but continued to
deny that he had any additional information on current threats to, or operatives in, the United States,
August 9, 2002, the sixth day of the interrogation period, the interrogation team informed CIA Headquarters that they had come to the "collective preliminary
assessment" that it was unlikely Abu Zubaydah "had actionable new information about current threats to the United States."On August 10, 2002, the interrogation team stated that it was "highly unlikely" that Abu Zubaydah possessed the information they were s e e k i n g , O n the same day, the interrogation team reiterated a request for personnel from CIA Headquarters to
Emphasis in the original. Email from: [REDACTED]; to: [REDACTED]; subject: Re: So it begins; date: August 4, 2002, at 09:45:09AM. CIA Director Hayden informed the Committee in 2007 that "in tlie section[oftheICRCreport]onmedicalcare,thereportomitskeycontextualfacts. Forexample,AbuZubaydali's statement that he was given only Ensure and water for two to three weeks fails to mention the fact that he was on a liquid diet quite appropriate because he was recovering from abdominal surgery at the time."
10644 (201235Z AUG 02). For the first 17 days, the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques were used against Abu Zubaydah in "varying combinations, 24 hours a day." The "aggressive phase," as defined by the CIA,continuedforanadditionalthreedays. TheCIAcontinuedtouseitsenhancedinterrogationtechniquesagainst Abu Zubaydah until August 30,2002.
10644 (201235Z AUG 02) 10667 (231206ZAUG 02);| 10615 (120619Z AUG 02) 10644 (201235Z AUG 02) 10604 (091624Z AUG 02) 10607 (100335Z AUG 02)
10672 (240229Z AUG 02)
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of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, including waterboarding. The ended afterthearrivaloftheofficersfromCIAHeadqua^rs. See 02); ALECHH(im AUG02);•••I 10643(••• AUG02); 02)j_and^^^B(l067^40229Z AUG 02).
ressive phase of intenogation" 10616 AUG
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travel to the detention site to view the interrogations. A cable stated that the team believed that a "first-hand, on-the-ground look is best," but if CIA Headquarters personnel could not visit, a video teleconference would suffice.DETENTION SITE GREEN personnel also informed CIA Headquarters that it was their assessment that the application of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques was "approach[ing] the legal limit."^^^ The chiefof CTC, Jose Rodriguez, responded:
"Strongly urge that any speculative language as to the legality of given activities or, more precisely, judgment calls as to their legality vis-a-vis operational guidelines for this activity agreed upon and vetted at the most senior levels of the agency, be refrained from in written traffic (email or cable traffic). Suchlanguageisnothelpful."^^^
detention SITE GREEN cables describe Abu Zubaydah as "compliant," informing CIA Headquarters that when the interrogator "raised his eyebrow,
without instructions," Abu Zubaydah "slowly walked on his own to the water table and sat down."^®'^ Whentheinten'ogator"snappedhisfingerstwice,"AbuZubaydahwouldlieflaton thewaterboard.^®^ DespitetheassessmentofpersonnelatthedetentionsitethatAbuZubaydah was compliant, CIA Headquarters stated that they continued to believe that Abu Zubaydah was withholding threat information and instructed the CIA interrogators to continue using the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques.
times Abu Zubaydah was described as "hysterical"^^^ and "distressedtothelevelthathewasunabletoeffectivelycommunicate."-^ Waterboarding
sessions "resulted in immediate fluid intake and involuntary leg, chest and arm spasms" and "hysterical p l e a s . I n at least one waterboarding session, Abu Zubaydah "became completely
10607 (100335Z AUG 02). On August 2002, a video-conference between DETENTION SITE GREEN and CIA Headquaiters occuned, which included an interrogation video described by the inteirogation team as "quite graphic" and possibly "disturbing to some viewers." After tlie video-conference, CIA Headquarters instructed DETENTION SITE GREEN to continue the use of the CIA's enhanced inteiTogation techniques against Abu Zubaydah, but agreed to send two CIA Headquarters officers to the detention site to obsei-ve the interrogations first-hand. OnAugust 2002,ateamfromCIAHeadquarters,including^^^|CTCLegal
and Deputy Chief of ALEC Station visited DETENTION SITE GREEN and observed tlie use
10607 (100335Z AUG 02)
Email from: Jose Rodi'iguez; to: [REDACTED]; subject: [DETENTION SITE GREEN]; date: August 12, 2002,
with attachment of earlier email from: [REDACTED]; to: [REDACTED]. 10614 (111633Z AUG 02)
10614 (111633Z AUG 02)
202 See, for example, ALEC^^H (101728 AUG02); ALEC•
i ^ G 02); and 10700 (280820Z AUG 02). 10644 (201235Z AUG 02)
10643 (191518Z AUG 02)
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unresponsive,withbubblesrisingthroughhisopen,fullmouth."^*^^ AccordingtoCIArecords,
Abu Zubaydah remained unresponsive until medical intervention, when he regained
consciousness and expelled "copious amounts of liquid." This experience with the waterboard
was referenced in emails, but was not documented or otherwise noted in CIA cables.^^^ When
two CIA Headquarters officers later compared the Abu Zubaydah interrogation videotapes to the
cablerecord,neithercommentedonthissession. Areviewofthecatalogofvideotapes,
however, found that recordings of a 21-hour period, which included two waterboarding sessions,
208
CIA personnel at DETENTION SITE GREEN reported being disturbed by the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques against Abu Zubaydah.
CIA records include the following reactions and comments by CIA personnel:
• August5,2002: "wanttocaution[medicalofficer]thatthisisalmostcertainlynota place he's ever been before in his medical career...It is visually and psychologically very uncomfortable."^®^
• August 8, 2002: "Today's first session.. .had a profound effect on all staff members present.. .it seems the collective opinion that we should not go much
further.. .everyone seems strong for now but if the group has to continue.. .we cannot guarantee how much longer."-^®
• August 8, 2002: "Several on the team profoundly affected.. .some to the point of tears and choking up."-"
The description of the episode stated that "on being righted, he failed to respond until the interrogators gave him a xyphoid thrust (with our medi^folks edcin^owai^tl^room)." This passage was included in multiple emails, to include emails from the ||^^|OMS, to; [DETENTION SIT^BLj^] and [REDACTED]; subject: Re: Departure; date: March 6, 2003, at 7:11:59 PM; email from:
m m , OMS; to: [REDACTED] and [REDACTED]^i^ect: Re: Acceptable lower ambient temperatures; date: March 7, 2003, at 8:22 PM; email from: OMS; to: [REDACTED] and [REDACTED]; subjec^Re: Talking Points for review and comment; date: August 13, 2004, at 10:22 AM; and email from:
to: [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], and [REDACTED]; subject: Discussion with Dai^evin-A^date: October 26, 2004, at 6:09 PM.
Email from: OMS; to: [REDACTED] and [REDACTED]^ubiect: Re: Acceptable lower ambient temperatures; date; March 7,2003, at 8:22 PM; email from: H H S f e H I I ' OMS; to: [REDACTED] and [REDACTED]^ubie^Re: Talking Points for review and comment; date: August 13, 2004, at 10:22 AM; email from: • H H I H I ; to: [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], and [REDACTED]; subject: Re; Discussions with Dan Levin - AZ; date: October 26, 2004, at 6:09 PM.
CIA Inspector General's Special Review on Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Activities issued on May 7, 2004.
Email from: [REDACTED]; to: and [REDACTED]; subject: Re: Monday; date: August 5, 2002, at 05:35AM.
Email from: [REDACTED]; to: [REDACTED], | | | | | | ^ | ^ m , and [REDACTED]; subject: Update; date: August 8, 2002, at 06:50 AM.
were missmg.
Email from: [REDACTED]; to; [REDACTED], August 8, 2002, at 06:50 AM.
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• August 9, 2002: "two, perhaps three [personnel] likely to elect transfer" away from the detention site if the decision is made to continue with the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques.^
• August 11, 2002: Viewing the pressures on Abu Zubaydah on video "has produced strong feelings of futility (and legality) of escalating or even maintaining the pressure." Per viewing the tapes, "prepare for something not seen previously."^^^
After the use of the CIA's enhanced inteiTogation techniques ended, CIA personnel at the detention site concluded that Abu Zubaydah had been truthful and
tliat he did not possess any new terrorist threat information.
As noted, CIA records indicate that Abu Zubaydah never provided the information for which the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques were justified and
approved: information on the next terrorist attack and operatives in the United States. Furthermore, as compared to the period prior to August 2002, the quantity and type of intelligence produced by Abu Zubaydah remained largely unchanged during and after the August 2002useoftheCIA'senhancedinterrogationtechniques.^'^ Nonetheless,CIAHeadquarters informed the National Security Council that the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques used againstAbuZubaydahwereeffectiveandwere"producingmeaningfulresults.A cablefrom
Email from: [REDACTED]; to: and [REDACTED]; subject: Re: 9 August Update; date: August 9, 2002, at 10:44:16 PM.
213 Email from: [REDACTED]; to: and [REDACTED]; subject: Greetings; date: August 11, 2002, at 09:45 AM.
See, forexample, • • • 10672 (240229Z AUG 02). 2'-''SeeAbuZubaydahdetaineereviewinVolumeIIIfordetailsonAbuZubaydah'sintelligenceproduction.As noted, Abu Zubaydah was taken into CIA custody on March 2002, and was hospitalized until April 15, 2002. During the months of April and May 2002, which included a period during which Abu Zubaydah was on life support andunabletospeak,theinterrogationsofAbuZubaydahproduced95intelligencereports. AbuZubaydahspent much of June 2002 and all of July 2002 in isolation, without being asked any questions. The CIA reinstituted contact with Abu Zubaydah on August 4, 2002, and immediately began using the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques—includingthewaterboard. DuringthemonthsofAugustiuidSeptember2002,AbuZubaydahproduced 91 intelligence reports, four fewer than the first two months of his CIA detention. CIA records indicate tliat the type of intelligence Abu Zubaydah provided remained relatively constant prior to and after the use of the CIA's enhanced intenogation techniques. According to CIA records, Abu Zubaydah provided information on "al-Qa'ida activities, plans, capabilities, and relationships," in addition to information on "its leadership structure, including personalities, decision-making processes, tiaining, and tactics." See also CIA paper entitled "Abu Zubaydah," dated March 2005, as well as "Abu Zubayd^iBio|^dorament, "Prepare^)r^^ugus^006."
On August 30, 2002, l-^egal, ^SC Legal Adviser John Bellinger to discuss Abu Zubaydah's interrogation. See email fi:om: John Rizzo; to: John Moseman; subject: Meeting with NSC Legal Adviser; date: August 30, 2002; ALEC (052227ZSEP 02). In his email documenting the meeting,
'noted that we had employed the walling techniques, confinement box, waterboaid, along witli some of the otlier methods which also had been approved by the Attorney General," and "reported that while the experts at tlie site and at Headquarters were still assessing the product of the recent sessions, it did appear that the current phase was producing meaningful results." (See email from: John Rizzo; to: John Moseman; subject: Meeting with NSC Legal Adviser; date: August 30, 2002.) The email did not provide any additional detail on what was described to Bellinger with respect to either the use of the techniques or the "results" of the inten ogation. It is unclear from CIA records whether the CIA ever informed the NSC Legal Adviser or anyone else at the NSC or the Department of Justice that Abu Zubaydah failed to provide information about futme attacks against the United States or operatives tasked to commit attacks in the U.S. during or after the use of tlie CIA's enhanced intenogation techniques.
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DETENTION SITE GREEN, which CIA records indicate was authored by SWIGERT and DUNBAR, also viewed the interrogation of Abu Zubaydah as a success. The cable recommended that "the aggressive phase at [DETENTION SITE GREEN] should be used as a template for future interrogation of high value captives,"^'^ not because the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques produced useful information, but rather because their use confirmed that Abu Zubaydah did not possess the intelligence that CIA Headquarters had assessed Abu Zubaydah to have. The cable from the detention site stated:
"Our goal was to reach the stage where we have broken any will or ability of subject to resist or deny providing us information (intelligence) to which he had access. We additionally sought to bring subject to the point that we confidently assess that he does not/not possess undisclosed threat information, or intelligence that could prevent a terrorist event."~"^
The cable further recommended that psychologists—a likely reference to contractors SWIGERT and DUNBAR — "familiar with interrogation, exploitation
and resistance to interrogation should shape compliance of high value captives prior to debriefing by substantive experts."-^^
From Abu Zubaydah's capture on March 28, 2002, to his transfer to Department of Defense custody on September 5, 2006, infomiation provided by Abu
Zubaydah resulted in 766 disseminated intelligence reports."^^ According to CIA documents, Abu Zubaydah provided information on "al-Qa'ida activities, plans, capabilities, and relationships," in addition to information on "its leadership structure, including personalities, decision-makingprocesses,training,andtactics."-'^ Asnoted,thistypeofinformationwas provided by Abu Zubaydah before, during, and after the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. AtnotimeduringoraftertheuseoftheCIA'senhancedinterrogationtechniques
According to CIA records, on September 27, 2002, the CIA briefed the chairman and the vice chairman of the Committee, Senators Graham and Shelby, as well as the Committee staff directors, on Abu Zubaydiili's interrogation. The CIA's memorandum of the briefing indicates that the chairman and vice chairman were briefed on "the enhanced techniques that had been employed," as well as "die nature and quality of reporting provided by Abu Zubaydah." See (DIRECTOR (252018Z OCT 02).
• • • 10644 (201235Z AUG 02) 10644 (201235Z AUG 02) 10644 (201235Z AUG 02)
TheCommitteeusessole-sourceintelligencereportinginthissummary. WhileCIAmulti-sourceintelligence reports are included in the full Committee Study, the focus of the Committee analysis is on sole-source intelligence reporting, as these reports were deemed to more accurately reflect useful reporting from individual CIA detainees. Asbackground,multi-sourceintelligencereportsarereportsthatcontaindatafrommultipledetainees. Forexample, a common multi-source report would result from the CIA showing a picture of an individual to all CIA detainees at a specific CIA detention site. A report would be produced regardless if detainees were or were not able to identify or provide infomiation on the individual. As a specific example, see HEADQUARTERS (202255Z JUN 06), which states that from January 1, 2006 - April 30, 2006, information from Hanibali was "used in the dissemination of three intelligence reports, two of which were non-recognitions of Guantanamo Bay detainees," and the third of which "detailed [Hambali's] statement that he knew of no threats or plots to attack any world sporting events." Sole-source reports, by contrast, are based on specific information provided by one CIA detainee.
CIApaperentitled,"AbuZubaydah,"datedMarch2005. Sameinformationincludedinan"AbuZubaydah Bio" document "Prepared on 9 August 2006."
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did Abu Zubaydah provide information about operatives in, or future attacks against, the United States.
10. A CIA Presidential Daily BriefProvides Inaccurate Information on the Interrogation of Abu Zubaydah
Although CIA personnel at DETENTION SITE GREEN agreed that Abu Zubaydah was compliant and cooperative, personnel at CIA Headquarters prepared a
Presidential Daily Brief (PDB) in October 2002 that, according to a cable, "accurately reflect[ed] the collective HQS view of the information provided [by Abu Zubaydah] to date."-^^ The October 2002 PDB stated Abu Zubaydah was still withliolding "significant threat information," including information on operatives in the United States, and that Abu "Zubaydah resisted providing useful information until becoming more cooperative in early August, probably in the hope of improving his living conditions.""^'^ The PDB made no reference to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques or the counter-assessment from the detention site interrogation team indicating that Abu Zubaydah was cooperative and not withholding information.^^^
documents identified the "key intelligence" acquired from Abu Zubaydah as information related to suspected terrorists Jose Padilla and Binyam
Mohammad, information on English-speaking al-Qa'ida member Jaffar al-Tayyar, and information identifying KSM as the mastermind of the September 11, 2001, attacks who used the alias"Mukhtar."^^^ AllofthisinformationwasacquiredbyFBIspecialagentsshortlyafterAbu Zubaydah's capture.^^^
The CIA has consistently represented that Abu Zubaydah stated that the CIA's enhanced inten'ogation techniques were necessary to gain his cooperation. For
example, the CIA informed the OLC that:
"As Zubaydah himself explained with respect to enhanced techniques, 'brothers who are captured and interrogated aie permitted by Allah to provide
Sec Abu Zubaydah detainee review in V olume III for additional details.
223 ALEC|||i|f(181439ZOCT02)
224 ALEC (181439Z OCT 02)
22'' Among other documents, 10667 (231206Z AUG 02); • • • 10672 (240229Z AUG 02); and email from: [REDACTED] (j^^^HclSof Base at DETENTION SITE GREEN); to: CIA Headquarters; subject: "Assessment to Date" of Abu Zubaydah; date: October 6,2002, at 05:36:46 AM.
22'' See "Key Intelligence and Reporting Derived from Abu Zubaydah and KSM," dated February 2008, updated for briefings on several dates, including for a 2009 briefing to Director Leon Panetta, as well as the "Effectiveness Memo" provided to the Department of Justice, testimony provided by CIA Director Michael Hayden, and other documentsdiscussedindetailinVolume11. Forexample,seeODNISeptember2006pressreleasestating: "During initial inteiTogation, Abu Zubaydah gave some information that he probably viewed as nominal. Some was important,however,includingthatKhalidShaykhMohammad (KSM) wasthe9/11mastermind andusedthe moniker 'Mukhtar.' This identification allowed us to comb previously collected intelligence for both names, openingupnewleadstothisterroristplotter—leadsthateventuallyresultedinhiscapture. Itwascleartohis intenogators that Abu Zubaydali possessed a great deal of information about al-Qa'ida; however, he soon stopped all cooperation. Over the ensuing months, the CIA designed a new interrogation program that would be safe, effective, and legal."
22^ See Abu Zubaydah detainee review in Volume III for additional details.
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information when they believe they have 'reached the limit of their ability to withhold it' in the face of psychological and physical hardships.
As is described in greater detail in the full Committee Study, CIA recordsdonotsupporttheCIArepresentationthatAbuZubaydahmadethesestatements.^^^ CIA
records indicate that Abu Zubaydah maintained that he always intended to talk and never believed he could withhold information from interrogators.^^'^ In February 2003, Abu Zubaydah told a CIA psychologist that he believed prior to his capture that every captured "brother" would talk in detention and that he told individuals at a terrorist training camp that "brothers should be able to expect that the organization will make adjustments to protect people and plans when someone with knowledge is captured.""^'
11. The CIA Does NotBriefthe Committee on the Interrogation ofAbuZubaydah
I" contrast to relatively open communications that the CIA had with the Committee following the issuance of the September 17, 2001, MON, the CIA
significantly limited its communications with the Committee on its detention and interrogation activitiesafterAbuZubaydah'scaptureonMarch28,2002.^^^ Inresponsestothreedifferent sets of Committee Questions for the Record addressed to the CIA regarding the MON authorities in the spring and summer of 2002, the CIA provided no indication that the CIA had established DETENTION SITE GREEN, or was using, or considering using, coercive interrogation techniques.'-^^
On September 27, 2002, CIA officials provided a briefing on Abu Zubaydah's interrogation only to Committee Chairman Bob Graham, Vice Chairman Richard
Shelby, and their staff directors. After this briefing Chairman Graham made multiple and
228
Memorandum for John A. Rizzo, Senior Deputy General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, from Steven G. Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, May 30, 2005, Re; Application of United States Obligations Under Article 16 of the Convention Against Torture to Certain Techniques that May be Used in the InteiTogation of High Value A1 Qaeda Detainees (DTS #2009-1810, Tab 11). This OLC mejiiorandum citesCIA memorandum for Steve Bradbury at the Department of Justice, dated March 2, 2005, from
H H I ' H I Legal Group, DCI Counterterrorist Center, subject "Effectiveness ofthe CIA Counterterrorist Interrogation Techniques."
^^Mj^iU^her^re no records of Abu Zubaydah making these statements, the deputy chief of ALEC Station,
told the Inspector General on July 17, 2003, that the "best information [tlie CIA] received on
how to handle die [CIA] detainees came from a wallc-in [a source ^
to volunteer information to the CIA] after the arrest of Abu Zubaydah. He told us we were
underestimating Al-Qa'ida. The detainees were happy to be arrested by the U.S. because they got a big show trial. Whentheywereturnedoverto[foreigngovernments],theyweretreatedbadlysotheytalked. Allahapparently allowsyoutotalkifyoufeelthreatened. The[CIA]detaineesnevercountedonbeingdetainedbyusoutsidethe U.S.andbeingsubjectedtomethodstheyneverdreamedof." See MemorandumfortheRecord; subject^^ting with deputy chief, CounterteiTorist Center ALEC Station; date: 17 July 2003.
10496 (1620I4Z FEB 03)^or more information, see a March 7, 2005, cable describing Abu Zubaydah|^xplanations more fully ( | ^ | 2166 (070647Z MAR 05)).
|M^Hi0496 (162014Z FEB 03) For additional details on this matter, see Volume D, specifically the section on information provided by the CIA to the Department of Justice.
The information provided by the CIA to the Committee on the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program is summarized later in this document, and described in greater detail in Volume IL
See Volume 11, specifically the section on CIA representations to Congress. 11II I (III 11
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specific requests for additional information on the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program. Internal CIA emails include discussion of how the CIA could "get... off the hook on the cheap" regarding Chairman Graham's requests for additional information.^-^"^ In the end, CIA officials simply did not respond to Graham's requests prior to his departure from the Committee in January 2003.
C. Interrogation in Country | and the January 2003 Guidelines
1. The CIA Establishes DETENTION SITE COBALT, Places Inexperienced First-Tour Officer in Charge
for a specialized CIA detentionfaciHtym Country | began in April 2002, with the intention that it would be "totally under [|^^^^H]/Station
C o n t r o l . O n June 6, 2002, CIA Headquarters approved more than $200,000 for the construction of the facility, identified in this summary as "DETENTION SITE COBALT."^^^ In a 2003 interview with the CIA Office of Inspector General, Associate Deputy Director for Operations ^n|||^^m|||| described his views ofthis facility and "stated that [DETENTION SITE COBALT] wasopened^cause there needed to be adetention site in [Country | ] for those detainees enroute [DETENTION SITE GREEN]. It was not a place for the use ofEITs."^^^
DETENTION SITE COBALT, constructed with CIA funding, opened in Country | in September 2002.^^^ According to CIA records, the windows at
DETENTION SITE COBALT were blacked out and detainees were kept in total darkness. The guards monitored detainees using headlamps and loud music was played
constantly in the facility. While in their cells, detainees were shackled to the wall and given buckets for human waste. Four of the twenty cells at the facility included a bar across the top of thecell.^^^ Laterreportsdescribedetaineesbeingshackledtothebai"withtheirhandsabove their heads, forcing them to stand, and therefore not allowing the detainees to sleep.^"^^
Email from: Stanley Moskowitz; to: John H. Moseman; cc: Scott Mtiller and James Pavitt; subject: [attached document] Re: Graliam request on interrogations; date: December 9, 2002, at 05:46:11 PM.
By June 2002 the CIA had taken custody offive detainees who were captured outside ofCountry H and placed these CIA detainees in Country detention facilities. The detainees were held at the Country B facilities at the request of the CIA and the CIA had unlimited access to them. See 21147
236 DIRECTOR (062212Z JUN 02)
23'' Interview Report, 2003-7123-IG, Review of Interrogations for Counterterrorism Purposes,
September 9, 2003.
238 For additional information on DETENTION SITE COBALT, see Volume I and Volume HI. Tlie specific date
has been generalized at the request of the CIA.
23^ 28246 2'*°ForadditionalinformationonDETENTIONSIT^COBALT^ceVolumeIan^Volum^U^n^mon^ther documents: 31118 DIRECTO^|^^^J|^Hp[|B|||||||B email from: [REDACTED]; to: [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], I^^^HB^BIREDACTED]; subject: Meeting with SO & Federal Bureau of Prisons; date: December 4,2002; email from: [REDACTED]; to: [REDACTED]; subject: Meeting with SO & Federal Bureau of Prisons; date: December 5, 2002; Special Review, Counterterrorism Detention and InteiTOgation Activities (Septembe^OO^^cto^r 2003) (2003-7123-IG), May 7, 2004; Memorandum for Deputy Director o^perations^romHHB||^^^^H|, January 28, 2003, Subject:
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\fm¥} TheCIAofficerinchargeofDETENTIONSITECOBALT, [CIA OFFICER 1], was a junior officer on his first overseas assignment with
no previous experience or training in handling prisoners or conducting interrogations.
[CIA OFFICER 1] was the DETENTION SITE COBALT manager during the period in which a CIA detainee died and numerous CIA detainees were subjected to unapproved coercive interrogationtechniques.-"^^ AreviewofCIArecordsfoundthatpriorto [CIA OFFICER I's] deployment and assignment as the CIA*s DETENTION SITE COBAL T manager, other CIA officers recommended [CIA OFFICER 1] not have continued access to classified information due to a "lack ofhone^, judgment, and maturity."^"^" According to records, "the chief of CTC told [ H i ^ l [CIA OFFICER 1]] that he would not want[him]inhisoverseasstation."^"^^ Asupervisingofficerassessedthat [CIA OFFICER 1]:
"has issues with judgment and maturity, [and his] potential behavior in the field isalso worrisome. [The officer] further advised that [|||[|||||[| [CIA OFFICER 1]] was only put into processing for an overseas position so that someone would evaluate all of the evidence of this situation all together. [The officer further noted that [ | ^ H | | [CIA OFFICER 1]] might not listen to his chief of station when in the field.
2. CIA Records Lack Information on CIA Detainees and Details ofInterrogations in Country |
Detainees held in Country | were detained under the authority of the MON; however, CIA officers conducted no written assessment of whether these detainees
DeaO^n^stigation - Gul RAHMAN; and CIA Inspector General, Reportoflnvestigation, Death of a Detainee |
H m i (2003-7402-10), April 27, 2005. One senior interrogator, told the CIA OIG that "literally, a detainee could go for days or weeks without anyone looking at him," and that his team found one
detainee who, "'as far as we could determine,' had been chained to the wall in a standing position for 17 days." According to the CIA interrogator, someof the CIA detainees at DETENTION SITE COBALT "'literally looked likeadogthathadbeenkenneled.' Whenthedoorstotheircellswereopened,'theycowered.'" {SeeInterview Report, 2003-7123-IG, Revie\^nnte^ogations for Counterterrorism Purposes, M^^llilllllii> April 30, 2003.) The chief of interrogations, told the CIA OIG that "[DETENTION SITE COBALT] is good for interrogations because it is the closest thing he has seen to a dungeon, facilitating the displacement of detainee Kions." {SeeInterviewReport, 2003-7123-IG, ReviewofInterrogationsforCounterterrorismPurposes,||^|
April 7, 2003.) An analyst who conducted interrogations at DETENTION SITE COBALT told the CIA OIG that "[DETENTION SITE COBALT] is an EIT." {See Interview Report, 2003-7123-IG, Review of Interrogations for Counterterrorism Purposes, ^ | B | | | | | B , May 8, 2003.)
See April 27, 2005, CIA Inspector General, Report of Investigation: Death of a Detainee
April 7, 2005, Memorandum for John Helgerson, Inspector General, from Robert Grenier, Subject: Comments on
Draft Report of Investigation: Death of a Detainee
(2003-7402-IG).
[CIA OFFICER 1].
[CIA OFFICER 1]| [CIA OFFICER I]|
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2^054 250 I I I B M l " ' "" 02).
11443
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its officers from the day it became operationalinSeptember2002^^^^^^^
UNCLASSIFIED
"pose[d] a continuing, serious threat of violence or death to U.S. persons and interests or... [we]re planning terrorist activities." The CIA maintained such poor records of its detainees in Country | during this period that the CIA remains unable to determine the number and identity of the individuals it detained. The full details of the CIA interrogations there remain largely unknown, as DETENTION SITE COBALT was later found to have not reported multiple uses of sleep deprivation, required standing, loud music, sensory deprivation, extended isolation,
reduced quantity and quality of food, nudity, and "rough treatment" of CIA detainees.
3. CIA Headquarters Recommends That Untrained Interrogators in Country | Use the CIA's Enhanced Interrogation Techniques on Ridha al-Najjar
Ridha al-Najjar was the first CIA detainee to be held at DETENTIONSITECOBALT. Al-Najjar,alongwithHassanMuhammadAbuBakran^a
number of other individuals, was arrested in Karachi, Pakistan, after raids conducted t>y ^^^mPakistan^^^l in late May 2002.^"^^ Al-Najjar was identified by the CIA as a former bodyguard for Usama bin Laden,^"^^ and was rendered with Abu Bakr to CIA custody at a Counti-y I detention facility on June | , 2002.^'^^ Ridha al-Najjar was transferred to DETENTION SITE COBALT on September B , 2002.^^^
While the CIA was describing to the Department of Justice why it needed to use the CIA's enhanced inten*ogation techniques against Abu Zubaydah, a parallel internal discussion at the CIA was taking place regarding Ridha al-Najjar. An ALEC Station
cable from a CTC officer stated that, on June 27, 2002:
"ALEC/HQS held a strategy session regarding the interrogation of high
priority detaineeRidhaAhmedal-Najjarin[Country|]. The
goal of the session was to review the progress of the interrogation to date and
to devise a general plan as to how best to proceed once the new [Country |
H H ] detention/debriefing facility [i.e., DETENTION SITE COBALT] is completed."250
The meeting participants included individuals who were also involved in discussionsrelatedtoAbi^ub^ interrogatiojMncludin^e^ chief of
ALEC Station, LegA
The full Committee Study includes a CIA photograph of a waterboard at DETENTION SITE COBALT. Wliile tliere are no records of the CIA using the waterboard at COBALT, the waterboard device in tlie photograph is surrounded by buckets, with a bottle of unknown pink solution (filled two thirds of the way to the top) and a watering can resting on the wooden beams of the waterboard. In meetings between tlie Committee Staff and the CIA in the summer of 2013, the CIA was unable to explain tlie details of the photograph, to include the buckets, solution, and watering can, as well as the waterboard's presence at COBALT.
government, the detention site was controlled and overseen by tlie CIA and
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2002, to the CIA Station in Country against Ridha al-Najjar, including:
A cable followed on July 16, suggesting possible interrogation techniques to use
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utilizing "Najjar's fear for the well-being of his family to our benefit," with the cable explicitly stating that interrogators could not "threaten his family with imminent death";
using "vague threats" to create a "mind virus" that would cause al-Najjar to believe that his situation would continue to get worse until he cooperated;^^^
manipulating Ridha al-Najjar's environment using a hood, restraints, and music; and • employing sleep deprivation through the use of round-the-clock interrogations.2 5 3
The cable went on to note that the "possibility that [al-Najjar] may havecurrentthreatorleadinformationdemandsthatwekeepupthepressureonhim."^^"^ With
the exception of a brief mention of "diminished returns from the most recent interviews of al- Najjar," and references to the detainee's complaints about physical ailments, the cable offers no evidence al-Najjar was actively resisting CIA interrogators."^^
Ten days later, on July 26, 2002, CIA officers in Country | , none of whom had been trained in the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, proposed
putting al-Najjar in isolation^^^ and using "sound disorientation techniques," "sense of time deprivation,"limitedlight,coldtemperatures,andsleepdeprivation.^^^ TheCIAofficersadded that they felt they had a "reasonable chance of breaking Najjar" to get "the intelligence and locator lead information on UBL and Bin Ladin's f a m i l y . T h e plan for al-Najjar was circulated to senior CIA officers as part of the Daily DCI Operations Update.-^^
ALEC 162135ZJUL02). ThedeputychiefofALECStation, andH||^^^|CTC Legal, would later travel to DETENTION SITE GREEN to observe the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques against Abu Zubaydah.
The term "mind virus" first appeared in the interrogations of Abu Zubaydah. See APR 02).
25^ Referenced July 16, 2002, cable is ALEC H I I (162135Z JUL 02). ALEC (162135Z JUL 02)
10086 (201900Z
255 ALEC • • (162135Z JUL 02) Atthistime,July26,2002,AbuZubaydahwasinisolationatDETENTIONSITEGREEN. AbuZubaydahwas
placed in isolation on June 18, 2002, and remained in isolation for 47 days, until the CIA began subjecting him to its enhance^nteiTogat^^ on August 4, 2002.
2-'^ 25107 (260903Z JUL 02)
25107 (260903Z JUL 02)
259 Email from: [REDACTEDjUo^uzz^rongard, John O. Brennan, [REDACTED], [REDACTED], John H.
Moseman, [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED]7^H||||^H, Rodriguez^^^m^^^^Kjohn P. Mudd, •••••, [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED],
[REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED],
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August 5, 2002, the day after Abu Zubaydah's interrogation using the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques at DETENTION SITE GREEN began, CIA
Headquarters autliorized the proposed interrogation plan for al-Najjar, to include the use of loud music (at less than the level that would cause physical harm such as permanent hearing loss), worse food (as long as it was nutritionally adequate for sustenance), sleep deprivation, and hooding.^^^
More than a month later, on September 21, 2002, CIA interrogators described al-Najjar as "clearly a broken man" and "on the verge of complete breakdown" as resultoftheisolation.^^^ Thecableaddedthatal-NajjarwaswillingtodowhatevertheCIA
officer asked.
In October 2002, officers from the U.S. military conducted a short debriefing of al-Najjar at DETENTION SITE COBALT and subsequently expressed an interest
in a more thorough debriefing.^^^ On November 2002, a U.S. military legal advisor visited DETENTION SITE COBALT and described it as a "CIA detentioi^acility/^ioting that "while CIA is the only user of the facility they contend it is a [Country facility."^^"^ The U.S. military officer also noted that the junior CIA officer designated as warden of the facility"haslittletonoexperiencewithinterrogatingorhandlingprisoners." Withrespecttoal- Najjar specifically, the legal advisor indicated that the CIA's interrogation plan included "isolation in total darkness; lowering the quality of his food; keeping him at an uncomfortable temperature (cold); [playing music] 24 hours a day; and keeping him shackled and hooded." In addition, al-Najjar was described as having been left hanging—which involved handcuffing one or both wrists to an overhead bar which would not allow him to lower his ai*ms—for 22 hours each day for two consecutive days, in order to "'break' his resistance." It was also noted al- Najjar was wearing a diaper and had no access to toilet facilities.
niilitary legal advisor concluded that, because of al- Najjar's treatment, and die concealment of the facility from the ICRC, military participation in
al-Najjai*'s interrogation would involve risks for the U.S. military H H m . The legal advisor reconmiended briefing the CIA's detention and interrogation activities to U.S.
[REDACTED], [REDACTED]; subject: ABU ZUBAYDAH - SENSITIVE ADDENDUM TO DCl DAILY 1630 OPS UPDATE -26 JULY; date: July 26,2002.
DIRECTORBIHI(052309ZAUG02). TheOLCopinionthatreviewedandapprovedtheuseofCIA's enhanced inteiTogation tecliniques, signed on August 1, 2002, was specific to Abu Zubaydali. The Office of Legal Counsel did not produce legal opinions for al-Najjar or other detainees held by or for the CIA until August 2004. 2^' [REDACTED] 27297 (210713Z SEP 02)
[REDACTED] 27297 (210713Z SEP
November 2002, Memorandum for
Subject: Legal Analysis ofJ U Personnel Participating in Interrogation at the CIA Detention Facility in [REDACTED] (aka"[DETENTIONSITECOBA^TX^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
November 2002, Memorandum for
Subject: Legal Analysis of Personnel Participating in Interrogation at the CIA Detention Facility in [REDACTED] (aka"[DETENTIONSITECOBAL22i_^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^_
November 2002, Memorandum for
Subject: Legal Analysis ofH I Personnel Participating in Interrogation at the CIA Detention Facility in [REDACTED] (aka "[DETENTION SITE COBAL T]'
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[combatant command] to alert the command of the risks prior to the U.S. military beinginvolvedinanyaspectoftheinterrogationofal-Najjar.-^^ AccordingtotheCIA
inspector general, the detention and interrogation of Ridha al-Najjar "became the model" for handling other CIA detainees at DETENTION SITE COBALT.-^^ The CIA disseminated one intelligence report from its detention and interrogation of Ridha al-Najjar,^^^
4. Death of Gul Rahman Leads CIA Headquarters to Learn of Unreported Coercive Interrogation Techniques at DETENTIONSITE COBALT; CIA Inspector General Review Reveals Lack of Oversight of the Detention Site
In November 2002, ALEC Station officers requested that CIA contract interrogator Hammond DUNBAR, one of the two primary interrogators of Abu
Zubaydah in August 2002, travel to DETENTION SITE COBALT to assess a detainee for the possible use ofthe CIA's enhanced interrogationtechni^^ While DUNBAR was present at DETENTION SITE COBALT, he assistedfl^^HllB [CIA OFFICER I] in the interrogations of Gul Rahman, a suspected Islamic extremist. As reported to CIA Headquarters, this interrogation included "48 hours of sleep deprivation, auditory overload, total darkness, isolation,acoldshower,androughtreatment." CIAHeadquartersdidnotapprovethese interrogation techniques in advance. Upon receipt of these cables, however, officers at CIA Headquarters responded that they were "motivated to extract any and all operational information on al-Qa'ida and Hezbi Islami from Gul Rahman" and suggested that "enhanced measures" might be needed to gain Gul Rahman's compliance. CIA Headquarters also requested that a psychologicalassessmentofRahmanbecompleted.^^^ PriortoDUNBAR'sdeparturefromthe detention site on November | , 2002, [a few days before the death of Gul Rahman] DUNBAR proposed the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques on other detainees and offered suggestions to [CIA OFFICER 1], the site manager, on the use of such techniques.^^^
On November!, 2002, [CIA OFFICER 1] ordered that Gul Rahman be shackled to the wall of his cell in a position that required the detainee to rest on
the bare concrete floor. Rahman was wearing only a sweatshirt, as [CIA OFFICER 1] had ordered that Rahman's clothing be removed when he had been judged to be uncooperative during an earlier interrogation. The next day, the guards found Gul Rahman's dead body. An internal CIA review and autopsy assessed that Rahman likely died from hypothermia—in part
November 2002, Meinor^um for
Subject: Legal Analysis ofdHPersonnel Participating in Interrogation at the CIA Detention Facility in [REDACTED] (aka "[DETENTION SITE COBALT]").
^^^A^ording to tlie IG report, "in late July or early August 2002, a senioroperationsofficer^ TDY to |
H H interrogated a particularly obstinate detainee [Ridha al-Najjar] at detention facility thatwasusedbefore[COBALT]wasopened. Theofficerdraftedacablethatproposedtechniquesthat,ultimately,
becam^h^mjj®' [COBALT]." See April 27, 2005, report by the CIA Inspector General, Death ofa Detainee | llllllllllllllll^^^l (2003-7402J[G)^e^fe^nt^iew Report, 2003-7123-IG, Review of Inten'ogations for
CounterterrorismPurposes, ^^^BHH||^Pnn0^003; InterviewReport, 2003-7123-IG, Reviewof Interrogations for Counterterrorism Pu^posesTlt^^^^^l, April 2, 2003.
See V olume II and V olume III for additional information. 26' ALEC
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from having been forced to sit on the bare concrete floor without pants.^^^ [CIA OFFICER I's] initial cable to CIA Headquarters on Rahman's death included a number of misstatements and omissions that were not discovered until internal investigations into Rahman's death.^^^
death of Gul Rahman resulted in increased attention to CIA detention and interrogation activities in Country | by CIA Headquarters. The CTC formally
designated the CTC's Renditions Group^^"^ as the responsible entity for the management and maintenance of all CIA interrogation facilities, including DETENTION SITE COBALT, in early December2002.-^^ Despitethischange,manyofthesameindividualswithintheCIA— including DUNBAR, officers at DETENTION SITE COBALT, and officers within ALEC Station who had recommended the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques against Gul Rahman—^remained key figures in the CIA inteiTogation program and received no reprimand or sanction for Rahman's death. Instead, in Maich 2003, just four months after the death of Gul Rahman, the CIA Station in Country |recommended that^^^^fm^^^^I^OFFICER 1] receive a "cash award" of $2,500 for his "consistently ikii wini " t ^ l I A OFFICER 1] remained in his position as manager of the detention site until July 2003 and continued to be involved in the interrogations of other CIA detainees. He was formally certified as a CIA interrogator in April 2003 after the practical portion of his training requirement was waived because of his past experience with interrogations at DETENTION SITE COB ALT.-^^
Memorandum for Deputy Director of Operations, from January 28, 2003, Subject: Death Investigation - Gul RAHMAN. Otlier contributing factors were identified as dehydration, lack of food, and iiTiraobilit^u^^|shor^^
30211 See V olume and 111 for additional details.
As noted, the Renditions Group was also known during the program as the "Renditions and InteiTogations
Group," as well as the "Rendition, Detention, and Interrogation Group," and by the initials, "RDI" and "RDG." 2'"nil 11 nil DEC02)
27^ DIRECTOrI^^I^^I^I^^^I^ In late 2005, the CIA convened an Accountability Board to review the actions of CIA personnel in Gul Rahman's death. The board recommended that the executive director "impose a 10 day suspension without pay" on I ^ B U I |CIA OFFICER 1], and noted that this action would "strike the appropriate balance between: I) the fact that [ m i i l ^ l OFFICER 1]] was the only individual who made decisions that led directly, albeit unintentionally, to Rahman's death, and 2) the significant weight the Board attached to the mitigating factors at play in this incident." {See Memorandumfor Executive Director from
H I , Deputy Director for Science and Technology, re: Report and Recommendations of the Special Accountability Board Regarding the Death ofAfghar^etainee Gul Rahman.) On February 10, 2006, however, the CIA Executive Director K.B. Foggo notified | | [ H | H [CIA OFFICER 1] that he intended to take no disciplinary action against liim. In his memo describing that decision, the executive director stated: "Wliile not condoning your actions, it is imperative, in my view, that they... be judged within the operational context that existed at the time of Raliman's detention. Cable traffic reviewed by the board shows conclusively that Headquarters generally was awaie of, and Bosed no objections to, the confinement conditions and interrogation techniques beii^ imposed on Rahman as late as
INovember. Onthatdate.Headquartersnotified[theCIAStationinCOUNTRY|]...thatitwas'motivatedto extract any and all operational information' from Rahman, that it rated achieving Rahman's cooperation to be of
'great importance' and that it acknowledged that Ralunan 'may need to be subjectedtoenhancedm measurestoinducehimtocomply." (SeeFebruary10,2006,Memorandumfor[^HI^HHH OFFICER 1]], CounterTerrorist Center, National Clandestine Service, from Executive Director, re; "Accountability Decision.") Witli regard to the death of Gul Raliman, the CIA's June 2013 Response states: "Most egregiously, we believe that CIA leaders erred in not holding anyone formally accountable for the actions and failure of management related to the death of Gul Raliman at [COBALT] in 2002. We understand the reasoning underlying CIA management's decision to overturn an accountability board recommendation that would have imposed sanctions on the least
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Later investigations of DETENTION SITE COBAL T conducted by tlie CIA inspector general and the deputy director of operations following the death of Gul
Rahman found that the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques—and other coercive interrogation techniques—was more widespread than was reported in contemporaneous CIA cables. Specifically, the interrogation techniques that went unreported in CIA cables included standing sleep deprivation in which a detainee's arms were shackled above his head, nudity, dietary manipulation, exposure to cold temperatures, cold showers, "rough takedowns," and, in at least two instances, the use of mock executions
NovembeM8^002^taf^min the CIA's Office ofInspector Oeneralcontacted^^^^miCTC Legal, to indicate their interest in being
briefed by CTC on the detention facility in Country At their meeting with the DDO and the chief of CTC on November | , 2002, the OIG staff explained that, while in that counti'y on a separate matter, the staff had overheard a conversation that included references to "war crimes" and "torture" at a CIA detention facility and were therefore seeking to follow-up on this information. According to notes from the meeting, the DDO described the "most recent event concerning Gul Rahman"—his death, which occurred on November H , 2002.^^^
experiencedofficerinvolved. Themostjuniorinthechainofcommandshouldnothavetobearthefullweightof accountability when larger, systemic problems exist and when they are tlmist into difficult battlefield situations by theirsupervisorsandgivenariskyanddifficulttaskandlittlepreparationorguidance. Still,itishardtoacceptthat a CIA officer does not beai'at least some responsibility for his or her actions, even under trying circumstances."
Special Review, Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Activities (September 2001 - October 2003) (2003-7123-IG), May 7, 2004; Memorandum for Deputy Director of Operations, from January 28, 2003, Subiect^^thInvestigation - Gul RAHMAN; CIA Inspector General, Report ofInvestigation, Death of a Detainee (2003-7402-IG), April 27, 2005. Inspector General records of the interview of a senior CIA debriefer indicated that, "[d]uring the two weeksof interrogation training, she heaid stories of [COBALT] detainees being 'hung for days on end,' not being fed, mock assassinations, and at least one case of a detainee being repeatedly choked/^Thesenio^ also informed the Office of Inspector General tliat, "[s]he heard that while at [COBALT] aka "CIA OFFICER 2"] had hung detainees up for long periods with their toes barely touchin^h^round." {See interview report, 2003-7123-IG, Review ofInterrogations for Counterterrorism Purposes, April 5, 2003.) DUNBAR described a "rough takedown" following the death of Gul RalimanatCOBALT. "Accordingto[DUNBAR],therewereapproximatelyfiveCIAofficersfromtherenditions team. Each one had a role during the takedown and it was thoroughly planned and rehearsed. They opened the door ofRahman'scellandrushedinscreamingandyellingforhimto'getdown.' Theydraggedhimoutside,cutoffhis clothes and secured him with Mylar tape. They covered his head with a hood and ran him up and down a long corridoradjacenttohiscell.Theyslappedhimandpunchedhimseveraltimes. [DUNBAR]statedthatalthoughit was obvious they were not trying to hit him as hard as they could, a couple of times the punches were forceful. As they ran him along the corridor, a couple of times he fell and they dragged him through the dirt (the floor outside of the cells is dirt). Rahman did acquire a numberof abrasions on his face, legs, and hands, but nothing that required medical attention. (This may account for the abrasions found on Rahman's body after his death. Rahman had a numberofsurfaceabrasionsonhisshoulders,pelvis,arms,legs,andface.) Atthispoint,Rahmanwasreturnedto hiscellandsecured. [DUNBAR]statedthat[tl^HIHrih[CIAOFFICER1]][theCIAofficerinchargeof DETENTION SITE COBALT] may have spoken to Rahman for a few moments, but he did not know what
[ H H I [CIA OFFICER 1]] said. [DUNBAR] stated that after sometliing like this is done, interrogators should speaktotheprisone^o^givethen^om tothinkabout.'" {SeeMemorandumforDeputyDirectorof Operations, from January 28, 2003, Subject: Death Investigation - Gul RAHMAN, pp. 21-22.)
See Notes ofNovember 2002, meetin^A^REDACTE^ lOI 'iM III I
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In January 2003, CIA Inspector General John Helgerson began a formal review of the death of Gul Rahman and began a separate review of the entire CIA Detention and Interrogation Program. The resulting Special Review of Counterterrorism
Detention and Interrogation Activities ("Special Review") found that there were no guidelines for the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques at DETENTION SITE COBALT prior to December 2002, and that interrogators, some with little or no training, were "left to their own devices in working with detainees.
The Inspector Generars Special Review also revealed the lack of oversight of DETENTION SITE COBALT by CIA leadership. DCI Tenet stated that he was
"not very familiar" with DETENTION SITE COBALT and "whaUh^I^s doing with medium valuetargets,"^^^ AssociateDeputyDirectorofOperations statedthathewas unaware that the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques were being used there.^^^ In August 2003, CIA General Counsel Scott Muller relayed that he was under the impression that DETENTION SITE COBALT was only a holding facility and that he had "no idea who is responsible for [ C O B A L T ] . S e n i o r Deputy General Counsel John Rizzo informed the OIG thathe knew little about DETENTION SITE COBALT and that his focus was on DETENTION SITEGREENandDETENTIONSITEBLUE.-^^ CTCChiefofOperations••
stated that he had much less knowledge of operations at DETENTION SITE COBALT, and that the CIA's GREEN and BLUE detention sites were much more important to him.^^^ Finally,ChiefofCTCJoseRodriguezstatedthathedidnotfocusonDETENTION SITE COBALT because he had "other higher priorities."^^^
5. The CIA Begins Training New Interrogators; Interrogation TechniquesNot Reviewedby the Department ofJustice Included in the Training Syllabus
See Office of Inspector General Special Review of CounterterrorismDetention and Interrogation Activities (September2001-October2003),May7,2004,p.52. AccordingtoanOIGinterviewwitliananalystwho conducted interrogations at DETENTION SITE COBALT, "indicative of the lack of intenogators was the fact that [ ^ 1 ^ 1 [CIA OFFICER 1]] enlisted a [REDACTED] case officer friend... to conducUnteirogation [DETENTION SITE COBALT] after he completed his [REDACTED] business in
{See Interview Report, 2003-7123-IG, Review ofInterrogations for CounterteiTorisrnPurposesTHHBBBI' 8,2003.) InspectorGeneralrecordsofaninterviewwithaseniorCIAdebrieferindicatethatthedebriefer,"heard prior to taking the [intenogator] training that people at [COBALT] had debriefed detainees on tlieir own, sometimes going out to the site at night." {See Interview Report, 2003-7123-IG, Reviewof Inteixogations for CounterteiTorism Purposes, April5,2003.) Asdescribedelsewhere,DCITenetissuedformalintenogationguidelines for the program on January 28, 2003. {See Guidelines on Interrogations Conducted Pursuant to the Presidential Memorandum of Notification of 17 September 2001, signed by George Tenet, Director of Central Intelligence, January 28, 2003.)
Interview of George Tenet, by [REDACTED], [REDACTED], Office of the Inspector General, memorandum dated, Septembe^^003^^^
Interview of Office of tlie Inspector General, September 9, 2003.
283 Interview of Scott MuUer, by [REDACTED], [REDACTED], and [REDACTED], Office of the Inspector
General, August 20, 2003.
Interview of John Rizzo, by [REDACTED], [REDACTED] and [REDACTED], Office of the Inspector General,
August 14, 2003^^^^^^^^^^
Interview of Office of the Inspector General, February 11, 2003.
286 Interview of Jose Rodriguez, by [REDACTED] and [REDACTED], Office of the Inspector General, August 12, 2003.
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The CIA's CTC Renditions Group began preparing for the first CIA interrogator training course in August 2002—during the period in which Abu Zubaydah was
being interrogate^jsing the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniquesatDETENTTON SITE GREEN. the CIA's chief ofinterrogations,andf^^l^^l^mi, the CIA officer with OTS who had spent | years as a SERE Instructor with JPRA, led the interrogation training. The first interrogation training, conducted with the assistance of JPRA personnel, occurred from November 12, 2002, to November 18, 2002.^^^ The class included eight students who were seeking to become CIA interrogators and three students seeking to support the CIA interrogation process.The CIA training program involved 65 hours of instruction and training on the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, including at least two interrogation techniques whose legality had not been evaluated by the Department of Justice: the "abdominal slap" and the "finger press." Although a number of personnel at CIA Headquarters reviewed the training materials, there are no CIA records of any CIA officer raising objections to the techniques being included in the syllabus.-^®
6. Despite Recommendation from CIA Attorneys, the CIA Fails to Adequately Screen Potential Interrogators in 2002 and 2003
On NovemberH^002^f^ the completion of the first formal tminin^lass7^^^^^|CTC Legal, asked CTC attorney
to "[m]ake it known that from now on, CTC/LGL must vet all personnel who are enrolled in, observing or teaching - or otherwise associated with - the class."^^^
added:
"Moreover, we will be forced to Disapprove [sic] the participation of specific personnel in the use of enhanced techniques unless we have ourselves vetted
December 4, 2002, Training Report, High Value Target Interrogatior^n^xploitation (HVTIE) Training Seminar 12-18 No^^pilo^unning) at 4. See also email from: to: [REDACTED], [REDACTED], subject: Formation of a High Value Target Interrogation team (describing initial training plan and requirements); date: August 30,2002, at 8:30 AM.
December 4, 2002, Training Report, High Value Target Interrogation and Exploitation (HVTIE) Training Seminar 12-18 Nov 02 (pilot running).
December 4, 2002, Training Report, High Value Target Interrogation and Exploitation (HVTIE) Training Seminar 12-18 Nov 02 (pilot running), at 15.
See, for example, email from: to: [REDACTED]; subject: HVT training date: October 10, 2002; email from: [REDACTED]; to: |HHiiHif> [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED]; subject: HVT trainine^ate^cto^r 10, 2002; November 1, 2002, Memorandum for: Director, DCI CounterterroristCenter, from Chief, Renditions Group, CTC, re: Request for use of Military Trainers in Support of Agency Interrogation Course, REFERENCE: Memo for D/CTC from C/RG/CTC^lt^^M^2, Same Subject.
2^' Email from: |^H||HH^HypCTC/LGL; to: [REDACTED]; cc: Jose Rodriguez, [REDACTED],
[R E D A C T E D ],E Y E S ONLY;date: NovemberB|,2002,at03:13:01 PM. As described above, Gul Rahmai^ikel^ro^ to death at DETENTION SITE COBALT sometime in the morning of November 2002. email, hov^ever, appears to have been drafted before the guards had found Gul Rahman's body and before that death was reported to CIA Headquarters. See [REDACTED] 30211
describingtheguardsobservingGulRahmanaliveinthemorningofNovember|,2002. Gul Rahman's death appeared in cable traffic at least 's email. No records could be identified to provide the impetus for email.
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them and are satisfied with their qualifications and suitability for what are clearly unusual measures that are lawful only when practiced correctly by personnel whose records clearly demonstrate their suitability for that role. The vetting process will not be that dissimilar from the checks that are provided by the OIG, OS, etc. in certain cases before individuals are promoted or receive awards, and the selection and training of aggressive interrogators certainly warrants a similar vetting process.
UN¥) The chief of CTC, Jose Rodriguez, objected to this approach.
"I do not think that CTC/LGL should or would want to get into the business of vetting participants, observers, instructors or others that are involved in this program. It is simply not your job. Your job is to tell all what are the acceptable legal standards for conducting interrogations per the authorities obtained from Justice and agreed upon by the White House,"^^^
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(T!8^^mi|||||H//NF) Contrary to statements later made by CIA Director Michael Hayden and other CIA officials that "[a]ll those involved in the questioning of detainees are carefully chosen and screened for demonstrated professional judgment and maturity,CIA records suggest that the vetting sought by did not take place. The Committee reviewed CIA records related to several CIA officers and contractors involved in the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program, most of whom conducted interrogations. The Committee identified a number of personnel whose backgrounds include notable derogatory information calling into question their eligibility for employment, their access to classified information, and their participation in CIA interrogation activities. In nearly all cases, the derogatory information was known to the CIA prior to the assignment of the CIA officers to the Detention and Interrogation Program. This group of officers included individuals who, among other issues, had engaged in inappropriate detainee interrogations, had workplace anger management issues, and had reportedly admitted to sexual assault.
7. Bureau ofPrisons "WOW'ed" by Level ofDeprivation at CIA's COBALT Detention Site
In December 2002, the CIA's Renditions Group sent a team of recently trained interrogators to DETENTION SITE COBALT to engage in inteiTogations. The
interrogation plans proposed by that team for at least three detainees at DETENTION SITE
Email from: [REDACTED],
Email from: Jose Rodriguez; to: [REDACTED], [REDACTED], PM.
TC/LGL; to: [REDACTED]; cc: Jose Rodriguez, [REDACTED], iect:EYES ONLY; date: Novemberft 2002, at03:13:01 PM.
|, HCTC/LGL; cc: [REDACTED], [REDACTED], subject: EYES ONLY; date: November f t 2002, at 04:27
Transcript of hetmng, April 12, 2007 (DTS #2007-1563).
The information | is described at length in the Committee Study in Volume III.
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COBALT included the use of interrupted sleep, loud music, and reduction in food quality and quantity. Less than a month after the death of Gul Rahman from suspected hypothermia, the plans also called for detainees' clothes to be removed in a facility that was described to be 45 degreesFahrenheit. CIAHeadquartersapprovedtheproposalsforthesedetainees,whomthe CIA described as "Medium Value."-^^
Prior to this, in November 2002, a delegation of several officers from the Federal Bureau of Prisons conducted an assessment of DETENTION SITE COBALT.
Following the November B , 2002, through November 2002, visit,^^^ CIA officers in Countiy I remarked that the Federal Bureau ofPrisons assessments, along with recommendations and training, had "made a noticeable improvement on how the day to day operations at the facility are performed," and made the detention site a "more secure and safer working environment for
officers."'^^
On December 4, 2002, officers at CIA Headquarters met with individuals from the Federal Bureau of Prisons to learn more about their inspection of
DETENTION SITE COBALT and their training ofm H | | security staff.During that meeting, the Federal Bureau of Prisons personnel described DETENTION SITE COBAL T and stated that there was "absolutely no talking inside the facility," that the guards do not interact withtheprisoners,andthat"[e]verythingisdoneinsilenceand[in]thedark."^®® Accordingtoa CIA officer, the Federal Bureau of Prisons staff also commented that "they were 'WOW'ed'" at first by the facility, because:
"They have never been in a facility where individuals are so sensory deprived, i.e., constant white noise, no talking, everyone in tiie dark, with the guards wearing a light on their head when they collected and escorted a detainee to an interrogation cell, detainees constantly being shackled to the wall or floor, and the starkness of each cell (concrete and bars). There is nothing like this in the Federal Bureau of Prisons. They then explained that they understood the mission and it was their collective assessment that in spite of all this sensory deprivation, the detainees were not being treated in humanely [sic]. They explained that the facility was sanitary, there was medical care and the guard force and our staff did not mistreat the detainee[s]."^®^
By the end of December 2002, the CIA Renditions Group that had visited DETENTION SITE COBALT had concluded that the detention facility's initial "baseline
conditions" involved so much deprivation that any further deprivation would have limited impact
31118 DIRECTOR • •
CIA detainee Gul Rahman died at DETENTION SITE COBALT at the end of the Federal Bureau of Prisons visit
to the CIA detention site.
[REDACTED] 30589 (271626Z NOV 02)
299 Email from: [REDACTED]; to: [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED],
[REDACTED]; subject: Meeting with SO & Federal Bureau of Prisons; date: December 4, 2002. 300 Email from: [REDACTED]; to: [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED],
[REDACTED]; subject: Meeting with SO & Federal Bureau of Prisons; date: December 4, 2002.
3°' Email from: [REDACTED]; to: [REDACTED]; subject: Meeting with SO & Federal Bureau of Prisons; date: December 5, 2002.
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on the inten'ogations. The team thus recommended that "experts and authorities other than the individuals who crafted the process" review the interrogation process and conditions, and that a legalreviewbeconducted.^®^ CIAHeadquartersdoesnotappeartohavetakenactiononthese recommendations.
8. The CIA Places CIA Detainees in Country | Facilities Because They Did Not Meet the MON Standardfor Detention
^ spring of 2003, the CIA continued to hold detainees at facilitiesinCountryBwhowereknownnottomeettheMONstandardfordetention. CIA
officer [CIA OFFICER 1] described the arrangement he had with Country | officers in an email, writing:
|. Theyalsohappentohave3or4roomswheretheycanlockuppeople discretely [sic]. I give them a few hundred bucks a month and they use the rooms for whoever I bring over - no questions asked. It is vei7 useful for housing guys that shouldn't be in [DETENTION SITE COBALT] for one reason or another but still need to be kept isolated and held in secret detention."^®^
cables indicate that CIA officers transferred at least four detainees to these Country | facilities because they did not meet the standard for CIA detention
under the MON.^^^
In total, four CIA detention facilities were established in Country CIA records indicate that DETENTION SITE COBAL T held a total of 64 detainees during
the period of its operation between Septem^r 2002 anc^^H2004, while DETENTION SITE GRA Y held eight detainees between 2003 and ^003. The CIA later establishedtwootherCl^acilitiesin^Countr^B: DETENTIONSITEORANGE,whichheld 34 detainees between |^^^004 and DETENTION SITE BROWN, which held 12 detainees between^^B 2006 and 2008.^®^
CIA document entitled Renditions Group Interrogation Team (RGIT), Baseline assessment for MVT, Detainee/Prisoner management, December 30, 2002. The CIA does not appear to have taken action on this recommendation.
[CIA OFFICER 1]; to: [REDACTED]; subject: Thanks and Query re: List of I^^IH^^I^HdET AINEES; date: March 14, 2003.
The cables did not explain any legal basis for detaining individuals who did not meet the detention requirements oftheSeptember17,2001,MON. HEADQUARTERS I
36682 38836(B^^^^^M); HEADQUARTERS|
See V olume III for additional information.
_ 41204 d H l ^ ^ K A L E C • •
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9. DCI TenetEstablishes First Guidelines on Detention Conditions and Interrogation; Formal Consolidation of Program Administration at CIA Headquarters Does Not Resolve Disagreements Among CIA Personnel
In late Januaiy 2003, in response to the death of CIA detainee Gul Rahman and the use of a gun and a drill in the CIA interrogations of 'Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri
(described later in this summary), DCI Tenet signed the first formal interrogation and confinement guidelines for the program."*^^ In contrast to proposals from late 2001, when CIA personnel expected that any detention facility would have to meet U.S. prison standards, the confinement guidelines signed in January 2003 set forth minimal standards for a detention facility. The confinement guidelines required only that the facility be sufficient to meet basic health needs, meaning that even a facility like DETENTION SITE COBALT, in which detainees were kept shackled in complete dai-kness and isolation, with a bucket for human waste, and without notable heat during the winter months, met the standard.^^^^
The guidelines also required quarterly assessments of the conditions at the detention facilities. The first quarterly review of detention facilities covered the
period from January 2003 to April 2003, and examined conditions at DETENTION SITE COBALT, as well as at DETENTION SITE BLUE in a different country. Country At that time, DETENTION SITE BLUE, which was initially designed for two detainees, was housing five detainees. Nonetheless, the site review team found that conditions at DETENTION SITE BLUE —including the three purpose-built "holding units"—met "the minimum standards set by the CIA" in the January 2003 guidance. Detainees received bi-weekly medical evaluations, bmshed their teeth once a day, washed their hands prior to each meal, and could bathe once a week. Amenitiessuchassolidfood,clothing(sweatshirts,sweatpants,andslippers),reading materials, prayer rugs, and Korans were available depending on the detainee's degree of cooperation with interrogators.
The first quarter 2003 review also found that conditions at DETENTION SITE COBALT satisfied the January 2003 guidance, citing "significant
improvements" such as space heaters and weekly medical evaluations. The review noted that a new facility was under construction in Country | [ to replace DETENTION SITE COBALT, and that this new detention facility, DETENTION SITE ORANGE, "will be a quantum leap forward" because "litj will incorporate heating/air conditioning, conventional plumbing, ap)propriate lighting, shower, and laundry facilitles."^^^ DETENTION SITE ORANGE opened in1^(12004. AlthoughsomeofthecellsatDETENTIONSITEORANGEincludedplumbing,
Guidelines on Interrogations Conducted Pursuant to the Presidential Memorandum of Notification of 17 September 2001, signed by George Tenet, Directorof Central Intelligence, January 28, 2003. ^"'Guidelines on Interrogations Conducted Pursuant to the Presidential Memorandum of Notification of 17 September 2001, signed by George Tenet, Directorof Central Intelligence, Januaiy 28, 2003.
CIA document titled. Quarterly Review of Confinement Conditions for CIA Detainees, 1/28/03 - 4/30/03, May 22,2003.
CIA document titled. Quarterly Review of Confinement Conditions for CIA Detainees, 1/28/03 - 4/30/03, May 22, 2003.
^'®CIA document titled. Quarterly Review of Confinement Conditions for CIA Detainees, 1/28/03 - 4/30/03, May 22,2003.
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detainees undergoing interrogation were kept in smaller cells, with waste buckets rather than toilet facilities.^
The DCl's January 2003 interrogation guidelines listed 12 "enhanced techniques" that could be used with prior approval of the director of CTC, including
two—use of diapers for "prolonged periods" and the abdominal slap—that had not been evaluated by the OLC. The "enhanced techniques" were only to be employed by "approved interrogators for use with [a] specific detainee." The guidelines also identified "standard techniques"—including sleep deprivation up to 72 hours, reduced caloric intake, use of loud music, isolation, and the use of diapers "generally not to exceed 72 hours"—that required advance approval "whenever feasible," and directed that their use be documented. The "standard techniques" were described as "techniques that do not incorporate physical or substantial psychological pressure." The guidelines provided no description or further limitations on the use of either the enhanced or standard interrogation techniques.^^^
Although the DCl interrogation guidelines were prepared as a reaction to the death of Gul Rahman and the use of unauthorized interrogation techniques on
*Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri, they did not reference all interrogation practices that had been employed at CIA detention sites. The guidelines, for example, did not address whether interrogation techniques such as the "rough take down,"^^^ the use of cold water showers,^^'^ and prolonged light deprivation were prohibited. In addition, by requiring advance approval of "standard techniques" "whenever feasible," the guidelines allowed CIA officers a significant amount of discretion to determine who could be subjected to the CIA's "standard" interrogation techniques, when those techniques could be applied, and when it was not "feasible" to request advance approval from CIA Headquarters. Thus, consistent with the interrogation guidelines, throughout much of 2003, CIA officers (including personnel not trained in interrogation) could, at their discretion, strip a detainee naked, shackle him in the standing position for up to 72 hours, and douse the detainee repeatedly with cold water^^^—without approval from CIA Headquarters if those officers judged CIA Headquarters approval was not "feasible." In practice, CIA personnel routinely applied these types of interrogation techniques without obtaining prior approval.^
311
September 2001, signed by George Tenet, Director of Central Intelligence, January 28, 2003.
For a description of the "rough takedown," see Memorandum for Deputy Director of Operations, from H H I
Januai-y 28, 2003, Subject: Death Investigation - Gul RAHMAN, pp. 21-22.
One cold water shower was described by a CIA linguist; "Rahman was placed back under the cold water by the
guards at [CIA OFFICER l]]'s direction. Rahman was so cold that he could barely utter his alias. According to [tlie on-site linguist], the entire process lasted no more tlian 20 minutes. It was intended to lower Rahman's resistance and was not for hygienic reasons. At the conclusion of the shower, Rahman was moved to one oftlie four sleep deprivation cells where hewas left shivering for hours oroveniiglUwitlUii^and chained over his head." See CIA Inspector General, Report of Investigation, Death of a Detainee (2003-7402-IG), April 27, 2005.
Water dousing was not designated by the CIA as a "standard" interrogation technique until June 2003. In January 2004 water dousing was recategorized by the CIA as an "enhanced" inteiTogation technique.
See V olume III for additional information.
mi i( III IiiU^jj|^JJUUii|ii(iiimiiii
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The DCI interrogation guidelines also included the first requirements related to recordkeeping, instaicting that, for "each interrogation session in which
an enhanced technique is employed," the field prepare a "substantially contemporaneous record... settingforththenatureanddurationofeachsuchtechniqueemployed,theidentitiesof those present, and a citation to the required Headquarters approval c a b l e . I n practice, these guidelines were not followed.
Therewerealsoadministrativechangestotheprogram. Asnoted, on December 3, 2002, CTC's Renditions Group formally assumed responsibility for the
managementandmaintenanceofallCIAdetentionandinterrogationfacilities.^^^ Priortothat time^h^nterrogation program was "joined at the hip" with CTC's ALEC Station, according to I ^ H ^ I c T C Legal, although another CTC attorney who was directly involved in the program informed the CIA OIG that she "was never sure what group in CTC was responsible for interrogation activities.Even after the formal designation of the CIA's Renditions Group,321 tensions continued, particularly between CTC personnel who supported SWIGERT and DUNBAR's continued role, and the Renditions Group, which designated as the
3'^DIRECTOR•• (302126ZJAN03);DIRECTOR (311702ZJAN03). Despitetheformalrecord keeping requirement, the CIA's June 2013 Response argues that detailed reporting on the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques at CIA detention sites was not necessary, stating: "First, the decline in reporting over time on the use of enhanced techniques, which the Study characterizes as poor or deceptive record keeping, actually reflectsthematiuationoftheprogram. Inearly2003,aprocesswasputinplacewherebyinterrogatorsrequested permission in advance for interrogation plans. The use of these plans for each detainee obviated the need for reporting in extensive detail on the use of specific techniques, unless there were deviations from the approved plan." As detailed in the Study, the process put in place by the CIA in early 2003 explicitly required record keeping, including "the nature and duration of each such technique employed, the identities of those present, and a citation to the required Headquarters approval cable." That requirement was never revised.
Subsequent to the January 2003 guidance, many cables reporting the use of the CIA's enhanced inteiTogation techniques listed the techniques used on a particular day, but did not describe the frequency with which those techniqueswereemployed,nordidtheyintegratethespecifictechniquesintonarrativesoftheinterrogations. Asthe CIA interrogation program continued, descriptions of the use of the CIA's enhanced inteiTOgation techniques were recorded in increasingly summarized form, providing little infomiation on how or when the techniques were applied during an interrogation. There aie also few CIA records detailing the rendition process for detainees and their transportation to or between detention sites. CIA records do include detainee comments on their rendition experiences and photographs of detainees in the process of being transported. Based on a review of the
photographs, detainees transported by the CIA by aircraft were typically hooded with their hands and feet shackled. The detainees wore large headsets to eliminate their ability to hear, and these headsets were typically affixed to a detainee's head with duct tape that ran the circumferenceof the detainee's head. CIA detainees were placed in diapers and not permitted to use the lavatory on the aircraft. Depending on the aircraft, detainees were either strappedintoseatsduringtheflights,orlaiddownandstrappedtotheflooroftheplanehorizontallylikecargo. See CIA photographs of renditions among CIA materials provided to the Committee pursuant to the Committee's documentrequests,aswellasCIAdetaineereviewsinVolumeIIIforadditionalinformationonthetransportofCIA detainees.
DIRECTORlllllllll^^
^20 Interview of H H H H H '
General, August 20,2003. Interview of
Inspector General, February 14, 2003. CTC Chief of Operations told the Inspector General that the program was handled by the Abu Zubaydah Task Force. See February 11, 2003, interview report of Office of the Inspector General.
As noted, the CIA's Rendition Group is variablyknown as the "Renditions Group," the "Renditions and Detainees Group," the "Renditions, DetentionSjan^nterroeation^roi^^ the initials, "RDI" and "RDG."
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CIA'schiefinterrogator.^^- AslateasJune2003,SWIGERTandDUNBAR,operatingoutside of the direct management of the Renditions Group, were deployed to DETENTION SITE BLUE tobothinterrogateandconductpsychologicalreviewsofdetainees.^^^ Thedisputeextendedto interrogation practices. The Renditions Group's leadership considered the waterboard, which Chief of Interrogations was not certified to use, as "life threatening," and complained to the OIG that some CIA officers in the Directorate of Operations believed that, as a result,theRenditionsGroupwas"runninga'sissified'inten'ogationprogram."^^"^ Atthesame time, CIA CTC personnel criticized the Renditions Group a n d ^ | ^ H for their use of painful stress positions, as well as for the conditions at DETENTION SITE COBALT.-^^''
(i:!8y'^|||||[|H|||HH||||//NF) There were also concerns about possible conflicts ofinterest related to the conti'actors, SWIGERT and DUNBAR. On January 30, 2003, a cable from CIA Headquarters stated that "the individual at the interrogation site who administers the techniques is not the same person who issues the psychological assessment of record," and that only a staff psychologist,notacontractor,couldissueanassessmentofrecord."^^^ InJune2003,however, SWIGERT and DUNBAR were deployed to DETENTION SITE BLUE to interrogate KSM, as well as to assess KSM's "psychological stability" and "resistance p o s t u r e . A s described later in this summary, the contractors had earlier subjected KSM to the waterboard and other CIA enhanced interrogation techniques. The decision to send the contract psychologists to DETENTION SITE BLUE prompted an OMS psychologist to write to OMS leadership that
Interview of by [REDACTE^^n^^DACTED], Office ofthe Inspector General, April 3,2003. Febniaiy21,2003,interviewreport, OfficeoftheInspectorGeneral. Hanunond DUNBAR told the Office of Inspector General that there was "intiigue" between the RDG and him and SWIGERT, and "there were emails coming to [DETENTION SITE BLUE] that questioned [his] and [SWIGERT]'s qualifications." See Interview of Hammond DUNBAR, by [REDACTED] and [REDACTED], Office of the Inspector GeneraljFebruary4^^
Email from: to: cc:^^^
m m ,IIIIII^^^HiHB^lHll^^Hrsubje^Re:^||RDGTa^ngforICPsychologists [DUNBAR] and [SWIGERT]; date: June 20, 2003, at 5:23:29 PWrji^^^HOMS expressed concern that "no professional in the field would credit [SWIGERT and DUNBAR|sUatmudgiTient^^sycho^ assess^ the
Tasking for IC Psychologists DUNBAR and SWIGERT; date: June 20,2003, at 2:19:53 PM.) Tlie CIA's June 2013 Response states that CIA "Headquarters established CTC's Renditions and Detentions Group CTC/RDG as the responsible entity for all CIA detention and interrogationsites in December2002, removing any latent institutional confusion."
Interview ofH m m i H , by [REDACTED] and [REDACTED], Office ofthe Inspector General, February 21, 2003. The chief of interrogations, told the Inspector General that the waterboard was overused with Abu Zubaydah and KSM and was ineffective in tlie interrogations of KSM. (See Interview of
by [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] ofthe Office ofthe Inspector General, Marcl^, 2003.) One doctor involved in CIA interrogations using the waterboard intenogation technique stated that | | ^ ^ | "has a huge bias againstthewaterboardb/che'snotapprovedtouseit. Tliereverseistm^nh^ontrac^^guy^SWIGER^and DUNBAR] who have a vested interest in favor ofit." See email from: ||||||||||||||^||||||||||||||m.
cc: [REDACTED]; subject: re: More; date^prim^003, at 08:11:07 AM.
March10,2003,interviewreportof OfficeoftheInspectorGeneral. InterviewofHIH n,by[REDACTED]and[REDACTED],OfficeoftheInspectorGeneral,February27,2003. Interview of by [REDACTED] and [REDACTED], Office of the Inspector General, April 3, 2003. March
24, 2003, interview report of
DIRECTOR ••11 (301835Z JAN 03)
Office of tlie Inspector General.
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"[a]ny data collected by them from detainees with whom they previously interacted as interrogators will always be suspect."^-^ then informed the management of the Renditions Group that "no professional in the field would credit [SWIGERT and DUNBAR's] later judgments as psychologists assessing the subjects of their enhanced measures." At the end of theirdeployment, in June 2003, SWIGERT and DUNBAR provided their assessment of KSM and recommended that he should be evaluated on a monthly basis by "an experienced interrogator known to him" who would assess how forthcoming he is and "remind him that there are differing consequences for cooperating or not cooperating."-^^^ In his response to the draft Inspector General Special Review, noted that "OMS concerns about conflict of interest... were nowhere more graphic than in the setting in which the same individuals applied an EIT which only they were approved to employ,judged both its effectiveness and detainee resilience, and implicitly proposed continued use of the technique - at a daily compensation reported to be $1800/day, or four times that of interrogators who could not use the technique."^^'
D. The Detention and Interrogation of 'Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri
7. CIA Interrogators Disagree with CIA Headquarters About Al-Nashiri's Level of Cooperation; Interrogators Oppose Continued Use of the CIA's Enhanced Interrogation Techniques
'Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri,^^- assessed by the CIA to be an al- Qa'ida "terrorist operations planner" who was "intimately involved" in planning both the USS
Cole bombing and the 1998 East Africa U.S. Embassy bombings, was captured in the United ArabEmiratesinmid-October2002.-^^-^ Heprovidedinformationwhileinthecustodyofa foreign government, including on plotting in the Persian Gulf,^^"^ and was then rendered by the
The email, which expressed concern that SWIGERT and DUNBAR would interfere with on-site psychologists, stated that, "[a]lthough these guys believe that their way is the only way, there should be an effort to define roles and responsibilitie^efor^h^-arroganc^n^iarc^isi^volv^ntounpro^ contlic^ the field." See email from: to: subject: ^i|||RDG
Psychologists DUNBAR and SWIGERT; date: June 16, 2003, at 4:54:32 PM.
Email from: to:
I; subject: Re: Tasking for IC Psychologists DUNBAR and SWIGER^ate: June 20, 2003, at 2:19:53 PM.
12168(301822ZJUN03).TheCIA'sJune2013Responsestates: "Inpractice,byApril2003,[CIA] staffpsychologistshadtakenoveralmostalloftheprovisionsofsupporttotheRDIprogram. Asitconcerned [SWIGERT] and [DUNBAR], however, the appearance of impropriety continued, albeit to a lesser degree, because they were occasionally asked to provide input to assessments on detainees whom they had not interrogated" (emphasis added). The CIA's June 2013 Response is inaccurate. For example, in June 2003, SWIGERT and DUNBAR provided an assessment on KSM, a detainee whom they had interrogated.
Memorandum for Inspe^r General, Attention: Assistant IG for Investigations, [REDACTED], from [REDACTED], M.D., |||||||||Medical Services • re Draft Special Review-Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Program (2003-7123-IG), at 13.
For more information on al-Nashiri, see detainee review of 'Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri in Volume III.
333alec^M" See i ^ H 3 6 5 9 5
For disseminated intelligence, see
For other reportini TOP SECRET/;
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l A
from al-Nashiri while he was in foreign government custody, see '/NOFORN
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CIA to DETENTION SITE COBALT in Country | on November 2002, where he was held for H days before being transferred to DETENTION SITE GREEN on November 2002.*^^^ At DETENTION SITE GREEN, al-Nashiri was interrogated using the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, including being subjected to the waterboard at least three t i m e s . I n December 2002, when DETENTION SITE GREEN was closed, al-Nashiri and Abu Zubaydah were rendered to DETENTION SITE BLUE.^^^
(T8^^H|||||mi||||||/^NF) In total, al-Nashiri was subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques during at least four separate periods, with each period typically ending with an assessment from on-site interrogators that al-Nashiri was compliant and cooperative.^^^ Officers atCIAHeadquai^ disagreed with these assessments, with the deputy chief of ALEC Station, commenting that DETENTION SITE BLUE interrogators should not make "sweeping statements" in cable traffic regarding al-Nashiri's compliance.Officers at CIA Headquarters sought to reinstate the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques based on their belief that al-Nashiri had not yet provided actionable intelligence on imminent attacks.
Shortly after al-Nashiri arrived at DETENTION SITE BLUE, CIA interrogators at the detention site judged al-Nashiri's cooperation and compliance by his
engagement and willingness to answer questions, while CIA Headquarters personnel judged his compliance based on the specific actionable intelligence he had provided (or the lack thereof). For example, in December 2002, interrogators informed CIA Headquarters that al-Nashiri was "cooperative and truthful," and that the "consensus" at the detention site was that al-Nashiri was
70866
7 0 8 7 0 For disseminated intelligence, see
335
29768 (^^HNOV02); See, for example, m|||^^|ll24^^|^^k|NOV 02);|
11243 (I [NOV 02) 112581 1NOV 02); I
112841 INOV 02);
|NOV 02); I 111322 NOV
IDEC 02); I 1113221
11263 NOV02)[M|^|Ti270^^H|NOV02) 11294HI^MnOV^^••^^^^3
02);••^•iJ352|^Hd^02)~^HH 11359
NO:V02)[^^Bi 11344^H|PI NOV 02). 78275(M^HdEC02)
Al-Nashiri's time at DETENTION SITE COBALT is not well documented in CIA records. As described elsewhere, standard operating procedure at COBALT at the time included total light deprivation, loud continuous music, isolation, and dietary manipulation. Based on CIA records, the other four "enhanced interrogation" periods of al-Nashiri took place at DETENTION SITE BLUE on December 5-8, 2002; December 27, 2002 - January 1, 2003;January9-10,2003;andJanuary15-27,2003. See•••l^O (111541ZDEC02); 10078 (211733Z DEC 02)^^^^Bi0140 (q31727ZJAf^rALi^^ (191729Z JAN 03).
339 Email from: to: • • • M , [REDACTED]; cc;
[REDACTED], [REDACTED]; subject: [DETENTION SITE BLUE] follow-up; date: December 15,
2002.
See, forexample, ALEC]||H(072315ZDEC02); ALEC (130352ZDEC02); ALECJjj^l
(180247Z DEC 02); ALEC HBI(191729Z JAN 03); CIA Office of Inspector General, Report of Investigation: UnauthorizedInterrogationTecliniquesat[DETENTIONSITEBLUE],(2003-7123-IG),October29,2003. See also CIA Office of Inspector General report, Counterterrorism Detention And Interrogation Activities (September 2001 - October 2003) (2003-7123-IG), released on May 7, 2004.
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"acompliantdetainee"whowasnot"withholdingimportantthi'eatinformation."^'^^ Officers from the CIA's ALEC Station at CL\ Headquarters responded:
"it is inconceivable to us that al-Nashiri cannot provide us concrete leads.... When we are able to capture other terrorists based on his leads and to thwart future plots based on his reporting, we will have much more confidence that he is, indeed, genuinely cooperative on some level."^"^^
Later, after multiple follow-up debriefings, DETENTION SITE BLUE officers again wrote that they had "reluctantly concluded" that al-Nashiri was providing
"logical and rational explanations" to questions provided by CIA Headquarters and therefore they recommended "against resuming enhanced measures" unless ALEC Station had evidence al-Nashiriwaslying.^"^^ Acablefromthedetentionsitestated:
"without tangible proof of lying or intentional withholding, however, we believe employing enhanced measures will accomplish nothing except show [al-Nashiri] that he will be punished whether he cooperates or not, thus eroding any remaining desire to continue cooperating.... [The] bottom line is that we think [al-Nashiri] is being cooperative, and if subjected to indiscriminate and prolonged enhanced measures, there is a good chance he will either fold up and cease cooperation, or suffer the sort of permanent mental harm prohibited by the statute. Therefore, a decision to resume enhanced measures must be grounded in fact and not general feelings."^"^
2. CIA Headquarters Sends Untrained Interrogator to Resume Al-Nashiri's Interrogations; Interrogator Threatens al-Nashiri with a Gun and a Drill
After the DETENTION SITE BLUE chief of Base sent two interrogators back to the United States because of "prolonged absences from family" and the
"facUha^nhan^d measures are no longer required for al-Nashiri," CIA Headquarters sent lllimillll^^HI [CIA OFFICER 2], aCIA officer who had not been trained or qualified as an interrogator, to DETENTION SITE BLUE to question and assess al-Nashiri.
[CIA OFFICER 2's] deployment, CIA records included numerous concerns about | B H H [CIA OFFICER 2's] anger management,
information on B H H [CIA OFFICER 2] and other CIA personnel in the program with similar alarming issues in their background, see Vohime III. The CIA's June 2013 Response states
that: "I
someofthe| officersmentionedintheS t u d y — h a v e been exclude^^Tiucl^^hed^^ information was not in fact available to senior managers making assignments |
" Notwithstandin^h^IA's June 2013 assertion, as detailed in Volume III, senior managers were aware of concerns related toH|^^H[CIA0FFICER2]priOT to his deployment.
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In late December 2002, following a meeting at CIA Headquarters to discuss resuming the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques against al-Nashiri,
the chief of RDG^"^^—^theentimhat managed the CIA's Detention and InteiTogation Program—objected to sending l ^ l H i OFFICER 2]tothed^ntion site because he "had not been through the interrogation training" and because "had heard from some colleagues that [|H^H[C1A0FFICER 2]] was too confident, had a temper, and had some securityjssues7^_^^^B^^B later learned from other CIA officials that "[CTC chief of operations OFFICER 2]] at [DETENTION SITE BLUE] over the holidays." HIHHtoldtiie Office of Inspector General that "his assessment is that the Agency management felt that the [RDG] interrogators were being too lenient with al-Nashiri and that l U l B l [CIA OFFICER 2]] was sent to [DETENTION SITE BLUE] to 'fix' the situation.
[CL\ OFFICER 2] anived at DETENTION SITE BLUE on December 2002, and the CIA resumed the use of its enhanced interrogation
techniques on al-Nashiri shortly thereafter, despite the fact tiiat [CIA OFFICER 2] had not been trained, certified, or approved to use the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. [CIA OFFICER 2] wrote in a cable to CIA Headquarters that "[al]-Nashiri responds
well to harsh treatment" and suggested that the interrogators continue to administer "various degrees of mild punishment," but still allow for "a small degree of 'hope,' by introducing some
'minute rewards.
//NF) It was later learned that during these interrogation sessions,
[CIA OFFICER 2], with the permission and participation of the DETENTION SITE
BLUE chief ofBase, who also had not been trained and qualified as an intemjgato^sed a series of unauthorized interrogation techniques against al-Nashiri. For example,
OFFICER 2] placed al-Nashiri in a "standing stress position" with "his hands affixed over his head" for approximately two and a halfdays^^^M^ater, during the course of al-Nashiri's debriefings, while he was blindfolded, |H|||||[|H [CIA OFFICER 2] placed a pistol near al- Nashiri'sheadandoperatedacordlessdrillnearal-Nashiri'sbody.^^^ Al-Nashirididnotprovide any additional threat information during, or after, these interrogations.^^^
As described, the "Renditions and Interrogations Group," is also refened to as the "Renditions Group," the "Rendition, Detention, and Intenogation Group," "RDI," and "RDG" in CIA records.
Interview Report, 2003-7123-IG, Review of Interrogations for Counterterrorism Purposes, February 23, 2003.
I B B 10140 (031727Z JAN 03)
email from: subject: EYES ONLY - [HHBHH] ONLY
- MEMORANDUM FOR ADDO/DDO; date: January 22,2003. In an April 12, 2007, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence hearing. Senator Carl Levin asked the CIA Directorif the CIA disputed allegations in an International Committee of the Red Cross report that suggested CIA detainees were placed in "[pjrolonged stress standing position, naked, arm[s] chained above the head...." The CIA Director responded, "Not above the head. Stress positionsarepartoftheEITs,andnakedness werepartoftheEITs,Senator." SeeSenateSelectCommitteeon Intelligence Hearing Transcript, dated April 12, 2007 (DTS #2007-3158).
See, for example, CIA Office of Inspector General, Report of Investigation: Unauthorized Interrogation Techniques at [DETENTION SITE BLUE], (2003-7123-IG), October 29, 2003; email from: [DETENTION SITE BLUE] COB to: subject: EYES ONLY - [••B H ll ONLY - MEMO FOR ADDO/DDO; date: January 22, 2003.
For additional details, see V olume III. Mil M III I
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Based on a report from CTC, the CIA Office of Inspector General conducted a review of these interrogation incidents, and issued a report of investigation in the
fall of 2003.^^^ The Office of Inspector General later described additional allegations of unauthorized techniques used against al-Nashiri by [CIA OFFICER 2] and other interrogators, including slapping al-Nashiri multiple times on the back of the head during inten'ogations; implying that his mother would be brought before him and sexually abused; blowing cigar smoke in al-Nashiri's face; giving al-Nashiri a forced bath using a stiff brush; and using improvised stress positions that caused cuts and bruises resulting in the intervention of a medical officer, who was concerned that al-Nashiri's shoulders would be dislocated using the stress positions.^^^ When interviewed by the Office of Inspector General, the DETENTION SITE BLUE chief of B a s ^ t ^ d he did not object to using the gun and drill in the interrogations because he believed [CIA OFFICER 2] was sent from CIA Headquarters "to resolve the matter of al-Nashiri's cooperation" and that he believed [CIA OFFICER 2] had permissiontousetheinterrogationtechniques.^^'^ ThechiefofBaseaddedthathisownon-site approval was based on this and "the pressure he felt from Headquarters to obtain imminent threat information from al-Nashiri on 9/11-style a t t a c k s . I n April 2004, m | | | | [CIA OFFICER 2] and the chief of Base were disciplined.^^^
3. CIA Contractor Recommends Continued Use of the CIA's Enhanced Interrogation Techniques Against Al-Nashiri; Chief Interrogator Threatens to Quit Because Additional Techniques Might "Push [Al-Nashiri] Over The Edge Psychologically, " Refers to the CIA Program As a "Train Wreak[sic] Waiting to Happen "
CIA Office of InspectorGeneral, Report of Investigation: Unauthorized Interrogation Techniques at [DETENTION SITE BLUE], (2003-7123-IG), October 29, 2003.
CIA Office of Inspector General, Special Review - Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Program, (2003-7123-IG), May 2004.
CIA Officeof Inspector General, Report of Investigation: Unauthorized Interrogation Techniques at [DETENTION SITE BLUE], (2003-7123-IG), October 29, 2003.
CIA Office of Inspector General, Report of Investigation: Unautliorized InteiTogation Techniques at [DETENTION SITE BLUE], (2003-7123-IG), October 29,2003.
[CIA OFFICER 2] received a one-year Letter of Reprimand, was suspended for five days without pay, and was prohibited from promotions, within-grade step increases, quality step increases, or permanent salary increases during that one-year period. The decision did not affect I H H H [CIA OFFICER 2's] eligibility to receiveExceptionalPerformanceAwards,bon^^^^^^M^^to^^MT|^^^^g^ition. See\
CIA OFFICER 2] retired from the CIA on 2004. {See
I.) On June 20, 2005, the CIA director of transnational issues, aware of [CIA OFFICER 2's] problematic
background, approved [CIA OFFICER 2's] employment on a CIA contract because the project was "mission critical" and "no other contractor with the needed skills was available.'
The chief of Base received a two-year Letter of Reprimand and a ten-day suspension without pay,and was prohibited from receiving any bonus awards from the
CIA during the period of reprimand. On 2003, prior to the implementation of the prohibitions, this individual retired from the CIA. See \
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On January 2003, CIA contractor DUNBAR arrived at DETENTION SITE BLUE to conduct a "Psychological Interrogation Assessment" to judge al-
Nashiri's suitability for the additional use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques and develop recommendations for his interrogation. The resulting interrogation plan proposed that the interrogators would have the "latitude to use the full range of enhanced exploitation and interrogation measures," adding that "the use of the water board would require additional support from" fellow CIA contractor Grayson SWIGERT. According to the interrogation plan, once the interrogators had eliminated al-Nashiri's "sense of control and predictability" and established a "desired level of helplessness," they would reduce the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques and transition to a debriefing phase once again.^^^
(T!S^|H||H^^^^^^JF)After receiving the proposed interrogation plan for al-Nashiri on
January2l720037^HHBBB' CIA's chief of interrogations—whose presence had previously prompted al-Nashiri to tremble in fear^^"^—emailed CIA colleagues to notify them that
he had "informed the front office of CTC" that he would "no longer be associated in any way with the interrogation progi'am due to serious reservation[s] [he had]abo^he current state of affairs" and would instead be "retiring shortly." In the same email, wrote, "[t]his is a train wreak [sic] waiting to happen and I intend to get the hell offthe train before it happens."^^^ H H drafted a cable for CIA Headquarters to send to DETENTION SITE BLUE raising a number of concerns that he, the chief of interrogations, believed should be "entered for the record." The CIA Headquarters cable—which does not appear to have been disseminated to DETENTION SITE BLUE—included the foUowing:
"we have serious reservations with the continued use of enhanced techniques with [al-Nashiri] and its long term impact on him. [Al-Nashiri] has been held for three months in very difficult conditions, both physically and mentally. It is the assessment of the prior inteiTOgators that [al-Nashiri] has been mainly truthful and is not withholding significant information. To continue to use enhanced technique[s] without clear indications that he [is] withholding important info is excessive and may cause him to cease cooperation on any level. [Al-Nashiri] may come to the conclusion that whether he cooperates or not, he will continually be subjected to enhanced techniques, therefore, what is theincentiveforcontinuedcooperation. Also,bothC/CTC/R^^hiefofCTC RDG and HVT Inter^ator [ | ^ H ^ ^ H ] who departed [DETENTION SITE BLUE] in J[(january, believe continued enhanced methods may push [al-Nashiri] over the edge psychologically."^^®
102671
According to a December 12, 2002, CIA cable, al-Nashiri "visibly and markedly trembles with fear every time he
sees 10038 (122119Z DEC 02).
Email from: [REDACTED]; subject: Re: date: January 22, 2003.
Despite this notificationT^^HI^^Bdid not imr^diately resign from the interrogation program. Email from: [REDACTED], |
[REDACTED], [REDACTED]; subiect^CON^NS OVER REVISED INTERROGATION PLAN FOR NASHIRI;date:January22,2003. |BH[iiH>referencedinthepassageasa"HVTInterrogator,"wastliechief of interrogations.
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HEADQUARTERS ~^*(031945Z SEP 06); (051613Z SEP 06)
1242 (050744Z SEP 06); HEADQUARTERS 1959(111700ZDEC04);
11701 (191640ZMAY 03);
See, for example, 2038
11247 (14132IZ APR 03);
2169 (251133Z MAR 05);
1756 (190800Z SEP 03). (021841Z AUG 04); • • •
2709 (271517Z APR 06);
3910 (241852Z JAN 06);
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The draft cable from also raised "conflict of responsibility" concerns, stating:
"Anotherareaofconcernistheuseofthepsychologistasaninterrogator. The role of the ops psychologist is to be a detached observer and serve as a check on the interrogator to prevent the interrogator from any unintentional excess of pressure which might cause permanent psychological harm to the subject. The medical officer is on hand to provide the same protection from physical actions that might harm the subject. Therefore, the medical officer and the psychologist should not serve as an interrogator, which is a conflict of responsibility. Wenotethat[th^ropose^lan]containsapsychological interrogation assessment by psychologist [DUNBAR] which
is to be carried out by interrogator [DUNBAR]. We have a problem with him conducting both roles simultaneously."^^'
Rather than releasing the cable that was drafted by CIA Headquarters approved a plan to reinstitute the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation
techniques against al-Nashiri, beginning with shaving him, removing his clothing, and placing him in a standing sleep deprivation position with his aims affixed over his head.^^^ CIA cables describing subsequent interrogations indicate that al-Nashiri was nude and, at times, "put in the standing position, handcuffed and shackled."^^^ According to cables, CIA interrogators decided to provide al-Nashiri clothes to "hopefully stabilize his physiological symptoms and prevent them from deteriorating,"^^ noting in a cable the next day that al-Nashiri was suffering from a head cold which caused his body to shake for approximately ten minutes during an
365
Beginning in June 2003, the CIA transferred al-Nashiri to five different CIA detention facilities before he was transferred to U.S. military custody on
September 5, 2006.^^^ In the interim, he was diagnosed by some CIA psychologists as having "anxiety" and "major depressive" disorder,^^^ while others found no symptoms of either
i l l n e s s . H e was a difficult and uncooperative detainee and engaged in repeated belligerent acts, including attempts to assault CIA detention site personnel and efforts to damage items in his
Email fiom: to: [REDACTED],
[REDACTED], [REDACTED]; subject: CONCERNS OVER REVISED INTERROGATION PLAN FOR NASHIRI; date: January 22, 2003. As noted above, personnel from CIA's Office of Medical Services raised the same concerns about medical and psychological personnel serving both to assess the health of a detainee and to participate in the interrogation process.
3^2director (201659ZJAN03 DIRECTOR•• (230008ZJAN03)
10289 (241203Z JAN 03); 10296 (251U3Z JAN 03), 10306 (261403Z JAN 03) 10309 (261403Z JAN 03)
10312 (270854Z JAN 03)
interrogation.
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Over a period of years, al-Nashiri accused the CIA staff of drugging or poisoning his food, and complained of bodily pain and insomnia.^^^ At one point, al-Nashiri launched a short lived hunger strike that resulted in the CIA force feeding him rectally.^^^
October 2004, 21 months after the final documented use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques against al-Nashiri, an assessment by CIA contract
interrogator DUNBAR and another CIA interrogator concluded that al-Nashiri provided "essentially no actionable information," and that "the probability that he has much more to contributeislow."^^^ Overthecourseofal-Nashiri'sdetentionandinterrogationbytheCIA,the CIA disseminated 145 intelligence reports based on his debriefings. Al-Nashiri provided information on past operational plotting, associates whom he expected to participate in plots, details on completed operations, and background on al-Qa'ida's structure and methods of operation.^^^ Al-NashiiididnotprovidetheinformationthattheCIA'sALECStationsought and believed al-Nashiri possessed, specifically "perishable threat information to help [CIA] thwart future attacks and capture additional operatives."-^^'^
E. Tensions with Country | Relating to the CIA Detention Facility and the Arrival of New Detainees
(TS// //NE) According to CIA records, three weeks after| andpoliticalleadershipofCountry| agreedtohostaCIAdetentionfacility,theCIA
informed the U.S. ambassador, because, as was noted in a cable, by not doing so, the CIA was
See, for example, (111600ZAUG 04); (291750Z JUN 06); 1716(180742Z SEPO^
See, for example, 1959(111700ZDEC04);|
1029 (291750Z JUN 06); 1716(180742ZSEP 04);
2474 (251622Z JUN 05);
1356 (011644ZJUL04);
1962 (121029Z DEC 04);
1142 (041358Z AUG 06); 3051 (301235Z SEP 05);
2673 (02145IZ AUG 05);
1880 (140917Z NOV 04); 1959 (111700ZDEC04);
2038 (211558Z JAN 05); 1091 (031835Z NOV 03); 1266 (052309Z JAN 04); •[^••H^^m63T(271^0Z MAR 04).
1203 (231709ZMA Y04)r|HHH 1^02(231644Z MAY 04)
3^2 1343 (271356Z O d 04). in the final years of al-Nashiri's detention, most of the intelligence
requirementsforal-Nashiriinvolvedshowingal-Nashiriphotographs. InJune2005,theDETENTIONSITE BLACK cliief of Base suspended even these debriefings because it was "the very, very rare moment" that al-Nashiri wouldrecognize a photogi*aph, and because the debriefings often were the "catalyst" for his outbursts. See
j ^ m l 2474 (251622Z JUN 05).
While still in the custody of a foreign government, prior to liis rendition to CIA custody, al-Nasliiri provided details on multiple terrorist plots in which he was involved prior to his detention, including the attacks against the
USS Cole and the MV Limburg, plans to sink oil tankers in the Strait of Honnuz, plans to attack warships docked at ports in Dubai and Jeddah, and his casing of a Dubai amusement park. This information was disseminatedin
intelli
custod
36595 36726 For disseminated intelligence, see
intelligence, see 374 ALEC
of a foreisn
ia[
ja| ;overnment, see
For other re 70879_^^^
70870
Page 73 of 499 UNCLASSIFIED
from al-Nashiri while he was in the 70866
. For disseminated
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"risking that he hear of this initiative" from Country | officials.^^^ As was the case in other host countries,theambassadorinCountry| wastoldbytheCIAnottospeakwithanyotherState Department official about the arrangement,^^^
of the CIA detention facility in Country ^ |CTC Legal, warned of possible legal actions against CIA
employees in countries that "take a different view of the detention and interrogation practices employed by [th^I^V^^^I^lirthe^^commendedagain^^ CIA facilities in countries that 378
advice was not heeded and, in December 2002, the two individuals then being detained by the CIA in Country | (Abu Zubaydah and 'Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri) were transferred to Country
The agreement to host a CIA detention facility in Country [ crea^multiple,ongoingdifficultiesbetweenCountry| andtheCIA. Country|'s||t||
m m proposed a written "Memorandum of Understanding" covering the relative roles and responsibilities of the CIA and which the CIA ultimately refused to sign.^®^® Fou^TTonthsaftCT sitebeganhostingCIAdetainees.Country| rejectedthetransfer of which included Khalid Shaykh Muhammad. The decision was reversedonlyaftertheU.S.ambassadorintervenedwiththepoliticalleadershipofCountry| on th^CIA|^chal^^ The following montlMh^CI^^ovided $ | million to CountryB's
which officials, for
Country | political leadership, indicated that Country | was now flexible with regard to the
numberofCIAdetaineesatthefacilityandwhenthefacilitywouldeventuallybeclosed.^^^ The facility, which was described^ the CIA as "over capacity," was nonetheless closed, as had been previously agreed, in [the fall of] 2003.^^'^
|//NP) According to CIA cables, years later, officials in reacted with "deep shock and regret'
was
[[Country | ] officials were "extremely upset"^^^ at the CIA's inability to keep secrets and were "deeply disappointed" in not having had more warning
3" [REDACTED] 84200 DIRECTOR
3" • • • 10640j
The CIA insisted be redacted in the Committee Study prior to the Study
beinerelocatedtothe U.S. Senate from the off-site research facility. 78275^^^1 DEC 02)
[REDACTED] 1888["
[REDACTED] 2666J 3^2 HEADQUARTERS
[REDACTED] 3280 According to the cable, the CIA Station speculated that the change of position was "atleast somewhat attribut£ible... toour gift of$H million...."
See V olume I for additional details.
[REDACTED] 7526 ([REDACTED] [REDACTED])
[REDACTED] 7849 ([REDACTED] [REDACTED]^^^^^^^^^
Page 74 of 499 UNCLASSIFIED
11II MUM
IIIIM UN I
394 a l e c (302240Z JUN 05) 395 ALEC (131444ZFEB 03)
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2695 10407
393 ALEC (130206ZSEP 02 ALEC (222334Z SEP 01); | (270132Z JUL 02); 97470 (281317Z MAR 02)
92557 (15SEP01); ALEC
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ofPresidentBush'sSeptember200^ubli^cknowledgmen^nh^IAprogram.^^^ TheCIA Station, for its part, described the ^ "serious blow*' to the bilateral relationship.^^^
F. The Detention and InteiTogation of Ramzi Bin Al-Shibh
1. Ramzi Bin Al-Shibh Provides Information While in Foreign Government Custody, Prior to Rendition to CIA Custody
September 15, 2001, Ramzi bin al-Shibh was assessed by the CIA to be a facilitator for the September 11, 2001, attacksand an associate of the 9/11
hijackers.^^^ Whiletargetinganotherterrorist,HassanGhul,Hjj^lPakistaniofficials unexpectedly captured bin al-Shibh during raids in Pakistan on Septemberll^2002.^^® On September |||, 2002, bin al-Shibh was rendered to a foreign government,
Approximately five months later, on February | , 2003, bin al-Shibh was rendered from the custody of to CIA custody, becoming the 41®' CIA detainee.^^^
As with Abu Zubaydah and 'Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri, personnel at CIA Headquarters- -often in ALEC Station—overestimated the information bin al-Shibh would
have access to within al-Qa'ida, writing that bin al-Shibh "likely has critical information on upcoming attacks and locations of senior al-Qa'ida operatives."^^^ Later, after bin al-Shibh was interrogated using the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques for an estimated 34 days, the CIA's ALEC Station concluded that bin al-Shibh was not a senior member of al-Qa'ida and was not in a position to know details about al-Qa'ida's plans for future attacks.In another parallel, officers at CIA Headquarters requested and directed the continued use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques against bin al-Shibh when CIA detention site personnel recommended ending such measures.^^^
38'' [REDACTED] 9210 (231043Z SEP 06)
388 [REDACTED] 7839 ([REDACTED]). Email from: [REDACTED]; to [REDACTED]; subject: BOMBSHELL; date: [REDACTED]. Email from: [REDACTED]; to: [REDACTED], [REDACTED]; subject: CIA Prisons in [Country l l ; date: [REDACTED]. EmaU from: [REDACTED]; to: [REDACTED], [REDACTED]; subject: I think
|] had to react [REDACTED], date: [REDACTED]. 389 alec (222334Z SEP 01); ^ ^ 1 9 2 ^ (15SEP 01)
390ALEC (292345ZAUG02)'ALEclm(lUSSlZSEP02). TlieCIArepresentedtopolicymakers and others—inaccurately—tliat "as a result of the use of EITs" Abu Zubaydah provided information on Ramzi bin al-Shibh that played a "key role in the ultimate capture of Ramzi Bin al-Shibh." See section of this summary on the "Capture of Ramzi bin al-Shibh" and Volume II for additional details.
See 225081 20744
10406
See also 22694
Page 75 of 499 UNCLASSIFIED
10406
. See also 22694
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UNCLASSIFIED
Ramzi bin al-Shibh was initially interrogated by a foreign government,^^^ While officers at CIA Headquarters were dissatisfied with the intelligence
production from his five months of detention in foreign government custody, CIA officers in that countryweresatisfiedwithbinal-Shibh'sreporting.^^^ ThoseCIAofficerswrotethatbinal- Shibh had provided information used in approximately 50 CIA intelligence reports, including information on potential fiiture threats, to include a potential attack on London's Heathrow Airport an^^Nashiri's planning for potential operations in the Arabian Peninsula. The CIA officers [in-country] also noted that they found bin al-Shibh's information to be generally accurate and that they "found few cases wherehe^enly/clearly misstated f a c t s . I n a cable to CIA Headquarters, the CIA officers in I H H H country where Ramzi bin al-Shibh was being held] concluded, "overall, he provided what was needed." The same cable stated that bin al-Shibh's interrogation was similar to other interrogations they had participated in, and that the most effective interrogation tool was having information available to confront him when he tried to mislead or provide incomplete information.^^^ Personnel at CIA Headquarters concluded in 2005 that the most significant intelligence derived from bin al-Shibh was obtained during his detention in foreign government custody, which was prior to his rendition to CIA custody and the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation technique
2. Interrogation Plan for Ramzi Bin Al-Shibh Proposes Immediate Use of Nudity and Shackling with Hands Above the Head; Plan Becomes Templatefor Future Detainees
Despite the aforementioned assessments from CIA officers in conce^ng bin al-Shibh's cooperation, officers at CIA Headquarters decided the CIA
should obtain m custody ofbin al-Shibh and render him to DETENTION SITE BLUE in Country On February | , 2003, in anticipationofbinal-Shi^ arrival, inten-ogators at the detention site, led by the CIA's chief interrogator, prepared an interrogation plan for bin al-Shibh.'^®^ The plan became a template, and subsequent requests to CIA Headquarters to use the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques against other detainees relied upon near identical language."^^^
ALEC ^^B(111551ZSEP02) DIRE^^OR^^H DEC 02)
22888 (240845Z FEB 03)
22888 (240845Z FEB 03)
400 Accordingtoa2005CIAassessment,the"mostsignificant"reportingfromRamzibinal-Shibhonpotential futureattackswasbackgroundinformationrelatedtoal-Qa'ida'splanstoattackHeathrowAirport. Accordingtothe CIA, Ramzi bin al-Shibh provided "useful intelligence," including an "overview of the plot" that was then used in theinterrogationofotherdetainees. {SeeALECHlHI(302240ZJUN05).) Ramzibinal-Shibhprovidedthe majority ofthis information in mid-October 2002, while in foreign government custody. See CIA f
''02 10361
^°^nii^ncluded Khaled Shaykh Mohammed (^H||^Hl065^030904Z MAR 03)); Hambali I
Yasir al-Jaza'iri (||H^^Hl0990j||^^^^HH||||B Barql^^^Hl2348•^•il^^AjHambaliandujlie^^^HII^HHIHl^^
Page 76 of 499 UNCLASSIFIED
Abd al-Latif al- (132049Z AUG
Kll MIIII'
I
Congress.
10361 10361 10361
10361
03);
Abu Hudhaifa^HiHHIiH^H^^'7<^ \M^ 03)); Hambali^Hljl^^^^^^lmin^ AUG03)); and Majid Khan
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10361
This included AsaduUaMDIRECTOR
UNCLASSIFIED
The interrogation plan proposed that immediately following the psychological and medical assessments conducted upon his arrival, bin al-Shibh would be
subjectedto"sensorydislocation.'"^^ Theproposedsensorydislocationincludedshavingbinal- Shibh's head and face, exposing him to loud noise in a white room with white lights, keeping him "unclothed and subjected to uncomfortably cool temperatures," and shackling him "hand and foot with arms outstretched over his head (with his feet firmly on the floor and not allowed tosupporthisweightwithhisarms).'""^'' ContrarytoCIArepresentationsmadelatertothe Committee that detainees were always offered the opportunity to cooperate before being subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, the plan stated that bin al-Shibh would be shackled nude with his arms overhead in a cold room prior to any discussion with interrogatorsoranyassessmentofhislevelofcooperation."^*^^ Accordingtoacable,onlyafter the interrogators determined that his "initial resistance level [had] been diminished by the conditions" would the questioning and interrogation phase begin."^^^
The interrogation phase described in the plan included near constant interrogations, as well as continued sensory deprivation, a liquid diet, and sleep
deprivation. In addition, the interrogation plan stated that the CIA's enhanced interrogation
techniques would be used, including the "attention grasp, walling, the facial hold, the facial
slap... the abdominal slap, cramped confinement, wall standing, stress positions, sleep
deprivation beyond 72 hours, and the waterboard, as appropriate to [bin al-Shibh's] level of
»»408
Based on versions of this interrogation plan, at least six detainees were stripped and shackled nude, placed in the standing position for sleep deprivation, or subjected to other CIA enhanced interrogation techniques prior to being questioned by an
inteiTogatorin2003."^®^ Fiveofthesedetaineeswereshacklednakedinthestandingposition with their hands above their head immediately after their medical check.'^^® These interrogation
resistance.
; Hassan Ghiil (
1267 and AL-TURKI
JAN 04)); Adnan al-Libi 2179
See Volume 11 for detailed information on CIA representations to
FE|^3))^bi^fasi^Wa^'iri
135558 mar03)); Suleiman Abdullali•^•^^^^^^•35787^^H|MAR
146471 (241242rMA Y03rHHHHHHH39077 (271719ZMAY03)).
For additional infonnation, see Volume III. In an April 12,2007, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
hearing, Senator Levin asked the CIA Director if the CIA disputed allegations in an International Committee of the Red Cross report that suggested CIA detainees were placed in "[p]rolonged stress standing position, naked, arm[s] chained above the head..." The CIA Director responded, "Not above the head. Stress positions are part of the EITs, andnakednesswerepartoftlieEITs,Senator." SenateSelectCommitteeonInteUigence,HearingTranscript,dated April 12, 2007 (DTS #2007-3158).
Page 77 of 499 UNCLASSIFIED
IIII 11 III I
IIII! IIII11
1(11 iiM III
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plans typically made no reference to the information the interrogators sought and why the detainee was believed to possess the information."*^'
3. CIA Headquarters Urges Continued Use of the CIA's Enhanced Interrogation Techniques, Despite Interrogators' Assessment That Ramzi Bin Al-Shibh Was Cooperative
When CIA interrogators at DETENTION SITE BLUE assessed that bin al-Shibh was cooperative and did not have additional knowledge of future attacks,
CIA Headquarters disagreed and instructed the interrogators to continue using the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, which failed to elicit the information sought by CIA Headquarters.'*^^ On February 11, 2003, interrogators asked CIA Headquarters for questions that ALEC Station was "85 percent certain [bin al-Shibh ] will be able to answer," in order to verify bin al-Shibh's level of cooperation.'*^'* The interrogators stated that information from Abu Zubaydah and al-Nashiri suggested that bin al-Shibh would not have been given a new assignment or trusted with significant information given his high-profile links to the September 11, 2001, attacks."*^^ They further stated that bin al-Shibh had "achieved substantial notoriety after 11 September," but was still unproven in al-Qa'ida circles and may have "been privy to information more as a bystander than as an active participant."'*^^
The CIA's ALEC Station disagreed with the assessment of the detention site personnel, responding that it did not believe the portrayals of bin al-Shibh offered by Abu Zubaydah and al-Nashiri were accurate and that CIA Headquarters assessed that bin al-
Shibh must have actionable information due to his proximity to KSM and CIA Headquarters' beliefthatbinal-Shibhhadahistoryofwithholdinginformationfrominterrogators. ALEC Station wrote:
"As base [DETENTION SITE BLUE] is well aware, Ramzi had long been deliberately withholding and/or providing misleading information to his interrogators in [a foreign government].... From our optic, it is imperative to focus Ramzi exclusively on two issues: 1) What are the next attacks planned for the US and 2) Who and where are the operatives inside the United States.'"*'^
' See Volume Til for additional information. -"2||[^^H^52 (121723Z FEB 03)
-•'3 (131444Z FEB 03)
|^^^BHfl0446 (1 li754Z FEB 03). The Committee was informed that the CIA's standard practice during coercive interrogations was to ask questions to which inteiTogators already knew the answers in order to assess the detainee'slevelofcooperation. HieCommitteewasfurtherinformedthatonlyafterdetaineeswereassessedtobe cooperative did inteiTogators ask questions whose answers were unknown to the CIA. See, for example, Transcript ofSSCni^ng, April 12, 2007 (testimony of CIA Director Michael Hayden) (DTS #2007-3158).
H H 10452 (121723Z FEB 03). In June 2002, Ramzi bin al-Shibl^^icipated with KSM in an interview with the al-Jazeera television network on the 9/11 attacks. DIRECTOR (112136Z SEP 02). '»'®^^^^0452 (121723Z FEB 03)
ALEC^IH(131444ZFEB03). ContrarytothestatementintheCIAcable,asdescribed,CIAofficersinthe country where Ramzi bin al-Shibh was held prior to being rendered to CIA custody wrote that Rainzi bin al-Shibh had provided information used in approximately 50 CIA intelligence reports, including information on potential
Kir'iM III'Iiik im u m i Page78 of499
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The ALEC Station cable stated that bin al-Shibh had ''spent extensive time with [KSM]," and "must have heard discussions of other targets." The cable
added that "HQS strongly believes that Binalshibh was involved in efforts on behalf of KSM to identify and place operatives in the West." The February 13, 2003, cable concluded:
"We think Binalshibh is uniquely positioned to give us much needed
critical information to help us thwart large-scale attacks inside the United
States, and we want to do our utmost to get it as soon as possible. Good luck."4i8
CIA officers at DETENTION SITE BLUE therefore continued to use the CIA's enhanced inten'ogation techniques against bin al-Shibh for approximately three
additional weeks after this exchange, including sleep deprivation, nudity, dietary manipulation, facial holds, attention grasps, abdominal slaps, facial slaps, and walling.'^^^ Bin al-Shibh did not provide the information sought on "operatives inside the United States" or "large-scale attacks inside the United States.""^^^
4. Information Already Provided by Ramzi Bin Al-Shibh in the Custody o f a Foreign Government Inaccurately Attributed to CIA Interrogations; Interrogators Apply the CIA's Enhanced Interrogation Techniques to Bin Al-Shibh When Not Addressed As "Sir" and When Bin Al-Shibh Complains ofStomach Pain
CIA records indicate that the CIA interrogators at DETENTION SITE BLUE questioning Ramzi bin al-Shibh were unaware of the intelUgencebh^l^^
)reviouslv provided in foreign government custody, even though
and the intelligence from those interrogations had been disseminated by
the CIA. On multiple occasions, personnel at the detention site drafted intelligence reports that contained information previously disseminated from interrogations of bin al-Shibh while he was in foreign government custody, under the faulty understanding that bin al-Shibh was providing new information."^^^
future threats, to include a potential attack on London's Heathrow aiiport and al-Nashiri's planning for potential operationsintlieArabianPeninsula. The CIAofficersinthatcountryalsonotedthattlieyfoundRamzibin al-Sliibh's information to be ceneralW accurate, and that they "found few cases where he openly^learly misstated facts." The CIA officers in concluded, "overall, [Ramzi bin al-Shibh] provided what was needed." See
22888 (240845Z FEB 03).
ALEC M (131444Z FEB 03)
See,forexample,••• 10525(200840ZFEB03)andI^Hi10573(241143ZFEB03). Forfurther
detail, see the detainee review of Ramzi bin al-Shibh in Volume III.
See detainee review of Ramzi bin al-Shibh in Volume IE for additional information. See, for example, CIA |
[^Siyjll^l^^^^^BCdescribing the foreign government's interrogators' "plan to ask Binalshibh to clarify his statements that Mohamed Atta, Marwan el-Shehhi, andZiadJ^ah could not agree
on the wisdom of targetincnuclea^cilitieO^^H^^Bl0568(23^ FEB 03); | H 1 H 20817 • ; CIA CIA
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Ramzi bin al-Shibh was subjected to interrogation techniques and conditions of confinement that were not approved by CIA Headquarters. CIA inten-ogators used
the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques for behavior adjustment purposes, in response to perceived disrespect, and on several occasions, before bin al-Shibh had an opportunity to respond to an inten'ogator's questions or before a question was asked. The CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques were applied when bin al-Shibh failed to address an interrogator as "sir," when inteiTogators noted bin al-Shibh had a "blank stare" on his face, and when bin al- Shibh complained of stomach pain.'^^^ Further, despite CIA policy at the time to keep detainees under constant light for security purposes, bin al-Shibh was kept in total darkness to heighten his sense of fear."^^^
CIA psychological assessments of bin al-Shibh were slow to recognize the onset of psychological problems brought about, according to later CIA
assessments, by bin al-Shibh's long-term social isolation and his anxiety that the CIA would return to using its enhanced inten"ogation techniques against him. The symptoms included visions, paranoia, insomnia, and attempts at self-harm."^^"^ In April 2005, a CIA psychologist stated that bin al-Shibh "has remained in social isolation" for as long as two and half years and the isolation was having a "clear and escalating effect on his psychological functioning." The officer continued, "in [bin al-Shibh's] case, it is important to keep in mind that he was previously a relatively high-functioning individual, making his deterioration over the past several months more alarming.'"^^^ The psychologist wrote, "significant alterations to RBS'[s] detention environment must occur soon to prevent further and more serious psychological disturbance.
On September 5, 2006, bin al-Shibh was transferred to U.S. military custody at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba."^^^ After his arrival, bin al-Shibh was placed on anti-psychotic medications.'^"'^
The CIA disseminated 109 intelligence reports from the CIA interrogations of Ramzi bin al-Shibh."^^^ A CIA assessment, which included intelligence from his
10582 (242026Z FEB 03); HIBI10627 (281949Z FEB 03)
10521 (191750Z FEB 03). The cable refeiTed to keeping bin al-Shibh in darkness as a "standard interrogationtechnique." ThesamecablestatesthatduringthenightofFebniary18,2003,thelightwentoutinbin al-Shibh's cell and that "[w]hen security personnel anived to replace the bulb, bin al-Shibh was cowering in the comer,sliivering. SecuritypersonnelnotedthatheappearedrelievedassoonasHielightwasreplaced."
1759 (021319Z OCT 04); HEADQUARTERSBHlm40023Z NOV 05); • H H l S O O (171225ZNOV04);(140915ZNOV 04);•^••1930 (061620ZDEC04)^^^^^B 2207(111319Z APR 05)rHBH[2210a41^7Z APR 2535(051^5Z JUL 05);
2589 (120857ZJlJl705)nBiHH 2830 (291304Z AUG 05); H l i H 1890 (171225Z NOV
0 4 1 8 9 3 20083IZ NOV 04); CIA document entitled, "Detainee Talking Points for ICRC Rebuttal, P
141507Z APR 05); HH|M|25^(051805Z JUL 05); | | m | ^ | | 2210 (141507Z A P R 0 5 ) ; ( 0 5 1 8 0 5 Z J U L o H ) ! ! } ^ ^ ^ 2 8 3 0 (291304Z AUG 05);
1930 (061620Z DEC 2210 (141507Z APR 05) 2210(141507Z APR 05)
-^28
|2210(141507Z APR 05) HEADQUARTERS H H i (031945Z SEP 06
SITE DAILY REPORT - 24 MAY 07: See V olume 11 for additional information.
8904(182103Z APR 08)
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time in foreign government custody, as well as his reporting in CIA custody before, during, and after being subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques,'^^® concluded that:
"Much of [bin al-Shibh's] statements on the 11 September attacks have been speculative, and many of the details could be found in media accounts of the attacks that appeared before he was detained. In the few instances where his reporting was unique and plausible, we cannot verify or refute the information... he has been sketchy on some aspects of the 9/11 plot, perhaps in order to downplay his role in the plot. His information on individuals is non specific; he has given us nothing on the Saudi hijackers or others who played a role... The overall quality of his reporting has steadily declined since 2003.'"^^^
G. The Detention and Interrogation of Khalid Shaykh Muhammad
7. KSM Held in Pakistani Custody, Provides Limited Information; Rendered to CIA Custody at DETENTION SITE COBALT, KSM Is Immediately Subjected to the CIA's Enhanced Interrogation Techniques
The capture of KSM was attributable to a single CIA source who firstcametotheCIA'sattentioninthespringof2001."^^^ Thesource
led the CIA and Pakistan authorities directly to KSM. KSM was held in Pakistani custody from the time of his capture on March 1, 2003, to March | , 2003, and was interrogated byCIAofficersandPakistaniofficials. AccordingtoCIArecords,whileinPakistanicustody, KSM was subjected to some sleep deprivation, but there are no indications of other coercive interrogation techniques being used.'^^^ While KSM denied knowledge of attack plans and the locations of Usama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri,'^^'^ he did provide limited information on various al-Qa'ida leaders and operatives who had already been captured. KSM's willingness to discuss operatives when confronted with information about their capture—behavior noted by CIA officers on-site in Pakistan—was a recurring theme throughout KSM's subsequent detention and inten-ogation in CIA custody
Less than two hours after KSM's capturc^nticipa^g KSM's arrival at DETENTION SITE COBALT, the chief of interrogations, B H I H I ' sent an email
to CIA Headquarters with the subject line, "Let's roll with the new guy." The email requested permission to "press [KSM] for threat info right away.'"^^^ Later that day, CIA Headquarters authorized to use a number of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques against
Ramzi bin al-Shibh was immediately subjected to die CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques at DETENTION SITE BLUE.
"31 ALEC • • (302240Z JUN 05)
For more details, see section of this summary on the capture of KSM and additional information in Volume IL 141403 (020949Z MAR 03)
[41484 (0313I5Z MAR 03) |4I564(041307ZMAR03);i^^HH41592(051050ZMAR03). FordetailsonKSM's
detention in Pakistani custody, see the KSM detainee review in Volume IlL
Email from: [REDACTED]; to; jj^HIII^Hii' subject: Let's Roll with the new guy;
date: March 1, 2003, at 03:43:12 AM. III! 11 III I
I III! (Ill11
Page 81 of 499 UNCLASSIFIED
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DIRECTOR 012240Z MAR 03)
34354 (•§• MAR 03); DIRECTOR|
34491 (051400Z MAR 03)
MAR 03)
I, by [REDACTED] and
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UNCLASSIFIED
KSM. The cable from CIA Headquarters did not require that non-coercive inten*ogation techniques be used first."^^^ On March 2003, two days before KSM's arrival at the detention site, CIA Headquarters approved an interrogation plan for
According to CIA records, interrogators began using the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques at DETENTION SITE COBALT a "few minutes" after the
questioning of KSM began. KSM was subjected to facial and abdominal slaps, the facial grab, stress positions, standing sleep deprivation^wi^ihisl^ atorabove head level), nudity, and waterdousing."^^^ ChiefofInterrogations|^|m|||[alsoorderedtherectalrehydrationof KSM without a determination of medical need, a procedure that the chief of interrogations would later characterize as illustrative of the interrogator's "total control over the detainee.'"^® At the end of the day, the psychologist on-site concluded that the interrogation team would likely have more success by "avoiding confrontations that allow [KSM] to transform the interrogation into battles of will with the interrogator.'"^^ KSM's reporting during his first day in CIA custody included an accurate description of a Pakistani/British operative, which was dismissed as having been provided during the initial "'throwaway' stage" of information collection when the CIA believed detainees provided false or worthless information.'^-
34575
"KhalidShaykhMuhammad'sThreatReporting- PreciousTruths,SurroundedbyaBodyguardofLies,"IICT,
April3,2003. KSMalsonamedthreeindividualswho,hesaid,workedonanal-Qa'idaant^axprogramthatwas still in its "earliest stages." Tliey were led, he said, b^|Omar|^h^iadbeena^ inthecountr£of^H
The group also included Abu Bakr al-Filistini. (See 34475 wouldlaterstatethat"Yazi£Me^l-Qa'ida'santhraxefifotir(5ec^^|^fo769(120937ZMAR03).) Yazid Sufaat, who had been in [foreign government] custody since 2001, had long been suspected of
articipating in al-Qa'ida chemical and biological activities. (See email from: [REDACTED]; to: _mii^^^iimiHcc:
,IIIII IIIIII IIIII IIIIIIIIIII IIIIII[REDACTED],[REDACTED]; subject: FOR COORD by noon please: Yazid Sufaat PDB; date: March 14, 2003, at 09:05 AM; email from: [REDACTED]; to: [REDACTED]; subject: Re: RESPONSE - INDIVIDUALS CONNECTED TO USAMA BIN LADIN ASSOCIATE YAZID SUFAAT; date: March 6, 2003, at 12:50:27 PM;
email from: to: [REDACTED]; SUBJECT: Re: KSM on WMD; date: March 12, 2003, at 08:28:31 AM.) Adraft PDB prepared on March 17, 2003, states that "Sufaat's own clauiis to ||||||||||^| [foreign government] authorities and personal background tracks with KSM's assertions." (See "KSM Guarding Most Sensitive Information," labeled "For the President Only 18 March 2003," stamped 0319 ksmupdate.doc 17 March 2003.) On April 3, 2003, an IICT analysis stated that KSM "likelyjudges that information related to Sufaat abeady has beencompromised sincehis arrest." (See "KhalidShaykhMuhammad'sTlireat Reporting - Precious Truths, Sur^nded by a Bodyguard of Lies," IICT, April 3, 2003.) CIA analysis from 2005 stated that
[a foreign government holding Sufaat] was likely to have known details of Y azid's involvement in al- Qa'ida's anthrax program by early 2002," although that information was not provided at the time to the CIA. (See CIA Duectorate ofIntelligence; "Al-QaMd^^nthra^^Program Emerge in a Key Reporting Stream; New InsightsintoYazidSufaat'sCredibility #2005-3264).) Al-Filistiniwaslater captured and detained by the CIA. Whilebeing subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques he changed his description of al-Qa'ida's anthrax efforts multiple times. On August 1, 2003, Abu Bakr al-Filistini, also known as Samr al-Barq, told CIA interrogators that "we never made anthrax." At the time, he was being subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques and was told that the harsh treatment would not stop until he "told the truth." According to cables, crying, al-Barq then said "I made the anthrax." Asked if he was lying, al-Barq said
Page 82 of 499 UNCLASSIFIED
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March 5, 2003, and March 6, 2003, while he was still at DETENTION SITE COBALT, KSM was subjected to nudity and sleep depnvation^On March
5, 2003, KSM was also subjected to additional rectal rehydration,"^"^^ which I ^ ^ ^ H O M S , described as helping to "clear a person's head" and effective in getting KSM
totalk."^ OnMarch6,2003, ^"'softerMr.Rogers'persona"afterthe interrogation team concluded that the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques had caused KSM to"clamup.'"^"^^ DuringthissessionKSMwasdescribedas"morecooperative,"andtheday's interrogation was deemed the "best session held to date" by the interrogation team."*^^ During this period KSM fabricated information on an individual whom he described as the protector of hischildren."^^ ThatinformationresultedinthecaptureandCIAdetentionoftwoinnocent individuals.'^^
2. The CIA Transfers KSM to DETENTION SITE BLUE, Anticipates Use o f the W aterboard Prior to His Arrival
Within hours of KSM's capture, ALEC Station successfully argued that CIA contractors SWIGERT and DUNBAR should take over the interrogation of KSM upon
KSM's arrival at DETENTION SITE BLUE.^^ On March 3, 2003, CIA Headquarters approved an interrogation plan indicating that KSM "will be subjected to immediate interrogation techniques," and that "the interrogation techniques will increase in intensity from standard to
thathewas. AfterCIAintenogators"demonstratedthepenaltyforlying,"al-BarqagainsUitedth^'Imadethe anthrax" and then immediately recanted, and then again stated that he made anthrax. {See 1015 (012057Z AUG 03).) Two days later, al-Barq stated that he had lied about the anthrax production "only because he thought thatwaswhatintenjoga^ 5ee^^^^HlOn (030812Z AUG 03).
^^•••^••11^4575
I I li III to: [REDACTED]; cc; [REDACTED], subject: Re:
Departure; date: March 6, 2003, at 7:11:59 PM; email from: |m|||||||||^|||||rto; [REDACTED]; cc: H | H | t: Re: Update; date: March 6, 2003, at 4:51:32 PM.
34573 (061751Z MAR 03);
34573 (061751Z MAR 03); In June 2004, KSM described his reporting as "all lies."
.34614 (071551Z MAR 03) 34614 (071551Z MAR 03) 34569 (061722Z MAR 03);
1281 (I30801Z JUN 04).
The two individuals, Sayed Habib and Shaistah Habibullali Khan, entered Cl/^ustod^t^pri^n^uW 2003
respectively, and were released inAugustandFebiiiary20 (See 5712 |; email from: to: [REDACTED]^REDACTED]^u^ct:
planned release of [DETENTION SITE ORANGE] detainee Syed Habib; ||||||m|||||||||||^^^^^^^^m.
CIA document, "Additional Details for DCIA on Sayed Habib's Arrest and Detention.") The CIA's June 2013 Response states tliat tlie detention of the two individuals "can only be considered 'wrongful' after the fact, not in the light of credible information available at tlie time and in a context in which plot disruption was deemed an urgent nationalpriority." TlieCIA'sJune2013ResponsefurtlierstatesthatKSM'sreportingonMarch6,2003,was "credible" because, at tlie time, "[CIA] assessed that Khalid Shaykli Muhammad (KSM) had moved to a more cooperativepostureashisinterrogationprogressed." AreviewofCIArecordsindicatesthattheCIAsubjected KSM to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques the following day. The use of the techniques continued until March 25,2003, and included 183 applications of tlie waterboard. See i m ^ m 10711
Interview of||||H||HH [REDACTED] and [REDACreDj^ffic^f the Inspector General, April 3, to:^^^^^^^^H|||M^^^^^Hp|H^rom^^H|||||PHm^c^RED^TED],
[REDACTED],[REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACrED]^subjectJCSN^^ March I, 2003, at 07:07:33 AM.
Page 83 of 499 UNCLASSIFIED
450
I(041444Z MAR 03). The initial approval was for TheauthorizationwasextendedtoDUNBARonMarch|,
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//NOFORN
10654 (030904Z MAR 03); DIRECTOR
SWIGERT and CIA interro 2003. DIRECTOR
"*5' Email from: [REDACTED]; 1 2003, at3:51:09 AM.
Email from: [REDACTED]; to: March j 2003, at 3:22:45 PM.
10711
10705 -•''s DIRECTOR
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enhanced techniques commensurate with [KSM's] level of resistance, until he indicates initial cooperation."^'^^ On March | , 2003, the day of KSM's amval at DETENTION SITE BLUE, the on-site medical officer described the use of the waterboard on KSM as inevitable;
"[T]he team here apparently looks to use the water board in two different contexts. Oneisasatoolofregressionandcontrolinwhichitisusedupfront and aggressively. The second is to vet information on an as needed basis. Given the various pressures from home vs what is happening on the ground, I think the team's expectation is that [KSM] will [be] getting treatment somewhere in between. I don't think they believe that it will be possible to entirely avoid the water board given the high and immediate threat to US and allied interests. It is an interesting dynamic because they are weU aware of the toll it will take on the team vs. the detainee. The requirements coming from home are really unbelievable in terms of breadth and detail.'"^^^
Meanwhile, OMS completed draft guidelines on the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, specifically addressing the waterboard interrogation
technique. These guidelines were sent to the medical personnel at the detention site. The guidelines included a warning that the risk of the waterboard was "directly related to number of exposures and may well accelerate as exposures increase," that concerns about cumulative effects would emerge after three to five days, and that there should be an upper limit on the total number of waterboard exposures, "perhaps 20 in a week." CIA records indicate that, as of the day of KSM's arrival at DETENTION SITE BLUE, the interrogation team had not reviewed the draft OMS guidelines."^^-
KSM arrived at DETENTION SITE BLUE at approximately 6:00 PM local time on March | , 2003, and was immediately stripped and placed in the standing sleep
deprivation position."^^^ At6:38 PM, after the medical and psychological personnel who had traveled with KSM from DETENTION SITE COBALT cleared KSM for the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, the detention site requested CIA Headquarters' approval to begin the interrogation process."^^"^ The detention site received the approvals at 7:18 PM,"^^^ at which point the interrogators began using the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques on KSM."^^^
Between March 2003^n^March^2003, contractors SWIGERT and DUNBAR, and a CIA interrogator, the CIA's enhanced
interrogation techniques against KSM, including nudity, standing sleep deprivation, the attention
TOP SECRET//
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UNCLASSIFIED
grab and insult slap, the facial grab, the abdominal slap, the kneeling stress position, and walling."^^^ Therewerenodebrieferspresent. AccordingtotheCIAinterrogator,duringKSM's first day at DETENTION SITE BLUE^WIGERTan^UNBAR first began threatening KSM's c h ild re n .la te rtoldtheinspectorgeneralthat these threats were legal so long as the threats were "conditional.'"^^^ On March 9, 2003, KSM fabricated information indicating that Jaffar al-Tayyar and Jose Padilla were plotting together"^^^ because, as he explained on April 23, 2003, he "felt some pressure to produce information about operations in the United States in the initial phases of his interrogation.'"^^
On March 2003^DeputyChiefof ALEC Station
and a second ALEC Station officer, arrived at DETENTION SITE
BLUE to serve as debriefers. The detention site also reportedly received a phone call ft^om CIA Headquarters conveying the views of the CIA's Deputy Director of Operations James Pavitt on theinteiTOgationofKSM.'^^^ Pavittlatertoldtheinspectorgeneralthathe"didnotrecall specifically ordering that a detainee be waterboarded right away," but he "did not discount that possibility." Accordingtorecordsoftheinterview,"Pavittdidrecallsaying,'Iwanttoknow whatheknows,andIwanttoknowitfast,""^^^ Theon-sitemedicalofficerlaterwroteinan email that the CIA interrogators "felt that the [waterboard] was the big stick and that HQ was more or less demanding that it be used early and often.'"^^'^
3. The CIA Waterboards KSM at Least 183 Times; KSM's Reporting Includes Significant Fabricated Information
On March 10, 2003, KSM was subjected to the first of his 15 separate waterboarding sessions. The first waterboarding session, which lasted 30 minutes (10 more than anticipated in the Office of Legal Counsel's August 1, 2002, opinion), was followed
by the use of a horizontal stress position that had not previously been approved by CIA Headquarters.The chief of Base, woiTied about the legal implications, prohibited the on-site
10711 10725 10732
10731 Interview of|
2003. Interview of I October 22, 2003.
10741 (100917Z MAR 03)
^ [REDACTED] and [REDACTED], Office of tlie Inspector General, April 30,
I by [REDACTED] and [REDACTED], Office of the Inspector General,
CIA Inspector General, Special Review, Counterterrorisra Detention and Interrogation Program (2003-7123-IG), January2004.
-*^0 10740 (092308Z MAR 03), disseminated as 10741 (100917Z MAR 03)
•••• 11377 (231943Z APR 03), disseminated as |
Interview of|BHHIIIIIH< 2003.
Interview of James Pavitt, by 2003.
f r o m :
10, 2003, at 5:59:27 PM.
10752 (i02320Z MAR 03) TOP SECRET//
[REDACTED] and [REDACTED], Office ofthe Inspector General, 30 April "
[REDACTED], Office of the Inspector General, August 21,
|; subject: More; date: April
Page 85 of 499 UNCLASSIFIED
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Email fiom: [REDACTED]; to:
3/10; date: March 11, 2003, at 8:10:39 AM.
10798 (131816Z MAR 03), disseminated as
10778 (121549Z MAR 03), disseminated as
10778 (121549Z MAR 03)jdis^minated as
12141 (272231ZJUN 03); 22939 (031541Z JUL 04);
disseminated as
I; subject: Re: MEDICAL SITREP
10883 (182127Z MAR 03),
UNCLASSIFIED
medical officer from reporting on the interrogation directly to OMS outside of official CIA cable traffic^^^
March 12, 2003, KSM provided information on the Heathrow Airport and Canary Wharf plotting. KSM stated that he showed a sketch in his notebook of a
building in Canary Wharf (a major business district in London) to Ammar al-Baluchi.'^^^ He also provided statements about directing prospective pilots to study at flight s c h o o l s , a n d stated that Jaffaral-TayyarwasinvolvedintheHeathrowPlot."^^^ KSMretractedallofthisinformation later in his detention.'^^^ There are no CIA records indicating that these and other retractions
were assessed to be false.
The March 12, 2003, reporting from KSM on the Heathrow Airport plotting was deemed at the time by CIA interrogators to be an effort by KSM to avoid discussion
of plotting inside the United States and thus contributed to the decision to subject KSM to two waterboardingsessionsthatday."^^' Duringthesesessions,KSMingestedasignificantamountof water. CIA records state that KSM's "abdomen was somewhat distended and he expressed water whentheabdomenwaspressed.'"^^^ KSM'sgastriccontentsweresodilutedbywaterthatthe medical officer present was "not concerned about regurgitated gastric acid damaging KSM's
e s o p h a g u s . T h e officer was, however, concerned about water intoxication and dilution of electrolytes and requested that the interroga^s use saline in future waterboarding sessions.
The medical officer later wrote to ^ ^ H ^ I ^ M S that KSM was "ingesting and aspiration [sic] a LOT of water," and that "[i]n the new technique we are basically doing a series of near drownings.'"^^^ During the day, KSM was also subjected to the attention grasp, insult slap, abdominal slap, and walling."^^^
March 13, 2003, after KSM again denied that al-Qa'ida had operations planned for inside the United States, CIA interrogators decided on a "day of intensive
HHHI10787(130716ZMAR03). TheCIAwouldlaterrepresentthattheinformationKSMprovidedonthe Heathrow plotting was an example of the effectiveness of the waterboard interrogation technique, listing the
Heathrow Plot as one of the "plots discovered as a result of ElTs" in a briefing on the waterboard for the President in November 2007. See document entitled, "DCIA Talking Points: Waterboard 06 November 2007," dated Novembe^2007, with the notation the document was "sent toDCIA Nov. 6inpreparation forPOTUS meeting." "^2 10800(131909^AR 03)
Interviewof by [REDACTED] and [REDACTED], Officeof the InspectorGeneral,May 15, 2003.
10800 (131909Z MAR 03); Interview of Office of the Inspecto^eneral^/Iay 15, 2003.
from: ||||||H||||||^^ cc:
10, 2003, at 5:59:27 PM. Emphasis in the original.
by [REDACTED] and [REDACTED], subject: More; date: April
476
10787 (130716Z MAR 03)
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waterboardsessions.'"^^^ Duringthefirstofthreewaterboardingsessionsthatday,interrogators responded to KSM's efforts to breathe during the sessions by holding KSM's lips and directing thewaterathismouth."^^^ Accordingtoacablefromthedetentionsite,KSM"wouldbegin signaling by pointing upward with his two index fingers as the water pouring approached the established time limit." The cable noted that "[t]his behavior indicates that the subject remains alert and has become familiar with key aspects of the p r o c e s s . C I A records state that KSM "yelled and twisted" when he was secured to the waterboard for the second session of the day, but "appeared resigned to tolerating the board and stated he had nothing new to say" about terrorist plots inside the United States."^^^
Prior to the third waterboard session of that calendar day, the on- site medical officer raised concerns that the waterboard session—which would be the fourth in 14 hours—would exceed the limits included in draft OMS guidelines that had been distributed
thepreviousaftemoon."^^^ Thosedraftguidelinesstatedthatuptothreewaterboardsessionsina 24-hourperiodwasacceptable.'^'^^ Atthetime,KSMhadbeensubjectedtomorethan65 applications of water during the four waterboarding sessions between the afternoon of March 12, 2003, and the morning of March 13, 2003. In response to a request for approval from the chief of Base, CTC attorney assured detention site personnel that the medical officer "is incorrect that these guidelines have been approved and/or fully coordinated.""^^^
sent an email to the detention site authorizing the additional waterboai*ding session."^^"^ Despite indications from that the detention site personnel would receive a formal authorizing cable, no such authorization from CIA Headquarters was provided. At the end of the day, the medical officer wrote ^ H m O M S that "[tjhings are slowly evolving form [sic] OMS being viewed as the institutional conscience and the limiting factor to the ones who are dedicated to maximizing the benefit in a safe manner and keepingeveryone's butt out of trouble." The medical officer noted that his communication with j l ^ H l O M S was no longer "viewed with s u s p i c i o n . O n the afternoon of March 13, 2003, KSM was subjected to his third waterboard session of that calendar day and fifth in 25 hours. CIA records note that KSM vomited during and after the procedure.
477
2003. The interviewee was a CIA interrogator for KSM at the CIA detention site. 10790 (130946Z MAR 03)
10791 (131229Z MAR 03)
[REDACTED]; to: cc: Jose
Rodriguez; subject^rejEyesOnly - Legal and Political Quandyr7^ateJMard^3, 2003, at 11:28:06 AM.
Email from: to: [REDACTED]; cc: subject: Re: MEDICAL SITREP
3/10; date: March 12,2003, at 2:09:47 PM.
h'om: to: [REDACTED]; cc:
Rodriguez; subjectJleJEYE^NLY - Legal and Political Quandary; date^larcM3^003^8^0^n AM. Emailfrom: to: [REDACTED];cc:JoseRodriguez,jjjBBHlHHIi'I^HI
subject: EYES ONLY - Use of Water Board; date: March 13,
2003, at 08:28 AM.
Email from: [REDACTED]; to: cc: subject: Re: State cable; date:
March 13, 2003, at 1:43:17 PM. The previous day, the medical officer had written thar|]^iT^oin^h^^ra mile to try to handle this in a non confrontational manner.'* Email from: [REDACTED]; to:
• H j j j H H ; subject: Re: MEDICAL SITREP 3/10; date: March 12, 2003, at 5:17:07 AM. ^^86^HB^03(131929ZMAR03)
Page 87 of 499 UNCLASSIFIED
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Interview of• • • • I , by [REDACTED] and [REDACTED], Office of tlie Inspector General, April 30,
TOP SECRET//
//NOFORN
UNCLASSIFIED
Shortly thereafter, CIA Headquarters began reevaluating the use of the waterboard interrogation technique. According to a March 14, 2003, email from an
interrogator who was not at DETENTION SITE BLUE, but was reviewing cable traffic, the "[ojverall view seems to be" that the waterboard "is not working in gaining KSM['s] compliance.'"^^^ ThedeputychiefoftheCIAinterrogationprogramrespondedinagreement, adding that "[a]gainst KSM it has proven ineffective," and that "[t]he potential for physical harm is far greater with the waterboard than with the other techniques, bringing into question the issue of risk vs. gain...." The deputy chief further suggested that the waterboard was counterproductive, stating that "[w]e seem to have lost ground" with KSM since progress made at DETENTION SITE COBALT, and as a result, the CIA should "consider the possibility" that the introduction of the waterboard interrogation technique "may poison the well.""^^^ The email in which these sentiments were expressed was sent to the CTC attorney overseeing the interrogation of KSM. Despite these reservations and assessments, the waterboarding of KSM continued for another 10 days.'^'^^
On March 15, 2003, KSM was waterboarded for failing to confirm references in signals intercepts on al-Qa'ida's efforts to obtain "nuclear suitcases.
Subsequent signals intercepts and information from a foreign government would later indicate that the nuclear suitcase threat was an orchestrated scam."^^^ KSM was waterboarded a second time that day after failing to provide information on operations against the United States or on al- QaMda nuclear capabilities."^^^ During the waterboarding sessions that day, the application of the interrogation technique further evolved, with the interrogators now using their hands to maintain a one-inch deep "pool" of water over KSM's nose and mouth in an effort to make it impossible forKSMtoingestallthewaterbeingpoured."^^^ Atonepoint,SWIGERTandDUNBARwaited for KSM to talk before pouring water over his mouth.
from: • ^ ^ • 1 ; to; cc: [REDACTED], [REDACTED]; subject: re Summary of KSM Waterboard Sessions - As of 1000 HRS 14 Mar 03; date: March 14, 2003, at 10:44:12 AM.
^^^EmaiHronr to: cc: [REDACTED], [REDACTED], BBBBBBBtsu^ectTreSummary of KSM Waterboard Sessions - As of1000 HRS 14 MAR 03; date: March 14, 2003, at 02:02:42 PM.
5eedet^d review of these sessions in Volume III.
10831 (151510ZMAR 03); ^ ^ 1 1 10841 (152007Z MAR 03); ^••110849 (161058Z MAR
03); Interview of by [REDACTED] and [REDACTED], Office of the Inspector General, May 15, 2003.
The original reporting, that al-Qa'ida had purchased nuclear suitcases in Yemen, was later determined to be based on an effort by unknown Yemenis to sell "suitcase weapons" to al-Qa'ida. Al-Qa'ida operatives concluded that the offer was a scam. See 74492 (250843Z JUL 03), disseminated as
HEADQUARTERS (092349Z DEC 04).
"^2 H H i 10841 (152007Z MAR 03); 10831 (151510Z MAR 03)
Email from: [REDACTED]; to:
date: March 15, 2003, at 3:52:54 A.M. Interviewof||||^^^|^^^WREDACTED] and [REDACTED], Office of the Inspector General, May 15,2003. See also interviewof^B||||tH|^|, by [REDACTED] and [REDACTED], Office of the Inspector General, May 15, 2003. The descriptions of the use of the waterboard interrogation techniqu^gaii^ were provided by these two on-site medical officers.
Interview of 2003.
by [REDACTED] and [REDACTED], Office of the Inspector General, May 15,
Page 88 of 499 UNCLASSIFIED
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March 17, 2003, and into the morning of
Marchl8720037^^|HilHH, exchanged emails with the medical officer at DETENTION SITE BLUE on the waterboarding of KSM. According to the waterboard inten'ogation technique had "moved even further from the SERE model.'"^^^
also wrote:
"Truthfully, though, I don't recall that the WB [waterboard] produced anything actionable in AZ [Abu Zubaydah] any earlier than another technique might have. This may be different with KSM, but that is still as much a statement of faith as anything else - since we don't seem to study the question as we go... it's been many more days of constant WB repetitions, with the evidence of progress through most of them not being actionable intel but rather that 'he looks like he's weakening.' The WB may actually be the best; just don't like to base it on religion.'"^^^
On March 18, 2003, KSM was confronted with the reporting of Majid Khan, who was then in the custody of a foreign government,"^^^ regarding plotting against
gas stations inside the United States, information that KSM had not previously discussed. In assessing the session, DETENTION SITE BLUE personnel noted that "KSM will selectively lie, provide partial truths, and misdirect when he believes he will not be found out and held accountable." On the other hand, they wrote that "KSM appears more inclined to make accurate
"95 Email to: [REDACTED]; from: |;subject: Re: Medical limitations ofWB -draft tlioughts; date: March 17, 2003, at 01:11:35 PM.
Email from: to: [REDACTED]; cc: |; subject: Oct 18; date: Maich 18, 2003, at 10:52:03 AM.
Majid Khan, who was arrested on March 5, 2003, provided extensive infonnation prior to being rendered to CIA custody. ThisincludedinformationonlymanParis,Uzhair(Paracha)andhisfatiier,AafiaSidiqqi,histransferof al-Qa'ida funds to a Bangkok-based Zubair, and his discussions with KSM regarding various proposed plots. Majid Khan also provided assistance to the CIA in its efforts to locateAmmar al-BaluchiJncludm al- Pakistani. (SeeM W 13697(080730ZMAR03); ••^•13765
144244 (161423Z APR^3)-MW^M44684 (250633Z APR 03); 13678 (070724Z MAR 03); ••••m85 • | | ^ ^ ^ H n ^ ^ H n 9 0 8 (26025IZ MAR
03); 13826 (190715Z MAR (200454Z MAR 03X^^^Mn8901 13686(071322ZMAR03)?^HH 13932(271244ZMAR^^^BI^I 13710
(081218Z MAR 03).) After being rendered to CIA custody, Majid Khan was subjected by the CIA to sleep deprivation, nudity, and dietary manipulation^andmayhavebeens^ to an ice water bath. (See \
139077 (271719Z MAY 03); 39099 (281 lOlZ MAY 03); | I Briefing for tlie Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, March 14, 2008;
|41772(121230ZJUL 03); • • ^ • | | | | | | | | ^ H ^ 4 2 0 2 5 ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ p ; email
|, [REDACTED]7^^^^^^^^|, and subject, "Re: i hope the
approvals for enhanced comes through quickly for tliis guy... this does not look good"; date: June 30, 2003.) A June 2006 CIA email stated that Majid Klian said he "fabricated a lot of his early [CIA] interrogation reporting to stop... what he called 'torture.'" According to the email, Klian stated that he was "hung up" for approximately one day in a sleep deprived position and thaMieprovided "ever^^ the^ante^^iea^^et out ofthe situation." (Seeemailfrom: [REDACTED] ••C0bJH|H||||H|, [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], |m|^H|^^|P^ibjectr|||Hfre^est for prozac; date: June 16, 2006.) As detailed in this summary and in more detail in Volume 11, the CIA inaccurately attributed information provided by Majid Khan in foreign government custody to tlie CIA interrogations of KSM.
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2003. 508
03)
10902 (201037Z MAR 03); TOP SECRET//
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TOP SECRET//
//NOFQRN
UNCL A SSIFIED
disclosures when he believes people, emails, or other source material are available to the USG for checking his responses.
The same day, KSM provided additional information on the Heathrow Airport plotting, much of which he would recant in 2004."^^^ KSM also discussed
Jaffar al-Tayyar again, prompting the detention site personnel to refer to the "all-purpose" al- Tayyar whom KSM had "woven... into practically every story, each time with a different role."^°° AfterKS^^iadincludedal-TayyarinhisdiscussionofMajidKhan'sgasstationplot, KSM debriefer in email that "[t]oday [al-Tayyar's] working with Majid Khan, yesterday the London crowd, the day before Padilla - you get the point."^^^ Beginning the evening of March 18, 2003, KSM began a period of sleep deprivation, most of it in the standing position, which would last for seven and a half days, or approximately 180 hours.^®-
On March 19, 2003, the interrogators at the detention site decided to waterboard KSM due to KSM's inconsistent information about Jaffar al-Tayyar's passport.^^^
According to CIA cables, after assuming his position on the waterboard, KSM "seemed to lose control" and appeared "somewhat frantic," stating diat he "had been forced to lie, and ma[k]e up stories about" Jaffar al-Tayyar because of his interrogators.KSM then stated that his reporting on al-Tayyar's role in Majid Khan's plotting was a "complete fabrication" and that al- Tayyar had been compromised as an operative and that as a result, al-Tayyar could not be used for a terrorist operation.^"^ In response, the interrogators told KSM that they only wanted to hear hin^p^ ifhe was revealing information on the next attack.^®^ Deputy Chief of ALEC Station
later told the inspector general that it was around this time that contract interrogator DUNBAR stated that "he had not seen a 'resistor' [sic] like KSM, and was 'going to go to school on this guy.'"^^^ According to CIA records, the interrogators then "devote[d] all measures to pressuring [KSM] on the single issue of the 'next attack on America,"' including attention grabs, insult slaps, walling, water dousing, and additional waterboard sessions.
(^¥8/J|||||||||||mi|^^^|//NF) On March 20, 2003, KSM continued to be subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques throughout the day, including a period of "intense questioning
10884 (182140Z MAR 03)
10883 (182127Z MAR 03), disseminated as H I ^^^39 (031541Z JUL 04). CIA records indicate that CIA officers believed that KSM's recantations were credible. See KSM detainee review in Volume ni.
500 10884 (182140Z MAR 03)
Email from: [REDACTED], OFFICE: 18,2003, at 08:16:07 PM. -'"^^^M|10884(182140ZMAR03); 03)'^^^H 10969 (240950Z MAR 03)
|^^Hi0892 (191503ZMAR03); 10902 (201037Z MAR 03)
10894 (191513Z MAR 03);
I; to: [REDACTED]; subject: JAFAR REQUEST; date: March
10888 (190805Z MAR 03); 10902 (201037Z MAR 03) 10902 (201037Z MAR 03)
10999 (260835Z MAR
10902 (201037ZMAR 03)
Interview of by [REDACTED] and [REDACTED], Office of the Inspector General, April 3,
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andwalling."^®^ KSMwasdescribedas"[t]iredandsore,"withabrasionsonhisankles,shins, andwrists,aswellasonthebackofhishead.^'® Healsosufferedfrompedaledemaresulting fromextendedstanding.^^^ Afterhavingconcludedthattherewas"nofurthermovement"inthe interrogation, the detention site personnel hung a picture of KSM's sons in his cell as a way to "[heighten] his imagination concerning where they are, who has them, [and] what is in store for them."^^2
The waterboarding of KSM on March 21, 2003, and March 22, 2003, was based on a misreading of intelligence provided by Majid Khan bvDeputyChief of
ALEC Station According to a cable from the CIA's Khan, who was in foreign government custody, had stated that KSM wanted to use "two to three unknown Black American Muslim converts who were currently training in Afghanistan," to "conduct attacks" on gas stations in the United States, and that "KSM was interested in usin^ anyone with US status to assist with this operation.Upon receipt of this reporting,
wrote in an email "i love the Black American Muslim at AQ camps in Afghanuistan [sic] ... Mukie [KSM] is going to be hatin' life on this one."^^"^ However, her subsequent questioning of KSM was not based on Khan's actual reporting, which was about potential operatives already in Afghanistan, but rather something Khan had not said—that KSM directed him to make contact withAfrican-AmericanconvertsintheUnitedStates.^^^ AccordingtoCIArecords,ina "contentious" session that lasted for hours and involved the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, KSM "flatly denied" any efforts to recruit African-American Muslim converts, KSMwasthenwaterboarded.^'^ Laterintheday,facingthethreatofasecond waterboarding session, KSM "relented and said that maybe he had told Khan that he should see if he could make contact with members of the Black American Muslim convert community." The CIA interrogators then returned KSM to the standing sleep deprivation position without a second waterboarding session.^^^
The next day, March 22, 2003, interrogators subjected KSM to "intense" questioning and walling, but when KSM provided no new information on African-
American Muslim converts or threats inside the United States, he was subjected to additional
10916 (210845Z MAR 03); 10921 (211046Z MAR 03) 10916 (210845Z MAR 03)
10909 (201918Z MAR 03)
Interviewof^^HjjjimiH, by [REDACTED] and [REDACTED], Office of the Inspector General, October 22,2003j|||^Bl0917(^907Z MAR 03).
13839 (201434Z MAR 03)
Email to: from: [REDACTED] OFFIC&^HH^[DETENTION SITE BLUE]; subject: Re:
Majid Khan; date: March 20, 2003, at 03:40:17 PM. BLUE via ALEC (210015Z MAR 03).
10932 (212132Z MAR 03) 10932 (212132Z MAR 03);| 10932 (212132Z MAR 03)
The ^^^(cabl^as formally sent to DETENTION SITE 10922 (211256Z MAR 03)
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^^^Fi0950 (222127Z MAR 03) 5201094^221610^MAR 03), disseminated as
disseminated as
10942 (221610Z MAR 03), disseminated as
10948 (222101Z MAR 03),
12095 (222049Z JUN 03)
12558 (04I938Z AUG 0 ^ 31148 (171919Z DEC 05);
10983 (242321Z MAR 03);
31147 (171919Z DEC 05), disseminated as 10972 (241122Z MAR 03)
10983 (242321Z MAR 03)
UNCL A SSIFIED
waterboarding.^^^ An hour later, KSM stated that he was "ready to talk."^^^ He told the CIA interrogators that he had sent Abu Issa al-Britani to Montana to recruit African-American Muslim converts, a mission he said had been prompted by discussions with a London-based shaykhwhosebodyguardshadfamiliesinMontana.^^® KSMalsostatedthathetaskedMajid Khan with attending Muslim conferences in the United States to "spot and assess potential extremists"whowouldassistinthegasstationplot.^^^ InJune2003,KSMadmittedthathe fabricated the story about Abu Issa al-Britani and Montana, explaining that he was "under
'enhanced measures' when he made these claims and simply told his interrogators what he thought they wanted to hear."^^^ In August 2003, KSM reiterated that he had no plans to recruit or use "black American Muslim" converts operationallyIn December 2005, he denied ever asking Majid Khan to recruit converts or attend Islamic conferences.^^"^
On March 24, 2003, KSM underwent his fifteenth and final documented waterboarding session due to his "intransigence" in failing to identify suspected
Abu Bakr al-Azdi operations in the United States, and for having "lied about poison and biological warfare programs."^^^ KSM was described in the session as being "composed, stoic, and resigned."^^^
That evening, the detention site received two reports. The first recounted the reporting of Majid Khan, who was still in the custody of a foreign govermnent, on Uzhair,whorantheNewYorkbranchofhisfather's Karachi-basedimport-exportbusiness,and on Uzhair's father/''-^ According to Khan, his meetings with the two were facilitated by Ammar
al-Baluchi.^^^ The second report described the reporting of lyman Paris, who was in FBI custody, on a plot to cut the suspension cables on the Brooklyn Bridge and exploration of plans toderailtrainsandconductanattackinWashington,D.C.^-^ KSM,whomdetentionsite personnel described as "boxed in" by the new reporting,^^® then stated that Uzhair's father, Sayf al-Rahman Paracha, had agreed to smuggle explosives into the United States.^^^ As described
10941(221506ZMAR03);••• 10950(222127ZMAR03). OnecablefromDETENTION SITE BLUE hypothesized that KSM was lying in order to force the CIA interrogators to apply the CIA's enhanced inteiTogation techniques: "[T]he enhanced measures resulting from his lying in [sic] details could be a resistance strategy to keep the interrogation from threatening issues... [KSM's] apparent willingness to provoke and incur the use of enhanced measures may represent a calculated strategy to either: (A) redirect the course of the interrogation; or (B)toattempt to cultivate some doubt that he had knowledge of any current or future operations against the US." SeeJ^g^ 10950 (222127Z MAR03).
10974 (241834ZMAR 03);
See the sections of this summary and Volume II on the Identification and Arrests of Uzhair and Saifullah
Paracha.
529 WHDC 530
13890 10984 (24235IZ MAR 03) I(242226ZMAR^3)?B|^Hi^83 (242321Z MAR 03)
10983 (242321ZMAR 03)
10984 (24235IZ MAR 03), disseminate^^
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elsewhere in this summary, the purported parties to the agreement denied that such an agreement existed.''^^ In confirming Paris's reporting, KSM exhibited what the Interagency Intelligence Committee on Terrorism would later describe as an effort to "stay obvious/general" and "provide little information that might enable the US to thwart attacks.
With the exception of sleep deprivation, which continued for one more day, the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques against KSM stopped abruptly
onMarch24,2003.^^"^ TherearenoCIArecordsdirectingtheinterrogationteamtoceaseusing the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques against KSM, nor any contemporaneous documentation explaining the decision.^^^
4. AftertheUseoftheCIA'sEnhancedInterrogationTechniquesAgainstKSMEnds,the CIA Continues to Assess That KSM Is Withholding and Fabricating Information
On April 3, 2003, the Interagency Intelligence Committee on Ten'orism produced an assessment of KSM's intelligence entitled, "Precious Truths, Surrounded
by a Bodyguard of Lies." The assessment concluded that KSM was withholding or lying about terrorist plots and operatives targeting the United States. It also identified contradictions between KSM's reporting on CBRN and other sources.
24, 2003, PBI Director Robert Mueller began seeking direct PBI access to KSM in order to better understand CIA reporting indicating threats to U.S.
cities.^^^ DespitepersonalcommitmentsfromDCITenettoDirectorMuellerthataccesswould be forthcoming, the CIA's CTC successfully formulated a CIA position whereby the FBI would
According to one cable, KSM did not volunteer the purported smugglingplot, but rather was asked about it by interrogators. (See ALEC (052230Z MAY 03). All partiesto^epurported plot - Paracha and Amma^- Balucht-deniedanyagreementhadbeenreached. DIRECTORm[(^^29ZJUN03),disseininatedasH
39239 (301600Z MA Y03)il^B 13588 (171505Z JUL 03); mill nil MIBrrT^^PZJUN03),disseminatedas 39239
(301600Z MAY 03); ALEC H H (012248Z APR 03).) With regard to the explosives smuggling reporting, the former chief of the Bin Ladin Unit wrote in a March 2003 email; "again, anotlier ksm op worthy of the lamentable knuckleheads... why 'smuggle' in explosives when you can get tliem here? neither fertilizer for bombs or regular explosives are that hard to come by. ramzi yousef came to conus with a suitcase and hundred bucks anId^got everythingheneededrighthere,thismaybetme,butitjustseemsdamnoddtome." Seeemailfrom:m:Bi
|; subject: see
Surrounded by a Bodyguard of Lies," ITCT, April 3, 2003.
Sleep deprivation was extended for an additional day, although it was intemipted by "catnapping." See \
10999 (260835Z MAR 03).
^35 For additional details, see KSM detainee review in Volume 111. 536"KhaiidShaykhMuhammad'sTlireatReporting- PreciousTruths,SuiToundedbyaBodyguardofLies,"IICT,
April 3, 2003.
^3^ Email fi'om: HHjjjjjjjH L. Pavitt; H H U B H ; John H. Moseman; Jose Rodriguez;^||||||||||||||||^^BHrand||||i|||BlllHH' subject: Mueller's Interest in FBI Access to KSM; date: April 24, 2003, at 10:59:53 AM.
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highlight: again, anotlier ksm op worthy of the lamentable; date: March 25, 2003, at 6:29:08 AM.
-''33••• 10985(242351ZMAR03). "KlialidShaykhMuhammad'sThreatReporting-PreciousTruths,
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notbeprovidedaccesstoKSMuntilhisanticipatedtransfertoGuantanamoBay,Cuba. Neither the CIA nor the FBI knew at the time that the transfer would not occur until September2006.^^^
Between April 2003 and July 2003, KSM frustrated the CIA on a numberoffronts. OnMay7,2003,aftermorethantwomonthsofconflictingreporting,ALEC Station concluded that KSM "consistently wavers" on issues of UBL's location, protectors, and
hosts, and that his information "conveniently lack[s] sufficient detail [to be] actionable intelligence.On June 12, 2003, CIA Headquarters indicated thatit "remain[ed] highly suspicious that KSM is withholding, exaggerating, misdirecting, or outright fabricating informationonCBRNissues."^'^'' AttheendofApril2003,KSMwasshownpicturesofthe recently captured Ammar al-Baluchi and Khallad bin Attash, after which he provided additional informationrelatedtotheirplottinginKarachi.^"^^ ALECStationwroteinaMay20,2003,cable that "[w]e consider KSM's long-standing omission of [this] information to be a serious concern, especially as this omission may well have cost American lives had Pakistani authorities not been diligent in following up on unrelated criminal leads that led to the capture of Ammar, bin Attash, and other probable operatives involved in the attack plans."^'^^
May and June 2003, Ammar al-Baluchi and Khallad bin Attash provided reporting that contradicted KSM's statements about the Heathrow Airport plotting and
includedinformationthatKSMhadnotprovided.^"^^ AfterKSMwasconfrontedwiththis reporting, Deputy Chief of ALEC Station wrote in an email, "OK, that's it... yet again he lies and ONLY ADMITS details when he knows we know them from someone
Memorandum for: James L. Pavitt; Jose Rodriguez;
from: subject:Update: DirectorMueller-DCITenetConversationonKSM;date:June4,2003, at05j4^2 PM. Note for: James L. Pavitt; f r o m ; c c : Jose Rodriguez,Bi
subject: Director Mueller Plans to Call DCI on KSM Issue; date: May 21, 2003, at 08:40:22 PM. In addition to the FBI, senior CIA officers, including CTC's representatives to the FBI, complained about the limitations on the dissemination of intelligence derived from CIA interrogations and the impact those limitations had on counterterrorism analysis. The CTC's representative to the FBI described this to the OIG as a "serious concern." He stated that the compartmentation of interrogation information resulted in delaysindisseminationthatcouldresultininformationbeing"missed." HealsostatedthattheCIA's compartmentation ofinformation preventedhimfrompi^ding totl^^ insight into the value/credibility ofintelligencereports." (SeeinterviewofIBIHBH't>yIHHHil'OfficeoftheInspectorGeneral, August 18,2003.) Among theotherCIAofficers expressing theseconcerns were thedeputy chiefofCTC's Al- Qa'ida Department, who told the OIG that limited acces^^operational traffic "has had an impact on [analysts'] full knowledge of activities, and thus their analysis." (See Memorandum for the Record; subject: Meeting with Deputy Chief, Counterterrorism Center Al-Qa'ida Department; July 28, 2003.) The Director of Analysis at CTC described analysts' limited access to information as a "continuing problem." (See August 18,
2003, Memorandum for the Record, meeting with Counterterrorism Center, Director of Analysis, Office of the Inspector General.) The CIA's Deputy Director of Intelligence told the OIG that limitations on the dissemination of operational information prevented the "fiill cadre of analysts" from reviewing the intelligence and that, as a result, "we^losing analytic ability to look at [foreign intelligence] in a timely manner." See interview of[
m , by [REDACTED] and [REDACTED], Office of the Inspector General, September 12, 2003.
ALEC^HH(072002Z MAY 03)
DIRECTOR^BH (121550Z JUN 03)
^ ^ • ^ ^ 3 4 (30I710Z APR 03); 11448 (301141Z APR 03) ALEC]BH(022012ZMAY03). SeeinformationindiissummaiyandVolumeIIonthe"KarachiPlot"for
additional information.
See detainee reviews for Ammar al-Baluchi and Khallad bin Attash in Volume III for additional information on
the reporting the detainees provided.
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On April 19, 2003, KSM was questioned for the first time about summer 2002 reporting from Masran bin Arshad, who was in the custody of a foreign government, regarding the "Second Wave" plot. Informed that bin Arshad had been detained, KSM stated, "I have forgottenabouthim,heisnotinmymindatall."^"^^ Inresponse,ALECStationnotedthatit "remain[e]d concerned that KSM's progression towards full debriefing status is not yet apparent where it counts most, in relation to threats to US interests, especially inside CONUS."^"^^ In June 2003, almost three months after the CIA had stopped using its enhanced interrogation techniques against KSM, senior ALEC Station and RDG officers met at least twice to discuss concerns aboutKSM'slackofcooperation.^"^^ AsanALECStationcablenotedatthetime,"KSM's pattern of behavior over the past three months, trying to control his environment, lying and then admitting things only when pressed that others have been caught and have likely admitted the plot,isacauseforconcem."^'^^ Inanemail,oneCIAofficernotedthat"whatKSM'sdoingis fairly typical of other detainees... KSM, Khallad [bin Attash], and others are doing what makes sense in their situation - pretend cooperation."'''^^
In the fall of 2003, after KSM's explanations about how to decrypt phone numbers related to British operative Issa al-Britani (KSM did not identify the operative as
"Issa al-Hindi," or by his true name, Dhiren Barot) yielded no results, and after KSM misidentified another individual, known not to be Issa, as Issa, Deputy Chief of ALEC Station
stated in an email that KSM was "obstructing our ability to acquire good information," noting that KSM "misidentifie[s] photos when he knows we are fishing" and "misleads us on telephone numbers.Later, after KSM's transfer to DETENTION SITE BLACK, ALEC Station wrote that KSM "may never be fully forthcoming and honest" on the topicofUBL'swhereabouts.^^^ Despiterepeatedchallenges,KSMmaintainedthathelacked information on UBL's location.^^-
for; from: subject: Action detainee branch; date: June 12, 2003 (emphasis in tlie original).
I H m i l L (191445Z APR 03), disseminated as | 5"^ ALEC^H|(222153ZA^03)
Email to cc; L[REDACTED], ^^•[^^^^n^^HHjREDA^DUREDACTEDJ, [REDACTED], |
[RHDACTED],
[REDACTED]; subject: Khallad & KSM Detainee Case Discussion; date: June 18, 2003, at 10:09 AM;
ALEC^^•0p2258Z JUN03).
ALEC^BH(302258Z^ 03)
Email to: [REDACTED], [REDACTED], |
[REDACTED], [REDACTED]; subject: Re: KSM's passive restraint - please let me know if you have comments for a memo to the DCI^ate^un^4^003^^27|0^M^^ ^^^mai^om^^H|PH||||||HuoJ^PI||||^^m, ||^m^^|[[^^^|!|^^H^||H|^|7[REDACT^]rccr^^|^^^|; subject: KSMand KhalladIssues; date: October 16, 2003, at 5:25:13 PM.
55' ALECMB(111932ZNOV 03)
552 10400(161754ZNOV03). KSM,whowaswithAymanal-Zawaliirithedaybefor^^March1,
2003,capture,firstinformedtheCIAoftliisfactmorethanamonthlater,onApril3,2003. Seem||||m||11139 (051956Z APR 03).
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KSM was transferred to DETENTION SITE o n
| , 2005,^^^ to DETENTION SITE BROWN on March 2006,^^"^ and to U.S. military detention
atGiiantanamoBay,Cuba,onSeptember5,2006.^"^^ TheCIAdisseminated831intelligence reports from the interrogations of KSM over a period of 3.5 years. While KSM provided more intelligence reporting than any other CIA detainee (nearly 15 percent of all CIA detainee intelligence reporting), CIA records indicate that KSM also received the most intelligence requirements and attention from CIA interrogators, debriefers, analysts, and senior CIA leadership. Further,asnoted,asignificantamountofthedisseminatedintelligencereporting from KSM that the CIA identified as important threat reporting was later identified as fabricated.^^^
H. The Growth of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program
I. Fifty-Three CIA Detainees Enter the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program in 2003
While the CIA held detainees from 2002 to 2008, early 2003 was the most active period of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program. Of the 119 detainees
identified by the Committee as held by the CIA, 53 were brought into custody in 2003, and of the 39 detainees the Committee has found to have been subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, 17 were subjected to such techniques between January 2003 and August 2003. The CIA's enhanced interrogations during that time were primarily used at DETENTION SITECOBALT and DETENTION SITEBLUE.^^^ Otherinterrogations using the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques took place at a CIA in Country | , at which at least one CIA detainee was submerged in a bathtub filled with ice water.^^^
In 2003, CIA interrogators sought and received approval to use the CIA's enhanced intenogation techniques against at least five detainees prior to their arrival at a
CIA detention facilityIn two of those cases, CIA Headquarters approved the use of the CIA's
2 2 1 8 |; HEADQUARTERS
12214 (050539Z SEP 06) See KSM detainee review in Volume TIL
For more information, see detainee reviews and reports in Volume III for Ramzi bin al-Shibh, Muhammad Umar 'Abd al-Rahman aka Asadallah, Abu Khalid, Khalid Shaykh Mohammad, Mustafa Ahmad al-Hawsawi, Abu Yasir al-Jaza'iri, Suleiman Abdullah, Abu Hazim, Al-Shara'iya aka Abd al-Karim, Ammar al-Baluchi, Khallad bin Attash, Laid Ben Dohman Saidi aka Abu Hudhaifa, Majid Khan, Mohd Farik bin Amin aka Abu Zubair, Samr Hilmi Abdul Latif al-Barq, Bashir bin Lap aka Lillie, and Riduan bin Isomuddin aka Hambali.
For example, Abu Hudhaifa was subjected to this technique at the safehouse. {Seeemail from: [REDACTED]; to: [REDACTEDl^ubiect^^emo; date^[arct^5^004.) The incident wa^^portedtottieCIAinspectorgeneral. See from: to: [REDACTED], illriHiHiilH'
subiect^u^elcon^t^a^17,2004,at11:24AM. Seealsoclaimsrelatedtothetreatmentof MajidKhan. See Briefmgfor theSenateSelectCommitteeon Intelligence,
Implementation of Central Intelligence Agency Secret Detention and Interrogation Program, March 14, 2008. 559 d i r e c t o r (012214ZMAR 03); DIRECTOR • • (040049Z MAR 03); DIRECTOR • • {
(252003Z MAR 03); DIRECTOR (162224Z MAY 03); HEADQUARTERS • • (102352Z SEP 03) mi M III I
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[REDACTED] 03]
HEADQUARTERS [
According to a cable from CIA Headquarters, ^•,2003. HEADQUARTERS |
[REDACTED]
detainees arrived in Country
UNCLASSIFIED
enhanced interrogation techniques before they were requested by CIA personnel at the detention
560 sites.
2. The CIA Establishes DETENTION SITE BLACK in Country' | and DETENTION SITE VIOLET in Country |
The CIA entered into an agrcemen^^ the
inCountry| tohostaCIAdetentionfacilityitj|^^^m||2002.^^' ^ 3 ,
CIAHeadquartersinvitedtheCIAStationinCoun^| toidentifywaystosupportthe
in Country | to "demonstrate to and the highest levels of the [Country | ]
government that we deeply appreciate their cooperation and support" for the detention )rogram.^^^ The Station responded with an $ | million "wish list"
CIA Headquarters provided the Station with $ | million more than was requestedforthepurposesofthe|||^|subsidy.^^ CIAdetaineesweretransferredto
DETENTION SITE BLACK inCountry | inthe fall of2003.^^^
InAugust2003,theU.S.ambassadorinCountry| soughtto contact State Department officials to ensure that the State Department was aware of the CIA
detention facility and its "potential impact on our policy vis-a-vis the [Country | ] govemment."^^ The U.S. ambassador was told by the CIA Station that this was not possible, and that no one at the State Department, including the secretary of state, was informed about the CIA detention facility in Country | . Describing the CIA's position as "unacceptable," the ambassador then requested a signed document from "at least the President's National Security Advisor" describing the authorities for the program, including a statement that the CIA's interrogation techniques met "legal and human rights standards," and an explicit order to him not to discuss the program with the secretary of state.^^^ CIA Headquarters then sought the intervention of Deputy Secretary of State Richaid Armitage, who called the U.S. ambassador. Deputy Secretary Armitage told the CIA to keep him and the secretary of state informed so that they would not be caught unaware when an ambassador raised concerns.
Nearly a year later, in May 2004, revelations about U.S. detainee abuses at the U.S. military prison in Abu Ghraib, Iraq, prompted the same U.S. ambassador in
Country | to seek information on CIA detention standards and interrogation methods.-''^'' In the fallof2004,when|BiU.S.ambassadortoCountry| soughtdocumentsauthorizingthe program, the CIA again sought the intervention of Deputy Secretary Armitage, who once again
5^0 DIRECTOR • • (012214Z MAR 03); DIRECTOR (040049Z MAR 03) [REDACTED] 60040j
568 £,Y^ail from: II^II^BIII^Ktor^^llllllllllllllll^^ subject; Re; DDCI-Armitage call on [Country | ]
Detention Facility; date: August®, 2003. 5'^'' [REDACTED] 6762 ( B I B m A Y 04)
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made "strong remarks" to the CIA about how he and the secretary of state were "cut out of the NSC [National Security Council] clearance/coordination process" with regard to the CIA program. AccordingtoCIArecords,Armitagealsoquestionedtheefficacyoftheprogramand thevalueoftheintelligencederivedfromtheprogram.^^^ Whileitisunclearhowthe ambassador's concerns were resolved, he later joined the chief of Station in making a presentationtoCountry|'s||H^|ontheCIA'sDetentionandInterrogationProgram. The presentation talking points did not describe the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, but represented that "[w]ithout the full range of these interrogation measures, we would not have succeeded in overcoming the resistance of [Khalid Shaykh Muhammad] and other equally resistantHVDs." Thetalkingpointsincludedmanyofthesameinaccuraterepresentations'^^ made to U.S. policymakers and others, attributing to CIA detainees critical information on the "Karachi Plot," the "Heathrow Plot," the "Second Wave Plot," and the "Guraba Cell"; as well as intelligence related to Issa al-Hindi, Abu Talha al-Pakistani, Hambali, Jose Padilla, Binyam Mohammed,SajidBadat,andJaffaral-Tayyar. Thepresentationalsonotedthatthepresidentof the United States had directed that he not be informed of the locations of the CIA detention facilities to ensure he would not accidentally disclose the information.'^^
a separate country, Country | , the CIA obtained the approval of the and the political leadership to establish a detention facility before
informingtheU.S.ambassador.'^^ AstheCIAchiefofStationstatedinhisrequesttoCIA Headquarters to brief the ambassador. Country | ' s
)robablvwouldasktheambassadorabouttheCIAdetentionfacility.'^"^ After!
delayed briefing the for
months, to the consternation oftheCIAStation^whichwa^ political approval prior to the arriva^^l^detainees^'^^rh^^^^^^^Hj^^^^HI^ICountry |ofhcial outside of the the was described as "shocked," but nonetheless approved.'^^
(TS/fl||||^^||||||||H||||/^^^) By mid-2003 the CIA had concluded that its completed, but still unused "holding cell" in Country | was insufficient, given the growing number ofCIA detainees in the program and the CIA's interest in interrogating multiple detainees at the same detention site. The CIA thus sought to build a new, expanded detention facility in the c o u n t r y T h e CIA
Lotus Notes message from Chief of Station to D/CTC, COPS; copied in: email from: I; to: [REDACTED], [REDACTED]; cc: [REDACTED],
|;subject: ADCI Talking Points for Call to DepSec ArmitageTdateT^^^lll^^ljjlat7:40:43 PM. The CIA's June 2013 Response states that "witli regard to the Study's claims that the State Department was 'cut out' of information relating to the program, the record shows that the Secretary of State, Deputy Secretary of State... wereawareofthesitesatdietimetheywereoperational." AsdetailedthroughouttheCommitteeStudy,CIA recordsindicatethesecretaryofstatewasnotinformedoftheCIAdetentionsitelocations. Duringmeetingswitli the CIA in the summer of 2013, the Committee requested, but was not provided, documentaiy evidence to support the assertion in the CIA's June 2013 Response.
See relevant sections of this summary and Volume II for additional details. "2 HEADQUARTERS ••[REDACTS]
[REDACTED] 64105^B^H|||P
[REDACTED] 30296
See V olume I for additional details.
[REDACTED] 4076 [REDACTED]; [REDACTED] 32266 [REDACTED] HEADQUARTERS W
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also offered $| million to the to "show appreciation" for the support for theprogram.^^^ AccordingtoaCIAcable,however,the
I»579 plan tp construct the
expanded facility was approved by the of Count developed complex mechanisms to
in order to provide the $ | million
in Coun complicated the arrangements
r^uested an update on planning for the CIA inaccurately—that the planning had been
m582 some sort of center.
3. At Least 17 CIA Detainees Subjected to the CIA's Enhanced Interrogation Techniques Without CIA Headquarters Authorization
cables from the spring of 2003 and afterwards describe multiple examples of interrogation practices at CIA detention sites that were inconsistent with
theCIA'sdetentionandinterrogationguidelines. CIAofficer^^ETENTIONSITE COBALT—led principally by Chief ofInterrogations ^ — a l s o described a number ofinterrogationactivitiesincablesthatwerenotapprovedbyCIAHeadquarters, CIA Headquarters failed to respond, inquire, or investigate:
• Cables revealing that the CIA's chief of interrogations used water dousing against detainees, including with cold water and/or ice water baths, as an interrogation technique without prior approval from CIA Headquarters
580
when the Coun detention site, he was told
discontinued.^^^
informedtheCIA^^I^^^Ilthatthe ofCountry| "probablyhasan incomplete notion[rcgardingtl^^ actual function, i.e., he probably believes that it is
HEADQUARTERS
[REDACTED] 4088
See V olume I for additional details.
*^8' [REDACTED] 5293 582 [REDACTED] 5417
details on detainees in Count
See also FREDACTEDl 5327
MA Y 03); 39582 (041743Z JUN 03);
38597 (201225Z MAY 03);
Water dousing was categorized as a "standard|^interTOgatioiUecl^^
. See V olume 111 for additional
38596 (201220Z MA Y 03); 38557 (191641ZM A Y 03);
39101••• MAY03). InilIIII11
39042
III! 11 III I
when thefacilityrcc^ed its first CIA detainees,
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Cables and records indicating that CIA detainees who were undergoing or had undergone the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques were subjected to rectal rehydration, without evidence of medical necessity, and that others were threatened with it;^^"^
Cables noting that groups of four or more interrogators, who required practical experience to acquire their CIA interrogation "certification," were allowed to apply the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques as a group against a single detainee;^^^ and
at4:51:32PMr^^^|12385(222045ZJUL03)!^^HFo415|H|||H||. In addition to the rectal rehydration or feeding of al-Nashiri, KSM and Majid Klian, described elsewhere, there is at leas^n^^ord ofAb^ubayd^^^eiving "rectal fluid resuscitation" for "partially refusing liquids." {See |B|||^^|i0070 Marwan al-Jabbur was subjected to whatwasoriginallyrefe^ a cabl^^i^|enei^," but was later acknowledged toberectal rehydration. {See
email from: to: ^•^^•••jR^ACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED]; subject: Re: TASKING - PvTHj^^Bd^March 30, 2007; DTS #2007-1502.) Ramzi bin al-Sliibh, Khallad bin Attash and Adnan al-Libi were threatened with rectal rehydration. {See 10415^PHHB|;•••12385 (222045ZJUL03); from: •••IHIH; to:
iiii|i II I li ilii il Evaluation/Update J|||(047); date: March2004.) CIA medical officers discussed rectal rehydration as a means of behavior control. As one officer wrote, "[w]hile IV infusion is safe and effective, we were impresse^witluh^ncillat^ffectivenes^^ectann^sion on endin^tfi^waterrefijsaiinas^ case." {See froinJI^^^B^BII; to subject: Re: (048); date: February ^7200^) The same officer provided a description of the procedure, writing that "[r]egarding the rectal tube, if you place it and open up the IV tubing, the flow will self regulate, sloshing up the large intestines." Referencing the experience of the medical officer who subjected KSM to rectal rehydration, the officer wrote that, "[w]hat I infer is that you get a tube up as far as you can, then open the IV wide. No need to squeeze the bag - let
work." (5e^mail from to ^Hi ^ntl [REDACTED], February 27, 2004, Subject: Re^^^J(048)^The same
email exchange included a description of a previous application of the technique, in which "we used the largest Ewal [sicHub^ehad."{Seeemailfrom: [REDACTED];to{{^^•^^^•||fcccJ^ED ACTED],
[REDACTED], [REDACTED]; subject: (048); date: February 2004,at11:42:16PM.) Asdescribedinthecontextoftherectalfeedingofal-Nashiri,Ensurewasinfusedintoal- Nashiri "in a forward-facing position (Trendlenberg) with head lower than torso." {See (231709Z MAY 04).) Majid KhanV^uncl^ray/^on^^ ofhummus, pasta with sauce, nuts, and raisins was "pureed" and rectallyinfused. {See^^^••^•••3240 (231839ZSEP04).) TheCIA'sJune2013Responsedoes not address the use of rectal feeding with CIA detainees, but defends the use of rectal rehydration as a "well acknowledged medical technique." CIA leadership, including General Counsel Scott Muller and DDO James Pavitt, was also alerted to allegations that rectal exams were conducted with "excessive force" on two detainees at DETENTIONSITECOBALT. CIAattorneymmHHIHwasaskedtofollowup,althoughCIArecordsdonot indicate any resolution of the inquiry. CIA records indicate that one of the detainees, Mustafa al-Hawsawi, was later diagnosed with chronic hemorrhoids, an anal fissure, and symptomatic rectal prolapse. See email from: [REDACTED]; to [REDACTED]; cc: [REDACTED]; subject: ACTIONS from the GC Updat^hi^^ornine^ateT^^^^^^^I, at 12:15 PM; email from: to: [REDACTED]; cc: BHHHjBjREDACTro], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], subject: ACTIONS from the GC Update this Momjng^ate^^Bmimi|, at 1:23:31 PM; email from:
[REDACTED]; cc: ^^^I^^HTfREDACTED]; subject: Re: ACTIONS from the GC Update this Mominj REQUEST FOR STATUS UPDATE; date: December | , 2003, at 10:47:32 AM; • • 3223
HEADQUARTERS
See
34491 (051400Z MAR 03); Interview of
[REDACTED] of the Office of the Inspector General, Maich 27, 2003;
;email from: to: [REDACTED]; cc: ^^H^^^Hj^^^^^^ubiectjRejUpdate; date:
See, for example, (201133Z MAY 03);
38130 (121722Z MA Y 03); 38127(121714ZMAY03);^||^^^^^^B 38161
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Cables revealing that the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques were used at CIA that were not designated as CIA detention sites.^^^
In the first half of 2003, the CIA interrogated four detainees with medicalcomplicationsintheirlowerextremities: twodetaineeshadabrokenfoot,onedetainee
had a sprained ankle, and one detainee had a prosthetic leg.^*^^ CIA interrogators shackled each of these detainees in the standing position for sleep deprivation for extended periods of time until medical personnel assessed that they could not maintain the position. The two detainees that each had a broken foot were also subjected to walling, stress positions, and cramped confinement, despite the note in their interrogation plans that these specific enhanced interrogation techniques were not requested because of the medical condition of the detainees.^^^ CIA Headquarters did not react to the site's use of these CIA enhanced interrogation techniques despite the lack of approval.
Over the course of the CIA program, at least 39 detainees were subjected to one or more of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques.CIA records indicate that there were at least 17 CIA detainees who were subjected to one or more CIA
enhanced interrogation techniques without CIA Headquarters approval. This count includes detainees who were approved for the use of some techniques, but were subjected to unapproved techniques, as well as detainees for whom interrogators had no approvals to use any of the techniques. This count also takes into account distinctions between techniques categorized as "enhanced" or "standard" by the CIA at the time they were a p p l i e d T h e 17 detainees who
38595 (201216ZMAY 03); |
35341 139042(^^MMAY03)jemailfr^^
3 8 1 2 6
39098 to:
(131326Z M A Y 03); (121709Z MAY 03).
See, for example, \
[REDACTED]; subject: Memo; date:
MAY 03); • ^ • • H | | H H 3 7 7 0 8
MAY 03); 39099 (281101Z MAY 03).
For more details, see detainee reviews for Muhammad Umar 'Abd al-Rahman aka Asadallah; Abu Hazim al-Libi; Al-Shara'iya aka Abd al-Karim; and Khallad bin Attash.
The two detainees were Abu Hazim al-Libi and Al-Shara'iya aka Abd al-Karim.
This is a conservative estimate. CIA records suggest that the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques may have alsobeenusedagainstfiveadditionaldetaineesatDETENTIONSITECOBALTin2002,whichwouldbringthe numberofCIAdetaineessubiecte^(Hh intenogationtechniquesto44. Thoseadditional detainees were [DETAINEE R], who was approved for the CIA's enlianced interrogation techniques, but whose records do not refer to the use of tlie tecliniques (ALEC j l H I i i d H l i H H H I)); Ayub Murshid Ali Salih andHa41AzizAhmadA^ whose records refer t^^ac^^leep^unio^^ application ofsleep deprivation (||^|^^^H|^^^^Hf28132 (101143Z OCT 02);
27964 (071949Z OCT 02)); Bashir Nasir Ali al-Marwalah, who later told debriefers that, when he was first captured, he "had to stand up for five day^traigh^nc^nswe^uestions'' and "was also forced to strip naked and stand in front of a female interrogator" 14353 (231521Z APR 03)); and Sa'id Salili Sa'id, who later told debriefe^that he was "mistreated and beaten by Americans while bUnd-folded and stripped down to his underwear in H H " 13386 (090154Z JAN 03)). See also detainee reviews in V olume III for more information.
The CIA's June 2013 Response objects to the Committee's count, arguing that "[n]o more than seven detainees received enhanced techniques prior to written Headquarters approval." The CIA's June 2013 Response then asserts diat "the Study miscounts because itconfusestheuseofstandar^echn^^ did not require prior approval at the
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weresubjectedtotechniqueswithouttheapprovalofCIAHeadquarterswere: RafiqBashiral- Hami,^^^ Tawfiq Nasir Awad al-Bihandi,^^^ Hikmat Nafi Shaukat,^^^ Lufti al-Arabi al-Gharisi, Muhammad Ahmad Ghulam Rabbani aka Abu Badr,^^^ Gul Rahman,Abd al-Rahim al-
tlme they were administered with enhanced techniques that did." This statement in the CIA's June 2013 Response is inaccurate. First,priortoJanuary2003,theCIAhadnotyetdesignatedanytechniqueasa"standard"technique. Because sleep deprivation was included in the August 1, 2002, OLC memorandum approving the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques on Abu Zubaydah, the Committee included, among the 17, CIA detainees subjected to sleep deprivation without CIA Headquarters authorization prior to January 2003. In January 2003, sleepdeprivationunderaspecifictimelimitwascategorizedasa"standard"CIAinterrogationtechnique. Second, the January 2003 guidelines state that advance CIA Headquarters approval was required for "standard" techniques "wheneverfeasible." Forthisreason,tlieCommitteedidnotincludecaseswhereCIAinterrogatorsfailedtoobtain authorization in advance, but did acquire approval within several days of initiating the use of the "standard" techniques. Finallywaterdousingwasnotcharacterizedasa"standard"techniqueuntilJune2003. {See DIRECTOR||||||l£ll^ DIRECTOR (302126Z JAN 03); DIRECTOR• • (311702Z JAN03); 39582(041743ZJUN03).) InnumerouscasespriortoJune2003,water dousing was expli^ly described in CIA cables as an "enhanced" interrogation technique. {See, for example, DIRECTORlllllllipi(I01700ZFEB03).) TheCommitteethusincluded,amongthe17,CIAdetaineessubjectedto water dousing prior to June 2003 without CIA Headquarters authorization. The distinction between standard and enhanced interrogation techniques, which began in January 2003, was eliminated by CIA leadership in 2005. See
V olume I and V olume III for additional details.
Rafiq Bashir al-Hami was subjected to 72 hours ofslee^epnvationbetweenh^^ arrival atDETENTION SITE
COBALTandhis October 2002, interrogation. See||||g||||^m|||^m|m^28297HHHilHii- Tawfiq Nasir Awad al-Bihani was subjected to 72 hours ofsleepdeprivationbetw^ arrival at DETENTION
SITE COBALT and his October 2002, interrogation. See 28462 CIAcablesfromOctober2002noted thatShaukat was"tiredfrom hisregimen of limited sleepdeprivation." See
29381 Luftial-Arabial-Gharisiunderwentatleasttwo48-hoursessionsofsleej^^givationinOctober2002. See
29036 and 29352
Abu Badr was subjectedtoforcedstandii^^
November 2002. See
5 9 6 CIA interrogators used sleep deprivation, facial slap, use of cold (including cold cells and cold showers), ' h a r d
grasps, and cold temperatures without blankets in 29963
takedowns/^ietar^miliPulatioiLil^^iilj-SSiii^lii^EP"^^^'® Rahinan. See| 29520 29520J
29770^^^^^^H^H||^^^^Hint^iew of [CIA OFFICER December 2002; ^^m^^^^^^^Hntervie^o^iammond DUNBAR, January 9, 2003; Memorandum for Deputy Director of Operati^nsr^oiti^^ January 28, 2003, Subiect^eatlUnvestigation - Gul RAHMAN; CIA Inspector General, Report of Investigation, Deathof a Detainee (2003-7402-IG), April 27, 2005; and CIA InspectorGeneral,SpecialReview, Counterterrorism Detention AndInterrogation Activities (September 2001 - October 2003), May 7, 2004.
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Nashiri,^^^ Ramzi bin al-Shibh,^^^ Asadallah,^^^ Mustafa al-Hawsawi,^*^^ Abu Khalid,^^^ Laid bin DuhmanakaAbuHudhaifa,^^^ Abdal-Karim,^®^AbuHazim,^"'^SayyidIbrahim,AbuYasir al-Jaza'iri,*^^^andSuleimanAbdullah.^®^ Ineverycaseexceptal-Nashiri,theunauthorized
Abd al-Raliira al-Nasliiri was subjected to unapproved nudity and approximately two-and-a-half days of sleep deprivation in December 2002, with his arms shackled over his head for as long as 16 hours. See email from: [DETENTION SITE BLUE] to; subject; EYES ONLY -
[ ^ • • 1 ^ 1 ] ONLY ~ MEMO FOR ADDO/DDO; date: January 22, 2003.
ThefacialholdwasusedagainstRamzibinal-Shibhmultipletimeswithoutapproval. Seem|||^^U0415 10429 (101215Z FEB 03); 10573 (241143Z FEB 0 3 ) r ^ ^ H 10582 (242026Z FEB 03); (252002Z FEB 03); 10602 (262020Z FEB 03); 1^633
(011537Z MAR 0 3 ) r a n d ^ | ^ | 10704 (071239Z MAR 03).
Interrogators used water dousing, nudity, and cramped confinement on Asadallah witliout having sought or
received authorization from CIA Headquarters. Bathing detainees did not require authorization by CIA Headquarters; however, as described in CIA cables, the application of "bathing" in the case of Asadallali was done punitively and was used as an interrogation technique. Nudity was also used in conjunction widi water dousing/bathingandlaterasaninte^^ techmque^ithou^pp^^fi^omCIAHeadquarters. See
134241 and 34310
Mustafa al-Hawsawi was subjected to water dousing without approval from CIA Headquarters. See
••••••• (081207Z APR 03).
Interrogators used sleep deprivation against AbiHChali^rio^^eekin^uthorizatioi^roiT^I^i^dquarters,
andthen^iledtoobta^^ authorizatioi^5e^^^PH|B|||imii 35193 and mmilimilimil^l35341m^mnil^ljjlf AbuKhaUdhadbeeninCIAcustodyfor17dayspriorto theuseofthetechnique. AdvanceautiiorizationfromCIAHeadquarterswastherefore"feasible,"andthusrequired under the guidelines.
Hudhaifa was subjected to baths in which ice water was used, standing sleep deprivation for 66 hours that was discontinued due to a swollen leg attribute^^rolongec^anding^mdity^n^ietar^nanipu^^ (5e^mail from: to; [REDACTED],|^H|||||||||||^H, llHIHiiH' 1^1
ject: our telecom; date: March ^7^04; CIA Office of Inspector General Report; 2005-8085-IG; 39098 39042 M A Y and 39101HI^ImAY03).). Norequestorapprovalfortheuseofstandardor
enhanced interrogation tecliniques could be located in CIA records.
Abd al-Karim, who suffered from a foot injury incurred during Ills capture, was subjected to cramped
confinement, stres^ositions, and walling despite CIA Headquarters having not approved their use. See DIRECTOR ^ ^ H I m A Y 03); and DIRECTOR
Abu Hazim, who also had a foot injury incun^^unn^u^apture^^subjecte^^walling^e^te CIA
Headquaiters having not approved its use. (See 36908 37410(291828ZAPR03).) Nudity^ietar^riani^^
Abu Hazim at least 13 days prior to receiving approval.
WIO (291828Z APR03);••••^^••3^3
and facialgraspwereusedon
37411 (291829Z APR 03);
DIRECTOR HiiHiMA Y 03).
CIA cables indicate that Sayyid Ibraliim was subjected to sleep deprivation from January 27^004,toJanuary 30,
2004,whichexceededthe48hoursapprovedbyCIAHeadqi^ters. SeeHEADQUARTER^^^^B(272155Z JAN 04); | | ^ ^ ^ H 1 3 0 3 ] ^ P | | W A N 0 4 X H • ^ • j A N 04); • • • • 1 3 0 3
[A N04)lM H^lliT|H|H|j^
During March 2003 intenogations at DETENTION SITE COBALT, Abu Yasir al-Jaza'iri was "bathed," a term
used to describe water dousing, which was considered at the time to be an enhanced intenogation technique. (See
••{^^••••^l 35558•••§ MAR 03).) Water dousing had not been approved, and the subsequent request, by DETENTION SITE BLUE, to use theCWsenhan^ inteiTogation techniques on al-Jaza'iri, did not
include water dousing. See 10990
Intenrogators requested approvals to use the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques on Suleiman Abdullah,
including water dousing. CIA Headquarters tlien approved other techniques, but not water dousing. (See
• H l H i l H H B i ! 36559 • • • • • I ; DIRECTOR Suleiman Abdullah was nonetheless subjected to water dousing
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interrogation techniques were detailed in CIA cables, but CIA Headquarters did not respond or take action against the CIA personnel applying the unauthorized interrogation techniques.
This list does not include examples in which CIA inten-ogators were authorized to use the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, but then implemented the
techniques in a manner that diverged from the authorization. Examples include Abu Zubair^®^ and, as detailed, KSM, whose intenogators developed methods of applying the waterboard in a manner that differed from how the technique had previously been used and how it had been describedtotheDepartmentofJustice. Thiscountalsoexcludesadditionalallegationsofthe unauthorized use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques.^^®
Over the course of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program, numerous detainees were subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques by untrained
interrogators. As noted, the CIA did not conduct its first training course until November 2002, by which time at least nine detainees had already been subjected to the techniques.^The DCI's January 28, 2003, guidelines, which stated that the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques
The CIA's June 2013 Response states that the CIA "conducted at least 29 investigations of RDI-related conduct, plus two wide-ranging reviews of the program... one involved the death of an Afghan national who was beaten by a contractor. TheindividualinvolvedwasprosecutedbytheDepartmentofJusticeandconvictedofafelonycharge. Another case involved a contractor who slapped, kicked, and struck detainees while they were in military custody. ... [T]hecontractorwasterminatedfromtheCIA,hadhissecurityclearancesrevoked,andwasplacedona contractor watch list." However, the two specific examples provided in the CIA's June 2013 Response refer to detainees who were never part of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program. On November 6, 2013, the CIA providedalistof"IGInvestigationsConcerningDetention,Interrogations,andRenditions." Thelistof29included 14 investigations that were diiectly related to the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program. Four additional investigations were related to detainees who claimed they had been subjected to abuse in transit from CIA custody to U.S. mihtary custody at Guantanamo Bay. The remaining 11 investigations were unrelated to tlie CIA's Detention and Interrogation Prograi^5e^TS #2013-3250.
CIA chief of interrogations, placed a broomstick behind the knees of Zubair when Zubair was in a stresspositiononliiskneesonthefloor. AlthoughstresspositionshadbeenapprovedforZubair,theuseofthe broomstick was not approved. See April 7, 2005, Briefing for Blue Ribbon Panel, CIA Rendition, Detention, and Interrogation Programs, at 22.
Majid KhmUm^laimecHhatJ^ 2003, he was subjected to immersion in a tub that was filled with ice and water. {See BriefingfortheSenateSelectCommitteeonIntelligence,Implementation ofCentralIntelligenceAgencySecretDetentionandInterrogationProgram,datedMarch14,2008.) WhileCIA cablesdonotconfirmbathingorwaterdousing.ChiefofInterrogations subjected AbuHudhaifato m^una^orized)"icywater"bathatthesame^^^^^vhere^jidKhanwasheld. (Seeemailfrom:
to: [REDACTE^^REDACTED], subject: telecon; date: email from: [REDACTED] to:
subject:Memo;dateTHjimm.) AyubMurshidAliSalihandHa'ilAzizAhmadal-Maythaliweredescribed a^ioMiavin^lept^IthouehitisunclearfromCIArecordswhethe^I^ntenjogatorekeptthemawake. {See
28132 (101143Z OCT 02) and 2^7^64 (071949Z OCT 02).) Basliir Nasri Ali al-Marwalah told debriefers at Guantanamo Bay that he was "tortured" at DETENTION SITE
COBALTwithfivedaysofcontinualstandingandnudity. (See 14353(231521ZAPR 03).) Sa'id Salih Sa'id likewise informed debriefera at Guantanamo that he was "beaten" while blind-folded in CIA custody. {See 13386 (090154Z JAN 03).) Sixteen other detainees were held at DETENTION SITE COBALT between September and December 2002, a period during wliich exposure to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques such as sleep deprivation and nudity cannot be determined based on the lack of details in CIA cables and related documents.
December4, 2002, TrainingReport, High Value Target Interrogation and Exploitation (HVTIE) Training Seminar 12-18 Nov 02 (pilot running).
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"may be employed only by approved interrogators for use with specific detainees," raised the additional issue of approved techniques used by unapproved i n t e r r o g a t o r s T h e January 28, 2003, DCI guidelines did not explicitly require CIA Headquarters to approve who could use the CIA's "standard" interrogation techniques, including techniques that were not previously considered "standard" and that would later be reclassified as "enhanced" interrogation techniques. Rather, the DCI guidelines required only that "all personnel directly engaged in the interrogation" be "appropriately screened," that they review the guidelines, and that they receive "appropriate training" in the implementation of the guidelines.^
4. CIA Headquarters Authorizes WaterDousing Without Department ofJustice Approval; Application of Technique Reported as Approximating Waterboarding
CIA Headquarters approved requests to use water dousing, nudity, the abdominal slap, and dietary manipulation, despite the fact that the techniques had not been
reviewed by the Department of Justice.^^'^ Interrogators used the water dousing technique in variousways. AtDETENTIONSITECOBALT,detaineeswereoftenhelddown,naked,ona tarp on the floor, with the tarp pulled up around them to form a makeshift tub, while cold or refrigerated water was poured on them.^^^ Others were hosed down repeatedly while they were shackled naked, in the standing sleep deprivation position. These same detainees were subsequently placed in rooms with temperatures ranging from 59 to 80 degrees Fahrenheit.^^^
^'2DIRECTOR director (311702ZJAN03). Forexample,onMay|, 2003, CIA interrogatorjtllBiHH applied three facial attention grabs, fiv^aciaHnsul^l^s, and tliree abdominalslapstoAbd^ underthesupemsioj^fCI/^nterrogator [CIA OFFICER 1]. (See 37821 ) H I I lia^ ^een approved by CIA Headquarters to employ the CIA's enhanced intenogation techniques on al-Karim; approval had only been provided for | [CIAOFFICERI]tousetheCIA'senhance^nterrogationtechniques. (SeeDIRECTOR
III.) On CIA interrogator B m H I H ' under tlie supervision of conducted an intenogation of Abd al-Karim in which intenogators used the facia^ttentioi^r^faciaHi^^ and abdominal
al-Karim. (See 38583 ) ll^^^lhad
approved by CIA Headquarter^^mpl^ the CIA's enhanced intenogation techniques against Abd al-Karim. In another example, on^B||B^^HpETENTION SITE COBALT requested approval for certified intenogators jjjjjlljj^l^^ and [CIA OFFICER 1] to use the CIA'senhance^^iTogatiorUechn^^
Kliallad bin Attash, and for tliree other interrogators, HIHHIil^^ndJ|i|H|HHIHHl to also use the techniquesj|unde^^ supervision of senior certified intenogator[||§^(]7^5^
H | [ | | H 38325 ) CIA Headquarters approved the use of CIA's enhanced intenogation techniques against Khallad bin Attash, but the approval cable did not include approval for participation
by or
03).) On May 17 and 18, 2003, Attash under the supervision of waterdousing. See
(201225Z MAY 03).
Iunder^^^n^;s^s^upervision. (SeeDIRECTOR•• (162224ZMAY the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques on bin
I, including facial grabs, facial insult slaps^abdomina^^ and 38557(191641ZMAY03);g||||||||^||^|^||^3339^
DIRECTORnil(302I26ZJAN03);DIRECTOR•• (311702ZJAN03). TheDCIguidehnesprovided no further information, other than to note that the screening should be "from the medical, psychological, and security standpoints."
See, for example, DIRECTOR (10I700Z FEB 03).
In the case of Abu Hudhaifa, and allegedly Majid Khan, intenogators placed the detainee in an actual tub in a CIA when employing water dousing that included ice water.
CIA cable records often describe tlie detainees as naked after tlie water dousing, while other records omit such detail. See V olume III for additional information.
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Otheraccountssuggestdetaineeswerewaterdousedwhileplacedonawaterboard.^'^ Although CIA Headquarters approved the use of the "water dousing" interrogation technique on several detainees, interrogators used it extensively on a number of detainees without seeking or obtaining prior authorization from CIA Headquarters.^^^
(TS/^H(^^^^U^^}F^runtenjoeation sessions on April 5, 2003, and April 6, 2003, senior CIA interrogator another interrogator used the water dousing technique on detainee Mustafa al-Hawsawi at DETENTION SITE COBALT. Al-Hawsawi later described the session to a different CIA interrogator, who wrote that al- Hawsawi might have been waterboarded or subjected to treatment that "could be indistinguishable from the waterboard."^^^ Anemail from the interrogator stated that:
"We did not prompt al-Hawsawi - he described the process and the table on hisown. Asyouknow,Ihaveseriousreservationsaboutwateringthemina prone position because if not done with care, the net effect can approach the effect of the water board. If one is held down on his back, on the table or on the floor, with water poured in his face I think it goes beyond dousing and the effect, to the recipient, could be indistinguishable from the water board.
I have real problems with putting one of them on the water board for 'dousing.' Putting him in a head down attiaide and pouring water around his chest and face is just too close to the water board, and if it is continued may lead to problems for us."^-^
Several months later, the incident was referred to the CIA inspector generalforinvestigation. ADecember6,2006,inspectorgeneralreportsummarizedthefindings
of this investigation, indicating that water was poured on al-Hawsawi while he was lying on the floor in a prone position, which, in the opinion of at least one CIA interrogatorquoted in the report,"caneasilyapproximatewaterboarding."^-^ TheOIGcouldnotcorroboratewhetheral- Hawsawi was strapped to the waterboard when he was interrogated at DETENTION SITE COBALT. Bodi of the interrogators who subjected al-Hawsawi to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques on April 6, 2003, said that al-Hawsawi cried out for God while the
Email from; J^ng [REDACTED] account; to: and subject: Al-Hawsawi Incident; date: November 21, 2003.
For additional details, see Volume III^
Email from: using [REDACTED] account;
su^j^^^j^^^^^jjidMt; date: November 21, 2003. ^^^^^^^u^ng [REDACTED] account; to: subject: Al-Hawsawi Incident; date: November 21, 2003.
Volume III of tlie Committee Study includes a CIA photograph of a wooden waterboard at DETENTION SITE COBALT. As detailed
in the full Committee Study, there are no records of the CIA using the waterboard interrogation technique at COBALT. Thewaterboarddeviceinthephotographissurroundedbybuckets,withabottleofunknownpink solution (filled two thirds of the way to the top) and a watering can resting on the wooden beams of waterboard. In meetings between the Committee staffand the CIA in the summer of 2013, the CL\ was unable to explain the details of the photograph, to include the buckets, solution, and watering can, as well as the waterboard's presence at DETENTION SITE COBALT.
CIA OIGDisposition Memorandum, "Alleged Useof Unauthorized Interrogation Techniques" OIG Case2004- 7604-IG, December 6, 2006.
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water was being poured on him and one of the interrogators asserted that this was because of the cold temperature of the water. Both of the interrogators also stated that al-Hawsawi saw the waterboard and that its purpose was made clear to hira. The inspector general report also indicates that al-Hawsawi's experience reflected "the way water dousing was done at [DETENTION SITE COBALT]," and that this method was developed with guidance from CIA CTC attorneys and the CIA's Office of Medical Services.^^^
Inuring the same time that al-Hawsawi claimed he was placed on the waterboard in April 2003, a CIA linguist claimed that CIA detainee Abu Hazim had also
been water doused in a way that approximated wate^arding.^^^ a linguist in Country^^HH from H I H I ' ^003, until 2003, told the OIG that;
"when water dousing was used on Abu Hazim, a cloth covered Abu Hazim's face, and [CIA OFFICER 1]] poured cold water directly on Abu Hazim'sfacetodisrupthisbreathing. [Th^ingui^saidthatwhenAbu Hazim turned blue, Physician's Assistant [^H^^|] removed the cloth so that Abu Hazim could breathe."^^'^
allegation was reported to the CIA inspector general on August 18, 2004. The CIA reported this incident as a possible criminal violation on September
CIA OIG Disposition Memorandum, "Alleged Use of Unauthorized Interrogation Techniques" OIG Case 2004- 7604-lG, December 6, 2006.
An accusation related to an additional detainee was included in a September 6, 2012, Human Rights Watch report entitled, "Delivered Into Enemy Hands." The report asserts that documents and interviews of former detainees contradict CIA claims that "only three men in US custody had been waterboarded." Specifically, the report states that Mohammed Shoroeiya, aka Abd al-Karim, "provided detailed and credible testimony that he was waterboarded onrepeatedoccasionsduringUSintenogationsinAfghanistan." Accordingtothereport,MohammedShoroeiya statedthatahoodwasplacedoverhisheadandhewasstrappedtoa"woodenboard." TlieformerCIAdetainee stated that after being strapped to the waterboard, "then they start with the water pouring... They start to pour water to the point where you feel like you are suffocating." As detailed in the full Committe^h^, Mohammed Shoroeiya, aka Abd al-Karim, was rendered to CIA custody at DETENTION SITE on April 2003. Wliile there are no CIA records of Mohammed Shoroeiya, aka Abd al-Karim, being subjected to the waterboard at DETENTION SITE^ | | H , the full nature of the CIMn^ogations at DETENTION SITE remains largelyunknown. DetaineesatDETENTIONSITE|BI|Hi subjectedtotechniquesthatwerenotrecorded in cable traffic, including multiple periods of sleep deprivation, required standing, loud music, sensory deprivation, extendedisolation,reducedquantityandqualityoffood,nudity,and"roughtreatment." Asdescribed^^ol^eIII oftlie Committee Study includes aCIA photograph ofawooden waterboard at DETENTION SITE|m[||||||. As detailed in the full Committee Study, there are no records of the CIA using the waterboard intenogation technique at DETENTION SITE waterboard device in the photograph is surrounded by buckets, with a bottle of unknown pink solution (filled two thirds of tlie way to the top) and a watering can resting on the wooden beams of waterboard. In meetings between the Committee staff and tlie CIA in the summer of 2013, tlie CIA was unable to explain the details ofthe photograpM^nclude the buckets, solution, and watering can, as well as the waterboard's presence at DETENTION SITEI^BB- response to the allegations in the September 2012 Human Rights Watchreport,theCIAstated: "Theagencyhasbeenontherecordthattherearethreesubstantiatedcasesinwhich detaineesweresubjectedtothewaterboardingtechniqueundertheprogram." See"LibyanAllegesWaterboarding by CIA, Report Says," New York Times, September 6, 2012.
CIA IG Disposition Memo, "Alleged Use of Unauthorized Techniques," dated December 6, 2006. 2004-77717- 16.
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10,2004,totheU.S.Attorney'sOfficeintheEasternDistrictofVirginia.^^^ Theinspector general report concluded that there was no corroboration of the linguist's allegation, stating, "[t]here is no evidence that a cloth was placed over Abu Hazim's face during water dousing or that his breathing was impaired.
5. Hambali Fabricates Information While Being Subjected to the CIA's Enhanced Interrogation Techniques
In the summer of 2003, the CIA captured three Southeast Asian operatives: Zubair,^-^ Lillie,^^^ and Hambali. (These captures are discussed later in this
summary in the section entitled, "The Capture of Hambii.")^^^
August 2003, Hambali was captured and transferred to CIA custodyDespite assessments that Hambali was cooperative in the interview process without "the use of more intrusive standard interrogation procedures much less the enhanced measures,"
CIA interrogators requested and obtained approval to use the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques on Hambali approximately a month after his transfer to CIA c u s t o d y I n late 2003, Hambali recanted most of the significant information he had provided to interrogators during the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, recantations CIA officers assessed to be credible.^^^ According to a CIA cable:
CIA IG Disposition Memo, "Alleged Use of Unauthorized Techniques," dated December 6, 2006. 2004-77717- 16.
626 CIAIGDispositionMemo,"AllegedUseofUnauthorizedTechniques,"datedDecember6,2006. 2004-77717-
84854^
87617 impilj^l87426(111223ZAUG03). Lilliewassubjectedtodie
CIA's enhanced inteiTOgation techniques almost immediately upon his anival at DETENTION SITE COBALT, on
August|,2003. H^wa^|strippe^nii^lo^thing,"and"placedinacellinthestandingsleepdeprivationposition,
in darkness." {See 1242 (151914Z AUG 03).) A day later an interrogation plan for
Lillie, including the use oftheCIA^senhancedii^rrogation techniques, was submitted to CIA Headquarters on
August | , 2003. {See 1243 (152049Z AUG 03).) CIA Headquarters approved the use
oftheCIA'senhancedinten-ogati^^ onLillieonthefollowingday,August|,2003. {See
HEADQUARTERS|||m|||(llHHIAUG03).) Asdescribed,theCommittee'scountofdetaineessubjectedto
unauthorized techniques did not include detainees such as Lillie, who were subjected to the CIA's "standard"
techniques prior to authorization from CIA Headquarters, but for whom authorization from CIA Headquarters was
acquiredshortlythereafter. Asnoted,tlieJanuary2003guidelinesrequiredadvanceapprovalofsuchtechniques
1271
The cable also noted that CIA contractor Hammond DUNBAR had arrived at the detention site and was
participatinginHambali'sinterrogationsasaninterrogator. The"psychologicalassessment"portionofthecable was attributed to a CIA staff psychologist, however, and not to DUNBAR.
CIA officers interrogating Hambali in November 2003 wrote about Hambali's "accountof how, through statements read to liim and constant repetition of questions, he was made aware of what type of answers his questionerswanted. [Hambali]saidhemerelygaveanswersthatweresimilartowhatwasbeingaskedandwhathe infened the interrogator or debriefer wanted, and when the pressure subsided or he was told that the information he gave was okay, [Hambali] knew that he had provided the answer that was being sought." The cable states, "Base assesses [Hambali]'s admission of previous fabrication to be credible. [Hambali]'s admission came after three
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"he had provided the false information in an attempt to reduce the pressure on himself ... and to give an account that was consistent with what [Hambali] assessed the questioners wanted to hear."^^^
officers later suggested that the misleading answers and resistance to interrogation that CIA interrogators cited in their requests to use the CIA*s
enhanced interrogation techniques against Hambali and an associated CIA detainee, LilHe, may not have been resistance to interrogation, but rather the result of issues related to culture and their poor English language skills.
6. After the Use of the CIA's Enhanced Interrogation Techniques, CIA Headquarters Questions Detention ofDetainee and Recommends Release; Detainee Transferred to U.S. Military Custody and Heldfor An Additional Four Years
In October 2003, the CIA interrogated Arsala Khan, an Afghan national in his mid-fifties who was believed to have assisted Usama bin Laden in his escape
throughtheToraBoraMountainsinlate2001.^^^ After56hoursofstandingsleepdeprivation, Arsala Khan was described as barely able to enunciate, and being "visibly shaken by his hallucinations depicting dogs mauling and killing his sons and family." According to CIA cables, Arsala Khan "stated that [the interrogator] was responsible for killing them and feeding them to the dogs."^^^
Arsala Khan was subsequently allowed to sleep.^^^ Two days later, however, the interrogators returned him to standing sleep deprivation. After subjecting Khan to
21 additional hours of sleep deprivation, interrogators stopped using the CIA's enhanced
weeksofdailydebriefingsessionswith[tliecaseofficer]carriedoutalmostentirelyinBahasaIndonesia. [Hambali] has consistently waimed to [tlie case officer's] discussions with him, and has provided to [the case officer] additional information that he had avoided in tlie past... More tellingly, [Hambali] has opened up considerably to [the case officer] about his fears and motivations, and has taken to trusting [the case officer] at his word. [Hambali] looks to [the case officer] as his sole confidant and the one person who has [Hambali]'s interest in mind^^J^5e^^
BIH (301055ZNOV03). Tliiscableappearstohavebeenretransmittedthefollowingdayas 1144 (010823Z DEC 03).
®3H|||||11^(301055ZNOV03)
1072 (110606Z OCX 03)^^^^^Bl075(lJ^28Z OCX 03); 1142 (301055Z NOV 03);
(08I459Z DEC 03); 1604 (191232Z JAN 04). After an Indonesian speaker was deployed to debrief Hambali, the debriefer "got the distinct impression [Hambali] was just responding 'yes'inthetypicalIndonesianculturalmannerwhenthey[sic]donotcomprehendaquestion." XheCIAcablethen noted that, "lj]ust to clarify, [the Indonesian speaking debriefer] then posed the same question in Indonesian," and "[w]itliout pause, [Hambah] rephe^witf^direct contradiction, claiming tliat on 20 September 2001, he was in Karachi, not Qandahar." (See 1^75 (111828Z OCX 03).) A January 2004 cable stated that "Lillie is of limited value," adding that "[h]is English is very poor, and we do not have a Malay linguist." See
j ^ m i H 1604 (191232Z JAN 04). See also detainee reviews in Volume III for additional information.
<^3SW ASHINGX0N|
^^^^Hm^^^^^Hl393^01006ZOCX03). Xheinformationwasalsoreleasedin |48122mi^^mi|||. CIA records indicate that the CIA's interrogations ofArsala Khan resulted
inonedisseniinatedintelligencerepo^ derivedfrominformationKhat^roWde^h^a^Mi^j^riencedthe hallucinations. via CIA W ASHINGXON DC <53^^^^^^^^^^Bi3^201006Z OCX03)
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interrogation techniques "[d]ue to lack of information from [Arsala Klian] pinning him directly to a recent a c t i v i t y . T h r e e days after the reporting about Khan's hallucinations, and after the interrogators had already subjected Khan to the additional 21 hours of standing sleep deprivation (beyond the initial 56 hours), CIA Headquarters sent a cable stating that RDG and the Office of Medical Services believed that Arsala Khan should not be subjected to additional standing sleep deprivation beyond the 56 hours because of his hallucinations.^^'^
After approximately a month of detention and the extensive use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques on Arsala Khan, tlie CIA concluded that the
"detaineeArsalaKhandocsnotappeartobethesubjectinvolvedin... currentplansoractivities against U.S. personnel or facilities," and recommended that he be released to his village with a cash payment.^® CIA interrogators at DETENTION SITE COBALT instead transferred him to U.S. military custody, where he was held for an additional four years despite the development of significant intelligence indicating that the source who reported that Arsala Khan had aided Usama bin Laden had a vendetta against Arsala Khan's family.^^
7. A Year After DETENTION SITE COBALT Opens, the CIA Reports "Unsettling Discovery That We Are Holding a Number of Detainees About Whom We Know Very Little "
In the fall of 2003, CIA officers began to take a closer look at the CIA detainees being held in Country raising concerns about both the number and types of
detainees being held by the CIA. CIA officers in Country | provided a list of CIA detainees to CIA Headquarters, resulting in the observation by CIA Headquarters that they had not previously hadthenamesofall44CIAdetaineesbeingheldinthatcountry. AtthedirectionofCIA Headquarters, the Station in Country | "completed an exhaustive search of all available records in an attempt to develop a clearer understanding of the [CIA] detainees." A December 2003 cable from the Station in Country | to CIA Headquarters stated that;
"In the process of this research, we have made the unsettling discovery that we are holding a number of detainees about whom we know very little. The majority of [CIA] detainees in [Country | | have not been debriefed for months and, in some cases, for over a year. Many of them appear to us to have no further intelligence value for [the CIAl and should more properly be turned over to the [U.S. military], to [Country | ] authorities or to third countries for further investigation and possibly prosecution. In a few cases, there does not appear to be enough evidence to continue incarceration, and, if this is in fact the case, the detainees should be released."^^
638
HEADQUARTERS ^0 HEADQUARTERS
' See, for example.
; HEADQUARTERS 1528
;HEADQUARTERS ,^^^^1375
1375
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Records indicate that all of these CIA detainees had been kept in solitary confinement. The vast majority of these detainees were later released, with some
receiving CIA payments for having been held in detention.
8. CIA Detention Sites in Country | Lack Sufficient Personnel and Translators to Support the Interrogations ofDetainees
Throughout 2003, the CIA lacked sufficient personnel and adequate translators to conduct debriefings and interrogations in Counti7 Because of this
personnel shortage, a number of detainees who were transferred to CIA custody were not inten-ogated or debriefed by anyone for days or weeks after their arrival at CIA detention facilities in Country As noted in a cable from the CIA Station in Country | , in April 2003:
I. 1.
"Station is supporting the debriefing and/or interrogation of a lai'ge number of individuals... and is constrained by a lack of personnel which would allow us to fully process them in a timely manner."^^
Other Medical, Psychological, and Behavioral Issues CIA Interrogations Take Precedence Over Medical Care
While CIA Headquarters informed the Department of Justice in July 2002 "that steps will be taken to ensure that [Abu Zubaydah's] injury is not in any way
exacerbated by the use of these [enhanced inteiTogation] methods,"^"^^ CIA Headquarters informed CIA interrogators that the interrogation process would take "precedence" over Abu Zubaydah's medical care.^"^^ Beginning on August 4, 2002, Abu Zubaydah was kept naked, fed a "bare bones" liquid diet, and subjected to the non-stop use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques.^'^® OnAugust15,2002,medicalpersonneldescribedhowAbuZubaydah's interrogation resulted in the "steady deterioration" of his surgical wound from April 2002.^'^^ On
This included S a ^ Habib Zarmein ("a nominal payment"), Modin Nik Mohammed ($H|), and Ali Saeed Awadh ($|HH). See Volume III for additional details.
For detailed information, see V olume III.
36229 (060943Z APR 03). See also detainee reviews for Lillie, Hambali, Mustafa al-
Hawsawi, and Suleiman Abdullah.
See Memorandum for John Rizzo, Acting General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, from Jay Bybee,
Assistant Attorn^ General, Office of Legal Counsel, August 1, 2002, InteiTogation of al Qaeda Operative." ALEC H|B|(18232.1Z JUL 02)
See Abu Zubaydah detainee review in Volume III for additional information, as well as email from:
[REDACTED], to: [REDACTED], subject: 15 Aug Clinical; date: August 15, 2002, at 06:54 AM.
An email to OMS stated: "We are currently providing absolute minimum wound care (as evidenced by the steady deterioration of the wound), [Abu Zubaydah] has no opportunity to practice any form of hygienic self cai*e (he's filtliy), the physical nature of this phase dictates multiple physical stresses (liis reaction to today's activity is I believe the culprit for the superioredgesepara^n), and nutrition is bare bones (six cans ofensure daily)." See email from: [REDACTED], to: H H H U I I and [REDACTED], subject: 15 Aug Clinical; date: August 15, 2002, at 06:54 AM.
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August 20, 2002, medical officers wrote that Abu Zubaydah's wound had undergone "significant" deterioration.^^^ Later, after one of Abu Zubaydah's eyes began to deteriorate,^^' CIA officers requested a test of Abu Zubaydah's other eye, stating that the request was "driven by our intelligence needs vice humanitarian concern for AZ." The cable relayed, "[w]e have a lot riding upon his abihty to see, read and write."^^^
In April 2003, CIA detainees Abu Hazim and Abd al-Karim each broke a foot while trying to escape capture and were placed in c a s t s C I A cables requesting
the use of the CIA's enhanced inten*ogation techniques on the two detainees stated that the interrogators would "forego cramped confinement, stress positions, walling, and vertical shackling (due to [the detainees'] injury)."^^"^ Notwithstanding medical concerns related to the injuries, both of these detainees were subjected to one or more of these CIA enhanced interrogation techniques prior to obtaining CIA Headquarters approval.^^^
I" the case of Abu Hazim, on May 4, 2003, the CIA regional medical officer examined Abu Hazim and recommended that he avoid all weight bearing
activities for an additional five weeks due to his broken foot.^^^ In the case of Abd al-Karim, on April 18, 2003, a CIA physician assistant recommended that al-Karim avoid extended standing for "a couple of weeks."^^^ Six days later, on April 24, 2003, CIA Headquarters reviewed x-rays of al-Karim's foot, diagnosing him with a broken foot, and reconmiending no weight bearing and theuseofcrutchesforatotalofthreemonths.^^^ Despitetheserecommendations,onMay10,
650
10647 (201331Z AUG 02); 10654 (211318Z AUG 02);
AUG 02)
Records indicate that Abu Zubaydah ultimatelylost the eye. See 11026 (070729Z OCT 02).
1^679 (250932Z AUG 02); 11026 (070729Z OCT 02) 44147^^••^H[^^H||^^^Hy6862(m352Z APR03)
36862 APR To accommodate Abu Hazim's and Abd al-Karim's injuries, the cable stated that, rather than being shackled
standing during sleep deprivation, the detainees would be "seated, secured to a cell wall, with intermittent disruptions ofnormal sleeping patterns." For water dousing^he detaineesM^ would be "wrapped in
lastic." The requests were approved. See DIRECTOR DIRECTOR
With regard to Abu Hazim, on April 24, 2003, an additional CIA Headquarters approval cable was sent to DETENTION SITE COBALT authorizing interrogator IH||H|||||||^||||||i to use the attention grasp, facial insult slap, abdominal slap, water dousing, and slee^eprivatwrui^^^io^; the cable did not approve the use of wallingorthefacialhold. (SeeDIRECTORB||| Despitetlielackofapproval,wallingwas used against Abu Hazim on April 28-29, 2003, and the facial hold was used on April 27, 2003.
37411 (291829Z APR 03); 37410 (291828Z APR 03);
37509 (021309^MA^^3V^A May 10,2003, CIA Headquarters cable approved walling and the facial grasp. (SeeDIRECTOR 03).) Abdal-KarimwasalsosubjectedtounapprovedCIA enhanced interrogation techniques that the detention site initially indicated would not be used due to the detainee's injuries. Without approval from CIA Headquarters, CIA interrogators subjected Abd al-Karim to cramped confinement^n^£r^^ 2003; stress positions on Apri^^003^ndwalling on April 21, and 29, 2003. (See
37121 (221703Z APR 03); 37152 (231424Z APR 03);
37202(250948ZAPR03); 37508(021305ZMAY03).) On May 10, 2003, CIA Headquarters approved an expanded list of CIA enhanced interrogation techniques that could be
used against Abd al-KarimJncl^ing walling and stress positions. See DIRECTOR
MAY 03).
DIRECTOR••• DIRECTOR I
MAY 03)
36862 (181352Z APR 03)
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See DIRECTOR
Abd al-Karim. 663
664
39582 (041743Z JUN 03);
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38161 38161
(131326ZMA Y03) (131326ZMA Y03)
MAY03)for AbuHazim;andDIRECTOR|
38365 (170652Z MA Y 03)
Asadallah was also placed in a "small isolation bo^^o^^riinutes^vi^
UNCLASSIFIED
2003, CIA interrogators believed that both Hazim and al-Karim were "strong mentally and physically due to [their] ability to sleep in the sitting position."^^^ On May 12, 2003, a different CIA physician assistant, who had not been involved in the previous examinations determining the need for the detainees to avoid weight bearing, stated that it was his "opinion" that Abu Hazim's and Abd al-Karim's injuries were "sufficiently healed to allow being placed in the standing sleep deprivation position."^^^ He further reported that he had "consulted with [CIA's Office of Medical Services] via secure phone and OMS medical officer concurred in this assessment."^^^ CIAHeadquartersapprovedtheuseofstandingsleepdeprivationagainstboth detainees shortly thereafter.As a result, both detainees were placed in standing sleep deprivation. AbuHazimunderwent52hoursofstandingsleepdeprivationfromJune3-5, 2003,^^^ and Abd al-Karim underwent an unspecified period of standing sleep deprivation on May 15, 2003.^^^
detainee Asadallah was left in the standing sleep deprivation positiondespiteasprainedankle. Later,whenAsadallahwasplacedinstresspositionsonhis
knees, he complained of discomfort and asked to sit. Asadallah was told he could not sit unless he answered questions truthfully
2. CIA Detainees Exhibit Psychological and Behavioral Issues
Psychological and behavioral problems experienced by CIA detainees, who were held in austere conditions and in solitary confinement, also posed
38262 (150541Z MA Y 03);
38161 (13I326Z MA Y 03)
MAY 03) for |39656(060955Z JUN 03)
authorizatior^n^ithoiit discussion of how the technique would affect hisankl^(5^^|H[^^^^^^^^^^^^4098
34294 34nO^|HB|iH.) While CIA records contain information on other detainee medical complaints (see Volume III), those records also suggest that detainee medical complaints could be underreported in CIA medical records. For example, CIA medicalrecordsconsistentlyreportthatCIAdetaineeRamzibinal-Shibhhadnomedicalcomplaints. However, CIA interrogation records indicate that when bin al-Shibh had previously complained of ailments to CIA personnel, he was subjected to the CIA's enhanced intenogationtechniques and told by CIA inte^ogators that liis medical conditionwasnotofconcerntotheCIA. (5ee|H|HH10591(252002ZFEB03);m[||p|||10627(281949Z FEB03).) IntestimonyonApril12,2007,CIADirectorMichaelHaydenreferencedmedicalcareofdetaineesin the context of the ICRC report on CIA detentions. Hayden testified to the Committee; "The medical section of the ICRC report concludes that the association of CIA medical officers witli the intenogation program is 'contrary to international standaids of medical ethics.' That is just wrong. Tlie role of CIA medical officers in tlie detainee programisandalwayshasbeenandalwayswillbetoensurethesafetyandthewell-beingofthedetainee. The placement of medical officers during the interrogation techniques represents an extra measure of caution. Our medicalofficersdonotrecommendtheemploymentorcontinuationofanyproceduresortechniques. Theallegation in the report that a CIA medical officer threatened a detainee, stating that medical care was conditional on cooperationisblatantlyfalse. Healthcarehasalwaysbeenadministeredbasedupondetaineeneeds. It'sneither policynorpracticetolinkmedicalcaretoanyotheraspectofthedetaineeprogram." Thistestimonywas incongruent with CIA records.
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See, for example, 1716(180742Z SEP 04).
See, for example, 1959(111700Z DEC 04);
2474 (251622ZJUN 05);
1356 (011644Z JUL 04);
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management challenges for the For example, later in his detention, Ramzi bin al-Shibh exhibited behavioral and psychological problems, including visions, paranoia, insomnia, and attempts at self-harm.^^^ CIA psychologists linked bin al-Shibh's deteriorating mental state to his isolation and inability to cope with his long-term detention.^^^ Similarly, 'Abd al-Rahim al- Nashiri's unpredictable and disruptive behavior in detention made him one of the most difficult detaineesfortheCIAtomanage. Al-Nashiriengagedinrepeatedbelligerentacts,including throwing his food tray,^^^ attempting to assault detention site personnel,and trying to damage itemsinhiscell.^^^ Overaperiodofyears,al-NashiriaccusedtheCIAstaffofdruggingor poisoninghisfoodandcomplainedofbodilypainandinsomnia.^^^ Asnoted,atonepoint,al- Nashiri launched a short-lived hunger strike, and the CIA responded by force feeding him rectally.^^^ AnOctober2004psychologicalassessmentofal-NashiriwasusedbytheCIAto advance its discussions with National Security Council officials on establishing an "endgame" for the program.^^'^ In July 2005, CIA Headquarters expressed concern regarding al-Nashiri's "continuedstateofdepressionanduncooperativeattitude."^"^^ DayslateraCIApsychologist assessed that al-Nashiri was on the "verge of a breakdown."^^^
Beginning in March 2004, and continuing until his rendition to U.S. military custody at Guantanamo Bay in September 2006, Majid Khan engaged in a series of
hunger strikes and attempts at self-mutilation that required significant attention from CIA detention site personnel. In response to Majid Khan's hunger strikes, medical personnel
Foradditional details, see Volume III.
• • • • 1759 (0213I9ZQCT04);HEADQUARTERSl|^Hm40023ZNOV05);|
(171225Z NOV 04); (140915Z NOV 04); (06I620Z DEC 04);
2207(1113I9Z APR 05)I^^^Hl2210a^7Z APR05)~|^|H2535 (051805Z JUL05);
^ ^ • • ^ 9 (120857ZJUL05)n^^^|2830 (29I304Z AUG 05); 1890 (171225Z NOV 040r^^B^^^^893^00831Z NOV 04); CIA document entitled, "Detainee Talking Points for ICRC Rebuttal, 12 April2007T||^BIB2210(141507Z APR 05); •^^••25^(051805Z JUL 05); 2210 (141507Z APR05)r^H|||[B225 (051805Z J U L 0 5 ) I ^ B | | 2830 (291304Z AUG 05);
1930 (061620Z DEC 2210 (141507Z APR 05)
2210(141507Z APR 05);
1691 (081609Z SEP04); 05); 2023 (151735Z JAN 05);
(282019Z NOV 03)
1029 (291750Z JUN 06);
17I6(180742Z SEP 04);
2535 (051805ZJUL05);
1_716(180742Z SEP 04); 2515 (301946Z JUN 05);
1_142 (041358Z AUG 06); 3051 (301235Z SEP 05);
2830 (29i304Z AUG
1998 (020752Z JAN 1150
1543 (111600Z AUG04); 1029 (291750Z JUN 06)
1959 (111700Z DEC 04); 2038 (211558ZJAN05)^^^BPHIHi 1091 (031835Z NOV 03);
1266 (052309Z JAN 04); ^••••|^HT63?(271^0Z MAR 04). 1^11^^^11203(231709ZMAY04)7^^H^U1202(231644ZMAY04). CIArecordsindicatethatat
least five detainees were subjected to rectal rehydration or rectal feeding; Abu Zubaydah, Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri, Khalid Shaykh MohammadjMaiid^ and Marwan al-Jabbur. See Volume III for additional details.
Email from; ••••••; to: [DETENTIONSITEBLACK|j|Hcc: subject: InteiTogator Assessments/Request for Endgame Views; date: October 30, 2004.
HEADQUARTERS ^^1(282217Z JUL 05)
CIA Sametime exchange, dated 29/JUL/05 08:01:51 - 08:50:13; between
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implemented various techniques to provide fluids and nutrients, including the use of a nasogastric tube and the provision of intravenous fluids. CIA records indicate that Majid Khan cooperated with the feedings and was permitted to infuse the fluids and nutrients himself.^^^ After approximately three weeks, the CIA developed a more aggressive treatment regimen "without unnecessary conversation."^^^ Majid Khan was then subjected to involuntary rectal feeding and rectal hydration, which included two bottles of Ensure. Later that same day, Majid Khan's "lunch tray," consisting of hunmius, pasta with sauce, nuts, and raisins, was "pureed"
and rectally infused.®^^ Additional sessions of rectal feeding and hydration followed.^^^ In addition to his hunger strikes, Majid Klian engaged in acts of self-harm that included attempting to cut his wrist on two occasions,^^^ an attempt to chew into his arm at the inner elbow,^^^ an attempt to cut a vein in the top of his foot,^^^ and an attempt to cut into his skin at the elbow joint using a filed toothbrush.^^"^
J. The CIA Seeks Reaffirmation of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program in 2003
1. Administration Statements About the Humane Treatment ofDetainees Raise Concerns at the CIA About Possible Lack ofPolicy Supportfor CIA Interrogation Activities
On several occasions in early 2003, CIA General Counsel Scott Muller expressed concern to the National Security Council principals, White House staff, and
Department of Justice personnel that the CIA's program might be inconsistent with public statements from the Administration that the U.S. Government's treatment of detainees was "humane."^^^ CIAGeneralCounselMullerthereforesoughttoverifywithWhiteHouseand Department of Justice personnel that a February 7, 2002, Presidential Memorandum requiring the U.S. military to treat detainees humanely did not apply to the CIA.^^^ Following those
3183(161626ZSEP 04); 3190(181558ZSEP 04); H 3197 (201731ZSEP04);
m35 (120625Z SEP04);
n 3237 (230552Z SEP 04) 3240 (231839ZSEP04)
3184(161628ZSEP04); 3196 (201731ZSEP 04); 3206 (211819ZSEP 04); 3181 (161621ZSEP04)
13259(261734ZSEP04). TheCIA'sJune2013Responsestatesthat"rectal rehydration"isa"wellacknowledgedmedicaltechniquetoaddresspressinghealthissues." Afollow-upCIA
document provided on October 25,2013 (DTS #2013-3152), states that "[fjrom a health perspective, Majid Klian became uncooperative on 31 August 2004, when he initiated a hunger strike and before he underwent rectal rehydration... CIA assesses that the use of rectal rehydration is a medically sound hydration technique...." Tlie assertionthatMajidKhanwas"uncooperative"priortorectalrehydrationandrectalfeedingisinaccurate. As described in CIA records, prior to being subjected to rectal rehydration and rectal feeding, Majid Khan cooperated with the nasogastric feedings and was pennitted to infuse the fluids and nutrients himself.
3694 (301800Z NOV 04); 4242 (191550Z MAR 05); [4250 (221213Z MAR 05)
n 3724 (031723Z DEC 04)
3835 (260659Z DEC 04) 14614 (071358Z JUN 05)
Febmary 12,2003, MFR from Scott Muller, Subject: "Humane" treatment of CIA detainees; March 7, 2003, Memorandum for DDCIA from Muller, Subject: Proposed Response to Human Rights Watch Letter.
January 9, 2003, Draft Memorandum for Scott Mueller [sic], General Counsel of the Central Intelligence Agency, from John C. Yoo, Deputy Assistant AttorneyGeneral^Offic^^^ga^o^^ re: Application ofthe President's
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discussions in early 2003, the White House press secretary was advised to avoid using the term "humane treatment" when discussing the detention of al-Qa'ida and Taliban personnel.^^^
In mid-2003, CIA officials also engaged in discussions with the Department of Justice, the Department of Defense, and attorneys in the White House on whether
representations could be made that the U.S. Government complied with certain requirements arising out of the Convention Against Torture, namely that the treatment of detainees was consistent with constitutional standards in the Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments.In late June 2003, after numerous inter-agency discussions, William Haynes, the general counsel of the Department of Defense, responded to a letter from Senator Patrick Leahy stating that it was U^Sjolicytocompl^witl^hes^tantods.^^^ AccordingtoamemorandumfromtheCIA's H^BcTC Legal, August 1, 2002, OLC opinion provided alegal "safe harbor" for the CIA's use of its enhancedinterrogation techniques.The August 1, 2002, opinion did not, however, address the constitutional standards described in the letter from William Haynes.
In July 2003, after the White House made a number of statements again suggesting that U.S. treatment of detainees was "humane," the CIA asked the national
security advisor for policy reaffirmation of the CIA's use of its enhanced interrogation techniques. During the time that request was being considered, CIA Headquarters stopped approving requests from CIA officers to use the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques.^^' Because of this stand-down, CIA interrogators, with CIA Headquarters approval, instead used repeated applications of the CIA's "standard" interrogation techniques. These "standard" techniques were coercive, but not considered to be as coercive as the CIA's "enhanced" interrogationtechniques. Atthistime,sleepdeprivationbeyond72hourswasconsideredan
February 7, 2002, Memorandum on the Geneva Convention (HI) of 1949 to the Release of an al Qaeda Detainee to theCustodyoftheCIA. Thememorandumstatedthatneitheral-Qa'idanorTalibandetaineesqualifiedasprisoners of war under Geneva, and that Common Article 3 of Geneva, requiring humane treatment of individuals in a conflict, did not apply to al-Qa'ida or Taliban detainees
March 18, 2003, Memorandum for the Record from Subject: meeting with DOJ and NSC Legal Adviser.
See, for example, March 18, 2003, email firom: H H I H H H ; to: Scott Muller; subject: Memorandum for the Record - Telcoi^itl^LC^^: March 13, 2003^mailft2mj^ott W. Muller; to: Stanley M. Moskowitz, John H. Moseman; cc: HjH^H^^H^oht^. Rizzo, subject: Interrogations; date: April 1,2003, at 1:18:35 PM; emailfromT^^^^^^H; to: Scott Muller; cc: John Rizzo, [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED]; subject: Black letter law on Interrogations; Legal Principles Applicable to CIA Detention and Interrogation of Captured Al-Qa'ida Personnel; date: April 17, 2003.
June 25, 2003, Letter from William J. Haynes, II, General Counsel of the Department of Defense to Patrick Leahy, United States Senate.
June 30, 2003, Memorandum for the Record from Subject: White House Meeting on Enhanced Techniques (DTS #200^659)^^^^^
See, for example, email fi-om: to: [REDACTED] and [REDACTED]; subject: FYI - Draft Paragraphs for the DCI on the Legal Issues on Interrogation, as requested by the General Counsel; date: March 14, 2003; June 26, 2003, Statement by the President, United Nations International Day in Support of Victims of Torture, http://www.whitehouse.gOv/news/releases/2003/06/20030626-3.htm; email from: John Rizzo; to: John Moseman,
|; cc: Buzzy Krongard, Scott Muller, William Harlow; subject: Today's Washington Post Piece on Administration Detainee Policy; date: June 27, 2003; July 3, 2003, Memorandum for National Security Advisor from Directorof Central Intelligence George J. Tenet, Subject: Reaffirmation of the Central Intelligence Agency's Interrogation Program.
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"enhanced" interrogation technique, while sleep deprivation under 72 hours was defined as a "standard" CIA interrogation technique. To avoid using an "enhanced" interrogation technique, CIA officers subjected Khallad bin Attash to 70 hours of standing sleep deprivation, two hours less than the maximum. After allowing him four hours of sleep, bin Attash was subjected to an additional 23 hours of standing sleep deprivation, followed immediately by 20 hours of seated sleep deprivation.^^^
Unlike during most of the CIA's interrogation program, during the time that CIA Headquarters was seeking policy reaffirmation, the CIA responded to infractions
in the interrogation program as reported through CIA cables and other communications. Although H m m , the chief of the intenrogations program in RDG, does not appear to have been investigated or reprimanded for training interrogators on the abdominal slap before its use was approved,training significant numbers of new inten-ogators to conduct interrogations on potentially compliant detainees,or conducting large numbers of water dousing on detainees without requesting or obtaining authorizationthe CIA removed his certification to conduct interrogations in late July 2003 for placing a broom handle behind the knees of a detainee while thatdetaineewasinastressposition.^^^ CIAHeadquartersalsodecertifiedtwoother interrogators, [CIA OFFICER 1] and H I H H H ' period, although there are no official records of why those decertifications occun*ed.^^^
2. The CIA Provides Inaccurate Information to Select Members of the National Security Council, Represents that "Termination ofThis Program WillResult in Loss ofLife, Possibly Extensive Policymakers Reauthorize Program
^003, DCI Tenet and CIA General Counsel Muller attended a meeting with Vice President Cheney, National Security Advisor Rice, Attorney
General Ashcroft, and White House Counsel Gonzales, among others, seeking policy
Bin Attash has one leg, which swelled during standing sleep deprivation, resulting in the transitionto seated sleep deprivation. He was also subjected to nudity and dietary manipulationduring this period. See 12371
(212J21Z JUL 03); 12385 (222045Z JUL 03); and 12389 (232040Z JUL 03). 693 Training and Curriculum, November 2, 2002, at 17.
694 Training and Curriculum, November 2, 2002, at 17.
See, for example, 10168 (092130^A^^nterview Report, 2003-7123-IG, Review of InteiTogations for Countertenorism Puq^oses, 2003; CIA Office of Inspector General, Special Review: Countertenorism Detention and Inten'ogation Activities(Septei^^ - October 2003) (2003- 7123-IG), MayJ7^2004jHM| 10168 (092130ZJAN03)J||||||||i|^^ 340981
|M179£62200ZFEB 03)^^^^^^^^^^H34294|
34310 |^^^^^^^^H^757 (101742ZMAR03);
135025 (16132IZ MAR 03).
April 7,2005, BriefingforBlueRibbonPai^^ Renditio^ Detention, and Interrogation Programs at22;
Memorandum for C h i e f , | | | m m | | | | m i | | | B | , via CTC Legal from Cliief, CTC/RDG, July 28, 2003, Subject: Decertification of former Interrogator. Document not signed by b e c a u s e h e w a s " n o t available for signature."
See Memorandum for Chief, via ICTCLegalfromChief,CTC/RDG,July 28, 2003, Subject: Decertification of former Intenogator, signed by [CIA OFFICER 1] on July 29, 2003; and April 7, 2005, Briefing for Blue Ribbon Panel: CIA Rwjdition, Detention, and Interrogation Programs at 22; Memorandum for Chief, H j j j H H U H i H H ' H H Legal from Chief, CTC/RDG, July 28, 2003, Subject: Decertification of former Intenogator.
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reaffirmation of its coercive interrogation program. The presentation included a list of the CIA's standardandenhancedinterrogationtechniques. CIAGeneralCounselMulleralsoprovideda description of the waterboard inten'ogation technique, including the inaccurate representation thatithadbeenusedagainstKSM119timesandAbuZubaydah42times.^^^ Thepresentation warned National Security Council principals in attendance that "termination of this program will result in loss of life, possibly extensive." The CIA officers further noted that 50 percent of CIA intelligence reports on al-Qaida were derived from detainee reporting, and that "major threats were countered and attacks averted" because of the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. TheCIAprovidedspecificexamplesof"attacksaverted"asaresultofusingthe CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, including references to the U.S. Consulate in Karachi, theHeathrowPlot,theSecondWavePlot,andlymanFaris,^^^ Asdescribedlaterinthis summary, and in greater detail in Volume 11, these claims were inaccurate. After the CIA's presentation, Vice President Cheney stated, and National Security Advisor Rice agreed, that the CIA was executing Administration policy in carrying out its interrogation program.^®®
The National Security Council principals at the July 2003 briefing initially concluded it was "not necessary or advisable to have a full Principals Committee
meetingtoreviewandreaffirmtheProgram."''®^ ACIAemailnotedthattheofficialreasonfor not having a full briefing was to avoid press disclosures, but added that:
"it is clear to us from some of the runup meetings we had with [White House] Counsel that the [White House] is extremely concerned [Secretary of State]
CIA records indicate that KSM received at least 183 applications of the waterboard technique, and that Abu Zubaydalireceivedatleast83applicationsofthewaterboardtechnique. InApril2003,CIAInspectorGeneralJohn HelgersonaskedGeneralCounselScottMullerabouttherepetitioususeofthewaterboard. InearlyJune2003, White House Counsel Alberto Gonzales and the Vice President's Counsel, David Addington, who were aware of the inspectorgeneral's concerns,asked Mullerwhether the numberof waterboard repetitions had been too high in light oftlieOLCguidance. ThisquestionpromptedMullertoseekinformationontheuseofthewaterboardonAbu Zubaydah and KSM. (See interview of Scott Muller, by [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED] and [REDACTED], Office of the Inspector General, August 20, 2003; and email from: Scott Muller; to: John Rizzo; cc:
[REDACTED], • • • • 1 , [REDACTED]; subject: "Report from Gitmotrip(Notproofread,asusual)";date:June|,2003,05:47PM.) AsMullertoldtheOIG,hecouldnotkeepup
withcabletrafficfromCIAdetaineeinterrogationsandinsteadreceivedmonthlybriefings. AccordingtoOIG records of the interview, Muller "said he does not know specifically how [CIA guidelines on intenogations] changed because he does not get that far down into the weeds," and "each detainee is different and those in the field have somelatitude." (SeeinterviewofScottMuller,OfficeoftheInspectorGeneral,August20,2003.)Despitethis record and others detailed in the full Committee Study, the CIA's June 2013 Response asserts that the CIA's "confinement conditions and treatment of high profile detainees like Abu Zubaydah were closely scrutinized at all levels of management from the outset."
August5, 2003 Memorandum for the Record from Scott Muller, Subject: Review of Interrogation Program on 29 July 2003; Briefing slides, CIA Interrogation Program, July 29, 2003.
August 5, 2003, Memorandum for the Record from Scott Muller, Subject: Review of the Interrogation Progr am on 29 July 2003. A briefing slide describing the "Pros" and "Cons" associated with the program listed the following under the heading "Con": (1) "Blowback due to public perception of 'humane treatment,'" (2) "ICRC continues to attack USG policy on detainees," and (3) "Congressional inquiries continue." See Volume n for additional details.
August5, 2003,Memorandum for theRecord from ScottMuller, Subject: Review of Interrogation Program,July 29, 2003.
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Powell would blow his stack if he were to be briefed on what's been going
"702 on.
National Security Advisor Rice, however, subsequently decided that Secretary of State Colin Powell and Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld should be
briefedontheCIAinterrogationprogrampriortorecertificationofthecovertaction^^^ As described, both were then formally briefed on the CIA program for the first time in a 25 minute briefing on September 16, 2003
On September 4, 2003, CIA records indicate that CIA officials may have provided Chairman Roberts, Vice Chairman Rockefeller, and their staff directors a briefing
regarding the Administration's reaffirmation of the program^®^ Neither the CIA nor the Committee has a contemporaneous report on the content of the briefing or any confirmation that the briefing occurred.
K. Additional Oversight and Outside Pressure in 2004: ICRC, Inspector General, Congress, and the U.S. Supreme Court
1. ICRC Pressure Leads to Detainee Transfers; Department ofDefense Official Informs the CIA that the U.S. Government "Should Not Be in the Position of Causing People to Disappear"; the CIA Provides Inaccurate Information on CIA Detainee to the Department ofDefense
f^N¥) InJanuary2004,theICRCsentaletterto|
indicating that it was aware that the United States Government was holding
unacknowledged detainees in several facilities in Country | "incommunicado for extensive periods of time, subjected to unacceptable conditions of internment, to ill treatment and torture, whiledeprivedofanypossiblerecourse."^''^ AccordingtotheCIA,theletterincludeda"fairly complete list" of CIA detainees to whom the ICRC had not had access.^^^ This prompted CIA Headquarters to conclude that it was necessary to reduce the number of detainees in CIA custody TheCIAsubsequentlytransferredatleast25ofitsdetaineesinCountry| tothe U.S. military and foreign governments. The CIA also released five detainees.^^^
Email from; John Rizzo; to: subject: Rump PC on interrogations; date: July 3J, 2003.
August 5,2003, Memorandum for the Record from Scott Muller, Subject: Review of Interrogation Program, July 29, 2003.
September 26,2003, CIA Memorandum for the Record from Muller, Subject: CIA Intenogation Program. September 4, 2003, CIA Memorandum for the Record, Subject: Member Briefing
January 6, 2004, Letter from |
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Details in June 13, 2005, Letter to ICRC, responding to 2004 ICRC note verbale.
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(TS/^|||||||||[|||H||||||/^^) The CIA provided afactually incorrect description to the Department of Defense concerning one of the 18 CIA detainees transferred to U.S. military custody in March 2004. The transfer letter described CIA detainee Ali Jan as "the most tmsted bodygua^f Jaluluddin Haqqani (a top AQ target of the USG)" who was capUired in the village of oi^un^H, 2002.^^^ Although there was an individual named Ali Jan captured in the village of on June 2002^^^CIArccords indicate that he was not the detainee being held by the CIA in the Country facility. The Ali Jan in CIA custody was apprehended circa early August 2003, during the U.S. military operation in ZormatValley,PaktiaProvince,Afghanistan.'^^^ CIArecordsindicatethatAliJanwas transferred to CIA custody after his satellite phone rang while he was in military custody, and the translatorindicatedthecallerwasspeakinginArabic.^^^ AfterhistransfertoU.S.military custody, Ali Jan was eventually released on July I, 2004.^^4
In response to the ICRC's formal complaint about detainees being kept in Country | without ICRC access. State Department officials met with senior ICRC
officials in Geneva, and indicated that it was U.S. policy to encourage all countries to provide ICRC access to detainees, including Country While the State Department made these official representations to the ICRC, the CIA was repeatedly directing the same country to deny the ICRC access to the CIA detainees. In June 2004, the secretary of state ordered the U.S. ambassador in that countr^^eliverademarche, "in essence demanding [the country] provide full access to all [country detainees," which included detainees being held at the CIA's behest.^These conflicting messages from the United States Government, as well as increased ICRC pressure on the country for failing to provide access, created significant tension between the United States and the country in question.^^^
that year, in advance of a National Security Council Principals Committee meeting on September 14, 2004, officials from the Department of Defense
called the CIA to inform the CIA that Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz would not support the CIA's position that notifying the ICRC of all detainees in U.S. Government custody wouldharmU.S.nationalsecurity. AccordingtoaninternalCIAemailfollowingthecall,the deputy secretary of defense had listened to the CIA's arguments for nondisclosure, but believed thatitwastimeforfullnotification. TheemailstatedthattheDepartmentofDefensesupported the U.S. Government's position that there should be full disclosure to the ICRC, unless there were compelling reasons of military necessity or national security. The email added that the
March 4, 2004, Letter from Jose Rodriguez, Director, DCI Counterterrorist Center to Thomas O'Connell, Assistant Secretary of Defense. Special Operations/Low Intensity Conflict.
'
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issued ademarche to the U.S. in 2004^Sgg^^BB||^BmB|^M 2274
92037, and 93291
For more information, see V olume I. III! IMil I
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Department of Defense did not believe an adequate articulation of military necessity or national security reasons warranting nondisclosure existed, that "DoD is tired of 'taking hits' for CIA 'ghost detainees,'" and that the U.S. government "should not be in the position of causing people to 'disappear.
Despite numerous meetings and communications within the executive branch throughout 2004, the United States did not formally respond to the January 6,
2004, ICRC letter until June 13, 2005.^^^
2. CIA Leadership Calls Draft Inspector General Special Review of the Program "Imbalanced and Inaccurate," Responds with Inaccurate Information; CIA Seeks to
Limit Further Review of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program by the Inspector General
The CIA's Office of the Inspector General (OIG) was first informed of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program in November 2002, nine months
after Abu Zubaydah became the CIA's first detainee. As described, the information was conveyedbytheDDO,whoalsoinformedtheOIGofthedeathofGulRahman. InJanuary 2003, the DDO further requested that the OIG investigate allegations of unauthorized inten'ogationtechniquesagainst'Abdal-Rahimal-Nashiri. Separately,theOIG"received information that some employees were concerned that certain covert Agency activities at an overseas detention and interrogation site might involve violations of human rights," according to the OIG's Special Review.^^®
During the course of the OIG's interviews, numerous CIA officers expressed concerns about the CIA's lack of preparedness for the detention and interrogation of
AbuZubaydah.^^^ OtherCIAofficersexpressedconcernabouttheanalyticalassumptions driving interrogations,^^- as well as the lack of language and cultural background among
Email from: [REDACTED]; to: John Rizzo, [REDACTED]; cc: [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], Jose Rodriguez, John P. Mudd, [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED]; subject: DoD's position on ICRC notification; date: September 13, 2004.
June 13, 2005, Letter to ICRC, responding to 2004 ICRC note verbale.
Special Review, Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Activities (September 2001 - October 2003) (2003-7123-IG), 7 May 2004, (DTS #2004-2710).
The chief of Station in the country that hosted the CIA's first detention site told the OIG that "[t]he Reports Officers did not know what was required of them, analysts were not knowledgeable of the target, translators were not native Arab speakers, and at least one ofthe [chiefs ofBase] had limited fielc^xperience/\^e Interview report of [REDACTED], Office of the Inspector General, May 20, 2003. According to of CTC Legal, there was no screening procedure in place for officers assigned to DETENTION SITE GREEN. See interview of
b^REDACTED^md [REDACTED, Office ofthe Inspector General, February 14, 2003. See also interview of | | | | H H H H I i H ' Office ofthe Inspector General, March 24,2003.
In addition to the statements to the OIG describe^bove^eg^ing the interrogation ofAbu Zubaydah, CIA officersexpressedmoregeneralconcerns. As noted,theassumptionsatCIAHeadquartersthat Abu Zubaydah "knew everything about Al-Qa'ida, including details ofthe nex^ttack^Jjeflect^iow "the 'Analyst vs. Interrogator' issue ha[d] been around from 'day one.'" {See interview of Office of the InspectorGeneral,February27,2003.) AccordingtoChiefofInteiTogations^H^H^HTsu^ctmatterexperts often provided interrogation requirements that were "not valid or well thought out," providing the example of Mustafaal-Hawsawi. (Seeinterviewofj^^^^^^H^ffic^^h^iTspecto^eneral,April7,2003.) SeniorCIA
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members of the interrogation teams7^^ Some CIA officers described pressure from CIA Headquarters to use the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, which they attributed to faulty analyticalassumptionsaboutwhatdetaineesshouldknow.^^"^ AsthechiefofRDG,
|, stated to the OIG in a February 2003 interview:
"CTC does not know a lot about al-Qa'ida and as a result, Headquarters analyst^a^ constructed 'models' ofwhat al-Qa'ida represents to them.
noted that the Agency does not have the linguists or subject matter experts it needs. The questions sent from CTC/Usama bin Laden (UBL) to the interrogators are based on SIGINT [signals intelligence] and other intelligence that often times is incomplete or wrong. When the detainee does not respond to the question, the assumption at Headquarters is that the detainee is holding back and 'knows' more, and consequently. Headquarters recommends resumption of EITs. This difference of opinion between the interrogators and Headquarters as to whether the detainee is 'compliant' is the type of ongoing pressure the interrogation team is exposed to.
believes the waterboard was used 'recklessly' - 'too many times' on Abu Zubaydah at [DETENTION SITE GREEN], based in pai't on faulty intelligence."^-^
interrogator toldtheOIG thatinterrogators "suffered from a lackof substantive requirements from CIA Headqu^te^" and that "in every case so far, Headquarters' model ofwhat the detainee should know is flawed." told the OIG that "I do not want to beat a man up based on what Headquarters says he should know," commenting that, "I want my best sho^i^ometfiing he (the detainee) knows, not a fishing expedition on things he should know." (See interview of Office of the Inspector General, April 30, 2003.) Two interviewees told the OIG tha^jequirem^ts were sometimes based on inaccurate or improperly translated intercepts. 5e^ntervi^ ofinterrogator Office ofthe Inspector General, March 24, 2003; Interview of|_
[former chief of Station in the country that hosted the CIA's first detention site]. Office of the Inspector General, May 29, 2003.
One interviewee noted that several interrogators with whom he had worked insisted on conducting inteiTogations inEnglishtodemonstratetheirdominanceoverthedetainee. (Seeintei-viewreportof Officeof theInspector General, Maich17, 2003.) TheCIA'sJune 2013 Response acknowledges that"[t]heprogram continued to face challenges in identifying sufficient, qualified staff~ particularly language-quahfied personnel -- as requirements impose^^Agen^ involvement in Iraq increased."
According t o ] | ^ | ^ H | | ^ m | of CTC Legal, "[t]he seventh floor [CIA leadership] can complicate tlie process because ofthemindsetthatinterrogations arethesilverbullet[andCIAleadership is] expecting immediate results." (Se^ntCTviewof||^m||H|[|,OfficeoftheInspectorGeneral,February14,2003.) SeniorIntenogatorijjH
provided the example of Khallad bin Attash, who, he told the OIG, was determined by the chief of Base at DETENTIO>^IT^^UEnotto"warrant"theCIA'senhancedintenogationtechniques. Accordingto||^||^|, debriefer called ALEC Station and told them to "go to the mat" in advocating for the use of the CIA's enhancedinterroptiontechniques,claimingthatbinAttashwasholdingbackinformation. (Seeinterviewof
I Office ofthe Inspector General, April 30, 2003.) described the "inherent tension that occasionally exists between officers at the interrogation facilities and those at Headquarters who view the detainee^r^ithholdinginformation." providedtheexampleof^uYassiral-Jaza'iri. (Seeinterview of Office of the Inspector General, May 8, 2003.) alsodescribed disagreements on whether to subjectdetaineesto the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques as a "field versus Headquarters issue." (Seeinterviewof OfficeoftheInspectorGeneral,August18,2003.) Asdescribed,intervieweesalso described pressur^ron^I^Ieadquarters related tothe interrogations ofKSM and Abu Zubaydah.
Interview of Office of the Inspector General, February 21, 2003.
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senior interrogator, informed the OIG that differences between CIA Headquarters and the interrogators at the CIA detention sites were not
partoftheofficialrecord. Accordingto "allofthefightingandcriticismisdoneover the phone and is not put into cables," and that CIA "[cjables reflect things that are 'all rosy.'"^^^
As is described elsewhere, and reflected in the final OIG Special Review, CIA officers discussed numerous other topics with the OIG, including conditions at
DETENTION SITE COBALT, specific inteiTogadons, the video taping of interrogations, the administration of the program, and concerns about the lack of an "end game" for CIA detainees, as well as the impact of possible public revelations concerning the existence and operadon of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Progi-amJ-^
In January 2004, the CIA inspector general circulated for comment to various offices within the CIA a draft of the OIG Special Review of the CIA's Detention and
InterrogationProgram. Amongothermatters,theOIGSpecialReviewdescribeddivergences between the CIA's enhanced inteiTogation techniques as applied and as described to the Department of Justice in 2002, the use of unauthorized techniques, and oversight problems related to DETENTION SITE COBALT. The draft OIG Special Review elicited responses from the CIA's deputy director for operations, the deputy director for science and technology, the Office of General Counsel, and the Office of Medical Services. Several of the responses— particularly those from CIA General Counsel Scott Muller and CIA Deputy Director for Operations James Pavitt—were highly critical of the inspector general's draft Special Review. General Counsel Muller wrote that the OIG Special Review presented "an imbalanced and inaccurate picture of the Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Program," and claimed the OIG Special Review, "[o]n occasion," "quoted or summarized selectively and misleadingly" fromCIAdocuments.^^^ DeputyDirectorforOperationsJamesPavittwrotethattheOIG Special Review should have come to the "conclusion that our efforts have thwarted attacks and saved lives," and that "EITs (including the water board) have been indispensable to our successes." Pavitt attached to his response a document describing information the CIA obtained "as a result of the lawful use of EITs" that stated, "[t]he evidence points clearly to the fact that without the use of such techniques, we and our allies would [have] suffered major terrorist
Interview of^^H^H||||||||||, Office ofthe Inspector General, April 30, 2003.
DDO Pavitt described possible public revelations related to the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program as "the CIA's worst nightmare." Interviewof James Pavitt,Officeof the InspectorGeneral, September21, 2003. AccordingtoOIGrecordsofaninterview withDCITenet,"Tenetbelievesthatifthegeneralpublicweretofindout aboutthisprogram,manywouldbelievewearetorturers." Tenetadded,however,thathis"onlypotentialmoral
di lemma would be if more Americans die at the hands of teiTorists and we had someone in our custody who possessedinformationthatcouldhavepreventeddeaths,butwehadnotobtainedsuchinformation." Seeinterview of GeorgeTenet, Officeof the InspectorGeneral,memorandum dated,September8, 2003.
See CIA Memorandum from Scott W. Muller, General Counsel, to Inspector General re Interrogation Program Special Review, dated February 24, 2004 (200^12MG^^^^^^^^^^^
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attacks involving hundreds, if not thousands, of casiialties."^-^ A review of CIA records found that the representations in the Pavitt materials were almost entirely inaccurateJ^^
addition to conveying inaccurate information on the operation, management, and effectiveness of the CIA program, CIA leadership continued to impede the
OIG in its efforts to oversee the program. In July 2005, Director Goss sent a memorandum to the inspector general to "express several concerns regarding the in-depth, multi-faceted review" of theCIA'sCTC. TheCIAdirectorwrotethathewas"increasinglyconcernedaboutthe cumulative impact of the OIG's work on CTC's performance," adding that "I believe it makes sense to complete existing reviews... before opening new ones." Director Goss added, "[t]o my knowledge, Congress is satisfied that you are meeting its requirements" with regard to the CIA's DetentionandInterrogationProgram.^^^ Atthetime,however,thevicechairmanoftheSenate Select Committee on Intelligence was seeking a Committee investigation of the CIA program, in part because of the aspects of the program that were not being investigated by the Office of Inspector General.^^^ In April 2007, CIA Director Michael Hayden had his "Senior Councilor"—an individual within the CIA who was accountable only to the CIA director— conduct a review of the inspector general's practices. Defending the decision to review the OIG, the CIA told the Committee that there were "morale issues that the [CIA] director needs to be mindful of," and that the review had uncovered instances of "bias" among OIG personnel against theCIA'sDetentionandInterrogationProgram.^^^ In2008,theCIAdirectorannouncedthe results of his review of the OIG to the CIA work force and stated that the inspector general had "chosen to take a number of steps to heighten the efficiency, assure the quality, and increase the transparency of the investigative process."^^"^
3. The CIA Does Not Satisfy Inspector General Special Review Recommendation to Assess the Effectiveness of the CIA's Enhanced Interrogation Techniques
The final May 2004 OIG Special Review included a recommendation that the CIA's DDO conduct a study of the effectiveness of the CIA's
interrogation techniques within 90 days. Prompted by the recommendation, the CIA tasked two senior CIA officers to lead "an informal operational assessment of the CIA detainee program." The reviewers were tasked with responding to 12 specific terms of reference, including an assessment of "the effectiveness of each interrogation technique and environmental deprivation"
TMMemorandum to the Inspector General from James Pavitt, CIA's Deputy Director for Operations, dated February 27, 2004, with the subject line, "Comments to Draft IG Special Review, 'Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Program' (2003-7123-IG)," Attachment, "Successes of CIA's Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Activities," dated February 24, 2004.
730 Pqj. additional information, see Volume II.
July 21, 2005, Memorandum for Inspector General from Porter J. Goss, Director, Central Intelligence Agency re: New IG Work Impacting the CounterTerrorism Center.
Transcript of business meeting, April 14, 2005 (DTS #2005-2810).
Committee Memorandum for the Record, "Staff Briefing with Bob Deitz on his Inquiry into the Investigative Practices of the CIA Inspector General," October 17, 2007 (DTS #2007-4166); Committee Memorandum for the Record, "Notes from Meetings with John Helgerson and Bob Deitz in late 2007 and early 2008" (DTS #2012-4203); Committee Memorandum for the Record, "StaffBriefing with CIA Inspector General John Helgerson" (DTS #2007- 4165).
Letter from DCIA MichaelHayden to SenatorJohn D. RockefellerIV, January 29, 2008 (DTS#2008-0606). 111! iM III
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to determine if any techniques or deprivation should be "added, modified, or discontinued."^^^ According to a CIA memorandum from the reviewers, their review was based on briefings by CTC personnel, "a discussion with three senior CTC managers who played key roles in running tlie CIA detainee program," and a review of nine documents, including the OIG Special Review and an article by the CIA contractors who developed the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, Hammond DUNBAR and Grayson SWIGERT^^^ As described in this summary, and in more detail in Volume H, these documents contained numerous inaccurate representations regardingtheoperationandeffectivenessoftheCIAprogram. Therearenorecordstoindicate the two senior CIA officers reviewed the underlying interrogation cables and intelligence records relatedtotherepresentations. Theirresultingassessmentrepeatedinformationfoundinthe documents provided to them and reported that the "CIA Detainee Program is a success, providing unique and valuable intelligence at the tactical level for the benefit of policymakers, warfighters,andtheCIA'scovertactionoperators." Theassessmentalsoreportedthat regulations and procedures for handling detainees were "adequate and clear," and that the program had responded swiftly, fairly, and completely to deviations from the structured program.^^^ Nonetheless,theassessmentcametotheconclusionthatdetentionand interrogations activities should not be conducted by the CIA, but by "experienced U.S. law enforcement officers," stating:
"The Directorate of Operations (DO) should not be in the business of nmning prisonsor'temporarydetentionfacilities,' TheDOshouldfocusonitscore mission: clandestine intelligence operations. Accordingly, the DO should continue to hunt, capture, and render targets, and then exploit them for intelligence and ops leads once in custody. The management of their incarceration and interrogation should be conducted by appropriately experienced U.S. law enforcement officers, because that is tlieir charter and they have the training and experience.
assessment noted that the CIA program required significant resources at a time when the CIA was already stretched thin. Finally, the authors wrote that they
"strongly believe" that the president and congressional oversight members should receive a
735 j2, 2004, Memorandum for Deputy Director for Operations from Chief, Information
Operations Center, and Henry Crumpton, Chief, National Resources Division, via Associate Deputy Director for
Operations, with the subject line, "Operational Review ofCIA Detainee Program/
736 12, 2004, Memorandum for Deputy Director for Operations from Chief, Information
Operations Center, and Henry Crumpton, Chief, National Resources Division, via Associate Deputy Director for Operations,withthesubjectline,"OperationalReviewofCIADetaineeProgram." TheCIA'sJune2013Response states, "[w]e acknowledge tliat tlie Agency ened in permitting the contractors to assess tlie effectiveness of enhanced techniques. Theyshouldnothavebeenconsideredforsucharolegiventheirfinancialinterestincontinued contracts from CIA."
May 12, 2004, Memorandum for Deputy Director for Operations from Chief, Information Operations Center, and Henry Crumpton, Chief, National Resources Division, via Associate Deputy Director for Operations reOperational Review ofCIA Detainee Program. For additionalinfomiati^^ Volume II.
May 12, 2004, Memorandum for Deputy Director for Operations from Chief, Information Operations Center,andHenry Crumpton, Chief,National Resources Division, viaAssociate DeputyDirectorfor Operations reOperational Review ofCIA Detaine^rogran^^^^^^^^^^
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Email from: John Helgerson; to: Porter Goss, [REDACTED]; subject: DCI Question Regardim Email from: John Helgerson; to: Porter Goss,]
|; cc: Jose Rodriguez, John Rizzo, [REDACTED], )rt; date: January 28, 2005.
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comprehensive update onthe program, "[g]iven theintense interest andcontroversy surrounding the detainee issue."^^^
On January 26, 2005, DCI Goss forwarded the senior officer review to Inspector General John Helgerson/"^^ The DCI asked whether the review would satisfy
theinspectorgeneralrecommendationforanindependentreviewoftheprogramJ"^^ OnJanuary 28, 2005, the inspector general responded that the senior officer review would not satisfy the recommendation fo^TMndepet^ent review.^"^^ The inspector general also responded to a concern raised by H ^ | ^ ^ | O M S that studying the results of CIA interrogations would amount to human experimentation, stating:
"Ifeartherewasamisunderstanding. OIGdidnothaveinminddoing additional,guineapigreseai'chonhumanbeings. Whatwearerecommending is that the Agency undertake a careful review of its experience to date in using the various techniques and that it draw conclusions about their safety, effectiveness, etc., that can guide CIA officers as we move ahead. We make this recommendation because we have found that the Agency over the decades has continued to get itself in messes related to interrogation programs for one overriding reason: we do not document and learn from our experience - each generation of officers is left to improvise anew, with problematic results for our officers as individuals and for our Agency. We are not unaware that there are subtleties to this matter, as the effectiveness of techniques varies among individuals, over time, as administered, in combination with one another, and so on. All the more reason to document these important findings."^"^^
I" November and December 2004, the CIA responded to National Security Advisor Rice's questions about the effectiveness of the CIA's enhanced interrogation
techniques by asserting that an effectiveness review was not possible, while highlighting examples of "[k]ey intelligence" the CIA represented was obtained after the use of the CIA's enhancedinterrogationtechniques. TheDecember2004memorandumpreparedforthenational security advisor entitled, "Effectiveness of the CIA Counterterrorist Interrogation Techniques," begins:
May 12, 2004 Memorandum for Deputy Director for Operations from Chief, Information Operations Center, and Henry Crumpton, Chief, National Resources Division, via Associate Deputy Director for Operations re Operational Review of CIA Detainee Program.
|; cc: Jose Rodriguez, John Rizzo, [REDACTED], [REDACTED]; subject: DCI Question Regardint OIG Report; January 28, 2005.
Email from: John Helgerson; to: Porter Goss,] |; cc: Jose Rodriguez, John Rizzo, [REDACTED], [REDACTED]; subject: DCI Question Regarding OIG Report; date: January 28, 2005. Tlie CIA's June 2013 Response maintains that "[a] systematic study over time of the effectiveness of the techniques would have been encumbered by a number of factors," including "Federal policy on the protection of human subjects and the impracticability of establishing an effective control group."
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"Action Requested: None, This memorandum responds to your request for an independent study of the foreign intelligence efficacy of using enhanced interrogation techniques. There is no way to conduct such a study. What we can do, however, if [sic] set forth below the intelligence the Agency obtained from detainees who, before their interrogations, were not providing any information of intelligence [value].
(T8/^BimHiH^^^) Underasectionofthememorandumentitled,"Results,"theCIA memo asserts that the "CIA's use of DOJ-approved enhanced inten'ogation techniques, as part of
a comprehensive interrogation approach, has enabled CIA to disrupt terrorist plots [and] capture additional terrorists." The memorandum then lists examples of "[k]ey intelligence collected from HVD interrogations after applying interrogation techniques," which led to "disrupte[ed] terroristplots"andthe"capture[of]additionalterrorists." Theexamplesinclude: the"Karachi Plot," the "Heathrow Plot," "the 'Second Wave'" plotting, the identification of the "the Guraba Cell," the identification of "Issa al-Hindi," the airest of Abu Talha al-Pakistani, "Hambali's Capture," information on Jaffar al-Tayyar, the "Dirty Bomb" plot, the arrest of Sajid Badat, and information on Shkai, Pakistan. CIA records do not indicate when, or if, this memorandum was provided to the national security advisor.^'^^
a subsequentCIAmemorandum,datedMarch5,2005,concerning an upcoming meeting between the CIA director and the national security advisor on the CIA's
progress in completing the OIG recommended review of the effectiveness of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques states, "we [CIA] believe this study is much needed and should be headed up by highly respected national-level poHtical figures with widely recognized reputations for independence and fairness."^"^^
On March 21, 2005, the director of the CTC formally proposed the "establishment of an independent 'blue ribbon' commission... with a charter to study our
Errs."^"^^ The CIA then began the process of establishing a panel that included and
Both panelists received briefings and papers from CIA personnel who participated in the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program. H||[m| [the
first panelist] wrote: "It is clear from our discussions with both DO and DI officers that the program is deemed by them to be a great success, and I would concur. The EITs, as part of the overall program, are credited with enabling the US to disrupt terrorist plots, capture additional terrorists, and collect a high volume of useful intelligence on al-Qa'ida (AQ).... There are accounts of numerous plots against the US and the West that were revealed as a result of HVD
December 2004 CIA Memorandum to "National Security Advisor," from "Director of Central Intelligence,' Subject: "Effectiveness of the CIA Countertenorist Interrogation Tecliniques."
December 2004 CIA Memorandum to "National Security Advisor," from "Director of Central Intelligence,' Subject: "Effectiveness of the CIA Counterterrorist Interrogation Techniques." Italics in original.
March 5, 2005, Talking Points for Weekly Meeting with NationalSecurity Advisor re CIA Proposal for Independent Study of the Effectiveness of CTC Intenogation Program's Enhanced Interrogation Techniques. March 21, 2005, Memorandum for Deputy Director for Operations from Robert L. Grenier, Director DCI
CounterteiTorism Center, re Proposal for Full-Scope Independent Study of the CTC Rendition, Detention, and Interrogation Programs.
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interrogations." Healsoobserved,however,that"[n]eithermybackgroundnorfieldofexpertise particularly lend themselves to judgin^h^fectiveness of interrogation techniques, taken individually or collectively."^"^^ second panelist] concluded that "there is no objective way to answer the question of efficacy," but stated it was possible to "make some general observations" about the program based on CIA personnel assessments of "the quality of the intelligence provided" by CIA detainees. Regarding the effectiveness of the CIA's enhanced interrogationtechniques,hewrote: "hereenterstheepistemologicalproblem. Wecannever know whether or not this intelligence could have been extracted though alternative procedures. Spokesmen from within the organization firmly believe it could not have been."^"^^
4. The CIA Wrongfully DetainsKhalidAl-Masri; CIA Director Rejects Accountabilityfor Officer Involved
After the dissemination of the draft CIA Inspector General Special Review in early 2004, approvals from CIA Headquarters to use the CIA's enhanced interrogation
techniquesadheredmorecloselytothelanguageoftheDCIguidelines. Nonetheless,CIA records indicate that officers at CIA Headquarters continued to fail to properly monitor
justifications for the capture and detention of detainees, as well as the justification for the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques on particular detainees.^^®
Por example, on January H, 2004, the CIA rendered German citizen Khalid al-Masri to a Country | facility used by the CIA for detention purposes. The
rendition was based on the determination by officers in the CIA's ALEC Station that "al-Masri knows key information that could assist in the capture of other al-Qa'ida operatives that pose a serious threat of violence or death to U.S. persons and interests and who may be planning terrorist a c t i v i t i e s . T h e cable did not state that Khalid al-Masri himself posed a serious threat of violence or death, the standard required for detention under the September 17, 2001, Memorandum of Notification (MON).
CIA debriefing cables from Country | on January 27, 2004, and January 28, 2004, note that Khalid al-Masri "seemed bewildered on why he has been sent to this
particular prison,"^^^ and was "adamant that [CIA] has the wrong person."^^^ Despite doubts from CIA officers in Country | about Khalid al-Masri's links to terrorists, and RDG's concurrence with those doubts, different components within the CIA disagreed on the process for his release.^^"^ As later described by the CIA inspector general, officers in ALEC Station continued to think that releasing Khalid al-Masri would pose a threat to U.S. interests and that
748 September2,2005MemorandumfromI ItoDirectorPorterGoss,CIAreAssessmentofEITs Effectiveness. For additional information, see Volume II.
September 23, 2005 Memorandum from |||||||||m||||| Honorable Porter Goss, Director, Central Intelligence Agency re Response to Request from Director for Assessment of EIT Effectiveness. For additional information, see Volume II.
For additional information, see V olume III.
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monitoring should be required, while those in the CIA's Division did not want to notify the German government about the rendition of a German citizenJ^"' Because of the significance of the dispute, the National Security Council settled the matter, concluding that al-Masri should be repatriated and that the Germans should be told about al-Masri's renditionJ^^
Khalid al-Masri was transferred from Country | to After al-Masri arrived in^|BI> officers released him and sent him toward
a fake border crossing, where the officers told him he would be sent back to Germany because he had entered illegally At the time of his release, al-Masri was provided 14,500 Euros,^^^ as well as his belongingsJ^®
the CIA inspector general issued a Report of Investigation on the rendition and detention of Khalid al-Masri, concluding that "[a]vailable
intelligence information did not provide a sufficient basis to render and detain Khalid al-Masri," andthatthe"Agency'sprolongeddetentionofal-Masriwasunjustified."^^^ OnOctober9,2007, the CIA informed the Committee that it "lacked sufficient basis to render and detain al-Masri," and that the judgment by operations officers that al-Masri was associated with terrorists who posed a threat to U.S. interests "was not supported by available intelligence/^^^eCIA director nonetheless decided that no further action was warranted against then the deputy chief of ALEC Station, who advocated for al-Masri's rendition, because "[t]he Director strongly believes that mistakes should be expected in a business filled with uncertainty and that, when they result from performance that meets reasonable standards, CIA leadership must stand behind tlie officers who make them." The notification also stated that "with regard to counterterrorism operations in general and the al-Masri matter in particular, the Director believes the scale tips decisively in favor of accepting mistakes that over connect the dots against those that under connect them."^^^
CIA Officeof InspectorGeneral, Reportof Investigation, The Rendition and Detention of German Citizen Klialid al-Masri (2004-7601-IG), July 16, 2007.
CIA Office of Inspector General, Report of Investigation, The Rendition and Detention of German Citizen Khalid al-Masri (2004-7601-IG), July 16, 2007.
^^042655
Using May 2004 exchange rates, this amounted to approximately $17,000. '''' 42655
CIA Office of Inspector General, Report of Investigation, The Rendition and Detention of German Citizen Klialid al-Masri (2004-7601-IG), July 16, 2007.
Referring to and a second CTC officer named in the OIG's Report of Investigation, the notification to Congress stated that the director "does not believe that... the performance of the two named CTC officers fall below a reasonable level of professionalism, skill, and diligence as defined in CIA's Standard for EmployeeAccountability." Thenotificationalsostatedthattherewasa"hightlireatenvironment"atthetimeofthe rendition, which "was essentially identical to the one in which CTC employees, including the two in question here, previouslyhadbeensharplycriticizedfornotconnectingthedotspriorto9/11." Thenotificationacknowledged"an insufficient legal justification, which failed to meet tlie standard prescribed in tlie [MON]," and refened to the acting generalcounselthetaskofassessinglegaladviceandpersonalaccountability. Basedonrecommendationsfiomthe inspectorgeneral,the CIA "developeda template for rendition proposals tliat makes clear what information is required, including the intelligence basis for that information." (See Congressional notification, with the subject, "CIA Response to OIG Investigation Regarding the Rendition and Detention of German Citizen Khalid al-Masri," dated October 9, 2007 (DTS #2007-4026).) The last CIA detainee, Muhammad Raliim, had already been rendered to CIA custody by the time ofthis notification^Th^CIA^^un^Ol^Respon^points to areview ofanalytical
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later released as HEADQUARTERS
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5. Hassan Ghul Provides Substantial Information—Including Information on a Key UBL Facilitator—Prior to the CIA's Use of Enhanced Interrogation Techniques
foreign authorities captured Hassan GhulintheIraqiKurdistanIiiiiiiimiIiiiiiiiiB 'INM ' lliihisidentitywasconfirmedon
January 2004^^ Ghul was rendered from U.S. military custody to CIA custody at DETENTION SITE COBALT on January H, 2004.^^^ The detention site interrogators, who, according to CIA records, did not use the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques on Ghul, sent at least 21 intelligence reports to CIA Headquarters based on their debriefings of Hassan Ghul from the two days he spent at the facility
As detailed in this summary, and in greater detail in Volume II, CIA records indicate that the most accurate CIA detainee reporting on the facilitator who led to
Usama bin Laden (UBL) was acquired from Hassan Ghul—prior to the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques.^^^ Ghul speculated that "UBL was likely living in [the]
training arising out of the al-Masri rendition, but states that, "[n]onetheless, we concede that it is difficult in hindsight to understand how the Agency could make such a mistake, take too long to correct it, determine that a flawed legal interpretation contributed, and in the end only hold accountable three CTC attorneys, two of whom receive^nl^i^m^dmonition."
21753j^^^H|^|; HEADQUARTERS•• JAN04) HEADQUARTERS CIA confirmed that the individual detained matched the
biographical data on Hassai^hul^Chalid ShtiykhM^ammad and Khallad bin Attash confirmed that a photo
provided was of Ghul. See
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As the dissemination of 21 intelligence reports suggests, information in CIA records indicates Hassan Ghul was cooperative prior to being subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. In an interview with the CIA OfficeofInspectorGeneral,aCIAofficerfamiliar withGhul's initial interrogations stated,"Hesanglikea tweetie bird. He opened up right away and was cooperative from the outset." {See December 2, 2004, interview with [REDACTED], Chief, DO, CTC UBL Department, ) CIA records reveal that Ghul's information on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti wasdisseminated while Ghulwasat DETENTION SITECOBALT, priorto theinitiationoftheCIA'senhancedinterrogationtechniques. OnApril16,2013,tlieCouncilonForeignRelations hosted a forum in relation to the screening of the film, "Manhunt." Tlie forum included former CIA officer Nada Bakos, who states in the film that Hassan Ghul provided the critical information on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti to KurdishofficialspriortoenteringCIAcustody. WhenaskedabouttheinterrogationtechniquesusedbytheKurds,
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Peshawar area," and that "it was well known that he was always with Abu Ahmed [al- Kuwaiti]."^^^ Ghul described Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti as UBL's "closest assistant,who couriered messages to al-Qa'ida's chief of operations, and listed al-Kuwaiti as one of three individuals likely with Ghul further speculated that:
"UBL's security apparatus would be minimal, and that the group likely lived in a house with a family somewhere in Pakistan.... Ghul speculated that Abu Ahmed likely handled all of UBL's needs, including moving messages out to Abu Faraj [al-Libi]...."^^^
During this same period, prior to the use of the CL\'s enhanced interrogation techniques, Ghul provided information related to Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, Abu
Faraj al-Libi (including his role in delivering messages from UBL), Jaffar al-Tayyar, 'Abd al- Hadi al-Iraqi, Hamza Rabi'a, Shaik Sa'id al-Masri, Sharif al-Masri, Abu 'Abd al-Rahman al- Najdi, Abu Talha al-Pakistani, and numerous other al-Qa'ida operatives. He also provided information on the locations, movements, operational security, and training of al-Qa'ida leaders living in Shkai, Pakistan, as well as on the visits of other leaders and operatives to Shkai.^^^ Ghul's reporting on Shkai, which was included in at least 16 of the 21 intelligence reports, confirmed earlier reporting that the Shkai valley sei-ved as al-Qa'ida's command and control center after the group's 2001 exodus from Afghanistan.^^"^ Notwithstanding these facts, in March
Bakos stated: ..honestly, Hassan Ghul.. .when he was being debriefed by the Kurdish government, he literally was sitting there having tea. He was in a safe house. He wasn't locked up in a cell. He wasn't handcuffed to anything. He was—he was having a free flowing conversation. And there's—you know, there's articles in Kurdish papers about sort of their interpretation of tlie story and how forthcoming he was." (See www.cfr.org/counterterrorism/film-screening-manhunt/p30560.) Given the unusually high number of intelligence reports disseminated in such a short time period, and the statements of former CIA officer Bakos, the Committee requested additional information from the CIA on Ghul's interrogation prior to entering CIA custody. The CIA wrote on October 25, 2013: "We have not identified any information in our holdings suggesting that Hassan Gul first provided information on Abu Ahmad while in [foreign] custody." No information was provided on Hassan Ghul's intelligence reporting while in U.S. military detention. See DTS #2013-3152.
JAN 04) AN 04) AN 04) AN 04)
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Email from: [REDACTED]; to: [REDACTED]; subject: Re: Detainee Profile on Hassan Ghul for coord; date;
December 30, 2005, at 8:14:04 AM.
780
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04). See Volume III for similar statements made to CIA detainees.
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2005, the CIA represented to the Department of Justice that Hassan Ghul's reporting on Shkai was acquired ''after''' the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniquesJ^^
After two days of questioning at DETENTION SITE COBAL T and the dissemination of 21 intelligence reports, Ghul was transferred to DETENTION SITE
BLACKJ^^ According to CIA records, upon arrival, Ghul was "shaved and barbered, stripped, and placed in the standing position against the wall" with "his hands above his head" with plans tolowerhishandsaftertwohours^^'' TheCIAinterrogatorsatthedetentionsitethenrequested to use the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques on Ghul, writing:
"[the] interrogation team believes, based on [Hassan Ghul's] reaction to the initial contact, that his ai-Qa'ida briefings and his earlier experiences with U.S. military interrogators have convinced him there are limits to the physical contact interrogators can have with him. The interrogation team believes the approval and employment of enhanced measures should sufficiently shift [Hassan Ghul's] paradigm of what he expects to happen. The lack of these increasd [sic] measures may limit the team's capability to collect critical and reliable information in a timely manner."^^^
(^FS/4|^H|||||||^^H||//NE) CIA Headquarters approved the request the same day.^^^ Following 59 hours of sleep deprivation,^^*^ Hassan Ghul experienced hallucinations, but was told by a psychologist that his reactions were "consistent with what many others experience in his condition," and that he should calm himself by telling himself his experiences are normal and willsubsidewhenhedecidestobetruthfiil.^^^ Thesleepdeprivation,aswellasotherenhanced interrogations, continued,^^- as did Ghul's hallucinations.''^^ Ghul also complained of back pain and asked to see a doctor,^^"^ but interrogators responded that the "pain was normal, and would stop when [Ghul] was confirmed as telling the tnith." A cable states that "[i]nterrogators told [Ghul] they did not care if he was in pain, but cared only if he provided complete and truthful
i n f o r m a t i o n . A CIA physician assistant later observed that Hassan Ghul was experiencing "notable physiological fatigue," including "abdominal and back muscle pain/spasm, 'heaviness' and mild paralysis of arms, legs and feet [that] are secondary to his hanging position and extreme
March 2, 2005, Memorandum for Steve Bradbury from Legal Group, DCI Counterterrorist Center, re: Effectiveness of the CIA Counterterrorist Intenogation Techniques. Italics in original. For additional representations, see V olume II.
AN 04) AN 04) 04)
detaineewouldbeallowedaperiodofsleep." Asdescribedinthissummary,andmoreextensivelyinVolumeIII, CIA records indicate that medical personnel did not always intervene and allow detainees to sleep after experiencing hallucinations.
1312IBIJAN04). TheCIA'sJune2013Response statesthatwhenhallucinations occurredduringsleepdeprivation, "medicalpersonnelintervenedtoensurea
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degree of sleep deprivation," but that Ghul was clinically stable and had "essentially normal vital signs," despite an "occasional premature heart beat" that the cable linked to Ghul's fatigueJ^® Throughout this period, Ghul provided no actionable threat information, and as detailed later in this summary, much of his reporting on the al-Qa'ida presence in Shkai was repetitive of his reportingpriortotheuseoftheCIA'senhancedinterrogationtechniques. Ghulalsoprovidedno other information of substance on UBL facilitator Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti7^^ Nonetheless, on May 5, 2011, the CIA provided a document to the Committee entitled, "Detainee Reporting on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti," which lists Hassan Ghul as a CIA detainee who was subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques and whopmvided^TierOne|Mnfo
Abu Ahmad to Bin Ladin."^^^ Hassan Ghul was later released
6. Other Detainees Wrongfully Held in 2004; CIA Sources Subjected to the CIA's Enhanced Interrogation Techniques; CIA Ojficer Testifies that the CIA Is "Not Authorized" "to Do Anything Like What You Have Seen " in Abu Ghraib Photographs
In March 2004, the CIA took custody of an Afghan national who had sought employment at a U.S. military base because he had the same name (Gul Rahman) as
anindividualbelievedtobetargetingU.S.militaryforcesinAfghanistan.^^^ Duringtheperiod in which the Afghan was detained, the CIA obtained signals intelligence of their true target communicating with his associates. DNA results later showed conclusively that the Afghan in custody was not the target. Nonetheless, the CIA held the detainee in solitary confinement for approximately a month before he was released with a nominal payment.^^^
In the spring of 2004, after two detainees were transferred to CIA custody, CIA interrogators proposed, and CIA Headquarters approved, using the CIA's enhanced
interrogation techniques on one of the two detainees because it might cause the detainee to provide information that could identify inconsistencies in the other detainee's s t o r y A f t e r both detainees had spent approximately 24 hours shackled in the standing sleep deprivation position, CIA Headquarters confirmed that the detainees were former CIA sources.^^"^ The two detainees had tried to contact the CIA on multiple occasions prior to their detention to inform the CIA of their activities and provide intelligence. The messages they had sent to the CIA
ISOSH^HJAN 04) See V olume II for additional information.
See CIA letter to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, dated May 5,2011, which includes a document entitled, "Background Detainee Infomiation on Abu Ahmed al-Kuwaiti," with an accompanying six-page chart entitled, "Detainee ReportingonAbi^hmed al-Kuwaiti" (DTS #2011-2004).
2441HEADQUARTERS 1635 1712••••••iHEADOUARrERSl
EHsl
''^^See\
The individual detained and the individual believed to be targeting U.S. forces were different from the Gul
RtJiman who died at DETENTION SITE COBALT. 2Q33
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were not translated until after the detainees were subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques
During this same period in early 2004, CIA inten^ogators interrogatedAdnanal-Libi,amemberoftheLibyanIslamicFightingGroup. CIAHeadquarters
did not approve the use of the CIA's enhanced techniques against al-Libi, but indicated that interrogators could use "standard" interrogation techniques, which included up to 48 hours of sleep deprivationJ^^ CIA interrogators subsequently reported subjecting Adnan al-Libi to sleep deprivation sessions of 46.5 hours, 24 hours, and 48 hours, with a combined three hours of sleep between sessions.^^^
Beginning in late April 2004, a number of media outlets published photographs of detainee abuse at the Department of Defense-run Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq. The media reports caused members of the Committee and individuals in the executive branch to focus
on detainee issues. On May 12, 2004, the Committee held a lengthy hearing on detainee issues with Department of Defense and CIA witnesses. The CIA used the Abu Ghraib abuses as a contrasting reference point for its detention and interrogation activities. In a response to a question from a Committee member, CIA Deputy Director McLaughlin said, "we are not authorized in [the CIA program] to do anything like what you have seen in those
p h o t o g r a p h s . I n response, a member of the Committee said, "I understand," and expressed the understanding, consistent with past CIA briefings to the Committee, that the "norm" of CIA's interrogations was "transparent law enforcement procedures [that] had developed to such a high level... that you could get pretty much what you wanted." The CIA did not correct the Committee member's misunderstanding that CIA interrogation techniques were similar to techniques used by U.S. law enforcement.^^^
7. The CIA Suspends the Use of its Enhanced Interrogation Techniques, Resumes Use of the Techniques on an Individual Basis; Interrogations are Based on Fabricated, Single Source Information
May 2004, the OLC, then led by Assistant Attorney General Jack Goldsmith, informed the CIA's Office of General Counsel that it had never formally opined
on whether the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques in the CIA's program was
^''5 HEADQUARTERS • I([REDACTED]). For more information on AL-TURKI and AL-MAGREBI, see Volume III.
SeeVolumeIandII,includingHEADQUARTER^^^HJ||H||^^B^H- I"November2003,CIA General Counsel Scott Muller sent an email to lll^^l^l^^uggesting "changing the sleep deprivation line a^ic^etweer^nhanced and standard from 72 to 48 hours." (See November 23, 2003, email from Scott Muller to
John Rizzo, Subject: Al-Hawsawi Incident.) On January 10, 2004, CIA Headquarters informed CIA detention sites of the change, stating that sleep depri^tion over 48 hours would now be considered an
enhanced" interrogation technique. See HEADQUARTERS (101713Z JAN 04).
797
1S88 (091823Z MAR 04); 1889 (091836Z MAR 04). Tliere is no indication in CIA records that CIA Headquailers addressed the repeated use of "standard" sleep deprivation againstAdnan al-Libi. Formore information, see Volume in detainee report for Adnan al-Libi.
Transcript of Senate Select Committee on Intelligence hearing, May 12, 2004 (DTS #2004-2332). Transcript ofSenate Select Committee oi^ntelligenc^iearir^ (DTS #2004-2332).
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consistent with U.S. constitutional standards.Goldsmith also raised concerns about divergences between the CIA's proposed enhanced interrogation techniques, as described in the August 1, 2002, memorandum, and their actual application, as described in the CIA Inspector General's Special R e v i e w . I n late May 2004, DCI Tenet suspended the use of the CIA's "enhanced" and "standard" interrogation techniques, pending updated approvals from the OLC.^®^ On June 4, 2004, DCI Tenet issued a formal memorandum suspending the use of the CIA's interrogation techniques, pending policy and legal review.^®^ The same day, the CIA sought reaffirmation of the program from the National Security Council.^^ National Security Advisor Rice responded, noting that the "next logical step is for the Attorney General to complete the relevant legal analysis now in preparation."^^^
H ' ^004, a foreign government captured Janat Gul, an individual believed, based on reporting from a CIA source, to have information about al-Qa'ida
plans to attack the United States prior to the 2004 presidential election.^®^ In October 2004, the CIA source who provided the information on the "pre-election" threat and implicated Gul and others admitted to fabricating the information. However, as early as March 2004, CIA officials internally expressed doubts about the validity ofthe CIA source's information.^®^
On July 2, 2004, the CIA met with National Security Advisor Rice, other National Security Council officials, White House Counsel Alberto Gonzales, as well as the
attorney general and the deputy attorney general, to seek authorization to use the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, specifically on Janat Gul.^®^ The CIA represented that CIA
800 25^ 2004,TalkingPointsforDCITelephoneConversation withAttorney General:DOJ's LegalOpinionre
CIA's Counterterrorist Program (CT) Interrogation. Letter from Assistant Attorney General Jack L. Goldsmith UI to Director Tenet, June 18, 2004 (DTS #2004-2710).
May 27, 2004, letter from Assistant Attorney General Goldsmith to General Counsel Muller.
May24,2003,MemorandumfortheRecordfrom subject: MemorandumofMeetingwiththe DCI Regarding DOJ's Statement that DOJ has Rendered No Legal Opinion on Whether CIA's Use of Enhanced InterrogationTechniqueswouldmeetConstitutionalStandards. MemorandumforDeputyDirectorforOperations from Director of Central Intelligence, June 4. 2004, re: Suspension of Use of InteiTOgation Techniques.
June 4, 2004, Memorandum for Deputy Director for Operations from Director of Central Intelligence, re: SuspensionofUseofIntenogationTechniques. OnJune2,2004,GeorgeTenetinformedtliePresidentthathe intended to resign from liis position on July I I , 2004. The White House announced the resignation on June 3, 2004.
June 4, 2004, Memorandum for the National Security Advisor from DCI George Tenet, re: Review of CIA Interrogation Program.
June 2004, Memorandum for the Honorable George J. Tenet, Director of Central Intelligence from Condoleezza Rice, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, re: Review ofCIA'^nteiTOgation Program. ^"^••••|39^4 • • 3121
The former chief of the CIA's Bin Ladin Unit wrote in a March | , 2004, email that the reporting was "vague" and "worthless in terms of actionable intelligence." He suggested that the reporting "would be an easy way [for al- Qa'ida] to test" the loydty of the source, given al-Qa'ida's knowledge that leaked threat reporting "causes panic in Wasliington." (See from: to: ^^||||^HI||||Hi[> [REDACTED],
|; subject: could AQ b^estin^^ASSE^Y] and [source name REDACTED]?; date:March 2004,at06:55AM.) A^^tatior^ffi^^^BHjHHHBexpresse^imilaj^o^sir^^
to the See emailfrom^^^^HH^^^^|;tor||||||||^^|; cc:
[REDACTED], jMUJjU^Jsnhject: Re: could A^b^^ing [ASSE^f^n^source name
REDACTED]?; date: March•, 2004, at 07:52:32 AM). See also•••• 1411 (^•^^•04).
July 2, 2004, CIA Memorandum re Meeting witli National Adviser Rice in the White House Situation Room, re
III! 11 III
Interrogations and Detainee Janat Gul, July 2, 2004.
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"interrogations have saved American lives," that more than half of the CIA detainees would not cooperate until they were interrogated using the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques,and that "unless CIA interrogators can use a full range of enhanced inteiTogation methods, it is unlikely that CIA will be able to obtain current threat information from Gul in a timely manner."^^^ Janat Gul was not yet in CIA custody.
On July 6, 2004, National Security Advisor Rice sent a memorandum to DCI Tenet stating that the CIA was "permitted to use previously approved enhanced interrogation methods for Janat Gul, with the exception of the waterboard." Rice
offered "to assist [the CIA] in obtaining additional guidance from the Attorney General and NSC Principals on an expedited basis" and noted the CIA's agreement to provide additional information about the waterboard technique in order for the Department of Justice to assess its legality. Rice's memorandum further documented that the CIA had informed her that "Gul likely has information about preelection terrorist attacks against the United States as a result of Gul's close ties to individuals involved in these alleged plots.
In a meeting on July 20, 2004, National Security Council principals, including the vice president, provided their authorization for the CIA to use its
enhanced interrogation techniques—again, with the exception of the waterboard—on Janat Gul. They also directed the Departmentof Justice to prepare a legal opinion on whether the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques were consistent with the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution.On July 22, 2004, Attorney General John Ashcroft sent a letter to Acting DCI John McLaughlin stating that nine interrogation techniques (those addressed in the August 1, 2002, memorandum, with the exception of the waterboard) did not violate the U.S. Constitution or any statute or U.S. treaty obligations, in the context of the interrogation of Janat Gul.^'"^ For the remainder of2004, the CIA used its enhanced interrogation techniques on three detainees—Janat Gul, Sharif al-Masri, and Ahmed Khalfan Ghailani—with individualized approval from the Department of Justice.^^^
being rendered to CIA custody on July 2004, Janat Gul was subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, including continuous sleep
deprivation, facial holds, attention grasps, facial slaps, stress positions, and walling,until he
At the time of this CIA representation, the CIA had held at least 109detainees and subjected at least 33 of them (30 percent) to tlie CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques.
July 6, 2004, Memorandum from Condoleezza Rice, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, to the Honorable George Tenet, Director of Central Intelligence, re Janat Gul. CIA Request for Guidance Regarding Interrogation of Janat Gul, July 2, 2004.
For additional details, see V olume III.
July 6, 2004, Memorandum from Condoleezza Rice, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, to the HonorableGeorge Tenet, Directorof Central Intelligence, re Janat Gul.
July 29, 2004, Memorandum for the Record from CIA General Counsel Scott Muller, "Principals Meeting relating to Janat Gul on 20 July 2004."
The one-paragraph letter did not provide legal analysis or substantive discussion of the interrogation techniques. Letter from Attorney General Ashcroft to Acting DCI McLaughlin, July 22, 2004 (DTS #2009-1810, Tab 4).
See V olume III for additional details.
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experiencedauditoryandvisualhallucinations.^'^ Accordingtoacable,JanatGulwas"not oriented to time or place" and told CIA officers that he saw "his wife and children in the mirror andhadheardtheirvoicesinthewhitenoise."^^^ ThequestioningofJanatGulcontinued, although the CIA ceased using the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques for several days. AccordingtoaCIAcable,"[Gul]askedtodie,orjustbekilled."^^^ Aftercontinued interrogation sessions with Gul, on August 19, 2004, CIA detention site personnel wrote that the interrogation "team does not believe [Gul] is withholding imminent threat i n f o r m a t i o n . O n August 21, 2004, a cable from CIA Headquarters stated that Janat Gul "is believed" to possess threat information, and that the "use of enhanced techniques is appropriate in order to obtain that information."^^^ Onthatday,August21,2004,CIAinterrogatorsresumedusingtheCIA's enhanced interrogation techniques against Gul.^^^ Gul continued not to provide any reporting on the pre-election threat described by the CIA source.^^^ On August 25, 2004, CIA interrogators sent a cable to CIA Headquarters stating that Janat Gul "may not possess all that [the CIA] believes him to know."^^ The interrogators added that "many issues linking [Gul] to al-Qaida are derived from single source reporting" (the CIA source).^^^ Nonetheless, CIA interrogators continuedtoquestionGulonthepre-electionthreat. AccordingtoanAugust26,2004,cable, after a 47-hour session of standing sleep deprivation, Janat Gul was returned to his cell, allowed to remove his diaper, given a towel and a meal, and permitted to sleep.^^^ In October 2004, the CIA conducted a | | B | | B source who had identified Gul as having knowledge of attack planning for the pre-election threat. ||^mi|^^HI||||i> the CIA source admitted to fabricating the information.^^^ Gul was subsequently ti^ansferred to a foreign government. On
(informed the CIA that Janat Gul had been released.^^^
Janat Gul never provided the threat information the CIA originally toldtheNationalSecurityCouncilthatGulpossessed. NordidtheuseoftheCIA'senhanced
interrogation techniques against Gul produce the "immediate thi-eat information that could save American lives," which had been the basis for the CIA to seek authorization to use the techniques. As described elsewhere in this summary, the CIA's justification for employing its enhanced interrogation techniques on Janat Gul—the first detainee to be subjected to the techniquesfollowingtheMay2004suspension—changedovertime. Afterhavinginitiallycited Gul's knowledge of the pre-election threat, as reported by the CIA's source, the CIA began representing that its enhanced interrogation techniques were required for Gul to deny the existence of the threat, thereby disproving the credibility of the CIA source.^^^
104) [04)
^4) 104)
). See V olume III for additional information. )492
Memorandum for John A. Rizzo, Senior Deputy General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, from Steven G. Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Attome^General^ffic^^ega^ou^l, May 30, 2005, Re: Application of
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83' W ASHINGTON
See, for example,
I, Assistant General Counsel, to Dan Levin, Acting Assistant Attorney General,
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August 11, 2004, in the midst of th^ntemjgation of Janat Gul using the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, CIA attorney wrote a letter
to Acting Assistant Attorney General Dan Levin with "brief biographies" of four individuals whom the CIA hoped to detain. Given the requirement at the time that the CLA seek individual approval from the Department of Justice before using the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques against a detainee, the CIA letter states, "[w]e are providing these preliminary biographies in preparation for a future request for a legal opinion on their subsequent interrogation in CIA control." Two of the individuals—Abu Faraj al-Libi and Hamza Rabi'a— had not yet been captured, and thus the "biographies" made no reference to their interrogations or the need to use the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. The third individual, Abu Talha a^akistani^a^i^oreigngovernmentcustody. Hisdebriefingsbyaforeigngovernment,|
described in the letter as "only moderately effective" because Abu Talha was "distracting [those questioning him] with noncritical information that is truthful, but is
not related to operational planning." The fourth individual, Ahmed Khalfan Ghailani, was also ir^or^n government custody and being debriefed by foreign government officials
According to the letter, Ghailani's foreign government debriefings were "ineffective" because Ghailani had "denied knowledge of current threats." The letter described reporting on the pre-election threat—much of which came from the CIA source—in the context of all four individuals.^^*^ Ahmed Ghailani and Abu Faraj al-Libi were eventually rendered to CIA custody and subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques.
On September 2004, after the CIA had initiated a counterintelligence review of the CIA source who had reported on the pre-election threat, but prior to the CIA source's the CIA took custody of Sharif al-Masri, whom the CIA
source had reported would also have information about the threat.Intelligence provided by Sharif al-Masri while he was in foreign government custody resulted in the dissemination of more than 30 CIA intelligence reports.^^^ After entering CIA custody, Sharifal-Masri expressed his intent to cooperate with the CIA, indicating thathewasfng^ ofinterrogations because he had been tortured while being interrogated in The CIA nonetheless sought approval to use the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques against al-Masri because of his failure to provide information on the pre-election threat.^^"^
After approximately a week of interrogating al-Masri using the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, including sleep deprivation that coincided with
UnitedStatesObligationsUnderArticle 16oftheConventionAgainstTorturetoCertainTechniquesthatMayBe UsedintheInterrogationofHighValuealQaedaDetainees,at11. SeesectionofthissummaryandVolumeII entitled, "The Assertion that CIA Detainees Subjected to Enhanced Interrogation Techniques Help ValidateCIA Sources."
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auditory hallucinations, CIA interrogators reported that al-Masri had been "motivated to Spate"atthetimeofhisarrival.^^^ Despiteal-Masri'srepeateddescriptionsoftorturein
the CIA transferred al-Masri to that government's custody after approximately thi*ee months of CIA detention.
As in the case of Janat Gul and Sharif al-Masri, the CIA's requests for OLC advice on the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques against Ahmed
Khalfan Ghailani were based on the fabricated reporting on the pre-election threat from the same CIAsource.^^^ LikeJanatGulandSharifal-Masri,Ghailanialsoexperiencedauditory hallucinationsfollowingsleepdeprivation.^^^ Asdescribedinthissummary,afterhavingopined on the legality of using the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques on these three individual detainees, the OLC did not opine again on the CIA's enhanced interrogation program until May 2005.
8. Country^Detains Individuals on the CIA's Behalf
Consideration ofadetention facility in Country | began in 2003, when the CIA sought to transfer Ramzi bin al-Shibh from the custody of a foreign
government to CIA custody.liiHHBHIHHHilimH!' which had not yet informed the country'political leadership of the CIA's request to establish a clandestine detention facility in Country[ surveyedpotentialsitesforthefacility,whiletheCIAsetaside$|millionforits construction.'^'^" In 2003,theCIAarrangedfora"temporarypatch"involvingplacingtwo CIA detainees (Ramzi bin al-Shibh and 'Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri) within an already existing Country| detentionfacility,untiltheCIA'sownfacilitycouldbebuilt.^"^^ That^ring,asthe CIA was offering millions of dollars in subsidies to IinCountries |, and | 842
835
Sharif al-Masri.
836 HEADQUARTERS
3289
For more information, see Volume III, detainee report for
138021
Associate General Counsel, CIA, to Dan Levin, Actin^Assi^nt Attorney
See letter from
General, August 25, 2004 (DTS #2009-.1809WNote: At various times during this perio^jj^B^^s identified as bothCIAassociategeneralcounseland|||H||||[|CTCLegal). Seealsoaletterfrom Assistant General Counsel, to Dan Levin, Acting Assistant Attorney General, September 5, 2004 (DTS #2009-1809). A CIA email sent prior to the CIA's request for advice from the OLC indicated that tlie judgment that Ghailani had knowledge of tenorist plotting was speculative: "Although Ghailani's role in operational planning is unclear, his respected role in al-Qa'ida and presence in Shkai as recently as October 2003 may have provided him some knowledge about ongoing attack planningagainsttheUm States homelandjandtheoi^^ involved." (See emailfrom:•••H, CTC/UBLd|||||H||^|(formerlyALEC^^HHIH;to: [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED]; subject: derog information for ODDO on TaIha, Ghailani, Hamza RabT^n^AbuFaraud^ AugusnO^OO^^Gl^lani was rendered to CIA custody on September ^2004. (See
provided the false repo£i^onthepre-e^ HEADQUARTERS
838 [REDACTED] 3221
839 [REDACTED] 2234^
threat5e£j|H|H|H
04); ^^^^^•4267^^^^^^4).
3072 l l l H f l H I i ) began using its enhanced interrogation techniques
on Ghailani on September 17,2004, as the CIA was iniUatin^t^ountmnteUi^^
of the source who (181558Z SEP 04);
8*'» HEADQUARTERS
8'" HEADQUARTERS
8''-WhileCIAHeadquartersoffered$|milliontoCountry| forhostingaCIAdetentionfacility,| precludedtheopeningofthefacility. Only$lmillionwa^m^^^^i^ Stationforsupporttothe
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thatkindofmon^forareceipt." Theboxescontainedonehundreddollarbills. recipient ofthe $ | million. See transcript ofOral History Interview, Interviewee: 13, 2006, Interviewer: [REDACTED] and [REDACTED].
ALEC • •
ALEC
8^^ See DTS #2010-2448.
[REDACTED] 2498
did not identify the (RJ) - October
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CIA Headquarters directed the CIA Station in Count to ^think big" about how CIA
Headquarters could support Country | ' s
submitted relatively modest proposals, CIAI^dquarters reiterated the directive, adding that the Station shoul^rovid^"wish list."^''^ Ii^^B|2003, the Station proposed amore expansive $||| million in subsidies.^"^^ jjH^ubsidy payments, intended in part as compeimtion for support ofthe CIA detention program, rose as high as $ | miUion.^"^^ By
I H B H 2003, after an extension of five months beyond the originally agreed upon timeframe for concluding CIA detention activities in Country | , both bin al-Shibh and al-Nashiri had been
transferredoutofCountry| totheCIAdetentionfacilityatGuantanamoBay,Cuba.^"^^
9. U.S. Supreme Court Action in the Case ofRasul v. Bush Forces Transfer of CIA Detaineesfrom Guantanamo Bay to Country^
Beginning in September 2003, the CIA held a number of detainees at CIA facilities on the grounds of, but separate from, the U.S. military detention facilities at
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.^'^'^ In early January 2004, the CIA and the Department of Justice began discussing the possibility that a pending U.S. Supreme Court case, Rasul v. Bush, might grant habeas corpus rights to the five CIA detainees then being held at a CIA detention facility at
although CIA Headquarters asked the CIA Station to "advise if additional funds may be needed to keep [the facility] viable over the coming year and beyond." CIA Headquarters added, "we cannot have enough blacksitehosts,andweareloathetoletonewehaveslipaway."Countiylne^hoste CIAdetainees. See HEADOUAR [REDACTBD] 5298 i H H H l j H ; HEADQUAR
ALEC interview on the CIA program, noted that the program had "more money than we could possibl^pen^^hc^ht, and itturned out to be accurate." In the same interview, he stated that "in one case, we gave $|,000,0001
Myself and Jos6 [Rodriguez]
W e never counted it. I'm not about to count
April 2003, Memorandum for Director, DCI Counterterrorist Center, from |
Rendition and Detainee^roup^ia^H|^^^^^B|, Counterterrorist Center, Chief of Operations,
Chief, IIIIIIBIII^II^^HIHTSubjec^Reqi^s^^Relocat^iig^Value Detainees to an Interim Detention Facility at Guantanamo. See also DIRECTOR CIA detainees were held at two facilities at Guantanamo Bay, DETENTION SITE MAROON and DETENTION SITE PsfDIGO. {See Quarterly Review of Confinement Conditions for CIA Detainees, Coverage Period: ) A third CIA detention facility, DETENTION SITE REI
13897 3445 9754 8405^m^^Hi^^H8'^081
and September 1, 2006, Memorandum of Agreement Between the Department of Defense (DOD) and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)Concerning the Detention by DODof Certain Terrorists at a Facility at Guantanamo Bay Naval Station.
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After the Station initially
I, Chief
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856 2004, CIA detainees in a Coun
pain from other detainees presumed to be in the facility.^^^ WhentheCIAchiefofStationapproachedthe
facility claimed to hear cries of
UNCLASSIFIED
Guantanamo Shortly after these discussions, CIA officers approached the
inCountry| todetermineifitwouldagainbewillingtohosttheseCIAdetainees,whowould remain in CIA custody within an already existing Country | facility.^'*® By January | , 2004, the
inCountry| hadagreedtothisarrangementforalimitedperiodoftime.^^^
(TS/^^BHUHI^^) Meanwhile, CIA General Counsel Scott Muller asked the Department of Justice, the National Security Council, and the White House Counsel for advice
on whether the five CIA detainees being held at Guantanamo Bay should remain at Guantanamo BayorbemovedpendingtheSupremeCourt'sdecision.^^^ AfterconsultationwiththeU.S. solicitor general in February 2004, the Department of Justice recommended that the CIA move four detainees out of a CIA detention facility at Guantanamo Bay pending the Supreme Court's resolutionofthecase.^^^ TheDepartmentofJusticeconcludedthatafifthdetainee,IbnShaykh al-Libi, did not need to be transferred because he had originally been detained under military authority and had been declared to the ICRC.^^"^ Nonetheless, by April 2004, all five CIA detainees were transferred from Guantanamo Bay to other CIA detention facilities.
Shortly after placing CIA detainees within anal^dy existing Country 1 facility fora second time, tensions arose between the CIA a n d C o u n t r y |
Email fiom: Scott W. Muller; to: [REDACTED]; cc: [REDACTED]; subject: Detainees in Gitmo; date: January | , 2004.
S50 See HEADQUARTERS • • • [REDACTED] 1845 The CIA's long- termfacilityinCountry whichtheCIAStationinCountry| hadwarnedwasadrainontheStation'sresources, had not yet been completed. See [REDACTED] 1785
[REDACTED] 1679H||^|HHi
Email from: Scott Muller; to: James Pavitt, [REDACTED], [REDACTED], February | , 2004.
Email from: Scott Muller; to: James Pavitt, [REDACTED], [REDACTED], February | , 2004.
Email from: Scott Muller; to: James Pavitt, [REDACTED],•^^^^^•jREDACT^ FebruaryI, 2004.
10255 ; ALEC
11672 [REDACTED] 1898^^
See, forexample, [REDACTED] 16791 Country | , see Volume I.
I; cc: George Tenet, John McLaughlin, [REDACTED], |; subject: CIA Detainees atGITMO; date:
I; cc: George Tenet, John McLaughlin, [REDACTED], |; subject: CIA Detainees atGITMO; date:
; cc: George Tenet, John McLaughlin, [REDACTED], \, subject: CIA Detainees atGITMO; date:
13698 ;ALEC
. For additional details of the CIA's interactions with
Among tiiedetaineesm^ this claim was Ibn Shaykh al-Libi, who had previousl;^eei^ndered from CIA custody to ALibyan national, Ibn Shaykh al-Libi reported while in BB|custody tliat Iraq was supporting al-Qa'ida and providing assistance with chemical and biological weapons. Some of this information was cited by Secretary Powell in his speech to the United Nations, and was used as a justification for the 2003 invasionofIraq. IbnShaykhal-LibirecantedtheclaimafterhewasrenderedtoCIAcustodyonFebruary|,2003, claimingthathehadbeentorturedbytheIHHH,andonlytoldtliemwhatheassessedtheywantedtohear. For moredetails,seeVolumeIIL WhileinCounfrJ^^ibHol^I^ebnefer^iatthe"sobbingandyelling"he
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Iabout the accounts ofthe CIA detainees, the stated with "bitter dismay" that the bilateral relationship was being "tested."^^^ There were also counterintelligence concerns relating to CIA detainee Ramzi bin al-Shibh, who had attempted to influence a Country I officer.^^^ These concerns contributed to a request from in
2004 for the CIA to remove all CIA detainees from Country
(^S/^^H^^^^^B^PMj^^^H|2004^heiUhechiefofStationinCountry| again appi*oacheTthe^^^|||||||||||||||HH^^^HH|H|^with allegations from CIA detainees aboutthemistreatmentofCountry| detainees^^^^|inthefacility,thechiefofStation received an angry response that, as he reported to CIA Headquarters, "starkly illustrated the inherent challenges [of]
According to the chief of Station, Country | saw the CIA as
"quemlous and unappreciative recipients of their I
2004, relations between the CIA and Country | deteriorated, particularly with regard to intelligence cooperation.®^^" The CIA detainees were transferred out of Country | 2005.«63
(TS// Beginning in 2005, the
inCountry| insisted,overtheCIA'sopposition,tobriefCountry|'s on
the effort to establish a more permanent and unilateral CIA detention facility, which was under constmction. Aproposedphonecalltothe VicePresidentCheneyto solidifysupportforCIAoperationsinCountry| wascomplicatedbythefactthatVicePresident Cheney had not been told about the locations of the CIA detention facilities. The CIA wrote that there was a "primary need" to "eliminate any possibility that could
explicitly or implicitly refer to the existence of a black site in [the country]" during the call with thevicepresident.^^"^ Therearenoindicationsthatthecalloccurred. The of Country| nonethelessapprovedtheunilateralCIAdetentionfacility,whichcost$|million,but was never used by the CIA.^^^ By 2006, the CIA was working widi Country | to decommission what was described as the "aborted" project.866
heard reminded him of what he previously endured in custody and it sounded to him like a prisoner had been tied up and beaten. See [REDACTED] 1989
[REDACTED] 20101
[REDACTED] 2010
[REDACTED] 2317 The CIA's June 2013 Response states that "[i]t was only as leaks
detailing the program began to emerge that for^n partners felt compelled to alter the scope oftheir involvement.' As described above, the tensions with Country Jwere unrelated topress leaks.
[REDACTED] 2602
5&&[REDAOEDn318^^HH^H; [REDACTED] 31281 • • • • • • ; and [REDACTED] 2783BIBHUHI-Country| officialsrefuse^^rovid^h^IAwithcounterterrorisminformation,
including information obtained through CIA-funded
8" HEADQUARTERS
8^-' HEADQUARTERS
8''-'' [REDACTED] andCTCmmRDG, "Evolution oftheProgram.'
[REDACTED] 3706 ([REDACTED] [REDACTED] TOP SECRET/^
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L. The Pace of CIA Operations Slows; Chief of Base Concerned About "Inexperienced, Marginal, Underperforming" CIA Personnel; Inspector General Describes Lack of Debriefers As "Ongoing Problem"
In the fall of 2004, CIA officers began considering "end games," or the final disposition of detainees in CIA custody. A draft CIA presentation for National Security
Council principals dated August 19, 2004, identified the drawbacks of ongoing indefinite detention by the CIA, including: the need for regular relocation of detainees, the "tiny pool of potential host countries" available "due to high risks," the fact that "prolonged detention without legal process increases likelihood of HVD health, psychological problems [and] curtails intel flow," criticism of the U.S. government if legal process were delayed or denied, and the likelihood that the delay would "complicate, and possibly reduce the prospects of successful prosecutions of these d e t a i n e e s . C I A draft talking points produced a month later state that transfer to Department of Defense or Department of Justice custody was the "preferred endgame for 13 detainees currently in [CIA] control, none of whom we believe should ever leave USG custody.""^^^
2004, the overwhelming majority of CIA detainees—113 of the 119 identified in the Committee Study—had already entered CIA custody.
Most of the detainees remaining in custody were no longer undergoing active interrogations; rather, they were infrequently questioned and awaiting a final disposition. The CIA took custody of only six new detainees between 2005 and January 2009: four detainees in 2005, one in 2006, and one—the CIA's final detainee, Muhammad Rahim—in 2007.^^^
I" 2004, CIA detainee^ere beingheldinUirc^oui^^ at DETENTION SITE BLACK in Country | , at the^Ifacility in
Country I, as well as atdetention facilities in Country DETENTION SITE VIOLET in Country | opened in early 2005.*^^^ On April 15, 2005, the chief of Base at DETENTION SITE BLACK in Country | sent the management of RDG an email expressing his concerns about the detention site and the program in general. He commented that "we have seen clear indications that various Headquarters elements are experiencing mission fatigue vis-a-vis their interaction with the program," resulting in a "decline in the overall quality and level of experience of deployed personnel," and a decline in "level and quality of requirements." He wrote that because of the length of time most of the CIA detainees had been in detention, "[the] detainees have been all but drained of actionable intelligence," and their remaining value was in providing "information that can be incorporated into strategic, analytical think pieces that deal with motivation, structiu-e and goals." The chief of Base observed that, during the course of the year, the detention site transitioned from an intelligence production facility to a long-term detention facility, which raised "a host of new challenges." These challenges included the need to address
CIA PowerPoint Presentation, CIA Detainees: Endgame Options and Plans, dated August 19, 2004. September 17, 2004, DRAFT Talking Points for tlie ADCI: Endgame Options and Plans for CIA Detainees. The CIA took custody of Abu Faraj al-Libi, Abu Munthir al-Magrebi, Ibrahim Jan, and Abu Ja'far al-Iraqi in
2005, and Abd al-Hadi al-Iraqi in 2006. ThefirstdetaineesaiTivedinCountry[ in
I facility in Country | from m to information, see V olume I.
2003. CIAdetaineeswereheldwithinanexistingCountry 2003, and then again beginning in m 2004. For additional
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the "natural and progressive effects of long-tenn solitary confinement on detainees" and ongoing behavioral probleras.^^^
(T8//H^^HH|//NF) With respect to the personnel at DETENTION SITE BLACK, the chief of Base wrote:
"I am concerned at what appears to be a lack of resolve at Headquarters to deploy to the field the brightest and most qualified officers for service at [the detention site]. Over the course of the last year the quality of personnel (debriefers and [security protective officers]) has declined significantly. With regard to debriefers, most are mediocre, a handfull [sic] are exceptional and more than a few are basically incompetent. From what we can determine there is no established methodology as to the selection of debriefers. Rather than look for their best, managers seem to be selecting either problem, underperforming officers, new, totally inexperienced officers or whomever seems to be willing and able to deploy at any given time. We see no evidence that thought is being given to deploying an 'A-Team.' The result, quite naturally, is the production of mediocre or, I dare say, useless intelhgence....
We have seen a similar deterioration in die quality of the security personnel deployed to the site.... If this program truly does represent one of the agency's most secret activities then it defies logic why inexperienced, marginal, underperforming and/or officers with potentially significant [counterintelligence] problems are permitted to deploy to this site. It is also important that we immediately inact [sic] some form of rigorous training
"872
A CIA OIG audit completed in June 2006 "found that personnel assigned to CIA-controlled detention facilities, for the most part, complied with the standards
and guidelines in carrying out their duties and responsibilities." The OIG also found that, "except for the shortage of debriefers, the facilities were staffed with sufficient numbers and typesofpersonnel." Thelackofdebriefers,however,wasdescribedas"anongoingproblem" fortheprogram. Accordingtotheaudit,therewereextendedperiodsin2005whentheCIA's DETENTION SITE ORANGE in Country | had either one or no debriefers. At least twice in the summer of 2005, the chief of Station in that country requested additional debriefers, warning that intelligence collection could suffer. Months later, in January 2006, the chief of Base at the detention site advised CIA Headquarters that "the facility still lacked debriefers to support intelligence collection requirements, that critical requirements were 'stacking up,' and that gaps in the debriefing of detainees were impacting the quantity and quality of intelligence reporting and would make the work of future debriefers more difficult.
Email from: [REDACTED] (COB DETENTION SITE BLACK); to; subject: General Comments; date: April 15, 2005.
^^^maUfrom: [REDACTED] (COB DETENTION SITE BLACK); to:
HlfjUBHIHI' subject: General Comments; date: April 15, 2005.
Report o f Audit, CIA-controlled Detention Facilities Operated Under the 17 September 2001 Memorandum of
Notification, Report No. 2005-0017-AS, June 14,2006, at DTS # 2006-2793. As further described in the
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M. Legal and Operational Challenges in 2005
1. Department ofJustice Renews Approvalfor the Use ofthe CIA's Enhanced Interrogation Techniques in May 2005
acting assistant attorney general for OLC, Steven Bradbury, issued two legal memoranda. The first analyzed whether the individual
use of the CIA's 13 enhanced interrogation techniques—including waterboarding, as well as a number of interrogation techniques that had been used in 2003 and 2004, but had not been analyzed in the original August 1, 2002, OLC memorandum—were consistent with the criminal prohibitionontorture.^^'^ ThesecondmemorandumconsideredthecombineduseoftheCIA's enhancedinterrogationtechniques.^^^ BothlegalmemorandaconcludedthattheuseoftheCIA's enhanced interrogation techniques did not violate the torture statute.
^005, the CIA inspector general, who had been provided with the two OLC memoranda, wrote a memo to the CIA director recommending that
the CIA seek additional legal guidance on whether the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques and conditions of confinement met the standard under Article 16 of the Convention Against Torture.^^^ Theinspectorgeneralnotedthat"astrongcasecanbemadethattheAgency's authorized intenogation techniques are the kinds of actions that Article 16 undertakes to prevent," adding that the use of the waterboard may be "cruel" and "extended detention with no clothing would be considered 'degrading' in most cultures, particularly Muslim." The inspector general further urged that the analysis of conditions was equally important, noting that the inspector general's staff had "found a number of instances of detainee treatment which arguably violate the prohibition on cruel, inhuman, and/or degrading treatment."^^^
Committee Study, the Inspector General audit described how the CIA's detention facihties were not equipped to providedetaineeswitlimedicalcare. Theauditdescribedunhygienicfoodpreparation,includingatafacilitywitha "rodent infestation," and noted that a physician assistant attributed symptoms of acute gastrointestinal illness and giardiasisexperiencedbysixstaffandadetaineetofoodandwatercontamination. Tlieauditfurtheridentified insufficient guidelines covering possible detainee escape or the death of a detainee.
See Memorandum for John A. Rizzo, Senior Deputy General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, from Steven G. Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, May 10, 2005, Re: Application of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340A to Certain Techniques That May Be Used in the Interrogation of a High Value al Qaeda Detainee.
See Memorandum for John A. Rizzo, Senior Deputy General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, from Steven G. Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, May 10, 2005, Re: Application of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340A to the Combined Use of Certain Techniques That May Be Used in the Interrogation of High Value al Qaeda Detainees.
May 26, 2005, Memorandum for Director, Central Intelligence Agency, from John Helgerson, Inspector General, re: Recommendation for Additional Approach to Department of Justice Concerning Legal Guidance on Intenogation Techniques.
May 26, 2005, Memorandum for Director, Central Litelligence Agency, from John Helgerson, Inspector General, re: Recommendation for Additional Approach to Department of Justice Concerning Legal Guidance on Interrogation Techniques.
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On May 30, 2005, a third OLC memorandum examining U.S. obligationsundertheConventionAgainstTorturewascompleted.^^^ Theconclusionsinthis
opinion were based largely on the CIA's representations about the effectiveness of the CIA interrogation program in obtaining unique and "otherwise unavailable actionable intelligence." As described later in this summary, and in more detail in Volume II, the CIA's effectiveness representations were almost entirely inaccurate.
2. Abu Faraj Al-Libi Subjected to the CIA *s Enhanced Interrogation Techniques Prior to Department of Justice Memorandum on U.S. Obligations Under the Convention Against Torture; CIA Subjects Abu Faraj Al-Libi to the CIA's Enhanced Interrogation Techniques When He Complains ofHearing Problems
Ori May 2, 2005, when Abu Faraj al-Libi, al-Qa'ida's chief of operations, was captured in Pakistan, the OLC had not yet issued the three aforementioned May
2005 legal memoranda.^^^ CIA officers described Abu Faraj al-Libi's capture as the "most important al-Qa'ida capture since Khalid Shaykh Muhammad."^^^ Shortly after al-Libi's capture, the CIA began discussing the possibility that Abu Faraj al-Libi might be rendered to U.S. custody.^^'
On May | , 2005, four days before the rendition of Abu Faraj al- Libi to CIA custody, Director of CTC Robert Grenier asked CIA Director Porter Goss to send a
memorandum to the national security advisor and the director of national intelligence "informing them of the CIA's plans to take custody of Abu Faraj al-Libi and to employ interrogation techniques if warranted and medically safe."^^^ On May 24, 2005, the White House informed the CIA that a National Security Council Principals Committee meeting would be necessary to discuss the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques on Abu Faraj al-Libi, but the travelscheduleofoneoftheprincipalswasdelayingsuchameeting.^^^ CIADirectorGoss instructed CIA officers to proceed as planned, indicating that he would call the principals individually and inform them that, if Abu Faraj al-Libi was found not to be cooperating and there were no contraindications to such an interrogation, he would approve the use of all of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques other than the waterboard, without waiting for a meeting of
See Memorandum for John A. Rizzo, Senior Deputy General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, from Steven G. Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, May 30, 2005, Re: Application of United States Obligations Under Article 16 of the Convention Against Torture to Certain Techniques that May Be Used in the Interrogation of High Value al Qaeda Detainees.
FormoreinfomiationonAbuFarajal-Libi'sdetentionandinterrogation,seeVolumeIII. HEADQUARTERSHM (251840ZMAY05^^
See, for example, 1085 (describing meetings on May 6 and 7, 2005).
May | , 2005, Memorandum for Director, Central Intelligence Agency, via Acting Deputy Director, Central
Intelligence Agency, ExecutiveDirector, Deputy Directorfor Operationsfrom Robert Grenier, Director, DCI Counterterrorist CenteTjrejlnterrogation Plan for Abu Faraj al-Libi.
Email froiir^m^^^p|; to; Robert Grenier, John Mudd, [REDACTEDl, [REDACTED1, | I ^ ^ I H B T r E D ACTED], cc:
[REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED]; subject: Possible significant delay in EITs for AFAL; date: May 24, 2005.
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theprincipals.Abu Faraj al-Libi wasrendered toCIAcustody atDETENTION SITE ORANGE on May 2005,^^^ and transferred to DETENTION SITE BLACK on May H, 2005.^^^
o n May 2005, CIA Director Goss formally notified National Security Advisor Stephen Hadley and Director of National Intelligence (DNI) John Negroponte
that Abu Faraj al-Libi would be rendered to the unilateral custody of the CIA.^^^ Director Goss's memorandum stated:
"[sjhould Abu Faraj resist cooperating in CIA debriefings, and pending a finding of no medical or psychological contraindictations [sic], to interrogation, I will authorize CIA trained and certified interrogators to employ one or more of the thirteen specific interrogation techniques for which CIA recently received two signed legal opinions from the Department of Justice (DOJ), Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) that these techniques, both individually andusedcollectively, arelawful."^^^
The memorandum from Director Goss described Abu Faraj al-Libi as holding the third most important position in al-Qa'ida, and "play[ing] a leading role in
directing al-Qa'ida's global operations, including attack planning against the US homeland." Abu Faraj al-Libi was also described as possibly overseeing al-Qa'ida's "highly compartmented anthrax efforts."^^^
On May 2005, one day after al-Libi's arrival at DETENTION SITE BLACK, CIA interrogators received CIA Headquarters approval for the use of the CIA's
enhanced interrogation techniques on Abu Faraj a l - L i b i . C I A interrogators began using the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques on Abu Faraj al-Libi on May 28, 2005, two days before the OLC issued its memorandum analyzing whether the techniques violated U.S. obligations under the Convention Against Torture.^^'
The CIA intenogated Abu Faraj al-Libi for more than a month usingtlieCIA'senhancedinterrogationtechniques. Onanumberofoccasions,CIA
interrogators applied the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques to Abu Faraj al-Libi when he
Email from: to: Robert Grenier, John Mudd, [REDACTED], [REDACTED],!
IH iH ' I^I^^Hj^DACTED],••••, cc:
[REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED]; subject: Possible significant delay in EITs for AFAL; date; May 24,
2005^ 88-'' ^
887 Memorandum for Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, Director of National Intelligence, from
Porter Goss, Director, CenUal Intelligence Agency, May 2005, re: Interrogation Plan for Abu Faraj al-Libi.
888 Memorandum for Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, Director of National Intelligence, from
Porter Goss, Director, Central Intelligence Agency, May 2005, re: Interrogation Plan for Abu Faraj al-Libi.
889 Memorandum for Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, Director of National Intelligence, from
Porter Goss, Director, Central Intelligence Agency, May 2005, re; Intenogation Plan for Abu Faraj al-Libi.
8^° HEADQUARTERS • • 1
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complained of a loss of hearing, repeatedly telling him to stop pretending he could not hear well.^^^ Although the interrogators indicated that they believed al-Libi's complaint was an interrogation resistance technique, Abu Faraj al-Libi was fitted for a hearing aid after his transfer toU.S.militarycustodyatGuantanamoBayin2006.^^^ Despitetherepeatedandextensiveuse of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques on Abu Faraj al-Libi, CIA Headquarters continued to insist throughout the summer and fall of 2005 that Abu Faraj al-Libi was withholdinginformationandpressedforthereneweduseofthetechniques. Theuseofthe CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques against Abu Faraj al-Libi was eventually discontinued because CIA officers stated that they had no intelligence to demonstrate that Abu Faraj al-Libi continued to withhold information, and because CIA medical officers expressed concern that additional use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques "may come with unacceptable medicalorpsychologicalrisks."^^"^ AfterthediscontinuationoftheCIA'senhanced interrogation techniques, the CIA asked Abu Faraj al-Libi about UBL facilitator Abu Ahmad al- Kuwaitiforthefirsttime.^^^ AbuFarajal-Libideniedknowledgeofal-Kuwaiti.^^^
3. CIA Acquires Two Detainees from the U.S. Military
Another legal issue in late 2005 was related to the U.S. Department of Defense's involvement in CIA detention activities. In September 2005, the CIA and the
Department of Defense signed a Memorandum of Understanding on this subject,^^-^^ and the U.S. military agreed to transfer two detainees, Ibrahim Jan and Abu Ja'far al-Iraqi, to CIA custody. Both were held by the U.S. military without being registered with the ICRC for over 30 days, pending their transfer to CIA c u s t o d y . T h e transfer of Abu Ja'far al-Iraqi took place notwithstanding Department of State concerns that the transfer would be inconsistent with statements made by the secretary of state that U.S. forces in Iraq would remain committed to the law of armed conflict, including the Geneva Conventions.^^^
2499 (262123Z JUN 05
Email from: to: [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED]7HHHBii' [REDACTED], subject:
IResponse to DDO Tasking of 7 July on Abu Faraj Interrogation; date: July 8, 2005, at 06:16 PM. DIRECTOR • • (121847Z JUL 05); HEADQUARTERS AN 04); i l l i 20361
(291232Z JAN 04); DIRECTOR • • (040522Z MAY 04) • • 29454 (131701Z JUL 05)
Memorandum of Understanding Concerning DOD Support to CIA with Sensitive Capture and Detention Operations in the War on Terrorism.
^^^5^mail from: [REDACTED], • • • ; to: [REDACTED], [REDACTED]; cc:
• • I , [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED]; subject: DoD Request for a list of HVTs not to be issued ISN numbers. The email stated: "In conjunction with discussions between CIA and DoD over the weelcend regarding our request to have the military render Ibraliim Jan to our custody and NOT issuing him an ISN number, DoD has requested CIA provide a list of HVTs to whom, if captured, the military should NOT issue ISN numbers" (emphasis in original)^ee | | H | ^ | l 5 0 5 j H | H | | | OCT 05).
July 2005 Memorandum for Joint Staff ( H m A Regarding ( ^ ^ ^ m
Interim Guidance
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In late 2005, during the period the U.S. Senate was debating the Detainee Treatment Act baning "cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment,the
CIAsubjectedAbuJa'faral-Iraqitoitsenhancedinterrogationtechniques.^®^ Adraft Presidential Daily Brief (PDB) stated that Abu Ja'far al-Iraqi provided "almost no information that could be used to locate former colleagues or disrupt attack plots"—the type of information sought by the CIA, and the CIA's justification for the use of its enhanced interrogation techniques.^^^ Later,thestatementthatAbuJa'faral-Iraqiprovided"almostnoinformationthat could be used to locate former colleagues or disrupt attack plots" was deleted from the draft PDB.^®^ AbuJa'faral-IraqiremainedinCIAcustodyuntilearlySeptember2006,whenhewas transferred to U.S. military custody in Iraq.^^
4. The CIA Seeks "End Game "for Detainees in Early 2005 Due to Limited Support From Liaison Partners
Email from: [REDACTED]; to; [REDACTED], [REDACTED]; cc: II^Himill [REDACTED], [REDACTED]; Subject: McCain Amendment on Detainee Treatment; date: October 6, 2005, at 12:37 PM.
According to CIA records, Abu Ja'far al-Iraqi was subjected to nudity, dietary manipulation, insult slaps, abdominal slaps, attention grasps, facial holds, walling, stress positions, and water dousing with 44 degree Fahrenheit water for 18 minutes. He was shackled in the standing position for 54 hours as part of sleep deprivation, and experienced swelling in his lower legs requiring blood thinner and spiriil ace bandages. He was moved to a sittingposition,andhissleepdeprivationwasextendedto78hours. Aftertheswellingsubsided,hewasprovided with more blood thinner and was returned to the standing position. The sleep deprivation was extended to 102 hours. Afterfourhoursofsleep,AbuJa'faral-Iraqiwassubjectedtoanadditional52hoursofsleepdeprivation, after which CIA Headquarters infomied interrogators that eight hours was the minimum rest period between sleep deprivation sessions exceeding 48 hours. In addition to the swelling, Abu Ja'far al-Iraqi also experienc^an edema onhisheadduetowalling,abrasionsonhisneck,andblistersonhisanklesfromshackles. SeeW^B^M1810
IDEC 05); 1813 DEC 05); • • • 1819 ^ ^ H p E C 0 5 ) J | ^ ^ l 1847
IDEC05); H H H 05); HEADQUARTERS^^!••j^DEC^). See additional informationonAbuJ£faraWmqHi^olum^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
titled: December 13, 2005, ALT ID#: -2132586. Director Goss notified the national security advisor that he had authorized the use of die CIA's enhanced intenogation techniques on Abu Ja'far al-Iraqi because "CIA believes that Abu Ja'far possesses considerableoperationalinformationaboutAbuMu'sabal-Zarqawi." SeeDecember1,2005,Memorandumforthe National Security Advisor, Director of National Intelligence, from Porter Goss, Central Intelligence Agency, subject, "CounterteiTonstlnterrogationTechnique^^
PDB Draft titled: December 2005, AL T ID: 20051217 PDB on Abu Jafar al-Iraqi. Urging the change to the draft PDB, one of the interrogators involved in Abu Ja'far al-Iraqi's interrogation wrote, "If we allow the Director to give tliis PDB, as it is written, to the President, I would imagine the President would say, 'You asked me to risk my presidency on your intenogations, and now you give me this that implies the intenogations are not working. Why do we bother?' We think the tone of the PDB should be tweaked. Some of the conclusions, based on our experts' observations, should be amended. The glass is half full, not half empty, and is getting more full every day." See email from: [REDACTED]
^ • • 1 ; to: [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED]; cc: [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED]; subiect^D^n [Abu Ja|fo^Mraqi]^te: December 15, 2005, at 12:25 AM.
2031 In June 2007, inaccurate information about the effectiveness of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques on Abu Ja'fai* al-Iiaqi was provided to the Committee. See CIA Response to Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Questions for die Record, June 18,2007 (DTS #2007-2564); |
32732 • • • 0 c r 0 5 ) ^ ^ l | | | | 3 2 7 0 7 H p H O C r 0 5 ) ^ H H H 32726 • • • OCT 05);
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(TS/^^Hp||[^H|//NF) In early 2005, the CIA again sought an "endgame" policy for its detainees, citing its unstable relations with host governments and its difficulty in identifying additionalcountriestohostCIAdetentionfacilities.^®^ TalkingpointspreparedfortheCIA director for a meeting with the national security advisor made the following appeal:
"CIA urgently needs [the President of the United States] and Principals Committee direction to establish a long-term disposition policy for the 12 High-Value detainees (HVD)s we hold in overseas detention sites. Our liaison partners who host these sites are deeply concerned by [REDACTED]^®^ press leaks, and they are increasingly skeptical of the [U.S. government's] commitment to keep secret their cooperation.... A combination of press leaks, international scrutiny of alleged [U.S. government] detainee abuse, and the perception that [U.S. government] policy on detainees lacks direction is eroding our partners' trust in U.S. resolve to protect their identities and supporting roles. If a [U.S. government] plan for long-term [detainee] disposition does not emerge soon, the handful of liaison partners who cooperate may ask us to close down our facilities on their tenitory. Few countries are willing to accept the huge risks associated with hosting a CIA detention site, so shrinkage of the akeady small pool of willing candidates could force us to curtail our highly successful interrogation and detention program. Fearofpublicexposuremayalsopromptpreviouslycooperative liaison partners not to accept custody of detainees we have captured and interrogated. Establishment of a clear, publicly announced [detainee] 'endgame' - one sanctioned by [the President of the United States] and supported by Congress - will reduce our partners' concerns and rekindle their enthusiasm for helping the US in the War on Terrorism."^^^
I" March 2005, talking points prepared for the CIA director for a discussion with the National Security Council Principals Committee stated that it was:
The CIA's June 2013 Response states that an "important factor" contributing to the slower pace of CIA detention operations was al-Qa'ida's relocation to the FATA, which "made it significantly more challenging [for the Pakistani government] to mount capture operations resulting in renditions and detentions by the RDI program." A review of CIA records by the Committee found that legal, policy, and otheroperational concerns dominated internal deliberationsabou^eprogram. In2005,CIAofficersasked officialstorendertwodetaineestoCIA
one mifjfll and one H H . neither detaineewastransferredtoCIAcustody. CIAofficersnotedthatobtainingcustodyofdetaineesheldbyaforeign
government during this period was becoming increasingly difficult, highlighting diat I H l H j H H l i i H I H H
In March 2006, Director Goss testified to the Committee thatlack(rfspacewas the limiting factor in taking custody of additional detainees.
See HEADQUAJRTERSHH^H|H||||HhEADQUARTERS H I ^ H l ^ H ^ ^ a i l from: [REDACTED], l ^ ^ ^ K t o : cc: [REDACTED], [REDACTED],! [REDACTEDUREDACrED]^[REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED]; subject: for coord, pis: D/CIA talkin^oint^ll^miPIII^Ire rendition ofj
6702|||||B|||fH|^^|ntIEADQUARTERS transcript of Senate Select Committee on Intelligence briefing, March 15, 2006 (DTS #2006-1308).
906 Text redacted by the CIA prior to provision to Committee members at the U.S. Senate.
See CIA document dated, January 12,2005, entitled, "DCI Talking Points for Weekly Meeting with National Security Advisor."
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"only a matter of time before our remaining handful of current blacksite hosts concludes that [U.S. government] policy on [detainees] lacks direction and... [the blacksite hosts] ask us to depart from their soil.... Continuation of status quo will exacerbate tensions in these very valuable relationships and cause them to withdraw their critical support and cooperation with the [U.S. government]."^®^
During this period, the U.S. solicitor general, however, expressed concern that if CIA detainees were transferred back to Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, they might be
entitled to file a habeas petition and have access to an attorneyMeanwhile, the National Security Council continued to discuss a public roll-out, and as described later in this summaiy, the CIA engaged the media directly in order to defend and promote the program.^^®
The question of what to do with the remaining detainees in CIA custody remained unresolved throughout 2005, during which time the CIA pursued agreements
with additional countries to establish clandestine CIA detention facilities.^'^ The Detainee Treatment Act was passed by Congress on December 23, 2005, as part of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Yeai* 2006. That day, the CIA suspended its interrogation program again.^'^ Asdescribedlaterinthissummary,inFebruary2006,theCIAinformedtheNational Security Council principals that the CIA would not seek continued use of all of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques.^'^
5. Press Stones and the CIA's Inability to Provide Emergency Medical Care to Detainees ResultintheClosingofCIADetentionFacilitiesinCountries| and|
In October 2005, the CIA learned that Washington Po^Hjeporter Dana Priest had information about the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program,
negotiations with the Washington Post in which it sought to prevent the newspaper from publishing information on the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program.^'"^ Fearful that
See CIA Talking Points for Principals Committee Meeting on Long-Term Disposition of High-Value Detainees, 8 March 2005.
See email from: to: John Rizzo; subject: Meeting this am with WH counsel on endgame planning; date: January 14,2005.
Email &omJHHH^p; to^H^^HHccOREDA^D], [REDACTED], John A. Rizzo, subject: Re: Brokaw Take date: April 14, 2005, at 9:22:32 AM. In 2006, Vice PresidentCheney expressed resei-vations about any public release of information regarding the CIA program. See CIA Memorandum for the Record from [REDACTED],
C/CTCjlHI' subject, "9 March 2006 Principals Committee Meeting on Detainees."
Negotiations with Countries | and | to host CIA detention facilities are described in this summary, and in
greater detail in Volume I.
HEADQUARTERS (232040Z DEC 05)
9'^ DDCIA Talking Points for 10 February 2006 Un-DC re Future of the CIA Counterterrorist Rendition, Detention, andIntenogation Program - Interrogation Techniques.
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the CIA recommended the immediate transfer of CIA detainees to Department of Defense custody When the
Department of Defense rejected the proposal, the National Security Council directed the CIA to prepar^ther options.^^^ Meanwhile, two U.S. ambassadors, one in and another in
inquired whether Secretary of State Rice had been briefed on the impending Washington Post article and sought to speak to the secretary herself to ensure that the CIA programwasauthorized. AccordingtoCIAdocuments,SecretaryRicewasnotawareofthe specificcountrieswheretheCIAdetentionfacilitieswerelocated.^^^ Inlieuofaphonecallfrom
Secretary Rice, the CIA recommended that the State Department's CounterteiTorism Coordinator and former CTC DDO, Henry Crumpton, call the ambassadors.^^^ The Washington Post published an article about CIA detention sites on November 2, 2005.^^^
The publicationofthe Washington Post article resulted in a demarche to th^Unite^StatesfromJ^^BHH^^ which also suggested that
contribution jjj^^^H^^^H^^^^^^ould be in jeopardyThe United States also receivedademarch^^m^^^^H^^||.^-^ AccordingtoaCIAcable,U.S. representatives to "if another shoe were to drop," there would be considerable ramifications for U.S. relations with on a number of issues that dependedonU.S.credibilityintheareaofhumanrights. Therepresentativesalso"questioned whether the gravity of this potential problem is fully appreciated in Washington."^--
The other options put forward by the CIA were transfer of CIA detainees which the CIA anticipatedwouldreleasethedetaineesafterashortperiod. TheCIAalsoproposeditsownoutrightreleaseofthe
detainees. See CIA document entitled D/CIA Talking Points for use at
HEADQUARTERS
Talking Points for Dr. J.D. Crouch for telephone calls to Ambassadors in [REDACTED] regarding possibility of
forthcoming Dana Priest press article; email from:
[REDACTED]; cc: [REDACTE^^REDACTED]; subject: Phone Call with State/L re Ambassadors who want to speak to the SecState^datej^^PHmi, at06:45 PM.
Email fiom: ^^HHRtoTiREDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED]; cc: [REDACTED], [REDACTED]; subject: Phone Call with State/L re Ambassadors who want tospeaktotheSec^ate; date: October 24, 2005, at 06:45 PM; email from: [REDACTED]; to: [REDACTED]; cc: • • • • • I , [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTCDUREDACTEDU^DACTED]; subject: Phone caU from S/CT Amb. Hank Crumpton to Ambassador in ^^te: November 1, 2005, at 6:13:21 PM. Afterthesubsequentpressrevelations,theU.S.ambassadorinCountry| askedagainaboutwhetherthesecretaryof statehadbeenbriefed,promptingtheCIAStationinCountiy| tonoteinacablethatbriefingU.S.officialsoutside of the CIA "would be a significant departure from current policy." See [REDACTED] H I [REDACTED].
See "CIA
Holds Terror Suspects in Secret Prisons," the Wasliin Post, November 2, 2005.
|. See cable to [REDACTED] at HEADQUAR |
cables to [REDACTED] at HEADQUAR and HEADQUAR cable to [REDACTED] at H E A D Q U A ^
|; Memorandum from D/CIA Goss to Hadley, Townsend and Negroponte,
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catalogued how the Washington Post story created tensions in its bilateral counterterrorism relations with allies and determined that:
"[t]he article is prompting our partners to reassess the benefits and costs of cooperating with the [U.S. government] and CIA. These services have conducted aggressive, high-impact operations with CIA against... targets,
including
aggressive or cooperative.
We no longer expect the services to be as
»923
In April 2006,
informed CIA officers that press stories on the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program led
the government to prohibit from providing "information that could lead to the rendition or detention of al-Qa'ida or other terrorists to U.S. Government custody for interrogation, including CIA and the Department ofDefense."^^"^
M^dia leaks also created tensions with countries that had hosted or continued to host CIA detention facilities. For example, leaks prompted Country | officials to
convey their intent to communicate directly with the Departments of Justice andState^^iey then formally demarched the U.S. government.^"^ As late as H 2009, the
Country| raisedwithCIADii'ectorPanettathe"problemoftheseojetdetentionfacility"that had"testedandstrained"thebilateralpartnership. The ofCountry| alsostated that assurances were needed that future cooperation with the CIA would be safeguarded.^^^
After publication of the Washington Post article, Countt^^demanded^e closure of DETENTION SITE BLACK within | hours.^^^ The CIA
transferred the H || remaining CIA detainees out ofthe facility shortly thereafter.^^^
[REDACTED]
See email from: HHHH^^MjtoOREDACTED]; cc: [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTEdT^^^H^H, [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED]; subject: sensitive do not forward - draft intel; date: April 7, 2006, at 04:12:59 AM. See also September 2, 2006, Fax from
DD/CTC, to Steve Bradbury, John Bellinger III, Steve Cambone, foi-warding September 1, 2006 Memorandum, "Anticipated Foreign Reactions to the Public Announcement of die US Secret Terrorist Detention Center." |||||||B begun raising legal and policy concerns related to [an^otential] support and assistance to the CIA in rendition, detention, and interrogation operations in Marcl^005j|||fcfficer^ndicate^haUl^ believed the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the prohibited H from aiding or assisting in these CIA operations. For iilililiinnNM^^iiimil iinHjh i' il (iiiii imi ilmiil Renditions and Detention, see email from: [REDACTED]^OS John A. Rizzo^c^REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED]; subject: more from R e T H l H
11:09 AM.
"[REDACTED] article fallout." According to CIA records, the ofCountry | was "very angry"
about press reports, which, he believed, would be "exploited by radical elements" to "foment increa^hostility toward [Country J] government." [REDACTED] DIRR|||||||||||| [REDACTED]; [REDACTED] |||H|| [REDACTED]. CIArecordsfurtherstatethatthepressreportingwould"putconsiderablestrainonthe relationship." (See"[REDACTED]articlefallout.")Despitethisrecord,andotherrecordsinthefullCommittee Study, theCIA'sJune 2013 Response state£"[w]efound noevidence that the RDI program inany way negatively affected US relations overall with Countr
[REDACTED] 23281
927 [REDACTED] 7885 ([REDACTED] [REDACTED]) 528 [REDACTED] 4895 ([REDACTED] [REDACTED])
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Country | officers refused to admit CIA detainee Mustafa Ahmad al-Hawsawi to a local hospital despite earlier discussions with country representatives abou^ow a detainee's medical emergency would be handled.^^^ While the CIA understood the
officers' reluctance to place a CIA detaineein^ocal hospital given media reports, CIA Headquarters also questioned the "willingness of to participate as originally agreed/plannedwithregardtoprovisionofemergencymedicalcare."^^^ Afterfailingtogain assistance from the Department of Defense,the CIA was forced to seek assistance from three third-party countries in providing medical care to al-Hawsawi and four other CIA detainees widi acuteailments. Ultimat^,th^CI^pai^heB|||H^^^^^^H|^Bmorcthan$^|millionfor the treatment of
fo^h^reatmen^f and made arrangements for
and to be treatedin^HBj^^^The medical issues resulted in the closing
of DETENTION SITE VIOLET in Countryjfin|B|| 2006.^^^ The CIA then transferred its remaining detainees to DETENTION SITE BROWN. At diat point, all CIA detainees were located in Country
Meanwhile, the pressures on the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program brought about by the Washington P o s ^ t ^ prompted die CIA to consider new options
among what it called the "[d]windling pool partners willing to host CIA Blacksites."^^^
The CIA thus renewed earlier efforts to establish a detention facility in Country The CIA had
earlier provided $ | million to Country | ' s in preparation for a potendal CIA
^tention site, prompting the chief of Station to comment, "Do you realize you can buy [Country ^7"939 December|,2005,thechiefofStationinCountry| metwiththe
who was not concerned about the CIA's detention of terrorists in his country, but wanted assurances that the CIA interrogation program did not include the use of
^29 HEADQUARTERS ([REDACTED] [REDACTED]).
[REDACTED] 5014
HEADQUARTERS
See CIA Request Letter to DOD for Medical Assistance, dated __MM •' 2006, from DCIA Porter Goss. This
letter was written four days after the CIA Headquarters cable noting the emerging difficulties in relying on host- country medical care. See also CIA document entitled. Summary and Reflections of Chief of Medical Services on OMSParticipationintheRDIProgram. Whilethedocumentisundated,itincludesinfomiationupdatedthrough 2007.
5eeCI^(^umententitled/|C0^ TO FOR MEDICAL TREATMENT," date not listed.
• ^ ^ • 7 7 1 9 See also CIA document entitled, "COMPENSATION TO LIAISON FOR MEDICAL TREATMENT," date not listed, which indicates that the total compensation provided was $ B m .
Summary and Reflections of Chief of Medical Services on OMS Participation in ttie RDI Program. SeeVolume Iforadditional details.
4118 HEADQUARTERS
See CIA Counterterrorlst Rendition, Detainee, andInteiTogation ProgramTdatedlBFebrucu-y 2006, "Un-DC"
Meeting slides.
Transcript of Oral History Interview, Interviewee: | B | | ^ H | | | | | | | | (RJ) - October 13, 2006, Interviewer:
[REDACTED] and [REDACTED].
Kii I (III I
imimiii
I([REDACTED] [REDACTED]). See also HEADQUARTERS
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CIA Headquarters that the facility in Country | committed plan for medical provider coverage.
^"0 [REDACTED] 1938 [REDACTED] 1938 ^"2 [REDACTED] 3145
HEADQUARTERS
[REDACTED] 6481 ^''5 [REDACTED] 6481
[REDACTED] 6877 947 HEADQUARTERS
[REDACTED] 7670
9495e^nail from: [REDACTED]^:
subject: ||H|||| CTC^^I discussion is also referenced in
"should not be activated without a clear,
UNCLASSIFIED
torture.^"^® In providing his approval, the
of Station not to inform the U.S. ambassador in Country
agreement with another country, Country to establish a CIA detention facility in that country and arranged with the leadership of Country | not to inform tlie U.S. ambassador there.^"^^ The CIA ultimately did not detain individuals in either counti7.
In late October 2005, days before the publication of the Washington Post article, the CIA asked a separate country. Country | , to temporarily house B
CIA detainees.The chief of Station briefed the U.S. ambassador in Country who requested that the National Security Council and the White House be bnefe^rnh^lan.^"^ There are no CIArecordstoindicatethebriefingoccurred. Country|'s|||^m||||||||m provided approval, while seeking assurances that the CIA would develop a contingenc^lai^i^as^ie detention site was exposedinthem^^ the CIA Station and the
considered in Countiy CIA Headquarters directed that a long-termCIAdetentionfacilitybeestablishedinthecountry. Counti7['s
approved a plan to build a CIA detention facility ^ut noted his ongoing concerns about the lack of a CIA "exit strategy.
The lack of emergency medical care for detainees, the issue that had forced the closing of DETENTION SITE VIOLET in Country was raised repeatedly in
thecontextoftheconstructionoftheCIAdetentionfacilityinCountry|. OnMarch 2006, CIA Headquarters requested that the CIA Station in Country | ask Counti'y | to arrange discreet access to the nearest hospital and medical staff. The cable stated that the CIA "look[s] forward to a favorable response, prior to commencing with the construction of our detention facility. Construction nonetheless began on the facility without the issue of emergency medical care havingbeenresolved. In^Hj2006,afterthedeputychiefoftheCIAStationinCounti'y|,the deputy chief of RDG, and an OMS officer met with officers, the Station reported that the establishment of emergency medical care proximaHothesitewas^^i^^ In July 2006, an OMS representative informed the chief of
REDACTED] 6903
leetin re.
UREDACTED]; cc: H i '^•57:2^M. The June
agreed to a request from the chief The CIA also reached an
date;
I; Memorandumfor the Record; to: C/CTCj^H;from:
^andRecommendations. Asdescribed,inJune2006,theCIA inspector general issued an audit tliatconcluded that while CIA detention facilities lacked sufficient debriefers, they
"were constructed, equipped, and staffed to securely and safely contain detainees and prompt intelligence exploitationofdetainees." Theauditfurtlierdeterminedthatthefacilities"arenotequippedtoprovidemedical treatment to detainees who have ordevelopseriousphysica^^iei^^ and operable plans are not in place
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By the time a CIA team visited the Country | detention site in late 2006,theCIAhadakeadyinvested$Bmillioninthenewfacility. Describingtheabsenceof
adequate emergency medical care options as "unacceptable," the chief of RDG recommended in adraftmemothatconstructioneffortsbeabandonedforthisreason.^^® Thefollowingday,an edited version of the same memo described the issue as a "challenge," but did not recommend thattheCIAceaseconstm^ionofthefacility.^^^ TheresultingCIAdetentionfacility,which wouldeventuallycost$|Hmillion,wasneverusedb^heCIA. PressreportsabouttheCIA's Detention and Interrogation Program that appeared in | | ^ | and m eventually forced the CIA to pass possession of the unused facility to the Country | government. 9 5 2
In early January 2006, officials at the Department of Defense informed CIA officers that Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld had made a formal decision not to
acceptanyCIAdetaineesattheU.S.militarybaseatGuantanamoBay,Cuba.^^^ Atthetime,the CIA was holding 28 detainees in its two remaining facilities, DETENTION SITE VIOLET, in Country | , and DETENTION SITE ORANGE, in Country In preparation for a meeting with Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld on January 6, 2006, CIA Director Goss was provided a document indicating that the Department of Defense's position not to allow the transfer of CIA detainees to U.S. military custody at Guantanamo Bay "would cripple legitimate end game planning" for the CIA.^^^ The talking points for that meeting suggested that Director Goss tell Secretary Rumsfeld that the:
"only viable 'endgame' for continued US Government custody of these most dangerous terrorists is a transfer to GTMO... [a]bsent the availability of GTMO and eventual DoD custody, CIA will necessarily have to begin transferring those detainees no longer producing intelligence to third countries,
to provide inpatient care for detainees," and concluded that CIA detention facilities were not equipped to provide emergencymedicalcaretodetainees. TheauditteamdidnotvisitthefacilityinCountry butstated,withregard to another country, Country | , that "CIA funds have been wasted in constructing and equipping a medical facility thatwaslaterdeterminednottobeaviableoptionforprovidinginpatientcarefordetainees." SeeReportofAudit, CIA-controlled Detention Facilities Operated Under the 17 September 2001 Memorandum of Notification, Report No.2005-0017-AS,June14,2006,atDTS#2006-2793. TheCIA's supervisedthe CIA's Renditions and Detention Group. ^^J|||H||Hp|2006,MemorandumfortheRecord,to:C/CTCHjl,from:C/CTCm^RDG,re: SiteVisitto
^^^^^^^HpH2006, Memorandumfor the Record, to: C/CTC|^^|, from: C/CTC||^H/RDG, re: Site Visit to IIIII^HIII^Vand Recommendations (2).
Congressional Notification: Central Intelligenc^gen^Response to Host Country Government Order to Vacate an Inactiv^lacksit^et^tion Facility, #2009-3711); SSCI Memorandum for the Record, CIA Document, RDI Program Background Brief for Leon Panetta, 2009.
DCIA Talking Points for 6 January 2006 Breakfast with Secretary of Defense, re: SecDef Refusal to Take CIA Detainees on GTMO.
See CIA Memo, "As of01 January 2006, therew^ 28 HVDs inCIA custody." As noted above, DETENTION SITE VIOLET inCountry | would beclosed in 2006.
DCIA Talking Points for 6 January 2006 Breakfast with Secretary of Defense, re: SecDef Refusal to Take CIA Detainees on GTMO.
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which may release them, or [the CIA itself may need to] outright release them."^^^
After Secretary Rumsfeld declined to reconsider his decision not to allow the transfer of CIA detainees to U.S. military custody at Guantanamo Bay, CIA officers
proposed elevating the issue to the president. CIA officers prepared talking points for Director Goss to meet with the president on the "Way Forward" on the program on January 12, 2006.^^^ The talking points recommended that the CIA director "stress that absent a decision on the long- term issue (so called 'endgame') we are stymied and the program could collapse of its own weight."^''^ TherearenorecordstoindicatewhetherDirectorGossmadethispresentationtothe president.
2005 and 2006, the CIA transferred detainees from its custody to
at least nine countries, includinji
aswellastotheU.S.militaryinIraq. Manyofthese detainees were subsequently released.^^^ By May 2006, the CIA had 11 detainees whom it had
identified as candidates for prosecution by a U.S. military commission. The remaining detainees were described as having "repatriation options open."^^°
6. The CIA Considers Changes to the CIA Detention and Interrogation Program Following the Detainee Treatment Act, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld
Following the passage of the Detainee Treatment Act in December 2005, the CIA conducted numerous discussions with the National Security Council principals
about modifications to the program that would be acceptable from a policy and legal standpoint. In February 2006, talking points prepared for CIA Director Goss noted that National Security Advisor Stephen Hadley:
"asked to be informed of the criteria CIA will use before accepting a detainee into its CIA Counterten-orist Rendition, Detention, and InteiTOgation Program, stating that he believed CIA had in the past accepted detainees it should not have."^^^
The CIA director proposed future criteria that would require not only that CIA detainees meet the standard in the MON, but that they possess information about
threats to the citizens of the United States or otiier nations, and that detention in a CIA facility
DCIA Talking Points for 6 January 2006 Breakfast with Secretaiy of Defense, re: SecDef Refusal to Take CIA Detainees on GTMO.
DCIA Talking Points for 12 January 2006 Meeting with tlie President, re: Way Forward on Counterterrorist Rendition, Detention and Interrogation Program.
DCIA Talking Points for 12 January 2006 Meeting with the President, re: Way Forward on CounterteiTorist Rendition, Detention and Intenogation Program.
See V olume I for additional details.
960 jyjgy |g^ 2006, Deputies Committee (Un-DC) Meeting, Preliminary Detainee End Game Options. For additional
information, see V olume I.
DCIA TalkingPointsfor 9 February2006Un-DC,re: Future of theCIACounterterrorist Rendition,Detention,
and Interrogation Program - Detainees.
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wa^pprapriate for intelligence exploitation.^^^ Afew months later, Legal, wrote to Acting Assistant Attorney General Steven Bradbury suggesting a
modifiedstandardforapplyingtheCIA'senhancedinterrogationtechniques. Thesuggestednew standard was that "the specific detainee is believed to possess critical intelligence of high value totheUnitedStates." Whiletheproposedmodificationincludedtherequirementthatadetainee have "critical intelligence of high value," it represented an expansion of CIA authorities, insofar as it covered the detention and interrogation of an individual with information that "would assist in locating the most senior leadership of al-Qa'ida of [sic] an associated terrorist organization," even if that detainee was not assessed to have knowledge of, or be directly involved in, imminent terrorist threats.^^^
Discussions with the National Security Council principals also resulted in a March 2006 CIA proposal for an interrogation program involving only seven of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques: sleep deprivation, nudity, dietary manipulation, facial
grasp, facial slap, abdominal slap, and the attention grab.^^"^ This proposal was not acted upon at the time. The proposal for sleep deprivation of up to 180 hours, however, raised concerns among the National Security Council principals.^^^
In April 2006, the CIA briefed the president on the "current status" of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program. According to an internal CIA review, this
was the first time the CIA had briefed the president on the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques.^^^ As previously noted, the president expressed concern at the April 2006 briefing about the "image of a detainee, chained to the ceiling, clothed in a diaper, and forced to go to the bathroom on himself."^*^^
On June 29, 2006, the Supreme Court issued its decision in the case of Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, concluding that the military commission convened to try Salim
DCIA Talking Points for 9 February 2006 Un-DC, re: Future of the CIA Counterterrorist Rendition, Detention, and Intenogation Program - Detainees.
Letter from Legal Acting Assistant Attorney General Bradbury, May 23, 2006. (DTS #2009-1809); Memorandum for John A. Rizzo, Senior Deputy General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, from StevenG. Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, May 10,2005, Re; Application of 18 U.S.C. Sections 2340-2340A to Certain Techniques That May be Used in the InteiTogation of a High Value al Qaeda Detainee (DTS #200^^l0^a^), citing Fax for Daniel Levin, Acting Assistant Attorney Genera^ffice of Legal Counsel, fromBH^^^H> Assistant General Counsel, CIA (Jan. 4, 2005) ('January 4
Fax'); Memorandum for John A. Rizzo, Senior Deputy General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, from Steven G. Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, May 10,2005, Re: Application of 18 U.S.C. Sections 2340-2340A to the Combined Use of Certain Techniques in the Interrogation of HighValuealQaedaDetainees (DTS #2009-1810, Tab10);Memorandum forJohnA.Rizzo, SeniorDeputy General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, from Steven G. Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, May 30, 2005, Re: Application of United States Obligations Under Article 16 of theConvention AgainstTorturetoCertain Techniques tliatMaybeUsedintheInterrogation ofHighValueAl Qaeda Detainees (DTS #2009-1810, Tab 11).
DCIA Talking Points for 9 March 2006 Principals Committee Meeting.
Memorandum for the Record from [REDACTED], C/CTCH, re: 9March 2006 Principals Committee Meeting on Detainees.
See CIA document entitled, "DCIA Meeting with the President/^atedApril 8, 2006.
Email from: Grayson SWIGERT; to: [REDACTED]; cc: subject: Dr. [SWIGERT's] 7 June meeting with DCI; date: June 7, 2006.
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Hamdan, a detainee at Guantanamo Bay, was inconsistent with statutory requirements and Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions. The implication of the decision was that treating a detainee in a manner inconsistent with the requirements of Common Article 3 would constitute a violation of federal criminal law. CIA attorneys analyzed the Hamdan decision, noting that it could have a significant impact on "current CIA interrogation practices.Their memorandum also referenced that Acting Assistant Attorney General Steven Bradbury had the "preliminary view ... that the opinion 'calls into real question' whether CIA could continue its CT interrogation program involving enhanced interrogation techniques," as the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques "could be construed as inconsistent with the provisions of Common Article 3 prohibiting 'outrages upon personal dignity' and violence to life and person."^^^
The case of Hamdan v. Rumsfeld prompted the OLC to withdraw a draft memorandum on the impact of the Detainee Treatment Act on the CIA's enhanced
interrogation techniques.^^® The CIA did not use its enhanced inten-ogation techniques again until July 2007, by which time the OLC had interpreted the Military Commissions Act, signed by the president on October 17, 2006, in such a way as to allow the CIA to resume the use of the techniques.^^^
N. The Final Disposition of CIA Detainees and the End of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program
L President Bush Publicly Acknowledges the Existence ofthe CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program
After significant discussions throughout 2006 among the National Security Council principals, the Department of Defense ultimately agreed to accept the transfer
of a number of CIA detainees to U.S. military custody
(U) On September 6, 2006, President George W. Bush delivered a public speech acknowledging that the United States had held al-Qaida operatives in secret detention, stating that the CIA had employed an "alternative set of procedures" in interrogating these detainees, and describing information obtained from those detainees while in CIA c u s t o d y A s described later in this summary, the speech, which was based on CIA information and vetted by the CIA, contained
CIA memorandum from tlie CIA's Office of General Counsel, circa June 2006, entitled, "Hamdan v. Rumsfeld." CIA memorandum from the CIA's Office of General Counsel, circa June 2006, entitled, "Hamdan v. Rumsfeld." Email from: [REDACTED]; cc: Rizzo; subject; FW: Summary
of Hamdan Decision; date: June 30, 2006, at 4:44 PM. Department of Justice Office of Professional Responsibility; Report, Investigation into the Office of Legal Counsel's Memoranda Concerning Issues Relating to the Central Intelligence Agency's Use of 'Enhanced Interrogation Techniques' on Suspected TeiTorists, July 29, 2009 (DTS #2010-1058).
Memorandum for Jolin A. Rizzo, Acting General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, from Steven G. Bradbury, Principal Deputy Acting Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, July 20, 2007, Re: Application of the War Crimes Act, the Detainee Treatment Act, and Common Article 3 ofthe Geneva Conventions to Certain Techniques that May Be Used by the CIA in the Intenogation of High Value al Qaeda Detainees.
See Volume I for details on these discussions.
September 6, 2006, The White House, President Discusses Creation of Military Commissions to Try Suspected Terrorists.
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significant inaccurate statements, especially regarding the significance of information acquired from CIA detainees and the effectiveness of the CIA's interrogation techniques.
(U) In the speech, the president announced the transfer of 14 detainees to Department of Defense custody at Guantanamo Bay and the submission to Congress of proposed legislation on military commissions.^^^ As all other detainees in the CIA's custody had been transferred to other nations, the CIA had no detainees in its custody at the time of the speech.^^^
2. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) Gains Access to CIA Detainees After Their Transfer to U.S. Military Custody in September 2006
After the 14 CIA detainees arrived at the U.S. military base at Guantanamo Bay, they were housed in a separate building from other U.S. military detainees and
remained under the operational control of the CIA.^^^ In October 2006, the 14 detainees were allowed meetings with the ICRC and described in detail similar stories regarding their detention, treatment, and interrogation while in CIA custody. The ICRC provided information on these claimstotheCIA.^^^ ActingCIAGeneralCounselJohnRizzoemailedtiieCIAdirectorand other CIA senior leaders, following a November 8, 2006, meeting with the ICRC, stating:
"[a]s described to us, albeit in summary form, what the detainees allege actually does not sound that far removed from the reality... the ICRC, for its part, seems to find their stories largely credible, having put much stock in the fact that the story each detainee has told about his transfer, treatment and conditions of confinement was basically consistent, even though they had been incommunicado with each other throughout their detention by us."^^^
In February 2007 the ICRC transmitted to the CIA its final report on the "Treatment of Fourteen 'High Value Detainees' in CIA Custody." The ICRC report
concluded that "the ICRC clearly considers that the allegations of the fourteen include descriptions of treatment and interrogation techniques - singly or in combination - that amounted totortureand/orcruel,inhumanordegradingtreatment."^^® NotwithstandingRizzo'scomments, the CIA disagreed with a number of the ICRC's findings, provided rebuttals to the ICRC in
See V olume I and V olume II for additional infomiation.
September 6, 2006, The White House, President Discusses Creation of Militiury Commissions to Try Suspected Terrorists.
See V olume III for additional information.
CIA Background Memo for CIA Director visit to Guantanamo, December | , 2006, entitled Guantanamo Bay High-Value Detainee Detention Facility.
^^^mai^roi^|^^^^^^H|CTC/LGL;to; JohnRizzo,[REDACTEDl, •^•^•,^^^^^Br[REDACrEDUREDACTED], [REDACTED],
[REDACTED], [REDACTED]; cc: subject: 8 November 2006 Meeting v^'ith ICRC reps; date: November 9, 2006, at 12:25 PM.
Email from: John A. Rizzo; to: Michael V. Hayden, Stephen R. Kappes, Michael J. Morell; cc:
[REDACTED]; subject: Fw: 8 November 2006 Meeting with ICRC Reps; date: November 9,
2006, at 12:25 PM.
February 14, 2007, Letter to John Rizzo, Acting General Counsel,
International Committee of the Red Cross, | 111! miiiiM
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writing, and informed the Committee that "numerous false allegations of physical or threatened abuses and faulty legal assumptions and analysis in the report undermine its overall
c r e d i b i l i t y . T h e ICRC report was acquired by The New York Review o f Books and posted on theReview'?,websiteinApril2009.^*^^ TheCommitteefoundtheICRCreporttobelargely consistent with information contained in CIA interrogation records.^^^
3. The CIA Considers Future ofthe Program Following the Military Commissions Act
noted, in June 2006, the U.S. Supreme Court case of Hamdan v. Rumsfeld prompted the OLC to withdraw a draft legal memorandum on the impact of the
DetaineeTreatmentActontheCIA'senhancedinterrogationtechniques.^^"^ Theadministration determined that the CIA would need new legislation to continue to use the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques.The Military Commissions Act addressed the issues raised by the Hamdan decision and provided the president the authority to issue an Executive Order detailing permissible conduct under Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions. The bill passed the Senate on September 28, 2006, and the House of Representatives the following day.^^^
On November | , 2006, when Abd Kadi al-Iraqi was rendered to CIA custody, the draft Executive Order and an updated OLC memorandum had not yet been
prepared.^^^ AlthoughAbdal-Hadial-Iraqiwasconsistentlyassessedasbeingcooperative,
CIA Comments on the February 2007 ICRC Report on the Treatmentof Fourteen "High Value Detainees" in CIACustody. AtaCommitteeHearingonApril12,2007,CIADirectorHaydenemphasizeddiecloserelationship tlieCIAhadwiththelCR^^I^eliev^urcontactswiththeICRChavebeenveryuseful. Ihavemetwit^
I,tlie fortheRedCross,onseveraloccasionsatCIA. Itappearsthat~
] is a runner and he's promised to bring his gear with him next time he comes to Langley so that we can jogonthecompound."),butemphasizedtheerrorsintheICRCreport,stating: "WhileCIAappreciatesthetime, effort, and good intentions of the ICRC in forming its report, numerous false allegations of physical or threatened abuses and faulty legal assumptions and analysis in the report undermine its overall credibility." (See SSCI Hearing Transcript,datedApril12,2007(DTS#2007-3158).)AsisdescribedinmoredetailinVolumeII,Director Hayden's statements to the Committee regarding the ICRC report included significant inaccurate infomiation.
See Assets/nybooks.com/media/doc/2010/04/022/icrc—report.pdf and detainee reviews and reports in Volume III.
CIA officers in RDG and OMS prepared a number of documents disputing tlie ICRC allegations. See document entitled, "CIA Comments on the Febmary 2007 ICRC Report on the Treatment of Fourteen 'High Value Detainees' in CIA Custody." See Volumes I and III for additional infonmtion.
Email from: ^o: [REDACTED]; cc: John Rizzo; subject: FW: Summary of Hamdan Decision; date: June 30, 2006, at 4:44 PM.
Acting Assistant Attorney General Bradbury told tlie Department of Justice's Office of Professional Responsibility (OPR) that officials from the Departments of State, Defense, and Justice met with the president and officials from the CIA and the NSC to consider the impact of the Hamdan decision, and that it was clear from tlie outset that legislation would have to be enacted to address the application of Common Article 3 and the War Crimes Act to the CIA interrogation program. As the OPR report noted, ''Hamdan directly contradicted OLC's January 22, 2002 opinion to the White House and the Department ofDefense, which had concluded that Common Article 3did not apply to captured members of al Qaeda." See Department of Justice Office of Professional Responsibility; Report, Investigation into the Office of Legal Counsel's Memoranda Concerning Issues Relating to the Central Intelligence Agency's Use of EnhancedInterrogation Techniques on Suspected Tenorists, July 29, 2009 (DTS #2010-1058).
S.3930passedtheSenatebyavoteof65-34(RecordVoteNumber:259)andtheHousebyavoteof250-170 (Roll no. 508). It was signed into law on October 17, 2006.
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interrogators also believed he was withholding information on operational plots and the locations ofhigh-value targets.^^^ The CIA believed his February 2007 supported this conclusion,prompting discussions at CIA Headquarters about the possible use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques against him. By the end of the month, however, the CIA had determined there was "insufficient intelligence...that [Abd al-Hadi al-Iraqi] possesses actionable information... to justify the use o f the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques.
(TS//^|||||||||||||||||||||||/^^) InOctober2006,apanelofCIAinterrogatorsrecommendedthat four CIA enhanced interrogation techniques—the abdominal slap, cramped confinement, nudity, and the waterboard—^be eliminated, but that the remainder of the interrogation techniques be retained.^^^ Underthisproposal,theCIAwouldhavebeenauthorizedtosubjectdetaineesto dietary manipulation, sleep deprivation, the facial slap, the facial grasp, the attention grab, walling,stresspositions,andwaterdousing. TherearefewCIArecordsdescribingthepanel's deliberations,ortheCIA'sresponsetoitsrecommendations. Thepanelproposeddroppingtwo of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques—nudity and the abdominal slap—that the CIA director had proposed retaining in March 2006, while recommending that the CIA retain three other techniques— walling, stress positions, and water dousing—that had not otherwise been requested for retention.^^^
4. The CIA Develops Modified Enhanced Interrogation Program After Passage of the Military Commissions Act
Iri the spring of 2007, the OLC completed a draft of a legal opinion concluding that the use of the CIA's seven proposed enhanced interrogation techniques—sleep
deprivation, nudity, dietary manipulation, facial grasp, facial slap, abdominal slap, and the attention grab—would be consistent with the requirements of Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions and the Military Commissions Act. This draft generated significant disagreement between the State Department's legal advisor, John Bellinger, and the Acting Assistant Attorney General Steven Bradbury, resulting in Secretary of State Rice refusing to concur with the proposed Executive Order.
See, for example, 1335 (021946ZNOV 06); (041805Z NOV 06); 1370 (071318Z NOV 06); (271250Z NOV 0 6 ) ; ^ ^ ^ ! 1703 (040918Z DEC 06) (Q81606ZJAN07);^^1^1956(15121IZJAN07);
2065 (081633Z FEB 07) ^^"Ei^lTom: ICTC/LGL; to;
H H I I ; subject: What needs to occur before we ask for EITs on 07); date: February 9, 2007.
See October 23, 2006, Memorandum for Director, CIA from
^^^Se^^ber 23, 2006, Memorandum for Director, CIA from
m m andDCIATalkingPointsfor9March2006PrincipalsCommitteeMeeting.
February 9, 2007, letter from John B. Bellinger III, Legal Adviser, Department of State, to Steven G. Bradbury, ActingAssistantAttorneyGeneral,OfficeofLegalCounsel,DepartmentofJustice. Atthetime,therewereinternal disagreementswithintheCIAaboutwhethertheCIAshouldhaveadetentionandinterrogationprogram. AnApril 2007 Sametime communication between the chief of CTC and another senior CIA leader described these disagreements and how CIA leadership responded to them. According to "[REDACTED] was carping to [REDACTED] and Jose [Ro^iguez^as^rid^^^haUi^nd^ichael] Sulick (!) had a long talk
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1340 (041114ZNOV 06); 1574 (230910Z NOV 06);
1860(181622Z DEC 06); 2007 (251057Z JAN 07).
; HEADQUARTERS Chief,
REDACTED], (272015Z FEB
Chief, [
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2007, in an effort to gain Secretary Rice's support, the CIA asked CIA contractors SWIGERT and DUNBAR to brief Secretary Rice on the CIA's
inten'ogation program. During that briefing, Secretary Rice expressed her concern about the use of nudity and a detainee being shackled in the standing position for the purpose of sleep deprivation. AccordingtoCIArecords,inearlyJuly2007,afterthecaptureofMuhammad Rahim, Secretary Rice indicated that she would not concur with an interrogation program that included nudity, but that she would not continue to object to the CIA's proposed interrogation program if it was reduced to six of the enhanced inteiTogation techniques listed in the draft OLC memorandum: (1) sleep deprivation, (2) dietary manipulation, (3) facial grasp, (4) facial slap, (5) abdominal slap, and (6) the attention grab.^^'^
5. Muhammad Rahim, the CIA's Last Detainee, is Subjected to Extensive Use of the CIA's Enhanced Interrogation Techniques, Provides No Intelligence
On June 25, 2007, al-Qa'ida facilitator Muhammad Rahim was capturedinPakistan.^^^ BasedonreportsofdebriefingsofRahiminforeigngovernmentcustody
and other intelligence, CIA personnel assessed that Rahim likely possessed information related to the location of Usama bin Laden and other al-Qa'ida leaders.^^^ On July 3, 2007, Acting CIA General Counsel John Rizzo informed Acting Assistant Attorney General Steven Bradbury that the CIA was anticipating a "new guest," and that the CIA "would need the signed DOJ opinion 'in a matterof days.'"^^^
Muhammad Rahim was rendered to CIA custody at DETENTION SITE BROWN in Country | on B 2007."® Upon his arrival, CIA
interrogators had a single discussion with Rahim during which he declined to provide answers to questions about threats to the United States and the locations of top al-Qa'ida l e a d e r s . B a s e d on this interaction, CIA interrogators reported that Rahim was unlikely to be cooperative. As a
andagreetlieCIAisoffthetrackandrails... thatweshouldnotbedoingdetention,rendition,interrogation." Referring to a CIA leadership meeting that day in which the Committee's April 12, 2007, hearing would be discussed, B H H H stated that: "I want to take that [criticism] on by letting all know how importan [sic] this [hearing] is... and what the leaderships [sic] position is from hayden, kappes and jose... in case there is some corrosive, bullsliit mumbling and rumblings amongcon^^ - "componenT^^ of which i am seeing." Sametimecommunication between 12/Apr/07, 09:50:54 to 09:56:57.
Email from: Rodriguez, John Rizzo etc.; subject: EIT briefing for SecState on
June 22, 2007; date: June 22, 2007; July 3, 2007, Steven Bradbury, Handwritten Notes, "John Rizzo"; email from:
John A. Rizzo; to: cc: [REDACTED], [REDACTED]; subject: Conversation with Bradbury; date:
July 3,2007. 995 1
1199 (251634ZJUN 07); 6439 7516
CIAmemorandumtitled,CTC/RDGPlanningforPossibleRenditionofMohammedRahim- 19June2007. The document was unsigned, and the author is unknown. A subsequent version, with identical text, was titled CTC/RDG Planning for Possible Rendition of Mohammad Raliim - 25 June 2007. See also 2463 (201956ZJUL 07).
Email from: John A. Rizzo; to: Bradbury; date: July 3,2007.
999^ ^ ^ 2 ^ II^^HrULOT)^ im n III
cc: [REDACTED], [REDACTED]; subject: Conversation with 75161
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result, CIA Director Michael Hayden sent a letter to the president formally requesting that the president issue the Executive Order interpreting the Geneva Conventions in a manner to allow theCIAtointerrogateRahimusingtheCIA'senhancedinterrogationtechniques. Aclassified legal opinion from OLC concluding that the use of the CIA's six enhanced interrogation techniques proposed for use on Rahim (sleep deprivation, dietary manipulation, facial grasp, facial slap, abdominal slap, and the attention grab) did not violate applicable laws was issued on July20,2007. TheaccompanyingunclassifiedExecutiveOrderwasissuedthesameday.^®^® Although Rahim had been described by the CIA as "one of a handful of al-Qa'ida facilitators working directly for Bin Ladin and Zawahiri,"^®®^ Rahim remained in a CIA cell without being questioned for a week, while CIA intenrogators waited for approval to use the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques against him.^'^^^
CIA interrogators initially expressed optimism about their ability to acquireinformationfromRahimusingtheCIA'senhancedinterrogationtechniques. Acable
sent from the CIA detention site stated:
"Senior interrogators on site, with experience in almost every HVD [high- value detainee] interrogation conducted by [CIA], believe the employment of interrogation with measures would likely provide the impetus to shock [Rahim] from his current resistance posture and provide an opportunity to influence his behavior to begin truthful participation."'^®^
Pour CIA interrogators present at the CIA detention site began applyingtheCIA'senhancedinterrogationtechniquesonJuly21,2007.^®"'^ AccordingtoCIA
records, the interrogators "employed interrogation measures of facial slap, abdominal slap, and facial hold, and explained to [Rahim] that his assumptions of how he would be treated were wrong."'®®^ TheinteiTogatorsemphasizedtoRahimthat"hissituationwastheresultofhis deception, he would stay in this position until interrogators chose to remove him from it, and he couldalwayscorrectapreviousmisstatement."^®®^ Accordingtothecabledescribingthe interrogation, Rahim then threatened to fabricate information:
"[Rahim] reiterated several times during the session that he would make up information if interrogators pressured him, and that he was at the complete
1000 j^jiy 2007, letter from Michael Hayden, Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, to President George W.
Bush; Executive Order 13440, July 20, 2007; and Memorandum for John A. Rizzo, Acting General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, from Steven G. Bradbury, Principal Deputy Acting Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, July 20, 2007, Re: Application of the War Crimes Act, the Detainee Treatment Act, and Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions to Certain Techniques that May Be Used by the CIA in the Intenogation of High Value al Qaeda Detainees.
CIA memorandum titled, "CTC/RDG Planning for Possible Rendition of Mohammed Rahim - 19 June 2007." The document was unsigned, and the author is unknown. A subsequent version, with identical text, was titled "CTC/RDG Planning for Possible Rendition of Mohammad Rahim - 25 June 2007."
2445 (181104Z JUL 07); 2463 (201956Z JUL 07) 2467 (211341Z JUL 07) 2467 (211341Z JUL 07) 2467 (211341Z JUL 07)
2463 (201956Z JUL 07);
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12467 (211341Z JUL 07^ 12558 (08151IZ AUG 07);
2502 (281557Z JUL 07); ^54 (301659Z AUG 07); f 2508 (291820ZJUL07); 12558(08151IZAUG07); 2626(241I58ZAUG07);[
^2496 (261834ZJUL 07
2645 (291552Z AUG 07); 12666 (030722Z SEP 07)
12467(211341ZJUL07); 2501 (271624ZJUL 07) 12467 (211341ZJUL07)
12502 (281557ZJUL 07); 2558 (08151 IZ AUG 07) 2644 (281606Z AUG 07); 2661 (311810Z AUG 07);
2661 (31181OZ AUG 07); 2570 (101155Z AUG 07);
12476 (231419Z JULOJ^ [2508 (291820Z JUL07); 12570 (101155Z AUG 07);
2645(291552Z AUG 07); 12662(020738ZSEP07);[
UNCLASSIFIED
mercy of the interrogators and they could even kill him if they wanted. InteiTogators emphasized to [Rahim] that they would not allow him to die because then he could not give them information, but that he would, eventually, tell interrogators the truth.
During the interrogation of Rahim using the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, Rahim was subjected to eight extensive sleep deprivation sessions,
as well as to the attention grasp, facial holds, abdominal slaps, and the facial slap.^®^^ During sleep deprivation sessions, Rahim was usually shackled in a standing position, wearing a diaper and a pair of s h o r t s . R a h i m ' s diet was almost entirely limited to water and liquid Ensure meals.CIA interrogatorswouldprovideRahimwithaclothtofurthercoverhimselfasan incentive to cooperate. For example, a July 27, 2007, cable from the CIA detention site states that when Rahim showed a willingness to engage in questioning about "historical information," he was "provided a large towel to cover his torso" as a "subtle reward."^®'^ CIA interrogators asked Rahim a variety of questions during these interrogations, seeking information about the current location of senior al-Qa'ida leaders, which he did not provide.
1007
deprivationwasstoppedwhenRahim"describedvisualandauditoryhallucinations." AfterRaliimwasallowedto sleep for eight hours and the psychologist concluded that Rahim had been faking his symptoms, Raliim was subjected toanother 62 hours ofsleep deprivation. Athird, 13 hour session, was haltedduet^ limit of180 hours of sleep deprivation during a30 day period^SeeJP^^^I 2486 (251450Z JUL07)J^^BH 2491 (261237Z JUL 0 7 ) j | | | | | 2496 (261834Z JUL 07); |H|Bin501 (271624Z JUL 07); JUL 07); and H^H2^8(291820ZJUL07).) OnAugust20,2007,Rahimwassubjectedtoafourthsleepdeprivation session. Afterasessionthatlasted104hours,CIAHeadquartersconsultedwithtlieDepartmentofJusticeand determined that "[tjermination at this point is required to be consistent witli theDCIA Guidelines, whichlimt sleep deprivationtoanaggregateof180hoursinanyrepeatany30dayperiod." {SeeHEADQUARTERS^H|[| (240022Z AUG 07).) Between August 28, 2007, and September 2,2007^ahim was subjected to three additional sleepdeprivationsessionsof32.5hours,12hours,and12hours. {See|^U^^64^291552ZAUG07);
• l i i l 2661 (311810Z AUG 07); 2662 (010738Z SEP OT^TandjBHIi 2666 (020722Z SEP 07).) As described, CIA interrogators conducted an eighth sleep deprivation session, lasting 138.5 hours, in November 2007.
2554 (071453Z AUG 07) 2671 (061450Z SEP 07)
2554 (071453Z AUG 07) 2644 (281606Z AUG 07); 2662 (020738Z SEP 07);
2615 (201528Z AUG 07)
2496 (261834ZJUL 07); 2554 (071453Z AUG 07);
2626 (241158Z AUG 07);
2654 (301659Z AUG 07); 2666 (030722Z SEP 07);
2467(211341ZJUL07)
Rahim was subjected to 104.5 hours of sleep deprivation from July 21, 2007, to July 25, 2007. Sleep
12671 (061450Z SEP 07). CIA contractor DUNBAR participated inMuhammad Rahim's interrogation sessions from August 9, 2007, to August 29, 2007. See Volume III for additional details.
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On September 8, 2007, CIA Director Hayden approved an extension of MuJiammad Rahim's CIA detention The Director of the National Clandestine
Service Jose Rodriguez disagreed with the approved extension, writing:
"I did not sign because I do not concur with extending Rahim's detention for another 60 days. I do not believe the tools in our tool box will allow us to overcomeRahim'sresistancetechniques. J.A.R."^^^^
Shortly after the September 2007 extension, CIA personnel were directed to stop the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques on Rahim. Rahim was
then left in his cell with minimal contact with CIA personnel for approximately six weeks.
On September 10, 2007, Rahim's interrogators reported to CIA Headquarters that Rahim had "demonstrated that the physical coiTective measures available to HVDIs^'^'^ have become predictable and beaiable."^^^^ The use ofthe CIA's enlianced interrogation techniques on Rahim resumed on November 2, 2007, with a sleep deprivation session that lasted until November 8, 2007,foratotalof138.5hours. Thissleepdeprivationsession,thelongesttowhichRahimhad beensubjected,washiseighthandfinalsession. Rahimwasalsosubjectedtodietary manipulation during this period.
According to CIA records, intermittent questioning of Rahim continued until December 9, 2007, when all questioning of Rahim ceased for nearly three weeks.
During this time, CIA detention site personnel discussed and proposed new ways to encourage Rahim's cooperation. These new proposals included suggestions that Rahim could be told that audiotapes of his interrogations might be passed to his family, or that
CIA memorandum from Director, Counterterrorism Center, to Director, Central Intelligence Agency, September 7, 2007, Subject: Request to Extend Detention of Muhammad Rahim.
CIA Routing and Record Sheet with Signatures for approval of the Memorandum, "Request to Extend Detention
ofMuharrnm^Rahim,"September5,2007. J.A.R.aretheinitialsoftheDirectoroftheNCS,JoseA.Rodriguez. 1016 2697 (121226Z SEP 07); CIA memorandum from Director, Counterterrorism
Center, to Director, Central Intelligence Agency, October 31, 2007, Subject: Request Approval for the use of Enhanced InteiTOgation Techniques; HEADQUARTERS I H I (101710 SEP 07). During this period, contractor Grayson SWIGERT recommended two approaches. The first was increasing Raliim's amenities over 8-14 days "beforereturningtotheuseofEITs." Thesecondwas"switchingfromaninterrogationapproachthatineffect amounts to a 'battle of wills,' to a 'recruiting' approach that sidesteps the adversarial contest inherent in framing the session as an interrogation." SWIGERT noted, however, that the latter approach "is apt to be slow in producing information" since intelligence requirements would not be immediately serviced, and "it would work best if [Rahim] believe^i^ill be hUCIA^usto^indefinitely." (See email from: Grayson SWIGERT; to: [REDACTED] and IHIIII^HIi; cc: H U B H i H Hammond DUNBAR; subject: Some thoughts on [Rahim] interrogation nextsteps;date:September17,2007,at4:05PM.) TheCTC'sdeputychiefofoperationsrepliedthat,"It'sclear that the 'harsh' approach isn't going to work and the more we try variants on it, the more it allows [Rahim] to believe he has won^Th^uestion is whether tliat perception will be conveyed in Scenario 2." See email from [REDACTED] to: |H|^^Hccj[REDACrcD], Grayson SWIGERT, Hammond DUNBAR, [REDACTED]7||||||[|^^ [REDACTED]; subject: Fw: Some thoughts on [Rahim] interrogation next steps; date: September 17, 2007, at 4:28 PM.
HighValue Detainee Interrogators (HVDI)
'"'^•[^•2691 (101306ZSEP07)
1019 2888(022355ZNOV07); 2915(081755ZNOV07). Duetothetimezonedifference,
when this sleep deprivation session began it was November 2, 2007, at CIA Headquarters, but November 3, 2007, at thedetention site.
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3166 (011404Z JAN 08); HEADQUARTERS
See V olume II and V olume III for additional information.
3165 (311016Z DEC 07); (180120ZDEC 07)
m;f|||^|8408 jjj^^^^^^^^^BRecords indicate that Rahimdid not depart
his time in nominal^^^Bcustody. See Volume IIIfor additional details on ttiis transfer.
uring
UNCLASSIFIED
Rahim was cooperating with U.S. forces. On December 18, 2007, CIA Headquarters directed the detention site to stand down on the proposals.
The CIA's detention and interrogation of Mohammad Rahim resulted in no disseminated intelhgence r e p o r t s . O n March B , 2008, Muhammad Rahim was
to where took custod^^^im. The|BHgovernment immediately transferred Rahim to the custody of
which point Rahim was transferred back to CIA custody and rendered by the CIA to U.S. military custody at Guantanamo Bay.'^^^
6. CIA After-Action Review ofRahimInterrogation Callsfor StudyofEffectiveness of Interrogation Techniques and Recommends Greater Use ofRapport-Building Techniques in Future CIA Interrogations
On April 21, 2008, and April 22, 2008, the CIA's RDG convened an after-action review of the CIA's interrogation of Muhammad Rahim. According to summary documents, the CIA review panel attempted to determine why the CIA had been unsuccessful in
acquiringusefulinformationfromRahim. Thesummarydocumentsemphasizedthatthe primary factors that contributed to Rahim's unresponsiveness were the interrogation team's lack of knowledge of Rahim, the decision to use the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques immediately after the short "neutral probe" and subsequent isolation period, the lack of clarity about whether the non-coercive techniques described in the Army Field Manual were permitted, the team's inability to confront Rahim with incriminating evidence, and the use of multiple improvised interrogation approaches despite the lack of any indication that these approaches might beeffective.The summary documents recommended thatfutureCIAinterrogations should incorporate rapport-building techniques, social interaction, loss of predictability, and deception to a greater e x t e n t . T h e documents also recommended that the CIA conduct a
13097(141321ZDEC07)^^HH 3098 151203Z DEC 07 3144 (270440ZDEC 07);
Undated CIA Memorandum, titled After-Action Review, author (REDACTED); Undated CIA Memorandum, titled [Rahim] After Action Review: HVDI Assessment, with attached addendum, [Raliim] Lessons Learned Review Panel Recommendations Concerningth^Modificatioi^^lee^Deprivatioi^n^Re^^
Walling as an and Memorandum from
to Director, CTC, May 9, 2008, Subject: Results of After-Action Review of [Rahim] Intenogation. A document drafted by one of tlie participants prior to the review suggested that "intense legal/policy scrutiny" was
also a negative factor; however, this point was not mentioned in any of the post-review summaries, except in the contextofdiscussingconfusionoverwhetherparticularinterrogationmethodswerelegal. Thesummarydocuments statethatCIAofficersdevisedandimplementedseveraldifferentstrategies,oneafteranother. Accordingtooneof the documents, "[t]hese varied strategies were implemented due to frustration and concern regarding the lack of intelligence production."
"^24 Undated CIA Memorandum, titled After-Action Review, author (REDACTED), Undated CIA
Memorandum, titled [Raliim] After Action Review: HVDI Assessment, with attached addendum, [Rahim] Lessons Learned Review Panel Recommendations Concemingth Deprivation and Reinstatement of
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survey of interrogation tccliniques used by other U.S. government ageneies and other countries in an effort to develop effective interrogation methods.'"--^
Muhammad Rahim was the last CIA detainee in the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program.
7. CIA Contracting Expenses Related to Company Formed by SWIGERTand DUNBAR
CIA contractors SWIGERT and DUNBAR, who played a central role in the development of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques in the summer of 2002,
and then used the techniques as contract interrogators, formed a company in 2005
["Company In addition to providing interrogators for the CIA's interrogation program, Company Y was granted a sole source contract to provide operational psychologists, debriefers, and security personnel at CIA detention s i t e s . U n d e r the contract. Company Y was tasked with conducting ongoing conversations with CIA detainees to learn about the terrorist mind set (this project was named the "Terrorist Think Tank" or "T-^"), developing
strategies, and writing the history of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program.Later descriptions of their services note that—on behalf of the CIA—Company Y officers participated in the interrogations of detainees held in foreign government custody and served as intermediaries between entities of those governments and the CIA.'^^^^"
By 2OO6, the value of the base contract for their company, with all options exercised, was in excess of$180 million.As ofMay 2007, Company Yhad hired |
former CIA staff officers, many of whom had previously been involved with the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program. Company Y's chief operating officer was the former
Walling and Memoranduni from
IIIH to Director, CTC, May 9, 2008, Subiect^esults of After-Action Review of [Rahim] Interrogation.
Undated CIA Memorandum, titled After-Action Review, author (REDACTED), Undated CIA Memorandum, titled [Rahim] After Action Review: HVDI Assessment, with attached addendum, [Rahim] Lessons Learned Review Panel Recommendations Concerning the Modification of Sleep Deprivation and Reinstatement of Walling as an EIT.
See V olume III for additional information.
1027 Pqj. more infomiation onCIA contracting with [Company Y], seeVolume I.
Letter Y|, attn: Hammond DUNBAR from [REDACTED], Contracting Officer, re Confirmation of Verbal Authorization to Proceed Not to Exceed (ATP/NTE); email from: [REDACTED]; to: • • • • ; cc: [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED]; subject: Next Contractual Stepswitl^WIGERT&D^ date: March 2, 2005; March 18, 2005, Letter from [REDACTED], Chief^^H|ta|p|^^^^^^^^^^^Company Y], re Letter Contract
Email from: subject: date: June 17, 2005, at 11:08:22 AM^emai^rom:^ to: [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED]; cc:
[REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED]; subject: PCS CTC officer to [Company Y location] ("One of the primary functions is to develop and set-up what we call the 'Terrorist Think Tank' (previously briefed to the DDO and ADDO) which will be critical as we develop our
date: July 12, 2005, at 10:25:48 AM; Justification Date: 28 February 2006, Justification For Other Than Full And Open Competition, Contractor: [Company Y].
for example, [Company Y] Monthly report, Febioiary 2006; [Company Y] Monthly Report, March 2006; [Company Y] Quarterly, 01 Jan - 31 March 2007.
Justification Date: 25 July 2006, Justification For Other Than Full and Open Competition, Contractor: [Company Y].
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chief of division of the CIA supervising the Renditions and Detention Group. In addition, Company Y hired at least | CIA security protective officers to work on Company Y's CIA contracts. In March 2006, a list of projected staff and contractors within CIA's Renditions and Detention Group included separate positions.Of those | positions, H [73%] were for contractors, the majority ofwhom were contractors from Company gy 2007, RDG reported having | staff officers and
contractors. By 2008, RDG had a total of positions, with | staff officeiTandJI [85%]
1035
The CIA's contract with Company Y was terminated in mid-2009. From the time of the company's creation in 2005 thi'ough the close-out of its contract in 2010,
the CIA paid Company Y more than $75 million for services in conjunction with the CIA's Detention and Inten'ogation Program.The CIA also certified Company Y's office in
[, as a Secure Compartmented Infomiation Facility (SCIF), which required a CIA officer to be detailed to and provided Company Y access to CIA internal computer networks at its facility. In 2008, the CIA authorized an additional payment to Company Y of approximately $570,000, after CompanyYindicatedthaUUm for conducting countersurveillance of its officers when appearedinthepressinconjunctionwiththeprogram. TheCIAagreedtoa$5million indemnification contract for the company that covered, among other expenses, criminal prosecution.^"^' Company Y hired a prominent law firm for representation in 2007,'®^^ and billed the CIA $1.1 million for legal expenses from 2007 through 2012 per its indemnification agreement. Part of these expenses included legal presentation at a Committee staff briefing by SWIGERT and DUNBAR on November > , 2008.^^^° Under the CIA's indemnification contract, the CIA is obligated to pay Company Y's legal expenses through 2021.'041
1032 dO/CTC^^^RDG Projected Staff &Contractors, updated as of March 15, 2006. 1033 dO/CTcHH/RDG Projected Staff &Contractors, updated as of March 15, 2006.
June 4, 2007, RDG, Mission Summary.
1035 confirmation, received by telephone on November 16, 2012.
1036 #2009-1258; DTS #2012-4008. CFA paid Company Y $612,000 in 2010 for contract close-out costs. In a
Mai-ch2009 notification, the CIA also infonned the Committee that, in addition to payments to Company Y, Grayson SWIGERT and Hammond DUNBAR had received $1.5 million and $1.1 million, respectively, as individuals. As noted elsewhere, the notification includes inaccurate representations about the effectiveness of the CIA program. See Congressional Notification, March 18, 2009 (DTS #2009-1258).
Email from: [REDACTED], CTC^M; to: Hammond DUNBAR, Grayson SWIGERT; cc:
[REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED]; subject: Copy of Signed IndemnificationAgreemen^ date: July 13, 2007, at 02:22 PM; email from: [REDACTED], Chief, Contract Law Division; to: cc: [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED],[REDACTED];subject:Fw:ModifiedIndemnificationAgmt... NewAR7-17WaiverMemo, Too?; date: November 13, 2007, at 10:32 AM.
Email from: [REDACTED]; to: subject: Billing, May-December 2007; date:
August 12, 2008, at 06:42 PM.
1039 Response from the CIA regarding Contract Costs for [Company Y], October 15, 2012 (DTS #2012-4008).
See DTS #2009-0572.
'0'^' Response from the CIA regarding ContractCost^o^^Compan^G^cto^^ 15, 2012 (DTS #2012-4008).
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8. The CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program Ends
(U) OnDecember5,2007,fewerthanninemonthsafterDirectorHaydentoldtheEuropean Union that the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program was not a CIA program, but "America's program," the House-Senate conference for the Fiscal Year 2008 Intelligence Authorization Act voted to include an amendment that banned coercive interrogation techniques and established the Army Field Manual on Human Intelligence Collector Operations as the interrogation standard for all U.S. government i n t e r r o g a t i o n s . T h e conference report passed both the House and the Senate with bipartisan majorities.
(U) On March 8, 2008, President Bush vetoed the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 that banned coercive interrogations. In a radio address explaining the decision, the president stated "[t]he bill Congress sent me would take away one of the most valuable tools in the war on terror—the CIA program to detain and question key terrorist leaders and operatives." Addressing the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, President Bush stated that the "main reason" the CIA program "has been effective is that it allows the CIA to use specialized interrogation procedures to question a small number of the most dangerous terrorists under careful supervision." The president stated that the CIA program had a "proven track record," and that the CIA obtained "critical intelligence" as a result of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques related to the Camp Lemonier plotting, the Karachi plotting, the Second Wave plotting, and the Heathrow Airport plotting. The president then repeated a warning the CIA had previously provided to the White House, that to "restrict the CIA to [interrogation] methods in the [Army] Field Manual," "could cost American lives."^^"^ As is described in this summary, and detailed more extensively in the full Conmiittee Study, the CIA's representations to the White House regarding the role of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques in the thwarting of the referenced plots were inaccurate.
(U) On March 11, 2008, by a vote of 225-188, the House of Representatives failed to override the presidential veto.^^"^^
(TS//^||||||||||||||H[//NF) In December 2008 and January 2009, CIA officers briefed the transition team for President-elect Barack Obama on the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program. CIA Director Hayden prepared a statement that relayed, "despite what you have heard or read in a variety of public fora, these [enhanced interrogation] techniques and this program did
1042 d i r e c t o r 1111111 (152227Z MAR 07); House Report 110-478 - Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 2008, 110"^ Congress (2007-2008), Section 327.
H.R. 2082 passed the House of Representatives on December 13, 2007, by a vote of 222-197 (Roll No: 1160)
and passed the Senate on February 13,2008, by a vote of 51-45 (Record Vote Number: 22). See"Text:BushonVetoofIntelligenceBill,"TheNewYorkTimes, datedMarch8,2008. Located,among
otherplaces,atwww.nytiiTies.eom/2008/03/08/washington/08cnd-ptext.html. ForanexampleofapreviousCIA briefing to the White House with similar assertions, see CIA Memorandum for the Record, "Review of Interrogation Program on 29 July 2003," prepared by CIA General Counsel Scott Muller, dated August 5, 2003; with briefing slidesentitled,"CMInterrogationProgram,"datedJuly29,2003. TheCIAdocumentprovidedtotheparticipants states, "Termination of this program will result in loss of life, possibly extensive." For additional commentary, see "Veto of Bill on CIA Tactics Affirms Bush's Legacy," The New York Times, dated March 9, 2008.
U.S.HouseofRepresentativesRollCallVote117ofthe110^Congress,SecondSession,March11,2008,7:01 PM.
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work."^^^ The prepared materials included inaccurate information on the operation and management of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program, as well as the same set of examples of the "effectiveness" of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques that the CIA had provided to policymakers over several y e a r s . T h e examples provided were nearly entirely inaccurate.
On January 22, 2009, President Obama issued Executive Order 13491, which required the CIA to "close as expeditiously as possible any detention facilities that
itcurrentlyoperatesand...notoperateanysuchdetentionfacilityinthefuture." TheExecutive Order prohibited any U.S. government employee from using inten'ogation techniques other than those in the Army Field Manual 2-22.3 on Human Intelligence Collector Operations.
1046 Briefing for Obama National Security Team - "Renditions, Detentions, and Interrogations (RDI)" including
"Tab 7," named "RDG Copy- Briefing on RDI Program 09 Jan. 2009." Referenced materials attached to cover memorandum with the title, "D/CIA Conference Room Seating Visit by President-elect Barrack [sic] Obama National Security Team Tuesday, 13 January 2009; 8:30 - 11:30 a.m." Tlie briefing book includes the previously mentioned,"BriefingNotesontheValueofDetaineeReporting,"dated15May2006,whichprovidedthesame intelligence claims found in the document of tlie same name, but dated April 15, 2005.
1047 detailed information, see Volume II.
The Executive Order also stated that the FBI and "other Federal law enforcement agencies" could "continufe] to use authorized, non-coercive techniques of interrogation tliat are designed to elicit voluntary statements and do not involve the use of force, threats, or promises." (See Executive Order 13491, "Ensuring Lawful Interrogation,' January 22, 2009.)
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III. Intelligence Acquired and CIA Representations on the Effectiveness of the CIA's Enhanced Interrogation Techniques to Multiple Constituencies
A. Background on CIA Effectiveness Representations
From 2002 through 2009, in order to obtain policy authorizations and legal approvals, the CIA made a series of representations to officials at the White House,
the Department of Justice, and the Congress, asserting that the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques were uniquely effective and necessary to produce otherwise unavailable intelligence that the U.S. government could not obtain from other s o u r c e s . T h e CIA further represented
1049 These representations were also made by the CIA to other elements of the executive branch, to include the
OfficeoftheDirectorofNationalIntelligence. AsdescribedinthisStudy,theDepartmentofJusticefirstapproved
the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques on August 1, 2002.
1050 2003 through 2009, the CIA's representations regarding theeffectiveness ofthe CIA'senhanced
interrogation techniques provided a specific set of examples of terrorist plots "disrupted" and terrorists captured that theCIAattributedtoinformationobtainedfromtheuseofitsenhancedinterrogationtechniques. CIA representations further asserted that the intelligence obtained from the use of tlie CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques was unique, otherwise unavailable, and resulted in "saved lives." Among other CIA representations, see: (I) CIArepresentationsintheDepartmentofJusticeOfficeofLegalCounselMemorandum,datedMay30,2005, which relied on a series of highly specific CIA representations on the type of intelligence acquired from the use of tlieCIA'senhancedinterrogationtechniquestoassesstheirlegality. TheCIArepresentationsreferencedbythe OLC include that the use ofthe CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques was "necessary" to obtain "critic^," "vital," and "otherwise unavailable actionable intelligence" that was "essential" for the U.S. government to "detect and disrupt" terrorist threats. The OLC memorandum further states that "[the CIA] ha[s] informed [the OLC] that the CIA believes that this program is largely responsible for preventing a subsequent attack within the United States." {See Memorandum for John A. Rizzo, Senior Deputy General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, from Steven G. Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, May 30, 2005, Re: Application of UnitedStatesObligations UnderArticle 16of the Convention Against Tortureto CertainTechniques thatMayBeUsedintheInterrogationofHighValuealQaedaDetainees.) (2)CIArepresentationsinthe Department of Justice Office of Legal Counsel Memorandum dated July 20, 2007, which also relied on CIA representations on the type of intelligence acquired from the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. CitingCIA documents and thePresident's September 6, 2006, speech describing dieCIA's interrogation program (whichwasbasedonCIA-providedinformation),theOLCmemorandumstates: "TheCIAinterrogationprogram— and, in particular, its use of enhanced interrogation techniques—is intended to serve this paramount interest [security of the Nation] by producing substantial quantities of otherwise unavailable inteUigence. ...As the President explained [on September 6, 2006], 'by giving us information about ten-orist plans we could not get anywhere else, theprogramhassavedinnocentlives.'" {SeeMemorandumforJohnA.Rizzo,ActingGeneralCounsel,Central Intelligence Agency, from Steven G. Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, July 20, 2007, Re: Application of the War Crimes Act, the Detainee Treatment Act, and Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions to Certain Techniques that May Be Used by the CIA in the Interrogation of High Value al Qaeda Detainees.) (3) CIA briefings for members of the National Security Council in July and September 2003 represented that "the use of Enhanced Techniques of one Icind or anotherhad produced significant intelligence information that had, in the view of CIA professionals, saved hves," and which warned policymakers that "[t]erminationofthisprogramwillresultinlossoflife,possiblyextensive." {SeeAugust5,2003Memorandumfor the Record from Scott Muller, Subject: Review of Interrogation Program on 29 July 2003; Briefing slides, CIA Interrogation Program, July 29, 2003; September 4, 2003, CIA Memorandum for the Record, Subject: Member Briefing; and September 26, 2003, Memorandum for the Record from Muller, Subject: CIA Interrogation Program.) (4) The CIA's response to the Office of Inspector General draft Special Review of the CIA program, which asserts: "Information[theCIA]received...asaresultofthelawfuluseofenhancedinterrogationtechniques('EITs') has almost certainly saved countless American lives inside the United States and abroad. The evidence points clearly to
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that the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques "saved lives" and "enabled the CIA to disrupt teiTorist plots, capture additional terrorists, and collect a high volume of critical intelligence on al-Qa'ida."^^^' TheDepartmentofJusticeusedtheserepresentationsofeffectivenesstoassess
the fact tliat without the use of such techniques, we and our allies would [have] suffered major terrorist attacks involving hundreds, if not thousands, of casualties." (See Memorandum for: Inspector General; from: James Pavitt, Deputy Director for Operations; subject: re (S) Commentsto Draft IG Special Review, "Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Program" 2003-7123-lG; date: February 27, 2004; attachment: February 24, 2004, Memorandum re Successes of CIA's Counterterrorism Detention and InteiTogation Activities.) (5) CIA briefing documents for CIA Director Leon Panetta in February 2009, which state that the "CIA assesses that the RDI program worked and the [enhanced interrogation] techniques were effective in producing foreign intelligence," and that "[m]ost, if not all, of the timely intelligence acquired from detainees in this program would not have been discovered or reported by other means." {See CIA briefing documents for Leon Panetta, entitled, "Tab 9: DCIA Briefing on RDI Program-
18FEB.2009" and graphic attachment, "Key Intelligence and Reporting Derived from Abu Zubaydah and Klialid Shaykli Muhammad (KSM),"including"DCIABriefingonRDIProgram" agenda,CIAdocument"EITsand Effectiveness," with associated documents, "Key Intelligence Impacts Chart: Attachment (AZ and KSM)," "Background on Key Intelligence Impacts Chart: Attachment," and "supporting references," to include "Background onKeyCapturesandPlotsDisrupted.") (6)CIAdocumentfaxedtotheSenateSelectCommitteeonIntelligenceon March 18,2009, entitled, "[SWIGERT] and [DUNBAR]" (DTS #2009-1258), which provides a list of "some of the key captures and disrupted plots" that the CIA had attributedto the use of the CIA's enhanced inteiTogation techniques, and states: "CIA assesses that most, if not all, of the timely intelligence acquired from detainees in this programwouldnothavebeendiscoveredorreportedbyanyothermeans." SeeVolumeIIforadditionalCIA representations asserting that tlie CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques enabled die CIA to obtain unique, otherwise unavailable intelligence that "saved lives."
1051 Aniong other documents that contain the exact, or similarCIA representations, see\ (1) CIA memorandum for
the Record, "Review of InteiTogation Program on 29 July 2003," prepared by CIA General Counsel Scott Muller, dated August 5, 2003; briefing slides entitled, "CM Interrogation Program," dated July 29,2003, presented to senior White House officials widi additional briefings using tlie slides as documented in September 4, 2003, CIA Memorandum for the Record, Subject: Member Briefing; and September 26,2003, Memorandum for the Record fromScottMuller,Subject:CIAInterrogationProgram. (2)CIAmemorandumtotheCIAInspectorGenerzilfrom James Pavitt, CIA's Deputy Director for Operations, dated Febiiiary 27, 2004, with the subject line, "Comments to DraftIGSpecialReview,'CounterterrorismDetentionandInteiTogationProgram'(2003-7123-IG)," Attachment, "Successes of CIA's Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Activities," dated February 24, 2004. (3) CIA Directorate of Intelligence, "Khalid Shaykh Muhammad: Preeminent Source on Al-Qa'ida," dated July 13^004; faxtotlieDepartmentofJustice,April22,2005,entitled,"HI,MaterialsonKSMandAbuZubaydah.|i|." This report was widely disseminated in the Intelligence Community and a copy of this report was provided to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence on July 15, 2004. On March 31,2009, former Vice President Cheney requested die declassification of tliis Intelligence Assessment, which was publicly released with redactions on August 24, 2009. (4) CIA memorandum to "National Security Advisor," from "Director ofCentral Intelligence/^ubie^ "Effectiveness of the ClACountertei^ Inte^gatior^fechi^ues,'' included in email from:]HHIHiH' to:
^"^t^ibject: on
tecliniques"; date: December 6, 2004, at 5:06:38 PM. The email references the attached "information paper to Dr.
Rice explaining the value ofthe interrogation techniques." (5) CIA Memorandum for^ve Bradbury at Office of Legal Counsel, Department ofJustice, dated March 2,2005, from 1 ^ 1 Legal Group, DCI Countertenorist Center, subject: "Effectiveness of the CIA CounterterroristInterrogation Techniques," (6) CIA briefing for Vice President Cheney, dated March 4, 2005, entitled, "Briefing for Vice President Cheney: CIA Detention and Intenogation Program." (7) CIA Talking Points entitled, "Talking Points for 10 March 2005 DCI MeetingPC:EffectivenessoftheHigh-ValueDetaineeInten'ogation(HVDI)Techniques." (8) CIA"Briefing Notes on the Value of Detainee Reporting" faxed from the CIA to the DepartmentofJustice on April 15, 2005, at 10:47AM. (9) CIA fax to DOJ Command Center^ate^^ril 22, 2005, for Office ofLegal Counsel, U.S. Depaitment of Justice, from Legal Group, DCI Counterterrorist Center, re: H , Materials of KSM and Abu Zubaydah, included CIA Intelligence Assessment "Khalid Shaykli Muhammad: Preeminent Source on Al-Qa'ida," and CIA document, "Materials of KSM and Abu Zubaydah.; (10) CIA Intelligence Assessment, "Detainee ReportingPivota^o^i^^a^gains^^a'ida," June 2005, which CIA
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whether the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques were legal;^^^" policymakers at the White House used these representations—and the legal analysis by the Department of Justice—to
recordsindicatewasprovidedtoWhiteHouseofficialsonJune1,2005. TheIntelligenceAssessmentatthe SECRET//NOFORNclassificationlevelwasmorebroadlydisseminatedonJune3,2005. OnMarch31,2009, former Vice President Cheney requested the declassification of this Intelligence Assessment, which was publicly released with redactions on August 24, 2009. (11) CIA memorandum entitled, "Future of CIA's Countertenorist Detention and Interrogation Program," dated December 23, 2005, from CIA Director Porter Goss to Stephen J. Hadley, Assistant to the President/National Security Advisor, Frances F. Townsend, Assistant to the President/Homeland Security Advisor, and Ambassador John D. Negroponte, the Director of National Intelligence, Attachment, "Impact of the Loss of the Detainee Program to CT Operations and Analysis." (12) CIA briefing document dated May 2, 2006, entitled, "BRIEFING FOR CHIEF OF STAFF TO THE PRESIDENT 2 May 2006 Briefing for Chief of Staff to the President Josh Bolten: CIA Rendition, Detention and Interrogation Programs."
(13) CIA briefing document entitled, "Detainee Intelligence Value Update," dated 11 July 2006, internal document saved witliin CIA records as, "DNI Memo Intel Value July 11 2006...TALKING POINTS FOR DCI MEETING." (14) CIA document dated July 16, 2006, entitled, "DRAFT Potential Public Briefing of CIA's High-Value Terrorist InteiTogations Program," and "CIA Validation of Remarks on Detainee Policy," drafts supporting the September 6, 2006, speech by President George W. Bush acknowledging and describing die CIA's Detention and InteiTogation Program, as well as an unclassified Office of the Director of National Intelligence release, entitled, "Summary of the High Value Tenorist Detainee Program." (15) CIA classified statement for the record. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, provided by General Michael V. Hayden, Director, Central Intelligence Agency, 12 April 2007, and accompanying Senate Select Committee on Intelligence hearing transcript, entitled, "Hearing on Central Intelligence Agency Detention and Interrogation Program." (16) CIA fax from CIA employee [REDACTED] to U.S. Senate Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Defense, with fax cover sheet entitled, "Talking points," sent on October 26, 2007, at5:39:48PM,entitled, "Talking Points Appeal ofdie $|H Million reduction in CIA/CTC's Rendition and Detention Program." (17) "DCIA Talking Points: Waterboai'd 06 November 2007," dated November 6,2007,withthenotationthedocumentwas"senttoDCIANov.6inpreparationforPOTUSmeeting." (18) CIA Briefing for Obama National Security Team- "Renditions, Detentions, and InteiTOgations (RDI)" including "Tab 7," named "RDG Copy- Briefing on RDI Program 09 Jan. 2009," prepared "13 January 2009." (19) CIA briefing
documents for Leon Panetta, entitled, "Tab 9: DCIA Briefing on RDI Program- 18FEB.2009" and graphic attachment, "Key Intelligence and Reporting Derived from Abu Zubaydah and Khalid Shaykh Muhammad (KSM)." Tlie documents include "DCIA Briefing on RDI Program" agenda, CIA document "EITs and Effectiveness," with associated documents, "Key Intelligence Impacts Chart: Attachment (AZ and KSM)," "Background on Key Intelligence Impacts Chart: Attachment," and "supporting references," to include "Background on Key Captures and Plots Disrupted." (20) CIA document faxed to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence on March 18, 2009, at 3:46PM, entitled, "[SWIGERT] and [DUNBAR]" (DTS #2009-1258). See also CIA representations detailed in OLC memorandum for John A. Rizzo, Senior Deputy General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, from Steven G. Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, May 30, 2005, Re: Application of United States Obligations Under Article 16 of the Convention Against Torture to Certain Techniques that May Be Used in the Interrogation of High Value al Qaeda Detainees; and OLC memorandum for John A. Rizzo, Acting General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, from Steven G. Bradbuiy, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel,July 20, 2007,Re: Application of the War Crimes Act, the DetaineeTreatment Act, and Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions to Certain Techniques that May Be Used by the CIA in the Interrogation of High Value al Qaeda Detainees.
See section of this summary addressing representations to the Department of Justice, as well as Memorandum for John Rizzo, Acting General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, from Jay Bybee, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, August 1, 2002, Interrogation of al Qaeda Operative; Memorandum for John A. Rizzo, Senior Deputy General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, from Steven G. Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant AttorneyGeneral,OfficeofLegalCounsel,May30,2005,Re: ApplicationofUnitedStatesObligationsUnder Article 16 of the Convention Against Torture to Certain Techniques that May be Used in the Interrogation of High Value Al Qaeda Detainees; and Memorandum for John A. Rizzo, Acting General Counsel, Centi-al Intelligence Agency, from Steven G. Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, July 20, 2007, Re: Application of the War Crimes Act, the Detainee Treatment Act, and Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions to Certain Techniques that May be Used by die CIA in the Interrogation of High Value Al Qaeda Detainees.
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assess whether the CIA interrogation program should be approved as a matter of policy;^®^^ and members of Congi-ess relied on the CIA representations in overseeing and assessing the program, providing funding, and crafting related legislation.
Among otherdocuments, see the August 5, 2003, CIA Memorandum for the Record from Scott Muller from a July 29,2003, National Security Council Principals Meeting with the subject, "Review of Inteaogation Program on 29 July 2003," as well as the accompanying briefing slides, "CIA Interrogation Program, July 29, 2003"; March 4, 2005, Briefing for Vice President Cheney: CIA Detention and Interrogation Program. CIA document, dated March 4, 2005, entitled, "Briefing for Vice PresidentCheney: CIA Detention and Interrogation Program"; CIA document, dated May 2, 2006, entitled, BRIEFING FOR CHIEF OFSTAFF TOTHE PRESIDENT 2 May 2006Briefing for Chief of Staff to the President Josh Bolten: CIA Rendition, Detention and InteiTogation Programs; CIA document entitled, "DCIA Talking Points: Waterboard 06 November 2007," dated November 6, 2007, with the notation die document was "sent to DCIA Nov. 6 in preparation for POTUS meeting"; and CIA Briefing for Obama National Security Team- "Renditions, Detentions, and Interrogations (RDI)" including "Tab 7," named "RDG Copy- Briefing on RDI Program 09 Jan. 2009," prepared "13 Januaiy 2009."
'^'^''Among otherdocuments, see\ (1)CIAtestimony totheSenate Select Conunittee onIntelligence (SSCI) on April 24, 2002, regarding Abu Zubaydali's initial intenogation; (2) CIA written answers to Committee Questions for the Record, dated August 15,2002, regarding results of Abu Zubaydah's interrogations; (3) CIA testimony to SSCIon September 5, 2002, regarding covert detention facilities and results of Abu Zubaydah's interrogation; (4) CIA cable documenting September 27, 2002, briefing to Chairman Bob Graham and Vice Chainnan Richard Shelby and their staff directors regarding the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques in the intenogations of Abu Zubaydah; (5) CIA Memorandum for the Record documenting February 4, 2003, briefing to SSCI Chairman Pat Roberts and CommitteestaffdirectorsregardingtheCIA'sDetentionandInterrogationProgram; (6)CIAtestimonytoSSCIon March5,2003,regardingthecaptureandinitialinterrogationofKSM; (7)CIAwitnesstestimonytoSSCIon March 19,2003, regarding KSM's inten:ogation; (8) CIA witness testimony to SSCI on April 1, 2003, regarding KSM's capture; (9) April 3, 2003, Intelligence Community Terrorist Threat Assessment regarding KSM threat reporting, entitled "Klialid Shaykh Muhammad's Threat Reporting—Precious Tmths, Sunounded by a Bodyguard ofLies,"providedtotheSSCIonApril7,2003; (10)CIAtestimonytoSSCIonApril30,2003,regardingdetainee reporting; (11)CIAtestimonytoSSCIonJune25,2003,regardingKSMintenogation; (12)CIAtestimonyto SSCI on July 30j2003^reear^g CIA detainee threat reporting; (13) CIA testimony to SSCI on September 3, 2003, regarding ^'^^^'^orities, including CIA detention authorities; (14) CIA prepared briefing for Chairman Pat Roberts and Vice Chainnan John D. Rockefeller IV entitled, "CIA Interrogation Program: DDO TalkingPoints,04September2003"; (15)CIAwitnesstestimonytoSSCIonMay12,2004,regardingCIArolein abusesatAbuGhraibprison; (16) SSCIstaffnotesforJuly15,2004,CIAbriefingtoChairmanPatRobertsand Vice Chairman John D. Rockefeller IV regarding the status of the CIA intenogation prograjii; (17) CIA testimony toSSCIonSeptember13,2004,regardingCIAandtheabusesatAbuGhraibprison; (18)Hand-writtennotesof ViceChairmanJohnD.RockefellerIVrecordingabriefingbyJoseRodriguezonMarch7,2005; (19)CIA Memorandum for the Record, Subject: Sensitive Issue -Counterterrorism, October 31, 2005, regarding briefing for Senate Majority Leader Bill Frist regarding the Detainee Treatment Act, and email exchanges between John Rizzo, lll^^llllllll^, subject: "Re: Immediate Re; Sen. Frist required for briefing on impact of McCain Amendment"; date: October 31, 2005, and associated records concerning CIA briefings for Senators John McCain, Tliad Cocluan, Ted Stevens, and John Cornyn; (20) SSCI Memorandum for die Record, March 8, 2006, documenting CIA briefing of March 7, 2006, to staff on status of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program;
(21) CIA Director Porter Goss testimony to the SSCI on March 15, 2006, regarding the status of the CIA's DetentionandInterrogationProgram; (22)CIADirectorMichaelHaydentestimonytotheSSCIonSeptember6, 2006, regarding the CIA's Detention and Intenogation Program, prior to Senate consideration of the Military Commissions Act of 2006; (23) CIA Director Michael Hayden testimony to the SSCI on November 16, 2006, regarding the CIA's Detention andInterrogation Program, following passage of the Military Commissions Actof 2006; (24) CIA DirectorMichael Hayden testimony to theSSCIon April 12,2007,regarding the CIA's Detention and Intenogation Program and a report of the International Committee of the Red Cross; (25) CIA fax from CIA employee [REDACTED] to U.S. Senate Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Defense, with fax cover sheetentitled,"Talkingpoints,"sentonOctober26,2007,at5:39:48PM. Documentfaxedentitled,"TalkingPoints Appealofthe$HiMillionreductioninCIA/CTC'sRenditionandDetentionProgram"; (26)CIADirector Michael Hayden testimony to the SSCI on Decembe^^^OOT^egardin^h^ublic revelation of the CIA's
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CIA presentations to the executive and legislative branches, the CIA represented that other parties had consented to, or endorsed, the CIA's interrogation
program. Asanexample,duringapolicyreviewoftheCIA'senhancedinterrogationtechniques in July 2003, the CIA informed a subset of the National Security Council principals that the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques was "approved by the attorney general," and was "fullydisclosedtotheSSCIandHPSCIleadership." Inthesamepresentation,theCIA represented that the CIA interrogation program "had produced significant intelligence information that had, in the view of CIA professionals, saved lives." The CIA then provided examples of "attacks averted" as a direct result of the CIA interrogation program, and warned policymakers that "[t]ermination of this program will result in loss of life, possibly extensive."'^^^
When the CIA was asked by White House officials to review and provide further evidence for the effectiveness of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques in
2004, the CIA responded that it was "difficult, if not impossible" to conduct such a review, but assured White House officials that "this program works," "the techniques are effective," and the program produces "results."^®^^ The "results" provided by the CIA consisted of the "disruption" ofspecificterroristplotsandthecaptureofspecificterrorists. TheCIAfurtherrepresentedthat the information acquired as a result of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques was unique and "otherwise unavailable.These specific CIA claims played an especially important role
destiiictionofvideotapesoftheinterrogationsofAbuZubaydahand'Abdal-Rahimal-Nashiri; (27)CIADirector Michael Hayden public testimony to the SSCI on February 5, 2008, regarding waterboarding and CIA interrogations, prior to Senate vote on February 13, 2008, on the Fiscal Year 2008 Intelligence Authorization Act that would have prohibited any member of the U.S. Intelligence Community from using interrogation techniques not authorized by the U.S. Army Field Manual.
MemorandumfortheRecord: "ReviewofInterrogationProgramon29July2003." Memorandumpreparedby CIA General Counsel Scott Muller, dated August 5, 2003, and briefing slides entitled, "CM Interrogation Program,"datedJuly29,2003,presentedtoseniorWhiteHouseofficials. Thoseattendingthemeetingincluded the director of the CIA, George Tenet; the CIA general counsel, Scott Muller; Vice President Cheney; National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice; White House Counsel Alberto Gonzales; Attorney General John Ashcroft; Acting Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, Patrick Philbin; and counsel to the National Security Council, John Bellinger.
1056 talking points for the National Security Council entitled, "Talking Points for 10 March 2005 DCI Meeting
PC: Effectiveness of the High-Value Detainee Inten-ogation (HVDI) Techniques," datedMarch4, 2005, for a March 8, 2005, meeting. See also CIA Memorandum for National Security Advisor Rice entitled, "Effectiveness of the
CIA CounterteiTorist Interrogation Techniques," dated December 2004.
1057 pjQiyj 2003 through 2009, the CIA'srepresentations regarding tlie effectiveness oftheCIA'senhanced
interrogation techniques provided a specific set of examples of terrorist plots "disrupted" and terrorists captured that theCIAattributedtoinformationobtainedfromtheuseofitsenhancedinterrogationtechniques. CIA representations further asserted that the intelligence obtained from the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques was unique, otherwise unavailable, and resulted in "saved lives." Among other CIA representations, see: (1) CIA representations in the Department of Justice Office of Legal Counsel Memorandum, dated May 30, 2005, which relied on a series of highly specific CIA representations on the type of intelligence acquired from the use of theCIA'senhancedinterrogationtechniquestoassesstheirlegality. TheCIArepresentationsreferencedbythe OLC include that the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques was "necessary" to obtain "critical," "vital," and "otherwise unavailable actionable intelligence" that was "essential" for the U.S. government to "detect and disrupt" terrorist tlireats. The OLC memorandum further states that "[the CIA] ha[s] informed [the OLC] that the CIA believes that this program is largely responsible for preventing a subsequent attack within the United States." (See Memorandum for John A. Rizzo^enio^Deput^enera^oun^ Central Intelligence Agency, from
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in the Department of Justice's legal review of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. Department of Justice documents stated that an analysis of the legality of the CIA's enhanced
Steven G. Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, May 30, 2005, Re: Application of United States Obligations Under Article 16of theConvention Against Torture to Certain Techniques thatMayBeUsedintheIntenogation ofHighValuealQaedaDetainees.) (2)CIArepresentations inthe Department of Justice Office of Legal Counsel Memorandum dated July 20, 2007, wliich also relied on CIA representations on the type of intelligence acquired from the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. Citing CIA documents and the President's September 6, 2006, speech describing the CIA's intenogation program (whichwasbasedonCIA-providedinfonnation),tlieOLCmemorandumstates: 'TheCIAinterrogationprogram— and, in particular, its use of enhanced interrogation techniques—is intended to serve tliis paiamount interest [security of the Nation] by producing substantial quantities of otherwise unavailable intelligence. ...As the President explained [on September 6, 2006], *by giving us information about terrorist plans we could not get anywhere else, the program has saved innocent lives.'" {See Memorandum for John A. Rizzo, Acting General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, from Steven G. Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel,July20,2007,Re:ApplicationoftheWarCrimesAct,tlieDetaineeTreatmentAct,andCommonArticle3 of tlie Geneva Conventions to Certain Techniques that May Be Used by the CIA in tlie Intenogation of High Value al Qaeda Detainees.) (3) CIA briefings for members of the National Security Council in July and September2003, which represented that "the use of Enhanced Techniques of one kind or another had produced significant
intelligence information that had, in the view of CIA professionals, saved lives," and which warned policymakers that"[t]erminationofthisprogramwillresultinlossoflife,possiblyextensive." (SeeAugust5,2003Memorandum for the Record from Scott Muller, Subject: Review of Interrogation Program on 29 July 2003; Briefing slides, CIA Interrogation Program, July 29,2003; September 4, 2003, CIA Memorandum for the Record, Subject: Member Briefing; and September 26,2003, Memorandum for the Record from Muller, Subject: CIA Interrogation Program.) (4) Tlie CIA's response to the Office of Inspector General draft Special Review of the CIA program, which asserts: "Infomiation [the CIA] received... as a result of the lawful use of enhanced interrogation techniques ('EITs') has almostcertainlysavedcountlessAmericanlivesinsidetheUnitedStatesandabroad. Theevidencepointsclearlyto the fact tliat without tlie use of such techniques, we and our allies would [have] suffered major terrorist attacks involving hundreds, if not thousands, of casualties." (See Memorandum for: Inspector General; from: James Pavitt, Deputy Director for Operations; subject: re (S) Comments to Draft IG Special Review, "Countertenorism Detention andInterrogation Program" 2003-7123-IG; date; Febinary 27,2004; attachment: February 24,2004,Memorandum re Successes of CIA's Counterterrorism Detention and Intenogation Activities.) (5) CIA briefing documents for CIA Director Leon Panetta in February 2009, which state that the "CIA assesses that the RDI progiam worked and tlie [enhanced interrogation] techniques were effective in producing foreign intelligence," and that "[m]ost, if not all, of the timely intelligence acquired from detainees in this program would not have been discovered or reported by other means." (SeeCIAbriefingdocumentsforLeonPanetta,entitled,"Tab9:DCIABriefingonRDIPiogram- 18FEB.2009" and graphic attachment, "Key Intelligence and Reporting Derived from Abu Zubaydah and Khaiid Shaykli Muhaimnad (KSM)," including "DCIA Briefing on RDI Program" agenda, CIA document "EITs and Effectiveness," with associated documents, "Key Intelligence Impacts Chart: Attaclmient (AZ and KSM)," "Background on Key Intelligence Impacts Chart: Attachment," and "supporting references," to include "Background onKeyCapturesandPlotsDisrupted.") (6)CIAdocumentfaxedtotheSenateSelectCommitteeonIntelligenceon March 18, 2009, entitled, "[SWIGERT] and [DUNBAR]" (DTS #2009-1258), wliich provides a list of "some of the key captures and disrupted plots" tliat the CIA had attributed to the use of the CIA's enhanced intenogation techniques,andstates: "CIAassessesthatmost,ifnotall,ofthetimelyintelligenceacquiredfromdetaineesinthis programwouldnothavebeendiscoveredorreportedbyanyothermeans." SeeVolumeIIforadditionalCIA representations asserting that the CIA's enhanced intenogation techniques enabled the CIA to obtain unique, otherwise unavailable intelligence that "saved lives."
See Volume II for detailed infomiation. The OLC's May 30, 2005, memorandum relied on the CIA's representations in determining that the CIA's enhanced intenogation techniques did not violate the Fifth Amendment's prohibition on executive conduct that "shocks the conscience," indicating that this analysis was a "highlycontext-specificandfact-dependentquestion." TlieOLCalsolinkeditsanalysisofwhethertheuseoftlie CIA's enhanced intenogation techniques was "constitutionally arbitrary" to the representation by the CIA that the program produced "substantial quantities of otlierwise unavailable actionable intelligence." (See Memorandum for John A. Rizzo, Senior Deputy General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, from Steven G. Bradbury, Principal DeputyAssistantAttorneyGeneral,Officeo^ega^ounsel^^a^0^005^e: ApplicationofUnitedStates
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interrogation techniques was a "highly context-specific, fact-dependent question" and highlighted the importance of the CIA representation that the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques produced "substantial quantities of otherwise unavailable actionable intelligence," and were "largely responsible for preventing a subsequent attack within the United States.
B. PastEffortstoReviewtheEffectivenessoftheCIA'sEnhancedInterrogation Techniques
During the period in which the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program was operational, from 2002 to 2009, there were three reviews that addressed the
effectiveness of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques: (1) the CIA Office of Inspector General Special Review, released in May 2004; (2) an internal review conducted by two senior CIA officers in 2004; and (3) a 2005 "Blue Ribbon" panel consisting of two individuals not employed by the CIA. According to CIA records, as of the spring of 2007, the CIA had not "conducted any other studies on the effectiveness of interrogation techniques."^®^^
Each of the previous reviews relied on interviews with CIA personnel involved in the program, as well as documents prepared by CIA personnel, which
represented that the CIA interrogation program was effective, and that the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques had "enabled the CIA to disrupt terrorist plots, capture
Obligations Under Article 16 of the Convention Against Torture to Certain Techniques that May be Used in the Interrogation of High Value A1 Qaeda Detainees.) The CIA provided examples of the purported effectiveness of the CIA^^nhancedinterroeatioiHech^uesinresponsetoarequestfromtheOLC. AccordingtoanemailftomH
m C T C Legal Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General Steven Bradbury explained that "because the standards under Article 16 [of the Convention Against Torture] require a balancing of the government's need for the information, it would be quite helpful if we had any case studies or examples to demonstrate the value ofinformation produced by the program." 5eeemail^romj^^B|J|||(; to:
illljll^H; cc: ^^•^BjREDA^D], [REDACTED], [REDACTED]; date: March 2, 2005, 2:32 PM.
1059 y^jyiong other documents, see Department of Justice Office of Legal Counsel memoranda dated May 30,2005,
and July 20, 2007. The May 30, 2005, OLC memorandum repeats additional CIA representations, including that "enhanced interrogation techniques remain essential to obtaining vital intelligence necessary to detect and disrupt such emerging threats" and that the use of the techniques "led to specific, actionable intelligence." The July 20, 2007, OLC memorandum states that the "...use of enhanced interrogation techniques is intended to service this paramount interest [security of the Nation] by producing substantial quantities of otherwise unavailable intelligence," citing CIA representations to the President that the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques produced information "we could not get anywhere else," and that "the use of such techniques saved American lives by revealing information about planned terrorist plots."
See CIA draft response to Questions for the Record submitted by the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence afteranApril12,2007,hearingontheCIA'sDetentionandInterrogationProgram. TheCIAdraftresponsestates the CIA Blue Ribbon Panel, consisting of two outside reviewers, was the only independent review of the effectiveness of the CIA's enhanced inteiTogation techniques, and that "CIA had not conducted any other studies on the effectiveness of [the] interrogation techniques." The final CIA response to tlie Committee states: "The 2004 CIA Officeof theInspectorGeneral reportthatreviewed CIA's counterterrorism detention andinterrogation activities recommended a non-CIA independent experts' review of the effectiveness of each of the authorized EFT andadeterminationregardingthenecessiwforthecontinue^iseofeachtechnique. Asaresult,CIAsoughtand obtained the agreement ofMr. |||||||||||||||||||||||| and Mr. to conduct an independent review, which is also known as the Blue-Ribbon Panel report. Their individual reports are provided at Tabs A and B."
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additionalterrorists,andcollectahigh-volumeofcriticalintelligenceonal-Qa'ida."^®^' CIA personnelrepresented: "[t]hisisinformationthatCTCcouldnothavegottenanyotherway."^°^^
There aie no indications in CIA records that any of the past reviews attempted to independently validate the intelligence claims related to the CIA's use of its
enhanced interrogation techniques that were presented by CIA personnel in interviews and in documents. As such, no previous review confirmed whether the specific intelligence cited by the CIA was acquired from a CIA detainee during or after being subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, or if the intelligence acquired was otherwise unknown to the United States government ("otherwise unavailable"), and therefore uniquely valuable.
C. The Origins of CIA Representations Regarding the Effectiveness of the CIA's Enhanced Interrogation Techniques As Having "Saved Lives," "Thwarted Plots," and "Captured Terrorists"
Before the CIA took custody of its first detainee, CIA attorneys researched the limits of coercive interrogations and the legal definitions of torture. On
November 26, 2001, CIA Office of General Counsel (OGC) attorneys circulated a draft legal memorandum entitled "Hostile Interrogations: Legal Considerations for CIA Officers."^®^^ The memorandum listed interrogation techniques considered to be torture by a foreign government and a specific nongovernmental organization, including "cold torture," "forced positions," "enforced physical exhaustion," "sensory deprivation," "perceptual deprivation," "social deprivation," "threats and humiliation," "conditioning techniques," and "deprivation of
sleep." The draft memorandum described various prohibitions on torture and the potential use of "necessity" as a legal defense against charges of torture, stating:
"[i]t would, therefore, be a novel application of the necessity defense to avoid prosecution of U.S. officials who tortured to obtain information that saved many lives... A policy decision must be made with regard to U.S. use of torture in light of our obligations under international law, with consideration given to the circumstances and to intemational opinion on our current
See: (1) CIA Office of Inspector General, Special Review - Countertenorism Detention and Interrogation Program, (2003-7123-IG), May 2004; (2) May 12, 2004, Memorandum for Deputy Director for Operations from
Chief, Information Operations Center, and Henry Crumpton, Chief, National Resources Divisions via Associate Deputy Director for Operations, witii the subject line, "Operational Review of CIA Detainee Program"; and (3) Blue Ribbon Panel Review, including a September 2, 2005, Memorandum from
mllllljl to Director Porter Goss, CIA, entitled "Assessment of EITs Effectiveness," and a September 23, 2005, Memorandum from to the Honorable Porter Goss, Director, Central Intelligence Agency, entitled, "Response to request from Director for Assessment of BIT effectiveness."
See, among other examples, a June 27,2003, Inspector General interview with CTC's Chief of Operations, The record ofthat interview (2003-^2MG^t^s: stated that the
Agency's Al-Qa'ida program has been very effective. • views the intelligence as the main criteria
for judging the success of the program; specifically, intelligence that has allowed CTC to take other tenorists off the
street and to prevent terrorist attacks. Tliis is information that CTC could not have gotten any other way."
1063 November 26, 2001, Draft of Legal Appendix, Paragraph 5, "Hostile Interrogations: Legal Considerations for
CIA Officers." This document includes information regarding Paragraph 4.
1064 November 26, 2001, Draft of Legal Appendix, Paragraph 5, "Hostile Interrogations: Legal Considerations for
CIA Officers." See V olume I for additional information. III! I (III I
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campaign against terrorism—states may be very unwilling to call the U.S. to task for torture when it resulted in saving thousands of lives
On February 1, 2002, a CTC attorney researched the impact of the application of the Geneva Conventions (GC) on future CIA interrogation a c t i v i t i e s . T h e
attorney wrote:
"If the detainee is a POW and enjoys GC coverage, then the optic becomes how legally defensible is a particular act that probably violates the convention, butultimatelysaveslives. Ibelievethat[anamedCIAattorney!'spapers reflecting on necessity and anticipatory selfdefense are the two most obvious defenses available."^^^^
(U) The Department of Justice Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) included the "necessity defense" in its August 1, 2002, memorandum to the White House Counsel, determining, among other things, that "under the current circumstances, necessity or self-defense may justify interrogation methods that might violate" the criminal prohibition against torture.The OLC memorandum states:
"It appears to us that under the cun-ent circumstances the necessity defense could be successfully maintained in response to an allegation of a Section 2340A violation. .. .Under these circumstances, a detainee may possess
Italicsadded. November26,2001,DraftofLegalAppendix,Paragraph5,"HostileIntenogations:Legal Considerations forCIAOfficers," at L TheCIAwould laterrepeat bothclaims, representing toseniorofficials and the Department of Justice that the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques produced intelligence that "savedlives,"andthatthisintelligencewasotherwiseunavailable. Further,onAugust1,2002,OLCissuedan unclassified, but non-public opinion, in the form of a memorandum to White House Counsel Alberto Gonzales, analyzing whether certain interrogation methods would violate 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340A. The memorandum provides a similar rationale for the necessity defense, stating, "certainjustification defenses might be available that wouldpotentiallyeliminatecriminalliability. Standardcriminallawdefensesofnecessityandself-defensecould justify intenogation methods needed to elicit information to prevent a direct and imminent threat to the United States and its citizens." The memorandum laterconcludes: "even if an interrogation method might violate Section 2340A, necessity orself-defense coul^rovid^ustifi^ions that would eliminate any criminal liability."
'0^ Email from: [REDACTED]; to: and [REDACTED]; subject: "POW's and Questioning"; date: February I, 2002.
Italics added. Email from: [REDACTED]; to: [REDACTED]; subject: "POW's and Questioning";date:February1,2002. InresponsetoarequestfromtheDepartmentofJustice'sOfficeof ProfessionalResponsibility(OPR),theCIAprovidedtwomemoranda- onedatedNovember7,2001,theother undated - neither of which discussed the necessity defense. The OPR report states: "Although the CIA Office of General Counsel (OGC) told us that these were the only CIA memoranda in its possession on interrogation policy, someoftheinfonnationweobtainedfromtheCIAsuggestedotherwise. Inaninternalemailmessagedated February 1, 2002, from CTC attorney [REDACTED] to [REDACTED], [REDACTED] refened to '[CIA Attorney [REDACTED]] papers reflecting on necessity and anticipatory self defense.'" See Department of Justice, Office of ProfessionalResponsibility,Report. InvestigationintotheOfficeofLegalCounsel'sMemorandaConcerningIssues Relating to the Central Intelligence Agency's Use of 'Enhanced Interrogation Techniques' on Suspected Terrorists, July 29, 2009, pp. 31-32.
1068 Memorandum for Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President, from Jay C. Bybee, Assistant Attorney
General, Office of Legal Counsel, August 1, 2002, "Re Standards of Conduct for Interrogation under 18 U.S.C 2340-2340A," the U.S. Federal Torture Statute.
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information that could enable the United States to prevent attacks that potentially could equal or surpass the September 11 attacks in their magnitude. Clearly, any harm that might occur during an interrogation would pale to insignificance compared to the harm avoided by preventing such an attack, which could take hundreds or thousands of lives."^^^^
According to a report by the Department of Justice Office of Professional Responsibility (OPR), released in July 2009, Deputy Assistant Attorney General
John Yoo "acknowledged that the CIA may have indirecdy suggested the new sections [related to Commander-in-Chief authority and possible defenses, including the necessity defense] by asking him what would happen in a case where an interrogator went 'over the line' and inadvertentlyviolatedthestatute." YooalsotoldtheOPRthathedraftedthoserelevantsections. Another senior Department of Justice lawyer at the time, Patrick Philbin, informed the OPR that when he told Yoo that the sections were superfluous and should be removed, Yoo responded, "They want it in there." The CIA's former Deputy General Counsel John Rizzo told the OPR that the CIA did not request the addition of the sections.In his response to the OPR report, Assistant Attorney General Jay Bybee stated that the "ticking time bomb" that could justify the necessitydefensewas,infact,a"realworld"scenario. AccordingtoBybee,"theOLCattorneys working on the [August 1, 2002] Memo had been briefed on the apprehension of Jose Padilla on May 8, 2002. Padilla was believed to have built and planted a dirty bomb."^^^^ The August 1, 2002, memorandum states that the "[i]nterrogation of captured al Qaida operatives allegedly allowed U.S. intelligence and law enforcement agencies to track Padilla and to detain him upon his entry into the United States."^®^^ This information was inaccurate.
Italics added. Memorandum for Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President, Re: Standards of Conduct for Interrogationunder18U.S.C.§§2340-2340A,pp.39-41. OnDecember30,2004,theOLCissuedanew memorandumsupersedingtlieAugust1,2002,memoranduminitsentirety. TheOLCwrotethat"[b]ecausethe discussion in [the August 1, 2002] memorandum concerning the President's Commander-in-Chief power and the potential defenses to liability was - and remains—unnecessary, it has been eliminated from the analysis that follows. Consideration of the bounds of any such authority would be inconsistent with the President's unequivocal directive thatUnitedStatespersonnelnotengageintorture." (SeeMemorandumforJamesB.Comey,DeputyAttorney General,Re:LegalStandardsApplicableUnder18U.S.C.§§2340-2340A). NoCIAdetaineesweresubjectedto the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques between the issuance of the December 2004 memorandum and May 2005, when the OLC opined on the application of the federal proliibition on torture to the techniques.
Department of Justice, Office of Professional Responsibility, Report, Investigation into the Office of Legal Counsel's Memoranda Concerning Issues Relating to tlie Central Intelligence Agency's Use of 'Enhanced Interrogation Techniques' on Suspected Terrorists, July 29, 2009, p. 51.
Bybee response, at 74, n. 6, cited in the OPR Report at fn. 171. Department of Justice, Office of Professional
Responsibility, Report, Investigation into the Office of Legal Counsel's Memoranda Concerning Issues Relating to
the Central Intelligence Agency's Use of 'Enhanced Interrogation Techniques' on Suspected TeiTorists, July 29,
2009.
1072 Memorandum for Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President, Re: Standards of Conduct for Interrogation
under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340A.
See section of this summary and Volume II on the Thwarting of the Dirty Bomb/Tall Buildings Plot and the
Capture of Jose Padilla.
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With the issuance on August 1, 2002, of a second OLC memorandum specific to Abu Zubaydah,^^'''^ the CIA initiated the use of its enhanced
inten*ogation techniques. After the CIA subjected Abu Zubaydah and other CIA detainees to the techniques, the CIA made increasingly stronger assertions about the effectiveness of the CIA's interrogation program, eventually asserting that the CIA interrogation program "saved lives,"^^^^ and that the use of the CIA's enhanced inten'ogation techniques was necessary, as the intelligence obtained could not have been acquired in any other way.
Many of the representations made by the CIA about the effectiveness of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques were first made in the spring of
2003 and evolved over the course of the year and into early 2004. In April 2003, CIA officers told the CIA's Office of Inspector General (OIG) that KSM, who had been subjected to the techniquesbetweenMarch[j,2003,andMarch25,2003,wasstillnotfullycooperative. For example, on April 3, 2003, more than a week after the CIA had discontinued the use of its enhanced interrogation techniques on KSM, the deputy chief of ALEC Station,
informe^h^O^ that KSM had made "remarkable progress," but there was "alot more to be done." did not cite any specific intelligence obtained from KSM in this
1077 context.
27, 2003, more than three months after the CIA had ceased using its enhanced interrogation techniques against KSM, CTC Chief of Operations
told the OIG that he was convinced that KSM "knows more and is just
Memorandum for John Rizzo, Acting General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, from Jay Bybee, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, August 1, 2002, Interrogation of al Qaeda Operative (DTS #2009-1810, Tab 1).
Amongotherdocuments,seeCIAmemorandum fortheRecord,"ReviewofInterrogation Programon29July 2003," prepared by CIA General Counsel Scott Muller, dated August 5, 2003; briefing slides entitled, "CIA Interrogation Program," dated July 29, 2003, presented to senior White House officials; Memorandum to the Inspector General from James Pavitt, CIA's Deputy Director for Operations, dated February 27, 2004, with the subject line, "Comments to Draft IG Special Review, 'Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Program' (2003-7123-IG)," Attachment,"SuccessesofCIA'sCounterterrorismDetentionandInterrogationActivities,"dated February 24, 2004; and the September 6, 2006, CIA-vetted speech by the President on the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program.
See, among other examples, interview of James Pavitt, by and [REDACTED], Office of the InspectorGeneral,August21,2003;Memorandumfor:InspectorGeneral;from: JamesPavitt,DeputyDirectorfor Operations; subject: re Comments to Draft IG Special Review, "Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Program" 2003-7123-IG; date: February 27,2004; attachment: February 24, 2004, Memorandum re Successes of CIA's Counterterrorism Detentioi^n^nte^ogation Activities; and a June 27, 2003, Inspector General interview of the Chief of Operations CTC, record of that interview states: stated that the Agency's Al-Qa'ida program has been very effective. views the intelligence as the main criteria for judging the success of the program; specifically, intelligence that has allowed CTC to take other terrorists offthe street and tomjeventtenorist attacks. This is information that CTC could not have gotten any other way."
Interview of by [REDACTED] and [REDACTED], Office of the Inspector General, April 3, 2003. OnApri^^2003^^TCanalysttoldtheIGthatKSM"hasnotprovidedanythingsignificanttodate." {^See interview o f ^ H m | ^ | , by [REDACTED] and [REDACTED], Office of the Inspector General, April 21, 2003.) OnApril30,2003,oneofKSM'sinterrogatorspointedto"informationonhijackings,bridgesinNewYork, andnuclearplants,"andinfonnationonhiddenuranium,whichwasneverfound. Seeinterviewof|
|, by [REDACTED] and [REDACTED]^ffic^^h^nspecto^en^l, April 30, 2003. I(II MIIII
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waiting for us to ask the right q u e s t i o n s , " t h e n provided two examples of information that KSM had not provided until he was asked specifically about the matters by CIA interrogators: information on the "tallest building in California" plot (also known as the "Second Wave" plot), and the inclusion of a building in Canary Wharf as a target in the plotting against Heathrow A irport.A sked if he could think of any instances in which information from CIA detainees had led to the arrest of a tenwist, H I H H stated only that Majid Khan provided information that led to the arrest of lyman Paris by the This information was inaccurate, as Majid Khan was not in CIA custody when he provided information on lyman Paris.
represented to the OIG that the CIA's inteiTogation program was "very effective," and that the intelligence obtained from CIA detainees was "the
main criteria for judging the success of the program; specifically, inteUigencethayjasaUowed CTC to take other terrorists off the street and to prevent tenwist attacks." also told the OIG that the information obtained from CIA interrogations was "information that CTC could nothave gotten any otherway."^°^^
(U) On June 26, 2003, President Bush issued a statement for the United Nations International Day in Support of Victims of Torture. That statement—referencedin multiple news articles— relayed that the:
"United States is committed to the world-wide elimination of torture and we are leading this fight by example. I call on all governments to join with the United States and the community of law-abiding nations in prohibiting, investigating, and prosecuting all acts of torture and in undertaking to prevent othercruel andunusual punishment."^®^^
The following day, after the Washington Post published an article on the Administration's detainee policy, CIA Deputy General Counsel John Rizzo called John
Bellinger, the legal advisor to the National Security Council. According to an email from Rizzo to other senior CIA officers, Rizzo called Bellinger to:
1078
told the OIG that KSM was asked about the plan to hijack an airplane in Malaysia and fly it into the Library Tower in Los Angeles, which tlie CIA had learnedfrom another detainee. That detainee was Masran bin Arshad, who was in foreign government custody, told tlie OIG that KSM "provided information on the Heathrow/Canary Whaif option, buUioUinti^ersonnel at [DETENTION SITE BLUE] asked him about a picture he drew of an I-beam." See Memorandum for tlie Record; subject: Meeting with Chief of Operations^_|^|j|||||||||||[||||^ Counterterrorist Center (2003-7123-IG); date: 27 June 2003.
Memorandum for the Record; subject: Meeting with Chief of Operations, |
CounterteiTorist Center (2003-7123-IG); date: 27 June 2003. See sections of this summaiy and Volume II on tlie
Thwarting of the Second Wave Plot and the Discovery of the Al-Ghuraba Group, and the Thwarting of the
HeathrowAirportand Canary Whaif Plotting.
1080 Memorandum for the Record; subject: Meeting with Chief of Operations, Counterterrorist
Center (2003-7123-IG); date: 27 June 2003.
See section of this summary and Volume II on the Identification, Capture, and Arrest of lyman Paris. 1082 U m i l l , Memorandum for the Record; subject: Meeting with Chief ofOperations, |
Counterterrorist Center (2003-7123-IG); date: 27 June 2003.
June 26, 2003, Statement by the President, United Nations International Day in Support of Victims of Torture,
http://www.whitehouse.gOv/news/releases/2003/06/20030626-3.html.
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"express our surprise and concern at some of the statements attributed to the Administration in the piece, particularly the Presidential statement on the UN International Day in Support of Victims of Torture as well as a quote from the Deputy White House Press Secretary Scott McClellan that all prisoners being held by the USG are being treated 'humanely.
While Rizzo expressed the view that the presidential statement did not appear to contain anything "we can't live with," Rizzo conveyed to senior CIA leaders that it
"might well be appropriate for us to seek written reaffirmation by some senior White House official that the Agency's ongoing practices... are to continue."^^^^
Ori July 3, 2003, DCI George Tenet sent a memorandum to National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice seeking reaffirmation of the Administration's
support for the CIA's detention and interrogation policies and practices. The memorandum stated that the reaffirmation was sought because:
"recent Administration responses to inquiries and resulting media reporting about the Administration's position have created the impression that these [interrogation] techniques are not used by U.S. personnel and are no longer approved as a policy matter."^"^^
While the CIA was preparing to meet with the White House on the reaffirmation of the CIA interrogation program, CIA personnel provided additional inaccurate
information about the "effectiveness" of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques to the OIG,aswellastoseniorCIAleadership. Theseinaccuraterepresentationsdescribedthe "thwarting" of specific plots and the capture of specific terrorists attributed to the interrogation of CIA detainees and the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques.
f/N¥) OnJuly16,2003,DeputyChiefo^ALE^tation||||^^| was interviewed again by the OIG. In this interview asserted that KSM
"provided information that helped lead to the arrest o f lyman Paris, Uzhair Paracha, Saleh al- Marri, Majid Khan, and Ammar al-Baluchi.'°^^ These representations were almost entirely
1088 maccurate.
Email from; John Rizzo; to: John Moseman,^^^^}}!^^}' cc: Buzzy Krongard, Scott Muller, William Harlow; subject: Today's Washington Post Piece on Administration Detainee PoUcy; date: June 27, 2003.
Email from: John Rizzo; to: John Moseman,H^^^^B; cc: Buzzy Krongard, Scott Muller, William
Harlow; subject: Today's Washington Post Piece on Administration Detainee Policy; date: June 27, 2003.
1086 j^iy 3^ 2003, CIA Memorandum for National Security Advisor from Director ofCentral Intelligence George J.
TenetwiththeSubject:ReaffimiationoftheCentralIntelligenceAgency'sInterrogationProgram. SeealsoScott Muller, Memorandum for the Record; subject: Review of Interrogation Program on 29 July 2003; date: 5 August
2003(OG^^003-50078).
1087 Memorandum for the Record; subject; Meeting with Deputy Chief,
Counterterrorist Center ALEC Station; date: 17 July 2003.
See sections of this summary and Volume II on the Identification, Capture, and Arrest of lyman Paris; the
Identification and Arrests of Uzhair and Saifullah Paracha; the Identification and Arrest of Saleh al-Marri; tlie Capture of Majid Khan; and the Thwarting of the Karachi Plots (regarding the capture of Ammaral-Baluchi).
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also informed the OIG that information from CIA detainees "provided a wealth of information about Al-Qa'ida plots," including: a terrorist plot in
Saudi Arabia against Israel; a plot against the U.S. Consulate in Karachi, Pakistan; a plot against Heathrow Airport and Canary Wharf; a plot to derail trains; a plot against subways; a gas station plot; a plot against the "tallest building" in California; a plot against suspension bridges; and a plot to poison water supplies.Much of this information was inaccurate.^^^^Ac^ding to OIG records, "[o]n the question of whether actual plots had been thwarted, opined that since the operatives involved ii^ian^f the above plots had been arrested, [CTC had], in effect, thwarted the operation[s]." ||||H|||| pi'ovided alist to the OIG of teirorist^aptured and tlie plots with which they were associated. None of the individuals listed by were captured as a result of reporting from CIA detainees.
(TS/^ //NF) Duringthissameperiodin2003,CIAofficerswerecompiling similarinformationforCIAleadership. OnJuly18,2003,tliechiefofALECStation,HBl wrote an email to ALEC Station officers requesting information on the "value and
impact" of CIA detainee information on behalf of the CIA Rendition^roup (RDG),^®^^ which hestatedwasbeingcompiledforseniorCIAleadership.wrote that"[o]newayto assist now is to provide input to RDG on highlights of intel and ops reporting from the detainees," in particular "reporting that helped reveal or stop plots, reporting that clinched the identity of terrorist suspects, etc."'®^"^ The first portion o^h^sponse^ompiled by ALEC Station, was drafted by Deputy Chief of ALEC Station who wrote that CIA detainee reporting "plays a key role in our ability to identify and capture al-Qa'ida ten^ns^ includingthosewhowereplanningtoattackinsidetheUnitedStates." Inanemail,|||^||H wrote that "[t]he ability of the detainees to identify many operatives previously unknown to us or to the FBI resulted in the successful capture/detention of several terrorists," and that the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques was "key" to acquiring this information on these operatives. Asexamplesofoperatives"previouslyunknown"totheCIAandtheFBIand identified by CIA detainees, PadiUa, Binyam Mohammed, Majid Khan,
1089
SeesectionsofthissummaryandVolume11ontheThwartingoftheKarachiPlots;theThwartingofthe Heathrow Airport and Canary WharfPlotting; the Identification, Capture, and AiTest of lyman Paris; the Capture of Majid Khan; the Thwarting of the SecondWave Plot and the Discovery of the Al-Ghuraba Group; and the KSM detainee review in V olume El.
'05" i m H I listed Majid Klian (gas station and poison plotting), lyman Paris (the suspension bridge plot, as well as a possible shopping mall plot), Kliallad bin Attash (the Heathrow plot), Masran bin Arshad (the "tallest building" plot), and Ammai- al-Baluchi (the plot against the U.S. consulate in Karachi). See relevant sections of tliis summary and V olume 11 for additional information.
As noted, the "Renditions and Interrogations Group," is also refened to as the "Renditions Group," the "Rendition,Detention^andlntenogationGroup," "RDI,"and"RDG"inCIArecords.
I, Memorandum for the Record; subject: Meeting with Deputy Chief, CounterteiTorist Center ALEC Station; date: 17 July 2003.
Email from: to: DQ_CTC_ALEC Group Cliiefs; cc:
|; subject: value of detainees; date: July 18, 2003, at 01:09 PM. Email fiom: to: DO_CTC_ALEC Group Chiefs; cc:
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I^mai^aris, and Sayf al-Rahman Paracha.^®^^ These representations were inaccurate. Iemail concluded:
"Simply put, detainee information has saved countless American lives inside the US and abroad. We believe there is no doubt al-Qa'ida would have succeeded in launching additional attacks in the US and that the information obtained from these detainees through the use of enhanced measures was key tounlockingthisinformation. ItisourassessmentthatifCIAlosestheability to interrogate and use enhanced measures in a responsible way, we will not be able to effectively prosecute this war."^^^^
The information relayed from ALEC Station to RDG in July 2003 for CIA leadership also included information from a CIA assessment entitled "Significant
Detainee R e p o r t i n g . T h a t document included information that was largely congruent with CIArecords. ItstatedthatKSMprovideddetailsontheHeathrowAirportPlotandtheKarachi Plots only after being confronted with the capture of Khallad bin Attash and Ammar al- Baluchi;^®^^ diat with regard to plots inside the United States, KSM had only admitted to plots that had been abandoned or already disrupted; that KSM fabricated information in order to tell CIA interrogators "what he thought they wanted to hear"; and that KSM generally only provided information when "boxed in" by information already known to CIA debriefers.^'^^ This information was not included in CIA representations to policymakers later that month.
(TS/y|||^|p|^H[|//NF) On July 29, 2003, as aresult of DCI Tenet's July 3, 2003, request seeking reaffirmation of the CIA's detention and interrogation policies and practices. Tenet and CIA General Counsel Scott Muller conducted a briefing for a subset of the National Security
Email from: [REDACTED],
I, [REDACTED],
[REDACTED],
t: value of detainees; date: July 18, 2003, at 2:30:09 PM; email from:
DO_CTC_ALEC Chiefs Groups,
[REDACTED], I; subject: Re: value of detainees; date: July 18, 2003, at 3:57:45 PM.
See sections of this summary and Volume II on the Thwarting of the Dirty Bomb/Tall Buildings Plot and the Capture of Jose Padilla; the Capture of Majid Khan; the Identification, Capture, and Arrest of lyman Paris; and the Identification and Arrests of Uzhair and Saifullah Paracha.
Italics added. Email from:
I, [REDACTED], 2003, at 3:57:45 PM.
Email from:
[REDACTED], cc:
PM. See CIA document "Significant Detainee Reporting."
See section of this summary and Volume II on the Thwarting of the Karachi Plots, and the KSM detainee review inVolume III.
Email from: to: DO_CTC_ALEC Group Chiefs,|
[REDACTED], cc: subject: Re: value of detainees; date: July 18,2003, at 3:57:45 PM. See also "Significant Detainee Reporting" and KSM detainee review in Volume III.
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Council principals.• According to a CIA memorandum, Muller represented that CIA "detainees subject to the use of Enhanced Techniques of one kind or another had produced significant intelligence information that had, in the view of CIA professionals, saved lives."'
briefing provided the "results" of using the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques in briefing slides with the heading: "RESULTS: MAJOR THREAT INFO." The slides represented that KSM provided information on "[a]ttack plans
against US Capitol, other US landmarks"; "[a]ttacks against Chicago, New York, Los Angeles; against towers, subways, trains, reservoirs, Hebrew centers, Nuclear power plants"; and the "Heathrow and Canary Wharf Plot." The slides also represented that KSM identified lyman Paris, the "Majid Khan family," and Sayf al-Rahman Paracha.^^^^ These representations were largely inaccurate.
The CIA slides represented that "major threat" information was obtained from the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques on CIA detainee 'Abd al-
Rahim al-Nashiri regarding "US Navy Ships in the Straits of Hormuz." This representation was inaccurate and omitted material f a c t s . T h e CIA slides further indicated that "major threat" information was obtained from the use of tlie CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques against CIA detainee Ramzi bin al-Shibh—specifically that bin al-Shibh "[i]dentified Hawsawi" and
CIA Memorandum for the Record, "Review of Interrogation Program on 29 July 2003," prepared by CIA General Counsel Scott Muller, dated August 5, 2003; briefing slides entitled, "CM Interrogation Program," dated July29,2003,presentedtoseniorWhiteHouseofficials. Thoseattendingthemeetingincludedthedirectorofthe CIA, George Tenet; the CIA general counsel, ScottMuller; Vice President Cheney; National Security Advisor Rice; Wliite House Counsel Alberto Gonzales; Attorney General Ashcroft; Acting Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, Patrick Philbin; and counsel to the National Security Council, John Bellinger.
CIA Memorandum for the Record, "Review of Interrogation Program on 29 July 2003," prepared by CIA General Counsel Scott Muller, dated August 5, 2003; briefing slides entitled, "CM Interrogation Program," dated July 29, 2003, presented to senior White House officials.
' CIA Memorandum for the Record, "Review of Intenogation Progi:am on 29 July 2003," prepared by CIA General Counsel Scott Muller, dated August 5, 2003; briefing slides entitled, "CM Interrogation Program," dated July 29, 2003, presented to senior White House officials.
CIA records indicate diat the "attacks," "attack plans," and "targets" discussed by KSM were well known to the Intelligence Community prior to any reporting from CIA detainees, or were merely ideas for attacks that were proposed,butneveroperationalized. TheCIAbriefingslidesmadenomentionofKSMwithholdingorfabricating informationduringandaftertheuseoftheCIA'senhancedintenogationtechniques. Seerelevantsectionsofthis summaiyandVolume11,aswellastheKSMdetaineereviewinVolumeHI.
CIA records indicate that al-Nashiri provided details on multiple terrorist plots—including plans to target ships in the Strait of Hormuz—prior to his CIA detention and the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. With regard to the targeting of ships in the Straitof Hormuz, tliis information was provided by al-Nashiri while he was still in foreign government custody and was disseminated in CIA intelligence reports prior to liis CIA detention. {SeeMM36595M B ; 36726^
disseminated intelligence,
|.) For other reporting from al-Nashiri while in foreign government custody s e e
pTOSTO^^^^H^mfF^ disseminated intelligence,
See also detainee review of 'Abd al-Rahim al-Nasliiri in Volume III.
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provided "major threat" information on "[a]ttacks against Nuclear Power Plants, Hebrew Centers," This representation was inaccurate and omitted material facts.
I" ^he context of "[mjajor threats [that] were countered and attacks averted," the CIA slides represented that "major threat" information was obtained from the use
of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques against Khallad bin Attash on an "[ajttack againstU.S.ConsulateinKarachi." Thisrepresentationwasinaccurate.TheCIAslides further represented that "major threat" information was obtained from the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques on CIA detainee Abu Zubaydah, resulting in the "[ijdentification of [Jose] Padilla, Richard Reid," as well as information on "[a]ttacks on banks, subways,petroleumandaircraftindustries." Theserepresentationswereinaccurate.
The briefing slides, which contained additional inaccuracies detailed in Volume II of the Committee Study, were used, at least in part, for CIA briefings for
Al-Hawsawi was linked to the September 11,2001, attacks and targeted by the CIA and other intelligence agencies prior to bin al-Shibh's capture. (See WASHINGTON ^Bf(232012Z MAY 02), CIA (032022Z
APR 02); 17743 (051408Z MAR 02); DIRECTOR
(161821Z JUL 03X^A1-Hawsawi's arrest on March 1, 2003, was unrelated to any reporting from CIA
detainees. (SeeALEC|i|H(16182IZJUL03).) Withregardtothereferenced"attacks,"nooperationalplots targetingthesitesreferencedwereeveridentifiedbytheCIA. PersonnelatCIAHeadquartersconcludedin2005 that the "most significant" intelligence derived from Ramzi bin al-Shibh was obtained prior to liis rendition to CIA custodyandtheuseoftheCIA'senhancedinterrogationtechniques. Accordingtoa2005CIAassessment,the "most significant" reporting from Ramzi bin al-Shibh onfuti^ attacks was background information related to al- Qa'ida's plans to attack Heathrow Airport. (See ALEC (302240Z JUN 05).) Ramzi bin al-Shibh provided the majority ofthis information in mid-0ctobe^002^vhil^ruh^|u^dy ofa foreign government and prior to being transferred to CIA custody. (See CIA | | ^ | ) See also detainee review of Ramzi bin al- Shibh in Volume III
See tlie section of this summary and Volume II on the Thwarting of the Karachi Plots. CIA officers in B H I wrote of the referenced reporting from bin Attash: "[w]hile reporting from both [al-Baluchi and bin Attash] was chilling-[CIA officers] had become aware of most of this reporting either tlirough previous information or through interviews ofal-Baluchi and Ba Attash priorto£ieir transfer out ofKarachi." This cable also stated, "[a]s noted in severalprevious cables, in December 2002 became aware of die threat to Consulate officials." See
§••• 14510
For information on the "[ijdentification of [Jose] Padilla," see the section of this summary and Volume II on the
Thwarting of the Dirty Bomb/Tall Buildings Plot and the Capture of Jose Padilla. Richard Reid was arrested in December2001,priortoAbuZubaydah'scapture. SeemultipleopensourcereportingandDepartmentofJustice materials, including, UnitedStates v. Richard Reid Indictment, U.S. District Court, District of Massachusetts, January16,2002. AbuZubaydahprovidedinformationonpotentialplacesal-Qa'idamighttarget,includingbanks and subways, shortly after his capture to FBI interrogators, months prior to the use of the CIA's "enhanced interrogation techniques" in August 2002. See Federal Bureau of Investigation documents pertaining "to the interrogation of detainee Zayn A1 Abideen Abu Zabaidah" and provided to die Senate Select Committee on IntelligencebycoverletterdatedJuly20,2010(DTS#2010-2939). SeealsoAbuZubaydahdetaineereviewin Volume UI.
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Secretary of State Powell and Secretary of Defense R u m s f e l d , a s well as for Assistant Attorney General Jack Goldsmith.
In subsequent interviews of CIA personnel, the OIG received information that contradicted other CIA representations about the CIA's Detention and
InterrogationProgram. Thechiefofthe||||BranchoftheUBLGroupatCTCdescribedat length how the arrests of Majid Khan and lyman Paris were um-elated to reporting from CIA detainees.^ The deputy director for law enforcement for the FBI's Counterterrorism Division told the OIG how Uzhair Paracha and FBI operational activities were ultimately responsible for the capture of Sayf al-Rahman Paracha.The chief of targeting and special requirem^Jts for CTC's al-Qa'ida Department and former chief of the Abu Zubaydah Task Force,fHIH
I, told the OIG that "the often-cited example ofZubaydah identifying Padilla is not quite accurate." According to '[n]ot only did [Abu Zubaydah] not tell us who Padilla was, his information alone would never have led us to Padilla." stated that the Pakistanis had told the CIA about Jose Padilla and his partner prior to Abu Zubaydah providing any information on the pair, relaying, "[i]n essence, CTC got lucky.
At the same time, however, CIA personnel provided inaccurate examplesoftheeffectivenessoftheCIA'senhancedinterrogationtechniquestotheOIG. The
deputy chief of the Al-Qa'ida Department of CTC told the OIG that "KSM gave us Majid Khan and Uzair Paracha."' Deputy DCI John McLaughlin told the OIG that information from KSM "ledtothecapture"ofMajidKhan,whichinturnledtothecaptureofHambali. McLaughlin also represented that "the capture of Richard Reid was a result of modus operandi information obtained from [Abu] Zubaydah."^These representations were inaccurate.
I" addition to these specific inaccurate examples, CIA leadership made additional general claims to the OIG about the effectiveness of the CIA intenogation
Memorandum for the Record; subject: CIA Interrogation Program; September27, 2003 (OGC-FO-2003-50088). Slides,CIAIntenogationProgram, 16September2003. TheMemorandumfortheRecorddraftedbyJohnBellinger referstoa"detailedhandout"providedbytlieCIA. SeeJohnB.Bellinger,in, SeniorAssociateCounseltothe PresidentandLegalAdvisor,NationalSecurityCouncil;MemorandumfortheRecord;subject: Briefingof SecretariesPowellandRumsfeldregardingIntenogationofHigh-Value Detainees; date:September30,2003.
ScottW.Muller;MemorandumfortheRecord;InterrogationbriefingforJackGoldsmitli;date:16October2003 (OGC-FO-2003-50097).
" Interview of chief of the IIIH Branch of the UBL Group, hy Office of the Inspector General^ul^0^003.
Interview of|B|||||BHIi' Office of the Inspecto^eneml^ugust 5, 2003.
August 19,2003,Memorandum fortheRecord, meeting with Officeof theInspector General.
August 19, 2003, Memorandum for the Record, meeting witli Office of the Inspector General. This infomiation was not included in the IG Special Review.
'•'5 H I H H H ' Memorandum for the Record; subject: Meeting with Deputy Chief, Counterterrorist Center Al- Qa'ida Department; date: 28 July 2003.
Interview of John E. McLaughlin, by [REDACTED] and [REDACTED], Office of the Inspector General, September5,2003. ThisinformationwasincludedintheCIA'sJuly2003briefingslides. RichardReidwas anested in December 2001, prior to the capture of Abu Zubaydah.
See tlie section in this summary and in Volume II on the Capture of Majid Khan; the Capture of Hambali; and the Identification and Arrests of Uzhair and Saifullali Paracha. See also the KSM detainee review in Volume in. Richard Reid was arrested prior tothe captureofAbuZubaydal^^^^^^^^
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program that highlighted the "critical threat information" that could only be acquired by using theCIA'senhancedinterrogationtechniquesagainstCIAdetainees. JoseRodriguez,thenCTC director, told the CIA OIG that "the use of EITs has saved lives and prevented terrorist operations from occurring."Deputy DCI McLaughlin told the OIG that he "believes the use of EITs has proven critical to CIA's efforts in the war on terrorism."^DDO Pavitt stated that the program was "invaluable to U.S. national security," that "American lives have been saved as a result of information received from detainees," and that the CIA "has been able to obtain informationthatwouldnothavebeenobtainedwithouttheuseofEITs."*^^° AccordingtoOIG records, DCI Tenet stated he "firmly believes that the interrogation program, and specifically the use of EITs, has saved many lives." Tenet added that the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques was "extremely valuable" in obtaining "enormous amounts of critical threat information," and that he did not believe that the information could have been gained any other way.^^^^
January 2, 2004, CIA Inspector General John Helgerson provided a draft of the OIG Special Review, entitled "Counterterrorism Detention and
Interrogation Program," to senior CIA officials for comment. The draft Special Review, which was based on numerous interviews of CIA personnel, as well as additional research by the OIG, described the origins of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program, the detention sites that were operational at the time of the review, and the guidance that had been provided on both interrogationanddetention. Thedraftalsoidentifiedanumberofunauthorizedinterrogation techniques that had been used,^^"^ and conckided that, in a number of cases, CIA interrogations went "well beyond what was articulated in the written DOJ legal opinion of 1 August 2002."^^-^
Interview of Jose E. Rodriguez, by [REDACTED] and [REDACTED], Office of the Inspector General, August 12, 2003.
"'9 Interview of John E. McLaughlin, by [REDACTED] and [REDACTED], Office of the Inspector General,
September 5, 2003.
H20 Pavitt also stated that by "September, October and November" of 2002, "they saw a clear benefit" to the use of
CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques on Abu Zubaydah (Interview of James Pavitt, by [REDACTED], Office of the Inspector General, August 21, 2003).
Interview of George Tenet, by [REDACTED], [REDACTED], Office of the Inspector General, 8 September,
2003.
1122 Pqj. example, the draft described interrogators placing pressure on a detainee's artery, conducting mock
executions, blowing cigarette or cigar smoke into a detainee's face, using cold water to interrogate detainees, and subjecting a detainee to a "hard takedown." In an interview conducted after Gul Rahman's death at DETENTION SITE COBALT, Dr. DUNBAR described a "rough takedown." The interview report stated: "According to [DUNBAR],therewereapproximatelyfiveCIAofficersfromtherenditionsteam. Eachonehadaroleduringthe takedownanditwasthoroughlyplannedandrehearsed. Theyopenedtliedoorof[adetainee]cellandrushedin screaming and yelling for him to 'get down.' They dragged him outside, cut off his clothes and secured him with Mylartape. Theycoveredhisheadwithahoodandranhimupanddownalongcorridoradjacenttohiscell. They slapped himandpunched himseveral times. [DUNBAR] stated that although it was obvious they were nottrying to hit him as hard as they could, a couple of times the punches were forceful. As they ran him along the corridor, a coupleoftimeshefellandtheydraggedhimthroughthedirt(theflooroutsideofthecellsisdirt). [Thedetainee] did acquire a number of abrasions on his face, legs, and hands, but nothing that required medical attention." DUNBAR stated that after "something like this is done, interrogators should speak to the prisoner to 'give diem somethingtothinkabout.'" SeeMemorandumforDeputyDirectorofOperations,from|
January 28, 2003, Subject: Death Investigation - Gul Rahman, pp. 21-22, paragraph 34.
CIA Inspector General, Special Review, Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Program (2003-7123-IG),
January 2004.
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The draft report repeated the inaccurate examples of the "effectiveness" of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques that had been conveyed by CIA officers to OIG p e r s o n n e l , b u t nonetheless concluded:
"[w]ith the capture of some of the operatives for the above-mentioned plots, it is not clear whether these plots have been thwarted or if they remain viable or even if they were fabricated in the first place. This Review did not uncover any evidence that these plots were imminent."
After reviewing the draft Special Review, including the OIG's qualified conclusions about the effectiveness ofthe CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques^he
CIA's CTC began preparing a highly critical response. In preparation for that response,
|CTC Legal, requested additional information that could be used as evidence for the effectiveness of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques from CTC personnel. sent an email seeking "a list of specific plots that have been thwarted by the use of detainee reporting that we acquired following the use of enhanced techniques."
noted that he would compile the information, "emphasizing that hundreds or thousands of innocent lives have been saved as a result of our use of those techniques... In a separate email, emphasized that it was "critical" that the information "establish direct links between the application of the enhanced interrogation techniques and the production of intelligence that directly enabled the saving of innocent lives," that the intelligence obtained after the use of die CIA's enlianced inten'ogation techniques be "significantly different in nature from the intelligence acquired before the use of the enhanced techniques," and that the information be "absolutely ironclad" and "demonstrably supported by cable citations, analytical pieces, or what have you."^^^^ further noted that "[w]e can expect to need to present these data to appropriately cleared personnel at the IG and on the Hill, to the Attorney General, and quite possibly to the President at some point, and they must be absolutely verifiable." He concluded, "[i]t is not an exaggeration to say that the future of the program, and the consequent saving of innocent lives, may depend substantially upon the input you provide.""^^
The Special Review draft stated that KSM "provided information that helped lead to the arrests" of Sayf al- Rahman Paracha, Uzhair Paracha, Saleh al-Marri, and Majid Khan, and that KSM's information "led to the investigation and prosecution" of lyman Paris. The draft Special Review also stated that information from Abu Zubaydah"helpedleadtotheidentification"ofJosePadillaandBii^^Muhammad. Finally,thedraftincludedthe "plots" described by Deputy Chief of ALEC Station during her July 16, 2003, interview. Most of the inaccurate representations would remain in the final version of the Special Review completed in May 2004. See CIA Inspector General, Special Review, Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Program (2003-7123- IG), January 2004.
CIA Inspector General, Special Review, Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Program (2003-7123-IG), January 2004.
Email from: to: Scott Muller, John Rizzo,
a n d ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ H ^ f subject: "For the response to the IG report"; date: February 4, 2004, at 1:04:03
PM.
'^2'' Email from: [REDACTED]; subject: Addition on KSM/AZ and measures; date: Februai-y 10,
Email from: m|||||m|||||^||||. [red/i^cTED]; subject: Addition on KSM/AZ and measures; date: Februaiy10,2004. Asdescribedinthissummaryan^n^^ CommitteeStudy,theexamples
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Responding to the request for information, Deputy Chief of ALEC Station sent an email describing intelligence from KSM in which she wrote,
"let's be foward [sic] leaning."The content of|^H||^'s email would serve as atemplate on which future justification^o^he CIA program and the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques were b a s e d . e m a i l stated that "Khalid Shaykh Muhammad's informationalonehassavedatleastseveralhundred,possiblythousands,oflives." Shethen wrote that KSM "identified" lyman Paris, "who is now serving time in the US for his support to al-Qa'ida," and "identified a photograph" of Saleh al-Marri, "whom the FBI suspected of some involvement with al-Qa'ida, but against whom we had no concrete information," adding that al- Marri "is now being held on a material witness warrant." I H ^ H ' s email stated that KSM "provided information" on Majid Khan, who "is now in custody," "identified a mechanism for al-Qa'ida to smuggle explosives into the US," and "identified" Jaffar al-Tayyar.^'^^
email also represented that "[a]fter the use of enhanced [interrogation techniques], [Abu Zubaydah] grew into what is now our most cooperative detainee," and that Abu Zubaydah's information "produced concrete results that helped saved lives."These representations were almost entirely inaccurate.As she had in an interview with the OIG,
former chief of the Abu Zubaydah Task Force, refuted this view, writing in an email that Abu Zubaydah "never really gave 'this is the plot' type of information," that Abu Zubaydah discussed Jose Padilla prior to the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, and that "he never reallygaveusactionableinteltogetthem.""^"^ Separately,DeputyChiefofALECStation
compiled were provided over the following years to the President, the Congress, die Department of Justice, and the American public.
Email from: to: cc: [REDACTEDUR^ACTED], |;subject:reAdditiononKSM/AZandmeasures;date:February9,2004. ^^|H'semail
began: "here is my draft contribution... it's late,I'm tired, so it's not especially elegant... welcome any fact correcting I got wrong, but let's be foward [sic] leaning." The inaccurate information included in the email was used in the CIA's formal response to the OIG.
' email and the subsequent DD^espons^^he OIG wereusedastte template for talking points on theprogram. See,forexample, from: to: subject: reEDITEDFinal- RE:AdditiononKSM/AZandmeasures(forwardingcommentsforresponsetodraftInspector Genera^evie^o^ape^o^ondoleezz^ic^n December 2004); date: December 6, 2004; email from:
to:HHHHi, HUHHIi' HHHUH' subject: re EDITED Final - RE: Addition on KSM/AZ and measures (forwarding comments for response to draft Inspector General review foMalkin^oints in November 2005); date: November 4, 2005.
In response to
email, one CIA officer asked whether "re the jaffar al-tayyar stuff, didnt [sic] we
alread^ave
H I H I '
KSM/AZ and measures^ate^Fe^ary 10,2004, at 09:38 AM.
Email from: to: cc:
|; subject: re Addition on KSM/AZ and measures; date: February 9, 2004.
See relevant sections of tliis summary and Volume II on the eight primary CIA effectiveness representations and 12 other prominen^I^epresenta^ns ofeffectiveness^^
Email from: to: cc: [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [R E D A C T E D ],[R E D A C T E D ], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], JoseRodriguez, [REDACTED], [REDACTEDlTll^H^^^l. subject: Re: Please Read ~ Re CTC Response to the Draft IG Report^ate:February10,2004. Asnoted,inanAugust19,2003^Memor^dumfortlieRecorddetailingBIH
I B l H i ' s interview with the Office ofthe Inspector General, I H H I told the OIG that "the often-cited example of Zubaydah identifying Padillais not quite accurate," and that "[n]ot only did [Abu Zubaydah] not tell us
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forwarded additional inaccurate information from CIA personnel in ALEC Station to CTC Legal related to al-Nashiri,'^^^ and Hambali.^^^^
On February 27, 2004, DDO Pavitt submitted his formal response to the OIG draft Special Review in the form of a memorandum to the inspector general. Pavitt
urged the CIA OIG not to "shy away from the conclusion that our efforts have thwarted attacks and saved lives," and to "make it clear as well that the EITs (including the waterboard) have beenindispensable to our successes."^Pavitt's memorandum included an attachment describing the "Successes of CIA's Counterteirorism Detention and Interrogation Activities," andwhytheCIA'senhancedinterrogationtechniqueswerenecessary. Theattachmentstated:
"Information we received from detained terrorists as a result of the lawful use of enhanced interrogation techniques ('EITs') has almost certainly saved countless American lives inside the United States and abroad. The evidence points clearly to the fact that without the use of such techniques, we and our
had told the CIA about Jose Padilla and liis partner prior to Abu Zubaydah providing any information on the pair, jfHHmillstated, "[i]n essence, CTC got lucky." Tliis infonnation was not included intlie draft orfinal OIG Special Review.
The information forwarded by was related to tlie Heathrow Aiqiort plotting and stated that "[o]nly after enhanced measures" did KSM "admit that the sketch of a beam labeled Canary Wharf in his notebook was in fact an illustration that KSM the engineer drew himself to show another AQ operative tliat tlie beams in the Wharf- like tliose in the World Trade Center - would likely melt and collapse the building, killing all inside." The email also stated that KSM "identified the leading operatives involved in both the UK and Saudi cells that would support theoperation."Theserepresentationswereinaccurate.SeethesectionofthissummaryandVolume11onthe Thwarting of the Heatlirow Airport and Canary Wharf Plotting, and the KSM detainee review in Volume III.
'•36 Tlie information forwarded by stated that, "subsequent to the application of enhanced measures," the CIA "learned more in-depth details" about operational planning, "to include ongoing operations against botli the US andSaudiinterestsinSaudiArabia." Thisrepresentationomittedkeyinformationprovidedbyal-Nashiriinforeign governmentcustodyandpriortotheuseoftheCIA'senhancedinterrogationtechniques. Seethe'Abdal-Rahimal- Nashiri detainee review in Volume l U ^ ^ ^
The information forwarded by stated that, "after tlie use of enhanced measures [Hambali] provided information that led to the wrap-up of an al-Qa'ida cell in Kar achi, some of whose members were destined to be the secondwaveattackpilotsinsidetheUSafter911.... [TJheu-identificationandsubsequentdetentionsavedhundreds of lives." This representation was inaccurate. See the section of tliis summary and V olumellonth^ of the Second Wave Plot and the Discovery of theAl-Ghun^ {See email from: H ^ I H U l i i '
multiple cc's; subject; EDITED—Re: Heathrow plot insight from KSM; date: February 10, 2004, at 2:38:36 PM^^h^mainnclu^ th^oHowin^ext: "Here is
Heathrow." Below this text were forwarded emails from and |||||||||||||||||||||||||||. See email from: to: ^^^^BB^B[^^B[^^^^^^B||subiect: Heatlirow plot insight
from KSM;date: February 10, 2004, at(H^MPMTemailft^nTlBjj^^^^BBB to:
B H U ' subject: OGO^butta^^t 5andfind-Rejal^shiri; date: February 12, 2004, at 02:59 PM; forwarding email from: to:
I; subject: Re: al-Nashiri; date: February 10, 2004, at 06:11 PM; email from: to: |; subject: **immediate—Hambali Reporting; date: February 10, 2004, at
11:43 AM.
Memorandum for: Inspector General; fiom: James Pavitt, Deputy Director for Operations; subject: re (S)
Comments to Draft IG Special Review, "Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Program" (2003-7123-IG); date: February 27, 2004; attachment: February 24, 2004, Memorandum re Successes of CIA's Countertenorism Detention and Interrogation Activities.
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allies would [have] suffered major terrorist attacks involving hundreds, if not thousands, of casualties."'
T^he attachment to Pavitt's memorandum repeated much of the inaccurate information contained in Deputy Chief of ALEC Station
about KSM and Abu Zubaydah, as well as the additional information ALEC Station personnel provided on KSM, al-Nashiri, and Hambali. In Pavitt's memorandum, every intelligence success claim was preceded with some version of the phrase, "as a result of the lawful use of EITs."'''^^ Inaccurate information provided to the OIG during interviews and in the Pavitt memorandum was included in the final version of the OIG's Special R e v i e w . ^ T h e relevant portion of the Special Review, including much of the inaccurate information, has been declassified.'''^^
As ^^^HUcTC Legal anticipated February 10, 2004, email, much of the information provided to the inspector general on the
"effectiveness" of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques was later provided to policymakers and the Department of Justice as evidence for the effectiveness of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques.
In late 2004, as the National Security Council was considering "endgame" options for CIA detainees, the CIA proposed a public relations campaign that would
include disclosures about the "effectiveness" of the CIA program. CIA talking points prepared
in December 2004 for the DCI to use with National Security Council principals stated that "[ijf done cleverly, selected disclosure of intelligence results could heighten the anxiety of terrorists at large about the sophistication of USG methods and underscore the seriousness of American commitment to prosecute aggressively the War on Terrorism.""'^ The following month, the
Memorandum for: Inspector General; from: James Pavitt, Deputy Director for Operations; subject: re (S) Comments to Draft IG Special Review, "Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Program" (2003-7123-IG); date: February 27, 2004; attachment: February 24, 2004, Memorandum re Successes of CIA's Counterterrorism Detention and InteiTogation Activities.
Memorandum for: Inspector General; from: James Pavitt, Deputy Director for Operations; subject: re (S) Comments to Draft IG Special Review, "Countertenorism Detention iind Interrogation Program" (2003-7123-IG); date: February 27, 2004; attachment: February 24, 2004, Memorandum re Successes of CIA's Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Activities.
A review of CIA records found that almost all of the information in the Pavitt memorandum was inaccurate and unsupported by CIA inten:ogation and intelligence records. The CIA's June 2013 Response states that CIA officers "generally provided accurate information [to the Inspector General] on the operation and effectiveness of the program," and that "with rare exceptions, [CIA officers] provided accurate assessments to the OIG."
The CIA Inspector General Special Review, "Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Program," was declassified with redactions in May 2008. On August 24, 2009, some portions of the Review that were redacted in May2008^were unredacted and declassified.
wrote in an email: "We can expect to need to present these data to appropriately cleared personnel at the IG and on the Hill, to the Attorney General^andqi^^ to the President at some point, and they must be absolutely verifiable." (See email from: |||||||||||||[||||I|B to: [REDACTED]; subject: Addition on KSM/AZ and measures; date: February 10,2004.) As detailed in this Study, the CIA consistently used the same "effectiveness" case studies. The eight most frequently cited "thwarted" plots and captured terrorists are examined in this summary, and in greater detail in the full Committee Study, as are 12 other prominent examples tliat the CIA has cited in the context of the "effectiveness" of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques.
Talking Points for the DCI: DOD Proposals to Move Forward on Transfer of HVDs to Guantanamo, 16 December 2004.
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CIA proposed that the public information campaign include details on the "intelligence gained andlivessavedinHVDinten-ogations."^''^^ TherewasnoimmediatedecisionbytheNational Security Council about an "endgame" for CIA detainees or the proposed public information campaign.
In early April 2005, chief of ALEC Station, asked that information on the success of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program be
compiled in anticipation of interviews of CIA personnel by Tom Brokaw of NBC News. The first draft included effectiveness claims relating to the "Second Wave" plotting, the Heathrow Airport plotting, the Karachi plotting, and the identification of a second shoe b o m b e r . ^ A subsequent draft sought to limit the information provided to what was already in the public recordandincludedassertionsaboutIssaal-Hindi,lymanParis,andSajidBadat.^^"^^ Thatday. Deputy Director of CTC Philip Mudd told that "we either get out and sell, or we get hammered, which has implications beyond the media. [CJongress reads it, cuts our authorities, messes up our b u d g e t . " T h e following day, the draft was cleared for release to the media.
DCI Talking Points for Weekly Meeting with National Security Advisor, 12 January 2005; included in email from: [REDACTED]; to: [REDACTED], cc: BMBBj^Bp^BjohnA^J^zzo,
subject:
Coord on NSC Talkings for 1/14; date: January 11, 2005, at 03:33 PM.
The draft stated tliat the "Second Wave" plotting "was uncovered during the initial debriefings of a senior al-
Qa'ida detainee," that the Heathrow plotting "was also discovered as a result of detainee debriefings," tliat the Karachi plotting "was revealed during the initial debriefings of two senior al-Qa'ida detainees," and tliat the CIA "learned form [sic] detainee debriefings o f the second shoe bomber. {See email from: to:
[ R E D A C T E D ] , [ R E D A C T E D ] , [REDACTED], [REDACTED],j
, [REDACTEpTBi^^^Bj^DACTED], • • • • . [REDACTED], [REDACTED; cc;
; subject: FOR IMMEDIA TE COORDINA TION: summary of impact of detainee
program; date: April 13,2005, at 5:21:37 PM.) These claims were inaccurate. See relevant sections of this summary and V olume 11.
The draft discussed Issa al-Hindi, who had been referenced in the 9/11 Commission Report, stating that "[p]rior to KSM's reporting, the U.S. Government was not aware of Issa's casing activity, nor did we know his true identity." It added tliat "KSM's reporting was the impetus for an intense investigation, culminating in Issa's identification and arrest." The draft also included two examples that had not been in official public documents, but had been described in press stories. The first was that "KSM led U.S. investigators to an Ohio tnick driver named lyman Paris." Tlie second was that "KSM's confessionswereals^nstrumental in determining the identity of Saajid Badat," the second shoe bomber. {See email from: ChiefofOperatio^, ALEC Station; to: m
••••, [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED],
[REDACTED],
subject: Brokaw interview: Take one; date: April 13, 2005, at 6:46:59 PM.) As described elsewhere, tliese claims were incongruent with CIA records. At least one earlier media account of KSM's purported role in tlie aiTest of lyman Paris was provided in a book by an author who had extensive access to CIA officials. {See Ronald Kessler, The CIA at War, St. Martin's Press, New York, 2003.). The CIA's cooperation with the author is described elsewhere in this summary, as well as in more detail in the full Committee Study.
Sametime communication, between John P. Mudd and | ^ ^ ^ | B H H i < April 13, 2005, from 19:23:50 to 19:56:05.
Email fi-om: A. Rizzo,
date: April 14, 2005, at 9:22:32 AM. TOP SECRET/.
;cc: [REDACTED],BBHI^H'[REDACTED],John subject: Re: Brokaw interview: Take one;
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On April 20, 2005, the same examples were circulated as part of an anticipated official public campaign to promote the "effectiveness" of the still-classified CIA
p r o g r a m . ^ I n response. |CTC Legal, |, expressed concern that "the examples cited, while true, and perhaps as far as we can go, are not nearly the most striking examples of lives saved." Referencing KSM's reporting on lyman Paris, noted that "we risk making ourselves look silly if the best we can do is the Brooklyn Bridge - perhaps we should omit specific examples rather than 'danm ourselves with faint praise.'" whoofferedtheHeathrowAirportplotasanexample,madethefollowingsuggestion: "Can [Office of Public Affairs] be more strongly declarative - 'while we can't provide details' (or maybe we can) 'the program has produce^nteUigence that has directly saved lOO's/lOOO's of American and other innocent lives'?" then attached claims originally compiled in February 2004 for the purpose of responding to the draft OIG Special Review which, he wrote, described "some of the actionable intelligence acquired as a result of the Program and the lawful useofsuchtechniques."^*''' Theexampleswereinaccurate.*
On June 24, 2005, Dateline NBC aired a program, accompanied by several online articles, which quoted CIA Director Goss and Deputy Director of CTC Mudd, as
well as anonymous "top American intelligence officials." Among other claims, NBC reported that the capture of Ramzi bin al-Shibh "le[d] ultimately" to the captures of KSM and Khallad bin Attash.^*^^ This information was inaccurate.
At the end of 2005, congressional concerns about the treatment of detainees again spurred interest at the CIA for public disclosures on the "effectiveness" of the
CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. Specifically, congressional action on the Detainee Treatment Act (the "McCain amendment") prompted a CIA attorney working at the Office of the Director of National Intelligence to express concern that legislative support was needed for the CIA to continue to use its enhanced interrogation techniques, and that a public information campaign would be required to garner that support. The CIA attorney described the "striking" similarities between the public debate surrounding the McCain amendment and the situation in Israel in 1999, in which the Israeli Supreme Court had "ruled that several... techniques were possibly permissible, but require some form of legislative sanction," and that the Israeli
""^0 See CIA document entitled, "INTERROGATION PROGRAM DRAFT PRESS BRIEFING," from April 2005. from: to Rizzo; Re:
Interrogation Program-Going Public Draft Talking Points—CommentsDueto^B||iTie by COB TODAY Thanks; date: April 20, 2005, at 5:10:10 PM.
SeethesectionsofthissummaryandVolumeElontheCaptureofKhalidShaykliMohammad(KSM)andthe Thwarting of the Karachi Plots (regarding the capture of Khallad bin Attash).
"The frightening evolution of al-Qaida; Decentralization has led to deadly staying power," Dateline NBC, June 24,2005. In2003,RonaldKesslerpublishedabookwithwhichtheCIAcooperatedthatstated"interceptsand information developed months earlier after the arrest of Ramzi Binalshibh... allowed the CIA to trace [KSM]." The Kessler book also stated that the bin Attash capture was the "result" of interrogations of KSM. This information is incongruent with CIA records. See Ronald Kessler, The CIA at War, St. Martin's Press, New York, 2003. See also
John A. Rizzo; to cc: Scott W. Muller, [REDACTED]; subject: Re: CIA at War; date: January 22, 2004, at 09:28 AM).
SeethesectionsofthissummaryandVolumenontheCaptureofKhalidShaykhMohammad(KSM)andthe Thwarting of the Karachi Plots (regarding thecaptureofKhal^
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government "ultimately got limited legislative authority for a few specific techniques."^ The CIA attorney then wrote:
"Once this became a political reality here, it became incumbent on the Administration to publicly put forth some facts, if it wanted to preserve these powers. Yet, to date, the Administration has refused to put forth any specific examples of significant intelligence it adduced as a result of using any technique that could not reasonably be construed as cruel, inhuman or degrading. Not even any historical stuff from three or four years ago. What conclusions are to be drawn from the utter failure to offer a specific justification: That no such proof exists? That the Administration does not recognize the legitimacy of the political process on this issue? Or, that need to reserve the right to use these techniques really is not important enough to justify the compromise ofeven historical intelligence?"^
described in more detail in the full Committee Study, the Administration sought legislative support to continue the CIA's Detention and Interrogation
Program, and chose to do so by publicly disclosing the program in a 2006 speech by President Bush. The speech, which was based on CIA-provided information and vetted by the CIA, included numerous inaccurate representations about the CIA program and the effectiveness of the CIA's enhanced inteiTogation techniques. The CIA's vetting of the speech is detailed in CIA "validation" documents, which include CIA concurrence and citations to records to support specific passages of the speech. For example, the CIA "Validation of Remarks" document includes the following:
'''...questioning the detainees in this program has given us information that has saved innocent lives by helping us to stop new attacks - here in the United States and across the world.'
CIA concurs with this assessment. Information from detainees prevented - among others - the West Coast airliner plot, a plot to blow up an apartment
The CIA attorney also described the Israeli precedent with regard to the "necessity defense" that had been invoked by CIA attorneys and the Department of Justice in 2001 and 2002. Tlie CIA attorney wrote that the Israeli Supreme Court "also specifically considered the 'ticking time bomb' scenario and said tiiat enhanced techniques could not be pre-approved for such situations, but that if worse came to worse, an officer who engaged in such activities could assert a common-law necessity defense, if he were ever prosecuted." {See email from: [REDACTED]; to: John A. Rizzo; cc: [REDACTED], John A. Rizzo, \
[REDACTEDl^ubject: Re: IVlcCain^ate^Decei^er 19,2005, at 10:18:58 AlVI.) At the time, the CIA attorney and the former | H ^ | C T C Legal, working in the Office of tlie Director of National Intelligence. The OLC, in its July 20,2007, memorandum, included an analysis of the Israeli court case in the context of concluding that the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques were "clearly authorized and justified by legislative authority" as a result of the Military Commissions Act. See memorandum for Jolin A. Rizzo, Acting General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, from Steven G. Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, July 20, 2007, Re: Application of the War Crimes Act, the Detainee Treatment Act, and Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions to Certain Techniques that May Be Used by tlie CIA in the Intenogation of High Value al Qaeda Detainees.
Emailfrom: [REDACTED];to:JohnA.Rizzo;cc:[REDACTED],JohnA.Rizzo,|
|, [REDACTED]; subject: Re: McCain; date: December 19,2005, at 10:18:58 AM.
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building in the United States, a plot to attack various targets in the United Kingdom, and plots against targets in Karachi and the Arabian Gulf. These attacks would undoubtedly have killed thousands."
(T8/^|||||||||||||||||^||B^^^ Multiple iterations ofthe CIA "validation" documents reflect changes to the speech as it was being prepared. One week before the scheduled speech, a
passage in the draft speech made inaccurate claims about the role played by Abu Zubaydah in the capaire of Ramzi bin al-Shibh and the role of Abu Zubaydah and Ramzi bin al-Shibh in the capture of KSM, but did not explicitly connect these claims to the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. In an August 31, 2006, email exchange, CIA officers proposed the following language for the speech:
"That same year, information from Zubaydah led the CIA to the trail of one of KSM's accomplices, Ramzi bin al Shibh. Information from Zubaydah together with information from Shibh gave the CIA insight into al-Qa'ida's 9/11 attack planning and th^mportanc^f KSM With the knowledge that KSM was the 'mastermind,' |||||||m|H|||||||Pakistani partners planned and mounted an operation that resulted in his eventual capture and detention."
The August 31, 2006, email exchange included citations to CIA cables to support the proposed passage; however, neither the cables, nor any other CIA records,
support the assertions.^
Emphasis in original. CIA Validation of Remarks on Detainee Policy, Wednesday, 6 September 2006, Draft #15. Asdescribedintherelevantsectionsofthissummary,andmoreextensivelyinVolumeII,theseclaimswere inaccurate.
Email from: ; to: [REDACTED], [REDACTED]; cc:
; subject: Source list for our AZ paragraphs; date: August 31, 2006, at 08:56 AM.
The cited cables describe Abu Zubaydah's June 2002 description of a meeting with Ramzi bin al-Shibh (acquired prior to the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques against Abu Zubaydah), and Abu Zubaydah'sAugust200^eportin^i^ussingthesamemeeting(aftertheuseofthetechniques). (SeeCIA (I01514Z JUN 02); August 2002).) Neither cable—or any other CIA record—indicates a connectionbetweenAbuZubaydah'sreportingonhismeetingwithbinal-Shibhandbinal-Shibh'scapture. The cited cables also do not include information, which was available to the CIA prior to the capture of Abu Zubaydali, highlighting KSM's"importance." Thecitedcabledescribes AbuZubaydah'sApril2002reporting, priortotheuse oftheCIA'senhance^nteiToe^ techniques,identifyingKSMas"Mukhtar"andthe"mastermind"ofthe9/11 attacks. (See H | | | | ^ ^ ^ H | ^ | ( 1 3 April 2002).) The citations did not include cables referencing infonnation available to the CIA about KSM that was obtained prior to the capture of Abu Zubaydah, including information on KSM's alias "Mukhtai'" and KSM's role in tlie September 11, 2001, attacks, as is detailed elsewhere in this summary. The cables also did not support the claim that information provided by Abu Zubaydah or Ramzi bin al- ShibhledtothecaptureofKSM. OnecitedcablerelatedtotheidentificationbyRamzibinal-Shibh,whilebinal- Shibh waMi^oreigr^ov^ment custody, ofAli Abdul Aziz Ali as "Ammar^[The cable was cited as
20700 Asdeterminedlater,theactualcablewas 20790.] Asdescribedelsewherein thissummary,KSMwasnotcapturedasaresultofinformationrelatedtoAmmaral-Baluchi. Theemailexchange listedtwocablesdirectlyrelatedtothecaptureofKSM. Thefirstcable,fromapproximatelyaweekbeforeKSM's capture, described the CIA's operational use and value of the asset who led the CIA to KSM. The cable stated that the relationshk^jetweeiUh^sse^n^CSM^s^^^B^^ the asset gained access to KSM, was "based on The cabl^tate^hat Cl^Iea^u^irters
'continues to be impressed with the evidence of [the asset's] access to I H I ^ H i K S M H H l i i associates, I
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." (5ee DIRECTOR |.) The second cable /NOFORN
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Within a few days, the passage in the draft speech relating to the captures of Ramzi bin al-Shibh and KSM was modified to connect the use of the CIA's enhanced
inteiTogation techniques against Abu Zubaydah to the capture of Ramzi bin al-Shibh. The updated draft now credited information from Abu Zubaydah and Ramzi bin al-Shibh with "help[ing] in the planning and execution of the operation that captured Khalid Sheikh Mohammed." The updated draft speech stated:
"Zubaydah [zoo-BAY-da] was questioned using these [interrogation] procedures, and he soon began to provide information on key al-Qaida operatives - including information that helped us find and capture more of those responsible for the attacks of Nine-Eleven. For example, Zubaydah [zoo-BA Y -da] identified one of KSM's accomplices in the Nine-Eleven attacks - a terrorist named Ramzi bin al Shibh [SHEEB]. The information Zubaydah [zoo-BAY-da] provided helped lead to the capture of bin al Shibh. And together these two terrorists provided information that helped in the planning and execution of the operation that captured Khalid Sheikh Mohammed."^
An updated CIA "validation" document concurring with the proposed passage provided a modified list of CIA cables as "sources" to support the passage.
Cable citations to Abu Zubaydah's reporting prior to the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques were removed.Like the previous version, the CIA's updated "validation" document did not cite to any cables demonstrating that information from Abu Zubaydah "helped lead to the capture of [Ramzi] bin al-Shibh."^ Similarly, none of the cables cited to support the passage indicated that information from Abu Zubaydah and Ramzi bin al-Shibh (who was in foreign government custody when he provided the information cited by the CIA) "helped in the
described KSM's capture, stating that it was "based on locational information" provided by the asset. {See 41351 ) Neither of the two cables cited to support the claim made any
reference to Abu Zubaydah, Ramzi bin al-Shibh, or any other detainee in CIA or foreign government custody. The capture of KSM, including the role of tlie asset (referred to herein as "ASSET X") is detailed elsewhere in this summaiy and in greater detail in the full ComniitteeStudy^^eeeinailfr to: [REDACTED], [REDACTED]; cc: H U H H H III' HHHHHii' Source our AZ paragraphs; date: August 31, 2006, at 08:56 AM.
Pronunciation brackets in original draft. CIA Validation of Remarks on Detainee Policy, Wednesday, 6 September 2006, Draft #15.
Tlie document cited a cable on Abu Zubaydali's August 2002 description of his meeting witli Ramzi bin al- Shibh, but not the previously cited June 2002 cable related to Abu Zubaydah's description of the same meeting^^
Zubaydah was subjected to the CIA's enhanced intenogation techniques. See
The information included in tlie cable describing Abu Zubaydah's August 200^^portin^rHii^2®®^|" Ramzi bin al-Shibh was unrelated to tlie capture of Ramzi bin al-Shibh. {See ) The CIA document also citedasa^|sourc£^^^ the capture ofbin al-Shibh with no mention ofAbu Zubaydah's reporting. {See H H H U H H H H - ) Ihe details ofRamzi bin al-Shibh's capture are described elsewhere in this summaiy and ingreaterdetaiUrHh^ul^om^
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planningandexecutionoftheoperationthatcaptured[KSM]."^'^^ Asdescribedelsewherein this summary, there are no CIA records to support these claims.
The CIA documents validating the president's speech addressed other passages that were Hkewise unsupported by the CIA's cited cables. For example, the
speech included an inaccurate claim regarding KSM that had been part of the CIA's representations on the effectiveness of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques since 2003. The speech stated:
"Once in our custody, KSM was questioned by the CIA using these procedures, and he soon provided information that helped us stop another planned attack on the United States. During questioning, KSM told us about another al Qaeda operative he knew was in CIA custody - a terrorist named Majid Khan. KSM revealed that [Majid] Khan had been told to deliver $50,000 to individuals working for a suspected terrorist leader named Hambah, the leader of al Qaeda's Southeast Asian affiliate known as 'J-I.' CIA officers confronted Khan with this information. Khan confirmed that the money had been delivered to an operative named Zubair, and provided both a physical description and contact number for this operative. Based on that information, Zubair was captured in June of 2003, and he soon provided information that helped lead to the capture of Hambali."' ^^^
support for this passage, the CIA cited a June 2003 cable describing a CIA interrogation of Majid Khan in which Majid Khan discussed Z u b a i r . ^ T h e
CIA "validation" document did not include cable citations from March 2003 that would have revealed that Majid Khan provided this inforaiation while in foreign government custody, prior to the reporting from KSM.^'^"^
The CIA document included a previousl^itec^^le relatin^^hecapture^ KSM that made no mention of reportingfromCIAdetainees. (^See 41351ri^HIH|||||Hi)'^heCIAdocumentalso included the previously cited cable describing bin al-Shibh's identification of "Ammar." As described in the section of this summary, as well as in Volume II, on the Capture of KSM, KSM was not captured as a result of information relate^o Ammar al-Baluchi. (The document cited the cable as 20700, as noted, the actual cite was
20790.) The CIA cable also cited an analytical product whose relevance was limited to the connection betweenKSMandal-Aziz(Ammaral-Baluchi). (SeeDISerialFlierCTC2002-30086CH:CIAanalyticreport, "Threat Threads: Recent Advances in Understanding 11 September.") Finally, the document included a cable that was unrelated to the content of the speech.
SeesectionsofthissummaryandVolumeIIontheCaptureofRamzibinal-ShibhandtheCaptureofKhalid
Shaykh Mohammad (KSM).
1165 Presidential Speech onSeptember 6,2006, based onCIA information and vetted byCIA personnel.
CIA Validation of Remarks on Detainee Policy, Wednesday, 6 September 2006, Draft #15; |
^ ^ ^ ^ 8 (070724Z MAR 03), disseminated as Further, the June 2003 cable, DIRECTOR i d B I (122120Z JUN 03), cited by the CIA as validation, makes no reference to reporting from KSM. Khan was captured on March 5, 2003 and was in foreign government detention until being transferred to CIA custody on May 2003. See details on the detention and interrogation of Majid Khan in Volume III.
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On September 6, 2006, President Bush delivered the speech based on the CIA-vetted information.On September 8, 2006, the chief of the
Department in CTC, participated in the CIA's validation of the speech, distributed the "final validation document" for possible updates or changes. In an email, m m urged the recipients to "[pjlease look very carefully, as this is going to be a very important document."
On September 11, 2006, a CIA officer responded, questioning the passage in the speech related to the capture of KSM, as well as the relevance of the CIA cables cited in the validation document to support the passage. The CIA officer questioned whether a CIA cable describing Ramzi bin al-Shibh's identification of "Ammar" supported the claim that
bin al-Shibh's reporting helped lead to the capture of KSM. The officer wrote:
"I presume the information in this cable that supports the statement is Ramzi's admission regarding Ammar?? Did that actually help lead us to KSM?? not sure who did this section, but we may want to double-check this and provide additional cables on how this actually 'assisted us'. This also seems to be a point critics in the press seem to be picking on, I will do some digging on my own as well."^'^^
There are no CIA records to indicate that the CIA officer's comments about the inadequate sourcing were further addressed. As described in this summary,
and in more detail in Volume H, there are no CIA records to support the passage in the speech related to the capture of KSM.
After the speech, press accounts challenging aspects of the speech becamethesubjectofinternaldiscussionamon^om^I^officers. OnSeptember7,2006,the
chiefoftheKIIHHDepartmentinCTC, emailstating: 'The NY Times has posted a story predictably poking holes in the President's speech." Defending the passage in the specch asserting that, after the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques.
On April 29, 2009, Marc Thiessen, the speechwriter responsible for President Bush's September 6, 2006, speech, wrote: "This was the most carefully vetted speech in presidential history - reviewed by all the key players from the individuals who ran the program all the way up to the director of national intelligence, who personally attested to the accuracy of the speech in a memo to tlie president. And just last week on Fox News, former CIA Director Michael Hayden said he went back and checked with the agency as to the accuracy of that speech and reported: *We stand by our story.'" See Maic Thiessen, "The West Coast Plot: An 'Inconvenient Truth,"' The
/?ev/evv^pri^5^009. from: to:
[REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTEDL^^|H|n^HHl^H> [REDACTED], [REDACTED], subject: THE MOMENT YOU MAY HAVE BEEN WAITING FOR!!! Please verify the
attached; date: September 8, 2006, at 06:28 PM.
Email from: [REDACTED]; to: cc: [REDACTED],
[REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED]7^^Hli^^^^H H
I; subject: Re: THE MOMENT YOU MAY HAVE BEEN WAITING FOR!!!
Please verify the Attached; date: September 11, 2006, at 9:16:15 AM; attachment Nl: CIA Validation of Remarks on Detainee Policy Final (Draft #15). The email also identified as unrelated one cable that had been cited as a source and conected a transposed number ofthecabledescribin^aii^ identification of"Ammar."
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Abu Zubaydah provided information "tJiat helped lead to the capture of bin al-Shibh,' explained:
"...we knew Ramzi bin al-Shibh was involved in 9/11 before AZ was captured; however, AZ gave us information on his recent activities that—when added intootherinformation—helpedustrackhim. Again,onthispoint,wewere very careful and the speech is accurate in what it says about bin al-Shibh."^
statement, that Abu Zubaydah provided "information on [bin al-Shibh's] recent activities" that "helped [CIA] track him," was no^uppor^ by the
cables cited in the CIA's "validation" document, or any other CIA record. |||||||B||||||||'s email did not address the other representation in the president's speech—that Abu Zubaydah "identified" Ramzi bin al-Shibh.^
The New York Times article also challenged the representation in the speech that Abu Zubaydah "disclosed" that KSM was the "mastermind behind the 9/11
attacks and used the alias 'Mukhtar,'" and that "[t]his was a vital picce of the puzzle that helped our intelligence community pursue KSM." As the New York Times article noted, the 9/11 Commissior^iad pointed to a cable from August 2001 that identified KSM as "Mukhtar." In her email, acknowledged the August 2001 report identifying KSM as "Mukhtar" and provided additional information on the drafting of the speech:
"[0]n 28 August, 2001, in fact, [CIA's] H H H I [database] does show a report from [a source] stating that Mohammad Rahim's brother Zadran told him that KSMwasnowbeingcalled'Mukhtar.' Moreover,weweresuspiciousthat KSM might have been behind 9/11 as early as 12 Sept 2001, and we had some reporting indicating he was the mastermind. We explained this latter fact to the White House, although the 28 August report escaped our notice."
Emailfrom; H H H H I'
Mark Mansfield, [REDACTED], [REDACTED]; cc: [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED]; subject: Questions about Abu Zubaydali's identification of KSM as "Mukhtar"; date: September 7, 2006. A September 7, 2006, article (published September 8, 2006) in the New York Times, by Mark Mazzetti, entitled, "Questions Raised About Bush's Primary Claims of Secret Detention System" included comments by CTA officials defending the assertions in the President's speech. The article stated: "Mr. Bush described the interrogation techniques used on the C.I.A. prisoners as having been 'safe, lawful and effective,' and he asserted that torture had not been used. .. .Mr. Bush also said it was the interrogation of Mr. Zubaydah that identified Mr. bin al- Shibh as an accomplice in the Sept. 11 attacks. American officials had identified Mr. bin al-Shibh's role in the attacks months before Mr. Zubaydah's capture."
TherearenoCIArecordstosupporttheseclaims. SeethesectionofthissummaryonthecaptureofRamzibin al-Shibh, as well as a more detailed account in Volume II.
from: jjjjBHUHH' to
Mark Mansfield, [REDACTED], [REDACTED]; cc: [REDACTEDL^^BBf^BHHinREDACT^, [REDACTED]; subject: Questions about Abu Zubaydah's identification of KSM as "Mukhtar"; date: September 7, 2006. There are no CIA records indicating what was "explained" to the White House. The CIA validation document provided officially concurred with the passage in the speech. See CIA Vahdation of Remarks on Detainee Policy, Wednesday, 6September2006, Draft#^
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In her email, H I H i i stated that "[t]he fact that the 9/11 commission, with 20-20 hindsight, thinks we should have known this in August 2001 does not
alter the fact that we didn't."'
(TS/4l||H^HIIi^B'/NF) In addition to the New York Times article, the CIA was concerned about an article by Ron Suskind in Time Magazine that also challenged the assertions in the speech about thecapturc^f Ramzi bin al-Shibh an^^CSNl^^^^r^September 11, 2006, email, the chief ofdie |||||HIHili Department in CTC, wrote; *'[w]e are not claiming [Abu Zubaydah] provided exact locational information, merely that he provided us with information that helped in our targeting efforts." | H H | ' s email did not address the representations in the president's speech that Abu Zubaydah "identified" Ramzi bin al-Shibh and that the information from Abu Zubaydah "helped lead to the capture" of bin al-Shibh. With regard to the capture of KSM, email acknowledged that Suskind's assertion that "the key was a cooperative source" was "correct as far as it goes, but the priority with which we pursued KSM changed once AZ conclusively identified him as the mastermind of 9/11."^^^^ j^^HH's email did not address the representation in the president's speech that Abu Zubaydah, along witii Ramzi bin al-Shibh, "helped in tii^lanning and execution of the operation that captured Khalid Sheikh Mohammed." statements about the captures of Ramzi bin al-Shibh and KSM are not supported by CIA records.
The president's September 6, 2006, speech, which was based on CIA-provided information and vetted by the CIA, was the first detailed, formal public
representation about tiieeffectiveness of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques.The
Email from: to |
Mark Mansfield, [REDACTED], [REDACTED]; cc: [REDACTEDLl^^|||^^^^^H[i, [REDACTED], [REDACTED]; subject: Questions about Abu Zubaydali's identification of KSM as "Muklitar"; date: September 7, 2006.
The Unofficial Story of the al-Qaeda 14; Tlieir torture by the CIA was wrong - in more ways than you might think, Ron Suskind, Time, 18 September 2006.
Email from: to: [REDACTED], ^ • • • 1 , [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED]; subject: URGENT: FOR YOUR COMMENT: DCIA Questions on the Suskind Article; date: September 11, 2006, at 08:23 PM.
SeethesectionofthissummaryandVolumeIIontheCaptiueofRamzibinal-ShibhandtheCaptureofKhalid
ShaykhMohammad(KSM). In2007,CIAofficersalsoquestionedthepassageinthePresident'sSeptember6,
2006,speechconcerningtliedisruptionofplottingagainstCampLemonierinDjibouti. Seethesectionofthis
summaryandVolumeIIontheThwartingoftlieCampLemonierPlottingforadditionalinfomiation. 1178PresidentBushmadeotherpublicstatementsthatreliedoninaccurateinformationprovidedbytheCIA. For
example, as described elsewhere in this summary, on March 8, 2008, President Bush vetoed legislation that would have limited intenogations to techniques authorized by the Army Field Manual. The President's veto message to the House of Representatives stated that "[t]he CIA's ability to conduct a separate and specialized inteirogation program for terrorists who possess the most critical information in the war on terror has helped the United States prevent a number of attacks, including plots to fly passenger airplanes into the Library Tower in Los Angeles and into Heatlirow Airport or buildings in downtown London." {See message to the House of Representatives, President GeorgeW.Bush,March8,2008).TliePresidentalsoexplainedhisvetoinhisweeklyradioaddress,inwhichhe referenced tlie"LibraryTower,"alsoknown asthe"SecondWave"plot,andtheHeathrowplot,whilerepresenting thattheCIAprogram"helpedusstopaplottostrikeaU.S. MarinecampinDjibouti, aplannedattackontheU.S. consulate in Karachi..." {SeePresident's Radio Address, President George W. Bush, March 8, 2008). As detailed in this summary, and described more fully ir^olum^I^I^representation^j^ the role ofthe CIA's
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inaccurate representations in the speech have been repeated in numerous articles, books, and broadcasts. The speech was also relied upon by the OLC in its July 20, 2007, memorandum on the legality of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, specifically to support the premise that the use of the techniques was effective in "producing substantial quantities of otherwise unavailable intelligence."'
D. CIARepresentationsAbouttheEffectivenessofItsEnhancedInterrogationTechniques Against Specific CIA Detainees
While the CIA made numerous general representations about the effectiveness of its enhanced interrogation techniques, CIA representations on specific detainees
focused almost exclusively on two CIA detainees, Abu Zubaydah, detained on March 28, 2002, and KSM, detained on March 1, 2003.''^®
I. Abu Zubaydah
As described in greater detail in the full Committee Study, the CIA provided significant information to policymakers and the Department of Justice on the CIA's
decision to use the newly developed CIA ^'enhanced interrogation techniques" on Abu Zubaydcih and the effects of doing so. These representations were provided by the CIA to the CIA OIG,''^'
enhancedintenogationtechniqueswithregardtotheSecondWave,Heathrow,DjiboutiandKarachiplotswere inaccurate.
The OLC memorandum, along with other OLC memoranda relying on inaccurate CIA representations, has been declassified, ashas theMay2004OIGSpecial Review containing inaccurate information provided byCIAofficers. Memorandum for John A. Rizzo, Acting General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, from Steven G. Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, July 20,2007, Re: Application of the War Crimes Act, the Detainee Treatment Act, andCommon Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions to Certain Techniques thatMayBeUsedbytheCIAintheInterrogationof HighValuealQaedaDetainees (DTS#2009-1810, Tab14).
See Volume II for additional information on CIA representations.
Among other documents, see Memorandum for: Inspector General; from: James Pavitt, Deputy Director for Operations; subject: re(S)Comments toDraftIGSpecial Review, "Counterterrorism Detention andInteiTogation Program" (2003-7123-IG); date: February 27, 2004; attachment: February 24, 2004, Memorandum re Successes of CIA's Counterterrorism Detention and Intenjogadoi^ctivitie^^^^^^^^^
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the White House,the Department of Justice,Congress,and the American public. The representations include that: (1) Abu Zubaydah told the CIA he believed "the general US population was 'weak,' lacked resilience, and would be unable to 'do what was necessary";^ (2) Abu Zubaydah stopped cooperating with U.S. government personnel using traditional interrogation techniques;(3) Abu Zubaydah's interrogation team believed the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques would result in critical information on teiTorist operatives and plotting;^^^^ and (4) the use of CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques on Abu Zubaydali was effective in eliciting critical intelligence from Abu Zubaydah. These representations are not supported by internal CIA records.
The CIA representation that Abu Zubaydah "expressed [his] belief that the general US population was 'weak,' lacked resilience, and would be unable to 'do what
was necessary' to prevent the terrorists from succeeding in their goals" is not supported by CIA
Amongotlierdocuments,seeMemorandumfortheRecord: "ReviewofIntenogationProgramon29July 2003." Memorandum prepared by CIA General Counsel Scott Muiler, dated August 5, 2003, and briefing slides entitled, "CM Interrogation Program," dated July 29, 2003, presented to senior White House officials; and Briefing for Vice President Cheney: CIA Detention and InteiTogation Program, CIA document dated March 4, 2005, entitled, "Briefing for Vice President Cheney: CIA Detention and Interrogation Program.'
Among otlierdocuments, see March 2, 2005, Memorandum for SteveBradbury from|
Legal Group, DCI Counterterrorist Center re: Effectiveness of the CIA Countertenorist Interrogation Techniques.
Among other documents, see CIA classified statement for the record. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, providedbyGeneralMichaelV.Hayden,Director,CentralIntelligenceAgency,12April2007;andaccompanying Senate Select Committee on Intelligence hearing tianscript for April 12, 2007, entitled, "Hearing on Central Intelligence Agency Detention and Interrogation Program." Director Hayden stated: "Now in June [2002], after about four mondis of intenogation, Abu Zubaydah reached a point where he refused to cooperate and he shut down. He would not talk at all to the FBI intenogators and although he was still talking to CIA interrogators no significant progress was being made in learning anything of intelligence value."
1185 pqj. example,see CIA "Questionsand ProposedAnswers" 9/2/2006, Tab 2 of CIA Validationof Remarkson
Detainee Policy, September 6, 2006.
See, for example, March 2, 2005, CIA memorandum for Steve Bradbury from H H Legal
Group, DCI Counterterrorist Center, "Effectiveness of the CIA Countertenorist Intenogation Techniques." See, for example, ODNI September 2006 Unclassified Public Release: "During initial inteiTOgation, Abu
Zubaydahgavesomeinformationtliatheprobablyviewedasnominal. Somewasimportant,however,including that Klialid Shaykh Mohammad (KSM) was the 9/11 mastermind and used the moniker 'Mukhtar.' This identification allowed us to comb previously collected intelligence for both names, opening up new leads to tliis teiToristplotter—leadsthateventuallyresultedinhiscapture. ItwascleartohisinteiTogatorsthatAbuZubaydah possessedagreatdealofinfonnationaboutal-Qa'ida;however,hesoonstoppedallcooperation. Overtheensuing months,theCIAdesignedanewinterrogationprogramtliatwouldbesafe,effective,andlegal." Seealso Presidential Speech on September 6, 2006, based on CIA information and vetted by CIA personnel.
AsdetailedinDIRECTORllli(031357ZAUG02). SeealsoOfficeofLegalCounselMemorandumfor John Rizzo, Acting General Counsel of the Central Intelligence Agency, dated August 1, 2002, and entitled "Interrogation of al Qaeda Operative," which states: "Tlie inteiTogation team is certain [Abu Zubaydah] has additional information that he refuses to divulge. Specifically, he is witWiolding information regaiding tenorist networks in the United States or in Saudi Arabia and information regarding plans to conduct attacks within the United States or against our interests overseas."
Amongother documents, see Officeof the Directorof National Intelligence, "Summary of the High Value Terrorist Detainee Progiam," September 6, 2006; and CIA Memorandum for Steve Bradbury at the Department of Justice, dated March 2, 2005, from H I H i i H H ' H Legal Group, DCI Counterterrorist Center, subject "Effectiveness ofthe CIA Counterterrorist Intenocatior^echnique^^^^^^
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records.'^^^ On August 30, 2006, a CIA officer from the CIA's al-Qa'ida Plans and Organization Group wrote: "we have no records that 'he declared that America was weak, and lacking in resilience and that our society did not have the will to 'do what was necessary' to prevent the terrorists from succeeding in their g o a l s . I n a CIA Sametime communication that same day, a CIA ALEC Station officer wrote, "I can find no reference to AZ being deifant [sic] and declaring America weak... in fact everything I have read indicated he used a non deifiant [sic] resistan^strategy." Inresponse,thechiefofthe DepartmentinCTC,
wrote: "I've certainly heard that said of AZ for years, but don't know why...." The CI^ALE^Station officeo^plied^robably a combo of [deputy chief of ALEC Station,
^nd ••• I'll at that." The chief of the
Department completed the exchange, writing "yes, beheve so... and agree, we shall pass over in silence."^^^2
(^^S/^|||^|||||H||||||||[|//NF) The CIA representation that Abu Zubaydah stopped cooperating with debriefers using traditional interrogation techniques is also not supported by CIA
r e c o r d s . I n early June 2002, Abu Zubaydah's interrogators recommended that Abu Zubaydah spend several weeks in isolation while the interrogation team members traveled | m | | "as a means ofkeeping [Abu Zubaydal^off-balance and to allow the team needed time offfor abreak and to atten^^^onal matters as well as to discuss "the endgame" for Abu Zubaydah jjjjjjjjjjj^^ with officers from CIA Headquarters.As a result, Abu Zubaydah spent much of June 2002, and all of July 2002,47 days in total, in isolation. When CIA officers next interrogated Abu Zubaydah, they immediately used the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, including the waterboard.^^^^ Prior to this isolation period, Abu Zubaydah provided information on al-Qa'ida activities, plans, capabilities, and relationships, in addition to information on its leadership structure, including personalities, decision-making processes, training, and tactics. Abu Zubaydah provided the same type of information prior to, during, and after the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques.Abu Zubaydah's inability to provide information
See, for example, March 2, 2005, CIA memorandum for Steve Bradbury from m H Legal Group, DCI Counterterrorist Center, "Effectiveness of the CIA Counterterrorist Interrogation Techniques."
from: to: and "Suggested language change forAZ^^jdatejAugust30, 2006, at06:32 PM.
I; subject:
Sametime communication, H H H l H H ' 30/Aug/06 13:15:23 to 19:31:47.
SeeODNISeptember2006Unclassified Public Release: "Duringinitial interrogation, AbuZubaydah gavesome informationthatheprobablyviewedasnominal. Somewasimportant,however,includingthatKhalidShaykh Mohammad (KSM) was the 9/11 mastermind and used the moniker 'Mukhtar.' This identification allowed us to comb previously collected intelligence for both names, opening up new leads to this terrorist plotter—leads that eventually resulted in his capture. It was clear to his interrogators that Abu Zubaydah possessed a great deal of informationaboutal-Qa'ida;however,hesoonstoppedallcooperation. Overtheensuingmontlis,theCIAdesigned a new interrogation program that would be safe, effective, and legal." See also Presidential Speechon September 6, 2006,basedonCIAinformationandvettedbyCIApersonnel,thatstates: "WeknewthatZubaydahhadmore information that could save innocent lives. But he stopped talking... And so, the CIA used an alternative set of procedures."
10424 (070814Z JUN 02)
See Abu Zubaydah detainee review in Volume IE, to include CIA email [REDACTED] dated March 28, 2007,
04:42 PM, with the subject line, "Subjectdetainee allegation - per our telcon of today."
See reporting charts in Abu Zubaydah detainee review, as well as CIA paper entitled "Abu Zubaydah" and dated
March2005. Thesameinformationwasincludedinan"AbuZubaydahBio"document"Preparedon9August 2006."
See reporting charts in the Abu Zubaydah detainee review in Volume III. III! II III I
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on the next attack in the United States—and operatives in the United States—provided the basis for CIA representations that Abu Zubaydah was "uncooperative," as well as for the CIA's determination that Abu Zubaydah required the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques to become "compliant" and reveal the information that CIA Headquarters believed he was withholding. The CIA further stated that Abu Zubaydah could stop the application of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, like the waterboard, by providing the names of operatives intheUnited States orinformation tostop the next attack.^At nopoint during or after the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques did Abu Zubaydah provide this type of information.
representation that Abu Zubaydah's interrogation team believed the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques would result in new information
on operatives in the United States and teiTorist plotting is also incongruent with CIA records. While Abu Zubaydah was in isolation in July 2002, CIA Headquarters informed the Department of Justice and White House officials that Abu Zubaydah's interrogation team believed Abu Zubaydah possessed information on terrorist threats to, and al-Qa'ida operatives in, the United
S t a t e s . T h e CIA officials further represented that the interrogation team had concluded that the use of more aggressive methods "is required to persuade Abu Zubaydah to provide the critical information needed to safeguard the lives of innumerable innocent men, women, and children within the United States and abroad," and warned "countless more Americans may die unlesswecanpersuadeAZtotelluswhatheknows."^-®^ However,accordingtoCIAcables,the interrogation team at the detention site had not determined that the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniqueswererequiredforAbuZubaydahtoprovidesuchthreatinformation. Rather,the interrogation team wrote "[o]ur assumption is the objective of this operation is to achieve a high degree of confidence that [Abu Zubaydah] is not holding back actionable information concerning threats to the United States beyond that which [Abu Zubaydah] has already provided."^^^^
The CIA representation that the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques on Abu Zubaydah was effective in producing critical threat information
See 10586 (041559Z AUG 02), which states: "In trutli, [Zubaydah] can halt the proceedings at any time by providing truthful revelations on the threat which may save countless lives."
See Abu Zubaydah detainee review in Volume III.
'200 As detailed in DIRECTOR (031357Z AUG 02). The CIA further represented: (1) that the enhanced interrogation phase of Abu Zubaydah's interrogation would likely last "no more than several days but could last up to thirty days," (2) "that tlie use of the [enhanced interrogation techniques] would be on an as-needed basis and that not all of these techniques will necessaiily be used," (3) tliat the CIA expected "these techniques to be used in some sort of escalating fashion, culminating with the waterboard, though not necessarily ending with this technique," (4) "that although some of these techniques may be used more tiian once, that repetition will not be substantial because the techniques generally lose their effectiveness after several repetitions," and (5) "that steps will be taken to ensure tliat [Abu Zubaydah's] injury is not in any way exacerbated by the use of these methods." See the Abu Zubaydah detainee review for detailed information for how these statements proved almost entirely inaccurate. See also Memorandum for John Rizzo, Acting General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, from Jay Bybee, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, August 1, 2002, Inten ogation of al Qaeda Operative.
'20' DIRECTOR• • (031357Z AUG 02)
'202 [REDACTED] 73208 (231043Z JUL 02); email from: to: [REDACTED], [REDACTED], and•^••1; subject: Addendumfrom[DETENTIONSITEGREEN];date:July23,2002,at07:56:49PM; [REDACTED] 73208 (231043Z JUL 02). Additional assessments by the interrogation team that Abu Zubaydah was not witliholding information aie described inth^bi^ubaydal^e^^ in Volume III.
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on terrorists and terrorist plotting against the United States is also not supported by CIA records. Abu Zubaydah did not provide the information for which the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques were justified and approved—information on the next attack and operatives in the United S t a t e s . A c c o r d i n g to CIA records, Abu Zubaydah provided information on "al-Qa'ida activities, plans, capabilities, and relationships," in addition to information on "its leadership structure, including personalities, decision-making processes, training, and tactics."'^®"^ This type of information was provided by Abu Zubaydah prior to, during, and after the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques.At no point during or after the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques did Abu Zubaydah provide information on al-Qa'ida cells in the United States or operational plans for terrorist attacks against the United States.Further, a quantitative review of Abu Zubaydah's intelligence reporting indicates that more intelligence reports were disseminated from Abu Zubaydah's first two months of interrogation, before the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques and when FBI special agents were directly participating, than were derived during the next two-month phase of interrogations, which included the non-stop use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques 24 hours a day for 17 days.'^^^ Nonetheless, on August 30, 2002, the CIA informed the National Security Council that
See Abu Zubaydah detainee review in Vohniie III. Participants in the interrogation of Abu Zubaydali also wrote that Abu Zubaydah "probably reached the point of cooperation even prior to the August institution of 'enhanced' measures-adevelopmentmissedbecauseofthenarrowfocusofdiequestioning. Inanyeventtherewasno evidence that the waterboard produced time-perishable information which otherwise would have been unobtainable." See CIA Summary and Reflections ofm^^|Medical Services on OMS participation in the RDI program.
CIA paper entitled "Abu Zubaydah" and dated March 2005. See also "Abu Zubaydah Bio" document "Prepared on 9 August 2006."
See Abu Zubaydah detainee review in Volume III, and CIA paper entitled, "Abu Zubaydah," dated March 2005; as well as "Abu Zubaydah Bio" document "Prepared on 9 August 2006."
See Abu Zubaydah detainee review in Volume III.
Abu Zubaydah was taken intoCIA custody on March 2002, and was shortly thereafter hospitalized until April 15, 2002. Abu Zubaydah returned to DETENTION SITE GREEN on April 15, 2002. During the months of April and May 2002, which included a period during which Abu Zubaydah was on life support and unable to speak (Abu Zubaydah communicated primarily with FBI special agents in writing), Abu Zubaydah's interrogations resultedin95intelligencereports. InFebruary2008,theCIAidentifiedthe"keyintelligenceandreportingderived" fromAbuZubaydah. ThethreeitemsidentifiedbytheCIAwereallacquiredinAprilandMayof2002byFBI interrogators. AbuZubaydahwasplacedinisolationfromJune18,2002,toAugust4,2002,withoutbeingasked anyquestions. After47daysinisolation,theCIAreinstitutedcontactwidiAbuZubaydahatapproximately11:50 AM on August 4,2002, when CIA personnel entered the cell, shackled and hooded Abu Zubaydah, and removed his towel, leaving Abu Zubaydali naked. Without asking any questions, CIA personnel made a collar around his neck withatowelandusedthecollar"toslamhimagainstaconcretewall." MultipleenhancedinteiTogationtechniques were used non-stop until 6:30 PM, when Abu Zubaydah was strapped to the waterboard and subjected to the waterboardtechnique"numeroustimes"between6:45PMand8:52PM. The"aggressivephaseofinterrogation" using theCIA'senhanced interrogation techniques continued for20days. {See Abu Zubaydah treatment cluonology in Volume III.) During the months of August and September 2002, Abu Zubaydah's reporting resulted in 91 intelligence reports, fourfewer than thefirst twomonths ofhisCIAdetention. {See Abu Zubaydah detainee review inVolumeIII.) Specifically,forinfonnationonAbuZubaydah'sinitialwalling,seeCIAemaildatedMarch28, 2007, at 04:42 PM, with the subject line, "Subject detainee allegation - per our telcon of today," which states that Abu Zubaydah claims "a collar was used to slam him against a concrete wall." The CIA officer wrote, "While we do not have a record that this occurred, one interrogator at the site at the time confinned that this did indeed happen. For the record, a plywood 'wall' was immediately constructed at tlie site after the walling on the concrete wall." Regarding the CIA's assessment of the "key intelligence" from Abu Zubaydah, see CIA briefing documents for Leon Panetta entitled, "Tab9:DCIA Briefing onRDI ftogram- I8FEB.2009" andgraphic attachment, "Key
Intelligence and Reporting Derived from Abj^ubaydaj^n^aiali^hay^ (KSM)" (includes "DCIA
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the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques were effective and "producing meaningful results."'^^^ Shortly thereafter, however, in October 2002, CIA records indicate that President Bush was informed in a Presidential Daily Brief (PDB) that "Abu Zubaydah resisted providing useful information until becoming more cooperative in early August, probably in the hope of improving his living conditions." The PDB made no reference to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques.Subsequently, the CIA represented to other senior policymakers and the Department of Justice that the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques were successfully used to elicit critical information from Abu Z u b a y d a h . F o r example, in a March 2, 2005, CIA memorandum to the Department of Justice, the CIA represented that information obtained from Abu Zubaydah on the "Dirty Bomb Plot" and Jose Padilla was acquired only ''after applying [enhanced] inteiTogation techniques."This CIA representation was repeated in numerous CIA communications with policymakers and the Department of Justice.The informationprovidedbytheCIAwasinaccurate. OntheeveningofApril20,2002,priortothe
Briefing on RDI Program" agenda, CIA document "ElTs and Effectiveness," with associated documents, "Key Intelligence Impacts Chart: Attachment (AZ and KSM)," "Background on Key Intelligence Impacts Chart: Attachment," and "supporting references," to includeJ|Backgroun Key Captures and Plots Disrupted.")-
On August 30, 2002, Legal, I H I H H i H l ' Legal Adviser John Bellinger to discuss Abu Zubaydali's interrogation. {See email from; John Rizzo^o^ohn Moseman; subject: Meeting with NSCLegalAdviser,30August2002;date:September3,2002;ALEC|m^|,052227ZSEP02.) Accordingto
I's email documenting the meeting, he "noted that we had employed the walling techniques, confinement box, waterboard, along with some of the other methods which also had been approved by the Attorney General," and "reported that while the experts at the site and at Headquarters were still assessing the product of the recent sessions, it did appeal" that the current phase was producing meaningful results." {See email from: John Rizzo; to: John Moseman; subject: Meeting with NSC Legal Adviser, 30 August 2002; date: September 3, 2002.) The email did not provide any additional detail on what was described to Bellinger with respect to either the use of thetechniquesorthe"results"oftheinterrogation. ItisunclearfromCIArecordswhethertheCIAeverinformed the NSC legal adviseror anyoneelse at the NSC or the Department of Justice that Abu Zubaydah failed to provide information about future attacks against the United States or operatives tasked to commit attacks in the U.S., during or after tlie use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques.
ALEC i l i l (181439Z OCT 02)
These representations were eventually included in the President's September 6, 2006, speech, in which the President stated: "We knew that Zubaydah had more information that could save innocent lives, but he stopped talking... so tlie CIA used an alternative set of procedures... Zubaydah was questioned using these procedures, and soon he began to provide information on key al Qaeda operatives, including information that helped us find and capture more of those responsible for tlie attacks on September the 11"'." Tliese representations were also made to theCommittee. OnSeptember6,2006,DirectorHaydentestifiedthat,"facedwiththetechniquesandwiththe prospects of what he did not know was coming, Abu Zubaydah decided that he had earned tlie burden as far as Allali had required him to cairy it and that he could put the burden down and cooperate with his interrogators." {See transcriptofbriefing,September6,2006(DTS#2007-1336).) DirectorHayden'sStatementfortheRecordforan April 12, 2007, hearing stated that: "[ajfter the use of these techniques, Abu Zubaydah became one of our most important sources of intelligence on al-Qa'ida." See statement for the Senate SelectCommittee on Intelligence from CIA Director Hayden, for April 12, 2007, hearing (DTS #2007-1563).
Italics in original document. CIAMemorandim Bradbury at Office of Legal Counsel, Dep<u-tment of Justice, dated March 2, 2005, fi-om H I Legal Group, DCI Counterteriorist Center, subject "Effectiveness of the CIA Counterterrorist Inten-ogation Techniques."
Among other documents, see Department of Justice Office of Legal Counsel Memoranda dated May 30, 2005, and July 20,2007. The July 20, 2007, memorandum - now declassified - states (inaccurately) that: "InteiTogations of Zubaydah—again, once enhanced techniques were employed—revealed two al Qaeda operatives already in the United States and planning to destroy a high rise apartment building and to detonate a radiological bomb in Washington, D.C." See VolumeII, specifically the sectionon the "Thwarting of the Dirty Bomb/TallBuildings Plot" and tlie capture of Jose Padilla, for additional details concerning the inaccuracies of this statement.
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use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, Abu Zubaydah provided this information to FBI officers who were using rapport building interrogation techniques.
2. Khalicl Shaykh Muhammad (KSM)
As described in more detail in the full Committee Study, the CIA provided significant inaccurate information to policymakers on the effectiveness of the CIA's
enhancedinterrogationtechniquesintheinterrogationofKSM. Theserepresentationswere
10091(210959ZAPR02). DespiterequestsbytheSenateSelectCommitteeonIntelligence,the CIAhasneverconectedtherecordonthisassertion. OnSeptember8,2008,theCommitteesubmittedQuestionsfor the Record (QFRs) to the CIA from a hearing on the legal opinions issued by the Department of Justice's Office of LegalCounselontheCIA'sDetentionandInterrogationProgram. Becauseoftimeconstraints,theCIAagreed"to takebackseveralquestionsfromMembersthat[theCIAwas]unabletoansweratthehearing." Onthetopicofthe effectiveness of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, the Committee asked"Why was this information [related to Padilla], which was not obtained through the use of EITs, included in the 'Effectiveness Memo?"' CIA recordsprovidedforthi^jevi^containcoinplete^respoi^stotlieseQuestionsfortheRecord. TlieCIA'sanswer tothisquestionwas: Legal simplyinadvertentlyreporte^iiswrong. Abu Zubaydah provided information on Jose Padilla while being interrogated by the FBI ( H I H l 10091)." The Committee never received this response, despite numerous requests. Instead, the CIA responded with a letter dated October 17, 2008, stating that the "CIA has responded to numerous written requests for information from SSCI on this topic [the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program]," and that "[w]e are available to provide additional briefingsonthisissuetoMembersasnecessary." InalettertoCIADirectorMichaelHayden,Chairman Rockefeller wrote, "[tjhe CIA's refusal to respond to hearing Questions for the Record is unprecedented and is simplyunacceptable." SenatorFeinsteinwroteaseparatelettertoCIADirectorMichaelHaydenstating,"Iwant you to know that I found the October 17, 2008 reply...appalling." The CIA did not respond. (See: (1) Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Questions for theRecord submitted to CIA Director Michael Hayden on September 8, 2008, with a request for a response by October 10,2008 (DTS #2008-3522); (2) CIA document prepared in response to "Questions for the Record" submitted by the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence on September 8, 2008; (3) letter from Senate Select Committee on Intelligence ChairmanJohn D. RockefellerIV, dated October 29, 2008, to CIA Director Michael Hayden (DTS #2008-4217); (4) letter from Senate Select Committee on Intelligence ChainnanJohnD.RockefellerIV,datedOctober29,2008,toCIADirectorMichaelHayden(DTS#2008-4217); and(5) letterfromSenateSelectCommitteeonIntelligenceCommitteemember,DianneFeinstein,datedOctober 30,2008,toCIADirectorMichaelHayden(DTS#2008-4235).) InFebruary2004,aseniorCIAofficerwrote: "AZ neverreallygave'thisistheplot'typeofinformation. Heclaimedeveryplot/operationhehadknowledgeofand/or was working on was only preliminary. (Padilla and the dirty bomb plot was prior to enhanced and he never really gave actionable to get them)." See email from: llli^^H|^^H||||htoJH|||^^H^m, cc: [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTEDL^^BHIilHjohn^Mu^^ [REDACTED], [REDACTED], Jose Rodriguez, [REDACTED], [REDACTEDlHIHBIH; subject: Please Read - Re CTC Response to the Draft IG Report; date: February 10, 2004)
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provided by the CIA to the the White House/^^^ the Department of Justice,the Congress,and the Americanpublic.The representations include that: (1) KSM provided little threat information or actionable intelligence prior to the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques(2) the CIA overcame KSM's resistance through the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques;^-^® (3) the CIA's waterboard interrogation technique was particularly effective in eliciting information from KSM;'^'^ (4) KSM "recanted little of the information" he had provided, and KSM's information was "generally accurate" and "consistent";'-^^ (5) KSM made a statement to CIA personnel—"soon, you will know"— indicating an attack was imminent upon his aiTest; and (6) KSM believed "the general US
'2''' Among otlier documents, see Memorandum for: Inspector General; from: James Pavitt, Deputy Director for Operations; subject: re (S) Comments to Draft IG Special Review, "Countertenorism Detention and Interrogation Program" (2003-7123-IG); date: February 27, 2004; attachment: February 24, 2004, Memorandum re Successes of CIA's Counterterrorism Detention and Inten'ogation Activities.
'2'-'' Amongotlierdocuments,seeMemorandumfortheRecord: "ReviewofInterrogationProgramon29July 2003," Memorandum prepaied by CIA General Counsel Scott Muller, dated August 5, 2003, and briefing slides entitled, "CM Interrogation Program," dated July 29, 2003, presented to senior White House officials; Briefing for Vice President Cheney: CIA Detention and Interrogation Program. CIA document dated March 4, 2005, entitled, "Briefing for Vice President Cheney: CIA Detention and Interrogation Program," and "DCIA Talking Points: Waterboard 06 November 2007," dated November 6, 2007, with the notation the document was "sent to DCIA Nov. 6 in preparation for POTUS meeting."
Among otlier documents, see March 2, 2005, Memorandum for Steve Bradbury from | | ^ | Legal Group, DCI Counterterrorist Center re: Effectiveness of the CIA Counterterrorist Interrogation Techniques.
Among otherdocuments, seeCIAclassifiedStatement fortheRecord, SenateSelectCommitteeonIntelligence, providedbyGeneralMichaelV.Hayden,Director,CentialIntelligenceAgency,12April2007;andaccompanying Senate Select Committee on Intelligence hearing transcript for April 12, 2007, entitled, "Hearing on Central Intelligence Agency Detention and Interrogation Program."
See, for example, CIA "Questions and Proposed Answers" (related to the President's speech) 9/2/2006; Tab 2 of CIA ValidationofRemarksonDetaineePolicy,September6,2006;andspeechbyPresidentBushonSeptember6, 2006.
CIA memorandum to"National Security Advisor," from "Director ofCentral Intelligence,'^ubje^ "Effectiveness oftlie CIA Counterterrorist Inte^ogatioirrechni^ included in email from: to:
and subject: on value
techniques"; date: December 6, 2004, at 5:06:38 PM. CIA document dated March 4, 2005, entitled, "Briefing for
VicePresidentCheney:CIADetentionandInterrogationProgram." CIATalkingPointsentitled,"TalkingPoints for10March2005DCIMeetingPC:EffectivenessoftheHigh-ValueDetaineeIntenogation (HVDI)Techniques." CIAbriefingdocumentdatedMay2,2006,entitled,"BRIEFINGFORCHIEFOFSTAFFTOTHEPRESIDENT2 May 2006 Briefingfor Chief of Staff to the President Josh Bolten: CIA Rendition, Detention and Intenogation Programs." March2,2005,MemorandumforSteveBradbuiyfrom LegalGroup,DCI CounterteiTorist Center re: Effectiveness of the CIA Countertenorist Interrogation Techniques.
CIA memorandum to "National Security Advisor," from "Director of Central Intelligence,''Subie^ "Effectiveness ofthe CIA Counterterrorist InterrogatiornTechi^ included in email from: to:
subject: on value
techniques"; date: December 6,2004, at 5:06:38 PM; CIA document dated March 4, 2005, entitled, "Briefing for
VicePresidentCheney:CIADetentionandIntenogationProgram." CIAbriefingdocumentdatedMay2,2006, entitled, "BRIEFING FOR CHIEF OF ST AFF TO THE PRESIDENT 2 May 2006 Briefing for Chief of Staff to the President Josh Bolten: CIA Rendition, Detention and Intenogation Programs."
See, for example, transcript. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, April 12, 2007 (DTS #2007-3158).
"Klialid Shaykh Muhammad: Preeminent Source On Al-Qa'ida," authored by [REDACTED], CTC/UBLD/AQPO/AQLB; CIA Briefing for Obama National Security Team- "Renditions, Detentions, and Interrogations (RDI)" including "Tab 7," named "RDG Copy- Briefing on RDI Program 09 Jan. 2009," referenced materials attached to cover memorandum with the title, "D/CIA Conference Room Seating Visit by President-elect Banack [sic] Obama National Security Teanrruesday^^anuar^009^3^- 11:30 a.m."
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population was 'weak,' lacked resilience, and would be unable to 'do what was necessary."'"'^ These representations are not supported by internal CIA records.
While the CIA represented to multiple parties that KSM provided little threat information or actionable intelligence prior to the use of the CIA's enhanced
interrogation techniques, CIA records indicate that KSM was subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques within "a few minutes" of first being questioned by CIA interrogators.This material fact was omitted from CIA representations.
The CIA represented that the CIA overcame KSM's resistance to interrogation by using the CIA's enhanced interrogation t e c h n i q u e s . C I A records do not
support this statement. To the contrary, there are multiple CIA records describing the ineffectiveness of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques in gaining KSM's cooperation. On March 26, 2003, the day after the CIA last used its enhanced interrogation techniques on KSM, KSM was described as likely lying and engaged in an effort "to renew a possible resistance s t a n c e . O n April 2, 2003, the Interagency Intelligence Committee on Terrorism (IICT) produced an assessment of KSM's intelligence entitled, "Precious Truths, Surrounded by aBodyguardofLies." TheassessmentconcludedthatKSMwaswithholdinginformationor lyingaboutterroristplotsandoperativestargetingtheUnitedStates.'--^ Duringandaftertheuse of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, the CIA repeatedly expressed concern that KSM was lying and withholding information in the context of CBRN (Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear) programs,plotting against U.S. interests in Karachi, Pakistan, plottingagainstHeathrowAirport,^^^^ AbuIssaal-Britani,^^^'aswellasthe"SecondWave" plotting against the "tallest building in California," which prompted the CIA's ALEC Station to note in a cable dated April 22, 2003, that it "remain[e]d concerned that KSM's progression towards full debriefing status is not yet apparent where it counts most, in relation to threats to US interests, especially inside CONUS."^^^^
1223 2,2005, Memorandum for Steve Bradbury from jj^H Legal Group, DCI
Counterterrorist Center re: Effectiveness of the CIA Counterterrorist Interrogation Techniques. 34491 (051400Z MAR 03)
CIA memorandum to "National Security Advisor," from "Director of Central Intelligence," Subject: '|Effectivenes^ni^CI/^Coun^^ Interrogation Techniques," included in email from;
subject; on value techniques";date:December6,2004,at5:06:38PM. CIAdocumentdatedMarch4,2005,entitled,"Briefingfor
Vice President Cheney: CIA Detention and Interrogation Program." CIA briefing document dated May 2, 2006, entitled, "BRIEFING FOR CHIEF OF STAFF TO THE PRESIDENT 2 May 2006 Briefing for Chief of Staff to the President Josh Bolten: CIA Rendition, Detention and Interrogation Programs."
^••11026 (271034Z MAR 03)
1227 "Khalid Shaykh Muhammad's Threat Reporting - Precious Truths, Surrounded by a Bodyguard of Lies,"
Interagency Intelligent Committee on Terrorism (IICT), April 3, 2003. '228 DIRECTOrJ^H (121550Z JUN 03)
'229 alec ^^B(022012Z MAY 03)
1230 Memorandum for:
Action detainee branch; date: 12 June 2003.
'23' ALEC (210159Z OCT 03); email from:
subject: KSM and Khallad Issues; date: October 16,2003, at 5:25:13 PM. '232alec (222153Z APR03)
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; from:
[REDACTED]; cc:
|; subject:
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repeatedly represented that the CIA's waterboard interrogationtechniquewasparticularlyeffectiveinelicitinginformationfromKSMJ~^^ This
representation is not supported by CIA records. Numerous CIA personnel, including members of KSM's interrogation team, expressed their belief that the waterboard interrogation technique was ineffective on KSM. The on-site medical officer told the inspector general that after three or four days it became apparent that the waterboard was ineffective and that KSM "hatedi^ut knewhe could manage."^-^"^ KSM debriefer and Deputy Chiefof ALEC Station
B H H inspector general that KSM "figured out a way to deal with [the waterboard],and she relayed in a 2005 Sametime communication that "we broke KSM...
using the Majid Khan stuff... and theemails^|Mri other words b^onfi^JJJjjJ^^SM with information from other sources. ^B^^^|CTC Legal, iH H B H IIH , told the inspectorgeneralthatthewaterboard"wasoflimiteduseonKSM."^^^^ AKSMinterrogatortold the inspector general that KSM had "beat the s y s t e m , a n d assessed that KSM responded to "creature comforts and sense of importance" and not to "confrontational" approaches.The interrogator later wrote in a Sametime communication that KSM and Abu Zubaydah "held back" despite the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, adding "I'm ostracized whenever I suggest those two did not tell us everything. How dare I think KSM was holding back."'-'^® In April 2003, ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ | O M S told the inspector general that the waterboard had "not been very effective on KSM." He also "questioned how the repeated use of the waterboard was categorically different from 'beating the bottom of my feet,' or from torture in general."^^'^^
The CIA repeatedly represented that KSM had "recanted little of the information" he had provided, and that KSM's information was "generally accurate" and
"consistent."^^'^^ ThisassertionisnotsupportedbyCIArecords. Thi*oughouttheperiodduring See, for example, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Hearing on the Central Intelligence Agency
Detention and Intenogatioi^rogri^^ '23'' Interview of
15,2003.
'-3-'' Interview of
2003.
Sametime Communication,
12, 2007 (SSCI #2007-3158).
by [REDACTED] and [REDACTED], Office of the Inspector General, May
[REDACTED] and [REDACTED], Office of the Inspector General, April 3,
and [REDACTED], 02/May/05, 14:51:48 to 15:17:39. The "Majid Klian s t u f f refers to confronting KSM with the reporting of Majid Klian, then in foreign government
custody.
'237 Interview of by [REDACTED], [REDACTED], and [REDACTED], Office of the Inspector
General, August 20^2003^^^^
'238 Interview of by [REDACTED] and [REDACTED], Office of the Inspector General, October
22, 2003.
'239 11715 (201047Z MA Y 03)
^2'*') Sametime Communication, and^H^^^H^5/Aug/06, 10:28:38 to 10:58:00. The Sametime also includes die following statement from "I thinlc it's a dangerous message to say we could do almost the same without measures. Begs the question- then why did you use them before?"
'2^" Interview of• • • • • , by [REDACTED] and [REDACTED], Office of the Inspector General, April 11 and 13,2003.
'2''2 "Klialid Shaykh Muhammad: Preeminent Source On Al-Qa'ida," was authored by [REDACTED], CTC/UBLD/AQPO/AQLB. CIA Briefing for Obama National Security Team- "Renditions, Detentions, and InteiTogations (RDI)" including "Tab7,"named "RDGCopy- Briefing onRDIProgram 09Jan.2009,"referenced materials attached to cover memorandum with the title, "D/CIA Conference Room Seating Visit by President-elect Barrack [sic] Obama National Security TeaiT^uesday^^anuar^009^^3^- 11:30 a.m."
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which KSM was subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, KSM provided inaccurate information, much of which he would later acknowledge was fabricated and recant. Specifically, KSM's fabrications and recantations covered his activities immediately before his
c a p t u r e , t h e identity of an individual whom he described as the protector of his children,^-"^ plotting against a U.S. aircraft carrier, a meeting with Abu Faraj al-Libi, and the location of HassanGhul.^^"^^ KSMfabricatedsignificantinformation,whichhewouldlaterrecant,relatedto Jaffaral-Tayyar, stating thatal-Tayyar andJosePadilla were plotting together,linking al- Tayyar toHeathrow Airport plotting'^"^^ and toMajid Khan's plotting,and producing what CIA officials described as an "elaborate tale" linking al-Tayyar to an assassination plot against former President Jimmy C a r t e r . K S M later explained that "he had been forced to lie" about al-Tayyar due to the pressure from CIA interrogators.KSM recanted other information about the Heathrow Airport plotting, including information regarding the targeting,additional operatives, and the tasking of prospective pilots to study at flight s c h o o l s . K S M provided significant information on Abu Issa al-Britani (Dhiren Barot) that he would later recant, including linking Abu Issa al-Britani to Jaffar al-Tayyar and to the Heathrow Airport plot.'^''^ Under direct threat of additional waterboarding,'^^"^ KSM told CIA interrogators that he had sent Abu Issa al-Britani to Montana to recruit African-American Muslim c o n v e r t s . I n June 2003, KSM stated he fabricated the story because he was "under 'enhanced measures' when he made theseclaimsandsimplytoldhisinterrogatorswhathethoughttheywantedtohear."^-^^ KSM also stated that he tasked Majid Khan with recruiting Muslims in the United States,which he
34513 (052246Z MAR 03); [34569 (061722Z MAR 03);
15712
[REDACTED]; subject: planned release of [DETENTION SITE ORANGE] detainee Syed Habib; date:
10751 (102258Z MAR 0 3 ) J H H | 10762 (112020Z MAR 03), disseminated iis 1
23796 (121932Z AUG 04); §^>20873 (08163IZ MAR 04); B|||20873 (081631Z MAR 04);
DIRECTOR•• (101847Z MAY 04); DIRECTOR jjj^HaOlS^^M^04)
10740 (092308Z MAR03), disseminatedasBBHH^I;i^HH 10741 (100917Z MAR
03);j\LECMBi (120134Z MAR 03)
10883 (182127^1A^3), disseminated as 11717 (201722Z MAY
03), disseminated as 10778 (121549Z MAR 03), disseminated as 10894 (19I513Z MAR 03);^^^B 10902 (201037Z MAR 03)
10959 (231205Z MAR 03); 10950 (222127Z MAR 03)
10902 (201037Z MAR 03); H I H 10959 (231205Z MAR 03);
10950 (222127Z MAR
144201
12141 (27223IZ JUN
12141 JUN 03);
10828 (151310Z MAR 03), include^s part ofdisseminated intelligence
d e s c r i b i n ^arch 17, 2003, interrogation; H I I H ! 10883 (182127Z MAR 03), disseminated as
11717 (201722Z MA Y 03), disseminated as
10941 (221506Z MAR 03); 10950 (222127Z MAR 03)
; ALEC
11377 (231943Z APR 03), disseminated as P 10798 (131816Z MAR 03), disseminated as
I(192314ZMAY03);••• 11717(201222ZMAY
10778 (121549Z MAR 03), disseminated as
122939 (031541Z JUL 04); 10883 (182127Z MAR 03), disseminated as
10942 (2216I0Z MAR 03), disseminated as 03), disseminated as
12095 (222049Z JUN 03)
10942 (221610Z MAR 03), disseminated as
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139 (051956Z APR 03) 1281 (130801Z JUN 04); |
[REDACTED],
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wouldlaterrecant.^-^^ OnMay3,2003,CIAofficersrecommendedrevisitingtheinformation KSM had provided "during earlier stages of his interrogation process," noting that "he has told us that he said some things during this phase to get the enhanced measures to stop, therefore some of this information may be suspect."
The CIA also repeatedly referred to a comment made by KSM while he was still in Pakistani custody as indicating that KSM had information on an imminent
attack. Inreports tothe inspector general,the national security advisor,^and the Department of Justice,^^^^ among others, the CIA represented that:
"When asked about future attacks planned against the United States, he coldly replied 'Soon, you will know.' In fact, soon we did know - after we initiated enhanced measures."^-^^
Contrary to CIA representations, CIA records indicate that KSM's comment was interpreted by CIA officers with KSM at the time as meaning that KSM was seeking to use his future cooperation as a "bargaining chip" with more senior CIA officers.
Finally, the CIA attributed to KSM, along with Abu Zubaydah, the statement that "the general US population was 'weak,' lacked resilience, and would be unable to
'do what was necessary' to prevent the teiTorists from succeeding in their goals."^-^-^ There are no CIA operational or interrogation records to support the representation that KSM or Abu Zubaydah made these statements.
1258
12558 (041938Z AUG 03); | |31148(171919Z DEC 05); I 31147 (171919Z DEC 05),
disseminated as|
1259 11437 (031551Z MAY 03). As detailed in Volumes II and III, KSM's claims tliat he fabricated
informationappearedcredibletoCIAofficers. Otherintelligencecollectionsupportedtheseclaims. Memorandum for: Inspector General; from: James Pavitt, Deputy Director for Operations; subject: re (S)
Comments to Draft IG Special Review, "Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Program" (2003-7123-IG); date: February 27, 2004; attachment: February 24, 2004, Memorandum re Successes of CIA's Counterterrorism Detention and Intenogation Activities.
'2'"' CIA memorandum to "National Security Advisor," from "Director of Central Intelligence," Subject: "Effectiveness ofthe CIA Countertenorist Intermgatioi^ech^ included in email from:
and iiiiigliiiiiiiiiiiggiii^ subject; on value techniques"; date: December 6, 2004, at 5:06:38 PM.
March 2, 2005, Memorandum for Steve Bradbury from Legal Group, DCI Countertenorist Center re: Effectiveness of tlie CIA Counterterrorist Interrogation Techniques.
Email from: to: cc: • • • • , [REDACTED], [REDACTED], BHI^^Hi^H^ubject:reAdditiononKSM/AZandmeasures;date:February9,2004. Memorandumfor: Inspector General; from: James Pavitt, Deputy Duectorfor Operations; subject: re (S) Comments to Draft IG Special Review, "Countertenorism Detention and Interrogation Program" (2003-7123-IG); date: Febmary 27, 2004; attachment: February 24, 2004, Memorandum re Successes of CIA's CounterteiTorism Detention and Intenogation Activities.
41592 (051050ZMAR03);(^••^•41627(0^29Z^R03)
1265 March 2, 2005, Memorandum for Steve Bradburyft^mJJ(HBBBi» i i H Legal Group, DCI
Countertenorist Center re: Effectiveness onh^CI^Countertenjorisnntm Techniques.
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E. CIA Effectiveness Claims Regarding a "High Volume of Critical Intelligence"
The CIA represented that the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques resulted in the collection of "a high volume of critical intelligence'-^^ on al-
Qa'ida."'^^^ The Committee evaluated the "high volume" ofintelligence collected by compiling the total number of sole source and multi-source disseminated intelligence reports from the 119 known CIA detainees.
The CIA informed the Committee that its interrogation program was successful in developing intelligence and suggested that all CIA detainees produced
disseminated intelligence reporting. For example, in September 2006, CIA Director Michael Hayden provided the following testimony to the Committee:
Senator Bayh: "I was impressed by your statement about how effective the [CIA's enhanced interrogation] techniques have been in eliciting important information to the country, at one point up to 50 percent of our information about al-Qa'ida. I think you said 9000 different intelligence reports?"
Director Hayden: "Over 8000, sir."
Senator Bayh: "And yet this has come from, I guess, only thirty individuals."
The "critical" description in this CIA representation is addressed in the section of this summary concerning the reported acquisition of actionable intelligence after the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques that the CIArepresentedasenablingtheCIAtothwartterroristplotsandcapturespecificterrorists. SeeVolumeIIfor additional information.
Among other documents, see CIA Memorandum for the National Security Advisor (Rice) entitled,
"Effectiveness of the CIA Counterterrorist Interrogation Techniques," December 2004; CIA Memorandum to the
Office of Legal Counsel, entitled, "Effectiveness of the CIA Countertenorist Interrogation Techniques," March 2,
2005;CIAbriefingnotesentitled,"BriefingforVicePresidentCheney: CIADetentionandInterrogationProgram,"
March 4, 2005; CIA talking points for the National Security Council entitled, "Talking Points for 10 March 2005
DCI Meeting PC: Effectiveness of the High-Value Detainee Interrogation (HVDI) Techniques," dated March 4,
2005; CIA briefing notes entitled, "Briefing for Chief of Staff to the President Josh Bolten: CIA Rendition,
Detention, and Interrogation Programs," dated May 2, 2006; CIA briefing document, entitled, "DCIA Talking
Points: Waterboard 06 November 2007," dated November 6, 2007, witli the notation the document was "sent to
DCIA Nov. 6 in preparation for POTUS meeting." Also included in additional briefing documents referenced and
described in this summary.
1268 \Yi^i|e multi-source intelligence reports are included in the Committee Study, the quantitative analysis in
this summary is based on sole-source intelligence reporting, as these reports best reflect reporting from CIA detainees. Multi-sourceintelligencereportsarereportsthatcontaindatafrommultipledetainees. Asdescribed above, a common multi-source report would result from the CIA showing a picture of an individual to all CIA detainees at a specific CIA detention site. A report would be produced regardless if detainees were or were not able toidentifyorprovideinformationontheindividual. Asaspecificexample,seeHEADQUARTERS
(202255Z JUN 06), which states that from January 1, 2006 - April 30, 2006, information from Hambali was "used in the dissemination of three intelligence reports, two of which were non-recognitions of Guantanamo Bay detainees," wliile the third "detailed [Hambali's] statement thathe knew of no threats or plots to attack any world sportingevents." Sole-sourcereports,bycontrast,arebasedonspecificinformationprovidedbyoneCIAdetainee.
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DirectorHayden: "No,sir,96,all96."''^^
(^F8yvm^m^H^NF) In April 2007, CIA Director Hayden testified that the CIA's interrogation program existed "for one purpose - intelligence," and that it is "the most successful program being conducted by American intelligence today" for "preventing attacks, disabling al- Qa'ida."^^^*^ AtthishearingDirectorHaydenagainsuggestedthattheCIAinterrogationprogram wassuccessfulinobtainingintelligencefromallCIAdetainees.^^^^ Atranscriptofthatheaiing included the following exchange:
Senator Snowe; "General Hayden. Of the 8000 intelligence reports that were provided, as you said, by 30 of the detainees."
DirectorHayden: "Byall97,ma'am."'^^^
suggestion that all CIA detainees provided information that resultedinintelligencereportingisnotsupportedbyCIArecords. CIArecordsrevealthat34
percent of the 119 known CIA detainees produced no intelligence reports, and nearly 70 percent produced fewer than 15 intelligence reports. Of the 39 detainees who were, according to CIA records, subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, nearly 20 percent produced nointelligencereports,while40percentproducedfewerthan15intelligencereports. Whilethe CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program did produce significant amounts of disseminated intelligence reporting (5,874 sole-source intelligence reports), this reporting was overwhelmingly derived from a small subset of CIA detainees. For example, of the 119 CIA detainees identified in the Study, 89 percent of all disseminated intelligence reporting was derived from 25 CIA detainees. Five CIA detainees produced more than 40 percent of all intelligence reporting from the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program. CIA records indicate that two of the five detainees were not subjected to the CIA's enhanced inteiTogation techniques.
F. The Eight Primaiy CIA Effectiveness Representations—the Use of the CIA's Enhanced InteiTOgation Techniques "Enabled the CIA to Disrupt Terrorist Plots" and "Capture Additional Terrorists"
From 2003 through 2009,'^^"^ the CIA consistently and repeatedly represented that its enhanced interrogation techniques were effective and necessary to produce
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Briefing by the Director, Central Intelligence Agency, on the Central IntelligenceAgencyDetention,IntenogationandRenditionProgram,September6,2006(SSCl#2007-1336). At the time this statement was made tliere had been at least 118 CIA detainees.
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Hearing on the Central Intelligence Agency Detention and Interrogation Program, April 12, 2007 (DTS #2007-3158).
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Hearing on the Central Intelligence Agency Detention and Intenogation Program, April 12, 2007 (DTS #2007-3158).
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Hearing on the Central Intelligence Agency Detention and Interrogation Program, April 12, 2007 (DTS #2007-3158).
See detainee intelligence reporting data in Volume 11.
'2^'' The CIA represented in 2002 that the CIA's enhanced intenogation techniques were necessary and effective.
The Committee analysis focuses on CIA representation^etweei^OO^n^O^, during which time the CIA
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critical intelligence that "enabled the CIA to disrupt terrorist plots, capture additional terrorists, andcollectahigh-volumeofcriticalintelligenceonal-Qa'ida." TheCIAfurtherstatedthatthe information acquired as a result of the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques could not have been acquired by the U.S. government in any other way ("otherwise unavailable").
provided specific examples of counterterrorism "successes" tlie CIA attributed to the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques.
Seelistof20CIArepresentations included inthissummary. From2003through 2009,theCIA's representations regarding the effectiveness of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques included a specific set of examples of terrorist plots "disrupted" and terrorists captured that the CIA attributed to information obtained from theuseofitsenhancedinterrogationtechniques. CIArepresentationsfurtherassertedthattheintelligenceobtained from the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques was unique, otherwise unavailable, and resulted in "saved lives." Among otherCIA representations, sec. (1) CIA representations in the Department of Justice Office of Legal Counsel Memorandum, dated May 30, 2005, which relied on a series of highly specific CIA representations on the type of intelligence acquired from the use of the CIA's enhanced inteiTogation techniques to assess their legality. TheCIArepresentationsreferencedbytheOLCincludethattheuseoftheCIA'senhancedinterrogation techniques was "necessary" to obtain "critical," "vital," and "otherwise unavailable actionable intelligence" that was "essential" for the U.S. government to "detect and dismpt" terrorist threats. The OLC memorandum further states that "[the CIA] ha[s] informed [the OLC] that the CIA believes that this program is largely responsible for preventing a subsequent attack within the United States." {See Memorandum for John A. Rizzo, Senior Deputy General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, from Steven G. Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Officeof Legal Counsel, May 30,2005, Re: Application of United StatesObligations Under Article 16of the Convention Against Torture to Certain Techniques that May Be Used in the Interrogation of High Value al QaedaDetainees.) (2)CIArepresentationsintheDepartmentofJusticeOfficeofLegalCounselMemorandum dated July 20, 2007, which also relied on CIA representations on the type of intelligence acquired from the use of theCIA'senhancedinterrogationtecliniques. CitingCIAdocumentsandthePresident'sSeptember6,2006,speech describing the CIA's interrogation program (which was based on CIA-provided information), the OLC memorandumstates: "TheCIAintenogationprogram—and,inparticular,itsuseofenhancedinterrogation techniques—is intended to serve this paramount interest [security of the Nation] by producing substantial quantities of otherwise unavailable intelligence. ...As the President explained [on September 6, 2006], 'by giving us information about terrorist plans we could not get anywhere else, the program has saved innocent lives.'" {See Memorandum for John A. Rizzo, Acting General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, from Steven G. Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, July 20, 2007, Re: Application of the War
Crimes Act, the Detainee Treatment Act, and Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions to Certain Techniques thatMayBeUsedbytheCIAintheInterrogationofHighValuealQaedaDetainees.) (3)CIAbriefingsfor members of the National Security Council in July and September 2003 represented that "the use of Enhanced Techniques of one kind or another had produced significant intelligence information that had, in the view of CIA professionals, saved lives," and warned policymakers that "[t]ermination of this program will result in loss of life, possibly extensive." {See August 5, 2003 Memorandum for the Record from Scott Muller, Subject: Review of Interrogation Program on 29 July 2003; Briefing slides, CIA Interrogation Program, July 29, 2003; September 4, 2003, CIA Memorandum for the Record, Subject: Member Briefing; and September 26, 2003, Memorandum for the RecordfromMuller,Subject:CIAInterrogationProgram.) (4)TheCIA'sresponsetotheOfficeofInspector General draft Special Review of the CIA program, which asserts: "Information [the CIA] received... as a result of the lawful use of enhanced interrogation techniques ('EITs') has almost certainly saved countless American lives inside theUnited States and abroad. The evidence points clearly tothefact that without theuseofsuch techniques, we and our allies would [have] suffered major terrorist attacks involving hundreds, if not thousands, of casualties." {See Memorandum for: Inspector General; from: James Pavitt, Deputy Director for Operations; subject: re (S) Comments to Draft IG Special Review, "Counterterrorism Dietention and Interrogation Program" 2003-7123-IG; date: February 27, 2004; attachment: February 24,2004, Memorandum re Successes of CIA's Counterterrorism Detention and InteiTogation Activities.) (5) CIA briefing documents for CIA Director Leon Panetta in February 2009, which statethatthe"CIA assesses that theRDI program worked andthe[enhanced interrogation] techniques were effective in producing foreign intelligence," and that "[m]ost, if not all, of the timely intelligence acquired from detainees in this program would not have been discovered or reported by other means." {See CIA briefing documents for Leon Panetta, entitled, "Tal^^CI^Briefin^nRDIProOTan^ 18FEB.2009" and graphic
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The CIA also represented tliat the best measure of effectiveness of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques was examples of specific terrorist plots "thwarted" and specific terrorists captured as a result of the use of the CIA's techniques.
For example, in a December 2004 CIA memorandum prepared for the national security advisor, the CIA wrote that there was "no way to conduct" an
"independent study of the foreign intelligence efficacy of using enhanced interrogation techniques," but stated, "[t]he Central Intelligence Agency can advise you that this program works and the techniques are effective in producing foreign intelligence." To illustrate the effectiveness of the CIA's interrogation techniques, the CIA provided 11 examples of "[k]ey intelligence collected from HVD interrogations after applying inten'ogation techniques," nine of which referenced specific ten'orist plots or the capture of specific t e r r o r i s t s . S i m i l a r l y , under the heading, "Plots Discovered as a Result of EITs," a CIA briefing prepared for President Bush in November 2007 states, "reporting statistics alone will not provide a fair and accurate measure of the effectiveness of EITs." Instead, the CIA provided eight "examples of key intelligence collected from CIA detainee inteiTogations after applying the waterboard along with other interrogation techniques," seven of which referenced specific terrorist plots or the capture of specific ten-orists.^^^^
The Committee selected 20 CIA documents that include CIA representations about the effectiveness of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques from
2003through2009. The20CIAdocuments,whichwereconsistentwithabroadersetofCIA representations made during this period, include materials the CIA prepared for the White
attaclunent, "Key Intelligence and Reporting Derived from Abu Zubaydah and Klialid Shaykli Muhaminad (KSM)," including "DCIA Briefing on RDI Progiam" agenda, CIA document "EITs and Effectiveness," with associated documents, "Key Intelligence Impacts Chart: Attachment (AZ and KSM)," "Background on Key Intelligence Impacts Chart: Attachment," and "supporting references," to include "Background on Key Captures and Plots Disrupted.") (6)CIAdocumentfaxedtotheSenateSelectCommitteeonIntelligenceonMarch18,2009,entitled, "[SWIGERT] and [DUNBAR]," located in Committee databases at DTS #2009-1258, which provides a list of "some of the key captures and dismpted plots" that the CIA had attributed to the use of the CIA's enhanced intenogationtechniques,andstating: "CIAassessesthatmost,ifnotall,oftlietimelyintelligenceacquiredfrom detaineesinthisprogramwouldnothavebeendiscoveredorreportedbyanyotiiermeans." SeeVolumeIIfor additional CIA representations asserting that tlie CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques enabled the CIA to obtain unique, otherwise unavailable intelligence that "saved lives."
Italicsinoriginaldocument. SeeCIAmemorandumto"NationalSecurityAdvisor,"from"DirectorofCentral Intelligence," Subject: "Effectiveness ofthe CIA Counterterron^nterro^^ included in email from: i H U H I i ' ||||||||||||^gm||||||m^ |||||||||m||||||||||||m_ subject: on value of interrogation techniques"; date: December 6,2004, at 5:06:38 PM. The email references the attached "informationpapertoDr.Riceexplainingthevalueoftiieinterrogationtechniques." Thedocumentincludesthe following: Tlie "Karachi Plot," "TheHeatlirow Plot," Tlie "Second Wave," "TheGuraba Cell," "Issaal-Hindi," "Abu Talha al-Pakistani," "Hambali's Capture," "Jafaar al-Tayyar," "Dirty Bomb Plot," "Shoe Bomber," and "Shkai, Pakistan."
See CIA documententitled, "DCIA Talking Points: Waterboaid 06 November 2007," dated November6, 2007, with the notation the document was "sent to DCIA Nov. 6 in preparation for POTUS meeting." The document states, under the heading, "Plots Discovered as a Result of EITs," that "reporting statistics alone will not provide a fair and accurate measure of the effectiveness of EITs," and then provides a list of "examples of key intelligence collected from CIA detainee inteiTOgations after applying the waterboard along with other intenogation techniques...The 'Second Wave'...Hambali's Capture...The Guraba Cell...Shoe Bomber...Issa al-Hindi...Jafaar al-Tayyar... The Karachi Plot...The H e a t h r o ^
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House, the Department of Justice, the Congress, the CIA Office of Inspector General, as well as incomingmembersofPresidentObama'snationalsecurityteam,andthepublic. TheCommittee selected the following 20 CIA documents:
1. JulyandSeptember2003: CIABriefingDocumentsSeekingPolicyReaffirmationofthe
CIA InteiTogation Program from White House Officials, "Review of Interrogation Program."i278
2. Febmary 2004: The CIA's Response to the Draft Inspector General Special Review, CIA "Comments to Draft IG Special Review, 'Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Program,'" and attachment, "Successes of CIA's CounterteiTorism Detention and Interrogation Activities."^^^^
3. July 2004: CIA Intelligence Assessment, "Khalid Shaykh Muhammad: Preeminent Source on Al-Qa'ida."'-^"
4. December 2004: CIA Memorandum for the President's National Security Advisor, "Effectiveness of the CIA Counterterrorist Interrogation Techniques.
5. March 2005: CIA Memorandum for the Office of Legal Counsel, "Effectiveness of the CIA CounterteiTorist Interrogation Techniques."
6. March 2005: CIA "Briefing for Vice President Cheney: CIA Detention and Interrogation Program.
CIA memorandum for the Record, "Review of Interrogation Program on 29 July 2003," prepared by CIA General Counsel Scott Muller, dated August 5, 2003; briefing slides entitled, "CM Interrogation Program,'''' dated July29,2003,presentedtoseniorWhiteHouseofficials. AdditionalbriefingsaredetailedinSeptember4,2003, CIA Memorandum for the Record, Subject: Member Briefing; and September 26, 2003, Memorandum for the Record from Scott Muller, Subject: CIA Interrogation Program.
CIA memorandum to the CIA Inspector General from JamesPavitt, CIA's Deputy Director for Operations, dated February 27, 2004, with the subject line, "Comments to Draft IG Special Review, 'Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Program' (2003-7123-IG)," Attachment, "Successes of CIA's Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Activities," dated February 24,2004.
CIA Directorate ofIntelligence, "Khalid Shaykh Muhammad^reeminent Source on Al-Qa'ida," dated July 13, 2004; fax to the Department of Justice, April 22,2005, entitled, Materials on KSM and Abu Zubaydah.|H " This report was widely disseminated in the Intelligence Community, and a copy of this report was provided to the SenateSelectCommitteeonIntelligenceonJuly15,2004. OnMarch31,2009,formerVicePresidentCheney requested the declassification of this Intelligence Assessment, which was publicly released witli redactions on August 24,2009.
CIA memorandum to "National Security Advisor," from "Director of Central Intelligence," Subject: "Effectivenes^^l^CI^Coun^ Inte^ogationTech^ included in email from: to:
H m H I ' subject: on value
techniques"; date: December 6, 2004, at 5:06:38 PM. The email references the attached "information paper to Dr.
Rice explaining the value of the interrogation techniques."
CI^Memorandi^ fo^teve Bradbury at Office ofLegal Counsel, Department ofJustice, dated March 2, 2005,
from H I Lcgtil Group, DCI Countertenorist Center, subject: "Effectiveness ofthe CIA Counterterrorist Interrogation Techniques."
CIA briefing for Vice President Cheney, dated March 4, 2005, entitled, "Briefing for Vice President Cheney: CIA Detention and Interrogation Program."
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7. March 2005: CIA Talking Points for the National Security Council, "Effectiveness of the High-Value Detainee Interrogation (HVDI) Techniques."'^^"^
8. April 2005: CIA "Briefing Notes on the Value of Detainee Reporting" provided to the Department of Justice for the OLC's assessment of the legality of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques.
9. April 2005: CIA "Materials of KSM and Abu Zubaydah" and additional CIA documents provided to the Department of Justice for the OLC's assessment of the legality of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques.
10. June 2005: CIA Intelligence Assessment, "Detainee Reporting Pivotal for the War Against Al-Qa'ida."''^"^
11. December 2005: CIA Document entitled, "Future of CIA's Counterten'orist Detention and Interrogation Program," with the attachment, "Impact of the Loss of the Detainee Program to CT Operations and Analysis," from CIA Director Porter Goss to Stephen Hadley, Assistant to the President/National Security Advisor, Frances Townsend, Assistant to the President/Homeland Security Advisor, and Ambassador John Negroponte, the Director of National Intelligence.
12. May 2006: CIA Briefing for the President's Chief of Staff, "CIA Rendition, Detention and Interrogation Programs," on the effectiveness of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques.
'284 CIA Talking Points entitled, "Talking Points for 10 March 2005 DCI Meeting PC: Effectiveness of the High- Value Detainee Interrogation (HVDI) Techniques."
CIA"BriefingNotesontlieValueofDetaineeReporting"faxedfrom theCIAtotheDepartmentofJusticeon April 15, 2005, at 10:47AM.
CIA fax to DOJ Command Center, dated Apri^2,2005, for Office of Legal Coui^l, U.S. Depaitment ofJustice, from H H H H I ' Legal Group, DCI Counteilerrorist Center, re: H | , Materials of KSM and Abu Zubaydah, included CIA Intelligence Assessment "Khalid Shaykli Muhammad: Preeminent Source on Al-Qa'ida," and CIA document, "Materials of KSM and Abu Zubaydah."
CIA Intelligence Assessment, "Detainee Reporting Pivotal for the War Against Al-Qa'ida," June 2005, which CIA records indicate was provided to White House officials on June 1, 2005. The Intelligence Assessment at the SECRET//NOFORN classification level was more broadly disseminated on June 3, 2005. On Maich 31, 2009, formerVicePresidentCheneyrequestedthedeclassification ofthisIntelligence Assessment,whichwaspublicly released with redactions on August 24, 2009.
CIA memorandum entitled, "Future of CIA's Counterterrorist Detention and Intenogation Program," dated December 23, 2005, from CIA Director Porter Goss to Stephen J. Hadley, Assistant to the President/National Security Advisor, Frances F. Townsend, Assistant to the President/Homeland Security Advisor, Ambassador John D. Negroponte, the Director of National Intelligence, Attachment, "Impact of the Loss of the Detainee Program to CT Operations and Analysis."
CIAbriefingdocumentdatedMay2,2006,entitled,"BRIEFINGFORCHIEFOFSTAFFTOTHE PRESIDENT 2 May 2006 Briefing for Chief of Staff to the President Josh Bolten: CIA Rendition, Detention and Interrogation Programs."
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13. July 2006: CIA Memorandum for the Director of National Intelligence, "Detainee Intelligence Value Update."
14. September 2006: CIA documents supporting the President's September 6, 2006, speech, including representations on the effectiveness of the CIA's interrogation program, including: "DRAFTPotentialPublicBriefingofCIA'sHigh-ValueTerrorist Interrogations Program," "CIA Validation of Remarks on Detainee Policy," and "Summary of the High Value Terrorist Detainee Program." ^^^^
15. April 2007: CIA Director Michael Hayden's Testimony to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence describing the effectiveness of the CIA's interrogation program.
16. October 2007: CIA Talking Points for the Senate Appropriations Committee, addressing the effectiveness of theCIA's Detention and Interrogation Program, entitled, "Talking Points Appeal of the S H I Million Reduction in CIA/CTC's Rendition and Detention Program.'"-^^
17. November 2007: CIA Director Talking Points for the President, entitled, "Waterboard 06 November 2007," on the effectiveness of the CIA's waterboard interrogation
technique.
18.January2009: CIABriefingforPresident-electObama'sNationalSecurityTransition Team on the value of the CIA's "Renditions, Detentions, and Interrogations (RDI)."^"^^
19. February 2009: CIA Briefing for CIA Director Leon Panetta on the effectiveness of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, including "DCIA Briefing on RDI Program- 18FEB.2009," "Key Intelhgence and Reporting Derived from Abu Zubaydah and Khalid Shaykh Muhammad (KSM)," "EITs and Effectiveness," "Key Intelligence Impacts Chart: Attachment (AZ and KSM)," "Background on Key Intelligence Impacts Chart:
CIAbriefingdocumententitled, "DetaineeIntelligence ValueUpdate,"dated11July2006,internaldocument saved within CIA records as, "DNI Memo Intel Value July 11 2006...TALKING POINTS FOR DCI MEETING." CIA documentdated July 16,2006, entitled, "DRAFTPotential Public Briefing of CIA's High-Value Terrorist
Interrogations Program," and "CIA Validation of Remarks on Detainee Policy," drafts supporting the September 6, 2006,speech by President George W.Bush acknowledging anddescribing theCIA's Detention andInterrogation Program, as well as an unclassified Office of the Director of National Intelligence release, entitled, "Summary of the High Value Terrorist Detainee Program."
CIA classified Statementfor the Record, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, provided by General Michael V.Hayden,Director,CentralIntelligenceAgency,12April2007;andaccompanyingSenateSelectCommitteeon Intelligence heating transcript for April 12, 2007, entitled, "Hearing on Central Intelligence Agency Detention and Interrogation Program."
CIA fax from CIA employee [REDACTED] to U.S. Senate Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Defense, with fax cover sheet entitled, "T^ng points," sent on October 26, 2007, at 5:39:48 PM. Document faxed
entitled, "Talking Points Appeal of tlie Million reduction in CIA/CTC's Rendition and Detention Program." 1294 "dcia Talking Points: Waterboard06 November2007," dated November6, 2007 with tlienotation the
document was "sent to DCIA Nov. 6 in preparation for POTUS meeting."
CIA Briefing for Obama National Security Team- "Renditions, Detentions, and Interrogations (RDI)" including
"Tab 7," named "RDG Copy- Briefing on RD^rogran^^an^OOQ/^repared "13 January 2009." mi ii ( III IiiBg[([m[[||^Bi(i|iinii()ii|i|
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The Thwarting of the Dirty Bomb/Tall Buildings Plot and the Capture of Jose Padilla
The Thwarting of the Karachi Plots
The Thwarting of the Second Wave Plot and the Discovery of the al-Ghuraba Group
The Thwarting of the United Kingdom Urban Targets Plot and die Capture of Dhiren Barot, aka Issa al-Hindi
The Identification, Capture, and Arrest of lyman Paris The Identification, Capture, and Arrest of Sajid Badat
The Thwarting of the Heathrow Airport and Canary Wharf Plotting
The Capture of Hambali
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Referenced X Nutnber ofTimesin the 20 CIA Documents
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Attachment," and "Background on Key Captures and Plots Disrupted," among other CIA documents.
20. March 2009: CIA Memorandum for the Chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, including representations on the "Key Captures and Disrupted Plots Gained from HVDs in the RDI Program."^^^^
From the 20 CIA documents, the Conmiittee identified the CIA's eight most frequently cited examples of "thwarted" plots and captured terrorists that the CIA
attributed to information acquired from the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques:
The Confmiittee sought to confirm that the CIA's representations about the most frequently cited examples of "thwarted" plots and captured terrorists were
consistent with the more than six million pages of CIA detention and inteiTogation records provided to the Committee. Specifically, the Committee assessed whether the CIA's representations that its enhanced interrogation techniques produced unique, otherwise unavailable intelligence^ that led to the capture of specific ten'orists and the "thwarting" of
CIA briefing documents for Leon Panetta, entitled, "Tab 9: DCIA Briefing on RDl Program- 18FEB.2009" and graphic attachment, "Key Intelligence and Reporting Derived from Abu Zubaydah and Khalid Shaykh Muhammad (KSM)," Includes "DCIA Briefing on RDI Program" agenda, CIA document "ElTs and Effectiveness," with associated documents, "Key Intelligence Impacts Chart: Attachment (AZ and KSM)," "Background on Key Intelligence Impacts Chart: Attachment," and "supporting references," to include "Background on Key Captures and Plots Disrupted."
CIA document faxed to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence on Mai'ch 18, 2009, at 3:46 PM, entitled,
"[SWIGERT] and [DUNBAR]," which includes "Key Captures and Disrupted Plots Gained From HVDs in the RDI
Program" (DTS #2009-1258).
1298 piom 2003 tlirough 2009, the CIA's representations regarding tlie effectiveness of the CIA's enhanced
interrogation techniques provided a specific set of examples of teiTorist plots "disrupted" and tenorists captured that the CIA attributed to information obtained fronUh^is^nt^nhance^nte^og^ation techniques. CIA
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representations further asserted that the intelhgence obtained from the use of the CIA's enhanced inteiTogation techniqueswasunique,otherwiseunavailable,andresultedin"savedlives." AmongotherCIArepresentations,see: (1) CIA representations in the Department of Justice Office of Legal Counsel Memorandum, dated May 30, 2005, which relied on a series of highly specific CIA representations on the type of intelligence acquired from the use of theCIA'senhancedinterrogationtechniquestoassesstheirlegality. TlieCIArepresentationsreferencedbythe OLC include tliat the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques was "necessary" to obtain "critic^," "vital," and "otherwise unavailable actionable intelligence" that was "essential" for the U.S. government to "detect and disnipt" terrorist threats. The OLC memorandum further states that "[the CIA] ha[s] informed [the OLC] that the CIA believes that this program is largely responsible for preventing a subsequent attack within the United States." (SeeMemorandumforJohnA.Rizzo,SeniorDeputyGeneralCounsel,CentralIntelligenceAgency,from Steven G. Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, May 30, 2005, Re: Application of United States Obligations Under Article 16 of the Convention Against Torture to Certain Techniques that May Be Used in the Interrogation of High Value al Qaeda Detainees.) (2) CIA representations in the Department of Justice Office of Legal Counsel Memorandum dated July 20, 2007, which also relied on CIA representations on the type of intelligence acquired from the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. Citing CIA documents and the President's September6, 2006, speech describing the CIA's interrogation program (whichwasbasedonCIA-providedinformation),theOLCmemorandumstates: "TheCIAinterrogationprogram— and, in particular, its use of enhanced interrogation techniques—is intended to serve this paramount interest [security of the Nation] by producing substantial quantities of otherwise unavailable intelligence. ...As tlie President explained [on September 6, 2006], 'by giving us information about terrorist plans we could not get anywhere else, theprogramhassavedinnocentlives.'" (SeeMemorandumforJohnA.Rizzo,ActingGeneralCounsel,Central Intelligence Agency, from Steven G. Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, July 20, 2007, Re: Application of the War Crimes Act, the Detainee Treatment Act, and Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions to Certain Techniques that May Be Used by tlie CIA in the Intenogation of High Value al Qaeda Detainees.) (3) CIA briefings for members of the National Security Council in July and September 2003 represented that "the use of Enhanced Techniques of one kind or another had produced significant intelligence information that had, in the view of CIA professionals, saved lives," and warned policymakers that "[t]ermination of this program will result in loss of life, possibly extensive." (See August 5, 2003 Memorandum for the Record from Scott Muller, Subject: Review of Interrogation Program on 29 July 2003; Briefing slides, CIA Inteirogation Program, July 29, 2003; September 4, 2003, CIA Memorandum for the Record, Subject: Member Briefing; and September 26, 2003, Memorandum for the Record from Muller, Subject: CIA Interrogation Program.) (4) Tlie CIA's response to the Office of Inspector General draft Special Review of the CIA program, which asserts: "Information [the CIA] received... as a result of the lawful use of enhanced inteirogation techniques ('ElTs') has almost certainly saved countless American lives inside the United States and abroad. The evidence points clearly to the fact that without the use of such techniques, we and our allies would [have] suffered major terrorist attacks involving hundreds, if not thousands, of casualties." (See Memorandum for: Inspector General; from: James Pavitt, Deputy Director for Operations; subject: re (S) Comments to Draft IG Special Review, "Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Program" 2003-7123-IG; date: February 27, 2004; attachment: February 24, 2004, Memorandum re Successes of CIA's Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Activities.) (5) CIA briefing documents for CIA Director Leon Panetta in February 2009, which state that the "CIA assesses that the RDI program worked and the [enhanced interrogation] techniques were effective in producing foreign intelligence," and tliat "[m]ost, if not all, of the timely intelligence acquired from detainees in this program would not have been discovered or reported by other means." (See CIA briefing documents for Leon Panetta, entitled, "Tab 9: DCIA Briefing on RDI Program- 18FEB.2009" and graphic attachment, "Key Intelligence and Reporting Derived from Abu Zubaydah and Khalid Shaykh Muhammad (KSM)," including "DCIA Briefing on RDI Program" agenda, CIA document "EITs and Effectiveness," with associated documents, "Key Intelligence Impacts Chart: Attachment (AZ and KSM)," "Background on Key Intelligence Impacts Chart: Attachment," and "supporting references," to include "Background on Key Captures and Plots Disrupted.") (6) CIA document faxed to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence on March 18, 2009, entitled, "[SWIGERT] and [DUNBAR]," located in Committee databases at DTS #2009-1258, which provides a list of "some of the key captures and disrupted plots" that the CIA had attributed to the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, and stating: "CIA assesses that most, if not all, of the timely intelligence acquired from detainees in this program would not have been discovered or reported by any other means." See Volume II for additional CIA representations asserting that the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques enabled the CIA to obtain unique, otherwise unavailable intelligence that "saved lives."
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specific plots were accurate.The Committee found the CIA's representations to be inaccurate and unsupported by CIA records.
Below are the summaries of the CIA's eight most frequendy cited examples of "thwarted" plots and captured terrorists, as well as a description of the CIA's claims
and an explanation for why the CIA representations were inaccurate and unsupported by CIA records.
1. The Thwarting of the Dirty Bomb/Tall Buildings Plot and the Capture ofJose Padilla
Summary: The CIA represented that its enhanced inten'ogation techniques were effective and necessary to produce critical, otherwise unavailable intelligence,
which enabled the CIA to disaipt terrorist plots, capture terrorists, and save lives. Over a period of years, the CIA provided the thwarting of terrorist plotting associated with, and the capture of, Jose Padilla, as evidence for the effectiveness of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. These CIA representations were inaccurate. The CIA first received reporting on the terrorist threat posed by Jose Padilla from a foreign government. Eight days later, Abu Zubaydah provided information on the terrorist plotting of two individuals, whom he did not identify by ti-ue name, to FBI special agents. Abu Zubaydah provided this information in April 2002, prior to the commencement of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques in August 2002. The plots associated with Jose Padilla were assessed by the Intelligence Community to be infeasible.
'299 xlye d y \ has represented that it has provided the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence with all CIA records
related to tlie CIA'sDetention and Intenogalion Program. This document production phase lasted more than three years and was completed in July 2012. The records produced include more than six million pages of material, including records detailing the interrogation of detainees, as well as the disseminated intelligence derived from the interrogation of CIA detainees. The CIA did not provide—nor was it requested to provide—intelligence records that were unrelated to the CIA Detention and Interrogation Program. In other words, this Study was completed without direct access to reporting from CIA HUMINT assets, foreign liaison assets, electronic intercepts, military detainee debriefings, law enforcement derived information, and otlier methods of intelligence collection. Insomuch as this material is included in the analysis herein, it was provided by the CIA witliin the context of documents directly related to the CIA Detention and Interrogation Program. For example, a requirements cable from CIA Headquarters to CIA interrogators at a CIA detention site could cite SIGNALS intelligence collected by NSA, or include a CIA HUMINT source report on a particulai- subject, with a request to question tlie CIA detainee about the reporting. While direct access to the NSA report, or the CIA HUMINT report, may not have been provided, it may still be included in this Study because it appeared in the CIA Headquarters requirements cable relating to the questioning of a CIA detainee. As such, there is likely significant intelligence related to die terrorist plots, terrorists captured, and other intelligence matters examined in diis report, that is unrelated to the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program and within the databases of the U.S. Intelligence Community, but which has not been identified or reviewed by the Select Committee on Intelligence for this Study. As is detailed in the near 6800-page Committee Study, the Committee found that there was significant intelligence in CIA databases to enable the capture of the terrorists cited, and "disrupt" the terrorist plots represented as "tliwarted," without intelligence from the CIA intenogation program. Had tlie Committee been provided with access to all intelligence available in CIA and Intelligence Community databases, it is likely this finding would be strengthened further. Finally, as of March 2014, the White House had not yet provided approximately 9,400 documents related to the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program— equivalent to less than .2 percent of CIA detention and interrogation records—pending an Executive Privilege determination. Tlie Committee requested access to tliese documents in tluee letters dated January 3, 2013, May 22, 2013, and December 19, 2013. The White House did not respond to tlie requests.
See Volume II for additional informationandanalysi^^^^^^^^^^^^ III! 11 III I
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Further Details: The Dirty Bomb/Tall Buildings plotting refers to terrorist plotting involving U.S. citizen Jose Padilla. Padilla and his associate, Binyam
Mohammed, conceived the "Dirty Bomb Plot" after locating information, derived from what the CIA described as "a satirical internet article" entitled "How to Make an H-bomb," on a computer ataPakistanisafehouseinearly2002.^^®^ Thearticleinstructedwould-bebombmakersto enrich uranium by placing it "in a bucket, attaching it to a six foot rope, and swinging it around your head as fast as possible for 45 minutes.Padilla and Mohammed approached Abu Zubaydah in early 2002, and later KSM, with their idea to build and use this device in the United States.Neither Abu Zubaydah norKSM believed theplanwasviable,'^^'^ butKSMprovided funding for, and tasked Padilla to conduct, an operation using natural gas to create explosions in tall buildings in the United States,^^^^ later known as the "Tall Buildings Plot."'^®^
1301
10090 (210703Z APR 02) and CIA Document, Subject: "CIA Statement Summarizing Significant Infonnation About Jose Padilla (21:10 hrs.- 8 June 02}." For more information on the Internet article that recommended enriching uranium by "putting it into a bucket and twisting it around one's head to enrich it," see 2Jow to Make an H-Bomb" and [REDACTED] 2281 (071658Z MAY 04). See also email from: [REDACTED], I^^BoTA/CTWG/CBRN Group; to: [REDACTED] and multiple ccs, including subject: "Re: [REDACTED]: Re: KSM homework on AQ nuke program"; date: April 22, 2003, at 03:30 PM, explaining CIA's CBRNgroup'spositiononPadillaandMohammed'splotting. Accordingtotheemail:"Padillaand Binyam/Zouaoui had pulled an article off a satirical web site called 'How to make an H-bomb' which is based on a 1979 Journal of Irreproducible Results article. The article was intended to be humorous and included instructions such as enriching uranium by placing liquid uranium hexaflouride in a bucket, attaching it to a six foot rope, and swinging it around your head as fast as possible for 45 minutes. While it appears that Padilla and Zouaoui took the article seriously, Zubaydah recommended that they take their (cockamamie) ideas to (I believe) KSM in Karachi. It was at that point that KSM told them to focus on bringing down apartment buildings with explosives, (in other words: keep your day iobs)." U.K. courts noted "that
Email from: [REDACTED], CTC/OTA/CBRNB; subject: "Note to Briefers Updating Zubaydah 'Uranium Device' Information"; date: April 23,2002, at 08:25:40 PM. The email states, "CIA and Lawrence Livermore National Lab have assessed that the article is filled with countless technical inaccuracies which would likely result in the deatli of anyone attempting to follow the instructions, and would definitely not result in a nuclear explosive device." See also [REDACTED] 2281 (071658Z MA Y 04).
'303 10090 (210703Z APR 02)
'30^CIA^^^B(290925ZAPR02); 11086(261140ZAPR02). SeealsoPadillastatementnotingAbu Zubaydah "chuckled at the idea," but sent Padilla and Muhammad to Karachi to present the idea to KSM. See fax from Pat Rowan, Department of Justice NationalSecurity Division, to [REDACTED], at CTC Legal, on August 15, 2007, with subject line: "Jose Padilla."
DIRECTOR•• (041637Z). SeealsoCIA•• (290925ZAPR02);|||^Bi|10091(210959ZAPR 02); [REDACTED] 2281 (071658Z MAY 04); and DIRECTOR (J01725Z MAR 04).
For additional background on the Dirty Bomb/Tall Buildings Plotting, see fax from Pat Rowan, Department of Justice National Security Division, to [REDACTED], at CTC Legal, on August 15, 2007, with subject line: "Jose Padilla." Thedocumentstates: "JosePadillaisaUnitedStatescitizenwhohasbeendesignatedasanenemy combatantbythePresidentandhasbeendetainedbythemilitarysinceJune9,2002. Padillaiscommonlyknownas
\e 'dirty bomber' because early intelligence from a senior al Qaeda detainee [Abu Zubaydah] and Padilla's intended accomplice [Binyam Muhammad] indicated that he had proposed to senior al Qaeda leaders the use of a radiological dispersion device, or 'dirty bomb,' against United States targets, or interests, and he was detained by the
military partly on that basis. Based on later and more complete intelligence, including Padilla's own statements
/ duringmilitarydetention,itnowappearsthatPadillare-enteredtheUnitedStatesafterheacceptedamissionfromal
Qaeda leaders, specifically from Klialid Sheikh Mohammad ('KSM'), the emir of the attacks of September 11, to destroy one or more high-rise apartment buildings in the United States tlirough the use of natural gas explosions triggered by timing devices, and had received training, equipment and money for that mission." See also other records that describe the plotting as targeting tall apartment buildings, without reference to a radiological or "dirty" bomb. Forexample,aJuly15,2004,CIAintelligenc^eporUitle^ Muhammad: Preeminent
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The capture of, and the thwarting of terrorist plotting associated with Jose Padilla, is one of the eight most frequently cited examples provided by the CIA as
evidence for the effectiveness of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. Over a period of years, CIA documents prepared for and provided to senior policymakers, intelligence officials, and the Department of Justice represent the identification and/or the capture of Jose Padilla, and/or the disruption of the "Dirty Bomb," and/or the "Tall Buildings" plotting, as examples of how "[k]ey intelligence collected from HVD inteiTogations after applying interrogation techniques" had "enabled CIA to disrupt terrorist plots" and "capaire additional terrorists."
The CIA further represented that the intelligence acquired from the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques was "otherwise unavailable" and "saved lives,
Source on Al-Qa'ida," noted: "From late 2001 until early 2003, KSM also conceived several low-level plots, including an early 2002 plan to send al-Qa'ida operative and US citizen Jose Padilla to set off bombs in high-rise apartmentbuildingsinanunspecifiedmajorUScity." Similarly,anIntelligenceCommunityreporttitled,"Klialid Shaykli Muhammad's Threat Reporting—Precious Truths, SuiTounded by a Bodyguard of Lies," noted: "Binyam Muhammad stated during his debriefmgs that his and Padilla's objective was to topple a high-rise building with a gas explosion in Chicago." (See Community CounterteiTorism Board, IntelligenceCommunity Terrorist Tlireat Assessment, "Khalid Shaykh Muhammad's Threat Reporting—Precious Truths, Surrounded by a Bodyguard of Lies," Report Number IICT-2003-14, April 3, 2003.) The unclassified ODNI "Summary of the High Value TeiTorist Detainee Program," released September 6, 2006, states that, "[wjorking with information from detainees, the US dismpted a plot to blow up tall buildings in the United States. KSM later described how he had directed operatives to ensure the buildings were high enough to prevent the people trapped above from escaping out of the windows, thus ensuring their deaths from smoke inhalation."
Italics included in CIA Memorandum to the Office of Legal Counsel, entitled, "Effectiveness of the CIA
Counterterrorist Interrogation Tecliniques," from March 2, 2005. See also CIA talking points for National Security
Council entitled, "Talking Points for 10 March 2005 DCI Meeting PC: Effectiveness of tlie High-Value Detainee
Interrogation (HVDI) Techniques," dated March 4, 2005, as well as multiple otlier CIA briefing records and
memoranda described in V olume II.
1308 Prom 2003 through 2009, the CIA's representations regarding the effectiveness of the CIA's enhanced
intenogation techniques provided a specific set of examples of terrorist plots "disrupted" and terrorists captured that the CIA attributed to information obtained from the use of its enhanced interrogation techniques. CIA representations further asserted that the intelligence obtained from the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniqueswasunique,otherwiseunavailable,andresultedin"savedlives." AmongotherCIArepresentations,see: (1) CIA representations in the Department of Justice Office of Legal Counsel Memorandum, dated May 30, 2005, which relied on a series of liighly specific CIA representations on the type of intelligence acquired from the use of the CIA's enhanced intenogation techniques to assess their legality. The CIA representations referenced by tlie OLC include that the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques was "necessary" to obtain "critical," "vital," and "othei*wiseunavailable actionable intelligence" that was "essential" for the U.S. government to "detect and disrupt" tenorist threats. The OLC memorandum furtlier states that "[the CIA] ha[s] informed [the OLC] that the CIA believes that this program is largely responsible for preventing a subsequent attack within tlie United States." {SeeMemorandum for John A. Rizzo, Senior Deputy General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, from Steven G. Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, May 30, 2005, Re: Application of United States Obligations Under Article 16 of the Convention Against Torture to Certain Techniques that May Be Used in the Interrogation of High Value al Qaeda Detainees.) (2) CIA representations in the Department of Justice Office of Legal Counsel Memorandum dated July 20, 2007, which also relied on CIA representations on the type of intelhgence acquired from the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. Citing CIA documents and the President's September 6, 2006, speech describing the CIA's interrogation program (which was based on CIA-provided information), the OLC memorandum states: "The CIA interrogation program— and, in particular, its use of enhanced intenogation techniques—is intended to serve this paramount interest [security of the Nation] by producing substantial quantities of otherwise unavailable intelligence. ...As the President explained [on September 6, 2006], 'by giving us information about tenorist plans we could not get anywhere else, theprogramhassavedinnocentlives.'" (SeeMemorandumforJohnA.Rizzo,ActingGeneralCounsel,Central
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Por example, a document prepared for Vice President Cheney in advance of a March 8, 2005, National Security Council principals meeting states, under a section
entitled "INTERROGATION RESULTS," that:
"Use of DOJ-authorized enhanced interrogation techniques, as part of a comprehensive interrogation approach, has enabled us to disrupt terrorist plots...
.. .Dirty Bomb Plot: Operatives Jose Padilla and Binyam Mohammed planned to build and detonate a 'dirty bomb' in the Washington DC area. Plot disrupted. Source: AbuZubaydah."^^^^
Intelligence Agency, from Steven G. Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, July 20, 2007, Re: Application of the War Crimes Act, the Detainee Treatment Act, and Common Article 3 of the GenevaConventions to Certain Techniques that May Be Usedby the CIA in the Interrogation of High Value al Qaeda Detainees.) (3) CIA briefings for members of the National Security Council in July and September 2003 represented that "the use of Enhanced Techniques of one kind or another had produced significant intelligence information that had, in the view of CIA professionals, saved lives," and warned policymakers that "[t]ermination of this program will result in loss of life, possibly extensive." {See August 5, 2003 Memorandum for the Record from Scott Muller, Subject: Review of Interrogation Program on 29 July 2003; Briefing slides, CIA Interrogation Program, July 29, 2003; September4, 2003, CIA Memorandum for the Record, Subject: Member Briefing; and September26,2003,MemorandumfortheRecordfromMuller,Subject:CIAInterrogationProgram.) (4)The CIA's response to the Office of InspectorGeneral draft Special Review of the CIA program, which asserts: "Information [tlieCIA]received...asaresultofthelawfuluseofenhancedinterrogation techniques ('EITs') has almostcertainlysavedcountlessAmericanlivesinsidetheUnitedStatesandabroad. Theevidencepointscleariyto the fact that without the use of such techniques, we and our allies would [have] suffered major terrorist attacks involving hundreds, if not thousands, of casualties." {See Memorandum for: Inspector General; from: James Pavitt, Deputy Director for Operations; subject: re (S) Comments to Draft IG Special Review, "Countertenorism Detention and Intenogation Program" 2003-7123-IG; date: February 27, 2004; attachment: February 24, 2004, Memorandum re Successes of CIA's Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Activities.) (5) CIA briefing documents for CIA Director Leon Panetta in Febmary 2009, which state that the "CIA assesses that the RDI program worked and the [enhanced intenogation] techniques were effective in producing foreign intelligence," and that "[m]ost, if not all, of the timely intelligence acquired from detainees in this program would not have been discovered or reported by other means." {See CIA briefing documents for Leon Panetta, entitled, "Tab 9: DCIA Briefing on RDI Program- 18FEB.2009" and graphic attachment, "Key Intelligence and Reporting Derived from Abu Zubaydah and Khalid Shaykh Muhammad (KSM)," including"DCIA Briefingon RDI Program" agenda, CIA document "EITs and Effectiveness," with associated documents, "Key Intelligence Impacts Chart: Attachment (AZ and KSM)," "Background on Key Intelligence Impacts Chart: Attachment," and "supporting references," to include "Background onKeyCapturesandPlotsDisrupted.") (6)CIAdocumentfaxedtotheSenateSelectCommitteeonIntelligenceon March 18, 2009, entitled, "[SWIGERT] and [DUNBAR]," located in Committee databases at DTS #2009-1258, which provides a list of "some of the key captures and disrupted plots" that the CIA had attributed to the use of the CIA'senhancedinterrogationtechniques,andstating: "CIAassessesthatmost,ifnotall,ofthetimelyintelligence acquired from detainees in this program would not have been discovered or reported by any other means." See VolumeII for additional CIA representations asserting that the CIA's enhancedinterrogation techniques enabledthe CIA to obtain unique, otherwise unavailable intelligence that "saved lives."
CIA document dated March 4, 2005, entitled, "Briefing for Vice President Cheney: CIA Detention and Interrogation Program." Tlie briefing document further represented that: (1) "Prior to the use of enhanced measures against skilled resistors [sic] like KSM and Abu Zubaydah- the two most prolific intelligence producers in our control- we acquired little threat information or significant actionable intelligence"; and (2) "[CIA] would not have succeeded in overcoming the resistance of KSM, Abu Zubaydah, and other equally resistant HVDs without the
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Likewise, the July 20, 2007, Department of Justice Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) memorandum on the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques used CIA-
provided information on Jose Padilla to describe the threat posed by al-Qa'ida and the success of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques to date. The July 20, 2007, OLC memorandum states:
"The CIA interrogation program—and, in particular, its use of enhanced interrogation techniques—is intended to serve this paramount interest [security of the Nation] by producing substantial quantities ofotherwise unavailable intelligence. The CIA believes that this program 'has been a key reason why al-Qa'ida has failed to launch a spectacular attack in the West since 11 September 2001'... We understand that use of enhanced techniques has produced significant intelligence that the Government has used to keep the Nation safe. As the President explained [in his September 6, 2006 speech], 'by giving us information about terrorist plans we could not get anywhere else, the program has saved innocent lives'.. .For example, we understand that enhanced interrogation techniques proved particularly crucial in the interrogations of Khalid Shaykh Muhammad and Abu Zubaydah... Interrogations of Zubaydah—again, once enhanced techniques were employed—revealed two al-Qaeda operatives already in the United States^^^'^ and planning to destroy a high rise apartment building and to detonate a radiological bomb in
W ashington,
On April 21, 2009, a CIA spokesperson confirmed the accuracy of the information in the OLC memorandum in response to the partial declassification of this and other memoranda.
The CIA provided similar inaccurate representations regarding the thwarting of the Dirty Bomb plotting, the thwarting of the Tall Buildings plotting, and/or the
capture of Jose Padilla in 17 of the 20 documents provided to policymakers and the Department of Justice between July 2003 and March 2009.^^^^
Italics added. CIA records indicate that Abu Zubaydah never provided information on "two operatives already in the United States." While neither Binyam Muhammad nor Jose Padilla was "already in the United States," the OLC description appears to be a reference to Jose Padilla and Binyam Mohammad, as the OLC then makes reference to the "Dirty Bomb" and "Tall Buildings" plotting.
Italics added. See Memorandum for John A. Rizzo, Acting General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, from Steven G. Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, July 20, 2007, Re: Application of the War Crimes Act, the Detainee Treatment Act, and Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions to Certain Techniques that May Be Used by the CIA in the InteiTogation of High Value al Qaeda Detainees.
See "Waterboarding Saved L.A.," Washington Times, April 25, 2009. The CIA's June 2013 Response asserts that it "took [the CIA] until 2007 to consistently stop referring to [Padilla's] 'Dirty Bomb' plot—a plan [the CIA] concludedearlyonwasneveroperationallyviable." Asnoted,theCIAcontinuedtorefertothe"DirtyBomb" plotting through 2007 and confimied tlie information publicly in 2009.
See list of CIA prepared briefings and memoranda from 2003 tlirough 2009 with representations on the effectiveness of the CIA's enhanced inteiTogation techniques referenced in this summary and described in detail in Volume II.
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^ review of CIA operational cables and other CIA records found that the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques played no role in the identification of
"Jose Padilla" or the thwarting of the Dirty Bomb or Tall Buildings plotting. CIA records indicate that: (1) there was significant intelligence in CIA databases acquired prior to—and independently of—the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program to fully identify Jose Padilla as a terrorist threat and to disrupt any terrorist plotting associated with him;^^^"^ (2) Abu Zubaydah provided information on the terrorist plotting of two individuals who proposed an idea to conduct a "Dirty Bomb" attack, but did not identify their true names; (3) Abu Zubaydah provided this information to FBI special agents who were using rapport-building techniques,
in April 2002, more than three months prior to the CIA's "use of DOJ-approved enhanced
See. for example, CIA documententitled, "CIA StatementSummarizing Sign^ant Information About Jose Padilla {21:10 hrs.- 8 June 02}"; 10972 (12031Z APR 02); ALEC
• I H (231837Z APR 02); and 10976 (120948Z APR 02); among other records.
Federal Bureau of Investigation documents pertaining "to the interrogation of detainee Zayn A1 Abideen Abu
Zabaidah" and provide^^h^en^e Select Committee on Intelligence by cover letter dated July 20, 2010 (DTS# 2010-2939). See also 10092 (211031Z APR 02). While Abu Zubaydah was subjected to sleep deprivation and nudity prior to this date by the CIA, he had been allowed to sleep shortly prior to being questioned on this matter by the FBI special agents, who were exclusively using rapport-building interrogation techniques when the information was acquired from Abu Zubaydah (who was covered with a towel). The sleep deprivation and nudity as implementedduring this period differedfrom how sleep deprivation and nudity were implemented after the CIA developed, and the Department of Justice approved, the CIA's "enhanced interrogation techniques" in August2002. Ratherthanbeingplacedinastress position duringsleepdeprivation, AbuZubaydahwaskeptawake bybeingquestionednearlynon-stopbyCIAandFBIinterrogators. Recordsfurtherindicatethatduringbreaksin the interrogations, Abu Zubaydah was allowed to briefly sleep. See also I ^ H H I 10116 (25073IZ APR 02), which describes this sleep deprivation as a period of "no sustained sleep" with "cat naps between interrogators." The cable further states: "Like many medical students, the subject appears to handle 76 plus hours of limitedsleep withfewproblems"(italicsadded). Theuseofnudityduringthisperiodalsodifferedfromfutureusesofnudity,as Abu Zubaydah was covered when interrogated by tlie FBI. See also SSCI Staff interview of FBI Special Agent Ali Soufan,April28,2008,at1:20PM,HartSenateOfficeBuilding(transcriptatDTS#2008-2411). AliSoufan describedeventspriortoAbuZubaydah'sprovisionofinformationrelatedtothe"DirtyBomb,"stating: "Hewas injured, badly injured. He was dehydrated. I remember we were putting ice on his lips. And he didn't have any bowelcontrol,sowewerecleaninghim. AndthereasonI'mtellingyousomeofthesedisgustingthingsisbecause it helped build rapport with the guy in this short period of time." Later, Ali Soufan described the provision of informationrelatedtotheDirtyBombplotting,statingjJ'WhenIwasgoingin,hewastotallynaked. Irefusedtogo andinterviewhimnaked. SoItookatowel. AndH Iand[REDACTED],everytimewewentinhehadto be covered or I [wouldn't] go. It's as simple as that." See also section of transcript stating, "So we went back. And westarttalkingtohim. WetooksomeCoke,tea,andwestarttalkingaboutdifferentthings. Weflippedhimabout differentthings, andIand[REDACTED]. Andthenhecamebacktohissensesandhestartedcooperating again. AndthisiswhenhegaveusPadilla." (AbuZubaydahprovidedinformationconcerningtheDirtyBomb plotting and Jose Padilla's kimya, but did not provide the name "Jose Padilla." As described in this summary, Jose Padilla's name had already been provided to the CIA by a foreign government that identified Padilla as a U.S. citizen suspected of being engaged in possible terrorist activity.) See also Abu Zubaydah detainee review in Volume III.
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interrogation techniques";^and (4) the Intelligence Community internally assessed that the "Dirty Bomb"^^^^ and "Tall Buildings"'^^^ plots were infeasible as envisioned.
Ti;ie Department of Justice finalized its approval of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, including
walling, facial slaps, wall standing, stress positions, sleep deprivation, and the waterboard, as well as other techniques,onAugust1,2002. SeeVolumeIandVolumeHIforadditionaldetails. BeginningonAugust4,2002, and extending through August 20, 2002, Abu Zubaydah was subjectedto the non-stop concurrent use of the CIA's enhanced intenogation techniques, including at least 83 applications of the waterboard. CIA records indicate that tlie use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques ceased on August 30, 2002, when Abu Zubaydah received clothing.
See intelligence chronology in Volume II, to include: (1) email from: [REDACTED]^^^^ ^BBOTA/CTWG/CBRN Group; to: [REDACTED] and multiple ccs, including subject: "Re: [REDACTED]: Re: KSM homework on AQ nuke program"; date: April 22, 2003, at 03:30 PM, explaining CIA's CBRNgroup'spositiononPadillaandMohammed'splotting; "PadillaandBinyam/Zouaouihadpulledanarticle off a satirical web site called 'How to make an H-bomb' which is based on a 1979 Journal of Irreproducible Results article. Tlie article was intended to be humorous..."; (2) email from: [REDACTED], CTC/OTA/CBRNB; subject: "Note to Briefers Updating Zubaydah 'Uranium Device' Information"; date: April 23, 2003, at 08:25:40 PM; and (3) U.K. court records relaying that "[Binyam Mohammed] at the outset said tliere was no Dirty Bomb plot (a position he has consistently maintained to his defense lawyers)" (UK Judgment, at 39). According to U.K. legal records, "[Binyam Mohammed] said ... that he had seen a file on a computer in Lahore and decided it was a joke - part of the instruction included adding bleach to uranium 238 in a bucket and rotating it around one's head for 45 minutes." (UK Judgment, at 11). On June 10, 2002, then-Attorney General John Ashcroft announced, "We have captured a known terrorist who was exploring a plan to build and explode a radiological dispersion device, or 'dirty bomb,' in the United States." The statement continued: "In apprehending A1 Muhajii* as he sought entry into the United States, we have disrupted an unfolding terrorist plot to attack the United States by exploding a radioactive
'dirty bomb.' Now, a radioactive 'dirty bomb' involves exploding a conventional bomb that not only kills victims in tlie immediate vicinity, but also spreads radioactive material that is highly toxic to humans and can cause mass death and injury. From information available to the United States government, we know tliat Abdullah A1 Muhajir is an A1 Qaeda operative and was exploring a plan to build and explode a radioactive dirty bomb. Let me be clear: We know from multiple independent and coiToborating sources that Abdullah A1 Muhajir was closely associated with A1 Qaeda and that as an A1 Qaeda operative he was involved in planning future terrorist attacks on innocent American civilians in the United States. .. .1 commend the FBI, the CIA and other agencies involved in capturing Abdullah A1 Muhajir before he could act on his deadly plan." See Transcript of the Attomey General John Ashcroft Regarding the Transfer of Abdullah A1 Muhajir (Bom Jose Padilla) to the Department of Defense as an Enemy Combatant, on June 10, 2002.
See Intelligence Community review of the Tall Buildings plotting included in CIA records with references to terrorist attacks in Russia in September 1999 against apartment buildings using traditionsd explosives and VBIEDs. See also U.S. Department of Justice Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives report entitled, "Use of Natural Gas as a Terrorist Weapon in Apartment Buildings," dated August 4, 2008.
The CIA's June 2013 Response acknowledges that the CIA "concluded early on" that the "dirty bomb" plot was "never operationally viable." The CIA's June 2013 Response states that "it took [the CIA] until 2007" to stop citing the "dirty bomb" plot in its representations about the effectiveness of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. Tliis is incoirect. The CIA refened to tliedisruption of this plotting in a representation to die Department ofJustice in July 2007, in representations to Congress in late October 2007, and confirmed this information to tlie press in April 2009. See CIA fax from CIA employee [REDACTED] to U.S. Senate Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Defense, with fax cover sheet entitled, "Talking points," sent on October 26, 2007, at 5:39:48 PM. Document faxed entitled, "Talking Points Appeal of the Million reduction in CIA/CTC's Rendition and Detention Program." See also the July 20, 2007, Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) memorandum, which states that "interrogations of Zubaydah—again, once enhanced techniques were employed—revealed two al-Qaeda operatives already in the United States and planning to destroy a high rise apartment building and to detonate a radiological bombinWashington,D.C."(italicsadded). AsdescribedelsewhereinthissummaryandinthefullCommittee Study, on April 21, 2009, in response to the partial declassification of OLC memoranda that month, a CIA spokespersonconfirmedtheCIAstoodbythe"factualassertions"indieOLCmemoranda. See"Waterboaiding Saved L.A.," Washington Times, April 25, 2009. The CIA's June 2013 Response further states "[d]espite the imprecision of our language, we continue toasses^^va^^oo^xampl^^he importance of intelligence derived
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Prior to the capture of Abu Zubaydah on March 28, 2002, the CIA was alerted to the threat posed by Jose Padilla. In early 2001, U.S. government records indicated that a Jose Padilla came to the U.S. Consulate in Karachi to report a lost passport. These records
indicated that Jose Padilla provided a "sketchy" story about overstaying his Pakistani visa and thathewas"allegedlystudyingIslamiclawinEgypt." AsearchoftheStateDepartment's Consular Lookout and Support System was conducted at the time, which resulted in "multiple" hits for "Jose Padilla."^^^® State Department records confirmed that Jose Padilla had sought a new passport at the U.S. Consulate in Karachi in February 2001, and was subsequently provided with a replacement on March 21, 2001.^-^^^
On December 15, 2001, the CIA provided the FBI with documents obtained in Afghanistan from a purported al-Qa'ida-related safe house. Included in the binder were 180 terrorist training camp application forms entitled, "Mujahideen Identification Form /
New Applicant Form." An application form for a then 33-year-old individual with the alias "Abu Abdullah al-Muhajir" from "America" was among the forms. "Al-Muhajir's" form—dated July 24, 2000—listed other identifying information, to include a "10/18/70" date of birth; language skills to include English, Spanish, and Arabic; travels to Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and
Y emen; and the individual's marital status.
fromthedetaineeprogram." AsdescribedinthissummaryandthroughoutthefullCommitteeStudy,initseffortsto obtain legal authorization and policy approval for the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, the CIA represented that the intelligence referenced was obtained "as a result" of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques (not the "detainee program"), and that the information obtained was unique and otherwise unavailable.
The Consular Lookout and Support System (CLASS) is used by State Department passport agencies, post, and border inspection agencies to perfonn name checks on visa and passport applicants to identify individuals who are, ineligible for issuance or require other special action. Source: www.state.gov
A February 16, 2001, email entitled, "Lost passport case- Jose Padilla," states that a "Jose Padilla," with a date of birth of October 18, 1970, came to the U.S. Consulate in Karachi to report a lost passport. The email notes that "his story is really-sketchy-been traveling here long enough to overstay his Pakistani visa, but speaks no Urdu, and is allegedly studying Islamic law in Egypt." A March 5, 2001, email in CIA records, entitled, "The continuing Jose Padilla saga!" states tliat there are "multiple CLASS hits" (Consular Lookout and Support System) for a Jose Padilla. The author writes "[REDACTED] and 1 both agree there is something sketchy about the guy." On March 21, 2001, State Department records indicate that Jose Padilla was provided with a replacement passport. See documents included in materials provided by the CIA to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, including email from: [REDACTED]; to: [REDACTED]: cc: [REDACTED]; subject: "Lost passport case- Jose Padilla"; date: February 16, 2001, at 4:46 AM, included in materials provided by the CIA to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence; second email from: [REDACTED]; to: [REDACTED]; cc: [REDACTED]; subject: "The continuing Jose Padilla saga!"; date: March 5, 2001, at 10:09 AM; U.S. State Department travel records identified by the Departmentof Justice; letter from Paul Wolfowitz, U.S. Departmentof Defense, to James Comey, U.S. Department of Justice, dated May 28, 2004.
Italics added. Jose Padilla's fingerprints would later be found on tlie forms. See Jose Padilla U.S. court documents, which include the pledge form and a translation of the pledge form. See also FBI Washington 101514Z
10AP^07V|Summar^hronolog^f Intelligence on Jose Padilla," and email from: [REDACTED]; to:
subject: "Pakistan Raid Evidence- Meeting with FBI SA in Pakistan at the
time"; date: July 17, 2007, at 01:07 PM, which notes the raids recovered a copy of "Padilla's Muj pledge form." See also numerous open source articles, to include, "CIA Officer Testifies He Was Given Qaeda 'Pledge Form' Said to be Padilla's," New York Times, dated May 16, 2007; "Key Padilla evidence got to CIA in Afghan pickup," Associated Press, March 28, 2007; and "Terror Suspect's Path from Streets to Brig," New York Times, dated April 24, 2004. The CIA's June 2013 Response states that the CIA could not locate information on this forni in CIA databases. According to testimony of a CIA officer at Jose Padilla's federal trial, the binder and other material were
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On April 10, 2002, the CIA disseminated a cable with intelligence derived from the exploitation of documents obtained during the raids in which Abu Zubaydah was captured. Included in the CIA cable is a translation of a letter from mid-March 2002 that
references a 33-yeai'-old English-speaking individual. The cable states that the CIA believed this individual might be involved in "a martyrdom operation." The translation disseminated states: "There is a brother from Argentina, he speaks Spanish, English and Arabic, he is 33 years old, he is maiTied and has two little children. He is a great brother. He knows business and studies English language. He trains [in] self defense, he is a good looking man."^^^-^
April 11, 2002, the CIA was provided with information from Pakistani officials on a 33-year-old U.S. citizen named "Jose Padilla," with a
date of birth of October 18, 1970, who was briefly detained by Pakistani officials on April 4, 2002. The Pakistani government provided a copy of Jose PadiUa's U.S. passport and relayed that Jose Padilla had overstayed his travel visa, and that there were inconsistencies with Jose
Padilla's appearance and accent. The CIA's wrote that they would provide the information on "Jose Padilla" to the State Department's Regional Security Officer, and "would follow-up with [Pakistani officials] on this matter." The date of birth and travel information included with Jose PadiUa's passport matched information on the "Mujahideen Identification Form" (33-year-old "American" referenced as "Abu Abdullah al-Muhajir") the CIA had provided to the FBI on December 15, 2001.^^^^
^002, Pakistani officials provided additional information to the CIA's specifically that they had detained a U.S. passport holder
named Jose Padilla and a British passport holder named "Fouad Zouaoui" (later identified as Binyam Muhammad), who had suspiciously attempted to depart Pakistan. According to the CIA cable, Pakistani authorities provided the information on the pair "due to concerns about possible terrorist a c t i v i t y . " ^ T h e cable noted that Pakistani authorities had to release Padilla, but tliat PadiUa's associate remained in detention.(When questioned further, the Pakistani authorities
provided by a CIA source to CIA officers in Kandaliar, Afghanistan. The CIA officer testified at Jose PadiUa's trial that, after he sorted tluough the material, the blue binder was placed in a sealed box and provided to tlie FBI in Islamabad, Pakistan. See referenced open source reporting.
'32' ALECJHM (102327Z APR 02)
'32'*m^|^972(12031ZAPR02). Asnoted,theStateDepartmentalreadypossessedinformationofconcern
related to Jose Padilla.
'325 See Jose Padilla U.S. court documents, which include the pledge form and a translation of the pledge form. See
also FBI Washington 101514ZQ0AP^^7V|SumiTiM^hr^^ ofIntelligence on Jose Padilla," and email from: [REDACTED]; to: subject: "Pakistan Raid Evidence- Meeting with FBI SA in Pakistan at the time"; date: July 17, 2007, at 01:07 PM, which notes the raids recovered a copy of "PadiUa's Muj pledge form"; and numerous open source articles, to include, "CIA Officer Testifies He Was Given Qaeda 'Pledge Form' Said to be PadiUa's," New York Times, dated May 16, 2007.
10976 (120948Z APR 02). The official cable s t ^ s that the Pakistani official and his office "has not received the full details, and he is passing this onto [the CIA] HII due to concerns about possible terrorist activity." The CIA's June 2013 Response states that the reporting from the Pakistani government that a Pakistan-based U.S. citizen named Jose Padilla was engaged in possiMe terrorist activity was "unremarkable at the time," and that the
CIA viewed the report as a "routine 'illegal traveler'" report.
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stated that they suspected Jose Padilla of being "an al-Qa'ida m e m b e r . " ) T h e information identifyin^os^Milla and "Fouad Zouaoui" as potential terrorists had been provided by the CIA's to CIA Headquarters, several CIA Stations, and the State Department's Regional Security Officer (RSO) in Karachi by April 12, 2002.'^^^ Using the identifyini in^mation in Jose Padilla's passport, provided by the Pakistani government, the CIA'
requested that CIA Headquarters and the CIA's Station conduct "
database search) using ^^e other identifying information provided.The CIA's thatCIAHeadquarters andtheCIA's
Station do the same for Padilla's associate, Fouad Zouaoui. As a result, by April 12, 2002, the CIA was already alerted that a named U.S. citizen, "Jose Padilla," had spent significant time in Pakistan and was engaged in "possible terrorist activity."^^^^
Eight days after the CIA was informed that U.S. citizen Jose Padilla was engaged in "possible terrorist activity," on the evening of April 20, 2002, Abu
Zubaydah told FBI special agents about two men who approached him with a plan to detonate a uranium-basedexplosivedeviceintheUnitedStates(the"dirtybomb"). AbuZubaydahstated he did not believe the plan was viable and did not know the true names of the two individuals, butdidprovidephysicaldescripdonsofthepair.^^^^ ThisinformationwasacquiredafterAbu Zubaydah was confronted with emails that indicated Abu Zubaydah had sent two individuals to KSM. The FBI special agents who acquired this information from Abu Zubaydah believed it was provided as a result of rapport-building interrogation t e c h n i q u e s . A b u Zubaydah would
See DIRECTOR (162003Z FEB 03), which details a follow-up exchange between personnel andPakistani officials.
10972 (12031Z APR 02); B H I 1 0 9 7 6 (120948Z APR 02)
There were no records identified to indicate that the CIA informed tlie FBI at this time that U.S. citizen "Jose
Padilla" was engaged in "possible terrorist activity." As described in Volume 11, once alerted, the FBI identified links between Jose Padilla and FBI counterterrorism subjects, including an individual who reportedly paid for Jose Padilla's travel to Pakistan to attend a terrorist training camp.
10972 (12031Z APR 02); • • • 10976 (120948Z APR 02)
10976 (120948Z APR 02). See additional reporting in the Volume II intelligence chronolo^ Abu Zubaydah provided the names of the individuals as Taiha al-Kini and Abdallah al-Muhajir (|
10090 (210703Z APR 02^^ 1334
10063 (180515Z APR 02); 10096 (221545Z
APR 02)
See FBI communications to FBI Headquarters in April 2002, as well as May 13, 2009, Senate Judiciary
Committee testimony of FBI Special Agent Ali Soufan on the interrogation of Abu Zubaydah. In the CIA's June 2013 Response, die CIA states the CIA's representation that Abu Zubaydah provided the information after the "use of DOJ-approved enhanced interrogation techniques" was accurate because, "Abu Zubaydah revealed this information after having been subjected to sleep deprivation, which would be categorized as an enhanced interrogationtechniqueoncetheprogramwasofficiallyunderway." AsdescribedindetailintheAbuZubaydah detainee review in Volume III, when Abu Zubaydah was discharged from a hospital in Country | , the CIA sought to deprive Abu Zubaydah of sleep and to cease Abu Zubaydah's interaction with the FBI special agents who had been interviewing Abu Zubaydah and acquiring information from him at the hospital. Days later, after this new CIA approach was implemented, the CIA reversed this decision and the FBI was allowed to question Abu Zubaydah again. Further,theuseofsleepdeprivationduringthisperioddifferedfromfutureusesofsleepdeprivationandhad ceased by the time of the referenced FBI interview, as the CIA had determined diat Abu Zubaydah's ability to focus on questions and provide coherent answers appeared compromised. (See 10071 (190827Z APR 02) and
10116(250731ZAPR02).) AliSoufantestifiedthatAbuZubaydaliprovidedinformationaboutthe "Dirty Bomb" plot only after he (Soufan) re-initiated a more traditional interrogation approach with Abu Zubaydah, stating,"WethenreturnedtousingtheInformedInterrogationApproach. Withinafewhours,AbuZubaydahagain
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not be subjected to the "use of DOJ-approved enhanced interrogation techniques" until August 2002, more than three months later.^'^^^
two hours of the dissemination of this information, CIA
officei^^llllj^^^BHIIII^I cables to CIA Headquarters and select CIA Stations calling attention to the similarities between Abu Zubaydah's reporting and their request from
April 12, 2002, for information on Jose Padilla and Fouad Zouaoui, which had not yet been acted upon by the receiving o f f i c e s . A travel alert was then initiated for Jose Padilla based on the previous information provided by the Pakistani government. Padilla was located and unknowingly escorted back to the United States by an FBI special agent on May 8, 2002.^^^^ Upon his arrival in the United States Padilla was found to be carrying $10,526 in U.S. currency, anamounthefailedtoreport.^^^^ Pad