Ruby code to benchmark Google Gemini Prompt Caching to understand runtime performance of caching.

cache.rb

# Copyright (c) 2024 Joe Heitzeberg
# Released under MIT License

module RedisUtil
  module Cache
    def self.redis
      redis_host = ENV['REDIS_HOST']
      redis_port = ENV['REDIS_PORT']
      redis_db_num = 0
      $redis ||= Redis.new(host: redis_host, port: redis_port, db: redis_db_num)
    end

    def self.get(key)
      redis.get(cache_key_for(key))
    end

    # fast way to check if the content is there without retrieving it (faster than doing .get.present? to check)
    def self.exists?(key)
      redis.exists(cache_key_for(key)) == 1
    end

    # get the date associated with the entity or nil if not found
    def self.date_cached(key)
      # result look like this: "{\"result\":\"MBA at MIT and B.S. in Computer Science at UW and Technical Japanese at UW\",\"created_at\":\"2024-08-11T18:35:37.445Z\",\"updated_at\":\"2024-08-11T18:35:37.445Z\"}"
      # get the created_at date quickly:
      result = redis.get(cache_key_for(key))
      return nil if result.blank?
      JSON.parse(result)["created_at"]
    end

    # RedisUtil::Cache.set("key-abc", "value-def", expires_in: 1.hour)
    # RedisUtil::Cache.get("key-abc")
    # NOTE: only store text please.
    def self.set(key, value, expires_in: 1.hour)
      redis.set(cache_key_for(key), value, ex: expires_in)
    end

    def self.delete(key)
      redis.del(cache_key_for(key))
    end

    def self.with_lock(key, expires_in: 30.seconds)
      lock_key = "lock:#{key}"
      if !exists?(lock_key) && set(lock_key, Time.now.to_i, expires_in: expires_in)
        begin
          yield
        ensure
          delete(lock_key)
        end
      else
        Rails.logger.info "Failed to acquire lock for: #{key}"
      end
    end

    def self.cache_key_for(key)
      cache_key = "cache:#{key}"
      if Rails.env.development?
        cache_key = "cache_dev:#{key}"
      end
      cache_key
    end

    def self.keys
      redis.keys
    end

  end
end

gemini_testing.rb

# Copyright (c) 2024 Joe Heitzeberg
# Released under MIT License
# 
# Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining a copy of this file.
#
# DEMO:
#   1) run once manually:
#   - explain the code (assemble long prompt, assemble short prompt, call llm)
#   - AiTinkerer::GeminiTesting.best_matches_for(description: "data scientist interested in starting a company to create tools for musicians")
# 
#   2) kick off benchmark run:
#    - explain the code
#       - runs the prompt "runs" times each, with and without caching, and stores timing and cost data in array of hashes
#       - passes those arrays to a prompt to explain the results in friendly way to humans
#   AiTinkerer::GeminiTesting.benchmark(description: "data scientist interested in starting a company to create tools for musicians", runs: 3)
#
#
#  README:
#    - The test file member_data_test.txt is designed to mimic a very long context RAG retrieval.
#    - The data in that file is hallicinated -- Any resemblance to actual people is unintentional and coincidental.
#    - To make sure that the total tokens were large, I appended some Wikipedia articles at the bottom.
#    - Note: at the end of a test run, all of the data is sent to an LLM to analyze and format nicely for humans. 
#    - You'll need Gems awesome_print and colorize to run this code.
#    - Redis is used for local caching. You could refactor this to use a memcache, memory or a file cache.
#
module AiTinkerer
  class GeminiTesting
    RECENCY = 4.weeks.ago

    # read a member_data.txt file with "context" for a very long prompt.
    MEMBER_DATA_TEST = File.read("member_data_test.txt")

    PRICING = {
      uncached: {
        input: 0.00009375,     # per 1k characters for full input
        output: 0.00125,       # per 1k characters for output
        storage: 0             # No storage cost for uncached
      },
      cached: {
        new_input: 0.00009375,      # per 1k characters for new unique text
        cached_content: 0.000023437, # per 1k characters for cached content (75% discount)
        output: 0.00125,            # per 1k characters for output
        storage: 0.00025            # per 1k characters per hour for text storage
      }
    }.freeze

    class << self
      def benchmark(description:, runs: 10)
        benchmark = BenchmarkRunner.new(description: description, runs: runs)
        benchmark.run
        benchmark.analyze_results
      end

      def best_matches_for(description:, use_context_caching: false)
        prompt_lines = []
        # The cachable part of the prompt
        prompt_lines << cached_prompt

        # The variable part of the prompt.
        prompt_lines << incremental_prompt(description)

        prompt = prompt_lines.join("\n")
        result = execute_prompt(prompt, use_context_caching)
        display_results(result)
      end

      def cached_prompt
        prompt_lines = []
        prompt_lines << "You are a helpful assistant."
        prompt_lines << "<member-database>"
        prompt_lines << AiTinkerer::GeminiTesting::MEMBER_DATA_TEST
        prompt_lines << "</member-database>"
        prompt = prompt_lines.join("\n")
        prompt
      end

      def incremental_prompt(description)
        prompt_lines = []
        prompt_lines << "<member-objective>"
        prompt_lines << description
        prompt_lines << "</member-objective>"
        prompt_lines << "The member objective describes the needs that a particular person has."
        prompt_lines << "The member database is a list of all of the people in our community."
        prompt_lines << "Please look through the entire member database and identify the best 3 people who can help with the member objective."
        prompt_lines << "Listing each by name, including a quick bio and a brief explanation of specifically how they might be able to help."
        prompt_lines << "Output that list now:"
        prompt = prompt_lines.join("\n")
        prompt
      end
      
      private

      def execute_prompt(short_prompt, use_context_caching)
        start_time = Time.current
        response = if use_context_caching
          execute_cached_prompt(short_prompt)
        else
          execute_uncached_prompt(short_prompt)
        end
        end_time = Time.current

        {
          prompt: short_prompt,
          response: response,
          time_elapsed_millis: ((end_time - start_time) * 1000).to_i
        }
      end

      def execute_cached_prompt(short_prompt)
        AiTinkerer::GeminiUtil.llm(
          short_prompt,
          cache_key: "members_test",
          cached_context: AiTinkerer::GeminiTesting.cached_prompt
        )
      end

      def execute_uncached_prompt(short_prompt)
        full_prompt = [AiTinkerer::GeminiTesting.cached_prompt, short_prompt].join("\n\n")
        AiTinkerer::GeminiUtil.llm(full_prompt)
      end

      def display_results(result)
        puts "Q: #{result[:prompt]}".yellow.bold
        puts "A: #{result[:response]}".white.bold
        puts "ms: #{result[:time_elapsed_millis]}"
      end
    end
  end

  class BenchmarkRunner
    attr_reader :description, :runs, :stats

    def initialize(description:, runs:)
      @description = description
      @runs = runs
      @cached_results = []
      @uncached_results = []
    end

    def run
      @overall_start_time = Time.current
      run_uncached_tests
      run_cached_tests
      process_results
      @stats = calculate_statistics
    end

    def analyze_results
      display_detailed_report
      perform_ai_analysis
      display_completion_time
    end

    private

    def run_uncached_tests
      puts "Running #{runs} iterations without caching..."
      runs.times do
        result = execute_uncached_test
        @uncached_results << result
        handle_quota_limit
      end
    end

    def run_cached_tests
      @cache_start_time = Time.current
      puts "Running #{runs} iterations with caching..."
      runs.times do
        @cached_results << execute_cached_test
      end
      @cache_end_time = Time.current
    end

    def execute_uncached_test
      result = GeminiTesting.send(:execute_prompt, incremental_prompt, false)
      build_result_hash(result, false)
    end

    def execute_cached_test
      result = GeminiTesting.send(:execute_prompt, incremental_prompt, true)
      build_result_hash(result, true)
    end

    def build_result_hash(result, is_cached)
      base_metrics = {
        incremental_prompt_token_count: token_count(incremental_prompt),
        incremental_prompt_char_count: incremental_prompt.length,
        response_text: result[:response],
        time_elapsed_millis: result[:time_elapsed_millis]
      }

      if is_cached
        base_metrics.merge!(
          cached_prompt_token_count: cached_prompt_token_count,
          cached_prompt_char_count: cached_prompt_char_count
        )
      else
        base_metrics.merge!(
          cached_prompt_token_count: 0,
          cached_prompt_char_count: 0
        )
      end

      base_metrics
    end

    def process_results
      [@cached_results, @uncached_results].each do |results|
        results.each do |run|
          run[:response_token_count] = token_count(run[:response_text])
          run[:response_char_count] = run[:response_text].length
        end
      end
    end

    def calculate_statistics
      return {} unless @cache_end_time && @cache_start_time
      storage_minutes = ((@cache_end_time - @cache_start_time) / 60).ceil
      {
        cached: calculate_approach_stats(@cached_results, storage_minutes),
        uncached: calculate_approach_stats(@uncached_results),
        cost_comparison: calculate_cost_comparison
      }
    end

    def calculate_approach_stats(results, storage_minutes = nil)
      {
        performance: calculate_performance_stats(results),
        metrics: calculate_metrics(results),
        costs: calculate_costs(results, storage_minutes)
      }
    end

    def calculate_performance_stats(results)
      {
        avg_time: results.sum { |r| r[:time_elapsed_millis] } / runs.to_f,
        min_time: results.min_by { |r| r[:time_elapsed_millis] }[:time_elapsed_millis],
        max_time: results.max_by { |r| r[:time_elapsed_millis] }[:time_elapsed_millis]
      }
    end

    def calculate_metrics(results)
      {
        tokens: {
          incremental_prompt: results.sum { |r| r[:incremental_prompt_token_count] },
          cached_prompt: results.sum { |r| r[:cached_prompt_token_count] },
          response: results.sum { |r| r[:response_token_count] }
        },
        characters: {
          incremental_prompt: results.sum { |r| r[:incremental_prompt_char_count] },
          cached_prompt: results.sum { |r| r[:cached_prompt_char_count] },
          response: results.sum { |r| r[:response_char_count] }
        }
      }
    end

    def calculate_cached_costs(results, storage_minutes)
      pricing = AiTinkerer::GeminiTesting::PRICING
      {
        new_text_cost: (results.sum { |r| r[:incremental_prompt_char_count] } / 1000.0) * pricing[:cached][:new_input] * runs,
        cached_content_cost: (results.sum { |r| r[:cached_prompt_char_count] } / 1000.0) * pricing[:cached][:cached_content] * runs,
        output_cost: (results.sum { |r| r[:response_char_count] } / 1000.0) * pricing[:cached][:output] * runs,
        storage_cost: (results.first[:cached_prompt_char_count] / 1000.0) * pricing[:cached][:storage] * (storage_minutes / 60.0),
        total: nil  # Will be calculated below
      }.tap do |costs|
        costs[:total] = costs.values.compact.sum
      end
    end

    def calculate_uncached_costs(results)
      pricing = AiTinkerer::GeminiTesting::PRICING
      {
        input_cost: (results.sum { |r| r[:incremental_prompt_char_count] } / 1000.0) * pricing[:uncached][:input] * runs,
        output_cost: (results.sum { |r| r[:response_char_count] } / 1000.0) * pricing[:uncached][:output] * runs,
        storage_cost: 0,  # No storage cost for uncached
        total: nil  # Will be calculated below
      }.tap do |costs|
        costs[:total] = costs.values.compact.sum
      end
    end

    def calculate_costs(results, storage_minutes = nil)
      if storage_minutes
        calculate_cached_costs(results, storage_minutes)
      else
        calculate_uncached_costs(results)
      end
    end

    def calculate_cost_comparison
      return {
        difference: 0,
        percentage_saved: 0
      } unless @stats && @stats[:uncached] && @stats[:cached]
    
      uncached_total = @stats[:uncached][:costs][:total]
      cached_total = @stats[:cached][:costs][:total]
    
      {
        difference: uncached_total - cached_total,
        percentage_saved: ((uncached_total - cached_total) / uncached_total * 100).round(2)
      }
    rescue => e
      puts "Error in cost comparison: #{e.message}"
      {
        difference: 0,
        percentage_saved: 0
      }
    end

    def display_detailed_report
      ReportGenerator.new(@stats).generate
    end

    def perform_ai_analysis
      analyzer = ResultAnalyzer.new(
        stats: @stats,
        runs: runs,
        prompt: incremental_prompt,
        sample_response: @uncached_results.first[:response_text]
      )
      analyzer.analyze
    end

    def display_completion_time
      puts "\nBenchmarking task took #{Util.time_diff_human(@overall_start_time, Time.current)}".white
    end

    def handle_quota_limit
      puts "Waiting 1 second because of quota...".white
      sleep 1
    end

    def token_count(text)
      AiTinkerer::GeminiUtil.count_tokens(text)
    end

    def incremental_prompt
      AiTinkerer::GeminiTesting.incremental_prompt(description)
    end

    def cached_prompt_token_count
      @cached_prompt_token_count ||= token_count(AiTinkerer::GeminiTesting.cached_prompt)
    end

    def cached_prompt_char_count
      AiTinkerer::GeminiTesting.cached_prompt.length
    end
  end

  class ReportGenerator
    def initialize(stats)
      @stats = stats
    end

    def generate
      puts "\nDETAILED COST ANALYSIS:".white.bold
      display_cached_approach
      display_uncached_approach
      display_savings
    end

    private

    def display_cached_approach
      puts "\nCACHED APPROACH:".white.bold
      display_performance(@stats[:cached])
      display_metrics(@stats[:cached])
      display_costs(@stats[:cached][:costs])
    end

    def display_uncached_approach
      puts "\nUNCACHED APPROACH:".white.bold
      display_performance(@stats[:uncached])
      display_metrics(@stats[:uncached], cached: false)
      display_costs(@stats[:uncached][:costs], cached: false)
    end

    def display_performance(stats)
      puts "  Performance:".white
      puts "    Avg time: #{stats[:performance][:avg_time].round(2)}ms".white
      puts "    Min time: #{stats[:performance][:min_time]}ms".white
      puts "    Max time: #{stats[:performance][:max_time]}ms".white
    end

    def display_metrics(stats, cached: true)
      puts "  Metrics:".white
      puts "    Characters:".white
      if cached
        puts "      New input: #{stats[:metrics][:characters][:incremental_prompt]}".white
        puts "      Cached content: #{stats[:metrics][:characters][:cached_prompt]}".white
      else
        puts "      Input: #{stats[:metrics][:characters][:incremental_prompt]}".white
      end
      puts "      Response: #{stats[:metrics][:characters][:response]}".white
    end

    def display_costs(costs, cached: true)
      puts "  Costs:".white
      if cached
        puts "    New input: $#{costs[:new_text_cost].round(6)}".white
        puts "    Cached content: $#{costs[:cached_content_cost].round(6)}".white
        puts "    Storage (1hr): $#{costs[:storage_cost].round(6)}".white
      else
        puts "    Input: $#{costs[:input_cost].round(6)}".white
      end
      puts "    Output: $#{costs[:output_cost].round(6)}".white
      puts "    Total: $#{costs[:total].round(6)}".white
    end

    def display_savings
      puts "\nSAVINGS:".white.bold
      puts "  Amount saved: $#{@stats[:cost_comparison][:difference].round(6)}".white
      puts "  Percentage saved: #{@stats[:cost_comparison][:percentage_saved]}%".white
    end
  end

  class ResultAnalyzer
    def initialize(stats:, runs:, prompt:, sample_response:)
      @stats = stats
      @runs = runs
      @prompt = prompt
      @sample_response = sample_response
    end

    def analyze
      prompt = generate_analysis_prompt
      result = AiTinkerer::GeminiUtil.llm(prompt)
      puts "ANALYSIS:".white.bold
      puts result.yellow
    end

    private

    def generate_analysis_prompt
      [
        context_description,
        "The results of these #{@runs} runs are here in this json:",
        @stats.to_json,
        task_parameters,
        analysis_instructions
      ].join("\n")
    end

    def context_description
      "We ran a benchmarking system that compares two different approaches for making API calls to Google's Gemini AI model: cached and uncached. For both approaches, it tracks metrics like response times, character counts, and calculates costs using a pricing model that varies for cached content, new input and output text. After running all tests, it generates a comprehensive comparison showing average/min/max response times, character counts, cost breakdowns, and total cost savings."
    end

    def task_parameters
      [
        "The actual task had the following parameters:",
        "  short_prompt:  ```#{@prompt}```",
        "  typical result: ```#{@sample_response}```",
        "  total runs: #{@runs}"
      ].join("\n")
    end

    def analysis_instructions
      [
        "",
        "INSTRUCTIONS:",
        " - Please analyze the results and provide a detailed explanation of the performance and cost implications of using the caching system versus making fresh API calls each time.",
        " - Address both speed and cost comparisons.",
        " - Format costs in a human-friendly way, e.g. $0.005, etc (only show fractional cents to the 10th of a cent)",
        " - Format time in hours, minutes, seconds and milliseconds",
        " - Also include a description of the benchmarking task that was done including the type of input data, the task and a typical result (in high level summary form) along with the total number of runs performed.",
        " - Please output your answer in plain text without markdown and without any formatting syntax of any kind."
      ].join("\n")
    end
  end
end

gemini_util.rb

# Copyright (c) 2024 Joe Heitzeberg
# Released under MIT License
# 
# Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining a copy of this file.
#
# This module implements a two-layer caching system for Gemini API context:
#
# The two-layered cache system makes this convenient for developers since they can just
# pass in their content each time without worrying about managing Google's cache IDs or 
# tracking when content changes - it just works™️.
#
# 1. First Layer: Redis Cache
#    - Stores cache metadata under keys like "gemini_context_#{your_key}"
#    - Contains: Google's cache ID, MD5 hash of content, and expiration time
#    - Helps us avoid unnecessary calls to Google's API
#    - Uses Redis TTL for automatic expiration
#
# 2. Second Layer: Google's Context Cache
#    - Stores the actual context content on Google's servers
#    - Accessed via the cache ID we get from Google
#    - Has its own TTL managed by Google
#
# How it works:
# - Every time you call generate_content with a cache_key and cached_context:
#   1. We check Redis for an existing cache entry
#   2. If found, we compare the MD5 hash of your content with the stored hash
#   3. If the hashes match and it hasn't expired, we reuse Google's cache ID
#   4. If the hashes differ or it's expired, we:
#      a. Create a new context cache on Google's servers
#      b. Store the new cache ID, hash, and expiration in Redis
#
# Cache Invalidation:
# - Redis entries auto-expire based on cache_ttl_minutes
# - Content changes are detected via MD5 hash comparison
# - When either expires or content changes, both caches are effectively renewed
#
# Google's context cache is powerful because it lets you reuse large context/prompt content
# across multiple API calls without sending it each time, saving bandwidth and tokens.
#
# EXAMPLE USAGE:
#
# First time - creates the cache:
#      response = AiTinkerer::GeminiUtil.llm(
#        "What color is the sky?",
#        cache_key: "sky_info",
#        cached_context: "The sky appears blue because of Rayleigh scattering...",
#        cache_ttl_minutes: 120
#      )
#      
# Same content - reuses existing cache
#      response = AiTinkerer::GeminiUtil.llm(
#        "Why does the sky change color at sunset?",
#        cache_key: "sky_info",
#        cached_context: "The sky appears blue because of Rayleigh scattering..."
#      )
#      
# Changed content - creates new cache
#      response = AiTinkerer::GeminiUtil.llm(
#        "Tell me about clouds",
#        cache_key: "sky_info",
#        cached_context: "Updated information about the atmosphere and weather...",
#        cache_ttl_minutes: 120
#      )
#

module AiTinkerer
  module GeminiUtil
    class << self
      CACHE_BASE_URL = "https://us-central1-aiplatform.googleapis.com/v1beta1"

      SAFETY_SETTINGS = [
        { category: "HARM_CATEGORY_SEXUALLY_EXPLICIT", threshold: "BLOCK_NONE" },
        { category: "HARM_CATEGORY_HATE_SPEECH", threshold: "BLOCK_NONE" },
        { category: "HARM_CATEGORY_HARASSMENT", threshold: "BLOCK_NONE" },
        { category: "HARM_CATEGORY_DANGEROUS_CONTENT", threshold: "BLOCK_NONE" }
      ].freeze
      
      GENERATION_CONFIG = {
        candidateCount: 1,
        maxOutputTokens: 8192,
        temperature: 0.5
      }.freeze
      
      GROUNDING_TOOL = {
        googleSearch: {
        }
      }.freeze

      def create_context_cache(cached_context, ttl_minutes: 1)
        token_count = count_tokens(cached_context)
        puts "CREATE A GOOGLE CONTEXT CACHE (size #{cached_context.length.commas} characters, #{token_count.commas} tokens)".green.bold
        puts "TIME: #{Time.current.in_time_zone("America/Los_Angeles").strftime("%m/%d/%Y %H:%M:%S")}".yellow
        # Create new cache          
        api_key = ENV["GOOGLE_GEMINI_API_KEY"]
        url = "https://generativelanguage.googleapis.com/v1beta/cachedContents?key=#{api_key}"
        
        body = {
          model: "models/#{MASTER_MODEL}",
          contents: [
            {
              parts: [
                {
                  text: cached_context
                }
              ],
              role: "user"
            }
          ],
          ttl: "#{ttl_minutes * 60}s"
        }
        
        response = make_post_request(url, body)
        ap response
        ap response.body
        name = JSON.parse(response.body)["name"]
        puts "CACHE NAME: #{name}".white.bold
        name
      end

      MASTER_MODEL = "gemini-1.5-flash-001"

      def llm(prompt, model_name: MASTER_MODEL, use_grounding: false, cached_context: nil, cache_key: nil, cache_ttl_minutes: 1)
        all_lines = prompt.split("\n")
        total_lines = all_lines.length
        truncated_lines = total_lines - 15

        if cached_context.present?
          prompt_truncated = "Using a cache with #{cached_context.length.commas} chars ".yellow.bold + " and a prompt: " + "#{prompt}".white.bold
        else
          token_count = count_tokens(prompt)
          prompt_truncated = all_lines.first(10).join("\n").yellow.bold + "\n\n... TRUNCATED #{truncated_lines.commas} LINES / #{token_count.commas} TOKENS ...\n\n".white.bold + all_lines.last(5).join("\n").yellow.bold
        end

        puts "PROMPT:".white.bold
        puts prompt_truncated
        puts ""

        chars = prompt.length
        if cached_context
          puts "POSTING #{chars.commas} CHARS TO [#{model_name}] FOR USE WITH CACHE...".red.bold
        else
          puts "POSTING #{chars.commas} CHARS TO [#{model_name}] NO CACHE...".red.bold
        end

        # Handle cache key and content if provided
        if cache_key && cached_context
          cached_context = get_or_create_cache_id(
            cache_key,
            cached_context,
            ttl_minutes: cache_ttl_minutes
          )
        end

        api_key = ENV["GOOGLE_GEMINI_API_KEY"]
        url = "https://generativelanguage.googleapis.com/v1beta/models/#{model_name}:generateContent?key=#{api_key}"
        
        # Prepare the content parts with proper role
        contents = {
          role: "user",  # Add the role specification
          parts: [{ text: prompt }]
        }

        # Add cached context if provided
        puts "🎉 USING CACHE ID: #{cached_context}".white.bold if cached_context
        sleep(2) if Rails.env.development?
        body = {
          contents: contents,
          cachedContent: cached_context,
          safetySettings: SAFETY_SETTINGS,
          generationConfig: GENERATION_CONFIG
        }
        body[:tools] = [GROUNDING_TOOL] if use_grounding

        response = make_post_request(url, body)
        json = JSON.parse(response.body)
        if cache_key && cached_context
          puts "DONE (cached - #{cache_key})".white.bold
        else
          puts "DONE (regular)".white.bold
        end

        if use_grounding
          log_debug_info(json)
        end

        if json.present? && json["candidates"].blank?
          handle_error_response(json)
        end

        json["candidates"][0]["content"]["parts"][0]["text"].to_s
      end
      
      def count_tokens(text, model_name: MASTER_MODEL)
        api_key = ENV["GOOGLE_GEMINI_API_KEY"]
        url = "https://generativelanguage.googleapis.com/v1beta/models/#{model_name}:countTokens?key=#{api_key}"
        
        body = {
          contents: [{
            parts: [{
              text: text
            }]
          }]
        }
      
        response = make_post_request(url, body)
        json = JSON.parse(response.body)
        
        if response.is_a?(Net::HTTPSuccess)
          json["totalTokens"]
        else
          raise "Error: #{response.code}, #{response.body}"
        end
      end

      private

      def get_or_create_cache_id(cache_key, cached_context, ttl_minutes: 1)
        cache_key = "gemini_context_#{cache_key}"
        cached_context_md5 = Digest::MD5.hexdigest(cached_context)
        cache_entry = RedisUtil::Cache.get(cache_key)

        puts "cached_context_md5: #{cached_context_md5}".yellow
        
        if cache_entry
          cache_entry = JSON.parse(cache_entry)
          # If cached_context hasn't changed and cache hasn't expired, use existing cache
          if cached_context_md5 == cache_entry["content_hash"] && Time.now < Time.parse(cache_entry["expires_at"])
            puts "Found existing Google Context Cache to use: #{cache_entry["cache_id"]}".white.bold
            puts "The cached content was #{cache_entry['tokens'].to_i.commas} tokens".yellow
            return cache_entry["cache_id"]
          end
          # Otherwise, we'll create a new cache below
        end

        # Create new cache entry
        cache_id = create_context_cache(cached_context, ttl_minutes: ttl_minutes)

        RedisUtil::Cache.set(
          cache_key,
          {
            cache_id: cache_id,
            content_hash: cached_context_md5,
            tokens: count_tokens(cached_context),
            expires_at: (Time.now + (ttl_minutes * 60)).iso8601
          }.to_json,
          expires_in: ttl_minutes * 60
        )
        
        cache_id
      end

      def make_post_request(url, body)
        uri = URI(url)
        
        http = Net::HTTP.new(uri.host, uri.port)
        http.use_ssl = true
        http.read_timeout = READ_TIMEOUT if defined?(READ_TIMEOUT)
        http.open_timeout = OPEN_TIMEOUT if defined?(OPEN_TIMEOUT)
        
        request = Net::HTTP::Post.new(uri.request_uri)
        request["Content-Type"] = "application/json"
        request.body = body.to_json
        
        http.request(request)
      end
      
      def make_get_request(url)
        uri = URI(url)
        api_key = ENV["GOOGLE_GEMINI_API_KEY"]
        uri.query = URI.encode_www_form(key: api_key)
        
        http = Net::HTTP.new(uri.host, uri.port)
        http.use_ssl = true
        
        request = Net::HTTP::Get.new(uri.request_uri)
        
        http.request(request)
      end

      def make_patch_request(url, body)
        uri = URI(url)
        api_key = ENV["GOOGLE_GEMINI_API_KEY"]
        uri.query = URI.encode_www_form(key: api_key)
        
        http = Net::HTTP.new(uri.host, uri.port)
        http.use_ssl = true
        
        request = Net::HTTP::Patch.new(uri.request_uri)
        request["Content-Type"] = "application/json"
        request.body = body.to_json
        
        http.request(request)
      end

      def log_debug_info(json)
        puts "\nGROUNDING DEBUG INFO:".blue.bold
        puts "Full API Response:".yellow
        ap json
        
        if json["candidates"]&.first&.dig("citationMetadata", "citations")
          puts "\nCITATIONS:".blue.bold
          citations = json["candidates"].first["citationMetadata"]["citations"]
          citations.each_with_index do |citation, i|
            puts "Citation #{i + 1}:".yellow
            ap citation
          end
        end
      
        if json["candidates"]&.first&.dig("finishReason")
          puts "\nFinish Reason: #{json["candidates"].first["finishReason"]}".blue.bold
        end
      
        if json["promptFeedback"]&.dig("safetyRatings")
          puts "\nSAFETY RATINGS:".blue.bold
          ap json["promptFeedback"]["safetyRatings"]
        end
      end
      
      def handle_error_response(json)
        reasons = []
        if json["promptFeedback"].present? && json["promptFeedback"]["safetyRatings"].present?
          json["promptFeedback"]["safetyRatings"].each do |rating|
            if rating["probability"] != "NEGLIGIBLE"
              reasons << rating["category"].humanize + " was " + rating["probability"].humanize
            end
          end
        end
        if reasons.blank?
          if json["error"] && json["error"]["message"].present?
            reasons << json["error"]["message"]
          else
            reasons << "No safety ratings provided."
          end
        end
        message = "Sorry, error: " + reasons.join(", ")
        puts message.red.bold
        raise message
      end
    end
  end
end

gistfile1.txt

<!-- test data generated by Gpt-4o. any resemblance to actual persons is purely coincidental. -->

<member token='client_def456uvw'>
Name: Marcus Green
Bio: Enthusiastic tech leader who loves mentoring teams and exploring new AI tools. Entrepreneur at heart, with a background in full-stack development and rapid prototyping.
Job: CTO, Alpha Dynamics
Primary Role: CTO / Technical Leader
Tags: AI, Entrepreneurship, Full-Stack Development, Leadership
Job tags: Cloud Architecture, Node.js, React, Agile Methodologies, DevOps, Software Engineering, Product Management, Machine Learning, Team Building, Strategy, Fundraising, Stakeholder Management
</member>

<member token='client_ghi789rst'>
Name: Naomi Patel
Bio: I’m an aspiring product manager with a knack for turning user insights into intuitive features. My experience spans user research, iterative design, and agile project management.
Job: Product Manager Intern, SmartWare
Primary Role: Product Manager (Intern)
Tags: Product Management, UX, Agile Development, Collaboration, Innovation
Job tags: User Research, UI/UX Design, Roadmap Planning, Agile Scrum, Stakeholder Management, Market Analysis, Prototyping, Feature Prioritization, Cross-Functional Collaboration
</member>

<member token='client_jkl012mno'>
Name: Evan Smith
Bio: Seasoned software engineer specialized in backend systems and microservices architecture. Passionate about open-source projects and building communities around code.
Job: Senior Software Engineer, CodeWave
Primary Role: Software Engineer
Tags: Backend Development, Open Source, Microservices, Community Building
Job tags: Java, Python, Go, Docker, Kubernetes, APIs, Distributed Systems, Software Architecture, Continuous Integration, Continuous Deployment, AWS, Mentoring, Code Reviews
</member>

<member token='client_pqr345tuv'>
Name: Clara Sanchez
Bio: Former startup founder turned AI ethics researcher. Focused on responsible development of machine intelligence and creating frameworks for transparency and fairness.
Job: Research Scientist, NextGen Ethics Lab
Primary Role: Research Scientist
Tags: AI, Ethics, Research, Startups, Responsible Innovation
Job tags: AI Ethics, Fairness in Machine Learning, NLP, Python, Data Governance, Policy, Research and Analysis, Technical Writing, Strategy, Stakeholder Engagement, Algorithmic Accountability
</member>

<member token='client_xyz123stu'>
Name: Clara Nguyen
Bio: Passionate computer science undergraduate exploring AI and robotics. Always tinkering with side projects and attending hackathons to collaborate on new ideas.
Job: Student, Stanford University
Primary Role: Student
Tags: AI, Robotics, Hackathons, Collaboration
Job tags: Python, C++, Machine Learning, ROS, Project Collaboration, Academic Research
</member>

<member token='client_abc456stu'>
Name: Isaac Contreras
Bio: Enthusiastic data science student eager to apply machine learning to real-world problems. Loves data wrangling and dabbling in visualization techniques.
Job: Student, University of Washington
Primary Role: Student
Tags: Data Science, Machine Learning, Visualization, Collaboration
Job tags: Python, R, Pandas, Data Analysis, Matplotlib, Team Projects
</member>

<member token='client_def789stu'>
Name: Leila Park
Bio: Aspiring product manager with a background in business and a growing interest in user-centric design. Works on class projects to build innovative prototypes.
Job: Student, UC Berkeley
Primary Role: Student
Tags: Product Management, Design, Prototyping, Entrepreneurship
Job tags: UX Research, Agile Methods, Wireframing, User Testing, Cross-functional Collaboration, Stakeholder Communication
</member>

<member token='client_ghi012stu'>
Name: Miguel Ortiz
Bio: Computer engineering student specializing in embedded systems. Enjoys building IoT devices and automating tasks with microcontrollers. Constantly learning new technologies.
Job: Student, MIT
Primary Role: Student
Tags: Embedded Systems, IoT, Hardware, Innovation
Job tags: C Programming, Arduino, Raspberry Pi, Sensors, Circuit Design, Prototyping
</member>

<member token='client_jkl345stu'>
Name: Sophia Ramirez
Bio: Graduate student focusing on AI ethics and responsible data use. Interested in policy and social impact, aiming to bridge the gap between research and implementation.
Job: Graduate Student, Harvard University
Primary Role: Student
Tags: AI Ethics, Policy, Social Impact, Research
Job tags: Machine Learning, Policy Analysis, Technical Writing, Academic Research, Data Governance, Stakeholder Engagement
</member>

<member token='client_mno123fnd'>
Name: Sarah Kwon
Bio: Founder of Aurora Analytics, building a real-time data pipeline for SMBs. Strong believer in serverless architectures to rapidly test and iterate on new features.
Job: Founder, Aurora Analytics
Primary Role: Founder
Tags: Entrepreneurship, Data Pipelines, Serverless, Cloud Computing
Job tags: AWS Lambda, DynamoDB, Python, React, CI/CD, Startups, Product Management, Business Strategy
</member>

<member token='client_pqr456fnd'>
Name: Tobias Schmidt
Bio: Web3 enthusiast and co-founder of TokenTribe, aiming to simplify decentralized transactions for everyday users. Enjoys pioneering blockchain-based solutions for real-world problems.
Job: Co-Founder, TokenTribe
Primary Role: Founder
Tags: Web3, Blockchain, Decentralization, Entrepreneurship
Job tags: Solidity, Ethereum, Smart Contracts, React, Node.js, Tokenomics, Cross-functional Leadership, Fundraising, Community Building
</member>

<member token='client_stu789fnd'>
Name: Ava López
Bio: Building immersive AR solutions at VisionSpark. I love experimenting with Unity and optimizing 3D experiences for consumer mobile applications.
Job: Founder, VisionSpark
Primary Role: Founder
Tags: AR/VR, Unity, Mobile Applications, User Experience
Job tags: Unity, C#, 3D Modeling, Mobile Development, UX Design, Product Roadmapping, Growth Strategy, Startup Management
</member>

<member token='client_vwx012fnd'>
Name: Han Liu
Bio: Co-founder of ParallelCom, delivering high-performance computing solutions for AI training. Expertise in GPU acceleration and distributed computing environments.
Job: Co-Founder, ParallelCom
Primary Role: Founder
Tags: HPC, AI, Distributed Systems, Entrepreneurship
Job tags: C++, CUDA, MPI, Python, TensorFlow, Cluster Management, Systems Architecture, Scalability, Team Leadership
</member>

<member token='client_yza345fnd'>
Name: Morgan Bennett
Bio: Developer-turned-entrepreneur working on SwiftSpark, a mobile-first marketplace for local artisans. Focused on elegant native apps and frictionless user experiences.
Job: Founder, SwiftSpark
Primary Role: Founder
Tags: iOS Development, E-Commerce, User Experience, Entrepreneurship
Job tags: Swift, iOS, Xcode, Firebase, In-App Purchases, Product Marketing, Marketplace Development, Agile Sprints, UX/UI Design, Strategic Partnerships
</member>


<member token='client_pmhealth01'>
Name: Laura Prescott
Bio: Product Manager with a strong background in healthcare operations. Focused on improving patient experiences through user-centric product strategies and efficient project oversight.
Job: Product Manager, MediWell
Primary Role: Product Manager
Tags: Healthcare, Project Management, User Research, Stakeholder Engagement
Job tags: Healthcare Operations, Roadmap Planning, Budgeting, Cross-Functional Collaboration, Vendor Management, Regulatory Compliance
</member>

<member token='client_pmfinance02'>
Name: Damien Woods
Bio: Seasoned product lead in the finance sector, adept at overseeing end-to-end product lifecycles. Skilled in aligning teams, managing risks, and optimizing customer journeys.
Job: Product Manager, FinCore
Primary Role: Product Manager
Tags: Finance, Product Strategy, Project Coordination, Risk Management
Job tags: Financial Analysis, Customer Journey Mapping, Requirements Gathering, Agile Methodologies, Stakeholder Alignment, Market Trends
</member>

<member token='client_pmedu03'>
Name: Emily Carter
Bio: Product manager specializing in edtech solutions, committed to making learning accessible and engaging for all. Adept at facilitating projects that bridge technology and pedagogy.
Job: Product Manager, LearnSphere
Primary Role: Product Manager
Tags: Education, Product Roadmapping, Collaboration, Accessibility
Job tags: Curriculum Alignment, Market Research, User Feedback, Agile Sprints, Time Management, Stakeholder Engagement
</member>

<member token='client_pmgaming04'>
Name: Javier Morales
Bio: Product Manager in the gaming industry, focused on creating captivating player experiences. Highly effective at coordinating multidisciplinary teams to deliver on tight deadlines.
Job: Product Manager, GameScape Studios
Primary Role: Product Manager
Tags: Gaming, Project Management, User Experience, Team Coordination
Job tags: Feature Planning, Milestone Scheduling, Cross-Functional Leadership, Market Analysis, Community Feedback, Sprint Planning
</member>

<member token='client_pmhospitality05'>
Name: Isabella Rossi
Bio: Hospitality-focused product manager with a passion for elevating guest services through streamlined processes and effective project workflows. Thrives in fast-paced environments.
Job: Product Manager, StayKey
Primary Role: Product Manager
Tags: Hospitality, Process Improvement, User Journey, Project Oversight
Job tags: Guest Experience, Vendor Relationships, Requirements Definition, Agile Frameworks, KPI Tracking, Collaboration with Stakeholders
</member>

<member token='client_mlsgoogle01'>
Name: Kelly Wilson
Bio: Machine Learning Scientist at Google, specializing in large-scale recommendation systems. Researches ways to optimize ad targeting using deep neural networks and reinforcement learning.
Job: ML Scientist, Google
Primary Role: ML Scientist
Tags: Machine Learning, Large-scale Systems, Recommendations, Ad Tech
Job tags: TensorFlow, Google Cloud Platform, TFX, Reinforcement Learning, A/B Testing, Data Analysis, Model Optimization, Python
</member>

<member token='client_mlsapple02'>
Name: Michael Lopez
Bio: ML Research Engineer at Apple, focusing on on-device inference and privacy-preserving learning. Believes in pushing the boundaries of edge computing while maintaining user trust.
Job: ML Research Engineer, Apple
Primary Role: ML Scientist
Tags: Edge Computing, On-device ML, Privacy, Neural Networks
Job tags: PyTorch, Core ML, Swift, Federated Learning, Secure Enclaves, Model Compression, Data Engineering, Performance Optimization
</member>

<member token='client_mlsamazon03'>
Name: Minji Kim
Bio: Leads the computer vision research team at Amazon, developing advanced object detection and image recognition capabilities for e-commerce and robotics applications.
Job: Senior ML Scientist, Amazon
Primary Role: ML Scientist
Tags: Computer Vision, E-commerce, Robotics, Research
Job tags: AWS SageMaker, OpenCV, Deep Learning, Convolutional Neural Networks, Data Labeling, Model Deployment, Python, Scalability
</member>

<member token='client_mlsnetflix04'>
Name: Francis Lee
Bio: Works on personalization and predictive analytics at Netflix, leveraging large-scale data pipelines to fine-tune recommendation algorithms and content forecasting models.
Job: ML Scientist, Netflix
Primary Role: ML Scientist
Tags: Personalization, Predictive Analytics, Data Pipelines, Content Recommendations
Job tags: Spark, Python, Neural Collaborative Filtering, AWS EMR, Exploratory Data Analysis, Pipeline Automation, Regression Models
</member>

<member token='client_mlsmeta05'>
Name: Lucy Parker
Bio: Drives research on conversational AI and natural language processing at Meta, creating intelligent chatbots and language models for social interactions at scale.
Job: NLP Research Scientist, Meta
Primary Role: ML Scientist
Tags: NLP, Conversational AI, Social Platforms, Research
Job tags: PyTorch, Transformers, Hugging Face, Self-Supervised Learning, Data Preprocessing, Dialogue Management, Distributed Training, Model Evaluation
</member>

<member token='client_uixtech01'>
Name: Morgan Riley
Bio: Full-stack UI/UX engineer blending visual design principles with robust front-end architectures. Known for championing accessibility and performance best practices.
Job: Senior UI/UX Engineer, TechFlow
Primary Role: UI/UX Engineer
Tags: UI/UX, Accessibility, Performance, Front-end
Job tags: React, TypeScript, CSS3, Webpack, Design Systems, UX Research, Web Accessibility, Performance Optimization
</member>

<member token='client_uixtech02'>
Name: Dominic Liu
Bio: User interface architect focusing on scalable design patterns for enterprise applications. Believes in seamless integrations between design mockups and production code.
Job: UI Architect, DataCore Solutions
Primary Role: UI/UX Architect
Tags: UI/UX Architecture, Enterprise Apps, Scalability, Collaboration
Job tags: Angular, RxJS, SCSS, Micro Frontends, Code Review, Design Tokens, API Integration, Agile Methodologies
</member>

<member token='client_uixtech03'>
Name: Barbara Estes
Bio: Creative technologist specialized in immersive user experiences. Builds interactive prototypes and advanced animations to push the boundaries of modern web design.
Job: Lead UI/UX Developer, LumiLabs
Primary Role: UI/UX Developer
Tags: Interactive Design, Prototyping, Animations, Web Innovation
Job tags: Vue.js, Three.js, JavaScript, CSS Animations, Prototyping Tools, Usability Testing, Storybook, Code Optimization
</member>

<member token='client_uixtech04'>
Name: Vivek Sen
Bio: Hybrid front-end developer and product designer focusing on bridging user needs with technical feasibility. Enjoys refining micro-interactions for delightful user journeys.
Job: Product Designer & Developer, Interactify
Primary Role: UI/UX Engineer
Tags: Micro-Interactions, Hybrid Development, User Journeys, Product Design
Job tags: Svelte, JavaScript, Figma, Prototyping, User Flows, A/B Testing, User-Centered Design, Continuous Integration
</member>

<member token='client_uixtech05'>
Name: Elsa Bennett
Bio: Senior UX engineer experienced in building cross-platform mobile UIs. Passionate about consistency and design cohesion across all user touchpoints.
Job: Senior UX Engineer, OmniApp
Primary Role: UI/UX Engineer
Tags: Cross-Platform, Mobile UX, Design Cohesion, Front-end Engineering
Job tags: React Native, Flutter, Dart, TypeScript, UI Style Guides, Rapid Prototyping, Theming, Performance Profiling
</member>

<member token='client_webdev01'>
Name: Adrian Foster
Bio: Passionate full-stack web developer specializing in building high-performance web apps. Enjoys experimenting with new JavaScript frameworks and optimizing server-side code.
Job: Full-Stack Web Developer, RiseUp Tech
Primary Role: Web Developer
Tags: Full-Stack, JavaScript, Performance, Innovative Tech
Job tags: Node.js, React, Express.js, MongoDB, REST APIs, Docker, Git, CI/CD
</member>

<member token='client_webdev02'>
Name: Bianca Malone
Bio: Front-end developer who loves crafting beautiful, responsive designs. Dedicated to creating user-friendly interfaces and continually refining visual appeal.
Job: Front-End Web Developer, BrightMedia
Primary Role: Web Developer
Tags: Front-End, Responsive Design, CSS, User Experience
Job tags: HTML5, CSS3, JavaScript, Vue.js, SCSS, Webpack, Cross-Browser Compatibility, UX Design
</member>

<member token='client_webdev03'>
Name: Colin Shepherd
Bio: DevOps-inclined back-end web developer with a strong background in optimizing workflows and automating deployments. Focused on reducing technical debt and ensuring system reliability.
Job: Back-End Web Developer, CodeStream Solutions
Primary Role: Web Developer
Tags: Back-End, DevOps, Workflow Optimization, Reliability
Job tags: Python, Django, PostgreSQL, Kubernetes, GitLab CI, Docker Compose, Test Automation, Cloud Infrastructure
</member>

<member token='client_webdev04'>
Name: Daria Kozlov
Bio: Versatile web developer with experience in headless CMS architectures and GraphQL APIs. Strives for seamless content management and scalable infrastructure.
Job: Web Developer, Harmony Digital
Primary Role: Web Developer
Tags: Headless CMS, GraphQL, Content Management, Scalability
Job tags: JavaScript, React, Next.js, GraphQL, CMS Integration, Docker, Serverless Functions, API Development
</member>

<member token='client_webdev05'>
Name: Ethan Brown
Bio: Seasoned WordPress developer known for creating custom themes and plugins. Enjoys integrating third-party APIs and ensuring high-quality, secure online experiences.
Job: WordPress Developer, BrandSpark
Primary Role: Web Developer
Tags: WordPress, Plugins, Security, Custom Themes
Job tags: PHP, MySQL, WordPress REST API, Theme Development, Plugin Development, SEO, Performance Tuning, Security Hardening
</member>

<member token='client_ds001'>
Name: Harriet Jensen
Bio: Data Scientist with a passion for healthcare analytics, utilizing large patient datasets to uncover insights that improve medical outcomes. Driven by evidence-based methodologies.
Job: Data Scientist, HealthNova
Primary Role: Data Scientist
Tags: Healthcare Analytics, Evidence-Based, Big Data, Collaboration
Job tags: Python, R, SQL, Statistical Modeling, Predictive Analytics, Healthcare Data Standards, HIPAA Compliance, Data Visualization
</member>

<member token='client_ds002'>
Name: Martin Shimizu
Bio: E-commerce data scientist focused on optimizing conversion funnels and personalized recommendations. Combines machine learning expertise with deep consumer behavior insights.
Job: Data Scientist, ShopWave
Primary Role: Data Scientist
Tags: E-commerce, Consumer Behavior, Recommendation Systems, Conversion Optimization
Job tags: Python, Pandas, Scikit-Learn, A/B Testing, SQL, Data Wrangling, Predictive Modeling, Recommender Systems
</member>

<member token='client_ds003'>
Name: Gwyneth Delgado
Bio: Finance-savvy data scientist leveraging statistical models for risk assessment and portfolio optimization. Enjoys pushing the boundaries of quantitative finance strategies.
Job: Data Scientist, Quantify Capital
Primary Role: Data Scientist
Tags: Quantitative Finance, Risk Analysis, Portfolio Optimization, Statistical Modeling
Job tags: Python, R, Time Series Analysis, Monte Carlo Simulations, SQL, Financial Forecasting, Machine Learning, Data Visualization
</member>

<member token='client_ds004'>
Name: Robin Feng
Bio: Industrial data scientist dedicated to optimizing manufacturing processes and resource allocation through robust data pipelines and advanced analytics.
Job: Data Scientist, ManaTech
Primary Role: Data Scientist
Tags: Manufacturing, Process Optimization, Industrial Analytics, Resource Allocation
Job tags: Python, Tableau, Statistical Process Control, Predictive Mainte
</member>

<member token='client_eng001'>
Name: Alex Morgan
Bio: Software engineer specializing in distributed systems, with a focus on designing scalable architectures for enterprise solutions. Enjoys solving complex system challenges.
Job: Software Engineer, ScaleSoft
Primary Role: Engineer
Tags: Distributed Systems, Scalable Architectures, Enterprise Software, System Design
Job tags: Java, Kubernetes, Apache Kafka, Microservices, Docker, REST APIs, Cloud Native, AWS
</member>

<member token='client_eng002'>
Name: Priya Reddy
Bio: Front-end engineer passionate about crafting engaging and interactive user interfaces. Combines design thinking with technical expertise to build responsive web apps.
Job: Front-End Engineer, DesignTech
Primary Role: Engineer
Tags: Front-End Development, UI/UX, Interactive Design, Responsive Web Apps
Job tags: React, TypeScript, CSS-in-JS, HTML5, Figma, Web Animations API, Cross-Browser Compatibility, Accessibility
</member>

<member token='client_eng003'>
Name: Diego Martinez
Bio: DevOps engineer focused on building automated pipelines and infrastructure as code to improve deployment efficiency and reliability. Advocates for seamless CI/CD processes.
Job: DevOps Engineer, BuildFlow
Primary Role: Engineer
Tags: DevOps, Automation, CI/CD, Infrastructure as Code
Job tags: Terraform, Ansible, Jenkins, Kubernetes, AWS, Docker, GitOps, Monitoring Tools (Prometheus/Grafana)
</member>

<member token='client_eng004'>
Name: Elena Park
Bio: Embedded systems engineer with a knack for low-level programming and firmware development. Works on IoT devices and real-time systems with strict resource constraints.
Job: Embedded Engineer, IoTech
Primary Role: Engineer
Tags: Embedded Systems, IoT, Firmware, Real-Time Systems
Job tags: C, C++, RTOS, ARM Cortex, SPI/I2C, Embedded Linux, Debugging Tools, Circuit Design
</member>

<member token='client_eng005'>
Name: Owen Carter
Bio: Security engineer dedicated to building robust systems to protect against modern cyber threats. Focuses on securing applications and infrastructure through best practices.
Job: Security Engineer, SafeNet
Primary Role: Engineer
Tags: Cybersecurity, Application Security, Threat Mitigation, Infrastructure Protection
Job tags: Python, Penetration Testing, OWASP, IAM, Network Security, Encryption, SIEM Tools, Cloud Security
</member>

<member token='client_eng006'>
Name: Yasmin Ali
Bio: Cloud engineer passionate about optimizing resource allocation and scaling cloud infrastructure for high-availability systems. Experienced in hybrid cloud environments.
Job: Cloud Engineer, Cloudify
Primary Role: Engineer
Tags: Cloud Computing, Infrastructure Scaling, High Availability, Hybrid Cloud
Job tags: AWS, GCP, Azure, Kubernetes, Terraform, Serverless Architectures, Monitoring, Autoscaling
</member>

<member token='client_eng007'>
Name: Nathan Zhang
Bio: Full-stack engineer skilled in building modern web applications with robust back-end systems and sleek front-end interfaces. Enjoys bringing ideas to life through code.
Job: Full-Stack Engineer, CodeCraft
Primary Role: Engineer
Tags: Full-Stack Development, Web Applications, Modern Interfaces, Back-End Systems
Job tags: JavaScript, Node.js, React, MongoDB, RESTful APIs, Redux, Express.js, Unit Testing
</member>

<member token='client_eng008'>
Name: Sophie Nguyen
Bio: Electrical engineer specializing in power systems and renewable energy technologies. Works on designing efficient energy storage and distribution systems.
Job: Electrical Engineer, GreenGrid
Primary Role: Engineer
Tags: Renewable Energy, Power Systems, Energy Storage, Efficiency
Job tags: MATLAB, Simulink, Circuit Simulation, Power Electronics, Grid Integration, Renewable Technologies, Batteries, IoT Integration
</member>

<member token='client_eng009'>
Name: Liam Hughes
Bio: Network engineer with deep expertise in designing and maintaining large-scale enterprise networks. Ensures optimal connectivity and network security across global systems.
Job: Network Engineer, NetSecure
Primary Role: Engineer
Tags: Networking, Enterprise Systems, Connectivity, Network Security
Job tags: Cisco, BGP, MPLS, Firewalls, VPN, SD-WAN, Packet Analysis, Network Monitoring
</member>

<member token='client_eng010'>
Name: Zara Patel
Bio: Mechanical engineer focusing on robotics and automation. Designs and builds robotic systems for industrial and consumer applications with precision and innovation.
Job: Mechanical Engineer, RoboWorks
Primary Role: Engineer
Tags: Robotics, Automation, Mechanical Design, Innovation
Job tags: CAD (SolidWorks/AutoCAD), Python, Mechatronics, Actuator Design, Sensors, Control Systems, Prototyping, Robotics Simulation
</member>


<some-text-to-make-the-cache-reach-minimum-size>
WikipediaThe Free Encyclopedia Search Wikipedia Search Donate Create account Log in Contents hide (Top) Prehistory Ancient history Frankish kingdoms (486–987) State building into the Kingdom of France (987–1453) Early Modern France (1453–1789) Revolutionary France (1789–1799) Napoleonic France (1799–1815) 1815–1914 Colonial empire 1914–1945 Since 1945 See also References Further reading External links History of France Article Talk Read Edit View history Tools Appearance hide Text Small Standard Large Width Standard Wide Color (beta) Automatic Light Dark From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia For the Jules Michelet work called "History of France", see Histoire de France. "French History" redirects here. For the academic journal, see French History (journal). Part of a series on the History of France Carte de France dressée pour l'usage du Roy. Delisle Guillaume (1721) Timeline Ancient Middle Ages Early modern Long 19th century 20th century Topics DiplomacyEconomyHealth careLawLGBTQMedicineMilitaryMonarchs ConsortsPoliticsReligion ChristianityIslamJudaismTaxationTerritory flag France portal ·  History portal vte The first written records for the history of France appeared in the Iron Age. What is now France made up the bulk of the region known to the Romans as Gaul. Greek writers noted the presence of three main ethno-linguistic groups in the area: the Gauls, Aquitani and Belgae. Over the first millennium BC the Greeks, Romans and Carthaginians established colonies on the Mediterranean coast and offshore islands. The Roman Republic annexed southern Gaul in the late 2nd century BC, and legions under Julius Caesar conquered the rest of Gaul in the Gallic Wars of 58–51 BC. A Gallo-Roman culture emerged and Gaul was increasingly integrated into the Roman Empire. In the later stages of the empire, Gaul was subject to barbarian raids and migration. The Frankish king Clovis I united most of Gaul in the late 5th century. Frankish power reached its fullest extent under Charlemagne. The medieval Kingdom of France emerged from the western part of Charlemagne's Carolingian Empire, known as West Francia, and achieved increasing prominence under the rule of the House of Capet, founded in 987. A succession crisis in 1328 led to the Hundred Years' War between the House of Valois and the House of Plantagenet. The war began in 1337 following Philip VI's attempt to seize the Duchy of Aquitaine from its hereditary holder, Edward III of England, the Plantagenet claimant to the French throne. A notable figure of the war was Joan of Arc, a French peasant girl who led forces against the English, establishing herself as a national heroine. The war ended with a Valois victory in 1453, strengthening French nationalism and increasing the power and reach of the French monarchy. During the Ancien Régime over the next centuries, France transformed into a centralized absolute monarchy through the Renaissance and Reformation. At the height of the French Wars of Religion, France became embroiled in another succession crisis, as the last Valois king, Henry III, fought against factions the House of Bourbon and House of Guise. Henry, the Bourbon King of Navarre, won and established the Bourbon dynasty. A burgeoning worldwide colonial empire was established in the 16th century. In the late 18th century the monarchy and associated institutions were overthrown in the French Revolution. The Revolutionary Tribunal executed political opponents by guillotine, instituting the Reign of Terror (1793–94). The country was governed as a Republic, until Napoleon's French Empire was declared in 1804. Following his defeat in the Napoleonic Wars, France went through regime changes, being ruled as a monarchy, then Second Republic, then Second Empire, until a more lasting French Third Republic was established in 1870. France was one of the Triple Entente powers in World War I against the Central Powers. France was one of the Allied Powers in World War II, but was conquered by Nazi Germany in 1940. The Third Republic was dismantled, and most of the country was controlled directly by Germany, while the south was controlled until 1942 by the collaborationist Vichy government. Following liberation in 1944, the Fourth Republic was established. France slowly recovered, and enjoyed a baby boom that reversed its low fertility rate. Long wars in Indochina and Algeria drained French resources and ended in political defeat. In the wake of the 1958 Algerian Crisis, Charles de Gaulle set up the French Fifth Republic. Into the 1960s most of the French colonial empire became independent, while smaller parts were incorporated into the French state as overseas departments and collectivities. Since World War II France has been a permanent member in the UN Security Council and NATO. It played a central role in the unification process after 1945 that led to the European Union. It remains a strong economic, cultural, military and political factor in the 21st century. Prehistory Main article: Prehistory of France Cave painting in Lascaux, 15,000 BC. Stone tools discovered at Chilhac and Lézignan-la-Cèbe indicate that pre-human ancestors may have been present in France at least 1.6 million years ago.[1] Neanderthals were present in Europe from about 400,000 BC,[2] but died out about 40,000 years ago, possibly out-competed by modern humans during a period of cold weather. The earliest modern humans entered Europe by 43,000 years ago (the Upper Palaeolithic).[3] Gavrinis megalithic tomb, Brittany, 4200-4000 BC In the Chalcolithic and Early Bronze Age the territory of France was largely dominated by the Bell Beaker culture, followed by the Armorican Tumulus culture, Rhône culture, Tumulus culture, Urnfield culture and Atlantic Bronze Age culture, among others. The Iron Age saw the development of the Hallstatt culture followed by the La Tène culture. The first written records for the history of France appear in the Iron Age. Ancient history Not to be confused with Ancien Régime. Greek colonies Massalia (modern Marseille) Greek silver coin, 5th–1st century BC Main article: Greeks in pre-Roman Gaul In 600 BC, Ionian Greeks founded the colony of Massalia (present-day Marseille) on the shores of the Mediterranean Sea, making it one of the oldest cities in France.[4][5] At the same time, some Celtic tribes arrived in the eastern parts (Germania superior) of the current territory of France, but this occupation spread in the rest of France only between the 5th and 3rd century BC.[6] Gaul Main article: Gaul See also: Hallstatt culture and La Tène culture Vix palace, central France, late 6th century BC Covering large parts of modern-day France, Belgium, northwest Germany and northern Italy, Gaul was inhabited by many Celtic and Belgae tribes whom the Romans referred to as Gauls and who spoke the Gaulish language roughly between the Oise and the Garonne, according to Julius Caesar.[7] On the lower Garonne the people spoke Aquitanian, a Pre-Indo-European language related to (or a direct ancestor of) Basque whereas a Belgian language was spoken north of Lutecia but north of the Loire according to other authors like Strabo. The Celts founded cities such as Lutetia Parisiorum (Paris) and Burdigala (Bordeaux) while the Aquitanians founded Tolosa (Toulouse).[citation needed] Celtic expansion in Europe, 6th–3rd century BC Long before any Roman settlements, Greek navigators settled in what would become Provence.[8] The Phoceans founded important cities such as Massalia (Marseille) and Nikaia (Nice),[9] bringing them into conflict with the neighboring Celts and Ligurians. The Celts themselves often fought with Aquitanians and Germans, and a Gaulish war band led by Brennus invaded Rome c. 393 or 388 BC following the Battle of the Allia.[citation needed] However, the tribal society of the Gauls did not change fast enough for the centralized Roman state. The Gaulish tribal confederacies were defeated by the Romans in battles such as Sentinum and Telamon during the 3rd century BC.[citation needed] In the early 3rd century BC, some Belgae (Germani cisrhenani) conquered the surrounding territories of the Somme in northern Gaul after battles supposedly against the Armoricani (Gauls) near Ribemont-sur-Ancre and Gournay-sur-Aronde, where sanctuaries were found.[citation needed] When Carthaginian commander Hannibal Barca fought the Romans, he recruited several Gaulish mercenaries who fought on his side at Cannae. It was this Gaulish participation that caused Provence to be annexed in 122 BC by the Roman Republic.[10] Later, the Consul of Gaul — Julius Caesar — conquered all of Gaul. Despite Gaulish opposition led by Vercingetorix, the Gauls succumbed to the Roman onslaught. The Gauls had some success at first at Gergovia, but were ultimately defeated at Alesia in 52 BC. The Romans founded cities such as Lugdunum (Lyon), Narbonensis (Narbonne) and allow in a correspondence between Lucius Munatius Plancus and Cicero to formalize the existence of Cularo (Grenoble).[citation needed] Roman Gaul Main article: Roman Gaul Vercingetorix throws down his arms at the feet of Julius Caesar after the Battle of Alesia. Painting by Lionel-Noël Royer, 1899. Roman Temple at Nîmes Gaul was divided into several different provinces. The Romans displaced populations to prevent local identities from becoming a threat to Roman control. Thus, many Celts were displaced in Aquitania or were enslaved and moved out of Gaul. There was a strong cultural evolution in Gaul under the Roman Empire, the most obvious one being the replacement of the Gaulish language by Vulgar Latin. It has been argued the similarities between the Gaulish and Latin languages favoured the transition. Gaul remained under Roman control for centuries and Celtic culture was then gradually replaced by Gallo-Roman culture. The Gauls became better integrated with the Empire with the passage of time. For instance, generals Marcus Antonius Primus and Gnaeus Julius Agricola were both born in Gaul, as were emperors Claudius and Caracalla. Emperor Antoninus Pius also came from a Gaulish family. In the decade following Valerian's capture by the Persians in 260, Postumus established a short-lived Gallic Empire, which included the Iberian Peninsula and Britannia, in addition to Gaul itself. Germanic tribes, the Franks and the Alamanni, entered Gaul at this time. The Gallic Empire ended with Emperor Aurelian's victory at Châlons in 274. A migration of Celts occurred in the 4th century in Armorica. They were led by the legendary king Conan Meriadoc and came from Britain. They spoke the now extinct British language, which evolved into the Breton, Cornish, and Welsh languages. In 418 the Aquitanian province was given to the Goths in exchange for their support against the Vandals. Those same Goths had sacked Rome in 410 and established a capital in Toulouse. Main article: Crossing of the Rhine The Roman Empire had difficulty integrating all the barbarian newcomers - with whom foederati treaties were concluded - within the empire, and generals as Flavius Aëtius had to use these tribes against each other in order to maintain some Roman control. He first used the Huns against the Burgundians, and these mercenaries destroyed Worms, killed king Gunther, and pushed the Burgundians westward. The Burgundians were resettled by Aëtius near Lugdunum in 443. The Huns, united by Attila, became a greater threat, and Aëtius used the Visigoths against the Huns. The conflict climaxed in 451 at the Battle of Châlons, in which the Romans and Goths defeated Attila. Main articles: Frankish War (428), Gothic War (436-439), and Burgundian Revolt of Gunther The Roman Empire was on the verge of collapsing. Aquitania was definitely abandoned to the Visigoths, who would soon conquer a significant part of southern Gaul as well as most of the Iberian Peninsula. The Burgundians claimed their own kingdom, and northern Gaul was practically abandoned to the Franks. Aside from the Germanic peoples, the Vascones entered Wasconia from the Pyrenees and the Bretons formed three kingdoms in Armorica: Domnonia, Cornouaille and Broërec.[11] Frankish kingdoms (486–987) Main article: Francia See also: List of Frankish kings, Merovingian, Carolingian Renaissance, Carolingian Empire, Carolingian dynasty, and Early Middle Ages Victory over the Umayyads at the Battle of Tours (732) marked the furthest Muslim advance and enabled Frankish domination of Europe for the next century. In 486, Clovis I, leader of the Salian Franks, defeated Syagrius at Soissons and subsequently united most of northern and central Gaul under his rule. Clovis then recorded a succession of victories against other Germanic tribes such as the Alamanni at Tolbiac. In 496, pagan Clovis adopted Catholicism. This gave him greater legitimacy and power over his Christian subjects and granted him clerical support against the Arian Visigoths. He defeated Alaric II at Vouillé in 507 and annexed Aquitaine, and thus Toulouse, into his Frankish kingdom.[12] The Goths retired to Toledo in what would become Spain. Clovis made Paris his capital and established the Merovingian dynasty but his kingdom would not survive his death in 511. Under Frankish inheritance traditions, all sons inherit part of the land, so four kingdoms emerged: centered on Paris, Orléans, Soissons, and Rheims. Over time, the borders and numbers of Frankish kingdoms were fluid and changed frequently. Also during this time, the Mayors of the Palace, originally the chief advisor to the kings, would become the real power in the Frankish lands; the Merovingian kings themselves would be reduced to little more than figureheads.[12] By this time Muslims had conquered Hispania and Septimania became part of the Al-Andalus, which were threatening the Frankish kingdoms. Duke Odo the Great defeated a major invading force at Toulouse in 721 but failed to repel a raiding party in 732. The mayor of the palace, Charles Martel, defeated that raiding party at the Battle of Tours and earned respect and power within the Frankish Kingdom. The assumption of the crown in 751 by Pepin the Short (son of Charles Martel) established the Carolingian dynasty as the kings of the Franks. The coronation of Charlemagne (painting by Jean Fouquet). Carolingian power reached its fullest extent under Pepin's son, Charlemagne. In 771, Charlemagne reunited the Frankish domains after a further period of division, subsequently conquering the Lombards under Desiderius in what is now northern Italy (774), incorporating Bavaria (788) into his realm, defeating the Avars of the Danubian plain (796), advancing the frontier with Al-Andalus as far south as Barcelona (801), and subjugating Lower Saxony after a prolonged campaign (804). In recognition of his successes and his political support for the papacy, Charlemagne was crowned Emperor of the Romans by Pope Leo III in 800. Charlemagne's son Louis the Pious (emperor 814–840) kept the empire united; however, this Carolingian Empire would not survive Louis I's death. Two of his sons — Charles the Bald and Louis the German — swore allegiance to each other against their brother — Lothair I — in the Oaths of Strasbourg, and the empire was divided among Louis's three sons (Treaty of Verdun, 843). After a last brief reunification (884–887), the imperial title ceased to be held in the western realm, which was to form the basis of the future French kingdom. The eastern realm, which would become Germany, elected the Saxon dynasty of Henry the Fowler.[13] Under the Carolingians, the kingdom was ravaged by Viking raiders. In this struggle some important figures such as Count Odo of Paris and his brother King Robert rose to fame and became kings. This emerging dynasty, whose members were called the Robertines, were the predecessors of the Capetian dynasty. Led by Rollo, some Vikings had settled in Normandy and were granted the land, first as counts and then as dukes, by King Charles the Simple, in order to protect the land from other raiders. The people that emerged from the interactions between the new Viking aristocracy and the already mixed Franks and Gallo-Romans became known as the Normans.[14] State building into the Kingdom of France (987–1453) Main article: France in the Middle Ages Strong princes France was a very decentralised state during the Middle Ages. The authority of the king was more religious than administrative. The 11th century in France marked the apogee of princely power at the expense of the king when states like Normandy, Flanders or Languedoc enjoyed a local authority comparable to kingdoms in all but name. The Capetians, as they were descended from the Robertians, were formerly powerful princes themselves who had successfully unseated the weak and unfortunate Carolingian kings.[15] The Capetians, in a way, held a dual status of King and Prince; as king they held the Crown of Charlemagne and as Count of Paris they held their personal fiefdom, best known as Île-de-France.[15] Some of the king's vassals would grow sufficiently powerful that they would become some of the strongest rulers of western Europe. The Normans, the Plantagenets, the Lusignans, the Hautevilles, the Ramnulfids, and the House of Toulouse successfully carved lands outside France for themselves. The most important of these conquests for French history was the Norman Conquest by William the Conqueror.[16] An important part of the French aristocracy also involved itself in the crusades, and French knights founded and ruled the Crusader states. The French were also active in the Iberian Reconquista to Rechristianize Muslim Spain and Portugal. The Iberian reconquista made use of French knights and settlers to repopulate former Muslim settlements that were sacked by conquering Spanish or Portuguese Christians.[17][18] Rise of the monarchy The monarchy overcame the powerful barons over ensuing centuries, and established absolute sovereignty over France in the 16th century.[19] Hugh Capet in 987 became "King of the Franks" (Rex Francorum). He was recorded to be recognised king by the Gauls, Bretons, Danes, Aquitanians, Goths, Spanish and Gascons.[20] A view of the remains of the Abbey of Cluny, a Benedictine monastery that was the centre of monastic life revival in the Middle Ages and marked an important step in the cultural rebirth following the Dark Ages. Hugh's son—Robert the Pious—was crowned King of the Franks before Capet's demise. Hugh Capet decided so in order to have his succession secured. Robert II, as King of the Franks, met Emperor Henry II in 1023 on the borderline. They agreed to end all claims over each other's realm, setting a new stage of Capetian and Ottonian relationships. The reign of Robert II was quite important because it involved the Peace and Truce of God (beginning in 989) and the Cluniac Reforms.[20] Godefroy de Bouillon, a French knight, leader of the First Crusade and founder of the Kingdom of Jerusalem. Under King Philip I, the kingdom enjoyed a modest recovery during his extraordinarily long reign (1060–1108). His reign also saw the launch of the First Crusade to regain the Holy Land. It is from Louis VI (reigned 1108–37) onward that royal authority became more accepted. Louis VI was more a soldier and warmongering king than a scholar. The way the king raised money from his vassals made him quite unpopular; he was described as greedy and ambitious. His regular attacks on his vassals, although damaging the royal image, reinforced the royal power. From 1127 onward Louis had the assistance of a skilled religious statesman, Abbot Suger. Louis VI successfully defeated, both military and politically, many of the robber barons. When Louis VI died in 1137, much progress had been made towards strengthening Capetian authority.[20] Thanks to Abbot Suger's political advice, King Louis VII (junior king 1131–37, senior king 1137–80) enjoyed greater moral authority over France than his predecessors. Powerful vassals paid homage to the French king.[21] Abbot Suger arranged the 1137 marriage between Louis VII and Eleanor of Aquitaine in Bordeaux, which made Louis VII Duke of Aquitaine and gave him considerable power. The marriage was ultimately annulled and Eleanor soon married the Duke of Normandy — Henry Fitzempress, who would become King of England two years later.[22] Late Capetians (1165–1328) Philip II victorious at Bouvines, thus annexing Normandy and Anjou into his royal domains. This battle involved a complex set of alliances from three important states, the Kingdoms of France and England and the Holy Roman Empire. The late direct Capetian kings were considerably more powerful and influential than the earliest ones. This period also saw the rise of a complex system of international alliances and conflicts opposing, through dynasties, kings of France and England and the Holy Roman Emperor. The reign of Philip II Augustus (junior king 1179–80, senior king 1180–1223) saw the French royal domain and influence greatly expanded. He set the context for the rise of power to much more powerful monarchs like Saint Louis and Philip the Fair. Philip II spent an important part of his reign fighting the so-called Angevin Empire. During the first part of his reign Philip II allied himself with the Duke of Aquitaine and son of Henry II—Richard Lionheart—and together they launched a decisive attack on Henry's home of Chinon and removed him from power. Richard replaced his father as King of England afterward. The two kings then went crusading during the Third Crusade; however, their alliance and friendship broke down during the crusade. John Lackland, Richard's successor, refused to come to the French court for a trial against the Lusignans and, as Louis VI had done often to his rebellious vassals, Philip II confiscated John's possessions in France. John's defeat was swift and his attempts to reconquer his French possession at the decisive Battle of Bouvines (1214) resulted in complete failure. Philip II had annexed Normandy and Anjou, plus capturing the Counts of Boulogne and Flanders, although Aquitaine and Gascony remained loyal to the Plantagenet King. Prince Louis (the future Louis VIII, reigned 1223–26) was involved in the subsequent English civil war as French and English (or rather Anglo-Norman) aristocracies were once one and were now split between allegiances. While the French kings were struggling against the Plantagenets, the Church called for the Albigensian Crusade. Southern France was then largely absorbed in the royal domains. France became a truly centralised kingdom under Louis IX (reigned 1226–70). The kingdom was vulnerable: war was still going on in the County of Toulouse, and the royal army was occupied fighting resistance in Languedoc. Count Raymond VII of Toulouse finally signed the Treaty of Paris in 1229, in which he retained much of his lands for life, but his daughter, married to Count Alfonso of Poitou, produced him no heir and so the County of Toulouse went to the King of France. King Henry III of England had not yet recognized the Capetian overlordship over Aquitaine and still hoped to recover Normandy and Anjou and reform the Angevin Empire. He landed in 1230 at Saint-Malo with a massive force. This evolved into the Saintonge War (1242). Ultimately, Henry III was defeated and had to recognise Louis IX's overlordship, although the King of France did not seize Aquitaine. Louis IX was now the most important landowner of France. There were some opposition to his rule in Normandy, yet it proved remarkably easy to rule, especially compared to the County of Toulouse which had been brutally conquered. The Conseil du Roi, which would evolve into the Parlement, was founded in these times. After his conflict with King Henry III of England, Louis established a cordial relation with the Plantagenet King.[23] The Kingdom was involved in two crusades under Louis: the Seventh Crusade and the Eighth Crusade. Both proved to be complete failures for the French King. Philip III became king when Saint Louis died in 1270 during the Eighth Crusade. Philip III was called "the Bold" on the basis of his abilities in combat and on horseback, and not because of his character or ruling abilities. Philip III took part in another crusading disaster: the Aragonese Crusade, which cost him his life in 1285. More administrative reforms were made by Philip IV, also called Philip the Fair (reigned 1285–1314). This king was responsible for the end of the Knights Templar, signed the Auld Alliance, and established the Parlement of Paris. Philip IV was so powerful that he could name popes and emperors, unlike the early Capetians. The papacy was moved to Avignon and all the contemporary popes were French, such as Philip IV's puppet Bertrand de Goth, Pope Clement V. Early Valois Kings and the Hundred Years' War (1328–1453) The capture of the French king John II at Poitiers in 1356 Coronation of Charles VII as King of France in Reims 17 July 1429 [reign 21 October 1422 – 22 July 1461] Coronation of English King Henry VI as Henri II King of France in Paris 16 December 1431 [reign 21 October 1422-19 October 1453] The tensions between the Houses of Plantagenet and Capet climaxed during the so-called Hundred Years' War (actually several distinct wars over the period 1337 to 1453) when the Plantagenets claimed the throne of France from the Valois. This was also the time of the Black Death in France, as well as several devastating civil wars. In 1420, by the Treaty of Troyes Henry V was made heir to Charles VI. Henry V failed to outlive Charles so it was Henry VI of England and France who consolidated the Dual-Monarchy of England and France. It has been argued that the difficult conditions the French population suffered during the Hundred Years' War awakened French nationalism, a nationalism represented by Joan of Arc (1412–1431). Although this is debatable, the Hundred Years' War is remembered more as a Franco-English war than as a succession of feudal struggles. During this war, France evolved politically and militarily. Although a Franco-Scottish army was successful at the Battle of Baugé (1421), the humiliating defeats of Poitiers (1356) and Agincourt (1415) forced the French nobility to realise they could not stand just as armoured knights without an organised army. Charles VII (reigned 1422–61) established the first French standing army, the Compagnies d'ordonnance, and defeated the Plantagenets once at Patay (1429) and again, using cannons, at Formigny (1450). The Battle of Castillon (1453) was the last engagement of this war; Calais and the Channel Islands remained ruled by the Plantagenets. Early Modern France (1453–1789) France in the late 15th century: a mosaic of feudal territories Main articles: Early Modern France and History of French foreign relations Ancien Regime Main article: Ancien Régime France's population was 13 million people in 1484 and 20 million in 1700. It had the second largest population in Europe around 1700. France's lead slowly faded after 1700, as other countries grew faster.[24] Political power was widely dispersed. The law courts ("Parlements") were powerful. However, the king had only about 10,000 officials in royal service – very few indeed for such a large country, and with very slow internal communications over an inadequate road system. Travel was usually faster by ocean ship or river boat.[25] The different estates of the realm — the clergy, the nobility, and commoners — occasionally met together in the "Estates General", but in practice the Estates General had no power, for it could petition the king but could not pass laws. The Catholic Church controlled about 40% of the wealth. The king (not the pope) nominated bishops, but typically had to negotiate with noble families that had close ties to local monasteries and church establishments. The nobility came second in terms of wealth, but there was no unity. Each noble had his own lands, his own network of regional connections, and his own military force.[25] The cities had a quasi-independent status, and were largely controlled by the leading merchants and guilds. Peasants made up the vast majority of the population, who in many cases had well-established rights that the authorities had to respect. In the 17th century peasants had ties to the market economy, provided much of the capital investment necessary for agricultural growth, and frequently moved from village to village (or town).[26] Although most peasants in France spoke local dialects, an official language emerged in Paris and the French language became the preferred language of Europe's aristocracy and the lingua franca of diplomacy and international relations. Holy Roman Emperor Charles V quipped, "I speak Spanish to God, Italian to women, French to men, and German to my horse."[27] Consolidation (15th and 16th centuries) Charles the Bold, the last Valois Duke of Burgundy. His death at the Battle of Nancy (1477) marked the division of his lands between the kings of France and Habsburg dynasty. With the death in 1477 of Charles the Bold, France and the Habsburgs began a long process of dividing his rich Burgundian lands, leading to numerous wars. In 1532, Brittany was incorporated into the Kingdom of France. France engaged in the long Italian Wars (1494–1559), which marked the beginning of early modern France. Francis I faced powerful foes, and he was captured at Pavia. The French monarchy then sought for allies and found one in the Ottoman Empire. The Ottoman Admiral Barbarossa captured Nice in 1543 and handed it down to Francis I. During the 16th century, the Spanish and Austrian Habsburgs were the dominant power in Europe. The many domains of Charles V encircled France. The Spanish Tercio was used with great success against French knights. Finally, on 7 January 1558, the Duke of Guise seized Calais from the English. Economic historians call the era from about 1475 to 1630 the "beautiful 16th century" because of the return of peace, prosperity and optimism across the nation, and the steady growth of population. In 1559, Henry II of France signed (with the approval of Ferdinand I, Holy Roman Emperor) two treaties (Peace of Cateau-Cambrésis): one with Elizabeth I of England and one with Philip II of Spain. This ended long-lasting conflicts between France, England and Spain. Protestant Huguenots and wars of religion (1562–1629) Main article: French Wars of Religion Henry IV of France was the first French Bourbon king The Protestant Reformation, inspired in France mainly by John Calvin, began to challenge the legitimacy and rituals of the Catholic Church.[28] French King Henry II severely persecuted Protestants under the Edict of Chateaubriand (1551).[29] Renewed Catholic reaction — headed by the powerful Francis, Duke of Guise — led to a massacre of Huguenots at Vassy in 1562, starting the first of the French Wars of Religion, during which English, German, and Spanish forces intervened on the side of rival Protestant ("Huguenot") and Catholic forces. King Henry II died in 1559 in a jousting tournament; he was succeeded in turn by his three sons, each of whom assumed the throne as minors or were weak, ineffectual rulers. Into the power vacuum entered Henry's widow, Catherine de' Medici, who became a central figure in the early years of the Wars of Religion. She is often blamed for the St. Bartholomew's Day massacre of 1572, when thousands of Huguenots were murdered in Paris and the provinces of France. The Wars of Religion culminated in the War of the Three Henrys (1584–98), at the height of which bodyguards of the King Henry III assassinated Henry de Guise, leader of the Spanish-backed Catholic league, in December 1588. In revenge, a priest assassinated Henry III in 1589. This led to the ascension of the Huguenot Henry IV; in order to bring peace to a country beset by religious and succession wars, he converted to Catholicism. He issued the Edict of Nantes in 1598, which guaranteed religious liberties to the Protestants, thereby effectively ending the civil war.[30] Henry IV was assassinated in 1610 by a fanatical Catholic. When in 1620 the Huguenots proclaimed a constitution for the 'Republic of the Reformed Churches of France', the chief minister Cardinal Richelieu invoked the entire powers of the state to stop it. Religious conflicts therefore resumed under Louis XIII when Richelieu forced Protestants to disarm their army and fortresses. This conflict ended in the Siege of La Rochelle (1627–28), in which Protestants and their English supporters were defeated. The following Peace of Alais (1629) confirmed religious freedom yet dismantled the Protestant military defences.[31] In the face of persecution, Huguenots dispersed widely throughout Europe and America.[32] Thirty Years' War (1618–1648) Main article: Thirty Years' War The religious conflicts that plagued France also ravaged the Habsburg-led Holy Roman Empire. The Thirty Years' War eroded the power of the Catholic Habsburgs. Although Cardinal Richelieu, the powerful chief minister of France, had mauled the Protestants, he joined this war on their side in 1636 because it was in the national interest. Imperial Habsburg forces invaded France, ravaged Champagne, and nearly threatened Paris.[33] Richelieu died in 1642 and was succeeded by Cardinal Mazarin, while Louis XIII died one year later and was succeeded by Louis XIV. France was served by some very efficient commanders such as Louis II de Bourbon, Prince de Condé and Henri de la Tour d'Auvergne, Vicomte de Turenne. The French forces won a decisive victory at Rocroi (1643), and the Spanish army was decimated; the Tercio was broken. The Truce of Ulm (1647) and the Peace of Westphalia (1648) brought an end to the war.[33] France was hit by civil unrest known as The Fronde which in turn evolved into the Franco-Spanish War in 1653. Louis II de Bourbon joined the Spanish army this time, but suffered a severe defeat at Dunkirk (1658) by Henry de la Tour d'Auvergne. The terms for the peace inflicted upon the Spanish kingdoms in the Treaty of the Pyrenees (1659) were harsh, as France annexed Northern Catalonia.[33] Colonies (16th and 17th centuries) Main article: French colonial empire During the 16th century, the king began to claim North American territories and established several colonies.[34] Jacques Cartier was one of the great explorers who ventured deep into American territories during the 16th century. The early 17th century saw the first successful French settlements in the New World with the voyages of Samuel de Champlain in 1608.[35] The largest settlement was New France. In 1699, French territorial claims in North America expanded still further, with the foundation of Louisiana. The French presence in Africa began in Senegal in 1626, although formal colonies and trading posts were not established until 1659 with the founding of Saint-Louis. The first French settlement of Madagascar began in 1642 with the establishment of Fort Dauphin. Louis XIV (1643–1715) Main article: Louis XIV of France Louis XIV of France, the "Sun King". Louis XIV, known as the "Sun King", reigned over France from 1643 until 1715. Louis continued his predecessors' work of creating a centralized state governed from Paris, sought to eliminate remnants of feudalism in France, and subjugated and weakened the aristocracy. By these means he consolidated a system of absolute monarchical rule in France that endured until the French Revolution. However, Louis XIV's long reign saw France involved in many wars that drained its treasury.[36] The French-dominated League of the Rhine fought against the Ottoman Turks at the Battle of Saint Gotthard in 1664.[36] France fought the War of Devolution against Spain in 1667. France's defeat of Spain and invasion of the Spanish Netherlands alarmed England and Sweden. With the Dutch Republic they formed the Triple Alliance to check Louis XIV's expansion. Louis II de Bourbon had captured Franche-Comté, but in face of an indefensible position, Louis XIV agreed to the peace of Aachen.[37] War broke out again between France and the Dutch Republic in the Franco-Dutch War (1672–78). France attacked the Dutch Republic and was joined by England in this conflict. Through targeted inundations of polders by breaking dykes, the French invasion of the Dutch Republic was brought to a halt.[38] The Dutch Admiral Michiel de Ruyter inflicted a few strategic defeats on the Anglo-French naval alliance and forced England to retire from the war in 1674. Because the Netherlands could not resist indefinitely, it agreed to peace in the Treaties of Nijmegen, according to which France would annex France-Comté and acquire further concessions in the Spanish Netherlands. In May 1682, the royal court moved to the lavish Palace of Versailles, which Louis XIV had greatly expanded. Over time, Louis XIV compelled many members of the nobility, especially the noble elite, to inhabit Versailles. He controlled the nobility with an elaborate system of pensions and privileges, and replaced their power with himself. Peace did not last, and war between France and Spain again resumed.[38] The War of the Reunions broke out (1683–84), and again Spain, with its ally the Holy Roman Empire, was defeated. Meanwhile, in October 1685 Louis signed the Edict of Fontainebleau ordering the destruction of all Protestant churches and schools in France. Its immediate consequence was a large Protestant exodus from France. Over two million people died in two famines in 1693 and 1710.[38] France would soon be involved in another war, the War of the Grand Alliance. This time the theatre was not only in Europe but also in North America. Although the war was long and difficult (it was also called the Nine Years' War), its results were inconclusive. The Treaty of Ryswick in 1697 confirmed French sovereignty over Alsace, yet rejected its claims to Luxembourg. Louis also had to evacuate Catalonia and the Palatinate. This peace was considered a truce by all sides, thus war was to start again.[37] The expansion of France, 1552 to 1798. In 1701, the War of the Spanish Succession began. The Bourbon Philip of Anjou was designated heir to the throne of Spain as Philip V. The Habsburg Emperor Leopold opposed a Bourbon succession, because the power that such a succession would bring to the Bourbon rulers of France would disturb the delicate balance of power in Europe. Therefore, he claimed the Spanish thrones for himself.[37] England and the Dutch Republic joined Leopold against Louis XIV and Philip of Anjou. They inflicted a few resounding defeats on the French army; the Battle of Blenheim in 1704 was the first major land battle lost by France since its victory at Rocroi in 1643. Yet, the extremely bloody battles of Ramillies (1706) and Malplaquet (1709) proved to be Pyrrhic victories for the allies, as they had lost too many men to continue the war.[37] Led by Villars, French forces recovered much of the lost ground in battles such as Denain (1712). Finally, a compromise was achieved with the Treaty of Utrecht in 1713. Philip of Anjou was confirmed as Philip V, king of Spain; Emperor Leopold did not get the throne, but Philip V was barred from inheriting France.[37] Louis XIV wanted to be remembered as a patron of the arts, and invited Jean-Baptiste Lully to establish the French opera. The wars were so expensive, and so inconclusive, that although France gained some territory to the east, its enemies gained more strength than it did. Vauban, France's leading military strategist, warned the King in 1689 that a hostile "Alliance" was too powerful at sea. He recommended the best way for France to fight back was to license French merchants ships to privateer and seize enemy merchant ships, while avoiding its navies.[39] Vauban was pessimistic about France's so-called friends and allies and recommended against expensive land wars, or hopeless naval wars.[40] Major changes in France, Europe, and North America (1718–1783) Main article: Seven Years' War See also: French colonization of the Americas and Age of Enlightenment Louis XIV died in 1715 and was succeeded by his five-year-old great-grandson who reigned as Louis XV until his death in 1774. In 1718, France was once again at war, as Philip II of Orléans's regency joined the War of the Quadruple Alliance against Spain.[41] In 1733 another war broke in central Europe, this time about the Polish succession, and France joined the war against the Austrian Empire. Peace was settled in the Treaty of Vienna (1738), according to which France would annex, through inheritance, the Duchy of Lorraine.[41] Two years later, in 1740, war broke out over the Austrian succession, and France seized the opportunity to join the conflict. The war played out in North America and India as well as Europe, and inconclusive terms were agreed to in the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle (1748). Prussia was then becoming a new threat, as it had gained substantial territory from Austria. This led to the Diplomatic Revolution of 1756, in which the alliances seen during the previous war were mostly inverted. France was now allied to Austria and Russia, while Britain was now allied to Prussia.[42] In the North American theatre, France was allied with various Native American peoples during the Seven Years' War and, despite a temporary success at the battles of the Great Meadows and Monongahela, French forces were defeated at the disastrous Battle of the Plains of Abraham in Quebec. In 1762, Russia, France, and Austria were on the verge of crushing Prussia, when the Anglo-Prussian Alliance was saved by the Miracle of the House of Brandenburg. At sea, naval defeats against British fleets at Lagos and Quiberon Bay in 1759 and a crippling blockade forced France to keep its ships in port. Finally peace was concluded in the Treaty of Paris (1763), and France lost its North American empire.[42] Lord Cornwallis surrenders at Yorktown to American and French allies. Britain's success in the Seven Years' War had allowed them to eclipse France as the leading colonial power. France sought revenge for this defeat, and under Choiseul France started to rebuild. In 1766, the French Kingdom annexed Lorraine and the following year bought Corsica from Genoa. Having lost its colonial empire, France saw a good opportunity for revenge against Britain in signing an alliance with the Americans in 1778, and sending an army and navy that turned the American Revolution into a world war. Admiral de Grasse defeated a British fleet at Chesapeake Bay while Jean-Baptiste Donatien de Vimeur, comte de Rochambeau and Gilbert du Motier, Marquis de Lafayette joined American forces in defeating the British at Yorktown. The war was concluded by the Treaty of Paris (1783); the United States became independent. The British Royal Navy scored a major victory over France in 1782 at the Battle of the Saintes and France finished the war with huge debts and the minor gain of the island of Tobago.[43] French Enlightenment Main article: Age of Enlightenment Cover of the Encyclopédie. The "Philosophes" were 18th-century French intellectuals who dominated the French Enlightenment and were influential across Europe.[44] The philosopher Denis Diderot was editor-in-chief of the famous Enlightenment accomplishment, the 72,000-article Encyclopédie (1751–72).[45] It sparked a revolution in learning throughout the enlightened world.[46] In the early part of the 18th century the movement was dominated by Voltaire and Montesquieu. Around 1750 the Philosophes reached their most influential period, as Montesquieu published Spirit of Laws (1748) and Jean Jacques Rousseau published Discourse on the Moral Effects of the Arts and Sciences (1750). The leader of the French Enlightenment and a writer of enormous influence across Europe, was Voltaire.[47] Astronomy, chemistry, mathematics and technology flourished. French chemists such as Antoine Lavoisier worked to replace the archaic units of weights and measures by a coherent scientific system. Lavoisier also formulated the law of Conservation of mass and discovered oxygen and hydrogen.[48] Revolutionary France (1789–1799) Main article: French Revolution Day of the Tiles in 1788 at Grenoble was the first riot. (Musée de la Révolution française). The French Revolution was a period of political and societal change in France that began with the Estates General of 1789, and ended with the coup of 18 Brumaire in November 1799 and the formation of the French Consulate. Many of its ideas are considered fundamental principles of liberal democracy,[49] while its values and institutions remain central to modern French political discourse.[50] Its causes are generally agreed to be a combination of social, political and economic factors, which the Ancien Régime proved unable to manage. A financial crisis and widespread social distress led in May 1789 to the convocation of the Estates General, which was converted into a National Assembly in June. The Storming of the Bastille on 14 July led to a series of radical measures by the Assembly, among them the abolition of feudalism, state control over the Catholic Church in France, and a declaration of rights. The next three years were dominated by the struggle for political control, exacerbated by economic depression. Military defeats following the outbreak of the French Revolutionary Wars in April 1792 resulted in the insurrection of 10 August 1792. The monarchy was abolished and replaced by the French First Republic in September, while Louis XVI was executed in January 1793. After another revolt in June 1793, the constitution was suspended and effective political power passed from the National Convention to the Committee of Public Safety. About 16,000 people were executed in a Reign of Terror, which ended in July 1794. Weakened by external threats and internal opposition, the Republic was replaced in 1795 by the Directory. Four years later in 1799, the Consulate seized power in a military coup led by Napoleon Bonaparte. This is generally seen as marking the end of the Revolutionary period. Napoleonic France (1799–1815) See also: Napoleonic wars Napoleon I on His Imperial Throne, by Jean Auguste Dominique Ingres. During the War of the First Coalition (1792–1797), the Directory had replaced the National Convention. Five directors then ruled France. As Great Britain was still at war with France, a plan was made to take Egypt from the Ottoman Empire, a British ally. This was Napoleon's idea and the Directory agreed to the plan in order to send the popular general away from the mainland. Napoleon defeated the Ottoman forces during the Battle of the Pyramids (1798). Scientists and linguists thoroughly explored Egypt. Weeks later, the British fleet under Admiral Horatio Nelson unexpectedly destroyed the French fleet at the Battle of the Nile. Napoleon planned to move into Syria, but was defeated at the Siege of Acre. He returned to France without his army, which surrendered.[51] The Directory was threatened by the Second Coalition (1798–1802). Royalists and their allies still dreamed of restoring the monarchy to power, while the Prussian and Austrian crowns did not accept their territorial losses during the previous war. In 1799, the Russian army expelled the French from Italy in battles such as Cassano, while the Austrian army defeated the French in Switzerland at Stockach and Zurich. Napoleon then seized power through a coup and established the Consulate in 1799. The Austrian army was defeated at the Battle of Marengo and the Battle of Hohenlinden in 1800.[52] While at sea the French had some success at Boulogne but Nelson's Royal Navy destroyed an anchored Danish and Norwegian fleet at the Battle of Copenhagen (1801) because the Scandinavian kingdoms were against the British blockade of France. The Second Coalition was beaten and peace was settled in two distinct treaties: the Treaty of Lunéville and the Treaty of Amiens. A brief interlude of peace ensued in 1802–03, during which Napoleon sold French Louisiana to the United States, because it was indefensible.[52] In 1801, Napoleon concluded a "Concordat" with Pope Pius VII that opened peaceful relations between church and state in France. The policies of the Revolution were reversed, except the Church did not get its lands back. Bishops and clergy were to receive state salaries, and the government would pay for the building and maintenance of churches.[53] Napoleon reorganized higher learning by dividing the Institut National into four (later five) academies. Napoléon at the Battle of Austerlitz, by François Gérard Napoléon at the Battle of Austerlitz, by François Gérard. In 1804, Napoleon was titled Emperor by the senate, thus founding the First French Empire. Napoleon's rule was constitutional, and although autocratic, it was much more advanced than traditional European monarchies of the time. The proclamation of the French Empire was met by the Third Coalition. The French army was renamed La Grande Armée in 1805 and Napoleon used propaganda and nationalism to control the French population. The French army achieved a resounding victory at Ulm, where an entire Austrian army was captured.[54] A Franco-Spanish fleet was defeated at Trafalgar, making plans to invade Britain impossible. Despite this defeat, Napoleon inflicted on the Austrian and Russian Empires one of their greatest defeats at Austerlitz on December 2, 1805, destroying the Third Coalition. Peace was settled in the Treaty of Pressburg; the Austrian Empire lost the title of Holy Roman Emperor and the Confederation of the Rhine was created by Napoleon over former Austrian territories.[54] Coalitions formed against Napoleon Prussia joined Britain and Russia, thus forming the Fourth Coalition. Although the Coalition was joined by other allies, the French Empire was also not alone since it now had a complex network of allies and subject states. The largely outnumbered French army crushed the Prussian army at Jena-Auerstedt in 1806; Napoleon captured Berlin and went as far as Eastern Prussia. There the Russian Empire was defeated at the Battle of Friedland (14 June 1807). Peace was dictated in the Treaties of Tilsit, in which Russia had to join the Continental System, and Prussia handed half of its territories to France. The Duchy of Warsaw was formed over these territorial losses, and Polish troops entered the Grande Armée in significant numbers.[55] In order to ruin the British economy, Napoleon set up the Continental System in 1807, and tried to prevent merchants across Europe from trading with Britain. The large amount of smuggling frustrated Napoleon, and did more harm to his economy than to his enemies'.[56] The height of the First Empire. Freed from his obligation in the east, Napoleon then went back to the west, as the French Empire was still at war with Britain. Only two countries remained neutral in the war: Sweden and Portugal, and Napoleon then looked toward the latter. In the Treaty of Fontainebleau (1807), a Franco-Spanish alliance against Portugal was sealed as Spain eyed Portuguese territories. French armies entered Spain in order to attack Portugal, but then seized Spanish fortresses and took over the kingdom by surprise. Joseph Bonaparte, Napoleon's brother, was made King of Spain after Charles IV abdicated.[57] This occupation of the Iberian peninsula fueled local nationalism, and soon the Spanish and Portuguese fought the French using guerilla tactics, defeating the French forces at the Battle of Bailén (June and July 1808). Britain sent a short-lived ground support force to Portugal, and French forces evacuated Portugal as defined in the Convention of Sintra following the Allied victory at Vimeiro (21 August 1808). France only controlled Catalonia and Navarre and could have been definitely expelled from the Iberian peninsula had the Spanish armies attacked again, but the Spanish did not.[58] Another French attack was launched on Spain, led by Napoleon himself, and was described as "an avalanche of fire and steel". However, the French Empire was no longer regarded as invincible by European powers. In 1808, Austria formed the Fifth Coalition in order to break down the French Empire. The Austrian Empire defeated the French at Aspern-Essling, yet was beaten at Wagram while the Polish allies defeated the Austrian Empire at Raszyn (April 1809). Although not as decisive as the previous Austrian defeats, the peace treaty in October 1809 stripped Austria of a large amount of territory, reducing it even more. Napoleon Bonaparte retreating from Moscow, by Adolf Northern. In 1812, war broke out with Russia, engaging Napoleon in the disastrous French invasion of Russia (1812). Napoleon assembled the largest army Europe had ever seen, including troops from all subject states, to invade Russia, which had just left the continental system and was gathering an army on the Polish frontier. Following an exhausting march and the bloody but inconclusive Battle of Borodino, near Moscow, the Grande Armée entered and captured Moscow, only to find it burning as part of the Russian scorched earth tactics. Although there still were battles, the Napoleonic army left Russia in late 1812 annihilated, most of all by the Russian winter, exhaustion, and scorched earth warfare. On the Spanish front the French troops were defeated at Vitoria (June 1813) and then at the Battle of the Pyrenees (July–August 1813). Since the Spanish guerrillas seemed to be uncontrollable, the French troops eventually evacuated Spain.[59] Since France had been defeated on these two fronts, states that had been conquered and controlled by Napoleon saw a good opportunity to strike back. The Sixth Coalition was formed under British leadership.[60] The German states of the Confederation of the Rhine switched sides, finally opposing Napoleon. Napoleon was largely defeated in the Battle of the Nations outside Leipzig in October 1813, his forces heavily outnumbered by the Allied coalition armies and was overwhelmed by much larger armies during the Six Days Campaign (February 1814), although, the Six Days Campaign is often considered a tactical masterpiece because the allies suffered much higher casualties. Napoleon abdicated on 6 April 1814, and was exiled to Elba.[61] The Congress of Vienna reversed the political changes that had occurred during the wars. Napoleon suddenly returned, seized control of France, raised an army, and marched on his enemies in the Hundred Days. It ended with his final defeat at the Battle of Waterloo in 1815, and his exile to St. Helena, a remote island in the South Atlantic Ocean.[62] The monarchy was subsequently restored and Louis XVIII, younger brother of Louis XVI became king, and the exiles returned. However many of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic reforms were kept in place.[63] Napoleon's impact on France Napoleon centralized power in Paris, with all the provinces governed by all-powerful prefects whom he selected. They were more powerful than royal intendants of the ancien régime and had a long-term impact in unifying the nation, minimizing regional differences, and shifting all decisions to Paris.[64] Religion had been a major issue during the Revolution, and Napoleon resolved most of the outstanding problems, moving the clergy and large numbers of devout Catholics from hostility to the government to support for him. The Catholic system was reestablished by the Concordat of 1801 (signed with Pope Pius VII), so that church life returned to normal; the church lands were not restored but the Jesuits were allowed back in and the bitter fights between the government and Church ended. Protestants, Jews and atheists were tolerated.[65] The French taxation system had collapsed in the 1780s. In the 1790s the government seized and sold church lands and lands of exiled aristocrats. Napoleon instituted a modern, efficient tax system that guaranteed a steady flow of revenues and made long-term financing possible.[66] Napoleon kept the system of conscription that had been created in the 1790s, so that every young man served in the army, which could be rapidly expanded even as it was based on a core of careerists and talented officers. Before the Revolution the aristocracy formed the officer corps. Now promotion was by merit and achievement—every private carried a marshal's baton, it was said.[67] The modern era of French education began in the 1790s. The Revolution in the 1790s abolished the traditional universities.[68] Napoleon sought to replace them with new institutions, the École Polytechnique, focused on technology.[69] The elementary schools received little attention. Napoleonic Code Of permanent importance was the Napoleonic Code created by eminent jurists under Napoleon's supervision. Praised for its clarity, it spread rapidly throughout Europe and the world in general, and marked the end of feudalism and the liberation of serfs where it took effect.[70] The Code recognized the principles of civil liberty, equality before the law, and the secular character of the state. It discarded the old right of primogeniture (where only the eldest son inherited) and required that inheritances be divided equally among all the children. The court system was standardized; all judges were appointed by the national government in Paris.[64] 1815–1914 Main articles: France in the long nineteenth century and History of French foreign relations The taking of the Hôtel de Ville – the seat of Paris's government – during the July Revolution of 1830. The Eiffel Tower under construction in July 1888. The century after the fall of Napoleon I was politically unstable: Every [French] head of state from 1814 to 1873 spent part of his life in exile. Every regime was the target of assassination attempts of a frequency that put Spanish and Russian politics in the shade. Even in peaceful times governments changed every few months. In less peaceful times, political deaths, imprisonments and deportations are literally incalculable.[71] The period from 1789 to 1914, dubbed the "Long nineteenth century" by the historian Eric Hobsbawm, extends from the French Revolution's aftermath to the brink of World War I. Throughout this period, France underwent significant transformations that reshaped its geography, demographics, language, and economic landscape, marking a period of profound change and development. The French Revolution and Napoleonic eras fundamentally altered French society, promoting centralization, administrative uniformity across departments, and a standardized legal code. Education also centralized, emphasizing technical training and meritocracy, despite growing conservatism among the aristocracy and the church. Wealth concentration saw the richest 10 percent owning most of the nation's wealth. The 19th century saw France expanding to nearly its modern territorial limits through annexations and overseas imperialism, notably in Algeria, Indochina, and Africa. Despite territorial gains, France faced challenges, including a slow population growth, compared to its European neighbors, and a late industrialization that saw a shift from rural to urban living and the rise of an industrial workforce. The period was also marked by significant linguistic and educational reforms, which sought to unify the country through language and secular education, contributing to a stronger national identity. Economically, France struggled to match the industrial growth rates of other advanced nations, maintaining a more traditional economy longer than its counterparts. Politically, the century was characterized by the end of the ancien régime, the rise and fall of the First and Second Empires, the tumultuous establishment of the Third Republic, and the radical experiment of the Paris Commune, reflecting the ongoing struggle between revolutionary ideals and conservative restoration. Significant social and political reforms marked Napoleon III's era, introducing measures like public assistance and regulations to improve working and living conditions for the lower classes. The Second Empire (1852–1870) sought modernization through infrastructure projects like the railway system, yet Napoleon III's foreign policy ventures often ended in failure, notably the catastrophic Franco-Prussian War which led to his capture and deposition. The Third Republic embarked on modernizing France, with educational reforms and attempts to create a unified national identity. Foreign policy focused on isolation of Germany and forming alliances, leading to the Triple Entente. Domestically, issues like the Dreyfus affair highlighted the nation's divisions, while laws aimed at reducing the Catholic Church's influence sparked further controversy. Cultural and artistic movements, from Romanticism to Modernism, mirrored these societal changes, contributing to France's rich cultural legacy. The Belle Époque emerged as a period of cultural flourishing and peace, overshadowed by the growing threats of war and internal discord. The long 19th century set the foundations for modern France, navigating through revolutions, wars, and social upheavals to emerge as a unified nation-state near the front of the global stage, by the early 20th century. Colonial empire Main article: French colonial empire Further information: Evolution of the French Empire and French Africa French empire, 17th-20th centuries. Dark blue = Second Empire 1830–1960. The second colonial empire constituted the overseas colonies, protectorates and mandate territories that came under French rule from the 16th century onward. A distinction is generally made between the "first colonial empire", that existed until 1814, by which time most of it had been lost, and the "second colonial empire", which began with the conquest of Algiers in 1830. The second colonial empire came to an end after the loss in later wars of Vietnam (1954) and Algeria (1962), and relatively peaceful decolonizations elsewhere after 1960.[72] France lost wars to Britain that stripped away nearly all of its colonies by 1765. France rebuilt a new empire mostly after 1850, concentrating chiefly in Africa as well as Indochina and the South Pacific. Republicans, at first hostile to empire, only became supportive when Germany after 1880 started to build their own colonial empire. As it developed, the new empire took on roles of trade with France, especially supplying raw materials and purchasing manufactured items as well as lending prestige to the motherland and spreading French civilization and language and the Catholic religion. It also provided manpower in the World Wars.[73] It became a moral mission to lift the world up to French standards by bringing Christianity and French culture. In 1884, the leading proponent of colonialism, Jules Ferry, declared; "The higher races have a right over the lower races, they have a duty to civilize the inferior races."[74] Full citizenship rights – assimilation – were offered. In reality the French settlers were given full rights and the natives given very limited rights. Apart from Algeria few settlers permanently settled in its colonies. Even in Algeria, the "Pied-Noir" (French settlers) always remained a small minority.[75] At its apex, it was one of the largest empires in history. Including metropolitan France, the total amount of land under French sovereignty reached 11,500,000 km2 (4,400,000 sq mi) in 1920, with a population of 110 million people in 1939. In World War II, the Free French used the overseas colonies as bases from which they fought to liberate France. "In an effort to restore its world-power status after the humiliation of defeat and occupation, France was eager to maintain its overseas empire at the end of the Second World War."[76] Only two days after the defeat of Nazi Germany, France suppressed Algerian calls for independence, who were celebrating VE day, ending in a massacre, which killed at least 30,000 Muslims.[77] However, gradually anti-colonial movements successfully challenged European authority. The French Constitution of 27 October 1946 (Fourth Republic), established the French Union which endured until 1958. Newer remnants of the colonial empire were integrated into France as overseas departments and territories within the French Republic. These now total about 1% of the pre-1939 colonial area, with 2.7 million people living in them in 2013. By the 1970s, the last "vestiges of empire held little interest for the French. ... Except for the traumatic decolonization of Algeria, however, what is remarkable is how few long-lasting effects on France the giving up of empire entailed."[78] 1914–1945 Main articles: France in the 20th century and History of French foreign relations Population trends Main article: Demographics of France The population held steady from 40.7 million in 1911, to 41.5 million in 1936. The sense that the population was too small, especially in regard to the rapid growth of more powerful Germany, was a common theme in the early twentieth century.[79] Natalist policies were proposed in the 1930s, and implemented in the 1940s.[80][81] France experienced a baby boom after 1945; it reversed a long-term record of low birth rates.[82] In addition, there was steady immigration, especially from former French colonies in North Africa. The population grew from 41 million in 1946, to 50 million in 1966, and 60 million by 1990. The farming population declined sharply, from 35% of the workforce in 1945 to under 5% by 2000. By 2004, France had the second highest birthrate in Europe.[83][84] World War I See also: French entry into World War I, French Army in World War I, and Home front during World War I § France A French bayonet charge in 1913. The 114th infantry in Paris, 14 July 1917. Preoccupied with internal problems, France paid little attention to foreign policy in the 1911–14 period, although it did extend military service to three years from two over strong Socialist objections in 1913. The rapidly escalating Balkan crisis of 1914 caught France unaware, and it played only a small role in the coming of World War I.[85] The Serbian crisis triggered a complex set of military alliances between European states, causing most of the continent, including France, to be drawn into war within a few short weeks. Austria-Hungary declared war on Serbia in late July, triggering Russian mobilization. On 1 August both Germany and France ordered mobilization. Germany was much better prepared militarily than any of the other countries involved, including France. The German Empire, as an ally of Austria, declared war on Russia. France was allied with Russia and so was ready to commit to war against the German Empire. On 3 August Germany declared war on France, and sent its armies through neutral Belgium. Britain entered the war on 4 August, and started sending in troops on 7 August. Italy, although tied to Germany, remained neutral and then joined the Allies in 1915. Germany's "Schlieffen Plan" was to quickly defeat the French. They captured Brussels, Belgium by 20 August and soon had captured a large portion of northern France. The original plan was to continue southwest and attack Paris from the west. By early September they were within 65 kilometres (40 mi) of Paris, and the French government had relocated to Bordeaux. The Allies finally stopped the advance northeast of Paris at the Marne River (5–12 September 1914).[86] The war now became a stalemate – the famous "Western Front" was fought largely in France and was characterized by very little movement despite extremely large and violent battles, often with new and more destructive military technology. On the Western Front, the small improvised trenches of the first few months rapidly grew deeper and more complex, gradually becoming vast areas of interlocking defensive works. The land war quickly became dominated by the muddy, bloody stalemate of Trench warfare, a form of war in which both opposing armies had static lines of defense. The war of movement quickly turned into a war of position. Neither side advanced much, but both sides suffered hundreds of thousands of casualties. German and Allied armies produced essentially a matched pair of trench lines from the Swiss border in the south to the North Sea coast of Belgium. Meanwhile, large swaths of northeastern France came under the brutal control of German occupiers.[87] Trench warfare prevailed on the Western Front from September 1914 until March 1918. Famous battles in France include the Battle of Verdun and the Battle of the Somme in 1916, and five separate conflicts called the Battle of Ypres (from 1914 to 1918).[citation needed] After Socialist leader Jean Jaurès, a pacifist, was assassinated at the start of the war, the French socialist movement abandoned its antimilitarist positions and joined the national war effort. Prime Minister René Viviani called for unity—for a "Union sacrée" ("Sacred Union")--Which was a wartime truce between the right and left factions that had been fighting bitterly. France had few dissenters. However, war-weariness was a major factor by 1917, even reaching the army. The soldiers were reluctant to attack; Mutiny was a factor as soldiers said it was best to wait for the arrival of millions of Americans. The soldiers were protesting not just the futility of frontal assaults in the face of German machine guns but also degraded conditions at the front lines and at home, especially infrequent leaves, poor food, the use of African and Asian colonials on the home front, and concerns about the welfare of their wives and children.[88] After defeating Russia in 1917, Germany now could concentrate on the Western Front, and planned an all-out assault in the spring of 1918, but had to do it before the very rapidly growing American army played a role. In March 1918 Germany launched its offensive and by May had reached the Marne and was again close to Paris. However, in the Second Battle of the Marne (15 July to 6 August 1918), the Allied line held. The Allies then shifted to the offensive.[89] The Germans, out of reinforcements, were overwhelmed day after day and the high command saw it was hopeless. Austria and Turkey collapsed, and the Kaiser's government fell. Germany signed "The Armistice" that ended the fighting effective 11 November 1918, "the eleventh hour of the eleventh day of the eleventh month."[90] Wartime losses The war was fought in large part on French soil, with 3.4 million French dead including civilians, and four times as many military casualties. The economy was hurt by the 1913 German invasion of major industrial areas in the northeast, which produced 58% of the steel, and 40% of the coal.[91][92] In 1914, the government implemented a war economy with controls and rationing. By 1915 the war economy went into high gear, as millions of French women and colonial men replaced the civilian roles of many of the 3 million soldiers. Considerable assistance came with the influx of American food, money and raw materials in 1917. This war economy would have important reverberations after the war, as it would be a first breach of liberal theories of non-interventionism.[93] The damages caused by the war amounted to about 113% of the GDP of 1913, chiefly the destruction of productive capital and housing. The national debt rose from 66% of GDP in 1913 to 170% in 1919, reflecting the heavy use of bond issues to pay for the war. Inflation was severe, with the franc losing over half its value against the British pound.[94] The richest families were hurt, as the top 1 percent saw their share of wealth drop from about 60% in 1914 to 36% in 1935, then plunge to 20 percent in 1970 to the present. A great deal of physical and financial damage was done during the world wars, foreign investments were cashed in to pay for the wars, the Russian Bolsheviks expropriated large-scale investments, postwar inflation demolished cash holdings, stocks and bonds plunged during the Great Depression, and progressive taxes ate away at accumulated wealth.[95][96] Postwar settlement The Council of Four (from left to right): David Lloyd George, Vittorio Emanuele Orlando, Georges Clemenceau, and Woodrow Wilson in Versailles. Peace terms were imposed by the Big Four, meeting in Paris in 1919: David Lloyd George of Britain, Vittorio Orlando of Italy, Georges Clemenceau of France, and Woodrow Wilson of the United States. Clemenceau demanded the harshest terms and won most of them in the Treaty of Versailles in 1919. Germany was forced to admit its guilt for starting the war, and was permanently weakened militarily. Germany had to pay huge sums in war reparations to the Allies (who in turn had large loans from the U.S. to pay off).[97] France regained Alsace-Lorraine and occupied the German industrial Saar Basin, a coal and steel region. The German African colonies were put under League of Nations mandates, and were administered by France and other victors. From the remains of the Ottoman Empire, France acquired the Mandate of Syria and the Mandate of Lebanon.[97] French Marshal Ferdinand Foch wanted a peace that would never allow Germany to be a threat to France again, but after the Treaty of Versailles was signed he said, "This is not a peace. It is an armistice for 20 years."[98] Interwar years: Foreign policy and Great Depression Further information: Interwar France and Great Depression in France French cavalry entering Essen during the Occupation of the Ruhr. France was part of the Allied force that occupied the Rhineland following the Armistice. Foch supported Poland in the Greater Poland Uprising and in the Polish–Soviet War and France also joined Spain during the Rif War. From 1925 until his death in 1932, Aristide Briand, as Prime Minister during five short intervals, directed French foreign policy, using his diplomatic skills and sense of timing to forge friendly relations with Weimar Germany as the basis of a genuine peace within the framework of the League of Nations. He realized France could neither contain the much larger Germany by itself nor secure effective support from Britain or the League.[99] As a response to the Weimar Republic's default on its reparations in the aftermath of World War I, France occupied the industrial region of the Ruhr as a means of ensuring German payments. The intervention was a failure, and France accepted the international solution to the reparations issues, as expressed in the Dawes Plan and the Young Plan.[100] Politically, the 1920s was dominated by the Right, with right-wing coalitions in 1919, 1926, and 1928, and later in 1934 and 1938.[101] In the 1920s, France established an elaborate system of border defences called the Maginot Line, designed to fight off any German attack. The Line did not extend into Belgium, which Germany would exploit in 1940. Military alliances were signed with weak powers in 1920–21, called the "Little Entente". The Great Depression affected France a bit later than other countries, hitting around 1931.[102] While the GDP in the 1920s grew at the very strong rate of 4.43% per year, the 1930s rate fell to only 0.63%.[103] The depression was relatively mild: unemployment peaked under 5%, the fall in production was at most 20% below the 1929 output; there was no banking crisis.[104] In contrast to the mild economic upheaval, the political upheaval was enormous. Socialist Leon Blum, leading the Popular Front, brought together Socialists and Radicals to become Prime Minister from 1936 to 1937; he was the first Jew and the first Socialist to lead France.[105] The Communists in the Chamber of Deputies voted to keep the government in power, and generally supported the government's economic policies, but rejected its foreign policies. The Popular Front passed numerous labor reforms, which increased wages, cut working hours to 40 hours with overtime illegal and provided many lesser benefits to the working class such as mandatory two-week paid vacations. However, renewed inflation cancelled the gains in wage rates, unemployment did not fall, and economic recovery was very slow. The Popular Front failed in economics, foreign policy, and long-term stability: "Disappointment and failure was the legacy of the Popular Front."[106][107][108] At first the Popular Front created enormous excitement and expectations on the left—including very large scale sitdown strikes—but in the end it failed to live up to its promise. However, Socialists would later take inspiration from the attempts of the Popular Front to set up a welfare state.[109] The government joined Britain in establishing an arms embargo during the Spanish Civil War (1936–1939). Blum rejected support for the Spanish Republicans because of his fear that civil war might spread to deeply divided France. Financial support in military cooperation with Poland was also a policy. The government nationalized arms suppliers, and dramatically increased its program of rearming the French military in a last-minute catch-up with the Germans.[110] Appeasement of Germany, in cooperation with Britain, was the policy after 1936, as France sought peace even in the face of Hitler's escalating demands. Prime Minister Édouard Daladier refused to go to war against Germany and Italy without British support as Neville Chamberlain wanted to save peace at Munich in 1938.[111][112] World War II Main articles: Vichy France, Diplomacy of World War II, Military history of France during World War II, and German occupation of France during World War II German soldiers on parade marching past the Arc de Triomphe. Vichy police escorting French Jewish citizens for deportation during the Marseille roundup, January 1943. Germany's invasion of Poland in 1939 finally caused France and Britain to declare war against Germany. But the Allies did not launch massive assaults and instead kept a defensive stance: this was called the Phoney War in Britain or Drôle de guerre — the funny sort of war — in France. It did not prevent the German army from conquering Poland in a matter of weeks with its innovative Blitzkrieg tactics, also helped by the Soviet Union's attack on Poland. When Germany had its hands free for an attack in the west, the Battle of France began in May 1940, and the same Blitzkrieg tactics proved just as devastating there. The Wehrmacht bypassed the Maginot Line by marching through the Ardennes forest. A second German force was sent into Belgium and the Netherlands to act as a diversion to this main thrust. In six weeks of savage fighting the French lost 90,000 men.[113][114] Many civilians sought refuge by taking to the roads of France: some 2 million refugees from Belgium and the Netherlands were joined by between 8 and 10 million French civilians, representing a quarter of the French population, all heading south and west. This movement may well have been the largest single movement of civilians in history prior to the Partition of India in 1947. Paris fell to the Germans on 14 June 1940, but not before the British Expeditionary Force was evacuated from Dunkirk, along with many French soldiers. Vichy France was established on 10 July 1940 to govern the unoccupied part of France and its colonies. It was led by Philippe Pétain, the aging war hero of the First World War. Petain's representatives signed a harsh Armistice on 22 June, whereby Germany kept most of the French army in camps in Germany, and France had to pay out large sums in gold and food supplies. Germany occupied three-fifths of France's territory, leaving the rest in the southeast to the new Vichy government. However, in practice, most local government was handled by the traditional French officialdom. In November 1942 all of Vichy France was finally occupied by German forces. Vichy continued in existence but it was closely supervised by the Germans.[115][116] The Vichy regime sought to collaborate with Germany, keeping peace in France to avoid further occupation although at the expense of personal freedom and individual safety. Some 76,000 Jews were deported during the German occupation, often with the help of the Vichy authorities, and murdered in the Nazis' extermination camps.[117] Women in Vichy France See also: Women in the French Resistance The French soldiers held as POWs and forced laborers in Germany throughout the war were not at risk of death in combat, but the anxieties of separation for their wives were high. The government provided them a modest allowance, but one in ten became prostitutes to support their families. It gave women a key symbolic role to carry out the national regeneration. It used propaganda, women's organizations, and legislation to promote maternity, patriotic duty, and female submission to marriage, home, and children's education.[118] Conditions were very difficult for housewives, as food and other necessities were in short supply. Divorce laws were made much more stringent, and restrictions were placed on the employment of married women. Family allowances that had begun in the 1930s were continued, and became a vital lifeline for many families; it was a monthly cash bonus for having more children. In 1942, the birth rate started to rise, and by 1945 it was higher than it had been for a century.[119] Resistance General Charles de Gaulle in London declared himself on BBC radio to be the head of a rival government in exile, and gathered the Free French Forces around him, finding support in some French colonies and recognition from Britain but not the United States. After the Attack on Mers-el-Kébir in 1940, where the British fleet destroyed a large part of the French navy, still under command of Vichy France, that killed about 1,100 sailors, there was nationwide indignation and a feeling of distrust in the French forces, leading to the events of the Battle of Dakar. Eventually, several important French ships joined the Free French Forces.[120] The United States maintained diplomatic relations with Vichy and avoided recognition of de Gaulle's claim to be the one and only government of France. Churchill, caught between the U.S. and de Gaulle, tried to find a compromise.[121][122] Within France proper, the organized underground grew as the Vichy regime resorted to more strident policies in order to fulfill the enormous demands of the Nazis and the eventual decline of Nazi Germany became more obvious. They formed the Resistance.[123] The most famous figure of the French resistance was Jean Moulin, sent in France by de Gaulle in order to link all resistance movements; he was captured and tortured by Klaus Barbie (the "butcher of Lyon"). Increasing repression culminated in the complete destruction and extermination of the village of Oradour-sur-Glane at the height of the Battle of Normandy. On 10 June 1944, a company of the 2nd SS Panzer Division, entered Oradour-sur-Glane, and massacred 642 men, women and children, all of whom were civilians. In 1953, 21 men went on trial for the Oradour killings; all but one were pardoned by the French government.[citation needed] A Resistance fighter during street fighting in 1944. On 6 June 1944, the Allies landed in Normandy, without a French component. On 15 August Allied forces landing in Provence, this time including 260,000 men of the French First Army. The German lines finally broke, and they fled back to Germany while keeping control of the major ports. Allied forces liberated France and the Free French were given the honor of liberating Paris in late August. The French army recruited French Forces of the Interior (de Gaulle's formal name for resistance fighters) to continue the war until the final defeat of Germany; this army numbered 300,000 men by September, and 370,000 by spring 1945.[124] The Vichy regime disintegrated. An interim Provisional Government of the French Republic was quickly put into place by de Gaulle. The gouvernement provisoire de la République française, or GPRF, operated under a tripartisme alliance of communists, socialists, and democratic republicans. The GPRF governed France from 1944 to 1946, when it was replaced by the French Fourth Republic. Tens of thousands of collaborators were executed without trial. The new government declared the Vichy laws unconstitutional and illegal, and elected new local governments. Women gained the right to vote. Since 1945 See also: French Fourth Republic, French Fifth Republic, and History of French foreign relations The political scene in 1944–45 was controlled by the Resistance, but it had numerous factions. Charles de Gaulle and the Free France element had been based outside France, but now came to dominate, in alliance with the Socialists, the Christian Democrats (MRP), and what remained of the Radical party. The Communists had largely dominated the Resistance inside France, but cooperated closely with the government in 1944–45, on orders from the Kremlin. There was a general consensus that important powers that had been an open collaboration with the Germans should be nationalized, such as Renault automobiles and the major newspapers. A new Social Security system was called for, as well as important new concessions to the labour unions. Unions themselves were divided among communist, Socialist, and Christian Democrat factions.[125] Frustrated by his inability to control all the dominant forces, de Gaulle resigned in 1946.[126] On 13 October 1946, a new constitution established the Fourth Republic. The Fourth Republic consisted of a parliamentary government controlled by a series of coalitions. France attempted to regain control of French Indochina but was defeated by the Viet Minh in 1954. Only months later, France faced another anti-colonialist conflict in Algeria and the debate over whether or not to keep control of Algeria, then home to over one million European settlers,[127] wracked the country and nearly led to a coup and civil war.[128] Charles de Gaulle managed to keep the country together while taking steps to end the war. The Algerian War was concluded with the Évian Accords in 1962 which led to Algerian independence. The June 1951 elections saw a re-emergence of the right, and until June 1954 France was governed by a succession of centre-right coalitions.[129] Economic recovery Wartime damage to the economy was severe, and apart from gold reserves, France had inadequate resources to recover on its own. The transportation system was in total shambles — the Allies had bombed out the railways and the bridges, and the Germans had destroyed the port facilities. Energy was in extremely short supply, with very low stocks of coal and oil. Imports of raw materials were largely cut off, so most factories shut down. The invaders had stripped most of the valuable industrial tools for German factories. Discussions with the United States for emergency aid dragged on, with repeated postponements on both sides. Meanwhile, several million French prisoners of war and forced labourers were being returned home, with few jobs and little food available for them. The plan was for 20 percent of German reparations to be paid to France, but Germany was in much worse shape even than France, and in no position to pay.[130] After de Gaulle left office in January 1946, the diplomatic logjam was broken in terms of American aid. The U.S. Army shipped in food, from 1944 to 1946, and U.S. Treasury loans and cash grants were disbursed from 1945 until 1947, with Marshall Plan aid continuing until 1951. France received additional aid from 1951 to 1955 in order to help the country in its war in Indochina. Apart from low-interest loans, the other funds were grants that did not involve repayment. The debts left over from World War I, whose payment had been suspended since 1931, were renegotiated in the Blum-Byrnes agreement of 1946. The United States forgave all $2.8 billion in debt from the First World War, and gave France a new loan of $650 million. In return, French negotiator Jean Monnet set out the French five-year plan for recovery and development.[131] The Marshall Plan gave France $2.3 billion with no repayment. The total of all American grants and credits to France from 1946 to 1953, amounted to $4.9 billion.[132] A central feature of the Marshall Plan was to encourage international trade, reduce tariffs, lower barriers, and modernize French management. The Marshall Plan set up intensive tours of American industry. France sent missions of businessmen and experts to tour American factories, farms, stores and offices. They were especially impressed with the prosperity of American workers, and the low price of vehicles.[133] Some French businesses resisted Americanization, but the most profitable, especially chemicals, oil, electronics, and instrumentation, seized upon the opportunity to attract American investments and build a larger market.[134] The U.S. insisted on opportunities for Hollywood films, and the French film industry responded with new life.[135] Although the economic situation in France was grim in 1945, resources did exist and the economy regained normal growth by the 1950s.[136] France managed to regain its international status thanks to a successful production strategy, a demographic spurt, and technical and political innovations. Conditions varied from firm to firm. Some had been destroyed or damaged, nationalized or requisitioned, but the majority carried on, sometimes working harder and more efficiently than before the war. Despite strong American pressure through the ERP, there was little change in the organization and content of the training for French industrial managers. This was mainly due to the reticence of the existing institutions, and the struggle among different economic and political interest groups for control over efforts to improve the further training of practitioners.[137] The Monnet Plan provided a coherent framework for economic policy, and it was strongly supported by the Marshall Plan. It was inspired by moderate, Keynesian free-trade ideas rather than state control. Although relaunched in an original way, the French economy was about as productive as comparable West European countries.[138] Vietnam and Algeria Pierre Mendès France, was a Radical party leader who was Prime Minister for eight months in 1954–55, working with the support of the Socialist and Communist parties. His top priority was ending the deadly war in Indochina in the wake of the humiliating defeat at the Battle of Dien Bien Phu.[139] The U.S. had paid most of the costs of the war, but its support inside France had collapsed. In February 1954, only 7% of the French people wanted to continue the fight to keep Indochina out of Ho Chi Minh and his Viet Minh movement.[140] At the Geneva Conference in July 1954, Pierre France made a deal that gave the Viet Minh control of Vietnam north of the 17th parallel, and allowed France to pull out all its forces.[141] That left South Vietnam standing alone, and the U.S. would provide support for it afterwards.[142] Pierre France next came to an agreement with Habib Bourguiba, the nationalist leader in Tunisia, for the independence of that colony by 1956, and began discussions with Moroccan nationalists for a French withdrawal.[143] With over a million European residents in Algeria (the Pieds-Noirs), France refused to grant independence until the Algerian War of Independence had turned into a French political and civil crisis. Algeria won its independence in 1962, unleashing a massive wave of immigration from the former colony back to France of both Pied-Noir and Algerians who had supported France.[144][145][146] Suez crisis (1956) Main article: Suez crisis Smoke rises from oil tanks beside the Suez Canal hit during the initial Anglo-French assault on Port Said, 5 November 1956. In 1956, another crisis struck French colonies, this time in Egypt. The Suez Canal, having been built by the French government, belonged to the French Republic and was operated by the Compagnie universelle du canal maritime de Suez. Great Britain had bought the Egyptian share from Isma'il Pasha and was the second-largest owner of the canal before the crisis. The Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser nationalized the canal despite French and British opposition; he determined that a European response was unlikely. Great Britain and France attacked Egypt and built an alliance with Israel against Nasser. Israel attacked from the east, Britain from Cyprus and France from Algeria. Egypt was defeated in a mere few days. The Suez crisis caused an outcry of indignation in the Arab world, and Saudi Arabia set an embargo on oil on France and Britain. U.S. President Dwight D. Eisenhower forced a ceasefire; Britain and Israel soon withdrew, leaving France alone in Egypt. Under strong international pressures, the French government ultimately evacuated its troops from Suez and largely disengaged from the Middle East.[147] President de Gaulle, 1958–1969 The May 1958 seizure of power in Algiers by French army units and French settlers opposed to concessions in the face of Arab nationalist insurrection ripped apart the unstable Fourth Republic. The National Assembly brought De Gaulle back to power during the May 1958 crisis. He founded the Fifth Republic with a strengthened presidency, and he was elected in the latter role. He managed to keep France together while taking steps to end the war, much to the anger of the Pieds-Noirs (Frenchmen settled in Algeria) and the military; both had supported his return to power to maintain colonial rule. He granted independence to Algeria in 1962 and progressively to other French colonies.[148] Proclaiming grandeur essential to the nature of France, de Gaulle initiated his "Politics of Grandeur."[149][150] He demanded complete autonomy for France in world affairs, which meant that major decisions could not be forced upon it by NATO, the European Community or anyone else. De Gaulle pursued a policy of "national independence." He vetoed Britain's entry into the Common Market, fearing it might gain too great a voice on French affairs.[151] While not officially abandoning NATO, he withdrew from its military integrated command, fearing that the United States had too much control over NATO.[152] He launched an independent nuclear development program that made France the fourth nuclear power. France then adopted the dissuasion du faible au fort doctrine which meant a Soviet attack on France would only bring total destruction to both sides.[153] De Gaulle and Germany's Konrad Adenauer in 1961. He restored cordial Franco-German relations in order to create a European counterweight between the "Anglo-Saxon" (American and British) and Soviet spheres of influence. De Gaulle openly criticised the U.S. intervention in Vietnam.[154] He was angry at American economic power, especially what his Finance minister called the "exorbitant privilege" of the U.S. dollar.[155] In May 1968, he appeared likely to lose power amidst widespread protests by students and workers, but persisted through the crisis with backing from the army. His party, denouncing radicalism, won the 1968 election with an increased majority in the Assembly.[156] Nonetheless, de Gaulle resigned in 1969 after losing a referendum in which he proposed more decentralization. Economic crises: 1970s-1980s By the late 1960s, France's economic growth, while strong, was beginning to lose steam. A global currency crisis meant a devaluation of the Franc against the West German Mark and the U.S. Dollar in 1968, which was one of the leading factors for the social upheaval of that year. Industrial policy was used to bolster French industries.[157] The Trente Glorieuses era (1945–1975) ended with the worldwide 1973 oil crisis, which increased costs in energy and thus on production. Economic instability marked the Giscard d'Estaing government (1974–1981). Giscard turned to Prime Minister Raymond Barre in 1976, who advocated numerous complex, strict policies ("Barre Plans"). The plans included a three-month price freeze; wage controls; salary controls; a reduction of the growth in the money supply; increases in taxes and bank rates but a reduction in the value-added tax; measures to restore the trade balance; limits on expensive oil imports; special aid to exports; an action fund to aid industries; increased financial aid to farmers; and social security.[158][159] Economic troubles continued into the presidency of François Mitterrand. A recession in the early 1980s led to the abandonment of dirigisme, in favour of a more pragmatic approach to economic intervention.[160] Growth resumed later in the decade, only to be slowed down by the economic depression of the early 1990s, which affected the Socialist Party.[161] France's recent economic history has been less turbulent than in many other countries. The average income in mid-century grew by 0.9% per year, a rate which has been outdone almost every year since 1975. By the early 1980s, for instance, wages in France were on or slightly above the EEC average.[162] 1989 to 2017 After the fall of the USSR and the end of the Cold War, potential menaces to mainland France appeared considerably reduced. France began reducing its nuclear capacities and conscription was abolished in 2001. In 1990, France, led by Mitterrand, joined the short successful Gulf War against Iraq; the French participation to this war was called the Opération Daguet.[163] Jacques Chirac assumed office after a campaign focused on the need to combat France's high unemployment rate.[citation needed] The economy became strengthened.[161] French leaders increasingly tied the future of France to the continued development of the European Union (EU). In 1992, France ratified the Maastricht Treaty establishing the EU. In 1999, the Euro was introduced to replace the Franc. France also became involved in joint European projects such as Airbus, the Galileo positioning system and the Eurocorps.[citation needed] The French stood among the strongest supporters of NATO and EU policy in the Balkans, to prevent genocide in former Yugoslavia; French troops joined the 1999 NATO bombing of the country. France became actively involved in fighting against international terrorism. In 2002, Alliance Base, an international Counterterrorist Intelligence Center, was secretly established in Paris. France contributed to the toppling of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, but it strongly rejected the 2003 invasion of Iraq.[citation needed] Emmanuel Macron and Germany's Angela Merkel in 2017. Jacques Chirac was reelected in 2002,[164] and became a fierce opponent of the Iraq invasion.[165] Conservative Nicolas Sarkozy was elected and took office in 2007.[166] Sarkozy was very actively involved in the military operation in Libya to oust the Gaddafi government in 2011.[167] After 2005, the world economy stagnated, and the 2008 global crisis (including its effects in both the Eurozone and France) dogged Sarkozy, who lost reelection in 2012 against Socialist Francois Hollande.[161] Hollande advocated a growth policy in contrast to the austerity policy advocated by Germany's Angela Merkel as a way of tackling the European sovereign debt crisis.[168] Muslim tensions At the close of the Algerian war, hundreds of thousands of Muslims, including some who had supported France (Harkis), settled permanently in France, especially in the larger cities where they lived in subsidized public housing, and suffered very high unemployment rates.[169] In 2005, the predominantly Arab-immigrant suburbs of many French cities erupted in riots.[170][171] Traditional interpretations say these race riots were spurred by radical Muslims or unemployed youth. Another view states that the riots reflected a broader problem of racism and police violence in France.[172] In 2009, there were more riots.[citation needed] Over 1 million demonstrators gathering to pledge solidarity to liberal French values, in 2015 after the Charlie Hebdo shooting In 2015, The New York Times summarized an ongoing conflict between France's secular and individualist values, and a growing Muslim conservatism.[173] In 1994, Air France Flight 8969 was hijacked by terrorists; they were captured. In 2012, a Muslim radical shot three French soldiers and four Jewish citizens in Toulouse and Montauban.[citation needed] In January 2015, the satirical newspaper Charlie Hebdo and a Jewish grocery store came under attack from some angered Muslims in Paris. World leaders rallied to Paris to show their support for free speech.[173] There were more terrorist attacks afterwards, including another series of attacks in Paris in November 2015, and a truck attack in Nice in 2016.[citation needed] 2017 to present In the 2017 election for president the winner was Emmanuel Macron, the founder of a new party "La République En Marche!" (later Renaissance RE).[174] In the 2022 presidential election president Macron was re-elected after beating his far-right rival, Marine Le Pen, in the runoff.[175] The problem of high unemployment has yet to be resolved.[167] See also flag	France portal History portal Annales School, historiography Demographics of France, For population history Economic history of France Foreign relations of France, Since the 1950s French colonial empire History of French foreign relations, To 1954 International relations, 1648–1814 International relations of the Great Powers (1814–1919) International relations (1919–1939). Diplomatic history of World War I Diplomatic history of World War II Cold War International relations since 1989 French law French criminal law French peasants French Revolution Historiography of the French Revolution History of French journalism History of Paris Legal history of France Fundamental laws of the Kingdom of France List of French monarchs List of presidents of France List of prime ministers of France Military history of France Politics of France Revue d'histoire moderne et contemporaine Territorial evolution of France Timeline of French history Women in France Turkish Airlines Flight 981, where a DC-10 crashed into a French forest (Ermenonville Forest) in Northern France. References Jones, Tim (17 December 2009). "Lithic Assemblage Dated to 1.57 Million Years Found at Lézignan-la-Cébe, Southern France". Anthropology.net. Archived from the original on 2 January 2010. Retrieved 21 June 2012. "Ancient skulls trace Neanderthal evolution". Australian Broadcasting Corporation. 19 June 2014. Archived from the original on 17 June 2022. Retrieved 26 July 2015. Wilford, John Noble (2 November 2011). "Fossil Teeth Put Humans in Europe Earlier Than Thought". The New York Times. Archived from the original on 15 November 2012. Edwards, I. E. S.; et al., eds. (1970). The Cambridge Ancient History. Cambridge University Press. p. 754. ISBN 978-0-5210-8691-2. Orrieux, Claude; Schmitt Pantel, Pauline (1999). A History of Ancient Greece. Wiley. p. 62. ISBN 978-0-6312-0309-4. Carpentier, Jean; Lebrun, François; Carpentier, Élisabeth (2000). Histoire de France (in French). Éditions du Seuil. p. 29. ISBN 978-2-0201-0879-9. "C. Julius Caesar, Gallic War, Book 1, chapter 1". www.perseus.tufts.edu. Retrieved 30 December 2024. "Provence". Britannica.com. Archived from the original on 5 September 2015. Retrieved 19 January 2017. Brown, Clifford M. (11 May 2015). "Gaul". In de Grummond, Nancy Thomson (ed.). Encyclopedia of the History of Classical Archaeology. Routledge. p. PT453. ISBN 978-1-1342-6861-0. OCLC 908993379. founding of Massalia (Marseilles) in 600 B.C. Jones & Ladurie (1999), pp. 29–30. Heather, P. J. (2007). The Fall of the Roman Empire: A New History of Rome and the Barbarians. James, Edward (1981). The Franks. Wilson, Derek (2007). Charlemagne. Van Houts, Elisabeth M. C. (2000). The Normans in Europe. Manchester University Press. p. 23. ISBN 978-0-7190-4751-0. Duby (1993). Carpenter, David. The Struggle for Mastery: Britain, 1066-1284. Penguin History of Britain. p. 91. A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE RECONQUISTA (718-1492 AD): CONQUEST, REPOPULATION AND LAND DISTRIBUTION Archived 2 December 2020 at the Wayback Machine By: Francisco J. Beltrán Tapia, Alfonso Díez-Minguela, Julio Martínez-Galarraga, and Daniel A. Tirado Fabregat. 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Cambridge University Press. ISBN 978-0-5212-8988-7. Bury, John Patrick Tuer (1949). France, 1814–1940. University of Pennsylvania Press. Chapters 9–16. Doyle, William (1989). The Oxford History of the French Revolution. Gildea, Robert (2008). Children of the Revolution: The French, 1799–1914. Guérard, Albert (1959). France: A Modern History. Textbook Publishers. ISBN 978-0-7581-2078-6. Mayeur, Jean-Marie; Rebérioux, Madeleine (1984). The Third Republic from its Origins to the Great War, 1871–1914. Cambridge University Press. ISBN 978-2-7351-0067-5. Price, Roger (1987). A Social History of Nineteenth-Century France. Shirer, William L. (1969). The Collapse of the Third Republic. New York: Simon & Schuster. Shusterman, Noah (2013). The French Revolution Faith, Desire, and Politics. Routledge. ISBN 978-1-1344-5600-0. Taylor, A. J. P. (1954). The Struggle for Mastery in Europe: 1848–1918. Taylor, A. J. P. (1967). Europe: Grandeur and Decline. Weber, Eugen (1976). Peasants into Frenchmen: The Modernization of Rural France, 1870–1914. Stanford University Press. ISBN 978-0-8047-1013-8. External links Wikimedia Commons has media related to History of France. Wikibooks has more on the topic of: History of France History of France, from Prehistory to Nowadays (in French + English translation) History of France, from Middle Ages to the 19th century (in French) History of France: Primary Documents (English interface) vte France topics vte Monarchs of France vte History of Europe vte History of current European countries Authority control databases: National Edit this at Wikidata United StatesSpainIsrael Category: History of France This page was last edited on 8 January 2025, at 11:27 (UTC). Text is available under the Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 License; additional terms may apply. By using this site, you agree to the Terms of Use and Privacy Policy. 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The French Revolution (French: Révolution française [ʁevɔlysjɔ̃ fʁɑ̃sɛːz]) was a period of political and societal change in France that began with the Estates General of 1789, and ended with the coup of 18 Brumaire in November 1799 and the formation of the French Consulate. Many of its ideas are considered fundamental principles of liberal democracy,[1] while its values and institutions remain central to modern French political discourse.[2] The causes of the revolution were a combination of social, political, and economic factors which the ancien régime ("old regime") proved unable to manage. A financial crisis and widespread social distress led to the convocation of the Estates General in May 1789, its first meeting since 1614. The representatives of the Third Estate broke away, and re-constituted themselves as a National Assembly in June. The Storming of the Bastille in Paris on 14 July was followed by a series of radical measures by the Assembly, among them the abolition of feudalism, state control over the Catholic Church, and a declaration of rights. The next three years were dominated by the struggle for political control, and military defeats following the outbreak of the French Revolutionary Wars in April 1792 led to an insurrection on 10 August. The monarchy was replaced by the French First Republic in September, and Louis XVI was executed in January 1793. After another revolt in June 1793, the constitution was suspended, and adequate political power passed from the National Convention to the Committee of Public Safety, led by the Jacobins. About 16,000 people were executed in what was later referred to as Reign of Terror, which ended in July 1794. Weakened by external threats and internal opposition, the Republic was replaced in 1795 by the Directory, and four years later, in 1799, the Consulate seized power in a military coup led by Napoleon Bonaparte on 9 November. This event is generally seen as marking the end of the Revolutionary period. Causes Part of a series on the History of France Carte de France dressée pour l'usage du Roy. Delisle Guillaume (1721) Timeline Ancient Middle Ages Early modern Long 19th century 20th century Topics DiplomacyEconomyHealth careLawLGBTQMedicineMilitaryMonarchs ConsortsPoliticsReligion ChristianityIslamJudaismTaxationTerritory flag France portal ·  History portal vte Main article: Causes of the French Revolution The Revolution resulted from multiple long-term and short-term factors, culminating in a social, economic, financial and political crisis in the late 1780s.[3][4][5] Combined with resistance to reform by the ruling elite, and indecisive policy by Louis XVI and his ministers, the result was a crisis the state was unable to manage.[6][7] Between 1715 and 1789, the French population grew from 21 to 28 million, 20% of whom lived in towns or cities, Paris alone having over 600,000 inhabitants.[8] This was accompanied by a tripling in the size of the middle class, which comprised almost 10% of the population by 1789.[9] Despite increases in overall prosperity, its benefits were largely restricted to the rentier and mercantile classes, while the living standards fell for wage labourers and peasant farmers who rented their land.[10][11] Economic recession from 1785, combined with bad harvests in 1787 and 1788, led to high unemployment and food prices, causing a financial and political crisis.[3][12][13][14] While the state also experienced a debt crisis, the level of debt itself was not high compared with Britain's.[15] A significant problem was that tax rates varied widely from one region to another, were often different from the official amounts, and collected inconsistently. Its complexity meant uncertainty over the amount contributed by any authorised tax caused resentment among all taxpayers.[16][a] Attempts to simplify the system were blocked by the regional Parlements which approved financial policy. The resulting impasse led to the calling of the Estates General of 1789, which became radicalised by the struggle for control of public finances.[18] Louis XVI was willing to consider reforms, but often backed down when faced with opposition from conservative elements within the nobility. Enlightenment critiques of social institutions were widely discussed among the educated French elite. At the same time, the American Revolution and the European revolts of the 1780s inspired public debate on issues such as patriotism, liberty, equality, and democracy. These shaped the response of the educated public to the crisis,[19] while scandals such as the Affair of the Diamond Necklace fuelled widespread anger at the court, nobility, and church officials.[20] Crisis of the Ancien Régime The regional Parlements in 1789; note area covered by the Parlement of Paris Financial and political crisis France faced a series of budgetary crises during the 18th century, as revenues failed to keep pace with expenditure.[21][22] Although the economy grew solidly, the increase was not reflected in a proportional growth in taxes,[21] their collection being contracted to tax farmers who kept much of it as personal profit. As the nobility and Church benefited from many exemptions, the tax burden fell mainly on peasants.[23] Reform was difficult because new tax laws had to be registered with regional judicial bodies or parlements that were able to block them. The king could impose laws by decree, but this risked open conflict with the parlements, the nobility, and those subject to new taxes.[24] France primarily funded the Anglo-French War of 1778–1783 through loans. Following the peace, the monarchy borrowed heavily, culminating in a debt crisis. By 1788, half of state revenue was required to service its debt.[25] In 1786, the French finance minister, Calonne, proposed a package of reforms including a universal land tax, the abolition of grain controls and internal tariffs, and new provincial assemblies appointed by the king. The new taxes, however, were rejected, first by a hand-picked Assembly of Notables dominated by the nobility, then by the parlements when submitted by Calonne's successor Brienne. The notables and parlements argued that the proposed taxes could only be approved by an Estates-General, a representative body that had last met in 1614.[26] The conflict between the Crown and the parlements became a national political crisis. Both sides issued a series of public statements, the government arguing that it was combating privilege and the parlement defending the ancient rights of the nation. Public opinion was firmly on the side of the parlements, and riots broke out in several towns. Brienne's attempts to raise new loans failed, and on 8 August 1788, he announced that the king would summon an Estates-General to convene the following May. Brienne resigned and was replaced by Necker.[27] In September 1788, the Parlement of Paris ruled that the Estates-General should convene in the same form as in 1614, meaning that the three estates (the clergy, nobility, and Third Estate or "commons") would meet and vote separately, with votes counted by estate rather than by head. As a result, the clergy and nobility could combine to outvote the Third Estate despite representing less than 5% of the population.[28][29] Following the relaxation of censorship and laws against political clubs, a group of liberal nobles and middle class activists, known as the Society of Thirty, launched a campaign for the doubling of Third Estate representation and individual voting. The public debate saw an average of 25 new political pamphlets published a week from 25 September 1788.[30] The Abbé Sieyès issued influential pamphlets denouncing the privilege of the clergy and nobility, and arguing the Third Estate represented the nation and should sit alone as a National Assembly. Activists such as Mounier, Barnave and Robespierre organised regional meetings, petitions and literature in support of these demands.[31] In December, the king agreed to double the representation of the Third Estate, but left the question of counting votes for the Estates-General to decide.[32] Estates-General of 1789 Main article: Estates General of 1789 in France Caricature of the Third Estate carrying the First Estate (clergy) and the Second Estate (nobility) on its back The Estates-General contained three separate bodies, the First Estate representing 100,000 clergy, the Second the nobility, and the Third the "commons".[33] Since each met separately, and any proposals had to be approved by at least two, the First and Second Estates could outvote the Third despite representing less than 5% of the population.[28] Although the Catholic Church in France owned nearly 10% of all land, as well as receiving annual tithes paid by peasants,[34] three-quarters of the 303 clergy elected were parish priests, many of whom earned less than unskilled labourers and had more in common with their poor parishioners than with the bishops of the first estate.[35][36] The Second Estate elected 322 deputies, representing about 400,000 men and women, who owned about 25% of the land and collected seigneurial dues and rents from their tenants. Most delegates were town-dwelling members of the noblesse d'épée, or traditional aristocracy. Courtiers and representatives of the noblesse de robe (those who derived rank from judicial or administrative posts) were underrepresented.[37] Of the 610 deputies of the Third Estate, about two-thirds held legal qualifications and almost half were venal office holders. Less than 100 were in trade or industry and none were peasants or artisans.[38] To assist delegates, each region completed a list of grievances, known as Cahiers de doléances.[39] Tax inequality and seigneurial dues (feudal payments owed to landowners) headed the grievances in the cahiers de doleances for the estate.[40] On 5 May 1789, the Estates-General convened at Versailles. Necker outlined the state budget and reiterated the king's decision that each estate should decide on which matters it would agree to meet and vote in common with the other estates. On the following day, each estate was to separately verify the credentials of their representatives. The Third Estate, however, voted to invite the other estates to join them in verifying all the representatives of the Estates-General in common and to agree that votes should be counted by head. Fruitless negotiations lasted to 12 June when the Third Estate began verifying its own members. On 17 June, the Third Estate declared itself to be the National Assembly of France and that all existing taxes were illegal.[41] Within two days, more than 100 members of the clergy had joined them.[42] Le Serment du Jeu de paume by Jacques-Louis David (c. 1791), depicting the Tennis Court Oath Shaken by this challenge to his authority, the king agreed to a reform package that he would announce at a Royal Session of the Estates-General. The Salle des États was closed to prepare for the joint session, but the members of the Estates-General were not informed in advance. On 20 June, when the members of the Third Estate found their meeting place closed, they moved to a nearby tennis court and swore not to disperse until a new constitution had been agreed.[43] At the Royal Session the king announced a series of tax and other reforms and stated that no new taxes or loans would be implemented without the consent of the Estates-General. However, he stated that the three estates were sacrosanct and it was up to each estate to agree to end their privileges and decide on which matters they would vote in common with the other estates. At the end of the session the Third Estate refused to leave the hall and reiterated their oath not to disperse until a constitution had been agreed. Over the next days more members of the clergy joined the National Assembly. On 27 June, faced with popular demonstrations and mutinies in his French Guards, Louis XVI capitulated. He commanded the members of the first and second estates to join the third in the National Assembly.[44] Constitutional monarchy (July 1789 – September 1792) Abolition of the Ancien Régime Main article: Storming of the Bastille Even the limited reforms the king had announced went too far for Marie Antoinette and Louis' younger brother the Comte d'Artois. On their advice, Louis dismissed Necker again as chief minister on 11 July.[45] On 12 July, the Assembly went into a non-stop session after rumours circulated he was planning to use the Swiss Guards to force it to close. The news brought crowds of protestors into the streets, and soldiers of the elite Gardes Françaises regiment refused to disperse them.[46] On the 14th, many of these soldiers joined the mob in attacking the Bastille, a royal fortress with large stores of arms and ammunition. Its governor, Bernard-René de Launay, surrendered after several hours of fighting that cost the lives of 83 attackers. Taken to the Hôtel de Ville, he was executed, his head placed on a pike and paraded around the city; the fortress was then torn down in a remarkably short time. Although rumoured to hold many prisoners, the Bastille held only seven: four forgers, a lunatic, a failed assassin, and a deviant nobleman. Nevertheless, as a potent symbol of the Ancien Régime, its destruction was viewed as a triumph and Bastille Day is still celebrated every year.[47] In French culture, some see its fall as the start of the Revolution.[48] The Storming of the Bastille on 14 July 1789; the iconic event of the Revolution, still commemorated each year as Bastille Day Alarmed by the prospect of losing control of the capital, Louis appointed the Marquis de Lafayette commander of the National Guard, with Jean-Sylvain Bailly as head of a new administrative structure known as the Commune. On 17 July, Louis visited Paris accompanied by 100 deputies, where he was greeted by Bailly and accepted a tricolore cockade to loud cheers. However, it was clear power had shifted from his court; he was welcomed as 'Louis XVI, father of the French and king of a free people.'[49] The short-lived unity enforced on the Assembly by a common threat quickly dissipated. Deputies argued over constitutional forms, while civil authority rapidly deteriorated. On 22 July, former Finance Minister Joseph Foullon and his son were lynched by a Parisian mob, and neither Bailly nor Lafayette could prevent it. In rural areas, wild rumours and paranoia resulted in the formation of militia and an agrarian insurrection known as la Grande Peur.[50] The breakdown of law and order and frequent attacks on aristocratic property led much of the nobility to flee abroad. These émigrés funded reactionary forces within France and urged foreign monarchs to back a counter-revolution.[51] In response, the Assembly published the August Decrees which abolished feudalism. Over 25% of French farmland was subject to feudal dues, providing the nobility with most of their income; these were now cancelled, along with church tithes. While their former tenants were supposed to pay them compensation, collecting it proved impossible, and the obligation was annulled in 1793.[52] Other decrees included equality before the law, opening public office to all, freedom of worship, and cancellation of special privileges held by provinces and towns.[53] With the suspension of the 13 regional parlements in November, the key institutional pillars of the old regime had all been abolished in less than four months. From its early stages, the Revolution therefore displayed signs of its radical nature; what remained unclear was the constitutional mechanism for turning intentions into practical applications.[54] Creating a new constitution Part of a series on Political revolution French Revolution By class By other characteristic Methods Examples icon Politics portal vte On 9 July, the National Assembly appointed a committee to draft a constitution and statement of rights.[55] Twenty drafts were submitted, which were used by a sub-committee to create a Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen, with Mirabeau being the most prominent member.[56] The Declaration was approved by the Assembly and published on 26 August as a statement of principle.[57] The Assembly now concentrated on the constitution itself. Mounier and his monarchist supporters advocated a bicameral system, with an upper house appointed by the king, who would also have the right to appoint ministers and veto legislation. On 10 September, the majority of the Assembly, led by Sieyès and Talleyrand, voted in favour of a single body, and the following day approved a "suspensive veto" for the king, meaning Louis could delay implementation of a law, but not block it indefinitely. In October, the Assembly voted to restrict political rights, including voting rights, to "active citizens", defined as French males over the age of 25 who paid direct taxes equal to three days' labour. The remainder were designated "passive citizens", restricted to "civil rights", a distinction opposed by a significant minority, including the Jacobin clubs.[58][59] By mid-1790, the main elements of a constitutional monarchy were in place, although the constitution was not accepted by Louis until 1791.[60] Food shortages and the worsening economy caused frustration at the lack of progress, and led to popular unrest in Paris. This came to a head in late September 1789, when the Flanders Regiment arrived in Versailles to reinforce the royal bodyguard, and were welcomed with a formal banquet as was common practice. The radical press described this as a 'gluttonous orgy', and claimed the tricolour cockade had been abused, while the Assembly viewed their arrival as an attempt to intimidate them.[61] On 5 October, crowds of women assembled outside the Hôtel de Ville, agitating against high food prices and shortages.[62] These protests quickly turned political, and after seizing weapons stored at the Hôtel de Ville, some 7,000 of them marched on Versailles, where they entered the Assembly to present their demands. They were followed to Versailles by 15,000 members of the National Guard under Lafayette, who was virtually "a prisoner of his own troops".[63] When the National Guard arrived later that evening, Lafayette persuaded Louis the safety of his family required their relocation to Paris. Next morning, some of the protestors broke into the royal apartments, searching for Marie Antoinette, who escaped. They ransacked the palace, killing several guards. Order was eventually restored, and the royal family and Assembly left for Paris, escorted by the National Guard.[64] Louis had announced his acceptance of the August Decrees and the Declaration, and his official title changed from 'King of France' to 'King of the French'.[65] The Revolution and the Church Historian John McManners argues "in eighteenth-century France, throne and altar were commonly spoken of as in close alliance; their simultaneous collapse ... would one day provide the final proof of their interdependence." One suggestion is that after a century of persecution, some French Protestants actively supported an anti-Catholic regime, a resentment fuelled by Enlightenment thinkers such as Voltaire.[66] Jean-Jacques Rousseau, considered a philosophical founder of the revolution,[67][68][69] wrote it was "manifestly contrary to the law of nature... that a handful of people should gorge themselves with superfluities, while the hungry multitude goes in want of necessities."[70] In this caricature, monks and nuns enjoy their new freedom after the decree of 16 February 1790. The Revolution caused a massive shift of power from the Catholic Church to the state; although the extent of religious belief has been questioned, elimination of tolerance for religious minorities meant by 1789 being French also meant being Catholic.[71] The church was the largest individual landowner in France, controlling nearly 10% of all estates and levied tithes, effectively a 10% tax on income, collected from peasant farmers in the form of crops. In return, it provided a minimal level of social support.[72] The August decrees abolished tithes, and on 2 November the Assembly confiscated all church property, the value of which was used to back a new paper currency known as assignats. In return, the state assumed responsibilities such as paying the clergy and caring for the poor, the sick and the orphaned.[73] On 13 February 1790, religious orders and monasteries were dissolved, while monks and nuns were encouraged to return to private life.[74] The Civil Constitution of the Clergy of 12 July 1790 made them employees of the state, as well as establishing rates of pay and a system for electing priests and bishops. Pope Pius VI and many French Catholics objected to this since it denied the authority of the Pope over the French Church. In October, thirty bishops wrote a declaration denouncing the law, further fuelling opposition.[75] When clergy were required to swear loyalty to the Civil Constitution in November 1790, it split the church between the 24% who complied, and the majority who refused.[76] This stiffened popular resistance against state interference, especially in traditionally Catholic areas such as Normandy, Brittany and the Vendée, where only a few priests took the oath and the civilian population turned against the revolution.[75] The result was state-led persecution of "Refractory clergy", many of whom were forced into exile, deported, or executed.[77] Political divisions The period from October 1789 to spring 1791 is usually seen as one of relative tranquility, when some of the most important legislative reforms were enacted. However, conflict over the source of legitimate authority was more apparent in the provinces, where officers of the Ancien Régime had been swept away, but not yet replaced by new structures. This was less obvious in Paris, since the National Guard made it the best policed city in Europe, but disorder in the provinces inevitably affected members of the Assembly.[78] The Fête de la Fédération on 14 July 1790 celebrated the establishment of the constitutional monarchy. Centrists led by Sieyès, Lafayette, Mirabeau and Bailly created a majority by forging consensus with monarchiens like Mounier, and independents including Adrien Duport, Barnave and Alexandre Lameth. At one end of the political spectrum, reactionaries like Cazalès and Maury denounced the Revolution in all its forms, with radicals like Maximilien Robespierre at the other. He and Jean-Paul Marat opposed the criteria for "active citizens", gaining them substantial support among the Parisian proletariat, many of whom had been disenfranchised by the measure.[79] On 14 July 1790, celebrations were held throughout France commemorating the fall of the Bastille, with participants swearing an oath of fidelity to "the nation, the law and the king." The Fête de la Fédération in Paris was attended by the royal family, with Talleyrand performing a mass. Despite this show of unity, the Assembly was increasingly divided, while external players like the Paris Commune and National Guard competed for power. One of the most significant was the Jacobin club; originally a forum for general debate, by August 1790 it had over 150 members, split into different factions.[80] The Assembly continued to develop new institutions; in September 1790, the regional Parlements were abolished and their legal functions replaced by a new independent judiciary, with jury trials for criminal cases. However, moderate deputies were uneasy at popular demands for universal suffrage, labour unions and cheap bread, and over the winter of 1790 and 1791, they passed a series of measures intended to disarm popular radicalism. These included exclusion of poorer citizens from the National Guard, limits on use of petitions and posters, and the June 1791 Le Chapelier Law suppressing trade guilds and any form of worker organisation.[81] The traditional force for preserving law and order was the army, which was increasingly divided between officers, who largely came from the nobility, and ordinary soldiers. In August 1790, the loyalist General Bouillé suppressed a serious mutiny at Nancy; although congratulated by the Assembly, he was criticised by Jacobin radicals for the severity of his actions. Growing disorder meant many professional officers either left or became émigrés, further destabilising the institution.[82] Varennes and after Main article: Flight to Varennes Held in the Tuileries Palace under virtual house arrest, Louis XVI was urged by his brother and wife to re-assert his independence by taking refuge with Bouillé, who was based at Montmédy with 10,000 soldiers considered loyal to the Crown.[83] The royal family left the palace in disguise on the night of 20 June 1791; late the next day, Louis was recognised as he passed through Varennes, arrested and taken back to Paris. The attempted escape had a profound impact on public opinion; since it was clear Louis had been seeking refuge in Austria, the Assembly now demanded oaths of loyalty to the regime, and began preparing for war, while fear of 'spies and traitors' became pervasive.[84] After the Flight to Varennes; the royal family are escorted back to Paris Despite calls to replace the monarchy with a republic, Louis retained his position but was generally regarded with acute suspicion and forced to swear allegiance to the constitution. A new decree stated retracting this oath, making war upon the nation, or permitting anyone to do so in his name would be considered abdication. However, radicals led by Jacques Pierre Brissot prepared a petition demanding his deposition, and on 17 July, an immense crowd gathered in the Champ de Mars to sign. Led by Lafayette, the National Guard was ordered to "preserve public order" and responded to a barrage of stones by firing into the crowd, killing between 13 and 50 people.[85] The massacre badly damaged Lafayette's reputation: the authorities responded by closing radical clubs and newspapers, while their leaders went into exile or hiding, including Marat.[86] On 27 August, Emperor Leopold II and King Frederick William II of Prussia issued the Declaration of Pillnitz declaring their support for Louis and hinting at an invasion of France on his behalf. In reality, the meeting between Leopold and Frederick was primarily to discuss the Partitions of Poland; the Declaration was intended to satisfy Comte d'Artois and other French émigrés but the threat rallied popular support behind the regime.[87] Based on a motion proposed by Robespierre, existing deputies were barred from elections held in early September for the French Legislative Assembly. Although Robespierre himself was one of those excluded, his support in the clubs gave him a political power base not available to Lafayette and Bailly, who resigned respectively as head of the National Guard and the Paris Commune. The new laws were gathered together in the 1791 Constitution, and submitted to Louis XVI, who pledged to defend it "from enemies at home and abroad". On 30 September, the Constituent Assembly was dissolved, and the Legislative Assembly convened the next day.[88] Fall of the monarchy The Legislative Assembly is often dismissed by historians as an ineffective body, compromised by divisions over the role of the monarchy, an issue exacerbated when Louis attempted to prevent or reverse limitations on his powers.[89] At the same time, restricting the vote to those who paid a minimal amount of tax disenfranchised a significant proportion of the 6 million Frenchmen over 25, while only 10% of those able to vote actually did so. Finally, poor harvests and rising food prices led to unrest among the urban class known as Sans-culottes, who saw the new regime as failing to meet their demands for bread and work.[90] This meant the new constitution was opposed by significant elements inside and outside the Assembly, itself split into three main groups. 264 members were affiliated with Barnave's Feuillants, constitutional monarchists who considered the Revolution had gone far enough, while another 136 were Jacobin leftists who supported a republic, led by Brissot and usually referred to as Brissotins.[91] The remaining 345 belonged to La Plaine, a centrist faction who switched votes depending on the issue, but many of whom shared doubts as to whether Louis was committed to the Revolution.[91] After he officially accepted the new Constitution, one recorded response was "Vive le roi, s'il est de bon foi!", or "Long live the king – if he keeps his word".[92] Although a minority in the Assembly, control of key committees allowed the Brissotins to provoke Louis into using his veto. They first managed to pass decrees confiscating émigré property and threatening them with the death penalty.[93] This was followed by measures against non-juring priests, whose opposition to the Civil Constitution led to a state of near civil war in southern France, which Barnave tried to defuse by relaxing the more punitive provisions. On 29 November, the Assembly approved a decree giving refractory clergy eight days to comply, or face charges of 'conspiracy against the nation', an act opposed even by Robespierre.[94] When Louis vetoed both, his opponents were able to portray him as opposed to reform in general.[95] The storming of the Tuileries Palace, 10 August 1792 Brissot accompanied this with a campaign for war against Austria and Prussia, often interpreted as a mixture of calculation and idealism. While exploiting popular anti-Austrianism, it reflected a genuine belief in exporting the values of political liberty and popular sovereignty.[96] Simultaneously, conservatives headed by Marie Antoinette also favoured war, seeing it as a way to regain control of the military, and restore royal authority. In December 1791, Louis made a speech in the Assembly giving foreign powers a month to disband the émigrés or face war, an act greeted with enthusiasm by supporters, but suspicion from opponents.[97] Barnave's inability to build a consensus in the Assembly resulted in the appointment of a new government, chiefly composed of Brissotins. On 20 April 1792, the French Revolutionary Wars began when French armies attacked Austrian and Prussian forces along their borders, before suffering a series of disastrous defeats. In an effort to mobilise popular support, the government ordered non-juring priests to swear the oath or be deported, dissolved the Constitutional Guard and replaced it with 20,000 fédérés; Louis agreed to disband the Guard, but vetoed the other two proposals, while Lafayette called on the Assembly to suppress the clubs.[98] Popular anger increased when details of the Brunswick Manifesto reached Paris on 1 August, threatening 'unforgettable vengeance' should any oppose the Allies in seeking to restore the power of the monarchy. On the morning of 10 August, a combined force of the Paris National Guard and provincial fédérés attacked the Tuileries Palace, killing many of the Swiss Guards protecting it.[99] Louis and his family took refuge with the Assembly and shortly after 11:00 am, the deputies present voted to 'temporarily relieve the king', effectively suspending the monarchy.[100] First Republic (1792–1795) Proclamation of the First Republic Main article: National Convention Execution of Louis XVI in the Place de la Concorde, facing the empty pedestal where the statue of his grandfather Louis XV previously stood In late August, elections were held for the National Convention. New restrictions on the franchise meant the number of votes cast fell to 3.3 million, versus 4 million in 1791, while intimidation was widespread.[101] The Brissotins now split between moderate Girondins led by Brissot, and radical Montagnards, headed by Robespierre, Georges Danton and Jean-Paul Marat. While loyalties constantly shifted, voting patterns suggest roughly 160 of the 749 deputies can generally be categorised as Girondists, with another 200 Montagnards. The remainder were part of a centrist faction known as La Plaine, headed by Bertrand Barère, Pierre Joseph Cambon and Lazare Carnot.[102] In the September Massacres, between 1,100 and 1,600 prisoners held in Parisian jails were summarily executed, the vast majority being common criminals.[103] A response to the capture of Longwy and Verdun by Prussia, the perpetrators were largely National Guard members and fédérés on their way to the front. While responsibility is still disputed, even moderates expressed sympathy for the action, which soon spread to the provinces. One suggestion is that the killings stemmed from concern over growing lawlessness, rather than political ideology.[104] On 20 September, the French defeated the Prussians at the Battle of Valmy, in what was the first major victory by the army of France during the Revolutionary Wars. Emboldened by this, on 22 September the Convention replaced the monarchy with the French First Republic (1792–1804) and introduced a new calendar, with 1792 becoming "Year One".[105] The next few months were taken up with the trial of Citoyen Louis Capet, formerly Louis XVI. While evenly divided on the question of his guilt, members of the convention were increasingly influenced by radicals based within the Jacobin clubs and Paris Commune. The Brunswick Manifesto made it easy to portray Louis as a threat to the Revolution, especially when extracts from his personal correspondence showed him conspiring with Royalist exiles.[106] On 17 January 1793, Louis was sentenced to death for "conspiracy against public liberty and general safety". 361 deputies were in favour, 288 against, while another 72 voted to execute him, subject to delaying conditions. The sentence was carried out on 21 January on the Place de la Révolution, now the Place de la Concorde.[107] Conservatives across Europe now called for the destruction of revolutionary France, and in February the Convention responded by declaring war on Britain and the Dutch Republic. Together with Austria and Prussia, these two countries were later joined by Spain, Portugal, Naples, and Tuscany in the War of the First Coalition (1792–1797).[108] Political crisis and fall of the Girondins The Girondins hoped war would unite the people behind the government and provide an excuse for rising prices and food shortages, but found themselves the target of popular anger. Many left for the provinces. The first conscription measure or levée en masse on 24 February sparked riots in Paris and other regional centres. Already unsettled by changes imposed on the church, in March the traditionally conservative and royalist Vendée rose in revolt. On 18th, Dumouriez was defeated at Neerwinden and defected to the Austrians. Uprisings followed in Bordeaux, Lyon, Toulon, Marseille and Caen. The Republic seemed on the verge of collapse.[109] The crisis led to the creation on 6 April 1793 of the Committee of Public Safety, an executive committee accountable to the convention.[110] The Girondins made a fatal political error by indicting Marat before the Revolutionary Tribunal for allegedly directing the September massacres; he was quickly acquitted, further isolating the Girondins from the sans-culottes. When Jacques Hébert called for a popular revolt against the "henchmen of Louis Capet" on 24 May, he was arrested by the Commission of Twelve, a Girondin-dominated tribunal set up to expose 'plots'. In response to protests by the Commune, the Commission warned "if by your incessant rebellions something befalls the representatives of the nation, Paris will be obliterated".[109] The Death of Marat by Jacques-Louis David (1793) Growing discontent allowed the clubs to mobilise against the Girondins. Backed by the Commune and elements of the National Guard, on 31 May they attempted to seize power in a coup. Although the coup failed, on 2 June the convention was surrounded by a crowd of up to 80,000, demanding cheap bread, unemployment pay and political reforms, including restriction of the vote to the sans-culottes, and the right to remove deputies at will.[111] Ten members of the commission and another twenty-nine members of the Girondin faction were arrested, and on 10 June, the Montagnards took over the Committee of Public Safety.[112] Meanwhile, a committee led by Robespierre's close ally Saint-Just was tasked with preparing a new Constitution. Completed in only eight days, it was ratified by the convention on 24 June, and contained radical reforms, including universal male suffrage. However, normal legal processes were suspended following the assassination of Marat on 13 July by the Girondist Charlotte Corday, which the Committee of Public Safety used as an excuse to take control. The 1793 Constitution was suspended indefinitely in October.[113] Key areas of focus for the new government included creating a new state ideology, economic regulation and winning the war.[114] They were helped by divisions among their internal opponents; while areas like the Vendée and Brittany wanted to restore the monarchy, most supported the Republic but opposed the regime in Paris. On 17 August, the Convention voted a second levée en masse; despite initial problems in equipping and supplying such large numbers, by mid-October Republican forces had re-taken Lyon, Marseille and Bordeaux, while defeating Coalition armies at Hondschoote and Wattignies.[115] The new class of military leaders included a young colonel named Napoleon Bonaparte, who was appointed commander of artillery at the siege of Toulon thanks to his friendship with Augustin Robespierre. His success in that role resulted in promotion to the Army of Italy in April 1794, and the beginning of his rise to military and political power.[116] Reign of Terror Main article: Reign of Terror Nine émigrés are executed by guillotine, 1793 Although intended to bolster revolutionary fervour, the Reign of Terror rapidly degenerated into the settlement of personal grievances. At the end of July, the Convention set price controls on a wide range of goods, with the death penalty for hoarders. On 9 September, 'revolutionary groups' were established to enforce these controls, while the Law of Suspects on 17th approved the arrest of suspected "enemies of freedom". This initiated what has become known as the "Terror". From September 1793 to July 1794, around 300,000 were arrested,[117] with some 16,600 people executed on charges of counter-revolutionary activity, while another 40,000 may have been summarily executed, or died awaiting trial.[118] Price controls made farmers reluctant to sell their produce in Parisian markets, and by early September, the city was suffering acute food shortages. At the same time, the war increased public debt, which the Assembly tried to finance by selling confiscated property. However, few would buy assets that might be repossessed by their former owners, a concern that could only be achieved by military victory. This meant the financial position worsened as threats to the Republic increased, while printing assignats to deal with the deficit further increased inflation.[119] On 10 October, the Convention recognised the Committee of Public Safety as the supreme Revolutionary Government, and suspended the Constitution until peace was achieved.[113] In mid-October, Marie Antoinette was convicted of a long list of crimes, and guillotined; two weeks later, the Girondist leaders arrested in June were also executed, along with Philippe Égalité. The "Terror" was not confined to Paris, with over 2,000 killed in Lyons after its recapture.[120] Georges Danton; Robespierre's close friend and Montagnard leader, executed 5 April 1794 At Cholet on 17 October, the Republican army won a decisive victory over the Vendée rebels, and the survivors escaped into Brittany. Another defeat at Le Mans on 23 December ended the rebellion as a major threat, although the insurgency continued until 1796. The extent of the repression that followed has been debated by French historians since the mid-19th century.[121] Between November 1793 to February 1794, over 4,000 were drowned in the Loire at Nantes under the supervision of Jean-Baptiste Carrier. Historian Reynald Secher claims that as many as 117,000 died between 1793 and 1796. Although those numbers have been challenged, François Furet concluded it "not only revealed massacre and destruction on an unprecedented scale, but a zeal so violent that it has bestowed as its legacy much of the region's identity."[122] [b] At the height of the Terror, not even its supporters were immune from suspicion, leading to divisions within the Montagnard faction between radical Hébertists and moderates led by Danton.[c] Robespierre saw their dispute as de-stabilising the regime, and, as a deist, objected to the anti-religious policies advocated by the atheist Hébert, who was arrested and executed on 24 March with 19 of his colleagues, including Carrier.[126] To retain the loyalty of the remaining Hébertists, Danton was arrested and executed on 5 April with Camille Desmoulins, after a show trial that arguably did more damage to Robespierre than any other act in this period.[127] The Law of 22 Prairial (10 June) denied "enemies of the people" the right to defend themselves. Those arrested in the provinces were now sent to Paris for judgement; from March to July, executions in Paris increased from five to twenty-six a day.[128] Many Jacobins ridiculed the festival of the Cult of the Supreme Being on 8 June, a lavish and expensive ceremony led by Robespierre, who was also accused of circulating claims he was a second Messiah. Relaxation of price controls and rampant inflation caused increasing unrest among the sans-culottes, but the improved military situation reduced fears the Republic was in danger. Fearing their own survival depended on Robespierre's removal, on 29 June three members of the Committee of Public Safety openly accused him of being a dictator.[129] The execution of Robespierre on 28 July 1794 marked the end of the Reign of Terror. Robespierre responded by refusing to attend Committee meetings, allowing his opponents to build a coalition against him. In a speech made to the convention on 26 July, he claimed certain members were conspiring against the Republic, an almost certain death sentence if confirmed. When he refused to provide names, the session broke up in confusion. That evening he repeated these claims at the Jacobins club, where it was greeted with demands for execution of the 'traitors'. Fearing the consequences if they did not act first, his opponents attacked Robespierre and his allies in the Convention next day. When Robespierre attempted to speak, his voice failed, one deputy crying "The blood of Danton chokes him!"[130] After the Convention authorised his arrest, he and his supporters took refuge in the Hotel de Ville, which was defended by elements of the National Guard. Other units loyal to the Convention stormed the building that evening and detained Robespierre, who severely injured himself attempting suicide. He was executed on 28 July with 19 colleagues, including Saint-Just and Georges Couthon, followed by 83 members of the Commune.[131] The Law of 22 Prairial was repealed, any surviving Girondists reinstated as deputies, and the Jacobin Club was closed and banned.[132] There are various interpretations of the Terror and the violence with which it was conducted. François Furet argues that the intense ideological commitment of the revolutionaries and their utopian goals required the extermination of any opposition.[133] A middle position suggests violence was not inevitable but the product of a series of complex internal events, exacerbated by war.[134] Thermidorian reaction Main article: Thermidorian Reaction The bloodshed did not end with the death of Robespierre; Southern France saw a wave of revenge killings, directed against alleged Jacobins, Republican officials and Protestants. Although the victors of Thermidor asserted control over the Commune by executing their leaders, some of those closely involved in the "Terror" retained their positions. They included Paul Barras, later chief executive of the French Directory, and Joseph Fouché, director of the killings in Lyon who served as Minister of Police under the Directory, the Consulate and Empire.[135] Despite his links to Augustin Robespierre, military success in Italy meant Napoleon Bonaparte escaped censure.[136] Former Viscount and Montagnard Paul Barras, who took part in the Thermidorian reaction and later headed the French Directory The December 1794 Treaty of La Jaunaye ended the Chouannerie in western France by allowing freedom of worship and the return of non-juring priests.[137] This was accompanied by military success; in January 1795, French forces helped the Dutch Patriots set up the Batavian Republic, securing their northern border.[138] The war with Prussia was concluded in favour of France by the Peace of Basel in April 1795, while Spain made peace shortly thereafter.[139] However, the Republic still faced a crisis at home. Food shortages arising from a poor 1794 harvest were exacerbated in Northern France by the need to supply the army in Flanders, while the winter was the worst since 1709.[140] By April 1795, people were starving and the assignat was worth only 8% of its face value; in desperation, the Parisian poor rose again.[141] They were quickly dispersed and the main impact was another round of arrests, while Jacobin prisoners in Lyon were summarily executed.[142] A committee drafted a new constitution, approved by plebiscite on 23 September 1795 and put into place on 27th.[143] Largely designed by Pierre Daunou and Boissy d'Anglas, it established a bicameral legislature, intended to slow down the legislative process, ending the wild swings of policy under the previous unicameral systems. The Council of 500 was responsible for drafting legislation, which was reviewed and approved by the Council of Ancients, an upper house containing 250 men over the age of 40. Executive power was in the hands of five Directors, selected by the Council of Ancients from a list provided by the lower house, with a five-year mandate.[144] Deputies were chosen by indirect election, a total franchise of around 5 million voting in primaries for 30,000 electors, or 0.6% of the population. Since they were also subject to stringent property qualification, it guaranteed the return of conservative or moderate deputies. In addition, rather than dissolving the previous legislature as in 1791 and 1792, the so-called 'law of two-thirds' ruled only 150 new deputies would be elected each year. The remaining 600 Conventionnels kept their seats, a move intended to ensure stability.[145] The Directory (1795–1799) Main article: French Directory Troops under Napoleon fire on Royalist insurgents in Paris, 5 October 1795 Jacobin sympathisers viewed the Directory as a betrayal of the Revolution, while Bonapartists later justified Napoleon's coup by emphasising its corruption.[146] The regime also faced internal unrest, a weak economy, and an expensive war, while the Council of 500 could block legislation at will. Since the Directors had no power to call new elections, the only way to break a deadlock was rule by decree or use force. As a result, the Directory was characterised by "chronic violence, ambivalent forms of justice, and repeated recourse to heavy-handed repression."[147] Retention of the Conventionnels ensured the Thermidorians held a majority in the legislature and three of the five Directors, but they were increasingly challenged by the right. On 5 October, Convention troops led by Napoleon put down a royalist rising in Paris; when the first elections were held two weeks later, over 100 of the 150 new deputies were royalists of some sort.[148] The power of the Parisian sans-culottes had been broken by the suppression of the May 1795 revolt; relieved of pressure from below, the Jacobin clubs became supporters of the Directory, largely to prevent restoration of the monarchy.[149] Removal of price controls and a collapse in the value of the assignat led to inflation and soaring food prices. By April 1796, over 500,000 Parisians were unemployed, resulting in the May insurrection known as the Conspiracy of the Equals. Led by the revolutionary François-Noël Babeuf, their demands included immediate implementation of the 1793 Constitution, and a more equitable distribution of wealth. Despite support from sections of the military, the revolt was easily crushed, while Babeuf and other leaders were executed.[150] Nevertheless, by 1799 the economy had been stabilised, and important reforms made allowing steady expansion of French industry. Many of these remained in place for much of the 19th century.[151] Prior to 1797, three of the five Directors were firmly Republican; Barras, Révellière-Lépeaux and Jean-François Rewbell, as were around 40% of the legislature. The same percentage were broadly centrist or unaffiliated, along with two Directors, Étienne-François Letourneur and Lazare Carnot. Although only 20% were committed Royalists, many centrists supported the restoration of the exiled Louis XVIII of France in the belief this would bring peace.[152] The elections of May 1797 resulted in significant gains for the right, with Royalists Jean-Charles Pichegru elected President of the Council of 500, and Barthélemy appointed a Director.[153] Napoléon Bonaparte in the Council of 500 during 18 Brumaire, 9 November 1799 With Royalists apparently on the verge of power, Republicans attempted a pre-emptive coup on 4 September. Using troops from Napoleon's Army of Italy under Pierre Augereau, the Council of 500 was forced to approve the arrest of Barthélemy, Pichegru and Carnot. The elections were annulled, sixty-three leading Royalists deported to French Guiana, and new laws passed against émigrés, Royalists and ultra-Jacobins. The removal of his conservative opponents opened the way for direct conflict between Barras, and those on the left.[154] Fighting continued despite general war weariness, and the 1798 elections saw a resurgence in Jacobin strength. Napoleon's invasion of Egypt in July 1798 confirmed European fears of French expansionism, and the War of the Second Coalition began in November. Without a majority in the legislature, the Directors relied on the army to enforce decrees, and extract revenue from conquered territories. Generals like Napoleon and Joubert were now central to the political process, while both the army and Directory became notorious for their corruption.[155] It has been suggested the Directory collapsed because by 1799, many 'preferred the uncertainties of authoritarian rule to the continuing ambiguities of parliamentary politics'.[156] The architect of its end was Sieyès, who when asked what he had done during the Terror allegedly answered "I survived". Nominated to the Directory, his first action was to remove Barras, with the help of allies including Talleyrand, and Napoleon's brother Lucien, President of the Council of 500.[157] On 9 November 1799, the Coup of 18 Brumaire replaced the five Directors with the French Consulate, which consisted of three members, Napoleon, Sieyès, and Roger Ducos. Most historians consider this the end point of the French Revolution.[158] Role of ideology Part of the Politics series Republicanism Concepts Schools Types Philosophers Politicians Theoretical works History National variants Related topics icon Politics portal vte The role of ideology in the Revolution is controversial with Jonathan Israel stating that the "radical Enlightenment" was the primary driving force of the Revolution.[159] Cobban, however, argues "[t]he actions of the revolutionaries were most often prescribed by the need to find practical solutions to immediate problems, using the resources at hand, not by pre-conceived theories."[160] The identification of ideologies is complicated by the profusion of revolutionary clubs, factions and publications, absence of formal political parties, and individual flexibility in the face of changing circumstances.[161] In addition, although the Declaration of the Rights of Man was a fundamental document for all revolutionary factions, its interpretation varied widely.[162] While all revolutionaries professed their devotion to liberty in principle, "it appeared to mean whatever those in power wanted."[163] For example, the liberties specified in the Rights of Man were limited by law when they might "cause harm to others, or be abused". Prior to 1792, Jacobins and others frequently opposed press restrictions on the grounds these violated a basic right.[164] However, the radical National Convention passed laws in September 1793 and July 1794 imposing the death penalty for offences such as "disparaging the National Convention", and "misleading public opinion."[165] While revolutionaries also endorsed the principle of equality, few advocated equality of wealth since property was also viewed as a right.[166] The National Assembly opposed equal political rights for women,[167] while the abolition of slavery in the colonies was delayed until February 1794 because it conflicted with the property rights of slave owners, and many feared it would disrupt trade.[168] Political equality for male citizens was another divisive issue, with the 1791 constitution limiting the right to vote and stand for office to males over 25 who met a property qualification, so-called "active citizens". This restriction was opposed by many activists, including Robespierre, the Jacobins, and Cordeliers.[169] The principle that sovereignty resided in the nation was a key concept of the Revolution.[170] However, Israel argues this obscures ideological differences over whether the will of the nation was best expressed through representative assemblies and constitutions, or direct action by revolutionary crowds, and popular assemblies such as the sections of the Paris commune.[171] Many considered constitutional monarchy as incompatible with the principle of popular sovereignty,[172] but prior to 1792, there was a strong bloc with an ideological commitment to such a system, based on the writings of Hobbes, Locke, Montesquieu and Voltaire.[173] Israel argues the nationalisation of church property and the establishment of the Constitutional Church reflected an ideological commitment to secularism, and a determination to undermine a bastion of old regime privilege.[174] While Cobban agrees the Constitutional Church was motivated by ideology, he sees its origins in the anti-clericalism of Voltaire and other Enlightenment figures.[175] Jacobins were hostile to formal political parties and factions which they saw as a threat to national unity and the general will, with "political virtue" and "love of country" key elements of their ideology.[176][177] They viewed the ideal revolutionary as selfless, sincere, free of political ambition, and devoted to the nation.[178] The disputes leading to the departure first of the Feuillants, then later the Girondists, were conducted in terms of the relative political virtue and patriotism of the disputants. In December 1793, all members of the Jacobin clubs were subject to a "purifying scrutiny", to determine whether they were "men of virtue".[179] French Revolutionary Wars Main article: French Revolutionary Wars The Battle of Valmy by Horace Vernet, 1826. French victory at the Battle of Valmy on 20 September 1792 validated the Revolutionary idea of armies composed of citizens The Revolution initiated a series of conflicts that began in 1792 and ended only with Napoleon's defeat at Waterloo in 1815. In its early stages, this seemed unlikely; the 1791 Constitution specifically disavowed "war for the purpose of conquest", and although traditional tensions between France and Austria re-emerged in the 1780s, Emperor Joseph II cautiously welcomed the reforms. Austria was at war with the Ottomans, as were the Russians, while both were negotiating with Prussia over partitioning Poland. Most importantly, Britain preferred peace, and as Emperor Leopold II stated after the Declaration of Pillnitz, "without England, there is no case".[180] In late 1791, factions within the Assembly came to see war as a way to unite the country and secure the Revolution by eliminating hostile forces on its borders and establishing its "natural frontiers".[181] France declared war on Austria in April 1792 and issued the first conscription orders, with recruits serving for twelve months. By the time peace finally came in 1815, the conflict had involved every major European power as well as the United States, redrawn the map of Europe and expanded into the Americas, the Middle East, and the Indian Ocean.[182] From 1701 to 1801, the population of Europe grew from 118 to 187 million; combined with new mass production techniques, this allowed belligerents to support large armies, requiring the mobilisation of national resources. It was a different kind of war, fought by nations rather than kings, intended to destroy their opponents' ability to resist, but also to implement deep-ranging social change. While all wars are political to some degree, this period was remarkable for the emphasis placed on reshaping boundaries and the creation of entirely new European states.[183] In April 1792, French armies invaded the Austrian Netherlands but suffered a series of setbacks before victory over an Austrian-Prussian army at Valmy in September. After defeating a second Austrian army at Jemappes on 6 November, they occupied the Netherlands, areas of the Rhineland, Nice and Savoy. Emboldened by this success, in February 1793 France declared war on the Dutch Republic, Spain and Britain, beginning the War of the First Coalition.[184] However, the expiration of the 12-month term for the 1792 recruits forced the French to relinquish their conquests. In August, new conscription measures were passed and by May 1794 the French army had between 750,000 and 800,000 men.[185] Despite high rates of desertion, this was large enough to manage multiple internal and external threats; for comparison, the combined Prussian-Austrian army was less than 90,000.[186] Napoleon's Italian campaigns reshaped the map of Italy By February 1795, France had annexed the Austrian Netherlands, established their frontier on the left bank of the Rhine and replaced the Dutch Republic with the Batavian Republic, a satellite state. These victories led to the collapse of the anti-French coalition; Prussia made peace in April 1795, followed soon after by Spain, leaving Britain and Austria as the only major powers still in the war.[187] In October 1797, a series of defeats by Bonaparte in Italy led Austria to agree to the Treaty of Campo Formio, in which they formally ceded the Netherlands and recognised the Cisalpine Republic.[188] Fighting continued for two reasons; first, French state finances had come to rely on indemnities levied on their defeated opponents. Second, armies were primarily loyal to their generals, for whom the wealth achieved by victory and the status it conferred became objectives in themselves. Leading soldiers like Hoche, Pichegru and Carnot wielded significant political influence and often set policy; Campo Formio was approved by Bonaparte, not the Directory, which strongly objected to terms it considered too lenient.[188] Despite these concerns, the Directory never developed a realistic peace programme, fearing the destabilising effects of peace and the consequent demobilisation of hundreds of thousands of young men. As long as the generals and their armies stayed away from Paris, they were happy to allow them to continue fighting, a key factor behind sanctioning Bonaparte's invasion of Egypt. This resulted in aggressive and opportunistic policies, leading to the War of the Second Coalition in November 1798.[189] Slavery and the colonies The Saint-Domingue slave revolt in 1791 In 1789, the most populous French colonies were Saint-Domingue (today Haiti), Martinique, Guadeloupe, the Île Bourbon (Réunion) and the Île de la France. These colonies produced commodities such as sugar, coffee and cotton for exclusive export to France. There were about 700,000 slaves in the colonies, of which about 500,000 were in Saint-Domingue. Colonial products accounted for about a third of France's exports.[190] In February 1788, the Société des Amis des Noirs (Society of the Friends of Blacks) was formed in France with the aim of abolishing slavery in the empire. In August 1789, colonial slave owners and merchants formed the rival Club de Massiac to represent their interests. When the Constituent Assembly adopted the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen in August 1789, delegates representing the colonial landowners successfully argued that the principles should not apply in the colonies as they would bring economic ruin and disrupt trade. Colonial landowners also gained control of the Colonial Committee of the Assembly from where they exerted a powerful influence against abolition.[191][192] People of colour also faced social and legal discrimination in mainland France and its colonies, including a bar on their access to professions such as law, medicine and pharmacy.[193] In 1789–90, a delegation of free coloureds, led by Vincent Ogé and Julien Raimond, unsuccessfully lobbied the Assembly to end discrimination against free coloureds. Ogé left for Saint-Domingue where an uprising against white landowners broke out in October 1790. The revolt failed and Ogé was killed.[194][192] In May 1791, the National Assembly granted full political rights to coloureds born of two free parents, but left the rights of freed slaves to be determined by the colonial assemblies. The assemblies refused to implement the decree and fighting broke out between the coloured population of Saint-Domingue and white colonists, each side recruiting slaves to their forces. A major slave revolt followed in August.[195] In March 1792, the Legislative Assembly responded to the revolt by granting citizenship to all free coloureds and sending two commissioners, Sonthonax and Polvérel, and 6,000 troops to Saint-Domingue to enforce the decree. On arrival in September, the commissioners announced that slavery would remain in force. Over 72,000 slaves were still in revolt, mostly in the north.[196] Brissot and his supporters envisaged an eventual abolition of slavery but their immediate concern was securing trade and the support of merchants for the revolutionary wars. After Brissot's fall, the new constitution of June 1793 included a new Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen but excluded the colonies from its provisions. In any event, the new constitution was suspended until France was at peace.[197] In early 1793, royalist planters from Guadeloupe and Saint-Domingue formed an alliance with Britain. The Spanish supported insurgent slaves, led by Jean-François Papillon and Georges Biassou, in the north of Saint-Domingue. White planters loyal to the republic sent representatives to Paris to convince the Jacobin controlled Convention that those calling for the abolition of slavery were British agents and supporters of Brissot, hoping to disrupt trade.[198] In June, the commissioners in Saint-Domingue freed 10,000 slaves fighting for the republic. As the royalists and their British and Spanish supporters were also offering freedom for slaves willing to fight for their cause, the commissioners outbid them by abolishing slavery in the north in August, and throughout the colony in October. Representatives were sent to Paris to gain the approval of the convention for the decision.[198][199] The Convention voted for the abolition of slavery in the colonies on 4 February 1794 and decreed that all residents of the colonies had the full rights of French citizens irrespective of colour.[200] An army of 1,000 sans-culottes led by Victor Hugues was sent to Guadeloupe to expel the British and enforce the decree. The army recruited former slaves and eventually numbered 11,000, capturing Guadeloupe and other smaller islands. Abolition was also proclaimed on Guyane. Martinique remained under British occupation, while colonial landowners in Réunion and the Îles Mascareignes repulsed the republicans.[201] Black armies drove the Spanish out of Saint-Domingue in 1795, and the last of the British withdrew in 1798.[202] In republican controlled areas from 1793 to 1799, freed slaves were required to work on their former plantations or for their former masters if they were in domestic service. They were paid a wage and gained property rights. Black and coloured generals were effectively in control of large areas of Guadeloupe and Saint-Domingue, including Toussaint Louverture in the north of Saint-Domingue, and André Rigaud in the south. Historian Fréderic Régent states that the restrictions on the freedom of employment and movement of former slaves meant that, "only whites, persons of color already freed before the decree, and former slaves in the army or on warships really benefited from general emancipation."[201] Media and symbolism Main article: Symbolism in the French Revolution Newspapers A copy of L'Ami du peuple stained with the blood of Marat Newspapers and pamphlets played a central role in stimulating and defining the Revolution. Prior to 1789, there have been a small number of heavily censored newspapers that needed a royal licence to operate, but the Estates-General created an enormous demand for news, and over 130 newspapers appeared by the end of the year. Among the most significant were Marat's L'Ami du peuple and Elysée Loustallot's Revolutions de Paris [fr].[203] Over the next decade, more than 2,000 newspapers were founded, 500 in Paris alone. Most lasted only a matter of weeks but they became the main communication medium, combined with the very large pamphlet literature.[204] Newspapers were read aloud in taverns and clubs, and circulated hand to hand. There was a widespread assumption that writing was a vocation, not a business, and the role of the press was the advancement of civic republicanism.[205] By 1793 the radicals were most active but initially the royalists flooded the country with their publication the "L'Ami du Roi [fr]" (Friends of the King) until they were suppressed.[206] Revolutionary symbols To illustrate the differences between the new Republic and the old regime, the leaders needed to implement a new set of symbols to be celebrated instead of the old religious and monarchical symbols. To this end, symbols were borrowed from historic cultures and redefined, while those of the old regime were either destroyed or reattributed acceptable characteristics. These revised symbols were used to instil in the public a new sense of tradition and reverence for the Enlightenment and the Republic.[207] La Marseillaise Main article: La Marseillaise La Marseillaise Duration: 1 minute and 20 seconds.1:20 The French national anthem La Marseillaise; text in French. Problems playing this file? See media help. Marche des Marseillois, 1792, satirical etching, London[208] "La Marseillaise" (French pronunciation: [la maʁsɛjɛːz]) became the national anthem of France. The song was written and composed in 1792 by Claude Joseph Rouget de Lisle, and was originally titled "Chant de guerre pour l'Armée du Rhin". The French National Convention adopted it as the First Republic's anthem in 1795. It acquired its nickname after being sung in Paris by volunteers from Marseille marching on the capital. The song is the first example of the "European march" anthemic style, while the evocative melody and lyrics led to its widespread use as a song of revolution and incorporation into many pieces of classical and popular music. De Lisle was instructed to 'produce a hymn which conveys to the soul of the people the enthusiasm which it (the music) suggests.'[209] Guillotine Cartoon attacking the excesses of the Revolution as symbolised by the guillotine Main article: Guillotine The guillotine remains "the principal symbol of the Terror in the French Revolution."[210] Invented by a physician during the Revolution as a quicker, more efficient and more distinctive form of execution, the guillotine became a part of popular culture and historic memory. It was celebrated on the left as the people's avenger, for example in the revolutionary song La guillotine permanente,[211] and cursed as the symbol of the Terror by the right.[212] Its operation became a popular entertainment that attracted great crowds of spectators. Vendors sold programmes listing the names of those scheduled to die. Many people came day after day and vied for the best locations from which to observe the proceedings; knitting women (tricoteuses) formed a cadre of hardcore regulars, inciting the crowd. Parents often brought their children. By the end of the Terror, the crowds had thinned drastically. Repetition had staled even this most grisly of entertainments, and audiences grew bored.[213] Cockade, tricolore, and liberty cap A sans-culotte and Tricoloure Cockades were widely worn by revolutionaries beginning in 1789. They now pinned the blue-and-red cockade of Paris onto the white cockade of the Ancien Régime. Camille Desmoulins asked his followers to wear green cockades on 12 July 1789. The Paris militia, formed on 13 July, adopted a blue and red cockade. Blue and red are the traditional colours of Paris, and they are used on the city's coat of arms. Cockades with various colour schemes were used during the storming of the Bastille on 14 July.[214] The Liberty cap, also known as the Phrygian cap, or pileus, is a brimless, felt cap that is conical in shape with the tip pulled forward. It reflects Roman republicanism and liberty, alluding to the Roman ritual of manumission, in which a freed slave receives the bonnet as a symbol of his newfound liberty.[215] Role of women Main articles: Women in the French Revolution and Militant feminism in the French Revolution Club of patriotic women in a church Deprived of political rights by the Ancien Régime, the Revolution initially allowed women to participate, although only to a limited degree. Activists included Girondists like Olympe de Gouges, author of the Declaration of the Rights of Woman and of the Female Citizen, and Charlotte Corday, killer of Marat. Others like Théroigne de Méricourt, Pauline Léon and the Society of Revolutionary Republican Women supported the Jacobins, staged demonstrations in the National Assembly and took part in the October 1789 March to Versailles. Despite this, the 1791 and 1793 constitutions denied them political rights and democratic citizenship.[216] In 1793, the Society of Revolutionary Republican Women campaigned for strict price controls on bread, and a law that would compel all women to wear the tricolour cockade. Although both demands were successful, in October the male-dominated Jacobins who then controlled the government denounced the Society as dangerous rabble-rousers and made all women's clubs and associations illegal. Organised women were permanently shut out of the French Revolution after 30 October 1793.[217] At the same time, especially in the provinces, women played a prominent role in resisting social changes introduced by the Revolution. This was particularly so in terms of the reduced role of the Catholic Church; for those living in rural areas, closing of the churches meant a loss of normality.[218] This sparked a counter-revolutionary movement led by women; while supporting other political and social changes, they opposed the dissolution of the Catholic Church and revolutionary cults like the Cult of the Supreme Being.[219] Olwen Hufton argues some wanted to protect the Church from heretical changes enforced by revolutionaries, viewing themselves as "defenders of faith".[220] Prominent women Olympe de Gouges, Girondist author of the Declaration of the Rights of Woman and of the Female Citizen, executed in November 1793 Olympe de Gouges was an author whose publications emphasised that while women and men were different, this should not prevent equality under the law. In her Declaration of the Rights of Woman and of the Female Citizen she insisted women deserved rights, especially in areas concerning them directly, such as divorce and recognition of illegitimate children.[221][full citation needed] Along with other Girondists, she was executed in November 1793 during the Terror. Madame Roland, also known as Manon or Marie Roland, was another important female activist whose political focus was not specifically women but other aspects of the government. A Girondist, her personal letters to leaders of the Revolution influenced policy; in addition, she often hosted political gatherings of the Brissotins, a political group which allowed women to join. She too was executed in November 1793.[222] Economic policies The Revolution abolished many economic constraints imposed by the Ancien Régime, including church tithes and feudal dues although tenants often paid higher rents and taxes.[223] All church lands were nationalised, along with those owned by Royalist exiles, which were used to back paper currency known as assignats, and the feudal guild system eliminated.[224] It also abolished the highly inefficient system of tax farming, whereby private individuals would collect taxes for a hefty fee. The government seized the foundations that had been set up (starting in the 13th century) to provide an annual stream of revenue for hospitals, poor relief, and education. The state sold the lands but typically local authorities did not replace the funding and so most of the nation's charitable and school systems were massively disrupted.[225] Early Assignat of 29 September 1790: 500 livres Between 1790 and 1796, industrial and agricultural output dropped, foreign trade plunged, and prices soared, forcing the government to finance expenditure by issuing ever increasing quantities assignats. When this resulted in escalating inflation, the response was to impose price controls and persecute private speculators and traders, creating a black market. Between 1789 and 1793, the annual deficit increased from 10% to 64% of gross national product, while annual inflation reached 3,500% after a poor harvest in 1794 and the removal of price controls. The assignats were withdrawn in 1796 but inflation continued until the introduction of the gold-based Franc germinal in 1803.[226] Impact Main article: Influence of the French Revolution The French Revolution had a major impact on western history, by ending feudalism in France and creating a path for advances in individual freedoms throughout Europe.[227][2] The revolution represented the most significant challenge to political absolutism up to that point in history and spread democratic ideals throughout Europe and ultimately the world.[228] Its impact on French nationalism was profound, while also stimulating nationalist movements throughout Europe.[229] Some modern historians argue the concept of the nation state was a direct consequence of the revolution.[230] As such, the revolution is often seen as marking the start of modernity and the modern period.[231] France The long-term impact on France was profound, shaping politics, society, religion and ideas, and polarising politics for more than a century. Historian François Aulard wrote: "From the social point of view, the Revolution consisted in the suppression of what was called the feudal system, in the emancipation of the individual, in greater division of landed property, the abolition of the privileges of noble birth, the establishment of equality, the simplification of life.... The French Revolution differed from other revolutions in being not merely national, for it aimed at benefiting all humanity."[232][title missing] The revolution permanently crippled the power of the aristocracy and drained the wealth of the Church, although the two institutions survived. Hanson suggests the French underwent a fundamental transformation in self-identity, evidenced by the elimination of privileges and their replacement by intrinsic human rights.[233] After the collapse of the First French Empire in 1815, the French public lost many of the rights and privileges earned since the revolution, but remembered the participatory politics that characterised the period. According to Paul Hanson, "Revolution became a tradition, and republicanism an enduring option."[234] The Revolution meant an end to arbitrary royal rule and held out the promise of rule by law under a constitutional order. Napoleon as emperor set up a constitutional system and the restored Bourbons were forced to retain one. After the abdication of Napoleon III in 1871, the French Third Republic was launched with a deep commitment to upholding the ideals of the Revolution.[235][236] The Vichy regime (1940–1944), tried to undo the revolutionary heritage, but retained the republic. However, there were no efforts by the Bourbons, Vichy or any other government to restore the privileges that had been stripped away from the nobility in 1789. France permanently became a society of equals under the law.[234] Agriculture was transformed by the Revolution. With the breakup of large estates controlled by the Church and the nobility and worked by hired hands, rural France became more a land of small independent farms. Harvest taxes were ended, such as the tithe and seigneurial dues. Primogeniture was ended both for nobles and peasants, thereby weakening the family patriarch, and led to a fall in the birth rate since all children had a share in the family property.[237] Cobban argues the Revolution bequeathed to the nation "a ruling class of landowners."[238] Economic historians are divided on the economic impact of the Revolution. One suggestion is the resulting fragmentation of agricultural holdings had a significant negative impact in the early years of 19th century, then became positive in the second half of the century because it facilitated the rise in human capital investments.[239] Others argue the redistribution of land had an immediate positive impact on agricultural productivity, before the scale of these gains gradually declined over the course of the 19th century.[240] In the cities, entrepreneurship on a small scale flourished, as restrictive monopolies, privileges, barriers, rules, taxes and guilds gave way. However, the British blockade virtually ended overseas and colonial trade, hurting the cities and their supply chains. Overall, the Revolution did not greatly change the French business system, and probably helped freeze in place the horizons of the small business owner. The typical businessman owned a small store, mill or shop, with family help and a few paid employees; large-scale industry was less common than in other industrialising nations.[241] Europe outside France Historians often see the impact of the Revolution as through the institutions and ideas exported by Napoleon. Economic historians Dan Bogart, Mauricio Drelichman, Oscar Gelderblom, and Jean-Laurent Rosenthal describe Napoleon's codified law as the French Revolution's "most significant export."[242] According to Daron Acemoglu, Davide Cantoni, Simon Johnson, and James A. Robinson the French Revolution had long-term effects in Europe. They suggest that "areas that were occupied by the French and that underwent radical institutional reform experienced more rapid urbanization and economic growth, especially after 1850. There is no evidence of a negative effect of French invasion."[243] The Revolution sparked intense debate in Britain. The Revolution Controversy was a "pamphlet war" set off by the publication of A Discourse on the Love of Our Country, a speech given by Richard Price to the Revolution Society on 4 November 1789, supporting the French Revolution. Edmund Burke responded in November 1790 with his own pamphlet, Reflections on the Revolution in France, attacking the French Revolution as a threat to the aristocracy of all countries.[244][245] William Coxe opposed Price's premise that one's country is principles and people, not the State itself.[246] Conversely, two seminal political pieces of political history were written in Price's favour, supporting the general right of the French people to replace their State. One of the first of these "pamphlets" into print was A Vindication of the Rights of Men by Mary Wollstonecraft . Wollstonecraft's title was echoed by Thomas Paine's Rights of Man, published a few months later. In 1792 Christopher Wyvill published Defence of Dr. Price and the Reformers of England, a plea for reform and moderation.[247] This exchange of ideas has been described as "one of the great political debates in British history".[248] In Ireland, the effect was to transform what had been an attempt by Protestant settlers to gain some autonomy into a mass movement led by the Society of United Irishmen involving Catholics and Protestants. It stimulated the demand for further reform throughout Ireland, especially in Ulster. The upshot was a revolt in 1798, led by Wolfe Tone, that was crushed by Britain.[249] German reaction to the Revolution swung from favourable to antagonistic. At first it brought liberal and democratic ideas, the end of guilds, serfdom and the Jewish ghetto. It brought economic freedoms and agrarian and legal reform. Above all the antagonism helped stimulate and shape German nationalism.[250] France invaded Switzerland and turned it into the "Helvetic Republic" (1798–1803), a French puppet state. French interference with localism and traditions was deeply resented in Switzerland, although some reforms took hold and survived in the later period of restoration.[251][252] During the Revolutionary Wars, the French invaded and occupied the region now known as Belgium between 1794 and 1814. The new government enforced reforms, incorporating the region into France. Resistance was strong in every sector, as Belgian nationalism emerged to oppose French rule. The French legal system, however, was adopted, with its equal legal rights, and abolition of class distinctions.[253] The Kingdom of Denmark adopted liberalising reforms in line with those of the French Revolution. Reform was gradual and the regime itself carried out agrarian reforms that had the effect of weakening absolutism by creating a class of independent peasant freeholders. Much of the initiative came from well-organised liberals who directed political change in the first half of the 19th century.[254] The Constitution of Norway of 1814 was inspired by the French Revolution,[255] and was considered to be one of the most liberal and democratic constitutions at the time.[256] North America Initially, most people in the Province of Quebec were favourable toward the revolutionaries' aims. The Revolution took place against the background of an ongoing campaign for constitutional reform in the colony by Loyalist emigrants from the United States.[257] Public opinion began to shift against the Revolution after the Flight to Varennes and further soured after the September Massacres and the subsequent execution of Louis XVI.[258] French migration to the Canadas experienced a substantial decline during and after the Revolution. Only a limited number of artisans, professionals, and religious emigres were allowed to settle in the region during this period.[259] Most emigres settled in Montreal or Quebec City.[259] The influx of religious emigres also revitalised the local Catholic Church, with exiled priests establishing a number of parishes across the Canadas.[259] In the United States, the French Revolution deeply polarised American politics, and this polarisation led to the creation of the First Party System. In 1793, as war broke out in Europe, the Democratic-Republican Party led by former American minister to France Thomas Jefferson favored revolutionary France and pointed to the 1778 treaty that was still in effect. George Washington and his unanimous cabinet, including Jefferson, decided that the treaty did not bind the United States to enter the war. Washington proclaimed neutrality instead.[260] Historiography Main article: Historiography of the French Revolution The first writings on the French revolution were near contemporaneous with events and mainly divided along ideological lines. These included Edmund Burke's conservative critique Reflections on the Revolution in France (1790) and Thomas Paine's response Rights of Man (1791).[261] From 1815, narrative histories dominated, often based on first-hand experience of the revolutionary years. By the mid-nineteenth century, more scholarly histories appeared, written by specialists and based on original documents and a more critical assessment of contemporary accounts.[262] Hippolyte Taine, conservative historian of the French Revolution Georges Lefebvre, Marxist historian of the French Revolution Dupuy identifies three main strands in nineteenth century historiography of the Revolution. The first is represented by reactionary writers who rejected the revolutionary ideals of popular sovereignty, civil equality, and the promotion of rationality, progress and personal happiness over religious faith. The second stream is those writers who celebrated its democratic, and republican values. The third were liberals like Germaine de Staël and Guizot, who accepted the necessity of reforms establishing a constitution and the rights of man, but rejected state interference with private property and individual rights, even when supported by a democratic majority.[263] Jules Michelet was a leading 19th-century historian of the democratic republican strand, and Thiers, Mignet and Tocqueville were prominent in the liberal strand.[264] Hippolyte Taine's Origins of Contemporary France (1875–1894) was modern in its use of departmental archives, but Dupuy sees him as reactionary, given his contempt for the crowd, and Revolutionary values.[265] The broad distinction between conservative, democratic-republican and liberal interpretations of the Revolution persisted in the 20th-century, although historiography became more nuanced, with greater attention to critical analysis of documentary evidence.[265][266] Alphonse Aulard (1849–1928) was the first professional historian of the Revolution; he promoted graduate studies, scholarly editions, and learned journals.[267][268] His major work, The French Revolution, a Political History, 1789–1804 (1905), was a democratic and republican interpretation of the Revolution.[269] Socio-economic analysis and a focus on the experiences of ordinary people dominated French studies of the Revolution from the 1930s.[270] Georges Lefebvre elaborated a Marxist socio-economic analysis of the revolution with detailed studies of peasants, the rural panic of 1789, and the behaviour of revolutionary crowds.[271][272] Albert Soboul, also writing in the Marxist-Republican tradition, published a major study of the sans-culottes in 1958.[273] Alfred Cobban challenged Jacobin-Marxist social and economic explanations of the revolution in two important works, The Myth of the French Revolution (1955) and Social Interpretation of the French Revolution (1964). He argued the Revolution was primarily a political conflict, which ended in a victory for conservative property owners, a result which retarded economic development.[274][275] In their 1965 work, La Revolution française, François Furet and Denis Richet also argued for the primacy of political decisions, contrasting the reformist period of 1789 to 1790 with the following interventions of the urban masses which led to radicalisation and an ungovernable situation.[276] From the 1990s, Western scholars largely abandoned Marxist interpretations of the revolution in terms of bourgeoisie-proletarian class struggle as anachronistic. However, no new explanatory model has gained widespread support.[231][277] The historiography of the Revolution has expanded into areas such as cultural and regional histories, visual representations, transnational interpretations, and decolonisation.[276]

Age of Revolution Article Talk Read Edit View history Tools Appearance hide Text Small Standard Large Width Standard Wide Color (beta) Automatic Light Dark From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia For the book, see The Age of Revolution: Europe 1789–1848. This article needs additional citations for verification. Please help improve this article by adding citations to reliable sources. Unsourced material may be challenged and removed. Find sources: "Age of Revolution" – news · newspapers · books · scholar · JSTOR (November 2020) (Learn how and when to remove this message) It has been suggested that Atlantic Revolutions be merged into this article. (Discuss) Proposed since December 2024. Age of Revolution Part of the Age of Enlightenment Scene from the French Revolution Scene from the French Revolution: The storming of the Tuileries, August 1792 Date	22 March 1765 – 4 October 1849 Outcome	Industrial Revolution Multiple revolutionary waves Atlantic Revolutions Latin American wars of independence Revolutions of 1820 Revolutions of 1830 Revolutions of 1848 End of feudalism Widespread implementation of Republicanism Deaths	American Revolution: 37,324+[1] French Revolution: 150,000+[1] Napoleonic Wars: 3,500,000–7,000,000 (see Napoleonic Wars casualties) Over 3,687,324–7,187,324 casualties (other wars excluded) The Age of Revolution is a period from the late-18th to the mid-19th centuries during which a number of significant revolutionary movements occurred in most of Europe and the Americas.[2] The period is noted for the change from absolutist monarchies to representative governments with a written constitution, and the creation of nation states. Influenced by the new ideas of the Enlightenment, the American Revolution (1765–1783) is usually considered the starting point of the Age of Revolution. It in turn inspired the French Revolution of 1789,[citation needed] which rapidly spread to the rest of Europe through its wars. In 1799, Napoleon took power in France and continued the French Revolutionary Wars by conquering most of continental Europe. Although Napoleon imposed on his conquests several modern concepts such as equality before the law, or a civil code, his rigorous military occupation triggered national rebellions, notably in Spain and Germany. After Napoleon's defeat, European great powers forged the Holy Alliance at the Congress of Vienna in 1814–15, in an attempt to prevent future revolutions, and also restored the previous monarchies. Nevertheless, Spain was considerably weakened by the Napoleonic Wars and could not control its American colonies, almost all of which proclaimed their independence between 1810 and 1820. Revolution then spread back to southern Europe in 1820, with uprisings in Portugal, Spain, Italy, and Greece. Continental Europe was shaken by two similar revolutionary waves in 1830 and 1848, also called the Spring of Nations. The democratic demands of the revolutionaries often merged with independence or national unification movements, such as in Italy, Germany, Poland, Hungary, etc. The violent repression of the Spring of Nations marked the end of the era. The expression was popularized by the British historian Eric Hobsbawm in his book The Age of Revolution: Europe 1789–1848, published in 1962.[3] Industrial Revolution Main article: Industrial Revolution The Industrial Revolution was the transition to new manufacturing processes in the period from about 1760 to sometime between 1820 and 1840. It marked a major turning point in history and almost every aspect of daily life was influenced in some way. In particular, average income and population began to exhibit unprecedented sustained growth. This led to a rapid expansion of cities that resulted in social strains and disturbances.[4] For instance, economic grievances associated with this industrialization fed later revolutions such as those that transpired from 1848.[5] New social classes emerged including those that began to reject orthodox politics.[6] This is demonstrated by the rise of the urban middle class, which became a powerful force so that they had to be integrated into the political system.[7] The upheavals also led to old political ideas that were directed against the social arrangements of the preindustrial regime.[5] American Revolution (1765–1783) Main article: American Revolution American Revolution The American Revolution brought about independence for the Thirteen Colonies of British America. This was the first European colony to claim independence. It was the birth of the United States of America, ultimately leading to the drafting and ratification of a U.S. Constitution that included a number of original features within a federated republic and a system of separation of powers and checks and balances. Those include but are not limited to an elected head of state, property rights, due process rights, and the rights of free speech, the press and religious practice.[8][9][10] French Revolution (1789–1799) Main article: French Revolution The British historian Eric Hobsbawm credits the French Revolution with giving the 19th century its ideology and politics, stating: France made its revolutions and gave them their ideas, to the point where a tricolour of some kind became the emblem of virtually every emerging nation, and European (or indeed world) politics between 1789 and 1917 were largely the struggle for and against the principles of 1789, or the even more incendiary ones of 1793. France provided the vocabulary and the issues of liberal and radical-democratic politics for most of the world. France provided the first great example, the concept and the vocabulary of nationalism. France provided the codes of law, the model of scientific and technical organization, the metric system of measurement for most countries. The ideology of the modern world first penetrated the ancient civilizations which had hitherto resisted European ideas through French influence. This was the work of the French Revolution.[3] Storming of the Bastille on July 14 (Bastille Day), 1789 The French Revolution was a period of radical social and political upheaval in France from 1789 to 1799 that profoundly affected French and modern history, marking the decline of powerful monarchies and churches and the rise of democracy and nationalism.[11] Popular resentment of the privileges enjoyed by the clergy and aristocracy grew amidst an economic crisis following two expensive wars and years of bad harvests, motivating demands for change. These were couched in terms of Enlightenment ideals and caused the convocation of the Estates-General in May 1789. The precipitating event was that the King went public that the French state was essentially bankrupt, and because of that he convened the États généraux (Estates general) to replenish state coffers. The Estates-General was made up of 3 estates/orders: 1st Estate: Clergy 2nd Estate: Nobility 3rd Estate: Wealthier, better educated non-nobility (commoners)[12][3] King's weakened position The French tax regime was regressive, and traditional noble and bourgeois allies felt shut out. Centralizing monarchical power, i.e. Royal absolutism, onward from Louis XIII in 1614[12] inward to the royal court in Versailles led to a snowball effect that ended up alienating both nobility and bourgeoisie. There was a tendency to play favorites with the tax regime, especially by exempting nobility from taxation. This led to a feeling of discrimination among the bourgeoisie, which itself was an engine of the Revolution[13] It was also a question of numbers. The population of nobles versus that of the rest of France wildly disparate: nobles = .4-1.5% out of total population of ca. 28 million. The population of clergy versus the rest of France was even less: about 120,000 clergy total, out of which were 139 powerful and wealthy bishops (.0005% of total pop.); the majority of parish priests were as poor as their parishioners.[14] Bourgeoisie These were young men from commoner families who were not sustenance farmers and whose families could afford to send their sons to either study the law or take over the family business. When talking about these young (mainly) lawyers from this segment of society, one is also talking about products of the Enlightenment. As the former Financial Times chief foreign affairs columnist and author Ian Davidson puts it: "French society, like others in much of Western Europe, was undergoing a colossal transformation. The ultra-intellectual Enlightenment of Montesquieu and Voltaire, Bach and Mozart, Isaac Newton and Adam Smith was just the tip of a vast change that was happening throughout society and producing an expanding, educated, literate and ambitious bourgeoisie."[14] Part of this ambition was to enter a political scene that was always locked behind a door to which only the monarchy, clergy, and nobility had the keys. The durable shift here was that, by the time the Estates general convened, their knowledge of law gave them the tools to enter the political scene. Constitutional chronology Ancien Régime (pre–1789) National Constituent Assembly (1789–1791) Constitutional Monarchy (1791–1792) National Legislative Assembly (1791–1792) First Republic (1792–1804) National Convention (1792–1795) Directory (1795–1799) Consulate (1799–1804) First Empire, the reign of Napoleon (1804–1814) Haitian Revolution (1791–1804) This section does not cite any sources. Please help improve this section by adding citations to reliable sources. Unsourced material may be challenged and removed. (June 2020) (Learn how and when to remove this message) Main article: Haitian Revolution Attack and siege of the Crête-à-Pierrot during Haitian revolution The Haitian Revolution was a slave rebellion in the French colony of Saint-Domingue, which culminated in the elimination of slavery there and the founding of the Republic of Haiti. The Haitian Revolution was the only slave revolt which led to the founding of a state. Furthermore, it is generally considered the most successful slave rebellion ever to have occurred and as a defining moment in the histories of both Europe and the Americas. The rebellion began with a revolt of black African slaves in August 1791. It ended in November 1803 with the French defeat at the Battle of Vertières. Haiti became an independent country on January 1, 1804. One-third of French overseas trade and revenue came from Haitian sugar and coffee plantations. During the French Revolution the island was ignored, allowing the revolt to have some initial successes. However, after Napoleon became the first consul of France, he sent troops to suppress the revolt. The war was known for cruelty on both sides, and extensive guerrilla warfare. French forces showed no mercy, as they were fighting blacks, who were not considered to be worthy opponents of the French army. The French army suffered from severe outbreaks of disease, and the Haitians were under-equipped. Top leaders of both sides were killed, and the leader of the Haitians died in captivity. United Irishmen's Rebellion (1798) This section does not cite any sources. Please help improve this section by adding citations to reliable sources. Unsourced material may be challenged and removed. (June 2020) (Learn how and when to remove this message) Main article: Irish Rebellion of 1798 Battle of Vinegar Hill during 1798 Irish rebellion In 1798, a revolt broke out against British rule in Ireland in the hopes of creating an independent Irish republic. The rebellion was initiated by the Society of United Irishmen and led by Theobald Wolfe Tone. The revolt was motivated by a combination of factors, including Irish nationalism, news of the success of the French Revolution, and resentment at the British-instituted Penal laws, which discriminated against Catholics and Presbyterians in Ireland. The rebellion failed and led to the Act of Union in 1801. Serbian Revolution (1804–1835) Main article: Serbian Revolution The Serbian Revolution was a national uprising and constitutional change in Serbia that took place between 1804 and 1835, during which the territory evolved from an Ottoman province into a rebel territory, a constitutional monarchy, and finally the modern Serbian state. The first part of the period, from 1804 to 1815, was marked by a violent struggle for independence from the Ottoman Empire with three armed uprisings taking place(The First Serbian Uprising, Hadži Prodan's rebellion and the Second Serbian Uprising), ending with a ceasefire.[citation needed] During the later period (1815–1835) a peaceful consolidation of political power developed in the increasingly autonomous Serbia, culminating in the recognition of the right to hereditary rule by Serbian princes in 1830 and 1833 and the territorial expansion of the young monarchy. The adoption of the first written Constitution in 1835 abolished feudalism and serfdom, and made the country suzerain. The term "Serbian Revolution" was coined by a German academic historiographer, Leopold von Ranke, in his book Die Serbische Revolution, published in 1829. These events marked the foundation of the modern Principality of Serbia.[citation needed] Scholars have characterized the Serbian War of Independence and subsequent national liberation as a revolution because the uprisings were started by broad masses of rural Serbian people who were in severe class conflict with the Turkish landowners as a political and economic masters at the same time, similar to Greece in 1821–1832.[15] Latin American Wars of Independence (1808–1833) This section does not cite any sources. Please help improve this section by adding citations to reliable sources. Unsourced material may be challenged and removed. (June 2020) (Learn how and when to remove this message) Main articles: Spanish American wars of independence and War of Independence of Brazil Latin America experienced independence revolutions in the early 19th century that separated the colonies from Spain and Portugal, creating new nations. These movements were generally led by the ethnically Spanish but locally born Creole class; these were often wealthy citizens that held high positions of power but were still poorly respected by the European-born Spaniards. One such Creole was Simón Bolívar, who led several revolutions throughout South America and helped establish Gran Colombia. Another important figure was José de San Martín, who helped create the United Provinces of the Río de la Plata and became the first president of Peru. Greek War of Independence (1821–1832) This section does not cite any sources. Please help improve this section by adding citations to reliable sources. Unsourced material may be challenged and removed. (June 2020) (Learn how and when to remove this message) Main article: Greek War of Independence Greece in the early 1800s was under the rule of the Ottoman Empire. A series of revolts, starting in 1821, began the conflict. The Ottoman Empire sent in forces to suppress the revolts. By 1827, forces from Russia, Great Britain, and France entered the conflict, helping the Greeks drive the Turkish forces off the Peloponnese Peninsula. The Turks finally recognized Greece as a free nation in May 1832. Revolutions of 1820 This section does not cite any sources. Please help improve this section by adding citations to reliable sources. Unsourced material may be challenged and removed. (June 2020) (Learn how and when to remove this message) Main article: Revolutions during the 1820s The Revolutions of 1820 were a series of revolutionary uprisings in Spain, Italy, Portugal, and Greece. Unlike the wars of 1830, these wars tended to be in the outer regions of Europe. Revolutions of 1830 Main article: Revolutions of 1830 A revolutionary wave in Europe which took place in 1830. It included two "romantic nationalist" revolutions, the Belgian Revolution in the United Kingdom of the Netherlands and the July Revolution in France. There also were revolutions in Congress Poland, Italian states, Portugal and Switzerland. It was followed eighteen years later by another and much stronger wave of revolutions known as the Revolutions of 1848.[16][17] Revolutions of 1848 Main article: Revolutions of 1848 The European Revolutions of 1848, known in some countries as the Spring of Nations, Springtime of the Peoples or the Year of Revolution, were a series of political upheavals throughout Europe in 1848. It remains the most widespread revolutionary wave in European history, but within a year, reactionary forces had regained control, and the revolutions collapsed. The political impact of the 1848 revolutions was more evident in Austria in comparison to the revolution's effects in countries like Germany. This is attributed to the way the upheavals in Vienna resulted in greater loss of life and gained stronger support from intellectuals, students, and the working class.[18] An account described the German experience as less concerned with national issues, although it succeeded in breaking down class barriers.[18] There was a previously prevalent view that there was only one revolutionary event in Germany but recent scholarship pointed to a fragmented picture of several revolutions happening at the same time.[19] The 1848 revolutions were also notable because of the increased participation of women. While women rarely participated in revolutionary activities, there were those who performed supportive and auxiliary roles such as the cases of the women's political club in Vienna, which demanded revolutionary measures from the Austrian Constituent Assembly, and the Parisian women who protested and proposed their own solutions to social problems, particularly those involving their rights and crafts.[20] Eureka Rebellion (1854) Main article: Eureka Rebellion The Eureka Rebellion was a 20-minute shootout between the miners of Ballarat, Victoria, and the British Army. After the imposition of Gold Mining Licences, that being that a person had to have one of these to mine gold, and which cost 30 shillings a month to own a license, the miners decided that it was too much. The Ballarat miners started rallies at Bakery Hill and burnt their licenses, took an oath under the flag of the Southern Cross, elected Peter Lalor as their rebellion leader, and built a stockade (a makeshift fort) around the diggings. Eventually, the British troops, led by Governor Charles Hotham of Ballarat fired upon the stockade. The miners fired back and lasted 20 minutes before their stockade was stormed by British troops. Most of the miners were arrested by the British colonial authorities, and taken to trial. If found guilty, they would hang for high treason. All were eventually acquitted. The Eureka Rebellion is controversially identified with the birth of democracy in Australia and interpreted by many as a political revolt.[21][22][23] First War of Indian Independence (1857–1858) Main article: Indian Rebellion of 1857 See also: Indian independence movement The Indian Rebellion of 1857 was a major, but ultimately unsuccessful, uprising in India in 1857–58 against the rule of the British East India Company, which functioned as a sovereign power on behalf of the British Crown. The rebellion began on 10 May 1857 in the form of a mutiny of sepoys of the Company's army in the garrison town of Meerut, 40 mi (64 km) northeast of Delhi (that area is now Old Delhi). It then erupted into other mutinies and civilian rebellions chiefly in the upper Gangetic plain and central India, though incidents of revolt also occurred farther north and east. The rebellion posed a considerable threat to British power in that region, and was contained only with the rebels' defeat in Gwalior on 20 June 1858. On 1 November 1858, the British granted amnesty to all rebels not involved in murder, though they did not declare the hostilities to have formally ended until 8 July 1859. Its name is contested, and it is variously described as the Sepoy Mutiny, the Indian Mutiny, the Great Rebellion, the Revolt of 1857, the Indian Insurrection, and the First War of Independence. Bulgarian revolts and liberation (1869–1878) Main articles: April Uprising of 1876, Bulgarian National Revival, and National awakening of Bulgaria Bulgarian modern nationalism emerged under Ottoman rule in the late 18th and early 19th century, under the influence of western ideas such as liberalism and nationalism, which trickled into the country after the French Revolution. In 1869 the Internal Revolutionary Organization was initiated. An autonomous Bulgarian Exarchate was established in 1870/1872 for the Bulgarian diocese wherein at least two-thirds of Orthodox Christians were willing to join it. The April Uprising of 1876 indirectly resulted in the re-establishment of Bulgaria in 1878. Paris Commune (1871) Main article: Paris Commune The Paris Commune was a revolutionary socialist government that controlled Paris from 18 March to 28 May 1871. It was established by radicalized defectors from the French National Guard, which had been mobilized to defend Paris in the Franco-Prussian War (19 July 1870 – 28 January 1871).

Franco-Prussian War Article Talk Read Edit View history Tools Appearance hide Text Small Standard Large Width Standard Wide Color (beta) Automatic Light Dark From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia "Franco-German war" redirects here. For the war between Lothair and Otto II, see Franco-German war of 978–980. Franco-Prussian War Part of the unification of Germany (clockwise from top right) Battle of Mars-la-Tour, 16 August 1870The Lauenburg 9th Jäger Battalion at GravelotteDamaged building in Paris, 1871The Defense of ChampignyThe Siege of Paris in 1870The Proclamation of the German Empire Date	19 July 1870 – 28 January 1871 (6 months, 1 week and 2 days) Location France and the Rhine Province, Prussia Result German victory End of the Second French Empire Unification of Germany and establishment of the German Empire Territorial changes	German annexation of Alsace-Lorraine Belligerents Before 4 September 1870: French Empire After 4 September 1870: French Republic[a] Foreign volunteers Before 18 January 1871: North German Confederation Prussia Saxony Hesse[1] and 19 smaller states Bavaria Württemberg Baden After 18 January 1871: German Empire Commanders and leaders Second French Empire Napoleon III Surrendered Second French Empire François Bazaine  Surrendered Second French Empire Patrice de MacMahon Surrendered French Third Republic Louis-Jules Trochu French Third Republic Léon Gambetta French Third Republic Giuseppe Garibaldi German Empire Wilhelm I German Empire Otto von Bismarck German Empire Helmuth von Moltke German Empire Crown Prince Friedrich German Empire Prince Friedrich Karl German Empire Karl F. von Steinmetz German Empire Albrecht von Roon Strength Total deployment: 2,000,740[2] Initial strength: 909,951 492,585 active, including 300,000 reservists[3][2] 417,366 Garde Mobile[3] Peak field army strength: 710,000[2] Total deployment: 1,494,412[4] Initial strength: 938,424 730,274 regulars and reservists[2] 208,150 Landwehr[2] Peak field army strength: 949,337[2] Casualties and losses 756,285[5][6] 138,871 dead[7][8][6] 143,000 wounded 474,414 captured or interned[9][6][10] 144,642[11] 44,700 dead[12] 89,732 wounded 10,129 missing or captured ~250,000 civilians dead, including 162,000 Germans in a smallpox epidemic spread by French POWs[11] a Until 4 September 1870. b From 4 September 1870. c From 18 January 1871. vte Franco-Prussian War The Franco-Prussian War or Franco-German War,[b] often referred to in France as the War of 1870, was a conflict between the Second French Empire and the North German Confederation led by the Kingdom of Prussia. Lasting from 19 July 1870 to 28 January 1871, the conflict was caused primarily by France's determination to reassert its dominant position in continental Europe, which appeared in question following the decisive Prussian victory over Austria in 1866.[13] According to some historians, Prussian chancellor Otto von Bismarck deliberately provoked the French into declaring war on Prussia in order to induce four independent southern German states—Baden, Württemberg, Bavaria and Hesse-Darmstadt—to join the North German Confederation. Other historians contend that Bismarck exploited the circumstances as they unfolded. All agree that Bismarck recognized the potential for new German alliances, given the situation as a whole.[14] France mobilised its army on 15 July 1870, leading the North German Confederation to respond with its own mobilisation later that day. On 16 July 1870, the French parliament voted to declare war on Prussia; France invaded German territory on 2 August. The German coalition mobilised its troops much more effectively than the French and invaded northeastern France on 4 August. German forces were superior in numbers, training, and leadership and made more effective use of modern technology, particularly railways and artillery. A series of hard-fought Prussian and German victories in eastern France, culminating in the Siege of Metz and the Battle of Sedan, resulted in the capture of the French Emperor Napoleon III and the decisive defeat of the army of the Second Empire; a Government of National Defense was formed in Paris on 4 September and continued the war for another five months. German forces fought and defeated new French armies in northern France, then besieged Paris for over four months before it fell on 28 January 1871, effectively ending the war. In the final days of the war, with German victory all but assured, the German states proclaimed their union as the German Empire under the Prussian king Wilhelm I and Chancellor Bismarck. With the notable exceptions of Austria and German Switzerland, the vast majority of German-speakers were united under a nation-state for the first time. Following an armistice with France, the Treaty of Frankfurt was signed on 10 May 1871, giving Germany billions of francs in war indemnity, as well as most of Alsace and parts of Lorraine, which became the Imperial Territory of Alsace-Lorraine (Reichsland Elsaß-Lothringen). The war had a lasting impact on Europe. By hastening German unification, the war significantly altered the balance of power on the continent, with the new German state supplanting France as the dominant European land power. Bismarck maintained great authority in international affairs for two decades, developing a reputation for Realpolitik that raised Germany's global stature and influence. In France, it brought a final end to imperial rule and began the first lasting republican government. Resentment over the French government's handling of the war and its aftermath triggered the Paris Commune, a revolutionary uprising which seized and held power for two months before its suppression; the event would influence the politics and policies of the Third Republic. Causes Main article: Causes of the Franco-Prussian War Map of the North German Confederation (red), four southern German states (orange) and Alsace–Lorraine (beige) The causes of the Franco-Prussian War are rooted in the events surrounding the lead up to the unification of the German states under Otto von Bismarck. France had gained the status of being the dominant power of continental Europe as a result of the Franco-Austrian War of 1859. During the Austro-Prussian War of 1866, the Empress Eugénie, Foreign Minister Drouyn de Lhuys and War Minister Jacques Louis Randon were concerned that the power of Prussia might overtake that of France. They unsuccessfully urged Napoleon to mass troops at France's eastern borders while the bulk of the Prussian armies were still engaged in Bohemia as a warning that no territorial changes could be effected in Germany without consulting France.[15] As a result of Prussia's annexation of several German states which had sided with Austria during the war and the formation of the North German Confederation under Prussia's aegis, French public opinion stiffened and now demanded more firmness as well as territorial compensations. As a result, Napoleon demanded from Prussia a return to the French borders of 1814, with the annexation of Luxembourg, most of Saarland, and the Bavarian Palatinate. Bismarck flatly refused what he disdainfully termed France's politique des pourboires ("tipping policy").[16][17] He then communicated Napoleon III's written territorial demands to Bavaria and the other southern German states of Württemberg, Baden and Hesse-Darmstadt, which hastened the conclusion of defensive military alliances with these states.[18] France had been strongly opposed to any further alliance of German states, which would have threatened French continental dominance.[19] The only result of French policy was the consent of Prussia to nominal independence for Saxony, Bavaria, Wurttemberg, Baden, and Hessia-Darmstadt; this was a small victory, and one without appeal to a French public which wanted territory and a French army which wanted revenge.[20] The situation did not suit either France, which unexpectedly found itself next to the militarily powerful Prussian-led North German Confederation, or Prussia, whose foremost objective was to complete the process of uniting the German states under its control. Thus, war between the two powers since 1866 was only a matter of time. In Prussia, some officials considered a war against France both inevitable and necessary to arouse German nationalism in those states that would allow the unification of a great German empire. This aim was epitomized by Prussian Chancellor Otto von Bismarck's later statement: "I did not doubt that a Franco-German war must take place before the construction of a United Germany could be realised."[21] Bismarck also knew that France should be the aggressor in the conflict to bring the four southern German states to side with Prussia, hence giving Germans numerical superiority.[22] He was convinced that France would not find any allies in her war against Germany for the simple reason that "France, the victor, would be a danger to everybody—Prussia to nobody," and he added, "That is our strong point."[23] Many Germans also viewed the French as the traditional destabilizer of Europe, and sought to weaken France to prevent further breaches of the peace.[24] The immediate cause of the war was the candidacy of Leopold of Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen to the throne of Spain. France feared an encirclement resulting from an alliance between Prussia and Spain. The Hohenzollern prince's candidacy was withdrawn under French diplomatic pressure, but Otto von Bismarck goaded the French into declaring war by releasing an altered summary of the Ems Dispatch, a telegram sent by William I rejecting French demands that Prussia never again support a Hohenzollern candidacy. Bismarck's summary, as mistranslated by the French press Havas, made it sound as if the king had treated the French envoy in a demeaning fashion, which inflamed public opinion in France.[22] French historians François Roth and Pierre Milza argue that Napoleon III was pressured by a bellicose press and public opinion and thus sought war in response to France's diplomatic failures to obtain any territorial gains following the Austro-Prussian War.[25] Napoleon III believed he would win a conflict with Prussia. Many in his court, such as Empress Eugénie, also wanted a victorious war to resolve growing domestic political problems, restore France as the undisputed leading power in Europe, and ensure the long-term survival of the House of Bonaparte. A national plebiscite held on 8 May 1870, which returned results overwhelmingly in favor of the Emperor's domestic agenda, gave the impression that the regime was politically popular and in a position to confront Prussia. Within days of the plebiscite, France's pacifist Foreign Minister Napoléon, comte Daru, was replaced by Agenor, duc de Gramont, a fierce opponent of Prussia who, as French Ambassador to Austria in 1866, had advocated an Austro-French military alliance against Prussia. Napoleon III's worsening health problems made him less and less capable of reining in Empress Eugénie, Gramont and the other members of the war party, known collectively as the "mameluks". For Bismarck, the nomination of Gramont was seen as "a highly bellicose symptom".[26] The Ems telegram of 13 July 1870 had exactly the effect on French public opinion that Bismarck had intended. "This text produced the effect of a red flag on the Gallic bull", Bismarck later wrote. Gramont, the French foreign minister, declared that he felt "he had just received a slap". The leader of the monarchists in Parliament, Adolphe Thiers, spoke for moderation, arguing that France had won the diplomatic battle and there was no reason for war, but he was drowned out by cries that he was a traitor and a Prussian. Napoleon's new prime minister, Emile Ollivier, declared that France had done all that it could humanly and honorably do to prevent the war, and that he accepted the responsibility "with a light heart". A crowd of 15,000–20,000 people, carrying flags and patriotic banners, marched through the streets of Paris, demanding war. French mobilization was ordered early on 15 July.[27] Upon receiving news of the French mobilization, the North German Confederation mobilized on the night of 15–16 July, while Bavaria and Baden did likewise on 16 July and Württemberg on 17 July.[28] On 19 July 1870, the French sent a declaration of war to the Prussian government.[29] The southern German states immediately sided with Prussia.[22] Napoleonic France had no documented alliance with other powers and entered the war virtually without allies. The calculation was for a victorious offensive, which, as the French Foreign Minister Gramont stated, was "the only way for France to lure the wary Austrians, Italians and Danes into the French alliance".[30] The involvement of Russia on the side of France was not considered by her at all, since Russia made the lifting of restrictions on its naval construction on the Black Sea imposed on Russia by the Treaty of Paris following the Crimean War a precondition for the union. But Imperial France was not ready to do this. "Bonaparte did not dare to encroach on the Paris Treaty: the worse things turned out in the present, the more precious the heritage of the past became".[31] Opposing forces For the organization of the two armies at the beginning of the war, see Franco-Prussian War order of battle. French French soldiers drill at IIe Chambrière camp near Metz, 1870 The French Army consisted in peacetime of approximately 426,000 soldiers, some of them regulars, others conscripts who until March 1869 were selected by ballot and served for the comparatively long period of seven years. Some of them were veterans of previous French campaigns in the Crimean War, Algeria, the Franco-Austrian War in Italy, and in the Mexican campaign. However, following the "Seven Weeks War" between Prussia and Austria four years earlier, it had been calculated that, with commitments in Algeria and elsewhere, the French Army could field only 288,000 men to face the Prussian Army, when potentially 1,000,000 would be required.[32] Under Marshal Adolphe Niel, urgent reforms were made. Universal conscription and a shorter period of service gave increased numbers of reservists, who would swell the army to a planned strength of 800,000 on mobilisation. Those who for any reason were not conscripted were to be enrolled in the Garde Mobile, a militia with a nominal strength of 400,000. However, the Franco-Prussian War broke out before these reforms could be completely implemented. The mobilisation of reservists was chaotic and resulted in large numbers of stragglers, while the Garde Mobile were generally untrained and often mutinous.[33] French infantry were equipped with the breech-loading Chassepot rifle, one of the most modern mass-produced firearms in the world at the time, with 1,037,555 available in French inventories. With a rubber ring seal and a smaller bullet, the Chassepot had a maximum effective range of some 1,500 metres (4,900 ft) with a short reloading time.[34] French tactics emphasised the defensive use of the Chassepot rifle in trench-warfare style fighting—the so-called feu de bataillon.[35] The artillery was equipped with rifled, muzzle-loaded La Hitte guns.[36] The army also possessed a precursor to the machine-gun: the mitrailleuse, which could unleash significant, concentrated firepower but nevertheless lacked range and was comparatively immobile, and thus prone to being easily overrun. The mitrailleuse was mounted on an artillery gun carriage and grouped in batteries in a similar fashion to cannon.[34] The army was nominally led by Napoleon III, with Marshals François Achille Bazaine and Patrice de MacMahon in command of the field armies.[37] However, there was no previously arranged plan of campaign in place. The only campaign plan prepared between 1866 and 1870 was a defensive one.[19] Prussians/Germans Prussian field artillery column at Torcy in September 1870 The German army comprised that of the North German Confederation led by the Kingdom of Prussia, and the South German states drawn in under the secret clause of the preliminary peace of Nikolsburg, 26 July 1866,[38] and formalised in the Treaty of Prague, 23 August 1866.[39] Recruitment and organisation of the various armies were almost identical, and based on the concept of conscripting annual classes of men who then served in the regular regiments for a fixed term before being moved to the reserves. This process gave a theoretical peace time strength of 382,000 and a wartime strength of about 1,189,000.[40] German tactics emphasised encirclement battles like Cannae and using artillery offensively whenever possible. Rather than advancing in a column or line formation, Prussian infantry moved in small groups that were harder to target by artillery or French defensive fire.[41] The sheer number of soldiers available made encirclement en masse and destruction of French formations relatively easy.[42] The army was equipped with the Dreyse needle gun renowned for its use at the Battle of Königgrätz, which was by this time showing the age of its 25-year-old design.[34] The rifle had a range of only 600 m (2,000 ft) and lacked the rubber breech seal that permitted aimed shots.[43] The deficiencies of the needle gun were more than compensated for by the famous Krupp 6-pounder (6 kg despite the gun being called a 6-pounder, the rifling technology enabled guns to fire twice the weight of projectiles in the same calibre) steel breech-loading cannons being issued to Prussian artillery batteries.[44] Firing a contact-detonated shell, the Krupp gun had a longer range and a higher rate of fire than the French bronze muzzle loading cannon, which relied on time fuses.[45] The Prussian army was controlled by the General Staff, under General Helmuth von Moltke. The Prussian army was unique in Europe for having the only such organisation in existence, whose purpose in peacetime was to prepare the overall war strategy, and in wartime to direct operational movement and organise logistics and communications.[46] The officers of the General Staff were hand-picked from the Prussian Kriegsakademie (War Academy). Moltke embraced new technology, particularly the railroad and telegraph, to coordinate and accelerate mobilisation of large forces.[47] French Army incursion Preparations for the offensive Map of the German and French armies near the common border on 31 July 1870 On 28 July 1870 Napoleon III left Paris for Metz and assumed command of the newly titled Army of the Rhine, some 202,448 strong and expected to grow as the French mobilization progressed.[48] Marshal MacMahon took command of I Corps (4 infantry divisions) near Wissembourg, Marshal François Canrobert brought VI Corps (4 infantry divisions) to Châlons-sur-Marne in northern France as a reserve and to guard against a Prussian advance through Belgium.[49] A pre-war plan laid down by the late Marshal Niel called for a strong French offensive from Thionville towards Trier and into the Prussian Rhineland. This plan was discarded in favour of a defensive plan by Generals Charles Frossard and Bartélemy Lebrun, which called for the Army of the Rhine to remain in a defensive posture near the German border and repel any Prussian offensive. As Austria, along with Bavaria, Württemberg, and Baden were expected to join in a revenge war against Prussia, I Corps would invade the Bavarian Palatinate and proceed to "free" the four South German states in concert with Austro-Hungarian forces. VI Corps would reinforce either army as needed.[50] Unfortunately for Frossard's plan, the Prussian army mobilised far more rapidly than expected. The Austro-Hungarians, still reeling after their defeat by Prussia in the Austro-Prussian War, were treading carefully before stating that they would only side with France if the south Germans viewed the French positively. This did not materialize as the four South German states had come to Prussia's aid and were mobilizing their armies against France.[51] Occupation of Saarbrücken Main article: Battle of Saarbrücken Course of the first phase of the war up to the Battle of Sedan on 1 September 1870 Napoleon III was under substantial domestic pressure to launch an offensive before the full might of Moltke's forces was mobilized and deployed. Reconnaissance by Frossard's forces had identified only the Prussian 16th Infantry Division guarding the border town of Saarbrücken, right before the entire Army of the Rhine. Accordingly, on 31 July the Army marched forward toward the Saar River to seize Saarbrücken.[52] General Frossard's II Corps and Marshal Bazaine's III Corps crossed the German border on 2 August, and began to force the Prussian 40th Regiment of the 16th Infantry Division from the town of Saarbrücken with a series of direct attacks. The Chassepot rifle proved its worth against the Dreyse rifle, with French riflemen regularly outdistancing their Prussian counterparts in the skirmishing around Saarbrücken. However the Prussians resisted strongly, and the French suffered 86 casualties to the Prussian 83 casualties. Saarbrücken also proved to be a major obstacle in terms of logistics. Only one railway there led to the German hinterland but could be easily defended by a single force, and the only river systems in the region ran along the border instead of inland.[53] While the French hailed the invasion as the first step towards the Rhineland and later Berlin, General Edmond Le Bœuf and Napoleon III were receiving alarming reports from foreign news sources of Prussian and Bavarian armies massing to the southeast in addition to the forces to the north and northeast.[54] Moltke had indeed massed three armies in the area—the Prussian First Army with 50,000 men, commanded by General Karl von Steinmetz opposite Saarlouis, the Prussian Second Army with 134,000 men commanded by Prince Friedrich Karl opposite the line Forbach-Spicheren, and the Prussian Third Army with 120,000 men commanded by Crown Prince Friedrich Wilhelm, poised to cross the border at Wissembourg.[55] Prussian Army advance Battle of Wissembourg Main article: Battle of Wissembourg (1870) Bavarian infantry at the Battle of Wissembourg, 1870 Upon learning from captured Prussian soldiers and a local area police chief that the Prussian Crown Prince's Third Army was just 30 miles (48 km) north from Saarbrücken near the Rhine river town Wissembourg, General Le Bœuf and Napoleon III decided to retreat to defensive positions. General Frossard, without instructions, hastily withdrew his elements of the Army of the Rhine in Saarbrücken back across the river to Spicheren and Forbach.[56] Marshal MacMahon, now closest to Wissembourg, spread his four divisions 20 miles (32 km) to react to any Prussian-Bavarian invasion. This organization was due to a lack of supplies, forcing each division to seek out food and forage from the countryside and from the representatives of the army supply arm that was supposed to furnish them with provisions. What made a bad situation much worse was the conduct of General Auguste-Alexandre Ducrot, commander of the 1st Division. He told General Abel Douay, commander of the 2nd Division, on 1 August that "The information I have received makes me suppose that the enemy has no considerable forces very near his advance posts, and has no desire to take the offensive".[57] Two days later, he told MacMahon that he had not found "a single enemy post ... it looks to me as if the menace of the Bavarians is simply bluff". Even though Ducrot shrugged off the possibility of an attack by the Germans, MacMahon tried to warn his other three division commanders, without success.[58] The first action of the Franco-Prussian War took place on 4 August 1870. This battle saw the unsupported division of General Douay of I Corps, with some attached cavalry, which was posted to watch the border, attacked in overwhelming but uncoordinated fashion by the German 3rd Army. During the day, elements of a Bavarian and two Prussian corps became engaged and were aided by Prussian artillery, which blasted holes in the city defenses. Douay held a very strong position initially, thanks to the accurate long-range rapid fire of the Chassepot rifles, but his force was too thinly stretched to hold it. Douay was killed in the late morning when a caisson of the divisional mitrailleuse battery exploded near him; the encirclement of the town by the Prussians then threatened the French avenue of retreat.[59] The fighting within the town had become extremely intense, becoming a door to door battle of survival. Despite an unceasing attack from Prussian infantry, the soldiers of the 2nd Division kept to their positions. The people of the town of Wissembourg finally surrendered to the Germans. The French troops who did not surrender retreated westward, leaving behind 1,000 dead and wounded and another 1,000 prisoners and all of their remaining ammunition.[60] The final attack by the Prussian troops also cost c. 1,000 casualties. The German cavalry then failed to pursue the French and lost touch with them. The attackers had an initial superiority of numbers, a broad deployment which made envelopment highly likely but the effectiveness of French Chassepot-rifle fire inflicted costly repulses on infantry attacks, until the French infantry had been extensively bombarded by the Prussian artillery.[61] Battle of Spicheren Main article: Battle of Spicheren Map of the Prussian and German offensives, 5–6 August 1870 The Battle of Spicheren on 5 August was the second of three critical French defeats. Moltke had originally planned to keep Bazaine's army on the Saar River until he could attack it with the 2nd Army in front and the 1st Army on its left flank, while the 3rd Army closed towards the rear. The aging General von Steinmetz made an overzealous, unplanned move, leading the 1st Army south from his position on the Moselle. He moved straight toward the town of Spicheren, cutting off Prince Frederick Charles from his forward cavalry units in the process.[62] On the French side, planning after the disaster at Wissembourg had become essential. General Le Bœuf, flushed with anger, was intent upon going on the offensive over the Saar and countering their loss. However, planning for the next encounter was more based upon the reality of unfolding events rather than emotion or pride, as Intendant General Wolff told him and his staff that supply beyond the Saar would be impossible. Therefore, the armies of France would take up a defensive position that would protect against every possible attack point, but also left the armies unable to support each other.[63] While the French army under General MacMahon engaged the German 3rd Army at the Battle of Wörth, the German 1st Army under Steinmetz finished their advance west from Saarbrücken. A patrol from the German 2nd Army under Prince Friedrich Karl of Prussia spotted decoy fires nearby and Frossard's army farther off on a distant plateau south of the town of Spicheren, and took this as a sign of Frossard's retreat. Ignoring Moltke's plan again, both German armies attacked Frossard's French 2nd Corps, fortified between Spicheren and Forbach.[64] The French were unaware of German numerical superiority at the beginning of the battle as the German 2nd Army did not attack all at once. Treating the oncoming attacks as merely skirmishes, Frossard did not request additional support from other units. By the time he realized what kind of a force he was opposing, it was too late. Seriously flawed communications between Frossard and those in reserve under Bazaine slowed down so much that by the time the reserves received orders to move out to Spicheren, German soldiers from the 1st and 2nd armies had charged up the heights.[65] Because the reserves had not arrived, Frossard erroneously believed that he was in grave danger of being outflanked, as German soldiers under General von Glume were spotted in Forbach. Instead of continuing to defend the heights, by the close of battle after dusk he retreated to the south. The German casualties were relatively high due to the advance and the effectiveness of the Chassepot rifle. They were quite startled in the morning when they had found out that their efforts were not in vain—Frossard had abandoned his position on the heights.[66] Battle of Wörth Main article: Battle of Wörth The Battle of Wörth began when the two armies clashed again on 6 August near Wörth in the town of Frœschwiller, about 10 miles (16 km) from Wissembourg. The Crown Prince of Prussia's 3rd army had, on the quick reaction of his Chief of Staff General von Blumenthal, drawn reinforcements which brought its strength up to 140,000 troops. The French had been slowly reinforced and their force numbered only 35,000. Although badly outnumbered, the French defended their position just outside Frœschwiller. By afternoon, the Germans had suffered c. 10,500 killed or wounded and the French had lost a similar number of casualties and another c. 9,200 men taken prisoner, a loss of about 50%. The Germans captured Fröschwiller which sat on a hilltop in the centre of the French line. Having lost any hope for victory and facing a massacre, the French army disengaged and retreated in a westerly direction towards Bitche and Saverne, hoping to join French forces on the other side of the Vosges mountains. The German 3rd army did not pursue the French but remained in Alsace and moved slowly south, attacking and destroying the French garrisons in the vicinity.[67] Battle of Mars-La-Tour Main article: Battle of Mars-La-Tour Heinrich XVII, Prince Reuss, on the side of the 5th Squadron I Guards Dragoon Regiment at Mars-la-Tour, 16 August 1870. Emil Hünten, 1902 About 160,000 French soldiers were besieged in the fortress of Metz following the defeats on the frontier. A retirement from Metz to link up with French forces at Châlons was ordered on 15 August and spotted by a Prussian cavalry patrol under Major Oskar von Blumenthal. Next day a grossly outnumbered Prussian force of 30,000 men of III Corps (of the 2nd Army) under General Constantin von Alvensleben, found the French Army near Vionville, east of Mars-la-Tour.[68] Despite odds of four to one, the III Corps launched a risky attack. The French were routed and the III Corps captured Vionville, blocking any further escape attempts to the west. Once blocked from retreat, the French in the fortress of Metz had no choice but to engage in a fight that would see the last major cavalry engagement in Western Europe. The battle soon erupted, and III Corps was shattered by incessant cavalry charges, losing over half its soldiers. The German Official History recorded 15,780 casualties and French casualties of 13,761 men.[69] On 16 August, the French had a chance to sweep away the key Prussian defense, and to escape. Two Prussian corps had attacked the French advance guard, thinking that it was the rearguard of the retreat of the French Army of the Meuse. Despite this misjudgment the two Prussian corps held the entire French army for the whole day. Outnumbered 5 to 1, the extraordinary élan of the Prussians prevailed over gross indecision by the French. The French had lost the opportunity to win a decisive victory.[70] Battle of Gravelotte This section does not cite any sources. Please help improve this section by adding citations to reliable sources. Unsourced material may be challenged and removed. (July 2016) (Learn how and when to remove this message) Main article: Battle of Gravelotte The "Rifle Battalion 9 from Lauenburg" at Gravelotte The Battle of Gravelotte, or Gravelotte–St. Privat (18 August), was the largest battle in the Franco-Prussian War. It was fought about 6 miles (9.7 km) west of Metz, where on the previous day, having intercepted the French army's retreat to the west at the Battle of Mars-La-Tour, the Prussians were now closing in to complete the destruction of the French forces. The combined German forces, under Field Marshal Count Helmuth von Moltke, were the Prussian First and Second Armies of the North German Confederation numbering about 210 infantry battalions, 133 cavalry squadrons, and 732 heavy cannons totaling 188,332 officers and men. The French Army of the Rhine, commanded by Marshal François-Achille Bazaine, numbering about 183 infantry battalions, 104 cavalry squadrons, backed by 520 heavy cannons, totaling 112,800 officers and men, dug in along high ground with their southern left flank at the town of Rozérieulles, and their northern right flank at St. Privat. On 18 August, the battle began when at 08:00 Moltke ordered the First and Second Armies to advance against the French positions. The French were dug in with trenches and rifle pits with their artillery and their mitrailleuses in concealed positions. Backed by artillery fire, Steinmetz's VII and VIII Corps launched attacks across the Mance ravine, all of which were defeated by French rifle and mitrailleuse firepower, forcing the two German corps' to withdraw to Rezonville. The Prussian 1st Guards Infantry Division assaulted French-held St. Privat and was pinned down by French fire from rifle pits and trenches. The Second Army under Prince Frederick Charles used its artillery to pulverize the French position at St. Privat. His XII Corps took the town of Roncourt and helped the Guard conquer St. Privat, while Eduard von Fransecky's II Corps advanced across the Mance ravine. The fighting died down at 22:00. The next morning the French Army of the Rhine retreated to Metz where they were besieged and forced to surrender two months later. A grand total of 20,163 German troops were killed, wounded or missing in action during the August 18 battle. The French losses were 7,855 killed and wounded along with 4,420 prisoners of war (half of them were wounded) for a total of 12,275. Siege of Metz Main article: Siege of Metz (1870) Surrender of Metz With the defeat of Marshal Bazaine's Army of the Rhine at Gravelotte, the French retreated to Metz, where they were besieged by over 150,000 Prussian troops of the First and Second Armies. Further military operations on the part of the army under Bazaine's command have drawn numerous criticisms from historians against its commander. It was later stated with derogatory irony that his occupation at that time was writing orders on hygiene and discipline, as well as playing dominoes.[71] Bazaine's surprising inactivity was a great relief to Moltke, who now had time to improve his lines around Metz and intensify the hunt for MacMahon.[72] At this time, Napoleon III and MacMahon formed the new French Army of Châlons to march on to Metz to rescue Bazaine. Napoleon III personally led the army with Marshal MacMahon in attendance. The Army of Châlons marched northeast towards the Belgian border to avoid the Prussians before striking south to link up with Bazaine. The Prussians took advantage of this maneuver to catch the French in a pincer grip. Moltke left the Prussian First and Second Armies besieging Metz, except three corps detached to form the Army of the Meuse under the Crown Prince of Saxony. With this army and the Prussian Third Army, Moltke marched northward and caught up with the French at Beaumont on 30 August. After a sharp fight in which they lost 5,000 men and 40 cannons, the French withdrew toward Sedan. Having reformed in the town, the Army of Châlons was immediately isolated by the converging Prussian armies. Napoleon III ordered the army to break out of the encirclement immediately. With MacMahon wounded on the previous day, General Auguste Ducrot took command of the French troops in the field. Battle of Sedan Main article: Battle of Sedan Napoleon III and Bismarck talk after Napoleon's capture at the Battle of Sedan, by Wilhelm Camphausen On 1 September 1870, the battle opened with the Army of Châlons, with 202 infantry battalions, 80 cavalry squadrons and 564 guns, attacking the surrounding Prussian Third and Meuse Armies totaling 222 infantry battalions, 186 cavalry squadrons and 774 guns. General Emmanuel Félix de Wimpffen, the commander of the French V Corps in reserve, hoped to launch a combined infantry and cavalry attack against the Prussian XI Corps. But by 11:00, Prussian artillery took a toll on the French while more Prussian troops arrived on the battlefield. The struggle in the conditions of encirclement turned out to be absolutely impossible for the French—their front was shot through with artillery fire from three sides. The French cavalry, commanded by General Margueritte, launched three desperate attacks on the nearby village of Floing where the Prussian XI Corps was concentrated. Margueritte was mortally wounded leading the very first charge, dying 4 days later, and the two additional charges led to nothing but heavy losses. By the end of the day, with no hope of breaking out, Napoleon III called off the attacks. The French lost over 17,000 men, killed or wounded, with 21,000 captured. The Prussians reported their losses at 2,320 killed, 5,980 wounded and 700 captured or missing. By the next day, on 2 September, Napoleon III surrendered and was taken prisoner with 104,000 of his soldiers. It was an overwhelming victory for the Prussians, who had captured an entire French army and the leader of France. They subsequently paraded the defeated French army in view of the besieged army in Metz, which had an impact on the morale of the defenders. The defeat of the French at Sedan had decided the war in Prussia's favour. One French army was now immobilised and besieged in the city of Metz, and nothing was preventing a Prussian invasion.[73] This defeat was humiliating for the already morally defeated French army and opened the paveway for the Siege of Paris. Surrender of Metz Bazaine, a well-known Bonapartist, at this time allowed himself to be carried away by illusory plans for a political role in France. Unconventional military plans were put forth, by which the Germans would allow the army under Bazaine's command to withdraw from the fortress of Metz to retreat to the south of France, where it would remain until the German armies captured Paris, eliminated the political usurpers and made room for the legitimate imperial authorities with the support of Bazaine's army.[74] Even ignoring moral issues and potential public outcry, this plan seems completely unrealistic. Bismarck and Moltke answered Bazaine's offer of "cooperation" against the "republican menace" with an indifferent shrug.[75] The German press, undoubtedly at the instigation of Bismarck, widely covered this topic, and reported the details of Bazaine's negotiations. The French press could only remain completely silent on this issue. With whom Bazaine negotiated still raises questions among historians. "For a decade, the French were considered him (M. Edmond Regnier) a sinister figure, almost certainly an agent of Bismarck. They would have been more justified in thinking him a buffoon".[76] Undoubtedly, the politically motivated actions of Commander Bazaine led to the passivity of the encircled army at Metz and contributed to the defeat of not only this army, but the country as a whole. Bazaine's army surrendered on 26 October. 173,000 people surrendered, with the Prussians capturing the huge amount of military equipment located in Metz. After the war, Marshal Bazaine was convicted by a French military court. War of the Government of National Defence Government of National Defence Course of the second phase of the war (part 1: 1 September to 30 November) Course of the second phase of the war (part 2: 1 December until the end of the war) When news of Napoleon III's surrender at Sedan arrived in Paris, the Second Empire was overthrown by a popular uprising. On 4 September, Jules Favre, Léon Gambetta, and General Louis-Jules Trochu proclaimed a provisional government called the Government of National Defence and a Third Republic.[77] After the German victory at Sedan, most of the French standing army was either besieged in Metz or held prisoner by the Germans, who hoped for an armistice and an end to the war. Bismarck wanted an early peace but had difficulty finding a legitimate French authority with whom to negotiate. The Emperor was a captive and the Empress in exile, but there had been no abdication de jure and the army was still bound by an oath of allegiance to the defunct imperial regime; on the other hand, the Government of National Defence had no electoral mandate.[78] Prussia's intention was to weaken the political position of France abroad. The defensive position of the new French authorities, who offered Germany an honorable peace and reimbursement of the costs of the war, was presented by Prussia as aggressive; they rejected the conditions put forward and demanded the annexation of the French provinces of Alsace and part of Lorraine. Bismarck was dangling the Emperor over the republic's head, calling Napoleon III "the legitimate ruler of France" and dismissing Gambetta's new republic as no more than "un coup de parti" ("a partisan coup").[73] This policy was to some extent successful; the European press discussed the legitimacy of the French authorities, and Prussia's aggressive position was to some extent understood. Only the United States and Spain recognized the Government of National Defence immediately after the announcement; other countries refused to do this for some time.[79] The question of legitimacy is rather strange for France after the coup d'état of 1851, since Louis-Napoleon himself only overthrew the Second Republic and rose to the imperial throne by means of a coup d'état. The Germans expected to negotiate an end to the war, but while the republican government was amenable to war reparations or ceding colonial territories in Africa or Southeast Asia, it would go no further. On behalf of the Government of National Defense, Favre declared on 6 September that France would not "yield an inch of its territory nor a stone of its fortresses".[80] The republic then renewed the declaration of war, called for recruits in all parts of the country, and pledged to drive the German troops out of France by a guerre à outrance ('overwhelming attack').[81] The Germans continued the war, yet could not pin down any proper military opposition in their vicinity. As the bulk of the remaining French armies was digging in near Paris, the German leaders decided to put pressure upon their enemy by attacking there. By 15 September, German troops had reached the outskirts and Moltke issued the orders to surround the city. On 19 September, the Germans surrounded it and erected a blockade, as already established at Metz, completing the encirclement on 20 September.[timeframe?] Bismarck met Favre on 18 September at the Château de Ferrières and demanded a frontier immune to a French war of revenge, which included Strasbourg, Alsace, and most of the Moselle department in Lorraine, of which Metz was the capital. In return for an armistice for the French to elect a National Assembly, Bismarck demanded the surrender of Strasbourg and the fortress city of Toul. To allow supplies into Paris, one of the perimeter forts had to be handed over. Favre was unaware that Bismarck's real aim in making such extortionate demands was to establish a durable peace on Germany's new western frontier, preferably by a peace with a friendly government, on terms acceptable to French public opinion.[clarification needed] An impregnable military frontier was an inferior alternative to him, favoured only by the militant nationalists on the German side.[82] When the war had begun, European public opinion heavily favoured the Germans; many Italians attempted to sign up as volunteers at the Prussian embassy in Florence and a Prussian diplomat visited Giuseppe Garibaldi in Caprera. Bismarck's demand that France surrender sovereignty over Alsace caused a dramatic shift in that sentiment in Italy, which was best exemplified by the reaction of Garibaldi soon after the revolution in Paris, who told the Movimento of Genoa on 7 September 1870 that "Yesterday I said to you: war to the death to Bonaparte. Today I say to you: rescue the French Republic by every means."[83] Garibaldi went to France and assumed command of the Army of the Vosges, with which he operated around Dijon until the end of the war. The energetic actions of a part of the government (delegation) in Tours under Gambetta's leadership led to significant success in the formation of a new army. In less than four months, with persistent battles at the front, eleven new corps were formed (Nos. XVI–XXVI). The average success of the formation was equal to six thousand infantrymen and two batteries per day. This success was achieved despite the fact that the military industry and warehouses were concentrated mainly in Paris; all supplies in the province—chiefs, weapons, camps, uniforms, ammunition, equipment, baggage—had to be improvised anew. Many branches of the military industry were re-established in the province. Freedom of communication with foreign markets brought significant benefits; it was possible to make large purchases on foreign markets, mainly English, Belgian, and American. The artillery created by Gambetta in four months—238 batteries—was one and a half times larger than the artillery of imperial France. In the end, eight corps participated in the battles, and three were ready only by the end of January, when a truce was already concluded.[84] While the Germans had a 2:1 numerical advantage before Napoleon III's surrender, this French recruitment gave them a 2:1 or 3:1 advantage. The French more than tripled their forces during the war, while the Germans did not increase theirs as much; the number of 888,000 mobilized by the North German Union in August increased by only 2% after 3+1⁄2 months, and by the end of the war, six months later, only by 15%, which did not even balance the losses incurred. Prussia was completely unaware of the feverish activity of permanent mobilization. This disparity in forces created a crisis for the Germans at the front in November 1870,[85] which only the release of the large forces besieging the fortress of Metz allowed them to overcome. Siege of Paris Troops quarter in Paris, by Anton von Werner (1894) Main article: Siege of Paris (1870–1871) Prussian forces commenced the siege of Paris on 19 September 1870. Faced with the blockade, the new French government called for the establishment of several large armies in the French provinces. These new bodies of troops were to march towards Paris and attack the Germans there from various directions at the same time. Armed French civilians were to create a guerilla force—the so-called Francs-tireurs—for the purpose of attacking German supply lines. Bismarck was an active supporter of the bombardment of the city. He sought to end the war as soon as possible, very much fearing a change in the international situation unfavorable to Prussia, as he himself called it "the intervention of neutrals".[86] Therefore, Bismarck constantly and actively insisted on the early start of the bombardment, despite all the objections of the military command. Von Blumenthal, who commanded the siege, was opposed to the bombardment on moral grounds. In this he was backed by other senior military figures such as the Crown Prince and Moltke. Nevertheless, in January, the Germans fired some 12,000 shells (300–400 daily) into the city.[87] The siege of the city caused great hardships for the population, especially for the poor from cold and hunger. Loire campaign The Battle of Bapaume, which took place from 2–3 January 1871 Dispatched from Paris as the republican government emissary, Léon Gambetta flew over the German lines in a balloon inflated with coal gas from the city's gasworks and organized the recruitment of the Armée de la Loire. Rumors about an alleged German "extermination" plan infuriated the French and strengthened their support of the new regime. Within a few weeks, five new armies totalling more than 500,000 troops were recruited.[88] The Germans dispatched some of their troops to the French provinces to detect, attack and disperse the new French armies before they could become a menace. The Germans were not prepared for an occupation of the whole of France. On 10 October, hostilities began between German and French republican forces near Orléans. At first, the Germans were victorious but the French drew reinforcements and defeated a Bavarian force at the Battle of Coulmiers on 9 November. After the surrender of Metz, more than 100,000 well-trained and experienced German troops joined the German 'Southern Army'. The French were forced to abandon Orléans on 4 December, and were finally defeated at the Battle of Le Mans (10–12 January). A second French army which operated north of Paris was turned back at the Battle of Amiens (27 November), the Battle of Bapaume (3 January 1871) and the Battle of St. Quentin (13 January).[89] Northern campaign Following the Army of the Loire's defeats, Gambetta turned to General Faidherbe's Army of the North.[90] The army had achieved several small victories at towns such as Ham, La Hallue, and Amiens and was protected by the belt of fortresses in northern France, allowing Faidherbe's men to launch quick attacks against isolated Prussian units, then retreat behind the fortresses. Despite access to the armaments factories of Lille, the Army of the North suffered from severe supply difficulties, which depressed morale. In January 1871, Gambetta forced Faidherbe to march his army beyond the fortresses and engage the Prussians in open battle. The army was severely weakened by low morale, supply problems, the terrible winter weather and low troop quality, whilst general Faidherbe was unable to command due to his poor health, the result of decades of campaigning in West Africa. At the Battle of St. Quentin, the Army of the North suffered a crushing defeat and was scattered, releasing thousands of Prussian soldiers to be relocated to the East.[91] Eastern campaign The French Army of the East is disarmed at the Swiss border in the monumental 1881 depiction. Following the destruction of the French Army of the Loire, remnants of the Loire army gathered in eastern France to form the Army of the East, commanded by general Charles-Denis Bourbaki. In a final attempt to cut the German supply lines in northeast France, Bourbaki's army marched north to attack the Prussian siege of Belfort and relieve the defenders. The French troops had a significant advantage (110 thousand soldiers against 40 thousand). The French offensive took the Germans by surprise and by mid-January 1871, the French had reached the Lisaine River, just a few kilometers from the besieged fortress of Belfort. In the battle of the Lisaine, Bourbaki's men failed to break through German lines commanded by General August von Werder. Bringing in the German 'Southern Army', General von Manteuffel then drove Bourbaki's army into the mountains near the Swiss border. Bourbaki attempted to commit suicide, but failed to inflict a fatal wound.[92] Facing annihilation, the last intact French army of 87,000 men (now commanded by General Justin Clinchant)[93] crossed the border and was disarmed and interned by the neutral Swiss near Pontarlier (1 February). The besieged fortress of Belfort continued to resist until the signing of the armistice, repelling a German attempt to capture the fortress on 27 January, which was some consolation for the French in this stubborn and unhappy campaign. Armistice This section needs additional citations for verification. Please help improve this article by adding citations to reliable sources in this section. Unsourced material may be challenged and removed. (July 2020) (Learn how and when to remove this message) Main article: Armistice of Versailles In this painting by Pierre Puvis de Chavannes a woman holds up an oak twig as a symbol of hope for the nation's recovery from war and deprivation after the Franco-Prussian War.[94] The Walters Art Museum. On 26 January 1871, the Government of National Defence based in Paris negotiated an armistice with the Prussians. With Paris starving, and Gambetta's provincial armies reeling from one disaster after another, French foreign minister Favre went to Versailles on 24 January to discuss peace terms with Bismarck. Bismarck agreed to end the siege and allow food convoys to immediately enter Paris (including trains carrying millions of German army rations), on condition that the Government of National Defence surrender several key fortresses outside Paris to the Prussians. Without the forts, the French Army would no longer be able to defend Paris. Although public opinion in Paris was strongly against any form of surrender or concession to the Prussians, the Government realised that it could not hold the city for much longer, and that Gambetta's provincial armies would probably never break through to relieve Paris. President Trochu resigned on 25 January and was replaced by Favre, who signed the surrender two days later at Versailles, with the armistice coming into effect at midnight. On 28 January, a truce was concluded for 21 days, after the exhaustion of food and fuel supplies, the Paris garrison capitulated, the National Guard retained its weapons, while German troops occupied part of the forts of Paris to prevent the possibility of resuming hostilities. But military operations continued in the eastern part of the country, in the area of operation of the Bourbaki army. The French side, having no reliable information about the outcome of the struggle, insisted on excluding this area from the truce in the hope of a successful outcome of the struggle.[95] The Germans did not dissuade the French. Several sources claim that in his carriage on the way back to Paris, Favre broke into tears, and collapsed into his daughter's arms as the guns around Paris fell silent at midnight. At Bordeaux, Gambetta received word from Paris on 29 January that the Government had surrendered. Furious, he refused to surrender. Jules Simon, a member of the Government arrived from Paris by train on 1 February to negotiate with Gambetta. Another group of three ministers arrived in Bordeaux on 5 February and the following day Gambetta stepped down and surrendered control of the provincial armies to the Government of National Defence, which promptly ordered a cease-fire across France. War at sea French warships at sea in 1870 Painting of Meteor in battle with Bouvet, by Robert Parlow [de] Blockade When the war began, the French government ordered a blockade of the North German coasts, which the small North German Federal Navy with only five ironclads and various minor vessels could do little to oppose. For most of the war, the three largest German ironclads were out of service with engine troubles; only the turret ship SMS Arminius was available to conduct operations. By the time engine repairs had been completed, the French fleet had already departed.[96] The blockade proved only partially successful due to crucial oversights by the planners in Paris. Reservists that were supposed to be at the ready in case of war, were working in the Newfoundland fisheries or in Scotland. Only part of the 470-ship French Navy put to sea on 24 July. Before long, the French navy ran short of coal, needing 200 short tons (180 t) per day and having a bunker capacity in the fleet of only 250 short tons (230 t). A blockade of Wilhelmshaven failed, and conflicting orders about operations in the Baltic Sea or a return to France made the French naval efforts futile. Spotting a blockade-runner became unwelcome because of the question du charbon; pursuit of Prussian ships quickly depleted the coal reserves of the French ships.[97][98] But the main reason for the only partial success of the naval operation was the fear of the French command to risk political complications with Great Britain. This deterred the French command from trying to interrupt German trade under the British flag.[99] Despite the limited measures of the blockade, it still created noticeable difficulties for German trade. "The actual captures of German ships were eighty in number".[100] To relieve pressure from the expected German attack into Alsace-Lorraine, Napoleon III and the French high command planned a seaborne invasion of northern Germany as soon as war began. The French expected the invasion to divert German troops and to encourage Denmark to join in the war, with its 50,000-strong army and the Royal Danish Navy. They discovered that Prussia had recently built defences around the big North German ports, including coastal artillery batteries with Krupp heavy artillery, which with a range of 4,000 yards (3,700 m), had double the range of French naval guns. The French Navy lacked the heavy guns to engage the coastal defences and the topography of the Prussian coast made a seaborne invasion of northern Germany impossible.[101] The French Marines intended for the invasion of northern Germany were dispatched to reinforce the French Army of Châlons and fell into captivity at Sedan along with Napoleon III. A shortage of officers, following the capture of most of the professional French army at the siege of Metz and at the Battle of Sedan, led to naval officers being sent from their ships to command hastily assembled reservists of the Garde Mobile.[102] As the autumn storms of the North Sea forced the return of more of the French ships, the blockade of the north German ports diminished and in September 1870 the French navy abandoned the blockade for the winter. The rest of the navy retired to ports along the English Channel and remained in port for the rest of the war.[102] Pacific and Caribbean Outside Europe, the French corvette Dupleix blockaded the German corvette SMS Hertha in Nagasaki and the Battle of Havana took place between the Prussian gunboat SMS Meteor and the French aviso Bouvet off Havana, Cuba, in November 1870.[103][104] War crimes Ruins of Bazeilles The Franco-Prussian War of 1870–71 resulted in numerous war crimes committed by the Prussian army. One notable war crime committed during the conflict was the execution of prisoners of war. Reports indicate that several hundred French prisoners were summarily executed by Prussian soldiers. This included the execution of a group of over 200 French soldiers at the village of Dornach, which was subsequently referred to as the "Dornach atrocities".[105] In the small town of Bazeilles, near Sedan, French marines and partisans put up a resistance against a force of Bavarian soldiers. After the initial French resistance was overcome, the Bavarian troops shelled the village with artillery before sending in infantry to continue the assault. In battle, some surrendering soldiers were shot on the spot, and over 400 buildings were destroyed. The Bavarian troops detained around one hundred civilians, believing they illegally took part in the battle, only to release them unharmed the next day. After the war investigations established that 39 civilians were killed or wounded during the battle.[106] Prussian soldiers were also accused of committing acts of violence against civilians, including murder, rape, and the destruction of property.[107] Aftermath Analysis German uhlans and an infantryman escorting captured French soldiers Europe at This Moment (1872) – A Political-Geographic Fantasy: An elaborate satirical map reflecting the European situation following the Franco-Prussian war. France had suffered a crushing defeat: the loss of Alsace and parts of Lorraine; The map contains satirical comments on 14 countries The quick German victory over the French stunned neutral observers, many of whom had expected a French victory and a long war. The strategic advantages which the Germans had were not appreciated outside Germany until after hostilities had ceased. Other countries quickly discerned the advantages given to the Germans by their military system, and adopted many of their innovations, particularly the general staff, universal conscription, and highly detailed mobilization systems.[108] The Prussian General Staff developed by Moltke proved to be extremely effective, in contrast to the traditional French school. This was in large part because the Prussian General Staff was created to study previous Prussian operations and learn to avoid mistakes. The structure also greatly strengthened Moltke's ability to control large formations spread out over significant distances.[109] The Chief of the General Staff, effectively the commander in chief of the Prussian army, was independent of the minister of war and answered only to the monarch.[110] The French General Staff—along with those of every other European military—was little better than a collection of assistants for the line commanders. This disorganization hampered the French commanders' ability to exercise control of their forces.[111] In addition, the Prussian military education system was superior to the French model; Prussian staff officers were trained to exhibit initiative and independent thinking. Indeed, this was Moltke's expectation.[112] The French, meanwhile, suffered from an education and promotion system that stifled intellectual development. According to the military historian Dallas Irvine, the system: was almost completely effective in excluding the army's brain power from the staff and high command. To the resulting lack of intelligence at the top can be ascribed all the inexcusable defects of French military policy.[110] Albrecht von Roon, the Prussian Minister of War from 1859 to 1873, put into effect a series of reforms of the Prussian military system in the 1860s. Among these were two major reforms that substantially increased the military power of Germany. The first was a reorganization of the army that integrated the regular army and the Landwehr reserves.[113] The second was the provision for the conscription of every male Prussian of military age in the event of mobilization.[114] Thus, although the population of France was greater than the population of all of the Northern German states that participated in the war, the Germans mobilized more soldiers for battle. Population and soldiers mobilized at the start of the war Population in 1870	Mobilized Second French Empire	38,000,000	500,000 North German Confederation	32,000,000	550,000 At the start of the Franco-Prussian War, 462,000 German soldiers concentrated on the French frontier while only 270,000 French soldiers could be moved to face them, the French army having lost 100,000 stragglers before a shot was fired, through poor planning and administration.[33] This was partly due to the peacetime organisations of the armies. Each Prussian Corps was based within a Kreis (literally "circle") around the chief city in an area. Reservists rarely lived more than a day's travel from their regiment's depot. By contrast, French regiments generally served far from their depots, which in turn were not in the areas of France from which their soldiers were drawn. Reservists often faced several days' journey to report to their depots, and then another long journey to join their regiments. Large numbers of reservists choked railway stations, vainly seeking rations and orders.[115] The effect of these differences was accentuated by the peacetime preparations. The Prussian General Staff had drawn up minutely detailed mobilization plans using the railway system, which in turn had been partly laid out in response to recommendations of a Railway Section within the General Staff. The French railway system, with competing companies, had developed purely from commercial pressures and many journeys to the front in Alsace and Lorraine involved long diversions and frequent changes between trains. There was no system of military control of the railways and officers simply commandeered trains as they saw fit. Rail sidings and marshalling yards became choked with loaded wagons, with nobody responsible for unloading them or directing them to the destination.[116] France also suffered from an outdated tactical system. Although referred to as "Napoleonic tactics", this system was developed by Antoine-Henri Jomini during his time in Russia. Surrounded by a rigid aristocracy with a "Sacred Social Order" mentality, Jomini's system was equally rigid and inflexible. His system simplified several formations that were meant for an entire army, using battalions as the building blocks. His system was simple, but only strong enough to attack in one direction. The system was adopted by the Bourbons to prevent a repeat of when Napoleon I had returned to France, and Napoleon III retained the system upon his ascension to power (hence why they became associated with his family name). The Prussians in contrast did not use battalions as their basic tactical unit, and their system was much more flexible. Companies were formed into columns and attacked in parallel, rather than as a homogeneous battalion-sized block. Attacking in parallel allowed each company to choose its own axis of advance and make the most of local cover. It also permitted the Prussians to fire at oblique angles, raking the French lines with rifle fire. Thus, even though the Prussians had inferior rifles, they still inflicted more casualties with rifle fire than the French, with 53,900 French killed by the Dreyse (70% of their war casualties) versus 25,475 Germans killed by the Chassepot (96% of their war casualties).[citation needed] Although Austria-Hungary and Denmark had both wished to avenge their recent military defeats against Prussia, they chose not to intervene in the war due to a lack of confidence in the French. These countries did not have a documented alliance with France, and they were too late to start a war. After the rapid and stunning victories of Prussia, they preferred to abandon any plans to intervene in the war altogether. Napoleon III also failed to cultivate alliances with the Russian Empire and the United Kingdom, partially due to the diplomatic efforts of the Prussian chancellor Otto von Bismarck. Bismarck had bought Tsar Alexander II's complicity by promising to help restore his naval access to the Black Sea and Mediterranean (cut off by the treaties ending the Crimean War), other powers were less biddable.[117] "Seizing upon the distraction of the Franco-Prussian War, Russia in November 1870 had begun rebuilding its naval bases in the Black Sea, a clear violation of the treaty that had ended the Crimean War fourteen years earlier".[118] After the peace of Frankfurt in 1871, a rapprochement between France and Russia was born. "Instead of forging ties with Russia in the east and further crippling France in the west, Bismarck's miscalculation had opened the door to future relations between Paris and St. Petersburg. The culmination of this new relationship will finally be the Franco-Russian Alliance of 1894; an alliance that explicitly refers to the perceived threat of Germany and its military response".[119] Great Britain saw nothing wrong with the strengthening of Prussia on the European continent, viewing France as its traditional rival in international affairs. Lord Palmerston, the head of the British cabinet in 1865, wrote: "The current Prussia is too weak to be honest and independent in its actions. And, taking into account the interests of the future, it is highly desirable for Germany as a whole became strong, so she was able to keep the ambitious and warlike nation, France, and Russia, which compress it from the West and the East".[120] English historians criticize the then British policy, pointing out that Palmerston misunderstood Bismarck's policy due to his adherence to outdated ideas.[121] Over time, Britain began to understand that the military defeat of France meant a radical change in the European balance of power. In the future, the development of historical events is characterized by a gradual increase in Anglo-German contradictions. "The colonial quarrels, naval rivalry and disagreement over the European balance of power which drove Britain and Germany apart, were in effect the strategical and geopolitical manifestations of the relative shift in the economic power of these two countries between 1860 and 1914".[122] After the Peace of Prague in 1866, the nominally independent German states of Saxony, Bavaria, Württemberg, Baden and Hesse-Darmstadt (the southern part that was not included in the North German Union) remained. Despite the fact that there was a strong opposition to Prussia in the ruling circles and in the war of 1866 they participated on the side of Austria against Prussia, they were forced to reckon with a broad popular movement in favor of German unity and were also afraid of angering their strong neighbor in the form of Prussia. After the diplomatic provocation in Bad Ems, these states had no room for maneuver, the war was presented by Bismarck as a war for national independence against an external enemy. All these states joined the Prussian war from the very beginning of hostilities. In January 1871, these states became part of the German Empire. The French breech-loading rifle, the Chassepot, had a longer range than the German needle gun; 1,400 metres (1,500 yd) compared to 550 m (600 yd). The French also had an early machine-gun type weapon, the mitrailleuse, which could fire its thirty-seven barrels at a range of around 1,100 m (1,200 yd).[123] It was developed in such secrecy that little training with the weapon had occurred, leaving French gunners with little experience; the gun was treated like artillery and in this role it was ineffective. Worse still, once the small number of soldiers who had been trained how to use the new weapon became casualties, there were no replacements who knew how to operate the mitrailleuse.[124] The French were equipped with bronze, rifled muzzle-loading artillery, while the Prussians used new steel breech-loading guns, which had a far longer range and a faster rate of fire.[125] Prussian gunners strove for a high rate of fire, which was discouraged in the French army in the belief that it wasted ammunition. In addition, the Prussian artillery batteries had 30% more guns than their French counterparts. The Prussian guns typically opened fire at a range of 2–3 kilometres (1.2–1.9 mi), beyond the range of French artillery or the Chassepot rifle. The Prussian batteries could thus destroy French artillery with impunity, before being moved forward to directly support infantry attacks.[126] The Germans fired 30,000,000 rounds of small arms ammunition and 362,662 field artillery rounds.[127] Effects on military thought The events of the Franco-Prussian War had great influence on military thinking over the next forty years. Lessons drawn from the war included the need for a general staff system, the scale and duration of future wars and the tactical use of artillery and cavalry. The bold use of artillery by the Prussians, to silence French guns at long range and then to directly support infantry attacks at close range, proved to be superior to the defensive doctrine employed by French gunners. Likewise, the war showed that breech-loading cannons were superior to muzzle-loaded cannons, just as the Austro-Prussian War of 1866 had demonstrated for rifles. The Prussian tactics and designs were adopted by European armies by 1914, exemplified in the French 75, an artillery piece optimised to provide direct fire support to advancing infantry. Most European armies ignored the evidence of the Russo-Japanese War of 1904–1905 which suggested that infantry armed with new smokeless-powder rifles could engage gun crews effectively in the open. This forced gunners to fire at longer range using indirect fire, usually from a position of cover.[128] The heavy use of fortifications and dugouts in the Russo-Japanese war also greatly undermined the usefulness of field artillery which was not designed for indirect fire. At the Battle of Mars-La-Tour, the Prussian 12th Cavalry Brigade, commanded by General Adalbert von Bredow, conducted a charge against a French artillery battery. The attack was a costly success and came to be known as "von Bredow's Death Ride", but which nevertheless was held to prove that cavalry charges could still prevail on the battlefield. Use of traditional cavalry on the battlefields of 1914 proved to be disastrous, due to accurate, long-range rifle fire, machine-guns and artillery.[129] Bredow's attack had succeeded only because of an unusually effective artillery bombardment just before the charge, along with favorable terrain that masked his approach.[130][129] A third influence was the effect on notions of entrenchment and its limitations. While the American Civil War had famously involved entrenchment in the final years of the war, the Prussian system had overwhelmed French attempts to use similar tactics. With Prussian tactics seeming to make entrenchment and prolonged offensive campaigns ineffective, the experience of the American Civil War was seen as that of a musket war, not a rifle war.[citation needed] Many European armies were convinced of the viability of the "cult of the offensive" because of this, and focused their attention on aggressive bayonet charges over infantry fire. These would needlessly expose men to artillery fire in 1914, and entrenchment would return with a vengeance.[citation needed] Casualties The Germans deployed a total of 33,101 officers and 1,113,254 men into France, of whom they lost 1,046 officers and 16,539 enlisted men killed in action. Another 671 officers and 10,050 men died of their wounds, for total battle deaths of 28,306. Disease killed 207 officers and 11,940 men, with typhoid accounting for 6,965. 4,009 were missing and presumed dead; 290 died in accidents and 29 committed suicide. Among the missing and captured were 103 officers and 10,026 men. The wounded amounted to 3,725 officers and 86,007 men.[11] French battle deaths were 77,000, of which 41,000 were killed in action and 36,000 died of wounds. More than 45,000 died of sickness. Total deaths were 138,871, with 136,540 being suffered by the army and 2,331 by the navy. The wounded totaled 137,626; 131,000 for the army and 6,526 for the navy. French prisoners of war numbered 383,860. In addition, 90,192 French soldiers were interned in Switzerland and 6,300 in Belgium.[11] During the war the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) established an international tracing agency in Basel for prisoners of that war. The holdings of the "Basel Agency" were later transferred to the ICRC headquarters in Geneva and integrated into the ICRC archives, where they are accessible today.[131] Subsequent events Prussian reaction and withdrawal Prussian parade in Paris in 1871 Europe after the Franco-Prussian War and the unification of Germany The Prussian Army, under the terms of the armistice, held a brief victory parade in Paris on 1 March; the city was silent and draped with black and the Germans quickly withdrew. Bismarck honoured the armistice, by allowing train loads of food into Paris and withdrawing Prussian forces to the east of the city, prior to a full withdrawal once France agreed to pay a five billion franc war indemnity.[132] The indemnity was proportioned, according to population, to be the exact equivalent to the indemnity imposed by Napoleon on Prussia in 1807.[132] At the same time, Prussian forces were concentrated in the provinces of Alsace and Lorraine. An exodus occurred from Paris as some 200,000 people, predominantly middle-class, went to the countryside. Paris Commune See also: Paris Commune During the war, the Paris National Guard, particularly in the working-class neighbourhoods of Paris, had become highly politicised and units elected officers; many refused to wear uniforms or obey commands from the national government. National guard units tried to seize power in Paris on 31 October 1870 and 22 January 1871. On 18 March 1871, when the regular army tried to remove cannons from an artillery park on Montmartre, National Guard units resisted and killed two army generals. The national government and regular army forces retreated to Versailles and a revolutionary government was proclaimed in Paris. A commune was elected, which was dominated by socialists, anarchists and revolutionaries. The red flag replaced the French tricolour and a civil war began between the Commune and the regular army, which attacked and recaptured Paris from 21–28 May in the Semaine Sanglante ("bloody week").[133][134][135] During the fighting, the Communards killed around 500 people, including Georges Darboy, the Archbishop of Paris, and burned down many government buildings, including the Tuileries Palace and the Hotel de Ville.[136] Communards captured with weapons were routinely shot by the army and Government troops killed between 7,000 and 30,000 Communards, both during the fighting and in massacres of men, women, and children during and after the Commune.[137][134][138][139] More recent histories, based on studies of the number buried in Paris cemeteries and in mass graves after the fall of the Commune, put the number killed at between 6,000 and 10,000.[140] Twenty-six courts were established to try more than 40,000 people who had been arrested, which took until 1875 and imposed 95 death sentences, of which 23 were inflicted. Forced labour for life was imposed on 251 people, 1,160 people were transported to "a fortified place" and 3,417 people were transported [where?]. About 20,000 Communards were held in prison hulks until released in 1872 and a great many Communards fled abroad to Britain, Switzerland, Belgium or the United States. The survivors were amnestied by a bill introduced by Gambetta in 1880 and allowed to return.[141] 1871 Kabyle revolt In 1830, the French army invaded and conquered the Beylik of Algiers. Afterwards, France colonized the country, setting up its own administration over Algeria. The withdrawal of a large proportion of the army stationed in French Algeria to serve in the Franco-Prussian War had weakened France's control of the territory, while reports of defeats undermined French prestige amongst the indigenous population. The most serious native insurrection since the time of Emir Abdelkader was the 1871 Mokrani Revolt in the Kabylia, which spread through much of Algeria. By April 1871, 250 tribes had risen, or nearly a third of Algeria's population.[142] German unification and power Further information: Unification of Germany Proclamation of the German Empire, painted by Anton von Werner The creation of a unified German Empire (which excluded Austria) greatly disturbed the balance of power that had been created with the Congress of Vienna after the end of the Napoleonic Wars. Germany had established itself as a major power in continental Europe, boasting one of the most powerful and professional armies in the world.[143] Although Britain remained the dominant world power overall, British involvement in European affairs during the late 19th century was limited, owing to its focus on colonial empire-building, allowing Germany to exercise great influence over the European mainland.[144] Anglo-German straining of tensions was somewhat mitigated by several prominent relationships between the two powers, such as the Crown Prince's marriage with the daughter of Queen Victoria. Einheit—unity—was achieved at the expense of Freiheit—freedom. According to Karl Marx, the German Empire became "a military despotism cloaked in parliamentary forms with a feudal ingredient, influenced by the bourgeoisie, festooned with bureaucrats and guarded by police." Likewise, many historians would see Germany's "escape into war" in 1914 as a flight from all of the internal-political contradictions forged by Bismarck at Versailles in the fall of 1870.[145] French reaction and Revanchism French students being taught about the provinces taken by Germany, painted by Albert Bettannier The defeat in the Franco-Prussian War led to the birth of Revanchism (literally, "revenge-ism") in France, characterised by a deep sense of bitterness, hatred and demand for revenge against Germany. This was particularly manifested in loose talk of another war with Germany in order to reclaim Alsace and Lorraine.[146][147] It also led to the development of nationalist ideologies emphasising "the ideal of the guarded, self-referential nation schooled in the imperative of war", an ideology epitomised by figures such as General Georges Ernest Boulanger in the 1880s.[148] Paintings that emphasized the humiliation of the defeat became in high demand, such as those by Alphonse de Neuville.[149] Revanchism was not a major cause of war in 1914 because it faded after 1880. J.F.V. Keiger says, "By the 1880s Franco-German relations were relatively good."[150] The French public had very little interest in foreign affairs and elite French opinion was strongly opposed to war with its more powerful neighbor.[151] The elites were now calm and considered it a minor issue.[152] The Alsace-Lorraine issue remained a minor theme after 1880, and Republicans and Socialists systematically downplayed the issue. Return did not become a French war aim until after World War I began.[153][154]

Plug-in electric vehicle Article Talk Read Edit View history Tools Appearance hide Text Small Standard Large Width Standard Wide Color (beta) Automatic Light Dark From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia For the more general category of electric drive for all type of vehicles, see electric vehicle. For the specific electric drive cars and SUVs, see electric car and plug-in hybrid. All-time top-selling plug-in cars (global sales since inception) Tesla Model Y electric car (2.49 million) Tesla Model 3 electric car (2.06 million) Wuling Hongguang Mini EV electric car (1.22 million) BYD Song DM plug-in hybrid car (>1.05 million) As of December 2023[1][2][3][4] A plug-in electric vehicle (PEV) is any road vehicle that can utilize an external source of electricity (such as a wall socket that connects to the power grid) to store electrical energy within its onboard rechargeable battery packs, to power an electric motor and help propel the wheels. PEV is a subset of electric vehicles, and includes all-electric/battery electric vehicles (BEVs) and plug-in hybrid electric vehicles (PHEVs).[5][6][7] Sales of the first series production plug-in electric vehicles began in December 2008 with the introduction of the plug-in hybrid BYD F3DM, and then with the all-electric Mitsubishi i-MiEV in July 2009, but global retail sales only gained traction after the introduction of the mass production all-electric Nissan Leaf and the plug-in hybrid Chevrolet Volt in December 2011. Plug-in electric cars have several benefits compared to conventional internal combustion engine vehicles. All-electric vehicles have lower operating and maintenance costs, and produce little or no air pollution when under all-electric mode, thus (depending on the electricity source) reducing societal dependence on fossil fuels and significantly decreasing greenhouse gas emissions, but recharging takes longer time than refueling and is heavily reliant on sufficient charging infrastructures to remain operationally practical. Plug-in hybrid vehicles are a good in-between option that provides most of electric cars' benefits when they are operating in electric mode, though typically having shorter all-electric ranges, but have the auxiliary option of driving as a conventional hybrid vehicle when the battery is low, using its internal combustion engine (usually a gasoline engine) to alleviate the range anxiety that accompanies current electric cars. Cumulative global sales of highway-legal plug-in electric passenger cars and light utility vehicles achieved the 1 million unit mark in September 2015,[8] 5 million in December 2018.[9] and the 10 million unit milestone in 2020.[10] Despite the rapid growth experienced, however, the stock of plug-in electric cars represented just 1% of all passengers vehicles on the world's roads by the end of 2020, of which pure electrics constituted two thirds.[11] As of December 2023, the Tesla Model Y ranked as the world's top selling highway-capable plug-in electric car in history.[1] The Tesla Model 3 was the first electric car to achieve global sales of more than 1,000,000 units.[12][13] The BYD Song DM SUV series is the world's all-time best selling plug-in hybrid, with global sales over 1,050,000 units through December 2023.[14][15][15][16][17][17] As of December 2021, China had the world's largest stock of highway legal plug-in electric passenger cars with 7.84 million units, representing 46% of the world's stock of plug-in cars.[18] Europe ranked next with about 5.6 million light-duty plug-in cars and vans at the end of 2021, accounting for around 32% of the global stock.[19][20][21] The U.S. cumulative sales totaled about 2.32 million plug-in cars through December 2021.[22] As of July 2021, Germany is the leading European country with cumulative sales of 1 million plug-in vehicles on the road,[23] and also has led the continent plug-in sales since 2019.[20][24] Norway has the highest market penetration per capita in the world,[25] and also achieved in 2021 the world's largest annual plug-in market share ever registered, 86.2% of new car sales.[26] Terminology Brammo Empulse electric motorcycle at a charging station Plug-in electric vehicle A plug-in electric vehicle (PEV) is any motor vehicle with rechargeable battery packs that can be charged from the electric grid, and the electricity stored on board drives or contributes to drive the wheels for propulsion.[5][6] Plug-in electric vehicles are also sometimes referred to as grid-enabled vehicles (GEV),[6] and the European Automobile Manufacturers Association (ACEA) calls them electrically chargeable vehicles (ECV).[27] PEV is a subcategory of electric vehicles that includes battery electric vehicles (BEVs), plug-in hybrid vehicles (PHEVs), and electric vehicle conversions of hybrid electric vehicles and conventional internal combustion engine vehicles.[5][6] Even though conventional hybrid electric vehicles (HEVs) have a battery that is continually recharged with power from the internal combustion engine and regenerative braking, they can not be recharged from an off-vehicle electric energy source, and therefore, they do not belong to the category of plug-in electric vehicles.[5][6] "Plug-in electric drive vehicle" is the legal term used in U.S. federal legislation to designate the category of motor vehicles eligible for federal tax credits depending on battery size and their all-electric range.[28][29] In some European countries, particularly in France, "electrically chargeable vehicle" is the formal term used to designate the vehicles eligible for these incentives.[30] While the term "plug-in electric vehicle" most often refers to automobiles or "plug-in cars", there are several other types of plug-in electric vehicle, including battery electric multiple units, electric motorcycles and scooters, neighborhood electric vehicles or microcars, city cars, vans, buses, electric trucks or lorries, and military vehicles.[31] New energy vehicles Main article: Alternative energy vehicle See also: Plug-in electric vehicles in China In China, the term new energy vehicles (NEVs) refers to automobile vehicles that are fully powered or predominantly powered by alternative energy other than fossil fuels, typically referring to electric motor-propelled vehicles such as battery electric vehicles (BEVs), plug-in hybrid electric vehicles (PHEVs) and fuel cell electric vehicles (FCEVs, mainly hydrogen fuel cell vehicles). The Chinese Government began implementation of its NEV program in 2009 to foster the development and introduction of new energy vehicles,[32] aiming to reduce the country's reliance on petroleum imports and better achieve energy security by promoting more electrified transportation powered by domestically generated, sustainable energy supply (see Energy policy of China). Battery electric vehicles Main article: Battery electric vehicle U.S. Army GEM e2 neighborhood electric vehicle A battery electric vehicle (BEV) uses chemical energy stored in rechargeable battery packs as its only source for propulsion.[6][33] BEVs use electric motors and motor controllers instead of internal combustion engines (ICEs) for propulsion.[6] A plug-in hybrid operates as an all-electric vehicle or BEV when operating in charge-depleting mode, but it switches to charge-sustaining mode after the battery has reached its minimum state of charge (SOC) threshold, exhausting the vehicle's all-electric range (AER).[34][35] BEVs are all-electric vehicles that use only electricity to power the motor, with no internal combustion engine. The energy stored in the rechargeable battery pack is used to power the electric motor, which propels the vehicle. BEVs have no tailpipe emissions and can be charged by plugging into a charging station or using a home charging system. They are known for their quiet operation, instant torque, and smooth ride, and are also more environmentally friendly than traditional gasoline-powered vehicles. However, the range of a BEV is limited by the size of its battery, so it may not be suitable for long-distance travel. Plug-in hybrid electric vehicles Main article: Plug-in hybrid A plug-in hybrid electric vehicle (PHEV or PHV), also known as a plug-in hybrid, is a hybrid electric vehicle with rechargeable batteries that can be restored to full charge by connecting a plug to an external electric power source.[6][36] A plug-in hybrid shares the characteristics of both a conventional hybrid electric vehicle and an all-electric vehicle: it uses a gasoline engine and an electric motor for propulsion, but a PHEV has a larger battery pack that can be recharged, allowing operation in all-electric mode until the battery is depleted.[36][37][38] PHEVs are a hybrid between a traditional gasoline-powered vehicle and an all-electric vehicle. They have both an internal combustion engine and an electric motor powered by a rechargeable battery pack. PHEVs operate as all-electric vehicles when the battery has a sufficient charge, and switch to gasoline power when the battery is depleted. This provides a longer driving range compared to a pure electric vehicle, as the gasoline engine acts as a range extender. PHEVs can be charged by plugging into a charging station or using a home charging system. They are a good option for those who want the benefits of electric driving, but also need the longer driving range and refueling convenience of a gasoline-powered vehicle. Several Prius+ converted plug-in hybrids Dual plug-in hybrids These contain two different energy recovery systems. The Mercedes-AMG ONE is a plug-in dual hybrid. The Mercedes-Benz C-Class (W206) and the Mercedes C254/X254 also have an electrically-assisted turbocharger/MGU-H.[39][40] Aftermarket conversions See also: Plug-in hybrid conversions and electric vehicle conversion An aftermarket electric vehicle conversion is the modification of a conventional internal combustion engine vehicle (ICEV) or hybrid electric vehicle (HEV) to electric propulsion, creating an all-electric or plug-in hybrid electric vehicle.[41][42][43] There are several companies in the U.S. offering conversions. The most common conversions have been from hybrid electric cars to plug-in hybrid, but due to the different technology used in hybrids by each carmaker, the easiest conversions are for 2004–2009 Toyota Prius and for the Ford Escape/Mercury Mariner Hybrid.[41] Advantages compared to ICE vehicles PEVs have several advantages. These include improved air quality, reduced greenhouse gas emissions, noise reduction, and national security benefits. According to the Center for American Progress, PEVs are an important part of the group of technologies that will help the U.S. meet its goal under the Paris Agreement, which is a 26–28 percent reduction in greenhouse gas emissions by the year 2025.[44] New Energy Vehicles are expected to help address issues related to environmental degradation at the global level.[45]" Improved air quality See also: Environmental aspects of the electric car Electric cars, as well as plug-in hybrids operating in all-electric mode, emit no harmful tailpipe pollutants from the onboard source of power, such as particulates (soot), volatile organic compounds, hydrocarbons, carbon monoxide, ozone, lead, and various oxides of nitrogen. However, like ICE cars, electric cars emit particulates from brake and tyres.[46] Depending on the source of the electricity used to recharge the batteries, air pollutant emissions are shifted to the location of the generation plants where they can be more easily captured from flue gases.[47] Cities with chronic air pollution problems, such as Los Angeles, México City, Santiago, Chile, São Paulo, Beijing, Bangkok and Kathmandu may also gain local clean air benefits by shifting the harmful emission to electric generation plants located outside the cities. Lower greenhouse gas emissions See also: Environmental aspects of the electric car and Greenhouse gas emissions in plug-in hybrids RechargeIT converted Toyota Prius plug-in hybrids at Google's Mountain View campus. The garage has recharging facilities powered by solar panels. Plug-in electric vehicles operating in all-electric mode do not emit greenhouse gases from the onboard source of power, but from the point of view of a well-to-wheel assessment, the extent of the benefit also depends on the fuel and technology used for electricity generation. This fact has been referred to as the long tailpipe of plug-in electric vehicles. From the perspective of a full life cycle analysis, the electricity used to recharge the batteries must be generated from renewable or clean sources such as wind, solar, hydroelectric, or nuclear power for PEVs to have almost none or zero well-to-wheel emissions.[5][47] In the case of plug-in hybrid electric vehicles operating in hybrid mode with assistance of the internal combustion engine, tailpipe and greenhouse emissions are lower in comparison to conventional cars because of their higher fuel economy.[5] The magnitude of the potential advantage depends on the mix of generation sources and therefore varies by country and by region. For example, France can obtain significant emission benefits from electric and plug-in hybrids because most of its electricity is generated by nuclear power plants; similarly, most regions of Canada are primarily powered with hydroelectricity, nuclear, or natural gas which have no or very low emissions at the point of generation; and the state of California, where most energy comes from natural gas, hydroelectric and nuclear plants can also secure substantial emission benefits. The United Kingdom also has a significant potential to benefit from PEVs as low carbon sources such as wind turbines dominate the generation mix. Nevertheless, the location of the plants is not relevant when considering greenhouse gas emission because their effect is global.[47] Lifecycle GHG emissions are complex to calculate, but compared to ICE cars generally while the EV battery causes higher emissions during vehicle manufacture this excess carbon debt is paid back after several months of driving.[48] Lower operating and maintenance costs Internal combustion engines are relatively inefficient at converting on-board fuel energy to propulsion as most of the energy is wasted as heat, and the rest while the engine is idling. Electric motors, on the other hand, are more efficient at converting stored energy into driving a vehicle. Electric drive vehicles do not consume energy while at rest or coasting, and modern plug-in cars can capture and reuse as much as one fifth of the energy normally lost during braking through regenerative braking.[49][47] Typically, conventional gasoline engines effectively use only 15% of the fuel energy content to move the vehicle or to power accessories, and diesel engines can reach on-board efficiencies of 20%, while electric drive vehicles typically have on-board efficiencies of around 80%.[49] The operating cost of the Toyota Prius Plug-in Hybrid in the U.S. is estimated at US$0.03 per mile while operating in all-electric mode.[49][50] All-electric and plug-in hybrid vehicles also have lower maintenance costs as compared to internal combustion vehicles, since electronic systems break down much less often than the mechanical systems in conventional vehicles, and the fewer mechanical systems onboard last longer due to the better use of the electric engine. PEVs do not require oil changes and other routine maintenance checks.[49][47] Less dependence on imported oil See also: Energy resilience, Energy security, and Mitigation of peak oil Evolution of oil prices since 1987 (average Brent spot prices – adjusted for U.S. inflation) For many developing countries, and particularly for the poorest African countries, oil imports have an adverse impact on the government budget and deteriorate their terms of trade thus jeopardizing their balance of payments, all leading to lower economic growth.[51][52] Through the gradual replacement of internal combustion engine vehicles for electric cars and plug-in hybrids, electric drive vehicles can contribute significantly to lessen the dependence of the transport sector on imported oil as well as contributing to the development of a more resilient energy supply.[47][53][54][55] Vehicle-to-grid Main article: Vehicle-to-grid Plug-in electric vehicles offer users the opportunity to sell electricity stored in their batteries back to the power grid, thereby helping utilities to operate more efficiently in the management of their demand peaks.[56] A vehicle-to-grid (V2G) system would take advantage of the fact that most vehicles are parked an average of 95 percent of the time. During such idle times the electricity stored in the batteries could be transferred from the PEV to the power lines and back to the grid. In the U.S. this transfer back to the grid have an estimated value to the utilities of up to $4,000 per year per car.[57] In a V2G system it would also be expected that battery electric (BEVs) and plug-in hybrids (PHEVs) would have the capability to communicate automatically with the power grid to sell demand response services by either delivering electricity into the grid or by throttling their charging rate.[56][58][59] Disadvantages Tesla Model S electric car (left) and Fisker Karma plug-in hybrid (right) at the parking spots reserved for green cars at San Francisco International Airport Cost of batteries Main article: Electric vehicle battery As of 2020, plug-in electric vehicles are significantly more expensive as compared to conventional internal combustion engine vehicles and hybrid electric vehicles due to the additional cost of their lithium-ion battery pack. Cost reductions through advances in battery technology and higher production volumes will allow plug-in electric vehicles to be more competitive with conventional internal combustion engine vehicles.[60] Bloomberg New Energy Finance (BNEF) concludes that battery costs are on a trajectory to make electric vehicles without government subsidies as affordable as internal combustion engine cars in most countries by 2022. BNEF projects that by 2040, long-range electric cars will cost less than US$22,000 expressed in 2016 dollars. BNEF expects electric car battery costs to be well below US$120 per kWh by 2030, and to fall further thereafter as new chemistries become available.[61] Availability of recharging infrastructure Converted Toyota Prius plug-in hybrids recharging at San Francisco City Hall charging station See also: Charging station and Range anxiety Despite the widespread assumption that plug-in recharging will take place overnight at home, residents of cities, apartments, dormitories, and townhouses do not have garages or driveways with available power outlets, and they might be less likely to buy plug-in electric vehicles unless recharging infrastructure is developed.[62][63] Electrical outlets or charging stations near their places of residence, in commercial or public parking lots, streets and workplaces are required for these potential users to gain the full advantage of PHEVs, and in the case of EVs, to avoid the fear of the batteries running out energy before reaching their destination, commonly called range anxiety.[63][64] Even house dwellers might need to charge at the office or to take advantage of opportunity charging at shopping centers.[65] However, this infrastructure is not in place and it will require investments by both the private and public sectors.[64] Battery swapping Main article: Charging station § Battery swapping See also: Tesla Supercharger and Better Place (company) Better Place's battery switching station in Israel A different approach to resolve the problems of range anxiety and lack of recharging infrastructure for electric vehicles was developed by Better Place but was not successful in the United States in the 2010s. As of 2020 battery swapping is available in China and is planned for other countries.[66] Potential overload of local electrical grids The existing low-voltage network, and local transformers in particular, may not have enough capacity to handle the additional power load that might be required in certain areas with high plug-in electric car concentrations. As recharging a single electric-drive car could consume three times as much electricity as a typical home, overloading problems may arise when several vehicles in the same neighborhood recharge at the same time, or during the normal summer peak loads. To avoid such problems, utility executives recommend owners to charge their vehicles overnight when the grid load is lower or to use smarter electric meters that help control demand. When market penetration of plug-in electric vehicles begins to reach significant levels, utilities will have to invest in improvements for local electrical grids in order to handle the additional loads related to recharging to avoid blackouts due to grid overload. Also, some experts have suggested that by implementing variable time-of-day rates, utilities can provide an incentive for plug-in owners to recharge mostly overnight when rates are lower.[64][67][68] In the five years from 2014 to 2019, EVs increased in number and range, and doubled power draw and energy per session. Charging increased after midnight, and decreased in the peak hours of early evening.[69][70] Risks associated with noise reduction Main article: Electric vehicle warning sounds The 2011 Nissan Leaf had a switch to manually turn off its electric warning sound system. Electric cars and plug-in hybrids when operating in all-electric mode at low speeds produce less roadway noise as compared to vehicles propelled by an internal combustion engine, thereby reducing harmful noise health effects. However, blind people or the visually impaired consider the noise of combustion engines a helpful aid while crossing streets, hence plug-in electric cars and conventional hybrids could pose an unexpected hazard when operating at low speeds.[71][72] Several tests conducted in the U.S. have shown that this is a valid concern, as vehicles operating in electric mode can be particularly hard to hear below 20 mph (30 km/h) for all types of road users and not only the visually impaired.[73][74][75] At higher speeds the sound created by tire friction and the air displaced by the vehicle start to make sufficient audible noise.[72] Therefore, in the 2010s laws were passed in many countries mandating warning sounds at low speeds. Risks of battery fire Main article: Plug-in electric vehicle fire incidents Frontal crash test of a Volvo C30 DRIVe Electric to assess the safety of the battery pack Lithium-ion batteries may suffer thermal runaway and cell rupture if overheated or overcharged, and in extreme cases this can lead to combustion.[76] Reignition may occur days or months after the original fire has been extinguished.[77] To reduce these risks, lithium-ion battery packs contain fail-safe circuitry that shuts down the battery when its voltage is outside the safe range.[78][page needed][79] Several plug-in electric vehicle fire incidents have taken place since the introduction of mass-production plug-in electric vehicles in 2008. Most of them have been thermal runaway incidents related to the lithium-ion batteries. General Motors, Tesla, and Nissan have published a guide for firefighters and first responders to properly handle a crashed plug-in electric-drive vehicle and safely disable its battery and other high voltage systems.[80][81] Car dealers' reluctance to sell With the exception of Tesla Motors, almost all new cars in the United States are sold through dealerships, so they play a crucial role in the sales of electric vehicles, and negative attitudes can hinder early adoption of plug-in electric vehicles.[82][83] Dealers decide which cars they want to stock, and a salesperson can have a big impact on how someone feels about a prospective purchase. Sales people have ample knowledge of internal combustion cars while they do not have time to learn about a technology that represents a fraction of overall sales.[82] As with any new technology, and in the particular case of advanced technology vehicles, retailers are central to ensuring that buyers, especially those switching to a new technology, have the information and support they need to gain the full benefits of adopting this new technology.[83] Car dealerships can play a role in the sales of plug-in electric vehicles. Shown a dealership exhibiting first generation Chevrolet Volts. There are several reasons for the reluctance of some dealers to sell plug-in electric vehicles. PEVs do not offer car dealers the same profits as a gasoline-powered cars. Plug-in electric vehicles take more time to sell because of the explaining required, which hurts overall sales and sales people commissions. Electric vehicles also may require less maintenance, resulting in loss of service revenue, and thus undermining the biggest source of dealer profits, their service departments. According to the National Automobile Dealers Association (NADS), dealers on average make three times as much profit from service as they do from new car sales.[82] Government incentives and policies Main article: Government incentives for plug-in electric vehicles See also: Government incentives for plug-in electric vehicles in the U.S. See also: Government incentives for plug-in electric vehicles in California See also: EU average fleet CO2 emissions See also: Phase-out of fossil fuel vehicles Togg C-SUV[84] produced by Togg,[85] a Turkish automotive company established in 2018 for producing EVs.[86][87][84] Several national, provincial, and local governments around the world have introduced policies to support the mass market adoption of plug-in electric vehicles. A variety of policies have been established to provide direct financial support to consumers and manufacturers; non-monetary incentives; subsidies for the deployment of charging infrastructure; procurement of electric vehicle for government fleets; and long term regulations with specific targets.[19][88] All-electric car on a bus lane in Oslo Financial incentives for consumers aim to make plug-in electric car purchase price competitive with conventional cars due to the still higher up front cost of electric vehicles. Among the financial incentives there are one-time purchase incentives such as tax credits, purchase grants, exemptions from import duties, and other fiscal incentives; exemptions from road, bridge and tunnel tolls, and from congestion pricing fees; and exemption of registration and annual use vehicle fees. Some countries, like France, also introduced a bonus–malus CO2 based tax system that penalize fossil-fuel vehicle sales.[19][88][89] As of 2020, monetary incentives for electrically chargeable vehicles are available, among others, in several European Union member states, China, the United States, the UK, Japan, Norway, some provinces in Canada, South Korea, India, Israel, Colombia, and Costa Rica.[19][90][91] Timeline of national targets for full ICE phase out [clarification needed]or 100% ZEV car sales[19][92] Selected countries	Year Norway (100% ZEV sales)	2025 Denmark	2030 Iceland Ireland Netherlands (100% ZEV sales) Sweden United Kingdom	2040 France Canada (100% ZEV sales) Singapore Sri Lanka (100% HEV or PEV stock) Germany (100% ZEV sales)	2050 U.S. (only 10 ZEV states) Japan (100% HEV/PHEV/ZEV sales) Costa Rica (100% ZEV sales) Among the non-monetary incentives there are several perks such allowing plug-in vehicles access to bus lanes and high-occupancy vehicle lanes, free parking and free charging.[88] In addition, in some countries or cities that restrict private car ownership (purchase quota system for new vehicles), or have implemented permanent driving restrictions (no-drive days), the schemes often exclude electric vehicles from the restrictions to promote their adoption.[89][93][90][94] For example, in Beijing, the license plate lottery scheme specifies a fixed number of vehicle purchase permits each year, but to promote the electrification of its fleet, the city government split the number of purchase permits into two lots, one for conventional vehicles, and another dedicated for all-electric vehicle applicants.[89] In the case of cities with driving alternate-days based on the license plate number, such as San José, Costa Rica, since 2012, São Paulo and Bogotá since 2014, and Mexico City since 2015, all-electric vehicles were excluded from the driving restrictions.[90][94][95][96] Some government have also established long term regulatory signals with specific target timeframes such as ZEV mandates, national or regional CO2 emissions regulations, stringent fuel economy standards, and the phase out of internal combustion engine vehicle sales.[19][88] For example, Norway set a national goal that all new car sales by 2025 should be zero emission vehicles (electric or hydrogen).[97][98] Sign for London's Ultra Low Emission Zone (ULEZ). A fee is charged to the most polluting vehicles entering Central London. Also, some cities are planning to establish zero-emission zones (ZEZ) restricting traffic access into an urban cordon area or city center where only zero-emission vehicles (ZEVs) are allowed access. In such areas, all internal combustion engine vehicles are banned.[99][100] As of June 2020, Oxford is slated to be the first city to implement a ZEZ scheme, beginning with a small area scheduled to go into effect by mid 2021. The plan is to expand the clean air zone gradually into a much larger zone, until the ZEZ encompasses the majority of the city center by 2035.[101][102] As of May 2020, other cities planning to gradually introduce ZEZ, or partial or total ban fossil fuel powered vehicles include, among others, Amsterdam (2030),[103] Athens (2025),[104] Barcelona (2030),[104] Brussels (2030/2035),[99] Copenhagen (2030),[104] London (2020/2025),[99] Los Angeles (2030),[104] Madrid (2025),[105] Mexico City (2025),[105] Milan (2030),[104] Oslo (2024/2030),[99] Paris (2024/2030),[99] Quito (2030),[104] Rio de Janeiro (2030),[104] Rome (2024/2030),[99][106] Seattle (2030),[104] and Vancouver (2030).[104] Production plug-in electric vehicles available See also: List of modern production plug-in electric vehicles and electric car use by country The General Motors EV1 was the first mass-produced and purpose-designed all-electric car of the modern era from a major automaker. During the 1990s several highway-capable plug-in electric cars were produced in limited quantities, all were battery electric vehicles. PSA Peugeot Citroën launched several electric "Électrique" versions of its models starting in 1991. Other models were available through leasing mainly in California. Popular models included the General Motors EV1 and the Toyota RAV4 EV. Some of the latter were sold to the public and were still in use by the early 2010s.[107] In the late 2000s began a new wave of mass production plug-in electric cars, motorcycles and light trucks. However, as of 2011, most electric vehicles in the world roads were low-speed, low-range neighborhood electric vehicles (NEVs) or electric quadricycles.[108] Sales of low-speed electric vehicles experienced considerable growth in China between 2012 and 2016, with an estimated NEV stock between 3 million to 4 million units, with most powered by lead-acid batteries.[109] As of December 2019, according to the International Energy Agency, there were about 250 models of highway-capable plug-in electric passenger cars available for sale in the world, up from 70 in 2014.[19] There are also available several commercial models of electric light commercial vehicles, plug-in motorcycles, all-electric buses, and plug-in heavy-duty trucks. The Tesla Model 3 was the world's top selling plug-in car in 2018.[110] The Renault–Nissan–Mitsubishi Alliance is the world's leading light-duty electric vehicle manufacturer. Since 2010, the Alliance's global all-electric vehicle sales totaled almost 725,000 units, including those manufactured by Mitsubishi Motors through December 2018, now part of the Alliance.[111] Its best selling all-electric Nissan Leaf was the world's top selling plug-in electric car in 2013 and 2014.[112] Tesla is the world's second largest plug-in electric passenger car manufacturer with global sales since 2012 of over 532,000 units as of December 2018.[113] Its Model S was the world's top selling plug-in car in 2015 and 2016,[112][114] and its Model 3 was the world's best selling plug-in electric car in 2018.[110] The BYD Qin is the Chinese company's all-time top selling model. Ranking next is BYD Auto with more than 529,000 plug-in passenger cars delivered in China through December 2018.[115][116][117][118] Its Qin plug-in hybrid is the company's top selling model with almost 137,000 units sold in China through December 2018.[112][119][118] As of December 2018, the BMW Group had sold more than 356,000 plug-in cars since inception of the BMW i3, accounting for global sales its BMW i cars, BMW iPerformance plug-in hybrid models, and MINI brand plug-ins.[120] BYD Auto ended 2015 as the world's best selling manufacturer of highway legal light-duty plug-in electric vehicles, with 61,722 units sold, followed by Tesla, with 50,580 units.[121][122][123] BYD was again the world's top selling plug-in car manufacturer in 2016, with 101,183 units delivered, one more time followed again by Tesla with 76,243 units.[115][124] In 2017 BYD ranked for the third consecutive year as the global top plug-in car manufacturer with 113,669 units delivered. BAIC ranked second with 104,520 units.[117][119] The BAIC EC-Series all-electric city car ranked as the world's top selling plug-in car in 2017 with 78,079 units sold in China.[125] After 10 years in the market, Tesla was the world's top selling plug-in passenger car manufacturer in 2018, both as a brand and by automotive group, with 245,240 units delivered and a market share of 12% of all plug-in cars sold globally in 2018.[110][126][127] BYD Auto ranked second with 227,152 plug-in passenger cars sold worldwide, representing a market share of 11%.[127][128] Sales and main markets Detroit Electric car charging in 1919. During the Golden Age of the electric car at the beginning of the 20th century, the EV stock peaked at about 30,000 vehicles.[129] The global stock of plug-in electric vehicles between 2005 and 2009 consisted exclusively of all-electric cars, totaling about 1,700 units in 2005, and almost 6,000 in 2009. The plug-in stock rose to about 12,500 units in 2010, of which, only 350 vehicles were plug-in hybrids.[130][131] By comparison, during the Golden Age of the electric car at the beginning of the 20th century, the EV stock peaked at approximately 30,000 vehicles.[129] After the introduction of the first mass-production plug-in cars by major carmakers in late 2010, plug-in car global sales went from about 50,000 units in 2011, to 125,000 in 2012, almost 213,000 in 2013, and over 315,000 units in 2014.[132] By mid-September 2015, the global stock of highway legal plug-in electric passenger cars and utility vans reached the one million sales milestone,[8][133] almost twice as fast as hybrid electric vehicles (HEV).[8][133] Annual sales of plug-in passenger cars in the world's top markets between 2011 and 2023[19][132][134][135][136][137][138][139][140] Light-duty plug-in electric vehicle sales in 2015 increased to more than 565,000 units in 2015, about 80% from 2014, driven mainly by China and Europe.[132] Both markets passed in 2015 the U.S. as the largest plug-in electric car markets in terms of total annual sales, with China ranking as the world's best-selling plug-in electric passenger car country market in 2015.[141][142] About 775,000 plug-in cars and vans were sold in 2016, and cumulative global sales passed the 2 million milestone by the end of 2016.[115] The global market share of the light-duty plug-in vehicle segment achieved a record 0.86% of total new car sales in 2016, up from 0.62% in 2015 and 0.38% in 2014.[143] Cumulative global light-duty plug-in vehicle sales passed the 3 million milestone in November 2017.[144] About 1.2 million plug-ins cars and vans were sold worldwide in 2017, with China accounting for about half of global sales. The plug-in car segment achieved a 1.3% market share.[125][145] Plug-in passenger car sales totaled just over 2 million in 2018, with a market share of 2.1%.[110] The global stock reached 5.3 million light-duty plug-in vehicles in December 2018.[9][134] By the end of 2019 the stock of light-duty plug-in vehicles totaled 7.55 million units, consisting of 4.79 million all-electric cars, 2.38 million plug-in hybrid cars, and 377,970 electric light commercial vehicles. Plug-in passenger cars still represented less than 1% of the world's car fleet in use.[19] In addition, there were about half a million electric buses in circulation in 2019, most of them in China.[19] In 2020, global cumulative sales of light-duty plug-in vehicles passed the 10 million unit milestone.[10] Despite the rapid growth experienced, the plug-in electric car segment represented just about 1 out of every 250 vehicles on the world's roads by the end of 2018 (0.4%),[146] rose to 1 out of every 200 motor vehicles (0.48%) in 2019,[147] and by the end of 2020, the stock share of plug-in cars on the world's roads was 1%.[11] Evolution of the ratio between global sales of BEVs and PHEVs between 2011 and 2023[110][148][149][150][151][152] All-electric cars have outsold plug-in hybrids for several years, and by the end of 2019, the shift towards battery electric cars continued. The global ratio between all-electrics (BEVs) and plug-in hybrids (PHEVs) went from 56:44 in 2012, to 60:40 in 2015, increased to 66:34 in 2017, and rose to 69:31 in 2018, and reached 74:26 in 2019.[110][148][149] Out of the 7.2 million plug-in passenger cars in use at the end of 2019, two thirds were all-electric cars (4.8 million).[19] Since 2016, China has the world's largest fleet of light-duty plug-in electric vehicles, after having overtaken during 2016 both the U.S. and Europe in terms of cumulative sales.[115][153][154] The fleet of Chinese plug-in passenger cars represented 46.7% of the global stock of plug-in cars at the end of 2019. Europe listed next with 24.8%, followed by the U.S. with 20.2% of the global stock in use.[19] As of December 2017, 25 cities accounted for 44% of the world's stock of plug-in electric cars, while representing just 12% of world passenger vehicle sales. Shanghai led the world with cumulative sales of over 162,000 electric vehicles since 2011, followed by Beijing with 147,000 and Los Angeles with 143,000. Among these cities, Bergen has the highest market share of the plug-in segment, with about 50% of new car sales in 2017, followed by Oslo with 40%.[155] China Further information: New energy vehicles in China Cumulative sales of new energy vehicles in China between 2011 and 2021[153][156][157][158][159][160][161] As of December 2021, China had the world's largest stock of highway legal plug-in cars with 7.84 million units, corresponding to about 46% of the global plug-in car fleet in use. Of these, all-electric cars accounted for 81.6% of the all new energy passenger cars in circulation.[18] Plug-in passenger cars represent 2.6% of all cars on Chinese roads at the end of 2021.[18] Domestically produced cars dominate new energy car sales in China, accounting for about 96% of sales in 2017.[125][162] Another particular feature of the Chinese passenger plug-in market is the dominance of small entry level vehicles.[163] China also dominates the plug-in light commercial vehicle and electric bus deployment, with its stock reaching over 500,000 buses in 2019, 98% of the global stock, and 247,500 electric light commercial vehicles, 65% of the global fleet. In addition, the country also leads sales of medium- and heavy duty electric trucks, with over 12,000 trucks sold, and nearly all battery electric.[19] Since 2011, combined sales of all classes of new energy vehicles (NEV) totaled almost 5.5 million at the end of 2020.[160][153][156][157][158][159] The BAIC EC-Series all-electric city car was China's the top selling plug-in car in 2017 and 2018, and also the world's top selling plug-in car in 2017. BYD Auto was the world's top selling car manufacturer in 2016 and 2017.[164][117][119][125][165] In 2020, the Tesla Model 3 listed as the best-selling plug-in car with 137,459 units.[166] Europe Main article: Plug-in electric vehicles in Europe For more details of European and other countries, see electric car use by country. See also: Plug-in electric cars in Sweden Evolution of annual registrations of plug-in electric passenger cars in Europe, 2011–2021 Europe had about 5.67 million plug-in electric passenger cars and light commercial vehicles in circulation at the end of 2021, consisting of 2.9 million fully electric passenger cars, 2.5 million plug-in hybrid cars, and about 220,000 light commercial all-electric vehicles.[19][20][21] The European stock of plug-in passenger is the world's second largest market after China, accounting for 30% of the global car stock in 2020.[19] Europe also has the second largest electric light commercial vehicle stock, 33% of the global stock in 2019.[19] In 2020, and despite the strong decline in global car sales brought by the COVID-19 pandemic, annual sales of plug-in passenger cars in Europe surpassed the 1 million mark for the first time.[167][168] In addition, Europe outsold China in 2020 as the world's largest plug-in passenger car market for the first time since 2015.[169][170] The plug-in car segment had a market share of 1.3% of new car registrations in 2016, rose to 3.6% in 2019, and achieved 11.4% in 2020.[171][172][173] The largest country markets in the European region in terms of EV stock and annual sales are Germany, Norway, France, the UK, the Netherlands, and Sweden.[19] Germany surpassed Norway in 2019 as the best selling plug-in market, leading both the all-electric and the plug-in hybrid segments in Europe.[173] and in 2020 listed as the top selling European country market for the second consecutive year.[19][168] Germany Annual registration of plug-in electric cars in Germany by type of powertrain between 2010 and 2021 Main article: Plug-in electric vehicles in Germany The stock of plug-in electric cars in Germany is the largest in Europe, there were 1,184,416 plug-in cars in circulation on January 1, 2022, representing 2.5% of all passenger cars on German roads, up from 1.2% the previous year.[174][175] As of December 2021, cumulative sales totaled 1.38 million plug-in passenger cars since 2010.[176][177] Germany had a stock of 21,890 light-duty electric commercial vehicles in 2019, the second largest in Europe after France.[19] Germany listed as the top selling plug-in car market in the European continent in 2019 and achieved a market share of 3.10%.[138][178] Despite the global decline in car sales brought by the COVID-19 pandemic, the segment market share achieved a record 13.6% in 2020.[179] with a record volume of 394,632 plug-in passenger cars registered in 2020, up 263% from 2019, allowing Germany to be listed for a second year running as the best selling European plug-in market.[180][179] Both years, the German market led both the fully electric and plug-in hybrid segments.[180] Despite to the continued global decline in car sales brought by the shortages related to the COVID-19 pandemic, and computer chips in particular, a record 681,410 plug-in electric passenger cars were registered in Germany in 2021, consisting of 325,449 plug-in hybrids and 355,961 all-electric cars, allowing the segment's market share to surge to 26.0%.[176] France Main article: Plug-in electric vehicles in France The Renault Zoe is the country's all-time best selling plug-in electric car with over 100,000 units delivered since inception through June 2020.[181] As of December 2021, a total of 786,274 light-duty plug-in electric vehicles have been registered in France since 2010, consisting of 512,178 all-electric passenger cars and commercial vans, and 274,096 plug-in hybrids.[182] Of these, over 60,000 were all-electric light commercial vehicles.[19][183] The market share of all-electric passenger cars increased from 0.30% of new car registered in 2012, to 0.59% in 2014.[184][185] After the introduction of the super-bonus for the scrappage of old diesel-power cars in 2015, sales of both pure electric cars and plug-in hybrids surged, rising the market share to 1.17% in 2015,[186][141] climbed to 2.11% in 2018, and achieved 2.8% in 2019.[19][187] Despite the global strong decline in car sales brought by the COVID-19 pandemic, and the related global computer chip shortage, plug-in electric car sales in France rose to a record of 315,978 light-duty plug-in vehicles in 2021, up 62% from 2020.[182] The plug-in electric passenger car market share rose to 11.2% in 2020 and achieved a record market share of 18.3% in 2021.[188] The combined light-duty plug-in vehicle segment (cars and utility vans) achieved a market share of 15.1% in 2021.[182] As of December 2019, France ranked as the country with the world's second largest stock of light-duty electric commercial vehicles after China, with 49,340 utility vans in use.[19] The market share of all-electric utility vans reached a market share of 1.22% in 2014, and 1.77% in 2018.[187][189] United Kingdom Registration of plug-in electric cars in the UK between 2011 and 2021 Main article: Plug-in electric vehicles in the United Kingdom About 745,000 light-duty plug-in electric vehicles had been registered in the UK up until December 2021, consisting of 395,000 all-electric vehicles and 350,000 plug-in hybrids.[190] A surge of plug-in car sales took place in Britain beginning in 2014. Total registrations went from 3,586 in 2013, to 37,092 in 2016, and rose to 59,911 in 2018.[191][192][193] Again sales surged to 175,339 units in 2020, despite the global strong decline in car sales brought by the COVID-19 pandemic, and achieved record sales of 305,281 units in 2021.[194] The market share of the plug-in segment went from 0.16% in 2013 to 0.59% in 2014, and achieved 2.6% in 2018.[191][195][193] The segment market share was 3.1% in 2019, rose to 10.7% in 2020,[196] and achieved a record 18.6% in 2021.[190] As of June 2020, the Mitsubishi Outlander P-HEV is the all-time top selling plug-in car in the UK over 46,400 units registered, followed by the Nissan Leaf more than 31,400 units.[197] Norway Historical evolution of the Norwegian plug-in electric car segment market share of new car sales and monthly records, 2011–2024 (Source: OFV) Main article: Plug-in electric vehicles in Norway As of 31 December 2021, the stock of light-duty plug-in electric vehicles in Norway totaled 647,000 units in use, consisting of 470,309 all-electric passenger cars and vans (including used imports), and 176,691 plug-in hybrids.[198] Norway was the top selling plug-in country market in Europe for three consecutive years, from 2016 to 2018.[25][199] Until 2019, Norway listed as the European country with the largest stock of plug-in cars and vans, and the third largest in the world.[19] The Norwegian plug-in car segment market share has been the highest in the world for several years, reaching 39.2% in 2017, up from 29.1% in 2016,[200][201] 49.1% in 2018,[202] rose to 55.9% in 2019,[203] and reached 74.7% in 2020, meaning that three out of every four new passenger car sold in Norway in 2020 was a plug-in electric.[204] In September 2021, the combined market share of the plug-in car segment achieved a new record of 91.5% of new passenger car registrations, 77.5% for all-electric cars and 13.9% for plug-in hybrids, becoming the world's highest-ever monthly plug-in car market share attained by any country.[205][206] The plug-in segment market share rose to 86.2% in 2021.[26] In October 2018, Norway became the first country where 1 in every 10 passenger cars in use was a plug-in electric vehicle.[207][208] and by the end of 2021, plug-in electric cars were 22.1% of all passenger cars on Norwegian roads.[209] The country's fleet of plug-in electric cars is one of the cleanest in the world because 98% of the electricity generated in the country comes from hydropower.[210][211] Norway is the country with the largest EV ownership per capita in the world.[212][213][214] Netherlands Main article: Plug-in electric vehicles in the Netherlands The Volkswagen ID.3 was the best selling plug-in car in the Netherlands in 2020.[215] As of 31 December 2021, there were 390,454 highway-legal light-duty plug-in electric vehicles in use in the Netherlands, consisting of 137,663 fully electric cars, 243,664 plug-in hybrid cars and 9,127 light duty plug-in commercial vehicles.[216] Plug-in passenger cars represented 4.33% of all cars on Dutch roads at the end of 2021.[216] As of July 2016, the Netherlands had the second largest plug-in ownership per capita in the world after Norway.[217] Plug-in sales fell sharply in 2016 due to changes in tax rules, and as a result of the change in government's incentives, the plug-in market share declined from 9.9% in 2015, to 6.7% in 2016, and fell to 2.6% in 2017.[218][219] The intake rate rose to 6.5% in 2018 in anticipation of another change in tax rules that went into effect in January 2019,[218] and increased to 14.9% in 2019, and rose 24.6% in 2020, and achieved a record 29.8% in 2021.[216] United States Main article: Plug-in electric vehicles in the United States See also: Plug-in electric vehicles in California Comparison of plug-in car market shares in California vs the American market (2011–2023) As of December 2023, cumulative sales of highway legal plug-in electric passenger cars in the U.S. totaled 4,684,128 units since 2010.[220] The U.S. has the world's third largest stock of plug-in passenger cars, after having been overtaken by Europe in 2015 and China during 2016.[153][154] California is the largest plug-in regional market in the country, with 1 million plug-in cars sold in California by November 2021.[221] The Tesla Model 3 electric car has been the best selling plug-in car in the U.S. for two consecutive years, 2018 and 2019.[222][223] Cumulative sales of the Model 3 surpassed in 2019 the discontinued Chevrolet Volt plug-in hybrid to become the all-time best selling plug-in car in the country, with an estimated 300,471 units delivered since inception, followed by the Tesla Model S all-electric car with about 157,992, and the Chevrolet Volt with 157,054.[224] Japan Main article: Plug-in electric vehicles in Japan As of April 2018, the Nissan Leaf was listed as the all-time top selling plug-in car in Japan, with 100,000 units delivered.[225] As of December 2020, Japan had a stock of plug-in passenger cars of 293,081 units on the road, consisting of 156,381 all-electric cars and 136,700 plug-in hybrids.[226] The fleet of electric light commercial vehicles in use totaled 9,904 units in 2019.[226] Plug-in sales totaled 24,660 units in 2015 and 24,851 units in 2016.[19] The rate of growth of the Japanese plug-in segment slowed down from 2013, with annual sales falling behind Europe, the U.S. and China during 2014 and 2015.[141][227] The segment market share fell from 0.68% in 2014 to 0.59% in 2016.[109] Sales recovered in 2017, with almost 56,000 plug-in cars sold, and the segment's market share reached 1.1%.[228] Sales fell slightly in 2018 to 52,000 units with a market share of 1.0%.[229] The market share continued declining to 0.7% in 2019 and 0.6% in 2020.[226] The decline in plug-in car sales reflects the Japanese government and the major domestic carmakers decision to adopt and promote hydrogen fuel cell vehicles instead of plug-in electric vehicles.[230][231] Top selling PEV models For more details of sales by model, see list of modern production plug-in electric vehicles. All-electric cars and vans The Tesla Model 3 is the world's all-time best selling highway legal plug-in electric car, with global sales of about 1.3 million units.[232][233] The Tesla Model 3 surpassed the Nissan Leaf in early 2020 to become the world's all-time best selling electric car,[12] and, in June 2021, became the first electric car to sell 1 million units globally.[13] The Model 3 has been the world's best selling plug-in electric car for four consecutive years, from 2018 to 2021.[232][234][110][148] The United States is the leading market with an estimated 395,000 units sold,[224][235] followed by the European market with over 180,000 units delivered, both through December 2020.[236][237] The Model 3 was the best-selling plug-in car in China in 2020, with 137,459 units sold.[166] Ranking second is the Nissan Leaf with cumulative global sales since inception of 577,000 units by February 2022.[238] As of September 2021, Europe listed as the biggest market with more than 208,000 units sold,[239] of which, 72 620 units have been registered in Norway, the leading European country market.[240] As of December 2021, U.S. sales totaled 165,710 units through December 2021,[241] and 157,059 units in Japan.[242] The Wuling Hongguang Mini EV has dominated sales in the Chinese market in 2021, selling over 550,000 units since its release in July 2020.[243] Europe's all-time top selling all-electric light utility vehicle is the Renault Kangoo Z.E., with global sales of over 57,500 units through November 2020.[244] The following table presents global sales of the top selling highway-capable electric cars and light utility vehicles produced since the introduction of the first modern production all-electric car, the Tesla Roadster, in 2008 and December 2021. The table includes all-electric passenger cars and utility vans with cumulative sales of about or over 200,000 units. Top selling highway legal electric cars and light utility vehicles produced between 2008 and December 2021(1) Model	Market launch	Global sales	Cumulative sales through	Source Tesla Model 3	Jul 2017	≈1.3 million	Dec 2021	[232][233] Nissan Leaf	Dec 2010	564,200	Dec 2021	[232][245] Wuling Hongguang Mini EV	Jul 2020	551,789(2)	Dec 2021	[232][246] Tesla Model Y	Mar 2020	≈490,000	Dec 2021	[232][247] Renault Zoe	Dec 2012	362,329	Dec 2021	[248][249] Tesla Model S	Jun 2012	≈319,600	Sep 2021	[250][251] Chery eQ	Nov 2014	≈243,000	Dec 2021	[232][252][253] BMW i3	Nov 2013	220,000(3)	Dec 2021	[254] BAIC EU-Series	2016	218,228(2)	Dec 2021	[255] BAIC EC-Series	Dec 2016	206,079(2)	Dec 2021	[256] Tesla Model X	Sep 2015	≈182,885	Sep 2021	[250][251] Notes: (1) Vehicles are considered highway-capable if able to achieve at least a top speed of 100 km/h (62 mph). (2) Sales in main China only. (3) BMW i3 sales includes the REx variant (split is not available). Plug-in hybrids The Mitsubishi Outlander P-HEV is the world's all-time best selling plug-in hybrid, with about 300,000 units sold globally through January 2022.[257] The Mitsubishi Outlander P-HEV is the world's all-time best selling plug-in hybrid according to JATO Dynamics.[258] Global sales achieved the 250,000 unit milestone in May 2020,[259] and the 300,000 mark in January 2022.[257] Europe is the Outlander P-HEV leading market with 126,617 units sold through January 2019,[260] followed by Japan with 42,451 units through March 2018.[261] European sales are led by the UK with 36,237 units delivered, followed by the Netherlands with 25,489 units, both through March 2018.[261] Ranking second is the Toyota Prius Plug-in Hybrid (Toyota Prius Prime) with about 225,000 units sold worldwide of both generations through December 2020.[250][262] The United States is the market leader with over 93,000 units delivered through December 2018.[263] Japan ranks next with about 61,200 units through December 2018,[229][262] followed by Europe with almost 14,800 units through June 2018.[262][264] Combined global sales of the Chevrolet Volt and its rebadged models totaled about 186,000 units by the end of 2018,[263][265][266][267][268] including about 10,000 Opel/Vauxhall Amperas sold in Europe through June 2016.[269] Volt sales are led by the United States with 157,054 units delivered through December 2019,[224] followed by Canada with 17,311 units through November 2018.[266][267] Until the end of 2018, the Chevrolet Volt family listed as the world's top selling plug-in hybrid, when it was surpassed by the Mitsubishi Outlander P-HEV.[258] The following table presents plug-in hybrid models with cumulative global sales of around or more than 100,000 units since the introduction of the first modern production plug-in hybrid car, the BYD F3DM, in 2008 up until December 2021: Top selling highway legal plug-in hybrid electric cars between 2008 and December 2021 Model	Market launch	Global sales	Cumulative sales through	Source Mitsubishi Outlander P-HEV	Jan 2013	≈300,000	Jan 2022	[257] Toyota Prius PHV/Prime	Jan 2012	251,400	Dec 2021	[250][270][271] Chevrolet Volt(1)	Dec 2010	≈186,000	Dec 2018	[263][265][266][268] BYD Qin(2)	Dec 2013	136,818	Dec 2018	[112][118][272] BYD Tang(2)	Jun 2015	101,518	Dec 2018	[118][272][273][274] Notes: (1) In addition to the Volt sold in North America, combined sales of the Volt/Ampera family includes about 10,000 Vauxhall/Opel Ampera and about 1,750 Volts sold in Europe,[275][276] 246 Holden Volt sold in Australia,[277] and 4,317 units of the Buick Velite 5 sold only in China (rebadged second generation Volt).[268] (2) Sales in China only. BYD Qin total does not include sales of the all-electric variant (Qin EV300). See also Electric car Electric car use by country Electric vehicle battery Electric vehicle warning sounds Hybrid tax credit (U.S.) List of electric cars currently available List of modern production plug-in electric vehicles Plug In America RechargeIT (Google.org PHEV program) Renewable energy by country References Akhtar, Riz (2024-01-29). "Tesla Model Y confirmed as world's best-selling car in 2023, beating Rav4 and Corolla". The Driven. Retrieved 2024-01-31. The Model Y first emerged as a best seller in the first quarter of last year, and now data firm Jato Dynamics has confirmed that it maintained this status for the entire year, selling 1.23 million cars. "【易车销量榜】全国2021年纯电动批发量销量榜-易车榜-易车". car.yiche.com. Retrieved 2024-01-21. "【易车销量榜】全国2023年插电混动批发量销量榜-易车榜-易车". car.yiche.com. Retrieved 2024-01-21. Pontes, José (2023-08-02). "World EV Sales Now 19% Of World Auto Sales!". CleanTechnica. 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"Global EV Outlook 2017: Two million and counting" (PDF). IEA Publications. Archived from the original (PDF) on 2017-06-07. Retrieved 2018-01-20. See pp. 5–7, 12–22, 27–28, and Statistical annex, pp. 49–51. Jose, Pontes (2019-01-31). "Global Top 20 - December 2018". EVSales.com. Retrieved 2019-01-31. "Global sales totaled 2,018,247 plug-in passenger cars in 2018, with a BEV:PHEV ratio of 69:31, and a market share of 2.1%. The world's top selling plug-in car was the Tesla Model 3, and Tesla was the top selling manufacturer of plug-in passenger cars in 2018, followed by BYD." "Alliance members achieve combined sales of 10.76 million units in 2018". Groupe Renault Media (Press release). Paris. 2019-01-30. Retrieved 2019-02-02. As of December 2018, a total of 724,905 electric vehicles have been sold by the Alliance since 2010. Cobb, Jeff (2017-01-26). "Tesla Model S Is World's Best-Selling Plug-in Car For Second Year In A Row". HybridCars.com. Retrieved 2017-01-26. See also detailed 2016 sales and cumulative global sales in the two graphs. Kane, Mark (2019-01-02). "Tesla Production And Deliveries Graphed Through Q4 2018". InsideEVs.com. Retrieved 2019-01-02. Sharan, Zachary (2017-02-04). "Tesla Model S & Nissan LEAF Clocked As World's Best-Selling Electric Cars In 2016". EV Volumes. CleanTechnica.com. Retrieved 2017-02-04. Cobb, Jeff (2017-01-16). "The World Just Bought Its Two-Millionth Plug-in Car". HybridCars.com. Retrieved 2017-01-17. An estimated 2,032,000 highway-legal plug-in passenger cars and vans have been sold worldwide at the end of 2016. The top selling markets are China (645,708 new energy cars, including imports), Europe (638,000 plug-in cars and vans), and the United States (570,187 plug-in cars). The top European country markets are Norway (135,276), the Netherlands (113,636), France (108,065), and the UK (91,000). Total Chinese sales of domestically produced new energy vehicles, including buses and truck, totaled 951,447 vehicles. China was the top selling plug-in car market in 2016, and also has the world's largest stock of plug-in electric cars. Cobb, Jeff (2016-11-07). "China's BYD Becomes World's Third-Largest Plug-in Car Maker". HybridCars.com. Retrieved 2016-11-07. "Top 10 Automakers by 2017 NEV Sales". Gasgoo China Automotive News. 2018-01-18. Retrieved 2018-01-29. According to the data released by China Passenger Car Association (CPCA), BYD topped the rank with annual NEV delivery of 113,669 units, increasing 11% year on year. With NEV deliveries soaring 125% on an annual basis to 104,520 units, BAIC BJEV took the second place among the top ten automakers. Kane, Mark (2019-01-14). "BYD Sold Record 37,000 Electric Cars In December 2018". InsideEVs.com. Retrieved 2019-01-14. BYD Auto sold in China 227,152 plug-in cars, up 109% from 2017. During 2018 BYD Qin sales totaled 47,425 units and BYD Tang sales totaled 37,146 units. Kane, Mark (2018-01-26). "BYD #1 In World For Plug-In Electric Car Sales In 2017, Beats Tesla Again". InsideEVs.com. Retrieved 2018-01-29. "BYD sold 108,612 passenger plug-in cars in China in 2017, enough to make it the world's top selling plug-in car manufacturer for the third year in a row." Mark Kane (2019-01-11). "BMW Sold 142,617 Plug-In Electric Cars In 2018". Inside EVs. Retrieved 2019-01-12. The BMW Group sold 142,617 plug-in electric cars in 2018, and cumulative sales since inception of the BMW i3 totaled over 356,000 BMW and MINI electrified vehicles. BMW set a target of cumulative sales of 500,000 units by the end of 2019. Cobb, Jeff (2016-01-12). "Tesla Model S Was World's Best-Selling Plug-in Car in 2015". HybridCars.com. Retrieved 2016-02-06. The Tesla Model S was the top selling plug-in electric car in 2015 with 50,366 units sold, followed by the Nissan Leaf (about 43,000), the Mitsubishi Outlander P-HEV (over 40,000), the BYD Qin (31,898) and the BMW i3 (24,057). The Model S is also the second-best seller ever with 107,148 sales since its mid-2012 launch, behind the Nissan Leaf and ahead of GM's Volt/Ampera family, credited with 106,000 sales. John Voelcker (2016-01-15). "Who Sold The Most Plug-In Electric Cars In 2015? (It's Not Tesla Or Nissan)". Green Car Reports. Retrieved 2016-01-17. BYD Auto delivered 31,898 Qins, 18,375 Tangs, and 7,029 e6s during 2015. Added to that are small numbers of the T3 small commercial van and e5 battery-electric compact sedan, along with 2,888 Denza EV compact hatchbacks built by its joint venture with Daimler. Altogether, BYD sold a total of 61,722 light-duty plug-in electric vehicles in China in 2015. Natasha Li (2016-03-04). "Alternative Energy Vehicles Account HALF of BYD's Profits for the Very First Time in 2015". Gasgoo Automotive News. Archived from the original on 2016-03-08. Retrieved 2016-03-07. BYD Auto delivered 69,222 new energy vehicles in China in 2015, including buses, of which, a total of 61,722 were passenger vehicles, mostly plug-in hybrids, led by the Qin and Tang. Jin Peiling (2017-01-10). "谁是2016年电动汽车市场的霸主?" [Who is the dominant electric vehicle market in 2016?] (in Chinese). Daily Observation Car. Archived from the original on 2017-01-16. Retrieved 2017-01-15. BYD sold more than 100,000 new energy passenger cars in China in 2016, about 30,000 more units than Tesla Motors. The BYD Tang was the top selling plug-in car in China in 2016 with 31,405 units delivered. Jose Pontes (2018-01-18). "China December 2017". EV Sales. Retrieved 2018-01-19. Sales of plug-in electric cars in China, including imports, totaled 600,174 units in 2017. The BAIC EC-Series was the top selling plug-in with 78,079 units sold in China, making the city car the world's top selling plug-in car in 2017. The top selling plug-in hybrid was the BYD Song PHEV with 30,920 units. BYD Auto was the top selling car manufacturer. Foreign brands captured only about 4% of plug-in sales in 2017, with about half by Tesla. The Chinese plug-in car market represented roughly half of the 1.2 million plug-ins sold worldwide in 2017. Jose, Pontes (2019-02-03). "2018 Global Sales by OEM". EVSales.com. Retrieved 2019-02-03. "Tesla led plug-in car sales among automotive groups in 2018, with 245,240 units delivered, followed by BYD with 229,338, and the Renault-Nissan Alliance with 192,711." "BMW sells over 140,000 plug-in cars throughout 2018". electricdrive.com. 2019-01-10. Retrieved 2019-01-14. The global share of plug-in electric cars by brand in 2018 was led by Tesla with 12%, followed by BYD with 11%, BMW with 9%, BAIC with 6%, and Roewe and Nissan, both with 5%. "BYD NEV sales in 2018 exceed 240,000 units". Gasgoo. 2019-01-08. Retrieved 2019-01-14. BYD Auto sold 247,811 new energy vehicles in 2018 (including commercial heavy-duty vehicles), up 118% from 2018, of which, 227,152 were passenger cars, consisting of 103,263 units all-electric cars and 123,889 units were plug-in hybrid vehicles. In addition, 20,659 new energy commercial vehicles were sold in 2018. Justin Gerdes (2012-05-11). "The Global Electric Vehicle Movement: Best Practices From 16 Cities". Forbes. Retrieved 2014-10-20. International Energy Agency (IEA), Clean Energy Ministerial, and Electric Vehicles Initiative (EVI) (May 2016). "Global EV Outlook 2016: Beyond one million electric cars" (PDF). IEA Publications. Archived from the original (PDF) on 2016-08-24. Retrieved 2016-09-07. See pp. 4–5, and 24–25 and Statistical annex, pp. 34–37. Clark, Pilita; Campbell, Peter (2016-08-31). "Motor Industry: Pressure on the Pump". Financial Times. Retrieved 2016-09-01. Argonne National Laboratory, United States Department of Energy (2016-03-28). "Fact#918: March 28, 2016 – Global Plug-in Light Vehicles Sales Increased By About 80% in 2015". Office of Energy Efficiency & Renewable Energy. Retrieved 2016-03-29. Nic Lutsey (2015-09-29). "Global milestone: The first million electric vehicles". International Council on Clean Transportation (ICCT). Archived from the original on 2016-04-12. Retrieved 2015-10-10. International Energy Agency (IEA), Clean Energy Ministerial, and Electric Vehicles Initiative (EVI) (May 2018). "Global EV Outlook 2017: 3 million and counting" (PDF). IEA Publications. Retrieved 2018-10-23. See pp. 9–10, 19–23, 29–28, and Statistical annex, pp. 107–113. The global stock of plug-in electric passenger cars totaled 3,109,050 units, of which, 1,928,360 were battery electric cars.. European Automobile Manufacturers Association (ACEA) (2017-02-01). "New Passenger Car Registrations By Alternative Fuel Type In The European Union: Quarter 4 2016" (PDF). ACEA. Retrieved 2018-10-23. See table New Passenger Car Registrations By Market In The EU + EFTA - Total Electric Rechargeable Vehicles: Total EU + EFTA in Q1-Q4 2015. European Automobile Manufacturers Association (ACEA) (2018-02-01). "New Passenger Car Registrations By Alternative Fuel Type In The European Union: Quarter 4 2017" (PDF). ACEA. Retrieved 2018-10-23. See table New Passenger Car Registrations By Market In The EU + EFTA - Total Electric Rechargeable Vehicles: Total EU + EFTA in Q1-Q4 2017 and Q1-Q4 2016. International Energy Agency (IEA), Clean Energy Ministerial, and Electric Vehicles Initiative (EVI) (May 2019). "Global EV Outlook 2019: Scaling-up the transition to electric mobility" (PDF). IEA Publications. Retrieved 2020-05-11. See Statistical annex, pp. 210–213. The global stock of plug-in electric passenger cars totaled 5,122,460 units at the end of 2018, of which, 3,290,800 (64.2%) were battery electric cars (See Tables A.1 and A.2).. European Automobile Manufacturers Association (ACEA) (2020-02-06). "New Passenger Car Registrations By Alternative Fuel Type In The European Union: Quarter 4 2019" (PDF). ACEA. Retrieved 2020-05-11. See table New Passenger Car Registrations By Market In The EU + EFTA - Total Electric Rechargeable Vehicles: Total EU + EFTA in Q1-Q4 2018 and 2019. Irle, Roland (2021-01-19). "Global Plug-in Vehicle Sales Reached over 3,2 Million in 2020". EV-volumes.com. Retrieved 2021-01-20. Plug-in sales totaled 3.24 million in 2020, up from 2.26 million in 2019. Europe, with nearly 1.4 million untits surpassed China as the largest EV market for the first time since 2015. IEA 2014 Cobb, Jeff (2016-01-18). "Top Six Plug-in Vehicle Adopting Countries – 2015". HybridCars.com. Retrieved 2016-02-12. About 520,000 highway legal light-duty plug-in electric vehicles were sold worldwide in 2015, with cumulative global sales reaching 1,235,000. The United States was the leading market with 411,120 units sold since 2008, followed by China with 258,328 units sold since 2011. Japan ranks third, followed by the Netherlands (88,991), Norway (77,897), France (74,291), and the UK (53,254). Over 21,000 units were sold in Japan in 2015. Berman, Brad (2016-02-13). "US Falls Behind Europe and China in Global Plug-in Vehicle Market". Plugincars.com. Retrieved 2016-02-16. Staff (February 2017). "Global Plug-in Sales for 2016". EV-Volumes.com. Retrieved 2017-02-05. Vaughan, Adam (2017-12-25). "Electric and plug-in hybrid cars whiz past 3m mark worldwide". The Guardian. Retrieved 2018-01-20. "The number of fully electric and plug-in hybrid cars on the world's roads passed the 3 million mark in November 2017." EVvolumes.com (January 2018). "Global Plug-in Sales for 2017-Q4 and the Full Year (prelim.)". EVvolumes.com. Retrieved 2018-02-17. Global registrations totaled around 1.2 million units in 2017, 57 % higher than 2016. These include all global BEV and PHEV passenger cars sales, light trucks in USA/Canada and light commercial vehicle in Europe. The segment market share was 1.3%, and in December the global plug-in share touched the 2 % mark for the first time. Coren, Michael J. (2019-01-25). "E-nough? Automakers may have completely overestimated how many people want electric cars". Quartz. Retrieved 2019-01-25. Despite exponential growth, with a record 2 million or so EVs sold worldwide last year, only one in 250 cars on the road is electric. "Global Electric Vehicle Stock Reaches 7.2 Million". EV Statistics. 2020-06-20. Retrieved 2020-09-29. Jose, Pontes (2020-01-31). "Global Top 20 - December 2019". EVSales.com. Retrieved 2020-05-10. "Global sales totaled 2,209,831 plug-in passenger cars in 2019, with a BEV to PHEV ratio of 74:26, and a global market share of 2.5%. The world's top selling plug-in car was the Tesla Model 3 with 300,075 units delivered, and Tesla was the top selling manufacturer of plug-in passenger cars in 2019 with 367,820 units, followed by BYD with 229,506." Hertzke, Patrick; Müller, Nicolai; Schenk, Stephanie; Wu, Ting (May 2018). "The global electric-vehicle market is amped up and on the rise". McKinsey & Company. Retrieved 2019-01-27. See Exhibit 1: Global electric-vehicle sales, 2010-17. Jose, Pontes (2022-01-30). "World EV Sales — Tesla Model 3 Wins 4th Consecutive Best Seller Title In Record Year". CleanTechnica. Retrieved 2022-02-02. That allowed them (BEVs) to end the year with 71% of plugin EV sales, up 2 percentage points from the 69% of 2020, but still below the 74% of 2019. "EV-Volumes - The Electric Vehicle World Sales Database". www.ev-volumes.com. IEA 2024 Cobb, Jeff (2016-12-27). "China Takes Lead As Number One In Plug-in Vehicle Sales". HybridCars.com. Retrieved 2017-01-06. As of November 2016, cumulative sales of plug-in vehicles in China totaled 846,447 units, including passenger and commercial vehicles, making it the world's leader in overall plug-in vehicle sales. With cumulative sales of about 600,000 passenger plug-ins through November 2016, China is also the global leader in the passenger plug-in car segment, ahead of Europe and the U.S. King, Danny (2016-12-29). "China far ahead of US, Europe in total electric vehicle sales". Autoblog.com. Retrieved 2017-01-08. Last year, China overtook both the US and Europe in annual sales of electric vehicles and plug-in hybrids. This year, it will move ahead of both the US and Europe in cumulative plug-in vehicle sales. Dale Hall, Hongyang Cui, Nic Lutsey (2018-10-30). "Electric vehicle capitals: Accelerating the global transition to electric drive". The International Council on Clean Transportation. Retrieved 2018-11-01. Click on "Download File" to get the full report, 15 pp. Liu Wanxiang (2017-01-12). "中汽协: 2016年新能源汽车产销量均超50万辆,同比增速约50%" [China Auto Association: 2016 new energy vehicle production and sales were over 500,000, an increase of about 50%] (in Chinese). D1EV.com. Retrieved 2017-01-12. Chinese sales of new energy vehicles in 2016 totaled 507,000, consisting of 409,000 BEV vehicles and 98,000 PHEVs. Automotive News China (2018-01-16). "Electrified vehicle sales surge 53% in 2017". Automotive News China. Retrieved 2018-01-19. Chinese sales of domestically-built new energy vehicles in 2017 totaled 777,000, consisting of 652,000 all-electric vehicles and 125,000 plug-in hybrid vehicles. Sales of domestically-produced new energy passenger vehicles totalled 579,000 units, consisting of 468,000 all-electric cars and 111,000 plug-in hybrids. Only domestically built all-electric vehicles, plug-in hybrids and fuel cell vehicles qualify for government subsidies in China. "中汽协: 2018年新能源汽车产销均超125万辆, 同比增长60%" [Chia Automobile Association: In 2018, the production and sales of new energy vehicles exceeded 1.25 million units, a year-on-year increase of 60%] (in Chinese). D1EV.com. 2019-01-14. Retrieved 2019-01-15. Chinese sales of new energy vehicles in 2018 totaled 1.256 million, consisting of 984,000 all-electric vehicles and 271,000 plug-in hybrid vehicles. Kane, Mark (2020-02-04). "Chinese NEVs Market Slightly Declined In 2019: Full Report". InsideEVs.com. Retrieved 2020-05-30. Sales of new energy vehicles totaled 1,206,000 units in 2019, down 4.0% from 2018, and includes 2,737 fuel cell vehicles. Battery electric vehicle sales totaled 972,000 units (down 1.2%) and plug-in hybrid sales totaled 232,000 vehicles (down 14.5%). Sales figures include passenger cars, buses and commercial vehicles.. China Association of Automobile Manufacturers (CAAM) (2021-01-14). "Sales of New Energy Vehicles in December 2020". CAAM. Retrieved 2021-02-08. NEV sales in China totaled 1.637 million in 2020, consisting of 1.246 million passenger cars and 121,000 commercial vehicles. China Association of Automobile Manufacturers (CAAM) (2022-01-12). "Sales of New Energy Vehicles in December 2021". CAAM. Retrieved 2022-01-13. NEV sales in China totaled 3.521 million in 2021 (all classes), consisting of 3.334 million passenger cars and 186,000 commercial vehicles. Dune, Michael J. (2016-12-14). "China's Automotive 2030 Blueprint: No. 1 Globally In EVs, Autonomous Cars". Forbes. Retrieved 2016-12-14. Majeed, Abdul (2016-09-29). "China faces acid test in vehicle emissions". Business Line. Retrieved 2016-09-29. "China's new energy PV wholesale volume in 2018 shoots up 83% year on year". Gasgoo. 2019-01-11. Retrieved 2019-01-21. Sales of new energy passenger cars totaled 1,016,002 units in 2018.The BAIC EC series ranked as China's top selling plug-in car in 2018 with 90,637 units delivered. "Top 10 NEV Models by 2017 Sales". Gasgoo China Automotive News. 2018-01-18. Retrieved 2019-01-15. Sales of the BAIC EC series totaled 78,079 cars in 2018 and ranked as China's top selling plug-in car. "Domestic EV makers rival Tesla in China, can they win?". SDchina.com. 2021-02-05. Retrieved 2021-02-19. See table: Top 10 NEV sold in China in 2020. Schmidt, Matthias (2020-12-03). "Exclusive: Western Europe's plug-in electric car market surpasses 1 million landmark". Schmidt Automotive Research. Retrieved 2021-01-16. Jacobs, Frank (2021-01-07). "Yes, 2021 is the year EVs go mainstream". Fleet Europe. Archived from the original on 2021-01-11. Retrieved 2021-01-12. Close to 1.25 million EVs were sold in Europe in 2020, around 10% of the total Carrington, Damian (2021-01-19). "Global sales of electric cars accelerate fast in 2020 despite pandemic". The Guardian. Retrieved 2021-01-19. The EV-volumes.com data showed the five highest national sales were in China (1.3m), Germany (0.4m), the US (0.3m), France and the UK (both 0.2m). Global sales of plug-ins cars totaled 3 million in 2020, 43% up from 2018. The market share of plug-in vehicles reached 4.2% of the global market, up from 2.5% in 2019. Tesla was the best selling brand with almost 500,000 units delivered. ""罚出来的"爆发式增长 欧洲新能源车销量首次超越中国" ["Punished" explosive growth, European new energy vehicle sales surpassed China for the first time] (in Chinese). Sina Finance. 2021-02-08. Retrieved 2021-02-08. Kane, Mark (2021-02-20). "European Countries Listed By Plug-In Electric Car Market Share In Q1-Q4 2020". InsideEVs.com. Retrieved 2021-02-21. The average market share of new passenger plug-in electric cars in Europe more than tripled in 2020 to 11.4% (from less than 3.6% in 2019). Figures includes the European Union, EFTA (Norway, Switzerland, Iceland) and the UK, using available registration data from the European Automobile Manufacturers Association (ACEA). LeSage, Jon (2017-02-06). "Renault Zoe Ekes By Mitsubishi Outlander in 2016 European Plug-in Sales". HybridCars.com. Retrieved 2017-02-06. France Mobilité Électrique - AVERE France (2020-02-11). "En Europe, les ventes de voitures électriques en hausse de 80 % en 2019" [In Europe, sales of electric cars up 80% in 2019] (in French). AVERE. Archived from the original on 2020-06-21. Retrieved 2020-05-16. Kraftfahrt-Bundesamtes (KBA) (2022-03-04). "Pressemitteilung Nr. 10/2022 - Der Fahrzeugbestand am 1. Januar 2022" [Press release No. 10/2021 - The vehicle stock on January 1, 2022] (in German). KBA. Retrieved 2022-03-14. There were 618,460 all-electric cars and 565,956 plug-in hybrids registered in Germany on January 1, 2022 (total 1,184,416 plug-in cars). The share of all-electric cars rose to 1.3% percent (+100.1%) and that of plug-in hybrids doubled to 1.2%, for a total of 2.5% of plug-in cars on German roads on January 1, 2022. Kraftfahrt-Bundesamtes (KBA) (2021-03-02). "Pressemitteilung Nr. 8/2021 - Der Fahrzeugbestand am 1. Januar 2021" [Press release No. 8/2021 - The number of vehicles on January 1st, 2021] (in German). KBA. Archived from the original on 2021-03-09. Retrieved 2021-03-02. The share of electric cars (BEV ) rose from 0.3 percent (136,617) on January 1, 2020 to 0.6 percent (309,083) and that of hybrid cars from 1.1 percent (539,383) to 2.1 percent (1.004.089). The number of plug-in hybrid vehicles grew from 102,175 to 279,861 (+ 173.9%). Their share tripled to 0.6 percent. (Translated from the original) Kraftfahrt-Bundesamtes (KBA) (2022-01-05). "Pressemitteilung Nr. 01/2022 - Fahrzeugzulassungen im Dezember 2021 - Jahresbilanz" [Press release No. 01/2022 - Vehicle registrations in December 2021 - Annual balance] (in German). KBA. Retrieved 2022-01-09. A total of 681,410 plug-in electric passenger cars were registered in Germany in 2021, consisting of 325,449 plug-in hybrids (12.4% market share) and 355,961 all-electric cars (13.6% market share). Kane, Mark (2021-01-16). "Germany: Plug-In Car Share At 26%: Records Everywhere In December 2020". InsideEVs.com. Retrieved 2022-01-09. The cumulative number of plug-in electric cars sold in Germany over the past seven years is close to 700,000 (since 2013) Kraftfahrt-Bundesamtes (KBA) (January 2020). "Neuzulassungsbarometer im Dezember 2019" [New Registrations Barometer December 2019] (in German). KBA. Retrieved 2019-05-14. See the tab Kraftsoffarten: A total of 45,348 plug-in hybrids (market share 1.3%) and 63,321 all-electric cars (market share 1.8%) were registered in Germany in 2019. Kraftfahrt-Bundesamtes (KBA) (2021-01-08). "Pressemitteilung Nr. 02/2021 - Fahrzeugzulassungen im Dezember 2020 - Jahresbilanz" [Press release No. 02/2021 - Vehicle registrations in December 2020 - Annual balance sheet] (in German). KBA. Archived from the original on 2021-07-19. Retrieved 2021-01-10. A total of 394,632 plug-in electric passenger cars were registered in Germany in 2021, consisting of 200,469 plug-in hybrids (6.9% market share) and 194,163 all-electric cars (6.7% market share). France Mobilité Électrique - AVERE France (2021-01-08). "Baromètre des immatriculations - En décembre 2020, les véhicules électriques et hybrides rechargeables ont représenté plus de 16 % du marché français : du jamais vu !" [Registrations barometer - In December 2020, electric and plug-in hybrid vehicles represented more than 16% of the French market: unprecedented!] (in French). AVERE France. Archived from the original on 2021-01-11. Retrieved 2021-01-23. See infograh "Parc Roulant et Immatriculations Annuelles depuis Janvier 2010" - As of December 2020, there were 470,295 plug-in electric cars and utility vans, consisting of 337,986 all-electric cars and vans, and 132,309 plug-in hybrids registered since 2010. Kane, Mark (2020-07-03). "Renault EV Sales In France Is Booming: 17,650 ZOE Sold In H1 2020". InsideEVs.com. Retrieved 2020-07-20. France Mobilité Électrique - AVERE France (2022-01-07). "[Baromètre] 20,4 % de parts de marché en décembre 2021 pour les véhicules électriques et hybrides rechargeables... et 15 % sur l'ensemble de 2021 !" [Barometer: 20.4% market share in December 2021 for electric and plug-in hybrid vehicles... and 15% for the whole of 2021!] (in French). AVERE France. Retrieved 2022-01-08. See infograh "Barometre mensuel de la mobilité électrique Chiffres clés du mois de septembre 2021 - Evolution du Parc Roulant Automobiles Depuis Janvier 2010" - As of December 2021, a total of 786,274 plug-in electric passenger cars and vans have been registered in France, consisting of 512,178 all-electric cars and vans, and 274,096 plug-in hybrids in circulation. Registrations of all-electric cars and vans totaled 174,191 units in 2021, and plug-in hybrids totaled 141,787 units, for a total of 315,978 units. The light-duty plug-in vehicle segment achieved a market share of 15.1% France Mobilité Électrique - AVERE France (2021-10-06). "En septembre 2021, les véhicules électriques et hybrides rechargeables ont représenté près de 18 % du marché français" [Barometer In September 2021, electric and plug-in hybrid vehicles represented nearly 18% of the French market] (in French). AVERE France. Archived from the original on 2021-10-20. Retrieved 2021-10-12. See infograh "Barometre mensuel de la mobilité électrique Chiffres clés du mois de septembre 2021 - Evolution du Parc Roulant Automobiles Depuis Janvier 2010" - As of September 2021, a total of 687,876 plug-in electric passenger cars and vans have been registered in France, consisting of 453,143 all-electric cars and vans, and 234,733 plug-in hybrids in circulation. Autoactu.com (May 2016). "Chiffres de vente & immatriculations de voitures électriques en France" [Sales figures & electric car registrations in France] (in French). Automobile Propre. Retrieved 2016-05-14. See "Ventes de voitures électriques en 2016/2015, 2014, 2013, 2012, 2011 and 2010" It shows all electric car registrations between 2010 and 2016. Yoann Nussbaumer (2013-01-16). "+115% pour les ventes de voitures électriques en France pour 2012" [Electric car sales in France increased 115% in 2011] (in French). Automobile Propre. Retrieved 2015-02-03. France Mobilité Électrique – AVERE France (2016-01-08). "Immatriculations des hybrides rechargeables : La barre des 5.000 est franchie !" [Plug-in hybrid registrations: The 5,000 barrier is achieved!] (in French). AVERE. Retrieved 2016-05-14. A total of 5,006 plug-in hybrids were registered in France in 2015. France Mobilité Électrique - AVERE France (2019-01-09). "Baromètre annuel : près de 40 000 véhicules électriques immatriculés en France en 2018 !" [Annual barometer: nearly 40,000 electric vehicles registered in France in 2018!] (in French). AVERE. Archived from the original on 2019-01-17. Retrieved 2019-01-18. A total of 53,745 light-duty plug-in electric vehicles were registered in France in 2018 consisting of 31,055 all-electric cars plus 1,148 REx vehicles, 8,103 electric utility vans, and 13,439 plug-in hybrid cars. The plug-in car segment achieved a market share of 2.1% of new car registrations in the country in 2018. Includes revised figures for 2017 Pontes, José (2022-01-18). "32% Plugin Vehicle Share In France! Tesla Model 3 = #8 In Overall Market". CleanTechnica. Retrieved 2022-01-18. With December at 32% plugin share (19% BEV) and the full 2021 share ending at 18.3% (9.8% BEV) Automobile Propre (August 2016). "Chiffres de vente & immatriculations d'utilitaires électriques en France" [Sales figures & electric utility van registrations in France] (in French). Automobile Propre. Retrieved 2016-10-02. See "Ventes d'utilitaires électriques en 2016/2015/2014 for all-electric utility van registrations. Light-duty electric vehicles reached a 1.22% market share of new van sales in the country in 2014, and rose to 1.30% in 2015. Goodall, Olly (2022-01-07). "2021 sees largest-ever increase in plug-in sales". UK: Next Green Car. Retrieved 2022-01-08. ... the cumulative total of plug-in vehicles on UK roads – as of the end of December 2021 – to over 740,000. This total comprises around 395,000 BEVs and 350,000 PHEVs. Overall in 2021, there were more than 190,000 sales of BEVs in the UK, with over 114,000 sales of PHEVs. Plug-in vehicles represented 18.6% of market share in 2021. Society of Motor Manufacturers and Traders(SMMT) (2014-01-07). "December 2013 – EV registrations". SMT. Retrieved 2014-01-12. A total of 2,254 plug-in electric cars were registered in 2013. Society of Motor Manufacturers and Traders (SMMT) (2018-01-05). "December – EV registrations". SMMT. Retrieved 2018-01-11.Registrations in 2017 totaled 47,263 plug-in electric vehicles consisting of 13,597 all-electric cars and 33,6663 plug-in hybrids. Of these, a total of 45,187 cars were eligible for the Plug-in Car Grant. Since its launch in 2011, a total of 127,509 cars eligible for the PICG have been registered through December 2017. A total of 2,540,617 new cars were registered in 2017, resulting in a plug-in electric car market share of 1.86% of new car sales. Society of Motor Manufacturers and Traders (SMMT) (2019-01-07). "December – EV registrations". SMMT. Retrieved 2019-01-17.Registrations in 2018 totaled 59,911 plug-in electric vehicles consisting of 15,474 all-electric cars and 44,437 plug-in hybrids. A total of 2,367,147 new cars were registered in 2018, resulting in a plug-in electric car market share of 2.53% of new car sales. Society of Motor Manufacturers and Traders (SMMT) (2022-01-06). "UK automotive looks to green recovery strategy after -29.4% fall in new car registrations in 2020". SMMT. Retrieved 2022-01-08. Download the file "December 2021" for detailed data for 2021 and revised 2020. Society of Motor Manufacturers and Traders(SMMT) (2015-01-07). "December 2014 – EV registrations". SMT. Retrieved 2015-01-08. A total of 14,518 plug-in electric cars were registered during 2014, consisting of 6,697 pure electrics and 7,821 plug-in hybrids, up from 3,586 plug-in electric cars were registered in 2013. A total of 2,476,435 new cars were registered in 2014. Society of Motor Manufacturers and Traders (SMMT) (2021-01-06). "UK automotive looks to green recovery strategy after -29.4% fall in new car registrations in 2020". SMMT. Retrieved 2021-02-22. Lane, Ben (December 2020). "Electric car market statistics". UK: Next Green Car. Retrieved 2021-03-01. Norsk Elbilforening (Norwegian Electric Vehicle Association) (January 2022). "Antall elbiler og ladbare hybrider i Norge" [Number of electric cars and rechargeable hybrids in Norway] (in Norwegian). Norsk Elbilforening. Archived from the original on 2021-01-27. Retrieved 2022-01-07. Click on the tab "Elbil" for the stock of electric cars and "Ladbar hybrid" for the stock of plug-in hybrids. As of 31 December 2021, the stock of registered light-duty plug-in electric vehicles totaled 647,000 units, consisting of 470,309 battery electric vehicles and 176,691 plug-in hybrids. Bratzel, Stefan (2019-01-16). "E-Mobility 2019: An International Comparison of Important Automotive Markets" (PDF). Center of Automotive Management. Bergisch Gladbach. Archived from the original (PDF) on 2019-01-21. Retrieved 2019-01-21. Opplysningsrådet for Veitrafikken AS (OFV). "Bilsalget i 2017" [Car sales in 2017] (in Norwegian). OFV. Archived from the original on 2018-01-10. Retrieved 2017-01-10. Norsk Elbilforening (Norwegian Electric Vehicle Association) (2017-01-05). "Elbilsalget: Ned i fjor – venter ny vekst i år" [EV Sales: Down from last year - awaiting new growth this year] (in Norwegian). Norsk Elbilforening. Retrieved 2017-01-18. Norwegian Road Federation (OFV) (2019-01-02). "Bilsalget i 2018" [Car sales in 2018] (in Norwegian). OFV. Archived from the original on 2019-02-07. Retrieved 2019-01-09. Norwegian Road Federation (OFV) (January 2020). "Bilsalget i 2019" [Car sales in 2019] (in Norwegian). OFV. Retrieved 2020-02-10. Norwegian Road Federation (OFV) (2021-01-05). "Bilsalget i desember og hele 2020" [Car sales in December and throughout 2020] (in Norwegian). OFV. Retrieved 2021-01-07. Norwegian Road Federation (OFV) (2021-10-01). "Car sales in September 2021" [Car sales in September 2021] (in Norwegian). OFV. Retrieved 2021-10-07. Kane, Mark (2021-10-02). "Norway: All-Electric Car Sales Reach New Record In September 2021". InsideEVs.com. Retrieved 2021-10-07. Kane, Mark (2018-10-07). "10% Of Norway's Passenger Vehicles Are Plug Ins". InsideEVs.com. Retrieved 2018-11-07. Miley, Jessica (2 October 2018). "45% of New Cars Sold in Norway in September were All-Electric Vehicles". Interesting Engineering. Retrieved 10 November 2018. Despite the huge increase in new electric cars on the road, EVs still only account for roughly 10% of all of Norway's vehicles. Norsk Elbilforening (January 2022). "Personbilbestanden i Norge fordelt på drivstoff" [Passenger car stock in Norway by fuel] (in Norwegian). Norsk Elbilforening (Norwegian Electric Vehicle Association). Retrieved 2022-01-07. See graph under "Personbilbestanden i Norge fordelt på drivstoff" - As of 31 December 2021, there were 15.95% all-electric cars and 6.18% plug-in hybrid cars in use on Norwegian roads. Combined plug-in electric passenger cars represented 22.13% of all passenger cars in circulation in the country. Figenbaum, Erik; Kolbenstvedt, Marika (June 2016). "Learning from Norwegian Battery Electric and Plug-in Hybrid Vehicle users". Institute of Transport Economics (TØI), Norwegian Centre for Transport Research. Retrieved 2016-08-17. TØI report 1492/2016. See pp. 1. Alister Doyle & Nerijus Adomaitis (2013-03-13). "Norway shows the way with electric cars, but at what cost?". Reuters. Retrieved 2013-03-15. Joly, David (2015-10-16). "Norway is A Model For Encouraging Electric Car Sales". The New York Times. Retrieved 2016-02-16. Agence France-Presse (2011-05-15). "Electric cars take off in Norway". The Independent. Archived from the original on May 17, 2011. Retrieved 2011-10-09. AVERE (2012-06-07). "Norwegian Parliament extends electric car initiatives until 2018". AVERE. Archived from the original on 2013-10-24. Retrieved 2012-07-20. Jose, Pontes (2021-01-07). "Netherlands December 2020". EVSales.com. Retrieved 2021-03-02. "Electric Vehicles Statistics in the Netherlands (up to and including December 2021)" (PDF). Rijksdienst voor Ondernemend Nederland (RVO) - Netherlands Enrerprise Agency. RVO. 2022-01-14. Retrieved 2022-01-19. As of 31 December 2021, there were 390,454 highway-legal light-duty plug-in electric vehicles in use in the Netherlands, consisting of 137,663 fully electric cars, 243,664 plug-in hybrid cars and 9,127 light duty plug-in commercial vehicles. Plug-in passenger cars represented 4.33% of all cars on Dutch roads at the end of 2021. The market share of the plug-in passenger car segment was 29.8% in 2021. Source includes figures from 2016 to 2021. Note: an improved methodology was introduced beginning January 2021. Some numbers in this new version are different than statistics published before in the old format. Cobb, Jeff (2016-09-01). "Americans Buy Their Half-Millionth Plug-in Car: Concentration of plug-in electrified car registrations per 1,000 people". HybridCars.com. Retrieved 2016-09-04. As of July 2016, Norway had a concentration of registered plug-in cars per 1,000 people of 21.52, the Netherlands of 5.63, California of 5.83, and the United States national average was 1.52. "Elektrisch Rijden – Personenauto's en laadpunten Analyse over 2018" [Electric Driving - Passenger cars and charging points - Analysis for 2018] (PDF). Rijksdienst voor Ondernemend Nederland (RVO) - Dutch National Office for Enterprising - (in Dutch). RVO. January 2019. Retrieved 2020-05-11. As of 31 December 2018, there were 145,882 highway legal light-duty plug-in electric vehicles registered in the Netherlands, consisting of 97,702 plug-in hybrids, 44,984 pure electric cars, and 3,196 all-electric light utility vans. With a total of 24,273 Mitsubishi Outlander P-HEVs registered by the end of December 2018, the plug-in hybrid is the all-time top selling plug-in electric vehicle in the Netherlands. The Tesla Model S is the best selling all-electric car with 12,990 units registered. Cobb, Jeff (2016-05-09). "Norway Is Fourth Country To Register 100,000 Plug-in Cars". HybridCars.com. Retrieved 2016-05-09. As of April 2016, the United States is the leading country market with a stock of about 450,000 highway legal light-duty plug-in electric vehicles delivered since 2008. China ranks second with around 300,000 units sold since 2011, followed by Japan with about 150,000 plug-in units sold since 2009, both through March 2016. European sales are led by Norway with over 100,000 units registered by the end of April 2016. Argonne National Laboratory (January 2024). "Light Duty Electric Drive Vehicles Monthly Sales Updates: Plug-In Vehicle Sales". Argonne National Laboratory. Retrieved 2024-01-18. Cumulatively, 1,402,371 PHEVs and BEVs have been sold in 2023. In total, 4,684,128 PHEVs and BEVs have been sold since 2010. PEVs were 9.1% of all passenger vehicle sales in 2023, up from 6.8% in 2022. "California Milestone, 1 Million EVs Sold: Tesla Played Huge Role". InsideEVs. 2022-01-09. Retrieved 2021-11-29. Kane, Mark (2019-01-24). "US Plug-In Electric Car Sales Charted: December 2018". InsideEVs. Retrieved 2019-01-24. See Graph: "Top 10 U.S. Plug-in cars (cumulative sales)" and "U.S. Plug-in Car Sales (cumulative)" Loveday, Steven (17 January 2020). "FINAL UPDATE: Quarterly Plug-In EV Sales Scorecard". InsideEVs.com. Retrieved 8 May 2020. See Chart: "2019 Monthly/Q4 Sales Chart : Annual" - Cumulative sales in the U.S. totaled 329,528 units in 2019, and the top selling models were the Tesla Model 3 with 158,925 units, the Toyota Prius Prime with 23,630, The Tesla Model X with 19,225, the Chevrolet Bolt EV with 16,418 and the Tesla Model S with 14,100 units. Kane, Mark (2020-01-11). "The Top 10 Plug-In Electric Cars In U.S. - 2019 Edition". InsideEVs.com. Retrieved 2020-05-19. At the end of 2019, the all-time top selling plug-in cars in the U.S. were the Tesla Model 3 with 300,471 units, Tesla Model S with 157,992, Chevrolet Volt with 157,054 units, Nissan Leaf with 141,907 and the Toyota Prius PHV with 109,003 (by September 2019). "Nissan LEAF sales surpass 100,000 in Japan" (Press release). Yokohama: Nissan. 2018-04-20. Retrieved 2018-12-02. International Energy Agency (IEA) (2021-04-29). "IEA Global EV Data Explorer". International Energy Agency (IEA). Retrieved 2022-01-22. Select Historical: "EV stock" and "EV stock share" + Transport mode: "Cars" and "Vans" + Region" "Japan" Kane, Mark (2016-04-02). "Plug-In Electric Car Sales Visualized From 2011 to 2015". InsideEVs.com. Retrieved 2016-06-19. Jose Pontes (2018-02-02). "Japan December 2017". EV Sales. Retrieved 2018-02-17. About 56,000 plug-in electric cars were sold in Japan in 2017. Pontes, Jose (2019-01-29). "Japan December 2018". EVSales.com. Retrieved 2019-02-01. A total of 52,013 plug-in cars were sold in Japan in 2018, with a market share of 1.0%. The Nissan Leaf was the top selling plug-in model with 25,722 units, followed by the Prius PHEV with 12,401 units. Shirouzu, Norihiko; Lienert, Paul (2015-10-28). "Auto power play: Japan's hydrogen car vs China's battery drive". Reuters. Retrieved 2016-06-19. Deign, Jason (2015-02-10). "Japan Makes a Big Bet on the Hydrogen Economy". Green Tech Media. Retrieved 2016-06-19. Jose, Pontes (2022-01-30). "World EV Sales — Tesla Model 3 Wins 4th Consecutive Best Seller Title In Record Year". CleanTechnica. Retrieved 2022-02-05. "The top 3 global best selling plug-in electric cars in 2021 were the Tesla Model 3 (500,713), the Wuling Hongguang Mini EV (424,138), and the Tesla Model Y (410,517). Nissan Leaf sales totaled 64,201 units and Chery eQ 68,821 units." Morris, James (2021-05-29). "Tesla Model 3 Is Now 16th Bestselling Car In The World". Forbes. Retrieved 2022-02-05. (The Model 3) ... is now the bestselling EV of all time as well, with over 800,000 units sold overall. Jose, Pontes (2021-02-02). "Global Top 20 - December 2020". EVSales.com. Retrieved 2021-02-03. "Global sales totaled 3,124,793 plug-in passenger cars in 2020, with a BEV to PHEV ratio of 69:31, and a global market share of 4%. The world's top selling plug-in car was the Tesla Model 3 with 365,240 units delivered, and Tesla was the top selling manufacturer of plug-in passenger cars in 2019 with 499,535 units, followed by VW with 220,220." C.J. Moore (2021-02-14). "Tesla's commanding lead in U.S. EVs illustrated by registration report". Automotive News. Retrieved 2021-02-14. According to Experian, in 2020 the top U.S. EVs by registrations were the Tesla Model 3 with 95,135 units. Gauthier, Michael (2020-02-19). "European Car Sales Climbed To 15.7 Million Units Last Year, Tesla Model 3 Is The EV Champion". Carscoops. Retrieved 2020-05-16. Sales of the Tesla Model 3 in Europe totaled 94,495 units in 2019 (Europe 23) and topped sales in the region in the EV segment. Attwood, James (2021-01-27). "Renault Zoe eclipses Tesla Model 3 as Europe's best-selling EV". AutoCar UK. Retrieved 2021-02-14. According to Jato Dynamics, the best selling plug-in electric models across 23 European markets in 2020, including the European Union member states, the UK, Norway and Switzerland, were the Renault Zoe (99,261), Tesla Model 3 (85,713), Volkswagen ID 3 (56,118), Hyundai Kona (47,796), and the VW e-Golf (33,650). The Mercedes-Benz A250e was the top selling plug-in hybrid in 2020, with 29,427 units, followed by the Mitsubishi Outlander (26,673), which led the market in 2019. "Nissan LEAF gets a new glow for 2022 with sharp design and advanced tech" (Press release). Paris: Nissan Europe. 2022-02-23. Retrieved 2022-03-04. The Nissan LEAF has always been about making advanced technology and the thrill of electric driving accessible to everyone with over 577,000 customers worldwide. Kane, Mark (6 September 2021). "Nissan Celebrates Sales Of 250,000 EVs In Europe". InsideEVs. Retrieved 7 September 2021. The cumulative number includes over 208,000 LEAFs (first- and second-generation), as well as about 42,000 Nissan e-NV200 medium-size vans. "Cumulative EV registrations by Make and Model". Elbil Statistikk. 2022-01-29. Retrieved 2022-01-29. Includes 20,661 used imports from neighboring countries as of 29 January 2022. Kane, Mark (2022-01-06). "US: Nissan LEAF Sales Improved In 2021". InsideEVs.com. Retrieved 2022-01-28. Kane, Mark (2022-01-12). "Japan: Nissan LEAF Sales Cruise At Roughly 11,000 In 2021". InsideEVs.com. Retrieved 2022-01-28. "Hongguang Mini EV sales reached 35,169 units in Sept, up 75% year-on-year". 13 October 2021. "Renault, Leader of EV Sales in Europe" (Press release). Île-de-France: Groupe Renault. 2020-12-07. Archived from the original on 2021-01-25. Retrieved 2021-02-21. ZOE remains the number 1 most sold electric passenger car in Europe. More than 268,000 ZOE have been sold in Europe since its launch (As of November 2020). Nissan (2020-12-03). "Nissan marks 10 years of LEAF sales, with over 500,000 sold worldwide". Automotive World. Retrieved 2020-12-11. Nissan today celebrated the 10th anniversary of the Nissan LEAF and the delivery of 500,000 LEAF vehicles since the model was first introduced. More than 148,000 have been sold in the United States Winton, Neil (2021-03-04). "Europe's Electric Car Sales Will Beat 1 Million In 2021, But Growth Will Slow Later; Report". Forbes. Retrieved 2021-08-30. Globally, according to Inovev, the biggest selling car in 2020 was the Tesla Model 3 – 365,240 with a 17% market share - followed by the Wuling Hong Guang Mini EV (127,651) Jose, Pontes (2021-02-04). "Global Electric Vehicle Top 20 — EV Sales Report". CleanTechnica. Retrieved 2022-02-05. Global sales of the Tesla Model Y totaled 79,734 units in 2020. "2020 Universal Registration Document" (PDF). 2021-03-15. Retrieved 2021-08-31. Since it launched its electric program, Renault has sold more than 370,000 electric vehicles in Europe and more than 397,000 worldwide: 284,800 ZOE, 59,150 KANGOO Z.E., 11,400 FLUENCE Z.E./SM3 Z.E., 4,600 K-Z.E., 31,100 TWIZY, 770 MASTER Z.E. and 5,100 TWINGO Electric in 2020. See pp. 28. Groupe Renault (January 2021). "Ventes Mensuelles - Statistiques commerciales mensuelles du groupe Renault" [Monthly Sales -Renault Group monthly sales statistics] (in French). Renault.com. Retrieved 2022-02-05. Sales figures includes passenger and light utility variants. Click on the corresponding link to download the file "MONTHLY-SALES_DEC-2021.XLSX - 692 KB", and open the tab "Sales by Model" to access sales figures for cumulative sales CYTD 2021. Global Zoe sales totaled 77,529 units inf 2021, including both passenger and LCV variants. Zentrum für Sonnenenergieund Wasserstoff-Forschung Baden-Württemberg (ZSW) (2021-03-09). "ZSW Data service renewable energies - Stock of electric cars worldwide". ZSW. Retrieved 2022-02-06. See table: Cumulated new registrations of electric cars (by models) Cumulative sales of the Tesla Model S totaled 308,700 and the end of 2020, Toyota Prius PHEV a total of 225,000, BAIC EC Series 205,600, BAIC EU Series 203,800 and the Tesla Model X 180,600. Shahan, Zachary (2021-10-05). "Tesla Quarterly Sales Growth From 2012 To 2021 — Like Climbing Mt. Everest". CleanTechnica. Retrieved 2022-02-06. See interactive chart broken by model: Tesla Vehicle Sales (Quarterly Deliveries)" Select the tab "Model S or Model X" for sales by quarter Q1 to Q3 (2021). Total sales during the first three quarters of 2021 totaled 10,900 Model S and 2,285 Model X cars. Jose, Pontes (2021-01-21). "China December 2020". EVSales.com. Retrieved 2022-02-07. "Sales of the Chery eQ totaled 38,214 units in 2020, and sales of the BAIC EU Series 23,365." Demandt, Bart (2020). "Chery eQ China Sales Figures". Car Sales Base. Retrieved 2022-02-07. Cumulative sales between 2014 and 2019 totaled 135,973 eQs. Car sales statistics from China only include domestic production and exclude imported models Nedela, Andrei (2022-01-28). "BMW i3 Production Reportedly Coming To An End In July". InsideEVs.com. Retrieved 2022-01-28. The i3 has sold over 220,000 examples around the world by now "BAIC EU-Series China Sales Figures". Car Sales Base. 2022. Retrieved 2022-02-08. See table with annual sales 2015-2021. "BAIC Beijing EC180 China Sales Figures". Car Sales Base. 2022. Retrieved 2022-02-08. See table with annual sales 2016-2021. "Mitsubishi Motors Introduces the All-New Outlander PHEV Model in New Zealand" (Press release). Tokyo: Mitsubishi Motors. 2022-03-04. Retrieved 2022-03-04. As of January 2022, about 300,000 Mitsubishi Outlander PHEVs have been sold worldwide. "Mitsubishi Outlander PHEV Hits 200,000 Global Sales Milestones" (Press release). Tokyo: Mitsubishi Motors Corporation (MMC). 2019-04-11. Retrieved 2019-04-12. Esther de Aragón (2020-06-11). "El Mitsubishi Outlander PHEV consigue llegar a la cifra récord de ventas de 250.000 unidades" [Mitsubishi Outlander PHEV achieves record sales of 250,000 units]. Automotive News Europe (in Spanish). movilidadeléctrica.com. Retrieved 2020-06-16. Kane, Mark (2019-03-13). "Outlander PHEV Is Best-Selling Mitsubishi In Europe". InsideEVs.com. Retrieved 2019-04-12. "New (MY19) Mitsubishi Outlander PHEV - Summer 2018" (PDF) (Press release). Mitsubishi Motors. 2018. Archived from the original (PDF) on 2018-10-30. Retrieved 2018-10-29. See tables in pp. 3-4. "Toyota sells 1.52 million electrified vehicles in 2017, three years ahead of 2020 target" (Press release). Toyota City, Japan: Toyota. 2018-02-02. Retrieved 2018-10-29. Kane, Mark (2019-01-25). "Top 3 Plug-In Hybrid Cars In U.S. In 2018: Prius Prime, Clarity, Volt". InsideEVs.com. Retrieved 2019-01-27. The Chevrolet Volt is the best selling plug-in electric car in the U.S. with 152,144 units sold through the end of 2018. American sales totaled 20,349 units in 2017 and 18,306 in 2018. Combined sales of both generations of the Toyota Prius plug-in hybrid totaled more than 93,000 units "46% of Toyota Motor Europe (TME) sales in H1 are self-charging hybrid electric vehicles" (Press release). Brussels: Toyota Europe Newsroom. 2018-07-11. Retrieved 2019-02-01. Toyota sold 1,693 Prius PHEV during the first half of 2018. Cobb, Jeff (2017-01-09). "Nissan's Quarter-Millionth Leaf Means It's The Best-Selling Plug-in Car In History". HybridCars.com. Retrieved 2017-01-10. As of December 2016, the Nissan Leaf is the world's best-selling plug-in car in history with more than 250,000 units delivered, followed by the Tesla Model S with over 158,000 sales, and the Volt/Ampera family of vehicles with 134,500 vehicles sold. "Chevrolet Volt Sales Numbers". GM Authority. January 2019. Retrieved 2019-02-01. Canadian sales totaled 4,313 units in 2017 and 4,114 in 2018 through November. Cain, Timothy (October 2018). "Chevrolet Volt Sales Figures". Good Car Bad Car. Retrieved 2018-12-01. "Buick Velite 5 ( Chinese Car Sales Data)". Car Sales Base. 17 May 2017. Retrieved 2019-02-01. Buick Velite 5 sales in China totaled 1,629 units in 2017 and 2,688 in 2018. Cobb, Jeff (2016-12-12). "Chevy Volt and Nissan Leaf Celebrate Their Sixth-Year Anniversary". HybridCars.com. Retrieved 2016-12-14. Global cumulative sales of plug-in electric vehicles totaled about 1.9 million units through November 2016. The Nissan Leaf is the world's leading plug-in car with more than 240,000 units delivered. As of November 2016, the Tesla Model S ranks next with over 151,000, followed by the Vollt/Ampera family of vehicles with 130,500 vehicles sold including over 10,000 Opel/Vauxhall Amperas sold in Europe, the Mitsubishi Outlander PHEV with about 116,500 units, and the Toyota Prius PHV with about 76,200. Kane, Mark (2022-01-05). "US: Toyota Sold Over 52,000 Plug-In Cars In 2021". InsideEVs.com. Retrieved 2022-02-10. "Toyota sold 25,042 units of the Prius Prime in the U.S. in 2021" "Toyota Motor Europe sales increase by +8% in 2021 to achieve a record 6.4% market share" (Press release). Brussels: Toyota Europe Newsroom. 2021-01-13. Retrieved 2022-02-10. "A total of 1,462 Toyota Prius PHEVs were sold in Europe in 2021." Kane, Mark (2018-01-26). "BYD #1 In World For Plug-In Electric Car Sales In 2017, Beats Tesla Again". InsideEVs.com. Retrieved 2018-10-31. During 2017, BYD Qin sales totaled 20,738 units and BYD Tang totaled 14,592 units. Staff (2017-01-19). "Best-selling China-made EVs in 2016". China Auto Web. Retrieved 2017-01-25. Three BYD Auto models topped the Chinese ranking of best-selling new energy passenger cars in 2016. The BYD Tang SUV was the top selling plug-in electric car in China in 2016 with 31,405 units sold, followed by the BYD Qin with 21,868 units sold, and ranking third overall in 2016 was the BYD e6 with 20,605 units. Staff (2016-02-13). "Best-selling China-made SUVs in 2015". China Auto Web. Retrieved 2016-01-17. A total of 18,375 Tangs were sold in China in 2015. Staff (2016-02-11). "Opel bringt 2017 neues Elektroauto" [Opel brings new electric car in 2017]. Autohaus.de (in German). Retrieved 2019-02-01. About 10,000 Opel Amperas were sold in Europe by the end of 2015. Jeff Cobb (2015-11-04). "GM Sells Its 100,000th Volt in October". HybridCars.com. Retrieved 2015-11-04.About 102,000 units of the Volt/Ampera family have been sold worldwide by the end of October 2015. Mike Costello (2015-04-25). "The Holden Volt is dead". Car Advice. Retrieved 2019-02-01. External links Clean Vehicle Rebate Project website Competitive Electric Town Transport, Institute of Transport Economics (TØI), Oslo, August 2015. Cradle-to-Grave Lifecycle Analysis of U.S. Light-Duty Vehicle-Fuel Pathways: A Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Economic Assessment of Current (2015) and Future (2025–2030) Technologies Archived 2020-08-12 at the Wayback Machine (includes BEVs and PHEVs), Argonne National Laboratory, June 2016. Driving Electrification – A Global Comparison of Fiscal Incentive Policy for Electric Vehicles, International Council on Clean Transportation, May 2014. Effects of Regional Temperature on Electric Vehicle Efficiency, Range, and Emissions in the United States, Tugce Yuksel and Jeremy Michalek, Carnegie Mellon University. 2015 eGallon Calculator: Compare the costs of driving with electricity, U.S. Department of Energy From Fiction to Reality: The Evolution of Electric Vehicles 2013 – 2015, JATO Dynamics, November 2015. Influence of driving patterns on life cycle cost and emissions of hybrid and plug-in electric vehicle powertrains, Carnegie MellonVehicle Electrification Group Modernizing vehicle regulations for electrification, International Council on Clean Transportation, October 2018. NHTSA Interim Guidance Electric and Hybrid Electric Vehicles Equipped with High Voltage Batteries – Vehicle Owner/General Public Archived 2013-12-09 at the Wayback Machine NHTSA Interim Guidance Electric and Hybrid Electric Vehicles Equipped with High Voltage Batteries – Law Enforcement/Emergency Medical Services/Fire Department Archived 2013-12-09 at the Wayback Machine New Energy Tax Credits for Electric Vehicles purchased in 2009 Overview of Tax Incentives for Electrically Chargeable Vehicles in the E.U. PEVs Frequently Asked Questions Plug-in Electric Vehicles: Challenges and Opportunities, American Council for an Energy-Efficient Economy, June 2013 Powering Ahead – The future of low-carbon cars and fuels, the RAC Foundation and UK Petroleum Industry Association, April 2013. Plugging In: A Consumer's Guide to the Electric Vehicle Electric Power Research Institute Plug-in America website Plug-in Electric Vehicle Deployment in the Northeast Georgetown Climate Center Plug-in List of Registered Charging Stations in the USA RechargeIT plug-in driving experiment (Google.org) Shades of Green – Electric Car's Carbon Emissions Around the Globe, Shrink that Footprint, February 2013. State of the Plug-in Electric Vehicle Market, Electrification Coalition, July 2013. The Great Debate – All-Electric Cars vs. Plug-In Hybrids, April 2014 UK Plug-in Car Grant website U.S. Federal & State Incentives & Laws US Tax Incentives for Plug-in Hybrids and Electric Cars


Euro area crisis Article Talk Read Edit View history Tools Appearance hide Text Small Standard Large Width Standard Wide Color (beta) Automatic Light Dark This is a good article. Click here for more information. From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia (Redirected from Eurozone crisis) This article may be too long to read and navigate comfortably. When this tag was added, its readable prose size was 20,000 words. Consider splitting content into sub-articles, condensing it, or adding subheadings. Please discuss this issue on the article's talk page. (January 2024) Long-term interest rates in eurozone Long-term interest rates (secondary market yields of government bonds with maturities of close to ten years) of all eurozone countries except Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania.[1] A yield being more than 4% points higher compared to the lowest comparable yield among the eurozone states, i.e. yields above 6% in September 2011, indicates that financial institutions have serious doubts about credit-worthiness of the state.[2] Part of a series on the Great Recession Major aspects Subprime mortgage crisis2000s energy crisis2000s United States housing bubble2000s United States housing market correction2007–2008 financial crisis2008–2010 automotive industry crisisDodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection ActEuropean debt crisis Causes Summit meetings Government response and policy proposals Business failures Regions Timeline vte The euro area crisis, often also referred to as the eurozone crisis, European debt crisis or European sovereign debt crisis, was a multi-year debt and financial crisis that took place in the European Union (EU) from 2009 until the mid to late 2010s. Several eurozone member states (Greece, Portugal, Ireland and Cyprus) were unable to repay or refinance their government debt or to bail out fragile banks under their national supervision without the assistance of other eurozone countries, the European Central Bank (ECB), or the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The euro area crisis was caused by a sudden stop of the flow of foreign capital into countries that had substantial current account deficits and were dependent on foreign lending. The crisis was worsened by the inability of states to resort to devaluation (reductions in the value of the national currency) due to having the Euro as a shared currency.[3][4] Debt accumulation in some eurozone members was in part due to macroeconomic differences among eurozone member states prior to the adoption of the euro. It also involved a process of cross-border financial contagion. The European Central Bank adopted an interest rate that incentivized investors in Northern eurozone members to lend to the South, whereas the South was incentivized to borrow because interest rates were very low. Over time, this led to the accumulation of deficits in the South, primarily by private economic actors.[3][4] A lack of fiscal policy coordination among eurozone member states contributed to imbalanced capital flows in the eurozone,[3][4] while a lack of financial regulatory centralization or harmonization among eurozone states, coupled with a lack of credible commitments to provide bailouts to banks, incentivized risky financial transactions by banks.[3][4] The detailed causes of the crisis varied from country to country. In several countries, private debts arising from a property bubble were transferred to sovereign debt as a result of banking system bailouts and government responses to slowing economies post-bubble. European banks own a significant amount of sovereign debt, such that concerns regarding the solvency of banking systems or sovereigns are negatively reinforcing.[5] The onset of crisis was in late 2009 when the Greek government disclosed that its budget deficits were far higher than previously thought.[3] Greece called for external help in early 2010, receiving an EU–IMF bailout package in May 2010.[3] European nations implemented a series of financial support measures such as the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) in early 2010 and the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) in late 2010. The ECB also contributed to solve the crisis by lowering interest rates and providing cheap loans of more than one trillion euro in order to maintain money flows between European banks. On 6 September 2012, the ECB calmed financial markets by announcing free unlimited support for all eurozone countries involved in a sovereign state bailout/precautionary programme from EFSF/ESM, through some yield lowering Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT).[6] Ireland and Portugal received EU-IMF bailouts In November 2010 and May 2011, respectively.[3] In March 2012, Greece received its second bailout. Both Cyprus received rescue packages in June 2012.[3] Return to economic growth and improved structural deficits enabled Ireland and Portugal to exit their bailout programmes in July 2014. Greece and Cyprus both managed to partly regain market access in 2014. Spain never officially received a bailout programme. Its rescue package from the ESM was earmarked for a bank recapitalisation fund and did not include financial support for the government itself. The crisis had significant adverse economic effects and labour market effects, with unemployment rates in Greece and Spain reaching 27%,[7] and was blamed for subdued economic growth, not only for the entire eurozone but for the entire European Union. The austerity policies implemented as a result of the crisis also produced a sharp rise in poverty levels and a significant increase in income inequality across Southern Europe.[8] It had a major political impact on the ruling governments in 10 out of 19 eurozone countries, contributing to power shifts in Greece, Ireland, France, Italy, Portugal, Spain, Slovenia, Slovakia, Belgium, and the Netherlands as well as outside of the eurozone in the United Kingdom.[9] Causes Main article: Causes of the euro area crisis Total (gross) government debt around the world as a percent of GDP by IMF (2012) European debt to GDP ratios Greece Italy Spain Portugal France Ireland Germany European 10 year bonds, before the Great Recession in Europe bonds floated together in parity Greece 10 year bond Portugal 10 year bond Ireland 10 year bond Spain 10 year bond Italy 10 year bond France 10 year bond Germany 10 year bond Greek bonds 20 year 15 year 10 year 5 year 1 year 3 month 1 month Portugal bonds during Portuguese financial crisis 30 year bond 10 year bond 5 year bond 1 year bond 3 month bond Ireland bond prices, Inverted yield curve in 2011[10] 15 year bond 10 year bond 5 year bond 3 year bond Spain bond rates during Spanish financial crisis 20 year bond 10 year bond 2 year bond 3 month bond Cyprus bonds 10 year 7 year 5 year 3 year 2 year The eurozone crisis resulted from the structural problem of the eurozone and a combination of complex factors. There is a consensus that the root of the eurozone crisis lay in a balance-of-payments crisis (a sudden stop of foreign capital into countries that were dependent on foreign lending), and that this crisis was worsened by the fact that states could not resort to devaluation (reductions in the value of the national currency to make exports more competitive in foreign markets).[3][4] Other important factors include the globalisation of finance; easy credit conditions during the 2002–2008 period that encouraged high-risk lending and borrowing practices;[11] the 2007–2008 financial crisis; international trade imbalances; real estate bubbles that have since burst; the Great Recession of 2008–2012; fiscal policy choices related to government revenues and expenses; and approaches used by states to bail out troubled banking industries and private bondholders, assuming private debt burdens or socializing losses. Macroeconomic divergence among eurozone member states led to imbalanced capital flows between the member states. Despite different macroeconomic conditions, the European Central Bank could only adopt one interest rate, choosing one that meant that real interest rates in Germany were high (relative to inflation) and low in Southern eurozone member states. This incentivized investors in Germany to lend to the South, whereas the South was incentivized to borrow (because interest rates were very low). Over time, this led to the accumulation of deficits in the South, primarily by private economic actors.[3][4] Comparative political economy explains the fundamental roots of the European crisis in varieties of national institutional structures of member countries (north vs. south), which conditioned their asymmetric development trends over time and made the union susceptible to external shocks. Imperfections in the Eurozone's governance construction to react effectively exacerbated macroeconomic divergence.[12] Eurozone member states could have alleviated the imbalances in capital flows and debt accumulation in the South by coordinating national fiscal policies. Germany could have adopted more expansionary fiscal policies (to boost domestic demand and reduce the outflow of capital) and Southern eurozone member states could have adopted more restrictive fiscal policies (to curtail domestic demand and reduce borrowing from the North).[3][4] Per the requirements of the 1992 Maastricht Treaty, governments pledged to limit their deficit spending and debt levels. However, some of the signatories, including Germany and France, failed to stay within the confines of the Maastricht criteria and turned to securitising future government revenues to reduce their debts and/or deficits, sidestepping best practice and ignoring international standards.[13] This allowed the sovereigns to mask their deficit and debt levels through a combination of techniques, including inconsistent accounting, off-balance-sheet transactions, and the use of complex currency and credit derivatives structures.[13] From late 2009 on, after Greece's newly elected, PASOK government stopped masking its true indebtedness and budget deficit, fears of sovereign defaults in certain European states developed in the public, and the government debt of several states was downgraded. The crisis subsequently spread to Ireland and Portugal, while raising concerns about Italy, Spain, and the European banking system, and more fundamental imbalances within the eurozone.[14] The under-reporting was exposed through a revision of the forecast for the 2009 budget deficit from "6–8%" of GDP (no greater than 3% of GDP was a rule of the Maastricht Treaty) to 12.7%, almost immediately after PASOK won the October 2009 Greek national elections. Large upwards revision of budget deficit forecasts were not limited to Greece: for example, in the United States forecast for the 2009 budget deficit was raised from $407 billion projected in the 2009 fiscal year budget, to $1.4 trillion, while in the United Kingdom there was a final forecast more than 4 times higher than the original.[15][16] In Greece, the low ("6–8%") forecast was reported until very late in the year (September 2009), clearly not corresponding to the actual situation. Fragmented financial regulation contributed to irresponsible lending in the years prior to the crisis. In the eurozone, each country had its own financial regulations, which allowed financial institutions to exploit gaps in monitoring and regulatory responsibility to resort to loans that were high-yield but very risky. Harmonization or centralization in financial regulations could have alleviated the problem of risky loans. Another factor that incentivized risky financial transaction was that national governments could not credibly commit not to bailout financial institutions who had undertaken risky loans, thus causing a moral hazard problem.[3][4] The Eurozone can incentivize overborrowing through a tragedy of the commons.[17] Evolution of the crisis See also: 2000s European sovereign debt crisis timeline and European debt crisis contagion MapWikimedia | © OpenStreetMap Public debt in 2009 (source: European Commission).[18] Legend: -    < 20%,    < 40%,    < 60% to Maastricht criteria; -    > 80%,    > 60% to Maastricht criteria; -    no data/not in the EU. Budget Deficit and Public Debt in 2009 The 2009 annual budget deficit and public debt both relative to GDP, for selected European countries. In the eurozone, the following number of countries were: SGP-limit compliant (3), Unhealthy (1), Critical (12), and Unsustainable (1). Budget Deficit and Public Debt to GDP in 2012 The 2012 annual budget deficit and public debt both relative to GDP, for all countries and UK. In the eurozone, the following number of countries were: SGP-limit compliant (3), Unhealthy (5), Critical (8), and Unsustainable (1). Debt profile of eurozone countries Debt profile of eurozone countries Duration: 179 hours, 5 minutes and 5 seconds.179:05:05 Change in national debt and deficit levels since 1980 The European debt crisis erupted in the wake of the Great Recession around late 2009, and was characterized by an environment of overly high government structural deficits and accelerating debt levels. When, as a negative repercussion of the Great Recession, the relatively fragile banking sector had suffered large capital losses, most states in Europe had to bail out several of their most affected banks with some supporting recapitalization loans, because of the strong linkage between their survival and the financial stability of the economy. As of January 2009, a group of 10 central and eastern European banks had already asked for a bailout.[19] At the time, the European Commission released a forecast of a 1.8% decline in EU economic output for 2009, making the outlook for the banks even worse.[19][20] The many public funded bank recapitalizations were one reason behind the sharply deteriorated debt-to-GDP ratios experienced by several European governments in the wake of the Great Recession. The main root causes for the four sovereign debt crises erupting in Europe were reportedly a mix of: weak actual and potential growth; competitive weakness; liquidation of banks and sovereigns; large pre-existing debt-to-GDP ratios; and considerable liability stocks (government, private, and non-private sector).[21] In the first few weeks of 2010, there was renewed anxiety about excessive national debt, with lenders demanding ever-higher interest rates from several countries with higher debt levels, deficits, and current account deficits. This in turn made it difficult for four out of eighteen eurozone governments to finance further budget deficits and repay or refinance existing government debt, particularly when economic growth rates were low, and when a high percentage of debt was in the hands of foreign creditors, as in the case of Greece and Portugal. The states that were adversely affected by the crisis faced a strong rise in interest rate spreads for government bonds as a result of investor concerns about their future debt sustainability. Four eurozone states had to be rescued by sovereign bailout programs, which were provided jointly by the International Monetary Fund and the European Commission, with additional support at the technical level from the European Central Bank. Together these three international organisations representing the bailout creditors became nicknamed "the Troika". To fight the crisis some governments have focused on raising taxes and lowering expenditures, which contributed to social unrest and significant debate among economists, many of whom advocate greater deficits when economies are struggling. Especially in countries where budget deficits and sovereign debts have increased sharply, a crisis of confidence has emerged with the widening of bond yield spreads and risk insurance on CDS between these countries and other EU member states, most importantly Germany.[22] By the end of 2011, Germany was estimated to have made more than €9 billion out of the crisis as investors flocked to safer but near zero interest rate German federal government bonds (bunds).[23] By July 2012 also the Netherlands, Austria, and Finland benefited from zero or negative interest rates. Looking at short-term government bonds with a maturity of less than one year the list of beneficiaries also includes Belgium and France.[24] While Switzerland (and Denmark)[24] equally benefited from lower interest rates, the crisis also harmed its export sector due to a substantial influx of foreign capital and the resulting rise of the Swiss franc. In September 2011 the Swiss National Bank surprised currency traders by pledging that "it will no longer tolerate a euro-franc exchange rate below the minimum rate of 1.20 francs", effectively weakening the Swiss franc. This is the biggest Swiss intervention since 1978.[25] Despite sovereign debt having risen substantially in only a few eurozone countries, with the three most affected countries Greece, Ireland and Portugal collectively only accounting for 6% of the eurozone's gross domestic product (GDP),[26] it became a perceived problem for the area as a whole,[27] leading to concerns about further contagion of other European countries and a possible break-up of the eurozone. In total, the debt crisis forced five out of 17 eurozone countries to seek help from other nations by the end of 2012. In mid-2012, due to successful fiscal consolidation and implementation of structural reforms in the countries being most at risk and various policy measures taken by EU leaders and the ECB (see below), financial stability in the eurozone improved significantly and interest rates fell steadily. This also greatly diminished contagion risk for other eurozone countries. As of October 2012 only 3 out of 17 eurozone countries, namely Greece, Portugal, and Cyprus still battled with long-term interest rates above 6%.[28] By early January 2013, successful sovereign debt auctions across the eurozone but most importantly in Ireland, Spain, and Portugal, showed investors' confidence in the ECB backstop.[29] As of May 2014 only two countries (Greece and Cyprus) still needed help from third parties.[30] Greece Main article: Greek government-debt crisis Greek debt compared to eurozone average Debt of Greece compared to eurozone average since 1999 Greece's public debt, gross domestic product (GDP), and public debt-to-GDP ratio. Graph based on "ameco" data from the European Commission. Picture of a Greek demonstration in May 2011 100,000 people protest against austerity measures in front of parliament building in Athens, 29 May 2011 The Greek economy had fared well for much of the 20th century, with high growth rates and low public debt.[31] By 2007 (i.e., before the 2007–2008 financial crisis), it was still one of the fastest growing in the eurozone, with a public debt-to-GDP that did not exceed 104%,[31] but it was associated with a large structural deficit.[32] As the world economy was affected by the 2007–2008 financial crisis, Greece was hit especially hard because its main industries—shipping and tourism—were especially sensitive to changes in the business cycle. The government spent heavily to keep the economy functioning and the country's debt increased accordingly. The Greek crisis was triggered by the turmoil of the Great Recession, which led the budget deficits of several Western nations to reach or exceed 10% of GDP.[31] In the case of Greece, the high budget deficit (which, after several corrections, had been allowed to reach 10.2% and 15.1% of GDP in 2008 and 2009, respectively[33]) was coupled with a high public debt to GDP ratio (which, until then, was relatively stable for several years, at just above 100% of GDP, as calculated after all corrections).[31] Thus, the country appeared to lose control of its public debt to GDP ratio, which already reached 127% of GDP in 2009.[34] In contrast, Italy was able (despite the crisis) to keep its 2009 budget deficit at 5.1% of GDP,[33] which was crucial, given that it had a public debt to GDP ratio comparable to Greece's.[34] In addition, being a member of the Eurozone, Greece had essentially no autonomous monetary policy flexibility.[citation needed] Finally, there was an effect of controversies about Greek statistics (due the aforementioned drastic budget deficit revisions which led to an increase in the calculated value of the Greek public debt by about 10%, a public debt-to-GDP ratio of about 100% until 2007), while there have been arguments about a possible effect of media reports. Consequently, Greece was "punished" by the markets which increased borrowing rates, making it impossible for the country to finance its debt since early 2010. Despite the drastic upwards revision of the forecast for the 2009 budget deficit in October 2009, Greek borrowing rates initially rose rather slowly. By April 2010 it was apparent that the country was becoming unable to borrow from the markets; on 23 April 2010, the Greek government requested an initial loan of €45 billion from the EU and International Monetary Fund (IMF) to cover its financial needs for the remaining part of 2010.[35] A few days later Standard & Poor's slashed Greece's sovereign debt rating to BB+ or "junk" status amid fears of default,[36] in which case investors were liable to lose 30–50% of their money.[36] Stock markets worldwide and the euro currency declined in response to the downgrade.[37] On 1 May 2010, the Greek government announced a series of austerity measures (the third austerity package within months)[38] to secure a three-year €110 billion loan (First Economic Adjustment Programme).[39] This was met with great anger by some Greeks, leading to massive protests, riots, and social unrest throughout Greece.[40] The Troika, a tripartite committee formed by the European Commission, the European Central Bank and the International Monetary Fund (EC, ECB and IMF), offered Greece a second bailout loan worth €130 billion in October 2011 (Second Economic Adjustment Programme), but with the activation being conditional on implementation of further austerity measures and a debt restructure agreement.[41] Surprisingly, the Greek prime minister George Papandreou first answered that call by announcing a December 2011 referendum on the new bailout plan,[42][43] but had to back down amidst strong pressure from EU partners, who threatened to withhold an overdue €6 billion loan payment that Greece needed by mid-December.[42][44] On 10 November 2011, Papandreou resigned following an agreement with the New Democracy party and the Popular Orthodox Rally to appoint non-MP technocrat Lucas Papademos as new prime minister of an interim national union government, with responsibility for implementing the needed austerity measures to pave the way for the second bailout loan.[45][46] All the implemented austerity measures have helped Greece bring down its primary deficit—i.e., fiscal deficit before interest payments—from €24.7bn (10.6% of GDP) in 2009 to just €5.2bn (2.4% of GDP) in 2011,[47][48] but as a side-effect they also contributed to a worsening of the Greek recession, which began in October 2008 and only became worse in 2010 and 2011.[49] The Greek GDP had its worst decline in 2011 with −6.9%,[50] a year where the seasonal adjusted industrial output ended 28.4% lower than in 2005,[51][52] and with 111,000 Greek companies going bankrupt (27% higher than in 2010).[53][54] As a result, Greeks have lost about 40% of their purchasing power since the start of the crisis,[55] they spend 40% less on goods and services,[56] and the seasonal adjusted unemployment rate grew from 7.5% in September 2008 to a record high of 27.9% in June 2013,[57] while the youth unemployment rate rose from 22.0% to as high as 62%.[58][59] Youth unemployment ratio hit 16.1 per cent in 2012.[60][61][62] Overall the share of the population living at "risk of poverty or social exclusion" did not increase notably during the first two years of the crisis. The figure was measured to 27.6% in 2009 and 27.7% in 2010 (only being slightly worse than the EU27-average at 23.4%),[63] but for 2011 the figure was now estimated to have risen sharply above 33%.[64] In February 2012, an IMF official negotiating Greek austerity measures admitted that excessive spending cuts were harming Greece.[47] The IMF predicted the Greek economy to contract by 5.5% by 2014. Harsh austerity measures led to an actual contraction after six years of recession of 17%.[65] Some economic experts argue that the best option for Greece, and the rest of the EU, would be to engineer an "orderly default", allowing Athens to withdraw simultaneously from the eurozone and reintroduce its national currency the drachma at a debased rate.[66][67] If Greece were to leave the euro, the economic and political consequences would be devastating. According to Japanese financial company Nomura an exit would lead to a 60% devaluation of the new drachma. Analysts at French bank BNP Paribas added that the fallout from a Greek exit would wipe 20% off Greece's GDP, increase Greece's debt-to-GDP ratio to over 200%, and send inflation soaring to 40–50%.[68] Also UBS warned of hyperinflation, a bank run and even "military coups and possible civil war that could afflict a departing country".[69][70] Eurozone National Central Banks (NCBs) may lose up to €100bn in debt claims against the Greek national bank through the ECB's TARGET2 system. The Deutsche Bundesbank alone may have to write off €27bn.[71] To prevent this from happening, the Troika (EC, IMF and ECB) eventually agreed in February 2012 to provide a second bailout package worth €130 billion,[72] conditional on the implementation of another harsh austerity package that would reduce Greek expenditure by €3.3bn in 2012 and another €10bn in 2013 and 2014.[48] Then, in March 2012, the Greek government did finally default on parts of its debt - as there was a new law passed by the government so that private holders of Greek government bonds (banks, insurers and investment funds) would "voluntarily" accept a bond swap with a 53.5% nominal write-off, partly in short-term EFSF notes, partly in new Greek bonds with lower interest rates and the maturity prolonged to 11–30 years (independently of the previous maturity).[73] This counted as a "credit event" and holders of credit default swaps were paid accordingly.[74] It was the world's biggest debt restructuring deal ever done, affecting some €206 billion of Greek government bonds.[75] The debt write-off had a size of €107 billion, and caused the Greek debt level to temporarily fall from roughly €350bn to €240bn in March 2012 (it would subsequently rise again, due to the resulting bank recapitalization needs), with improved predictions about the debt burden.[76][77][78][79] In December 2012, the Greek government bought back €21 billion ($27 billion) of their bonds for 33 cents on the euro.[80] Creditors of Greece 2011 and 2015 Critics such as the director of LSE's Hellenic Observatory[81] argue that the billions of taxpayer euros are not saving Greece but financial institutions.[82] Of all €252bn in bailouts between 2010 and 2015, just 10% has found its way into financing continued public deficit spending on the Greek government accounts. Much of the rest went straight into refinancing the old stock of Greek government debt (originating mainly from the high general government deficits being run in previous years), which was mainly held by private banks and hedge funds by the end of 2009.[83] According to LSE, "more than 80% of the rescue package" is going to refinance the expensive old maturing Greek government debt towards private creditors (mainly private banks outside Greece), replacing it with new debt to public creditors on more favourable terms, that is to say paying out their private creditors with new debt issued by its new group of public creditors known as the Troika.[84] The shift in liabilities from European banks to European taxpayers has been staggering. One study found that the public debt of Greece to foreign governments, including debt to the EU/IMF loan facility and debt through the Eurosystem, increased from €47.8bn to €180.5bn (+132,7bn) between January 2010 and September 2011,[85] while the combined exposure of foreign banks to (public and private) Greek entities was reduced from well over €200bn in 2009 to around €80bn (−€120bn) by mid-February 2012.[86] As of 2015, 78% of Greek debt is owed to public sector institutions, primarily the EU.[83] According to a study by the European School of Management and Technology only €9.7bn or less than 5% of the first two bailout programs went to the Greek fiscal budget, while most of the money went to French and German banks[87] (In June 2010, France's and Germany's foreign claims vis-a-vis Greece were $57bn and $31bn respectively. German banks owned $60bn of Greek, Portuguese, Irish and Spanish government debt and $151bn of banks' debt of these countries).[88] According to a leaked document, dated May 2010, the IMF was fully aware of the fact that the Greek bailout program was aimed at rescuing the private European banks – mainly from France and Germany. A number of IMF Executive Board members from India, Brazil, Argentina, Russia, and Switzerland criticized this in an internal memorandum, pointing out that Greek debt would be unsustainable. However their French, German and Dutch colleagues refused to reduce the Greek debt or to make (their) private banks pay.[89][90] In mid May 2012, the crisis and impossibility to form a new government after elections and the possible victory by the anti-austerity axis led to new speculations Greece would have to leave the eurozone shortly.[91][92][93] This phenomenon became known as "Grexit" and started to govern international market behaviour.[94][95][96] The centre-right's narrow victory in 17 June election gave hope that Greece would honour its obligations and stay in the Euro-zone. Due to a delayed reform schedule and a worsened economic recession, the new government immediately asked the Troika to be granted an extended deadline from 2015 to 2017 before being required to restore the budget into a self-financed situation; which in effect was equal to a request of a third bailout package for 2015–16 worth €32.6bn of extra loans.[97][98] On 11 November 2012, facing a default by the end of November, the Greek parliament passed a new austerity package worth €18.8bn,[99] including a "labour market reform" and "mid term fiscal plan 2013–16".[100][101] In return, the Eurogroup agreed on the following day to lower interest rates and prolong debt maturities and to provide Greece with additional funds of around €10bn for a debt-buy-back programme. The latter allowed Greece to retire about half of the €62 billion in debt that Athens owes private creditors, thereby shaving roughly €20 billion off that debt. This should bring Greece's debt-to-GDP ratio down to 124% by 2020 and well below 110% two years later.[102] Without agreement the debt-to-GDP ratio would have risen to 188% in 2013.[103] The Financial Times special report on the future of the European Union argues that the liberalisation of labour markets has allowed Greece to narrow the cost-competitiveness gap with other southern eurozone countries by approximately 50% over the past two years.[104] This has been achieved primary through wage reductions, though businesses have reacted positively.[104] The opening of product and service markets is proving tough because interest groups are slowing reforms.[104] The biggest challenge for Greece is to overhaul the tax administration with a significant part of annually assessed taxes not paid.[104] Poul Thomsen, the IMF official who heads the bailout mission in Greece, stated that "in structural terms, Greece is more than halfway there".[104] In June 2013, Equity index provider MSCI reclassified Greece as an emerging market, citing failure to qualify on several criteria for market accessibility.[105] Both of the latest bailout programme audit reports, released independently by the European Commission and IMF in June 2014, revealed that even after transfer of the scheduled bailout funds and full implementation of the agreed adjustment package in 2012, there was a new forecast financing gap of: €5.6bn in 2014, €12.3bn in 2015, and €0bn in 2016. The new forecast financing gaps will need either to be covered by the government's additional lending from private capital markets, or to be countered by additional fiscal improvements through expenditure reductions, revenue hikes or increased amount of privatizations.[106][107] Due to an improved outlook for the Greek economy, with return of a government structural surplus in 2012, return of real GDP growth in 2014, and a decline of the unemployment rate in 2015,[108] it was possible for the Greek government to return to the bond market during the course of 2014, for the purpose of fully funding its new extra financing gaps with additional private capital. A total of €6.1bn was received from the sale of three-year and five-year bonds in 2014, and the Greek government now plans to cover its forecast financing gap for 2015 with additional sales of seven-year and ten-year bonds in 2015.[109] The latest recalculation of the seasonally adjusted quarterly GDP figures for the Greek economy revealed that it had been hit by three distinct recessions in the turmoil of the 2007–2008 financial crisis:[110] Q3-2007 until Q4-2007 (duration = 2 quarters) Q2-2008 until Q1-2009 (duration = 4 quarters, referred to as being part of the Great Recession) Q3-2009 until Q4-2013 (duration = 18 quarters, referred to as being part of the eurozone crisis) Greece experienced positive economic growth in each of the three first quarters of 2014.[110] The return of economic growth, along with the now existing underlying structural budget surplus of the general government, build the basis for the debt-to-GDP ratio to start a significant decline in the coming years ahead,[111] which will help ensure that Greece will be labelled "debt sustainable" and fully regain complete access to private lending markets in 2015.[a] While the Greek government-debt crisis hereby is forecast officially to end in 2015, many of its negative repercussions (e.g. a high unemployment rate) are forecast still to be felt during many of the subsequent years.[111] During the second half of 2014, the Greek government again negotiated with the Troika. The negotiations were this time about how to comply with the programme requirements, to ensure activation of the payment of its last scheduled eurozone bailout tranche in December 2014, and about a potential update of its remaining bailout programme for 2015–16. When calculating the impact of the 2015 fiscal budget presented by the Greek government, there was a disagreement, with the calculations of the Greek government showing it fully complied with the goals of its agreed "Midterm fiscal plan 2013–16", while the Troika calculations were less optimistic and returned a not covered financing gap at €2.5bn (being required to be covered by additional austerity measures). As the Greek government insisted their calculations were more accurate than those presented by the Troika, they submitted an unchanged fiscal budget bill on 21 November, to be voted for by the parliament on 7 December. The Eurogroup was scheduled to meet and discuss the updated review of the Greek bailout programme on 8 December (to be published on the same day), and the potential adjustments to the remaining programme for 2015–16. There were rumours in the press that the Greek government has proposed immediately to end the previously agreed and continuing IMF bailout programme for 2015–16, replacing it with the transfer of €11bn unused bank recapitalization funds currently held as reserve by the Hellenic Financial Stability Fund (HFSF), along with establishment of a new precautionary Enhanced Conditions Credit Line (ECCL) issued by the European Stability Mechanism. The ECCL instrument is often used as a follow-up precautionary measure, when a state has exited its sovereign bailout programme, with transfers only taking place if adverse financial/economic circumstances materialize, but with the positive effect that it help calm down financial markets as the presence of this extra backup guarantee mechanism makes the environment safer for investors.[114] The positive economic outlook for Greece—based on the return of seasonally adjusted real GDP growth across the first three quarters of 2014—was replaced by a new fourth recession starting in Q4-2014.[115] This new fourth recession was widely assessed as being direct related to the premature snap parliamentary election called by the Greek parliament in December 2014 and the following formation of a Syriza-led government refusing to accept respecting the terms of its current bailout agreement. The rising political uncertainty of what would follow caused the Troika to suspend all scheduled remaining aid to Greece under its second programme, until such time as the Greek government either accepted the previously negotiated conditional payment terms or alternatively could reach a mutually accepted agreement of some new updated terms with its public creditors.[116] This rift caused a renewed increasingly growing liquidity crisis (both for the Greek government and Greek financial system), resulting in plummeting stock prices at the Athens Stock Exchange while interest rates for the Greek government at the private lending market spiked to levels once again making it inaccessible as an alternative funding source. Faced by the threat of a sovereign default and potential resulting exit of the eurozone, some final attempts were made by the Greek government in May 2015 to settle an agreement with the Troika about some adjusted terms for Greece to comply with in order to activate the transfer of the frozen bailout funds in its second programme. In the process, the Eurogroup granted a six-month technical extension of its second bailout programme to Greece. On 5 July 2015, the citizens of Greece voted decisively (a 61% to 39% decision with 62.5% voter turnout) to reject a referendum that would have given Greece more bailout help from other EU members in return for increased austerity measures. As a result of this vote, Greece's finance minister Yanis Varoufakis stepped down on 6 July. Greece was the first developed country not to make a payment to the IMF on time, in 2015 (payment was made with a 20-day delay[117][118]). Eventually, Greece agreed on a third bailout package in August 2015. Between 2009 and 2017 the Greek government debt rose from €300 bn to €318 bn, i.e. by only about 6% (thanks, in part, to the 2012 debt restructuring);[34][119] however, during the same period, the critical debt-to-GDP ratio shot up from 127% to 179%[34] basically due to the severe GDP drop during the handling of the crisis.[31] Greece's bailouts successfully ended (as declared) on 20 August 2018.[120] Ireland Main article: Post-2008 Irish economic downturn Irish debt compared to eurozone average Debt of Ireland compared to eurozone average since 1999 Public debt, gross domestic product (GDP), and public debt-to-GDP ratio. Graph based on "ameco" data from the European Commission. The Irish sovereign debt crisis arose not from government over-spending, but from the state guaranteeing the six main Irish-based banks who had financed a property bubble. On 29 September 2008, Finance Minister Brian Lenihan Jnr issued a two-year guarantee to the banks' depositors and bondholders.[121] The guarantees were subsequently renewed for new deposits and bonds in a slightly different manner. In 2009, a National Asset Management Agency (NAMA) was created to acquire large property-related loans from the six banks at a market-related "long-term economic value".[122] Irish banks had lost an estimated 100 billion euros, much of it related to defaulted loans to property developers and homeowners made in the midst of the property bubble, which burst around 2007. The economy collapsed during 2008. Unemployment rose from 4% in 2006 to 14% by 2010, while the national budget went from a surplus in 2007 to a deficit of 32% GDP in 2010, the highest in the history of the eurozone, despite austerity measures.[123][124] With Ireland's credit rating falling rapidly in the face of mounting estimates of the banking losses, guaranteed depositors and bondholders cashed in during 2009–10, and especially after August 2010. (The necessary funds were borrowed from the central bank.) With yields on Irish Government debt rising rapidly, it was clear that the Government would have to seek assistance from the EU and IMF, resulting in a €67.5 billion "bailout" agreement of 29 November 2010.[125] Together with additional €17.5 billion coming from Ireland's own reserves and pensions, the government received €85 billion,[126] of which up to €34 billion was to be used to support the country's failing financial sector (only about half of this was used in that way following stress tests conducted in 2011).[127] In return the government agreed to reduce its budget deficit to below three per cent by 2015.[127] In April 2011, despite all the measures taken, Moody's downgraded the banks' debt to junk status.[128] In July 2011, European leaders agreed to cut the interest rate that Ireland was paying on its EU/IMF bailout loan from around 6% to between 3.5% and 4% and to double the loan time to 15 years. The move was expected to save the country between 600 and 700 million euros per year.[129] On 14 September 2011, in a move to further ease Ireland's difficult financial situation, the European Commission announced it would cut the interest rate on its €22.5 billion loan coming from the European Financial Stability Mechanism, down to 2.59 per cent—which is the interest rate the EU itself pays to borrow from financial markets.[130] The Euro Plus Monitor report from November 2011 attests to Ireland's vast progress in dealing with its financial crisis, expecting the country to stand on its own feet again and finance itself without any external support from the second half of 2012 onwards.[131] According to the Centre for Economics and Business Research, Ireland's export-led recovery "will gradually pull its economy out of its trough". As a result of the improved economic outlook, the cost of 10-year government bonds has fallen from its record high at 12% in mid July 2011 to below 4% in 2013 (see the graph "Long-term Interest Rates"). On 26 July 2012, for the first time since September 2010, Ireland was able to return to the financial markets, selling over €5 billion in long-term government debt, with an interest rate of 5.9% for the 5-year bonds and 6.1% for the 8-year bonds at sale.[132] In December 2013, after three years on financial life support, Ireland finally left the EU/IMF bailout programme, although it retained a debt of €22.5 billion to the IMF; in August 2014, early repayment of €15 billion was being considered, which would save the country €375 million in surcharges.[133] Despite the end of the bailout the country's unemployment rate remains high and public sector wages are still around 20% lower than at the beginning of the crisis.[134] Government debt reached 123.7% of GDP in 2013.[135] On 13 March 2013, Ireland managed to regain complete lending access on financial markets, when it successfully issued €5bn of 10-year maturity bonds at a yield of 4.3%.[136] Ireland ended its bailout programme as scheduled in December 2013, without any need for additional financial support.[113] Portugal Main article: 2010–2014 Portuguese financial crisis Portuguese debt compared to eurozone average Debt of Portugal compared to eurozone average since 1999 Portugal's public debt, gross domestic product (GDP), and public debt-to-GDP ratio. Graph based on "ameco" data from the European Commission. Unlike other European countries that were also severely hit by the Great Recession in the late 2000s and eventually received bailouts in the early 2010s (such as Greece and Ireland), Portugal had the characteristic that the 2000s were not marked by economic growth, but were already a period of economic crisis, marked by stagnation, two recessions (in 2002–03[137] and 2008–09[138]) and government-sponsored fiscal austerity in order to reduce the budget deficit to the limits allowed by the European Union's Stability and Growth Pact.[139][140][141] According to a report by the Diário de Notícias,[142] Portugal had allowed considerable slippage in state-managed public works and inflated top management and head officer bonuses and wages in the period between the Carnation Revolution in 1974 and 2010. Persistent and lasting recruitment policies boosted the number of redundant public servants. Risky credit, public debt creation, and European structural and cohesion funds were mismanaged across almost four decades.[143] When the global crisis disrupted the markets and the world economy, together with the US subprime mortgage crisis and the eurozone crisis, Portugal was one of the first economies to succumb, and was affected very deeply. In the summer of 2010, Moody's Investors Service cut Portugal's sovereign bond rating,[144] which led to an increased pressure on Portuguese government bonds.[145] In the first half of 2011, Portugal requested a €78 billion IMF-EU bailout package in a bid to stabilise its public finances.[146] Portugal's debt was in September 2012 forecast by the Troika to peak at around 124% of GDP in 2014, followed by a firm downward trajectory after 2014. Previously the Troika had predicted it would peak at 118.5% of GDP in 2013, so the developments proved to be a bit worse than first anticipated, but the situation was described as fully sustainable and progressing well. As a result, from the slightly worse economic circumstances, the country has been given one more year to reduce the budget deficit to a level below 3% of GDP, moving the target year from 2013 to 2014. The budget deficit for 2012 has been forecast to end at 5%. The recession in the economy is now also projected to last until 2013, with GDP declining 3% in 2012 and 1% in 2013; followed by a return to positive real growth in 2014.[147] Unemployment rate increased to over 17% by end of 2012 but it has since decreased gradually to 10,5% as of November 2016.[148] As part of the bailout programme, Portugal was required to regain complete access to financial markets by September 2013. The first step towards this target was successfully taken on 3 October 2012, when the country managed to regain partial market access by selling a bond series with 3-year maturity. Once Portugal regains complete market access, measured as the moment it successfully manages to sell a bond series with a full 10-year maturity, it is expected to benefit from interventions by the ECB, which announced readiness to implement extended support in the form of some yield-lowering bond purchases (OMTs),[147] aiming to bring governmental interest rates down to sustainable levels. A peak for the Portuguese 10-year governmental interest rates happened on 30 January 2012, where it reached 17.3% after the rating agencies had cut the governments credit rating to "non-investment grade" (also referred to as "junk").[149] As of December 2012, it has been more than halved to only 7%.[citation needed] A successful return to the long-term lending market was made by the issuing of a 5-year maturity bond series in January 2013,[150] and the state regained complete lending access when it successfully issued a 10-year maturity bond series on 7 May 2013.[113][151] According to the Financial Times special report on the future of the European Union, the Portuguese government has "made progress in reforming labour legislation, cutting previously generous redundancy payments by more than half and freeing smaller employers from collective bargaining obligations, all components of Portugal's €78 billion bailout program".[104] Additionally, unit labour costs have fallen since 2009, working practices are liberalizing, and industrial licensing is being streamlined.[104] On 18 May 2014, Portugal left the EU bailout mechanism without additional need for support,[30] as it had already regained a complete access to lending markets back in May 2013,[113] and with its latest issuing of a 10-year government bond being successfully completed with a rate as low as 3.59%.[152] Portugal still has many tough years ahead. During the crisis, Portugal's government debt increased from 93 to 139 percent of GDP.[152] On 3 August 2014, Banco de Portugal announced the country's second biggest bank Banco Espírito Santo would be split in two after losing the equivalent of $4.8 billion in the first 6 months of 2014, sending its shares down by 89 percent. Spain See also: 2008–2014 Spanish financial crisis Spanish debt compared to eurozone average Debt of Spain compared to eurozone average since 1999 Spain had a comparatively low debt level among advanced economies prior to the crisis.[153] Its public debt relative to GDP in 2010 was only 60%, more than 20 points less than Germany, France or the US, and more than 60 points less than Italy or Greece.[154][155] Debt was largely avoided by the ballooning tax revenue from the housing bubble, which helped accommodate a decade of increased government spending without debt accumulation.[156] When the bubble burst, Spain spent large amounts of money on bank bailouts. In May 2012, Bankia received a 19 billion euro bailout,[157] on top of the previous 4.5 billion euros to prop up Bankia.[158] Questionable accounting methods disguised bank losses.[159] During September 2012, regulators indicated that Spanish banks required €59 billion (US$77 billion) in additional capital to offset losses from real estate investments.[160] The bank bailouts and the economic downturn increased the country's deficit and debt levels and led to a substantial downgrading of its credit rating. To build up trust in the financial markets, the government began to introduce austerity measures and in 2011 it passed a law in congress to approve an amendment to the Spanish Constitution to require a balanced budget at both the national and regional level by 2020.[161] The amendment states that public debt can not exceed 60% of GDP, though exceptions would be made in case of a natural catastrophe, economic recession or other emergencies.[162][163] As one of the largest eurozone economies (larger than Greece, Portugal and Ireland combined[164]) the condition of Spain's economy is of particular concern to international observers. Under pressure from the United States, the IMF, other European countries and the European Commission[165][166] the Spanish governments eventually succeeded in trimming the deficit from 11.2% of GDP in 2009 to 7.1% in 2013.[167] Nevertheless, in June 2012, Spain became a prime concern for the Euro-zone[168] when interest on Spain's 10-year bonds reached the 7% level and it faced difficulty in accessing bond markets. This led the Eurogroup on 9 June 2012 to grant Spain a financial support package of up to €100 billion.[169] The funds will not go directly to Spanish banks, but be transferred to a government-owned Spanish fund responsible to conduct the needed bank recapitalisations (FROB), and thus it will be counted for as additional sovereign debt in Spain's national account.[170][171][172] An economic forecast in June 2012 highlighted the need for the arranged bank recapitalisation support package, as the outlook promised a negative growth rate of 1.7%, unemployment rising to 25%, and a continued declining trend for housing prices.[164] In September 2012 the ECB removed some of the pressure from Spain on financial markets, when it announced its "unlimited bond-buying plan", to be initiated if Spain would sign a new sovereign bailout package with EFSF/ESM.[173][174] Strictly speaking, Spain was not hit by a sovereign debt-crisis in 2012, as the financial support package that they received from the ESM was earmarked for a bank recapitalization fund and did not include financial support for the government itself. According to the latest debt sustainability analysis published by the European Commission in October 2012, the fiscal outlook for Spain, if assuming the country will stick to the fiscal consolidation path and targets outlined by the country's current EDP programme, will result in a debt-to-GDP ratio reaching its maximum at 110% in 2018—followed by a declining trend in subsequent years. In regards of the structural deficit the same outlook has promised, that it will gradually decline to comply with the maximum 0.5% level required by the Fiscal Compact in 2022/2027.[175] Though Spain was suffering with 27% unemployment and the economy was shrinking 1.4% in 2013, Mariano Rajoy's conservative government has pledged to speed up reforms, according to the Financial Times special report on the future of the European Union.[176] "Madrid is reviewing its labour market and pension reforms and has promised by the end of this year to liberalize its heavily regulated professions".[104] But Spain is benefiting from improved labour cost competitiveness.[104] "They have not lost export market share," says Eric Chaney, chief economist at Axa.[104] "If credit starts flowing again, Spain could surprise us".[104] On 23 January 2014, as foreign investor confidence in the country has been restored, Spain formally exited the EU/IMF bailout mechanism.[177] By the end of March 2018, unemployment rate of Spain has fallen to 16.1%[178] and the debt is 98,30% of the GDP.[179] Cyprus Main article: 2012–2013 Cypriot financial crisis Cypriot debt compared to eurozone average Debt of Cyprus compared to eurozone average since 1999 The economy of the small island of Cyprus with 840,000 people was hit by several huge blows in and around 2012 including, amongst other things, the €22 billion exposure of Cypriot banks to the Greek debt haircut, the downgrading of the Cypriot economy into junk status by international rating agencies and the inability of the government to refund its state expenses.[180] On 25 June 2012, the Cypriot Government requested a bailout from the European Financial Stability Facility or the European Stability Mechanism, citing difficulties in supporting its banking sector from the exposure to the Greek debt haircut.[181] On 30 November the Troika (the European Commission, the International Monetary Fund, and the European Central Bank) and the Cypriot Government had agreed on the bailout terms with only the amount of money required for the bailout remaining to be agreed upon.[182] Bailout terms include strong austerity measures, including cuts in civil service salaries, social benefits, allowances and pensions and increases in VAT, tobacco, alcohol and fuel taxes, taxes on lottery winnings, property, and higher public health care charges.[183][184][185] At the insistence of the Commission negotiators, at first the proposal also included an unprecedented one-off levy of 6.7% for deposits up to €100,000 and 9.9% for higher deposits on all domestic bank accounts.[186] Following public outcry, the eurozone finance ministers were forced to change the levy, excluding deposits of less than €100,000, and introducing a higher 15.6% levy on deposits of above €100,000 ($129,600)—in line with the EU minimum deposit guarantee.[187] This revised deal was also rejected by the Cypriot parliament on 19 March 2013 with 36 votes against, 19 abstentions and one not present for the vote.[188] The final agreement was settled on 25 March 2013, with the proposal to close the most troubled Laiki Bank, which helped significantly to reduce the needed loan amount for the overall bailout package, so that €10bn was sufficient without need for imposing a general levy on bank deposits.[189] The final conditions for activation of the bailout package was outlined by the Troika's MoU agreement, which was endorsed in full by the Cypriot House of Representatives on 30 April 2013. It includes:[189][190] Recapitalisation of the entire financial sector while accepting a closure of the Laiki bank, Implementation of the anti-money laundering framework in Cypriot financial institutions, Fiscal consolidation to help bring down the Cypriot governmental budget deficit, Structural reforms to restore competitiveness and macroeconomic imbalances, Privatization programme. The Cypriot debt-to-GDP ratio is on this background now forecasted only to peak at 126% in 2015 and subsequently decline to 105% in 2020, and thus considered to remain within sustainable territory.[190] Although the bailout support programme feature sufficient financial transfers until March 2016, Cyprus began slowly to regain its access to the private lending markets already in June 2014. At this point of time, the government sold €0.75bn of bonds with a five-year maturity, to the tune of a 4.85% yield. A continued selling of bonds with a ten-year maturity, which would equal a regain of complete access to the private lending market (and mark the end of the era with need for bailout support), is expected to happen sometime in 2015.[191] The Cypriot minister of finance recently confirmed, that the government plan to issue two new European Medium Term Note (EMTN) bonds in 2015, likely shortly ahead of the expiry of another €1.1bn bond on 1 July and a second expiry of a €0.9bn bond on 1 November.[192] As announced in advance, the Cypriot government issued €1bn of seven-year bonds with a 4.0% yield by the end of April 2015.[193][194] MapWikimedia | © OpenStreetMap Public debt in 2017 (source: factsmaps, The World Factbook, Central Intelligence Agency)[195] Legend: -    < 30%,    < 60% to Maastricht criteria; -    > 90%,    > 60% to Maastricht criteria Policy reactions EU emergency measures The table below provides an overview of the financial composition of all bailout programs being initiated for EU member states, since the global financial crisis erupted in September 2008. EU member states outside the eurozone (marked with yellow in the table) have no access to the funds provided by EFSF/ESM, but can be covered with rescue loans from EU's Balance of Payments programme (BoP), IMF and bilateral loans (with an extra possible assistance from the Worldbank/EIB/EBRD if classified as a development country). Since October 2012, the ESM as a permanent new financial stability fund to cover any future potential bailout packages within the eurozone, has effectively replaced the now defunct GLF + EFSM + EFSF funds. Whenever pledged funds in a scheduled bailout program were not transferred in full, the table has noted this by writing "Y out of X". vte EU member	Time span	IMF[196][197] (billion €)	World Bank[197] (billion €)	EIB / EBRD (billion €)	Bilateral[196] (billion €)	BoP[197] (billion €)	GLF[198] (billion €)	EFSM[196] (billion €)	EFSF[196] (billion €)	ESM[196] (billion €)	Bailout in total (billion €) Cyprus I1	Dec.2011-Dec.2012	–	–	–	2.5	–	–	–	–	–	2.51 Cyprus II2	May 2013-Mar.2016	1.0	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	6.3 out of 9.0	7.3 out of 10.02 Greece I+II3	May 2010-Jun.2015	32.1 out of 48.1	–	–	–	–	52.9	–	130.9 out of 144.6	–	215.9 out of 245.63 Greece III4	Aug.2015-Aug.2018	(proportion of 86, to be decided Oct.2015)	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	(up till 86)	864 Hungary5	Nov.2008-Oct.2010	9.1 out of 12.5	1.0	–	–	5.5 out of 6.5	–	–	–	–	15.6 out of 20.05 Ireland6	Nov.2010-Dec.2013	22.5	–	–	4.8	–	–	22.5	18.4	–	68.26 Latvia7	Dec.2008-Dec.2011	1.1 out of 1.7	0.4	0.1	0.0 out of 2.2	2.9 out of 3.1	–	–	–	–	4.5 out of 7.57 Portugal8	May 2011-Jun 2014	26.5 out of 27.4	–	–	–	–	–	24.3 out of 25.6	26.0	–	76.8 out of 79.08 Romania I9	May 2009-Jun 2011	12.6 out of 13.6	1.0	1.0	–	5.0	–	–	–	–	19.6 out of 20.69 Romania II10	Mar 2011-Jun 2013	0.0 out of 3.6	1.15	–	–	0.0 out of 1.4	–	–	–	–	1.15 out of 6.1510 Romania III11	Oct 2013-Sep 2015	0.0 out of 2.0	2.5	–	–	0.0 out of 2.0	–	–	–	–	2.5 out of 6.511 Spain12	July 2012-Dec.2013	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	41.3 out of 100	41.3 out of 10012 Total payment	Nov.2008-Aug.2018	104.9	6.05	1.1	7.3	13.4	52.9	46.8	175.3	136.3	544.05 1 Cyprus received in late December 2011 a €2.5bn bilateral emergency bailout loan from Russia, to cover its governmental budget deficits and a refinancing of maturing governmental debts until 31 December 2012.[199][200][201] Initially the bailout loan was supposed to be fully repaid in 2016, but as part of establishment of the later following second Cypriot bailout programme, Russia accepted a delayed repayment in eight biannual tranches throughout 2018–2021 - while also lowering its requested interest rate from 4.5% to 2.5%.[202] 2 When it became evident Cyprus needed an additional bailout loan to cover the government's fiscal operations throughout 2013–2015, on top of additional funding needs for recapitalization of the Cypriot financial sector, negotiations for such an extra bailout package started with the Troika in June 2012.[203][204][205] In December 2012 a preliminary estimate indicated, that the needed overall bailout package should have a size of €17.5bn, comprising €10bn for bank recapitalisation and €6.0bn for refinancing maturing debt plus €1.5bn to cover budget deficits in 2013+2014+2015, which in total would have increased the Cypriot debt-to-GDP ratio to around 140%.[206] The final agreed package however only entailed a €10bn support package, financed partly by IMF (€1bn) and ESM (€9bn),[207] because it was possible to reach a fund saving agreement with the Cypriot authorities, featuring a direct closure of the most troubled Laiki Bank and a forced bail-in recapitalisation plan for Bank of Cyprus.[208][209] The final conditions for activation of the bailout package was outlined by the Troika's MoU agreement in April 2013, and include: (1) Recapitalisation of the entire financial sector while accepting a closure of the Laiki bank, (2) Implementation of the anti-money laundering framework in Cypriot financial institutions, (3) Fiscal consolidation to help bring down the Cypriot governmental budget deficit, (4) Structural reforms to restore competitiveness and macroeconomic imbalances, (5) Privatization programme. The Cypriot debt-to-GDP ratio is on this background now forecasted only to peak at 126% in 2015 and subsequently decline to 105% in 2020, and thus considered to remain within sustainable territory. The €10bn bailout comprise €4.1bn spend on debt liabilities (refinancing and amortization), 3.4bn to cover fiscal deficits, and €2.5bn for the bank recapitalization. These amounts will be paid to Cyprus through regular tranches from 13 May 2013 until 31 March 2016. According to the programme this will be sufficient, as Cyprus during the programme period in addition will: Receive €1.0bn extraordinary revenue from privatization of government assets, ensure an automatic roll-over of €1.0bn maturing Treasury Bills and €1.0bn of maturing bonds held by domestic creditors, bring down the funding need for bank recapitalization with €8.7bn — of which 0.4bn is reinjection of future profit earned by the Cyprus Central Bank (injected in advance at the short term by selling its gold reserve) and €8.3bn origin from the bail-in of creditors in Laiki bank and Bank of Cyprus.[210] The forced automatic rollover of maturing bonds held by domestic creditors were conducted in 2013, and equaled according to some credit rating agencies a "selective default" or "restrictive default", mainly because the fixed yields of the new bonds did not reflect the market rates — while maturities at the same time automatically were extended.[202] Cyprus successfully concluded its three-year financial assistance programme at the end of March 2016, having borrowed a total of €6.3 billion from the European Stability Mechanism and €1 billion from the International Monetary Fund.[211][212] The remaining €2.7 billion of the ESM bailout was never dispensed, due to the Cypriot government's better than expected finances over the course of the programme.[211][212] 3 Many sources list the first bailout was €110bn followed by the second on €130bn. When you deduct €2.7bn due to Ireland+Portugal+Slovakia opting out as creditors for the first bailout, and add the extra €8.2bn IMF has promised to pay Greece for the years in 2015-16 (through a programme extension implemented in December 2012), the total amount of bailout funds sums up to €245.6bn.[198][213] The first bailout resulted in a payout of €20.1bn from IMF and €52.9bn from GLF, during the course of May 2010 until December 2011,[198] and then it was technically replaced by a second bailout package for 2012-2016, which had a size of €172.6bn (€28bn from IMF and €144.6bn from EFSF), as it included the remaining committed amounts from the first bailout package.[214] All committed IMF amounts were made available to the Greek government for financing its continued operation of public budget deficits and to refinance maturing public debt held by private creditors and IMF. The payments from EFSF were earmarked to finance €35.6bn of PSI restructured government debt (as part of a deal where private investors in return accepted a nominal haircut, lower interest rates and longer maturities for their remaining principal), €48.2bn for bank recapitalization,[213] €11.3bn for a second PSI debt buy-back,[215] while the remaining €49.5bn were made available to cover continued operation of public budget deficits.[216] The combined programme was scheduled to expire in March 2016, after IMF had extended their programme period with extra loan tranches from January 2015 to March 2016 (as a mean to help Greece service the total sum of interests accruing during the lifespan of already issued IMF loans), while the Eurogroup at the same time opted to conduct their reimbursement and deferral of interests outside their bailout programme framework — with the EFSF programme still being planned to end in December 2014.[217] Due to the refusal by the Greek government to comply with the agreed conditional terms for receiving a continued flow of bailout transfers, both IMF and the Eurogroup opted to freeze their programmes since August 2014. To avoid a technical expiry, the Eurogroup postponed the expiry date for its frozen programme to 30 June 2015, paving the way within this new deadline for the possibility of transfer terms first to be renegotiated and then finally complied with to ensure completion of the programme.[217] As Greece withdrew unilaterally from the process of settling renegotiated terms and time extension for the completion of the programme, it expired uncompleted on 30 June 2015. Hereby, Greece lost the possibility to extract €13.7bn of remaining funds from the EFSF (€1.0bn unused PSI and Bond Interest facilities, €10.9bn unused bank recapitalization funds and a €1.8bn frozen tranche of macroeconomic support),[218][219] and also lost the remaining SDR 13.561bn of IMF funds[220] (being equal to €16.0bn as per the SDR exchange rate on 5 Jan 2012[221]), although those lost IMF funds might be recouped if Greece settles an agreement for a new third bailout programme with ESM — and passes the first review of such programme. 4 A new third bailout programme worth €86bn in total, jointly covered by funds from IMF and ESM, will be disbursed in tranches from August 2015 until August 2018.[222] The programme was approved to be negotiated on 17 July 2015,[223] and approved in full detail by the publication of an ESM facility agreement on 19 August 2015.[224][225] IMF's transfer of the "remainder of its frozen I+II programme" and their new commitment also to contribute with a part of the funds for the third bailout, depends on a successful prior completion of the first review of the new third programme in October 2015.[226] Due to a matter of urgency, EFSM immediately conducted a temporary €7.16bn emergency transfer to Greece on 20 July 2015,[227][228] which was fully overtaken by ESM when the first tranche of the third program was conducted 20 August 2015.[225] Due to being temporary bridge financing and not part of an official bailout programme, the table do not display this special type of EFSM transfer. The loans of the program has an average maturity of 32.5 years and carry a variable interest rate (currently at 1%). The program has earmarked transfer of up till €25bn for bank recapitalization purposes (to be used to the extent deemed needed by the annual stress tests of European Banking Supervision), and also include establishment of a new privatization fund to conduct sale of Greek public assets — of which the first generated €25bn will be used for early repayment of the bailout loans earmarked for bank recapitalizations. Potential debt relief for Greece, in the form of longer grace and payment periods, will be considered by the European public creditors after the first review of the new programme, by October/November 2015.[225] 5 Hungary recovered faster than expected, and thus did not receive the remaining €4.4bn bailout support scheduled for October 2009-October 2010.[197][229] IMF paid in total 7.6 out of 10.5 billion SDR,[230] equal to €9.1bn out of €12.5bn at current exchange rates.[231] 6 In Ireland the National Treasury Management Agency also paid €17.5bn for the program on behalf of the Irish government, of which €10bn were injected by the National Pensions Reserve Fund and the remaining €7.5bn paid by "domestic cash resources",[232] which helped increase the program total to €85bn.[196] As this extra amount by technical terms is an internal bail-in, it has not been added to the bailout total. As of 31 March 2014 all committed funds had been transferred, with EFSF even paying €0.7bn more, so that the total amount of funds had been marginally increased from €67.5bn to €68.2bn.[233] 7 Latvia recovered faster than expected, and thus did not receive the remaining €3.0bn bailout support originally scheduled for 2011.[234][235] 8 Portugal completed its support programme as scheduled in June 2014, one month later than initially planned due to awaiting a verdict by its constitutional court, but without asking for establishment of any subsequent precautionary credit line facility.[236] By the end of the programme all committed amounts had been transferred, except for the last tranche of €2.6bn (1.7bn from EFSM and 0.9bn from IMF),[237] which the Portuguese government declined to receive.[238][239] The reason why the IMF transfers still mounted to slightly more than the initially committed €26bn, was due to its payment with SDR's instead of euro — and some favorable developments in the EUR-SDR exchange rate compared to the beginning of the programme.[240] In November 2014, Portugal received its last delayed €0.4bn tranche from EFSM (post programme),[241] hereby bringing its total drawn bailout amount up at €76.8bn out of €79.0bn. 9 Romania recovered faster than expected, and thus did not receive the remaining €1.0bn bailout support originally scheduled for 2011.[242][243] 10 Romania had a precautionary credit line with €5.0bn available to draw money from if needed, during the period March 2011-June 2013; but entirely avoided to draw on it.[244][245][197][246] During the period, the World Bank however supported with a transfer of €0.4bn as a DPL3 development loan programme and €0.75bn as results based financing for social assistance and health.[247] 11 Romania had a second €4bn precautionary credit line established jointly by IMF and EU, of which IMF accounts for SDR 1.75134bn = €2bn, which is available to draw money from if needed during the period from October 2013 to 30 September 2015. In addition the World Bank also made €1bn available under a Development Policy Loan with a deferred drawdown option valid from January 2013 through December 2015.[248] The World Bank will throughout the period also continue providing earlier committed development programme support of €0.891bn,[249][250] but this extra transfer is not accounted for as "bailout support" in the third programme due to being "earlier committed amounts". In April 2014, the World Bank increased their support by adding the transfer of a first €0.75bn Fiscal Effectiveness and Growth Development Policy Loan,[251] with the final second FEG-DPL tranch on €0.75bn (worth about $1bn) to be contracted in the first part of 2015.[252] No money had been drawn from the precautionary credit line, as of May 2014. 12 Spain's €100bn support package has been earmarked only for recapitalisation of the financial sector.[253] Initially an EFSF emergency account with €30bn was available, but nothing was drawn, and it was cancelled again in November 2012 after being superseded by the regular ESM recapitalisation programme.[254] The first ESM recapitalisation tranch of €39.47bn was approved 28 November,[255][256] and transferred to the bank recapitalisation fund of the Spanish government (FROB) on 11 December 2012.[254] A second tranch for "category 2" banks on €1.86n was approved by the Commission on 20 December,[257] and finally transferred by ESM on 5 February 2013.[258] "Category 3" banks were also subject for a possible third tranch in June 2013, in case they failed before then to acquire sufficient additional capital funding from private markets.[259] During January 2013, all "category 3" banks however managed to fully recapitalise through private markets and thus will not be in need for any State aid. The remaining €58.7bn of the initial support package is thus not expected to be activated, but will stay available as a fund with precautionary capital reserves to possibly draw upon if unexpected things happen — until 31 December 2013.[253][260] In total €41.3bn out of the available €100bn was transferred.[261] Upon the scheduled exit of the programme, no follow-up assistance was requested.[262] European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) Main article: European Financial Stability Facility On 9 May 2010, the 27 EU member states agreed to create the European Financial Stability Facility, a legal instrument[263] aiming at preserving financial stability in Europe, by providing financial assistance to eurozone states in difficulty. The EFSF can issue bonds or other debt instruments on the market with the support of the German Debt Management Office to raise the funds needed to provide loans to eurozone countries in financial troubles, recapitalise banks or buy sovereign debt.[264] Emissions of bonds are backed by guarantees given by the euro area member states in proportion to their share in the paid-up capital of the European Central Bank. The €440 billion lending capacity of the facility is jointly and severally guaranteed by the eurozone countries' governments and may be combined with loans up to €60 billion from the European Financial Stabilisation Mechanism (reliant on funds raised by the European Commission using the EU budget as collateral) and up to €250 billion from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to obtain a financial safety net up to €750 billion.[265] The EFSF issued €5 billion of five-year bonds in its inaugural benchmark issue 25 January 2011, attracting an order book of €44.5 billion. This amount is a record for any sovereign bond in Europe, and €24.5 billion more than the European Financial Stabilisation Mechanism (EFSM), a separate European Union funding vehicle, with a €5 billion issue in the first week of January 2011.[266] On 29 November 2011, the member state finance ministers agreed to expand the EFSF by creating certificates that could guarantee up to 30% of new issues from troubled euro-area governments, and to create investment vehicles that would boost the EFSF's firepower to intervene in primary and secondary bond markets.[267] The transfers of bailout funds were performed in tranches over several years and were conditional on the governments simultaneously implementing a package of fiscal consolidation, structural reforms, privatization of public assets and setting up funds for further bank recapitalization and resolution. Reception by financial markets Stocks surged worldwide after the EU announced the EFSF's creation. The facility eased fears that the Greek debt crisis would spread,[268] and this led to some stocks rising to the highest level in a year or more.[269] The euro made its biggest gain in 18 months,[270] before falling to a new four-year low a week later.[271] Shortly after the euro rose again as hedge funds and other short-term traders unwound short positions and carry trades in the currency.[272] Commodity prices also rose following the announcement.[273] The dollar Libor held at a nine-month high.[274] Default swaps also fell.[275] The VIX closed down a record almost 30%, after a record weekly rise the preceding week that prompted the bailout.[276] The agreement is interpreted as allowing the ECB to start buying government debt from the secondary market, which is expected to reduce bond yields.[277] As a result, Greek bond yields fell sharply from over 10% to just over 5%.[278] Asian bonds yields also fell with the EU bailout.[279] Usage of EFSF funds The EFSF only raises funds after an aid request is made by a country.[280] As of the end of July 2012, it has been activated various times. In November 2010, it financed €17.7 billion of the total €67.5 billion rescue package for Ireland (the rest was loaned from individual European countries, the European Commission and the IMF). In May 2011 it contributed one-third of the €78 billion package for Portugal. As part of the second bailout for Greece, the loan was shifted to the EFSF, amounting to €164 billion (130bn new package plus 34.4bn remaining from Greek Loan Facility) throughout 2014.[281] On 20 July 2012, European finance ministers sanctioned the first tranche of a partial bailout worth up to €100 billion for Spanish banks.[282] This leaves the EFSF with €148 billion[282] or an equivalent of €444 billion in leveraged firepower.[283] The EFSF is set to expire in 2013, running some months parallel to the permanent €500 billion rescue funding program called the European Stability Mechanism (ESM), which will start operating as soon as member states representing 90% of the capital commitments have ratified it. (see section: ESM) On 13 January 2012, Standard & Poor's downgraded France and Austria from AAA rating, lowered Spain, Italy (and five other[284]) euro members further. Shortly after, S&P also downgraded the EFSF from AAA to AA+.[284][285] European Financial Stabilisation Mechanism (EFSM) Main article: European Financial Stabilisation Mechanism On 5 January 2011, the European Union created the European Financial Stabilisation Mechanism (EFSM), an emergency funding programme reliant upon funds raised on the financial markets and guaranteed by the European Commission using the budget of the European Union as collateral.[286] It runs under the supervision of the Commission[287] and aims at preserving financial stability in Europe by providing financial assistance to EU member states in economic difficulty.[288] The Commission fund, backed by all 27 European Union members, has the authority to raise up to €60 billion[289] and is rated AAA by Fitch, Moody's and Standard & Poor's.[290] Under the EFSM, the EU successfully placed in the capital markets an €5 billion issue of bonds as part of the financial support package agreed for Ireland, at a borrowing cost for the EFSM of 2.59%.[291] Like the EFSF, the EFSM was replaced by the permanent rescue funding programme ESM, which was launched in September 2012.[292] Brussels agreement and aftermath On 26 October 2011, leaders of the 17 eurozone countries met in Brussels and agreed on a 50% write-off of Greek sovereign debt held by banks, a fourfold increase (to about €1 trillion) in bail-out funds held under the European Financial Stability Facility, an increased mandatory level of 9% for bank capitalisation within the EU and a set of commitments from Italy to take measures to reduce its national debt. Also pledged was €35 billion in "credit enhancement" to mitigate losses likely to be suffered by European banks. European Commission president José Manuel Barroso characterised the package as a set of "exceptional measures for exceptional times".[293][294] The package's acceptance was put into doubt on 31 October when Greek Prime Minister George Papandreou announced that a referendum would be held so that the Greek people would have the final say on the bailout, upsetting financial markets.[295] On 3 November 2011 the promised Greek referendum on the bailout package was withdrawn by Prime Minister Papandreou. In late 2011, Landon Thomas in the New York Times noted that some, at least, European banks were maintaining high dividend payout rates and none were getting capital injections from their governments even while being required to improve capital ratios. Thomas quoted Richard Koo, an economist based in Japan, an expert on that country's banking crisis, and specialist in balance sheet recessions, as saying: I do not think Europeans understand the implications of a systemic banking crisis. ... When all banks are forced to raise capital at the same time, the result is going to be even weaker banks and an even longer recession—if not depression. ... Government intervention should be the first resort, not the last resort. Beyond equity issuance and debt-to-equity conversion, then, one analyst "said that as banks find it more difficult to raise funds, they will move faster to cut down on loans and unload lagging assets" as they work to improve capital ratios. This latter contraction of balance sheets "could lead to a depression", the analyst said.[296] Reduced lending was a circumstance already at the time being seen in a "deepen[ing] crisis" in commodities trade finance in western Europe.[297] Final agreement on the second bailout package In a marathon meeting on 20/21 February 2012 the Eurogroup agreed with the IMF and the Institute of International Finance on the final conditions of the second bailout package worth €130 billion. The lenders agreed to increase the nominal haircut from 50% to 53.5%. EU Member States agreed to an additional retroactive lowering of the interest rates of the Greek Loan Facility to a level of just 150 basis points above Euribor. Furthermore, governments of Member States where central banks currently hold Greek government bonds in their investment portfolio commit to pass on to Greece an amount equal to any future income until 2020. Altogether this should bring down Greece's debt to between 117%[76] and 120.5% of GDP by 2020.[78] European Central Bank ECB Securities Markets Program (SMP) ECB Securities Markets Program (SMP) covering bond purchases since May 2010 See also: European Central Bank § The ECB's response to the euro crisis The European Central Bank (ECB) has taken a series of measures aimed at reducing volatility in the financial markets and at improving liquidity.[298] In May 2010 it took the following actions: It began open market operations buying government and private debt securities,[299] reaching €219.5 billion in February 2012,[300] though it simultaneously absorbed the same amount of liquidity to prevent a rise in inflation.[301] According to Rabobank economist Elwin de Groot, there is a "natural limit" of €300 billion the ECB can sterilise.[302] It reactivated the dollar swap lines[303] with Federal Reserve support.[304] It changed its policy regarding the necessary credit rating for loan deposits, accepting as collateral all outstanding and new debt instruments issued or guaranteed by the Greek government, regardless of the nation's credit rating. The move took some pressure off Greek government bonds, which had just been downgraded to junk status, making it difficult for the government to raise money on capital markets.[305] On 30 November 2011, the ECB, the US Federal Reserve, the central banks of Canada, Japan, Britain and the Swiss National Bank provided global financial markets with additional liquidity to ward off the debt crisis and to support the real economy. The central banks agreed to lower the cost of dollar currency swaps by 50 basis points to come into effect on 5 December 2011. They also agreed to provide each other with abundant liquidity to make sure that commercial banks stay liquid in other currencies.[306] With the aim of boosting the recovery in the eurozone economy by lowering interest rates for businesses, the ECB cut its bank rates in multiple steps in 2012–2013, reaching an historic low of 0.25% in November 2013. The lowered borrowing rates have also caused the euro to fall in relation to other currencies, which is hoped will boost exports from the eurozone and further aid the recovery.[307] With inflation falling to 0.5% in May 2014, the ECB again took measures to stimulate the eurozone economy, which grew at just 0.2% during the first quarter of 2014.[308] (Deflation or very low inflation encourages holding cash, causing a decrease in purchases). On 5 June, the central bank cut the prime interest rate to 0.15%, and set the deposit rate at −0.10%.[309] The latter move in particular was seen as "a bold and unusual move", as a negative interest rate had never been tried on a wide-scale before.[308] Additionally, the ECB announced it would offer long-term four-year loans at the cheap rate (normally the rate is primarily for overnight lending), but only if the borrowing banks met strict conditions designed to ensure the funds ended up in the hands of businesses instead of, for example, being used to buy low risk government bonds.[308] Collectively, the moves are aimed at avoiding deflation, devaluing the euro to make exportation more viable, and at increasing "real world" lending.[308][309] Stock markets reacted strongly to the ECB rate cuts. The German DAX index, for example, set a record high the day the new rates were announced.[309] Meanwhile, the euro briefly fell to a four-month low against the dollar.[308] However, due to the unprecedented nature of the negative interest rate, the long-term effects of the stimulus measures are hard to predict.[309] Bank president Mario Draghi signalled the central bank was willing to do whatever it takes to turn around the eurozone economies, remarking "Are we finished? The answer is no".[308] He laid the groundwork for large-scale bond repurchasing, a controversial idea known as quantitative easing.[309] Resignations In September 2011, Jürgen Stark became the second German after Axel A. Weber to resign from the ECB Governing Council in 2011. Weber, the former Deutsche Bundesbank president, was once thought to be a likely successor to Jean-Claude Trichet as bank president. He and Stark were both thought to have resigned due to "unhappiness with the ECB's bond purchases, which critics say erode the bank's independence". Stark was "probably the most hawkish" member of the council when he resigned. Weber was replaced by his Bundesbank successor Jens Weidmann, while Belgium's Peter Praet took Stark's original position, heading the ECB's economics department.[310] Long Term Refinancing Operation (LTRO) See also: European Central Bank § Long-term refinancing operation On 22 December 2011, the ECB[311] started the biggest infusion of credit into the European banking system in the euro's 13-year history. Under its Long Term Refinancing Operations (LTROs) it loaned €489 billion to 523 banks for an exceptionally long period of three years at a rate of just one per cent.[312] Previous refinancing operations matured after three, six, and twelve months.[313] The by far biggest amount of €325 billion was tapped by banks in Greece, Ireland, Italy and Spain.[314] This way the ECB tried to make sure that banks have enough cash to pay off €200 billion of their own maturing debts in the first three months of 2012, and at the same time keep operating and loaning to businesses so that a credit crunch does not choke off economic growth. It also hoped that banks would use some of the money to buy government bonds, effectively easing the debt crisis.[315] On 29 February 2012, the ECB held a second auction, LTRO2, providing 800 eurozone banks with further €529.5 billion in cheap loans.[316] Net new borrowing under the €529.5 billion February auction was around €313 billion; out of a total of €256 billion existing ECB lending (MRO + 3m&6m LTROs), €215 billion was rolled into LTRO2.[317] ECB lending has largely replaced inter-bank lending. Spain has €365 billion and Italy has €281 billion of borrowings from the ECB (June 2012 data). Germany has €275 billion on deposit.[318] Reorganization of the European banking system On 16 June 2012 the European Central Bank together with other European leaders hammered out plans for the ECB to become a bank regulator and to form a deposit insurance program to augment national programs. Other economic reforms promoting European growth and employment were also proposed.[319] Outright Monetary Transactions (OMTs) On 6 September 2012, the ECB announced to offer additional financial support in the form of some yield-lowering bond purchases (OMT), for all eurozone countries involved in a sovereign state bailout program from EFSF/ESM.[6] A eurozone country can benefit from the program if -and for as long as- it is found to suffer from stressed bond yields at excessive levels; but only at the point of time where the country possesses/regains a complete market access -and only if the country still complies with all terms in the signed Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) agreement.[6][173] Countries receiving a precautionary programme rather than a sovereign bailout will, by definition, have complete market access and thus qualify for OMT support if also suffering from stressed interest rates on its government bonds. In regards of countries receiving a sovereign bailout (Ireland, Portugal and Greece), they will on the other hand not qualify for OMT support before they have regained complete market access, which will normally only happen after having received the last scheduled bailout disbursement.[6][112] Despite none OMT programmes were ready to start in September/October, the financial markets straight away took notice of the additionally planned OMT packages from ECB, and started slowly to price-in a decline of both short-term and long-term interest rates in all European countries previously suffering from stressed and elevated interest levels (as OMTs were regarded as an extra potential back-stop to counter the frozen liquidity and highly stressed rates; and just the knowledge about their potential existence in the very near future helped to calm the markets). European Stability Mechanism (ESM) Main article: European Stability Mechanism The European Stability Mechanism (ESM) is a permanent rescue funding programme to succeed the temporary European Financial Stability Facility and European Financial Stabilisation Mechanism in July 2012[292] but it had to be postponed until after the Federal Constitutional Court of Germany had confirmed the legality of the measures on 12 September 2012.[320][321] The permanent bailout fund entered into force for 16 signatories on 27 September 2012. It became effective in Estonia on 4 October 2012 after the completion of their ratification process.[322] On 16 December 2010 the European Council agreed a two line amendment to the EU Lisbon Treaty to allow for a permanent bail-out mechanism to be established[323] including stronger sanctions. In March 2011, the European Parliament approved the treaty amendment after receiving assurances that the European Commission, rather than EU states, would play 'a central role' in running the ESM.[324][325] The ESM is an intergovernmental organisation under public international law. It is located in Luxembourg.[326][327] Such a mechanism serves as a "financial firewall". Instead of a default by one country rippling through the entire interconnected financial system, the firewall mechanism can ensure that downstream nations and banking systems are protected by guaranteeing some or all of their obligations. Then the single default can be managed while limiting financial contagion. European Fiscal Compact Main article: European Fiscal Compact Public debt to GDP ratio for selected eurozone countries and the UK Public debt to GDP ratio for selected eurozone countries and the UK—2008 to 2011. Source Data: Eurostat. In March 2011 a new reform of the Stability and Growth Pact was initiated, aiming at straightening the rules by adopting an automatic procedure for imposing of penalties in case of breaches of either the 3% deficit or the 60% debt rules.[328] By the end of the year, Germany, France and some other smaller EU countries went a step further and vowed to create a fiscal union across the eurozone with strict and enforceable fiscal rules and automatic penalties embedded in the EU treaties.[329][330] On 9 December 2011 at the European Council meeting, all 17 members of the eurozone and six countries that aspire to join agreed on a new intergovernmental treaty to put strict caps on government spending and borrowing, with penalties for those countries who violate the limits.[331] All other non-eurozone countries apart from the UK are also prepared to join in, subject to parliamentary vote.[292] The treaty will enter into force on 1 January 2013, if by that time 12 members of the euro area have ratified it.[332] Originally EU leaders planned to change existing EU treaties but this was blocked by British prime minister David Cameron, who demanded that the City of London be excluded from future financial regulations, including the proposed EU financial transaction tax.[333][334] By the end of the day, 26 countries had agreed to the plan, leaving the United Kingdom as the only country not willing to join.[335] Cameron subsequently conceded that his action had failed to secure any safeguards for the UK.[336] Britain's refusal to be part of the fiscal compact to safeguard the eurozone constituted a de facto refusal (PM David Cameron vetoed the project) to engage in any radical revision of the Lisbon Treaty. John Rentoul of The Independent concluded that "Any Prime Minister would have done as Cameron did".[337] Economic reforms and recovery proposals Main article: Economic reforms and recovery proposals regarding the Eurozone crisis Direct loans to banks and banking regulation On 28 June 2012, eurozone leaders agreed to permit loans by the European Stability Mechanism to be made directly to stressed banks rather than through eurozone states, to avoid adding to sovereign debt. The reform was linked to plans for banking regulation by the European Central Bank. The reform was immediately reflected by a reduction in yield of long-term bonds issued by member states such as Italy and Spain and a rise in value of the Euro.[338][339][340] Country	Banks recapitalised Portugal	Banco BPI, Caixa Geral de Depositos, Millennium BCP Ireland	Allied Irish Bank, Anglo Irish Bank, Bank of Ireland Greece	Alpha Bank, Eurobank, National Bank of Greece, Piraeus Bank Spain	Banco de Valencia, Bankia, CatalunyaCaixa, Novagalicia Less austerity, more investment There has been substantial criticism over the austerity measures implemented by most European nations to counter this debt crisis. US economist and Nobel laureate Paul Krugman argues that an abrupt return to "'non-Keynesian' financial policies" is not a viable solution.[341] Pointing at historical evidence, he predicts that deflationary policies now being imposed on countries such as Greece and Spain will prolong and deepen their recessions.[342] Together with over 9,000 signatories of "A Manifesto for Economic Sense"[343] Krugman also dismissed the belief of austerity focusing policy makers such as EU economic commissioner Olli Rehn and most European finance ministers[344] that "budget consolidation" revives confidence in financial markets over the longer haul.[345][346] In a 2003 study that analysed 133 IMF austerity programmes, the IMF's independent evaluation office found that policy makers consistently underestimated the disastrous effects of rigid spending cuts on economic growth.[347][348] In early 2012 an IMF official, who negotiated Greek austerity measures, admitted that spending cuts were harming Greece.[47] In October 2012, the IMF said that its forecasts for countries which implemented austerity programmes have been consistently overoptimistic, suggesting that tax hikes and spending cuts have been doing more damage than expected, and countries which implemented fiscal stimulus, such as Germany and Austria, did better than expected.[349] Also Portugal did comparably better than Spain. The latter introduced drastic austerity measures but was unable not meet its EU budget deficit targets. On the other hand, Portugal's leftist coalition fought austerity (it increased the minimum wage by 25 percent and took back cuts in the pension system and the public sector) and at the same time reduced its budget deficit to below three percent in 2016.[350] According to historian Florian Schui from University of St. Gallen no austerity program has ever worked. Schui particularly notes Winston Churchill's attempt in 1925 and Heinrich Brüning's attempt in 1930 during the Weimar Republic. Both led to disastrous consequences.[351] Greek public revenue and expenditure in % of GDP National finances of Greece, 2002-2014 According to Keynesian economists "growth-friendly austerity" relies on the false argument that public cuts would be compensated for by more spending from consumers and businesses, a theoretical claim that has not materialised.[352] The case of Greece shows that excessive levels of private indebtedness and a collapse of public confidence (over 90% of Greeks fear unemployment, poverty and the closure of businesses)[353] led the private sector to decrease spending in an attempt to save up for rainy days ahead. This led to even lower demand for both products and labour, which further deepened the recession and made it ever more difficult to generate tax revenues and fight public indebtedness.[354] According to Financial Times chief economics commentator Martin Wolf, "structural tightening does deliver actual tightening. But its impact is much less than one to one. A one percentage point reduction in the structural deficit delivers a 0.67 percentage point improvement in the actual fiscal deficit". This means that Ireland e.g. would require structural fiscal tightening of more than 12% to eliminate its 2012 actual fiscal deficit. A task that is difficult to achieve without an exogenous eurozone-wide economic boom.[355] According to the Europlus Monitor Report 2012, no country should tighten its fiscal reins by more than 2% of GDP in one year, to avoid recession.[356] Instead of public austerity, a "growth compact" centring on tax increases[354] and deficit spending is proposed. Since struggling European countries lack the funds to engage in deficit spending, German economist and member of the German Council of Economic Experts Peter Bofinger and Sony Kapoor of the global think tank Re-Define suggest providing €40 billion in additional funds to the European Investment Bank (EIB), which could then lend ten times that amount to the employment-intensive smaller business sector.[354] The EU is currently planning a possible €10 billion increase in the EIB's capital base. Furthermore, the two suggest financing additional public investments by growth-friendly taxes on "property, land, wealth, carbon emissions and the under-taxed financial sector". They also called on EU countries to renegotiate the EU savings tax directive and to sign an agreement to help each other crack down on tax evasion and avoidance. Currently authorities capture less than 1% in annual tax revenue on untaxed wealth transferred between EU members.[354] According to the Tax Justice Network, worldwide, a global super-rich elite had between $21 and $32 trillion (up to 26,000bn Euros) hidden in secret tax havens by the end of 2010, resulting in a tax deficit of up to $280bn.[357][358] Apart from arguments over whether or not austerity, rather than increased or frozen spending, is a macroeconomic solution,[359] union leaders have also argued that the working population is being unjustly held responsible for the economic mismanagement errors of economists, investors, and bankers. Over 23 million EU workers have become unemployed as a consequence of the global economic crisis of 2007–2010, and this has led many to call for additional regulation of the banking sector across not only Europe, but the entire world.[360] After the 2007–2008 financial crisis and the Great Recession, the focus across all EU member states was to gradually to implement austerity measures, with the purpose of lowering the budget deficits to levels below 3% of GDP, so that the debt level would either stay below -or start decline towards- the 60% limit defined by the Stability and Growth Pact. To further restore the confidence in Europe, 23 out of 27 EU countries also agreed to adopt the Euro Plus Pact, consisting of political reforms to improve fiscal strength and competitiveness; 25 out of 27 EU countries also decided to implement the Fiscal Compact which include the commitment of each participating country to introduce a balanced budget amendment as part of their national law/constitution. The Fiscal Compact is a direct successor of the previous Stability and Growth Pact, but it is more strict, not only because criteria compliance will be secured through its integration into national law/constitution, but also because it starting from 2014 will require all ratifying countries not involved in ongoing bailout programmes, to comply with the new strict criteria of only having a structural deficit of either maximum 0.5% or 1% (depending on the debt level).[329][330] Each of the eurozone countries being involved in a bailout programme (Greece, Portugal, and Ireland) was asked both to follow a programme with fiscal consolidation/austerity, and to restore competitiveness through implementation of structural reforms and internal devaluation, i.e. lowering their relative production costs.[361] The measures implemented to restore competitiveness in the weakest countries are needed, not only to build the foundation for GDP growth, but also in order to decrease the current account imbalances among eurozone member states.[362][363] Germany has come under pressure due to not having a government budget deficit and funding it by borrowing more. As of late 2014, the government (federal and state) has spent less than it receives in revenue, for the third year in a row, despite low economic growth.[364] The 2015 budget includes a surplus for the first time since 1969. Current projections are that by 2019 the debt will be less than required by the Stability and Growth Pact. It has been a long known belief that austerity measures will always reduce the GDP growth in the short term. Some economists believing in Keynesian policies criticised the timing and amount of austerity measures being called for in the bailout programmes, as they argued such extensive measures should not be implemented during the crisis years with an ongoing recession, but if possible delayed until the years after some positive real GDP growth had returned. In October 2012, a report published by International Monetary Fund (IMF) also found, that tax hikes and spending cuts during the most recent decade had indeed damaged the GDP growth more severely, compared to what had been expected and forecasted in advance (based on the "GDP damage ratios" previously recorded in earlier decades and under different economic scenarios).[349] Already a half-year earlier, several European countries as a response to the problem with subdued GDP growth in the eurozone, likewise had called for the implementation of a new reinforced growth strategy based on additional public investments, to be financed by growth-friendly taxes on property, land, wealth, and financial institutions. In June 2012, EU leaders agreed as a first step to moderately increase the funds of the European Investment Bank, in order to kick-start infrastructure projects and increase loans to the private sector. A few months later 11 out of 17 eurozone countries also agreed to introduce a new EU financial transaction tax to be collected from 1 January 2014.[365] Progress Projections of Greek debt in percent of GDP (2008-2020) In April 2012, Olli Rehn, the European commissioner for economic and monetary affairs in Brussels, "enthusiastically announced to EU parliamentarians in mid-April that 'there was a breakthrough before Easter'. He said the European heads of state had given the green light to pilot projects worth billions, such as building highways in Greece".[366] Other growth initiatives include "project bonds" wherein the EIB would "provide guarantees that safeguard private investors. In the pilot phase until 2013, EU funds amounting to €230 million are expected to mobilise investments of up to €4.6 billion".[366] Der Spiegel also said: "According to sources inside the German government, instead of funding new highways, Berlin is interested in supporting innovation and programs to promote small and medium-sized businesses. To ensure that this is done as professionally as possible, the Germans would like to see the southern European countries receive their own state-owned development banks, modeled after Germany's [Marshall Plan-era-origin] KfW [Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau] banking group. It's hoped that this will get the economy moving in Greece and Portugal".[366] In multiple steps during 2012–2013, the ECB lowered its bank rate to historical lows, reaching 0.25% in November 2013. Soon after the rates were shaved to 0.15%, then on 4 September 2014 the central bank shocked financial markets by cutting the razor-thin rates by a further two thirds from 0.15% to 0.05%, the lowest on record.[367] The moves were designed to make it cheaper for banks to borrow from the ECB, with the aim that lower cost of money would be passed on to businesses taking out loans, boosting investment in the economy. The lowered borrowing rates caused the euro to fall in relation to other currencies, which it was hoped would boost exports from the eurozone.[307] Increase competitiveness See also: Euro Plus Pact Crisis countries must significantly increase their international competitiveness to generate economic growth and improve their terms of trade. Indian-American journalist Fareed Zakaria notes in November 2011 that no debt restructuring will work without growth, even more so as European countries "face pressures from three fronts: demography (an aging population), technology (which has allowed companies to do much more with fewer people) and globalisation (which has allowed manufacturing and services to locate across the world)".[368] In case of economic shocks, policy makers typically try to improve competitiveness by depreciating the currency, as in the case of Iceland, which suffered the largest financial crisis in 2008–2011 in economic history but has since vastly improved its position. Eurozone countries cannot devalue their currency. Internal devaluation Relative change in unit labour costs in 2000–2017 Relative change in unit labour costs, 2000–2017 As a workaround many policy makers try to restore competitiveness through internal devaluation, a painful economic adjustment process, where a country aims to reduce its unit labour costs.[361][369] German economist Hans-Werner Sinn noted in 2012 that Ireland was the only country that had implemented relative wage moderation in the last five years, which helped decrease its relative price/wage levels by 16%. Greece would need to bring this figure down by 31%, effectively reaching the level of Turkey.[370][371] By 2012, wages in Greece had been cut to a level last seen in the late 1990s. Purchasing power dropped even more to the level of 1986.[372] Similarly, salaries in Italy fell to 1986 levels and consumption fell to the level of 1950.[373] Other economists argue that no matter how much Greece and Portugal drive down their wages, they could never compete with low-cost developing countries such as China or India. Instead weak European countries must shift their economies to higher quality products and services, though this is a long-term process and may not bring immediate relief.[374][375] Fiscal devaluation Another option would be to implement fiscal devaluation, based on an idea originally developed by John Maynard Keynes in 1931.[376][377] According to this neo-Keynesian logic, policy makers can increase the competitiveness of an economy by lowering corporate tax burden such as employer's social security contributions, while offsetting the loss of government revenues through higher taxes on consumption (VAT) and pollution, i.e. by pursuing an ecological tax reform.[378][379][380] Germany has successfully pushed its economic competitiveness by increasing the value added tax (VAT) by three percentage points in 2007, and using part of the additional revenues to lower employer's unemployment insurance contribution. Portugal has taken a similar stance[380] and also France appears to follow this suit. In November 2012 French president François Hollande announced plans to reduce tax burden of the corporate sector by €20 billion within three years, while increasing the standard VAT from 19.6% to 20% and introducing additional eco-taxes in 2016. To minimise negative effects of such policies on purchasing power and economic activity the French government will partly offset the tax hikes by decreasing employees' social security contributions by €10 billion and by reducing the lower VAT for convenience goods (necessities) from 5.5% to 5%.[381] Progress Eurozone economic health and adjustment progress 2011–2012 Eurozone economic health and adjustment progress 2011–2012 (Source: Euro Plus Monitor)[356] On 15 November 2011, the Lisbon Council published the Euro Plus Monitor 2011. According to the report most critical eurozone member countries are in the process of rapid reforms. The authors note that "Many of those countries most in need to adjust [...] are now making the greatest progress towards restoring their fiscal balance and external competitiveness". Greece, Ireland and Spain are among the top five reformers and Portugal is ranked seventh among 17 countries included in the report (see graph).[382] In its Euro Plus Monitor Report 2012, published in November 2012, the Lisbon Council finds that the eurozone has slightly improved its overall health. With the exception of Greece, all eurozone crisis countries are either close to the point where they have achieved the major adjustment or are likely to get there over the course of 2013. Portugal and Italy are expected to progress to the turnaround stage in spring 2013, possibly followed by Spain in autumn, while the fate of Greece continues to hang in the balance. Overall, the authors suggest that if the eurozone gets through the current acute crisis and stays on the reform path "it could eventually emerge from the crisis as the most dynamic of the major Western economies".[356] The Euro Plus Monitor update from spring 2013 notes that the eurozone remains on the right track. According to the authors, almost all vulnerable countries in need of adjustment "are slashing their underlying fiscal deficits and improving their external competitiveness at an impressive speed", for which they expected the eurozone crisis to be over by the end of 2013.[383] Address current account imbalances Current account imbalances in 1998–2013 Current account imbalances (1998–2014) Duration: 9 seconds.0:09 Animated graph of current account imbalances since 1999 Regardless of the corrective measures chosen to solve the current predicament, as long as cross border capital flows remain unregulated in the euro area,[384] current account imbalances are likely to continue. A country that runs a large current account or trade deficit (i.e., importing more than it exports) must ultimately be a net importer of capital; this is a mathematical identity called the balance of payments. In other words, a country that imports more than it exports must either decrease its savings reserves or borrow to pay for those imports. Conversely, Germany's large trade surplus (net export position) means that it must either increase its savings reserves or be a net exporter of capital, lending money to other countries to allow them to buy German goods.[385] The 2009 trade deficits for Italy, Spain, Greece, and Portugal were estimated to be $42.96bn, $75.31bn and $35.97bn, and $25.6bn respectively, while Germany's trade surplus was $188.6bn.[386] A similar imbalance exists in the US, which runs a large trade deficit (net import position) and therefore is a net borrower of capital from abroad. Ben Bernanke warned of the risks of such imbalances in 2005, arguing that a "savings glut" in one country with a trade surplus can drive capital into other countries with trade deficits, artificially lowering interest rates and creating asset bubbles.[387][388] A country with a large trade surplus would generally see the value of its currency appreciate relative to other currencies, which would reduce the imbalance as the relative price of its exports increases. This currency appreciation occurs as the importing country sells its currency to buy the exporting country's currency used to purchase the goods. Alternatively, trade imbalances can be reduced if a country encouraged domestic saving by restricting or penalising the flow of capital across borders, or by raising interest rates, although this benefit is likely offset by slowing down the economy and increasing government interest payments.[389] Either way, many of the countries involved in the crisis are on the euro, so devaluation, individual interest rates, and capital controls are not available. The only solution left to raise a country's level of saving is to reduce budget deficits and to change consumption and savings habits. For example, if a country's citizens saved more instead of consuming imports, this would reduce its trade deficit.[389] It has therefore been suggested that countries with large trade deficits (e.g., Greece) consume less and improve their exporting industries. On the other hand, export driven countries with a large trade surplus, such as Germany, Austria and the Netherlands would need to shift their economies more towards domestic services and increase wages to support domestic consumption.[390][391] Economic evidence indicates the crisis may have more to do with trade deficits (which require private borrowing to fund) than public debt levels. Economist Paul Krugman wrote in March 2013: "... the really strong relationship within the [eurozone countries] is between interest spreads and current account deficits, which is in line with the conclusion many of us have reached, that the euro area crisis is really a balance of payments crisis, not a debt crisis".[392] A February 2013 paper from four economists concluded that, "Countries with debt above 80% of GDP and persistent current-account [trade] deficits are vulnerable to a rapid fiscal deterioration..".[393][394][395] Progress In its spring 2012 economic forecast, the European Commission finds "some evidence that the current-account rebalancing is underpinned by changes in relative prices and competitiveness positions as well as gains in export market shares and expenditure switching in deficit countries".[396] In May 2012 German finance minister Wolfgang Schäuble has signalled support for a significant increase in German wages to help decrease current account imbalances within the eurozone.[397] According to the Euro Plus Monitor Report 2013, the collective current account of Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, and Spain is improving rapidly and is expected to balance by mid 2013. Thereafter these countries as a group would no longer need to import capital.[383] In 2014, the current account surplus of the eurozone as a whole almost doubled compared to the previous year, reaching a new record high of 227.9bn Euros.[398] Mobilisation of credit Several proposals were made in mid-2012 to purchase the debt of distressed European countries such as Spain and Italy. Markus Brunnermeier,[399] the economist Graham Bishop, and Daniel Gros were among those advancing proposals. Finding a formula, which was not simply backed by Germany, is central in crafting an acceptable and effective remedy.[400] Proposed long-term solutions Main article: Proposed long-term solutions for the Eurozone crisis The key policy issue that has to be addressed in the long run is how to harmonise different political-economic institutional set-ups of the north and south European economies to promote economic growth and make the currency union sustainable. The Eurozone member states must adopt structural reforms, aimed at promoting labour market mobility and wage flexibility, restoring the south's economies’ competitiveness by increasing their productivity.[401] At the same time, it is vital to keep in mind that just putting emphasis on emulating LME's wage-setting system to CMEs and mixed-market economies will not work. Therefore, apart from wage issues, structural reforms should be focused on developing capacities for innovations, technologies, education, R&D, etc., i.e. all institutional subsystems, crucial for firms’ success.[402] In economies of the south special attention should be given to creating less labour-intensive industries to avoid price competition pressure from emerging low-cost countries (such as China) via an exchange rate channel, and providing a smooth transition of workers from old unsustainable industries to new ones based on the so-called Nordic-style ‘flexicurity’ market model.[403][12] European fiscal union Main article: European Fiscal Compact The crisis is pressuring Europe to move beyond a regulatory state and towards a more federal EU with fiscal powers.[404] Increased European integration giving a central body increased control over the budgets of member states was proposed on 14 June 2012 by Jens Weidmann, President of the Deutsche Bundesbank,[405] expanding on ideas first proposed by Jean-Claude Trichet, former president of the European Central Bank. Control, including requirements that taxes be raised or budgets cut, would be exercised only when fiscal imbalances developed.[406] This proposal is similar to contemporary calls by Angela Merkel for increased political and fiscal union which would "allow Europe oversight possibilities".[407] European bank recovery and resolution authority Main articles: European Banking Supervision and Single Resolution Mechanism European banks are estimated to have incurred losses approaching €1 trillion between 2007 and 2010. The European Commission approved some €4.5 billion in state aid for banks between October 2008 and October 2011, a sum which includes the value of taxpayer-funded recapitalisations and public guarantees on banking debts.[408] This has prompted some economists such as Joseph Stiglitz and Paul Krugman to note that Europe is not suffering from a sovereign debt crisis but rather from a banking crisis.[409] On 6 June 2012, the European Commission adopted a legislative proposal for a harmonised bank recovery and resolution mechanism. The proposed framework sets out the necessary steps and powers to ensure that bank failures across the EU are managed in a way that avoids financial instability.[410] The new legislation would give member states the power to impose losses, resulting from a bank failure, on the bondholders to minimise costs for taxpayers. The proposal is part of a new scheme in which banks will be compelled to "bail-in" their creditors whenever they fail, the basic aim being to prevent taxpayer-funded bailouts in the future.[411] The public authorities would also be given powers to replace the management teams in banks even before the lender fails. Each institution would also be obliged to set aside at least one per cent of the deposits covered by their national guarantees for a special fund to finance the resolution of banking crisis starting in 2018.[408] Eurobonds Main article: Eurobonds A growing number of investors and economists say eurobonds would be the best way of solving a debt crisis,[412] though their introduction matched by tight financial and budgetary co-ordination may well require changes in EU treaties.[412] On 21 November 2011, the European Commission suggested that eurobonds issued jointly by the 17 euro nations would be an effective way to deal with the financial crisis. Using the term "stability bonds", Jose Manuel Barroso insisted that any such plan would have to be matched by tight fiscal surveillance and economic policy coordination as an essential counterpart so as to avoid moral hazard and ensure sustainable public finances.[413][414] Germany remains largely opposed at least in the short term to a collective takeover of the debt of states that have run excessive budget deficits and borrowed excessively over the past years.[415] European Safe Bonds Main article: Securitization A group of economists from Princeton University suggest a new form of European Safe Bonds (ESBies), i.e. bundled European government bonds (70% senior bonds, 30% junior bonds) in the form of a "union-wide safe asset without joint liability". According to the authors, ESBies "would be at least as safe as German bonds and approximately double the supply of euro safe assets when protected by a 30%-thick junior tranche". ESBies could be issued by public or private-sector entities and would "weaken the diabolic loop and its diffusion across countries". It requires "no significant change in treaties or legislation.“[416][417] In 2017 the idea was picked up by the European Central Bank. The European Commission has also shown interest and plans to include ESBies in a future white paper dealing with the aftermath of the financial crisis.[418] The European Commission has recently introduced a proposal to introduce what it calls Sovereign Bond Backed Securities (SBBS) which are essentially the same as ESBies and the European Parliament endorsed the changes in regulations necessary to facilitate these securities in April 2019.[419] European Monetary Fund Main article: European Stability Mechanism On 20 October 2011, the Austrian Institute of Economic Research published an article that suggests transforming the EFSF into a European Monetary Fund (EMF), which could provide governments with fixed interest rate Eurobonds at a rate slightly below medium-term economic growth (in nominal terms). These bonds would not be tradable but could be held by investors with the EMF and liquidated at any time. Given the backing of all eurozone countries and the ECB, "the EMU would achieve a similarly strong position vis-à-vis financial investors as the US where the Fed backs government bonds to an unlimited extent". To ensure fiscal discipline despite lack of market pressure, the EMF would operate according to strict rules, providing funds only to countries that meet fiscal and macroeconomic criteria. Governments lacking sound financial policies would be forced to rely on traditional (national) governmental bonds with less favourable market rates.[420] The econometric analysis suggests that "If the short-term and long- term interest rates in the euro area were stabilised at 1.5% and 3%, respectively, aggregate output (GDP) in the euro area would be 5 percentage points above baseline in 2015". At the same time, sovereign debt levels would be significantly lower with, e.g., Greece's debt level falling below 110% of GDP, more than 40 percentage points below the baseline scenario with market-based interest levels. Furthermore, banks would no longer be able to benefit unduly from intermediary profits by borrowing from the ECB at low rates and investing in government bonds at high rates.[420] Debt write-off financed by wealth tax Overall debt levels in 2009 and write-offs necessary in the eurozone, UK and USA Overall debt levels in 2009 and write-offs necessary in the eurozone, UK and US to reach sustainable grounds. According to the Bank for International Settlements, the combined private and public debt of 18 OECD countries nearly quadrupled between 1980 and 2010, and will likely continue to grow, reaching between 250% (for Italy) and about 600% (for Japan) by 2040.[421] A BIS study released in June 2012 warns that budgets of most advanced economies, excluding interest payments, "would need 20 consecutive years of surpluses exceeding 2 per cent of gross domestic product—starting now—just to bring the debt-to-GDP ratio back to its pre-crisis level".[422] The same authors found in a previous study that increased financial burden imposed by ageing populations and lower growth makes it unlikely that indebted economies can grow out of their debt problem if only one of the following three conditions is met:[423] government debt is more than 80 to 100% of GDP; non-financial corporate debt is more than 90% of GDP; private household debt is more than 85% of GDP. The first condition, suggested by an influential paper written by Kenneth Rogoff & Carmen Reinhart has been disputed due to major calculation errors. In fact, the average GDP growth at public debt/GDP ratios over 90% is not dramatically different from when debt/GDP ratios are lower.[424] The Boston Consulting Group (BCG) adds that if the overall debt load continues to grow faster than the economy, then large-scale debt restructuring becomes inevitable. To prevent a vicious upward debt spiral from gaining momentum the authors urge policymakers to "act quickly and decisively" and aim for an overall debt level well below 180% for the private and government sector. This number is based on the assumption that governments, non-financial corporations, and private households can each sustain a debt load of 60% of GDP, at an interest rate of five per cent and a nominal economic growth rate of three per cent per year. Lower interest rates and/or higher growth would help reduce the debt burden further.[425] To reach sustainable levels the eurozone must reduce its overall debt level by €6.1 trillion. According to BCG, this could be financed by a one-time wealth tax of between 11 and 30% for most countries, apart from the crisis countries (particularly Ireland) where a write-off would have to be substantially higher. The authors admit that such programmes would be "drastic", "unpopular" and "require broad political coordination and leadership" but they maintain that the longer politicians and central bankers wait, the more necessary such a step will be.[425] Thomas Piketty, French economist and author of the bestselling book Capital in the Twenty-First Century regards taxes on capital as a more favorable option than austerity (inefficient and unjust) and inflation (only affects cash but neither real estates nor business capital). According to his analysis, a flat tax of 15 percent on private wealth would provide the state with nearly a year's worth national income, which would allow for immediate reimbursement of the entire public debt.[426] Instead of a one-time write-off, German economist Harald Spehl has called for a 30-year debt-reduction plan, similar to the one Germany used after World War II to share the burden of reconstruction and development.[427] Similar calls have been made by political parties in Germany including the Greens and The Left.[428][429][430] Debt write-off based on international agreement In 2015 Hans-Werner Sinn, president of German Ifo Institute for Economic Research, called for a debt relief for Greece.[431] In addition, economists from London School of Economics suggested a debt relief similar to the London agreement. In 1953, private sector lenders as well as governments agreed to write off about half of West Germany’s outstanding debt; this was followed by the beginning of Germany's "economic miracle" (or Wirtschaftswunder). According to this agreement, West Germany had to make repayments only when it was running a trade surplus, that is "when it had earned the money to pay up, rather than having to borrow more, or dip into its foreign currency reserves. Its repayments were also limited to 3% of export earnings". As LSE researchers note, this had the effect that, Germany's creditors had an incentive to buy the country's goods, so that it would be able to afford to pay them.[83] Controversies The European bailouts are largely about shifting exposure from banks and others, who otherwise are lined up for losses on the sovereign debt they have piled up, onto European taxpayers.[82][85][432][433][434][435] EU treaty violations Wikisource has original text related to this article: Consolidated version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union No bail-out clause The EU's Maastricht Treaty contains juridical language that appears to rule out intra-EU bailouts. First, the "no bail-out" clause (Article 125 TFEU) ensures that the responsibility for repaying public debt remains national and prevents risk premiums caused by unsound fiscal policies from spilling over to partner countries. The clause thus encourages prudent fiscal policies at the national level. The European Central Bank's purchase of distressed country bonds can be viewed as violating the prohibition of monetary financing of budget deficits (Article 123 TFEU). The creation of further leverage in EFSF with access to ECB lending would also appear to violate the terms of this article. Articles 125 and 123 were meant to create disincentives for EU member states to run excessive deficits and state debt, and prevent the moral hazard of over-spending and lending in good times. They were also meant to protect the taxpayers of the other more prudent member states. By issuing bail-out aid guaranteed by prudent eurozone taxpayers to rule-breaking eurozone countries such as Greece, the EU and eurozone countries also encourage moral hazard in the future.[436] While the no bail-out clause remains in place, the "no bail-out doctrine" seems to be a thing of the past.[437] Convergence criteria The EU treaties contain so called convergence criteria, specified in the protocols of the Treaties of the European Union. As regards government finance, the states agreed that the annual government budget deficit should not exceed 3% of gross domestic product (GDP) and that the gross government debt to GDP should not exceed 60% of GDP (see protocol 12 and 13). For eurozone members there is the Stability and Growth Pact, which contains the same requirements for budget deficit and debt limitation but with a much stricter regime. In the past, many European countries have substantially exceeded these criteria over a long period of time.[438] Around 2005 most eurozone members violated the pact, resulting in no action taken against violators. Credit rating agencies Picture of Standard & Poor's Headquarters Standard & Poor's Headquarters in Lower Manhattan, New York City The international US-based credit rating agencies—Moody's, Standard & Poor's and Fitch—which have already been under fire during the housing bubble[439][440] and the Icelandic crisis[441][442]—have also played a central and controversial role[443] in the current European bond market crisis.[444] On one hand, the agencies have been accused of giving overly generous ratings due to conflicts of interest.[445] On the other hand, ratings agencies have a tendency to act conservatively, and to take some time to adjust when a firm or country is in trouble.[446] In the case of Greece, the market responded to the crisis before the downgrades, with Greek bonds trading at junk levels several weeks before the ratings agencies began to describe them as such.[32] According to a study by economists at St Gallen University credit rating agencies have fuelled rising euro zone indebtedness by issuing more severe downgrades since the sovereign debt crisis unfolded in 2009. The authors concluded that rating agencies were not consistent in their judgments, on average rating Portugal, Ireland, and Greece 2.3 notches lower than under pre-crisis standards, eventually forcing them to seek international aid.[447] On a side note: as of the end of November 2013 only three countries in the eurozone retain AAA ratings from Standard & Poor, (i.e. Germany, Finland and Luxembourg.)[448] European policy makers have criticised ratings agencies for acting politically, accusing the Big Three of bias towards European assets and fuelling speculation.[449] Particularly Moody's decision to downgrade Portugal's foreign debt to the category Ba2 "junk" has infuriated officials from the EU and Portugal alike.[449] State-owned utility and infrastructure companies like ANA – Aeroportos de Portugal, Energias de Portugal, Redes Energéticas Nacionais, and Brisa – Auto-estradas de Portugal were also downgraded despite claims to having solid financial profiles and significant foreign revenue.[450][451][452][453] French central bank chief Christian Noyer criticised the decision of Standard & Poor's to lower the rating of France but not that of the United Kingdom, which "has more deficits, as much debt, more inflation, less growth than us".[454] Similar comments were made by high-ranking politicians in Germany. Michael Fuchs, deputy leader of the leading Christian Democrats, said: "Standard and Poor's must stop playing politics. Why doesn't it act on the highly indebted United States or highly indebted Britain?", adding that the latter's collective private and public sector debts are the largest in Europe. He further added: "If the agency downgrades France, it should also downgrade Britain in order to be consistent".[454] Credit rating agencies were also accused of bullying politicians by systematically downgrading eurozone countries just before important European Council meetings. As one EU source put it: "It is interesting to look at the downgradings and the timings of the downgradings... It is strange that we have so many downgrades in the weeks of summits".[455] Regulatory reliance on credit ratings Think-tanks such as the World Pensions Council (WPC) [fr] have criticised European powers such as France and Germany for pushing for the adoption of the Basel II recommendations, adopted in 2005 and transposed in European Union law through the Capital Requirements Directive (CRD), effective since 2008. In essence, this forced European banks and more importantly the European Central Bank, e.g. when gauging the solvency of EU-based financial institutions, to rely heavily on the standardised assessments of credit risk marketed by only two private US firms- Moody's and S&P.[456] Counter measures Due to the failures of the ratings agencies, European regulators obtained new powers to supervise ratings agencies.[443] With the creation of the European Supervisory Authority in January 2011 the EU set up a whole range of new financial regulatory institutions,[457] including the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA),[458] which became the EU's single credit-ratings firm regulator.[459] Credit-ratings companies have to comply with the new standards or will be denied operation on EU territory, says ESMA Chief Steven Maijoor.[460] Germany's foreign minister Guido Westerwelle called for an "independent" European ratings agency, which could avoid the conflicts of interest that he claimed US-based agencies faced.[461] European leaders are reportedly studying the possibility of setting up a European ratings agency in order that the private US-based ratings agencies have less influence on developments in European financial markets in the future.[462][463] According to German consultant company Roland Berger, setting up a new ratings agency would cost €300 million. On 30 January 2012, the company said it was already collecting funds from financial institutions and business intelligence agencies to set up an independent non-profit ratings agency by mid-2012, which could provide its first country ratings by the end of the year.[464] In April 2012, in a similar attempt, the Bertelsmann Stiftung presented a blueprint for establishing an international non-profit credit rating agency (INCRA) for sovereign debt, structured in way that management and rating decisions are independent from its financiers.[465] But attempts to regulate credit rating agencies more strictly in the wake of the eurozone crisis have been rather unsuccessful. World Pensions Council (WPC) [fr] financial law and regulation experts have argued that the hastily drafted, unevenly transposed in national law, and poorly enforced EU rule on ratings agencies (Regulation EC N° 1060/2009) has had little effect on the way financial analysts and economists interpret data or on the potential for conflicts of interests created by the complex contractual arrangements between credit rating agencies and their clients"[466] Influence of anglo-saxon media coverage Some in the Greek, Spanish, and French press and elsewhere spread conspiracy theories that claimed that the U.S. and Britain were deliberately promoting rumors about the euro in order to cause its collapse or to distract attention from their own economic vulnerabilities. The Economist rebutted these "Anglo-Saxon conspiracy" claims, writing that although American and British traders overestimated the weakness of southern European public finances and the probability of the breakup of the eurozone, these sentiments were an ordinary market panic, rather than some deliberate plot.[467] Greek Prime Minister Papandreou is quoted as saying that there was no question of Greece leaving the euro and suggested that the crisis was politically as well as financially motivated. "This is an attack on the eurozone by certain other interests, political or financial".[468] The Spanish Prime Minister José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero has also suggested that the recent financial market crisis in Europe is an attempt to undermine the euro.[469][470] He ordered the Centro Nacional de Inteligencia intelligence service (National Intelligence Centre, CNI in Spanish) to investigate the role of the "Anglo-Saxon media" in fomenting the crisis.[471][472][473][474][475][476] So far, no results have been reported from this investigation. Other commentators believe that the euro is under attack so that countries, such as the UK and the US, can continue to fund their large external deficits and government deficits,[477] and to avoid the collapse of the US$.[478][479][480] The US and UK do not have large domestic savings pools to draw on and therefore are dependent on external savings e.g. from China.[481][482] This is not the case in the eurozone, which is self-funding.[483][484][485] Speculators Both the Spanish and Greek Prime Ministers have accused financial speculators and hedge funds of worsening the crisis by short selling euros.[486][487] German chancellor Merkel has stated that "institutions bailed out with public funds are exploiting the budget crisis in Greece and elsewhere".[488] Goldman Sachs and other banks faced an inquiry by the Federal Reserve over their derivatives arrangements with Greece. The Guardian reported that "Goldman was reportedly the most heavily involved of a dozen or so Wall Street banks" that assisted the Greek government in the early 2000s "to structure complex derivatives deals early in the decade and 'borrow' billions of dollars in exchange rate swaps, which did not officially count as debt under eurozone rules".[489] Critics of the bank's conduct said that these deals "contributed to unsustainable public finances" which in turn destabilized the eurozone.[489] In response to accusations that speculators were worsening the problem, some markets banned naked short selling for a few months.[490] Speculation about the break-up of the eurozone Further information: Greek withdrawal from the eurozone Some economists, mostly from outside Europe and associated with Modern Monetary Theory and other post-Keynesian schools, condemned the design of the euro currency system from the beginning because it ceded national monetary and economic sovereignty but lacked a central fiscal authority. When faced with economic problems, they maintained, "Without such an institution, EMU would prevent effective action by individual countries and put nothing in its place".[491][492] US economist Martin Feldstein went so far to call the euro "an experiment that failed".[493] Some non-Keynesian economists, such as Luca A. Ricci of the IMF, contend that the eurozone does not fulfil the necessary criteria for an optimum currency area, though it is moving in that direction.[382][494] As the debt crisis expanded beyond Greece, these economists continued to advocate, albeit more forcefully, the disbandment of the eurozone. If this was not immediately feasible, they recommended that Greece and the other debtor nations unilaterally leave the eurozone, default on their debts, regain their fiscal sovereignty, and re-adopt national currencies.[66][67][495][496][497] Bloomberg suggested in June 2011 that, if the Greek and Irish bailouts should fail, an alternative would be for Germany to leave the eurozone to save the currency through depreciation[498] instead of austerity. The likely substantial fall in the euro against a newly reconstituted Deutsche Mark would give a "huge boost" to its members' competitiveness.[499] Iceland, not part of the EU, is regarded as one of Europe's recovery success stories. It defaulted on its debt and drastically devalued its currency, which has effectively reduced wages by 50% making exports more competitive.[500] Lee Harris argues that floating exchange rates allows wage reductions by currency devaluations, a politically easier option than the economically equivalent but politically impossible method of lowering wages by political enactment.[501] Sweden's floating rate currency gives it a short-term advantage, structural reforms and constraints account for longer-term prosperity. Labour concessions, a minimal reliance on public debt, and tax reform helped to further a pro-growth policy.[502] British discount retailer Poundland chose the name Dealz and not "Euroland" for its 2011 expansion into Ireland because, CEO Jim McCarthy said, "'Eurozone' ... is usually reported in association with bad news — job losses, debts and increased taxes". His company planned to use Dealz in continental Europe; McCarthy stated that "There is less certainty about the longevity [of the currency union] now".[503] The Wall Street Journal conjectured as well that Germany could return to the Deutsche Mark,[504] or create another currency union[505] with the Netherlands, Austria, Finland, Luxembourg and other European countries such as Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, and the Baltics.[506] A monetary union of these countries with current account surpluses would create the world's largest creditor bloc, bigger than China[507] or Japan. The Wall Street Journal added that without the German-led bloc, a residual euro would have the flexibility to keep interest rates low[508] and engage in quantitative easing or fiscal stimulus in support of a job-targeting economic policy[509] instead of inflation targeting in the current configuration. Breakup vs. deeper integration There is opposition in this view. The national exits are expected to be an expensive proposition. The breakdown of the currency would lead to insolvency of several euro zone countries, a breakdown in intrazone payments. Having instability and the public debt issue still not solved, the contagion effects and instability would spread into the system.[510] Having that the exit of Greece would trigger the breakdown of the eurozone, this is not welcomed by many politicians, economists and journalists. According to Steven Erlanger from The New York Times, a "Greek departure is likely to be seen as the beginning of the end for the whole euro zone project, a major accomplishment, whatever its faults, in the post-War construction of a Europe "whole and at peace".[511] Likewise, the two big leaders of the Euro zone, German Chancellor Angela Merkel and former French president Nicolas Sarkozy have said on numerous occasions that they would not allow the eurozone to disintegrate and have linked the survival of the Euro with that of the entire European Union.[512][513] In September 2011, EU commissioner Joaquín Almunia shared this view, saying that expelling weaker countries from the euro was not an option: "Those who think that this hypothesis is possible just do not understand our process of integration".[514] The former ECB president Jean-Claude Trichet also denounced the possibility of a return of the Deutsche Mark.[515] The challenges to the speculation about the break-up or salvage of the eurozone is rooted in its innate nature that the break-up or salvage of eurozone is not only an economic decision but also a critical political decision followed by complicated ramifications that "If Berlin pays the bills and tells the rest of Europe how to behave, it risks fostering destructive nationalist resentment against Germany and ... it would strengthen the camp in Britain arguing for an exit—a problem not just for Britons but for all economically liberal Europeans.[516] Solutions which involve greater integration of European banking and fiscal management and supervision of national decisions by European umbrella institutions can be criticised as Germanic domination of European political and economic life.[517] According to US author Ross Douthat "This would effectively turn the European Union into a kind of postmodern version of the old Austro-Hungarian Empire, with a Germanic elite presiding uneasily over a polyglot imperium and its restive local populations".[517] The Economist provides a somewhat modified approach to saving the euro in that "a limited version of federalisation could be less miserable solution than break-up of the euro".[516] The recipe to this tricky combination of the limited federalisation, greatly lies on mutualisation for limiting the fiscal integration. In order for overindebted countries to stabilise the dwindling euro and economy, the overindebted countries require "access to money and for banks to have a "safe" euro-wide class of assets that is not tied to the fortunes of one country" which could be obtained by "narrower Eurobond that mutualises a limited amount of debt for a limited amount of time".[516] The proposition made by German Council of Economic Experts provides detailed blue print to mutualise the current debts of all euro-zone economies above 60% of their GDP. Instead of the break-up and issuing new national governments bonds by individual euro-zone governments, "everybody, from Germany (debt: 81% of GDP) to Italy (120%) would issue only these joint bonds until their national debts fell to the 60% threshold. The new mutualised-bond market, worth some €2.3 trillion, would be paid off over the next 25 years. Each country would pledge a specified tax (such as a VAT surcharge) to provide the cash." So far, German Chancellor Angela Merkel has opposed all forms of mutualisation.[516] The Hungarian-American business magnate George Soros warns in "Does the Euro have a Future?" that there is no escape from the "gloomy scenario" of a prolonged European recession and the consequent threat to the Eurozone's political cohesion so long as "the authorities persist in their current course". He argues that to save the Euro long-term structural changes are essential in addition to the immediate steps needed to arrest the crisis. The changes he recommends include even greater economic integration of the European Union.[518] Soros writes that a treaty is needed to transform the European Financial Stability Fund into a full-fledged European Treasury. Following the formation of the Treasury, the European Council could then authorise the ECB to "step into the breach", with risks to the ECB's solvency being indemnified. Soros acknowledges that converting the EFSF into a European Treasury will necessitate "a radical change of heart". In particular, he cautions, Germans will be wary of any such move, not least because many continue to believe that they have a choice between saving the Euro and abandoning it. Soros writes that a collapse of the European Union would precipitate an uncontrollable financial meltdown and thus "the only way" to avert "another Great Depression" is the formation of a European Treasury.[518] Odious debt Main article: Odious debt Some protesters, commentators such as Libération correspondent Jean Quatremer and the Liège-based NGO Committee for the Abolition of the Third World Debt (CADTM) allege that the debt should be characterised as odious debt.[519] The Greek documentary Debtocracy,[520] and a book of the same title and content examine whether the recent Siemens scandal and uncommercial ECB loans which were conditional on the purchase of military aircraft and submarines are evidence that the loans amount to odious debt and that an audit would result in invalidation of a large amount of the debt.[521] Manipulation of public finances statistics The revision of Greece's 2009 budget deficit from a forecast of "6–8% of GDP" to 15.4% in 2010 was the key trigger for the Greek debt crisis. However accusations of the use of "creative accounting" by several other governments have been raised[522][523][524][525][526] the United Kingdom,[527][528][529][530][531] Spain,[532] the United States,[533][534][535] and even Germany.[536][537][538] Collateral for Finland On 18 August 2011, as requested by the Finnish parliament as a condition for any further bailouts, it became apparent that Finland would receive collateral from Greece, enabling it to participate in the potential new €109 billion support package for the Greek economy.[539] Austria, the Netherlands, Slovenia, and Slovakia responded with irritation over this special guarantee for Finland and demanded equal treatment across the eurozone, or a similar deal with Greece, so as not to increase the risk level over their participation in the bailout.[540] The main point of contention was that the collateral is aimed to be a cash deposit, a collateral the Greeks can only give by recycling part of the funds loaned by Finland for the bailout, which means Finland and the other eurozone countries guarantee the Finnish loans in the event of a Greek default.[539] Finland's recommendation to the crisis countries is to issue asset-backed securities to cover the immediate need, a tactic successfully used in Finland's early 1990s recession,[541] in addition to spending cuts and bad banking. After extensive negotiations to implement a collateral structure open to all eurozone countries, on 4 October 2011, a modified escrow collateral agreement was reached. The expectation is that only Finland will utilise it, due, in part, to a requirement to contribute initial capital to European Stability Mechanism in one instalment instead of five instalments over time. Finland, as one of the strongest AAA countries, can raise the required capital with relative ease.[542] In February 2012, the four largest Greek banks agreed to provide the €880 million in collateral to Finland to secure the second bailout programme.[543] Political impact Unscheduled change of governments in EU countries due to the debt crisis Unscheduled change of governments in Euro countries (marked red) due to crisis The handling of the crisis has led to the premature end of several European national governments and influenced the outcome of many elections: Ireland – February 2011 – After a high deficit in the government's budget in 2010 and the uncertainty surrounding the proposed bailout from the International Monetary Fund, the 30th Dáil (parliament) collapsed the following year, which led to a subsequent general election, collapse of the preceding government parties, Fianna Fáil and the Green Party, the resignation of the Taoiseach Brian Cowen and the rise of the Fine Gael party, which formed a government alongside the Labour Party in the 31st Dáil, which led to a change of government and the appointment of Enda Kenny as Taoiseach. Portugal – March 2011 – Following the failure of parliament to adopt the government austerity measures, PM José Sócrates and his government resigned, bringing about early elections in June 2011.[544][545] Finland – April 2011 – The approach to the Portuguese bailout and the EFSF dominated the April 2011 election debate and formation of the subsequent government.[546][547] Spain – July 2011 – Following the failure of the Spanish government to handle the economic situation, PM José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero announced early elections in November.[548] "It is convenient to hold elections this fall so a new government can take charge of the economy in 2012, fresh from the balloting," he said.[549] Following the elections, Mariano Rajoy became PM. Slovenia – September 2011 – Following the failure of June referendums on measures to combat the economic crisis and the departure of coalition partners, the Borut Pahor government lost a motion of confidence and December 2011 early elections were set, following which Janez Janša became PM.[550] After a year of rigorous saving measures, and also due to continuous opening of ideological question, the centre-right government of Janez Janša was ousted on 27 February 2013 by nomination of Alenka Bratušek as the PM-designated of a new centre-left coalition government.[551] Slovakia – October 2011 – In return for the approval of the EFSF by her coalition partners, PM Iveta Radičová had to concede early elections in March 2012, following which Robert Fico became PM. Italy – November 2011 – Following market pressure on government bond prices in response to concerns about levels of debt, the right-wing cabinet, of the long-time prime minister Silvio Berlusconi, lost its majority: Berlusconi resigned on 12 November and four days later was replaced by the technocratic government of Mario Monti.[552] Greece – November 2011 – After intense criticism from within his own party, the opposition and other EU governments, for his proposal to hold a referendum on the austerity and bailout measures, PM George Papandreou of the PASOK party announced his resignation in favour of a national unity government between three parties, of which only two currently remain in the coalition.[45] Following the vote in the Greek parliament on the austerity and bailout measures, which both leading parties supported but many MPs of these two parties voted against, Papandreou and Antonis Samaras expelled a total of 44 MPs from their respective parliamentary groups, leading to PASOK losing its parliamentary majority.[553] The early Greek legislative election, 2012 were the first time in the history of the country, at which the bipartisanship (consisted of PASOK and New Democracy parties), which ruled the country for over 40 years, collapsed in votes as a punishment for their support to the strict measures proposed by the country's foreign lenders and the Troika (consisted of the European Commission, the IMF and the European Central Bank). The popularity of PASOK dropped from 42.5% in 2010 to as low as 7% in some polls in 2012.[554] The radical right-wing, extreme left-wing, communist and populist political parties that have opposed the policy of strict measures, won the majority of the votes. Netherlands – April 2012 – After talks between the VVD, CDA and PVV over a new austerity package of about 14 billion euros failed, the Rutte cabinet collapsed. Early elections were called for 12 September 2012. To prevent fines from the EU – a new budget was demanded by 30 April – five different parties called the Kunduz coalition forged together an emergency budget for 2013 in just two days.[555] France – May 2012 – The 2012 French presidential election became the first time since 1981 that an incumbent failed to gain a second term, when Nicolas Sarkozy lost to François Hollande. See also Wikinews has related news: European Commission warns Eurozone economy to shrink further flag	European Union portal icon	Economics portal 2000s commodities boom 1991 Indian economic crisis Stock market crashes in India Corporate debt bubble Crisis situations and unrest in Europe since 2000 Federal Reserve Economic Data Great Recession Great Recession in Europe List of stock market crashes and bear markets List of acronyms associated with the eurozone crisis List of countries by credit rating List of people associated with the eurozone crisis The Intervention of ECB in the Eurozone Crisis Notes According to ECB's definition, a sovereign state will have managed to regain complete access to private lending markets, when it succeeds in issuing new government bonds with a ten-year maturity.[112][113] References "Long-term interest rate statistics for EU Member States". ECB. 12 July 2011. Retrieved 22 July 2011. Wearden, Graeme (20 September 2011). 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Comparative Political Studies, 49(7), 811–840. Foremny, Dirk; von Hagen, Jürgen (2012). "Fiscal federalism in times of crisis". CEPR Discussion Papers. 9154. Centre for Economic Policy Research. SSRN 2155524. Frieden, Jeffry and Stefanie Walter. 2017. "Understanding the Political Economy of the Eurozone Crisis". Annual Review of Political Science. Nedergaard, Peter; Bang, Henrik; Jensen, Mads Dagnis (March 2015). "'We the People' versus 'We the Heads of States': the debate on the democratic deficit of the European Union" (PDF). Policy Studies. 36 (2): 196–216. doi:10.1080/01442872.2014.1000846. S2CID 154326073. Nedergaard, Peter; Snaith, Holly (September 2015). "'As I drifted on a river I could not control': the unintended ordoliberal consequences of the Eurozone crisis". Journal of Common Market Studies. 53 (5): 1094–1109. doi:10.1111/jcms.12249. S2CID 143248038. Tooze, Adam (2018). Crashed: How a Decade of Financial Crises Changed the World. New York: Viking. ISBN 9780670024933. Markus K. Brunnermeier, Ricardo Reis. 2019. "A Crash Course on the Euro Crisis" NBER paper Cecilia Emma Sottilotta. 2022. How not to manage Crises in the European Union. International Affairs Volume 98, Issue 5, September 2022, Pages 1595–1614 (open access) External links The EU Crisis Pocket Guide by the Transnational Institute in English (2012) – Italian (2012) – Spanish (2011) Eurostat – Statistics Explained: Structure of government debt (October 2011 data) Interactive Map of the Debt Crisis Economist Magazine, 9 February 2011 European Debt Crisis New York Times topic page updated daily. Budget deficit from 2007 to 2015 Economist Intelligence Unit 30 March 2011 Stefan Collignon: Democratic requirements for a European Economic Government Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, December 2010 (PDF 625 KB) Wolf, Martin, "Creditors can huff but they need debtors", Financial Times, 1 November 2011 7:28 pm. More Pain, No Gain for Greece: Is the Euro Worth the Costs of Pro-Cyclical Fiscal Policy and Internal Devaluation? Center for Economic and Policy Research, February 2012 Michael Lewis-How the Financial Crisis Created a New Third World-October 2011 NPR, October 2011 Global Financial Stability Report International Monetary Fund, April 2012 OECD Economic Outlook-May 2012 "Leaving the Euro: A Practical Guide" by Roger Bootle, winner of the 2012 Wolfson Economics Prize Macroeconomic Policy Advice and the Article IV Consultations: A European Union Case Study Center for Economic and Policy Research, January 2013 Over Their Heads: The IMF and the Prelude to the Euro-zone Crisis, Paul Blustein, CIGI, March 2015
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