Me:
I've heard someone summarize Rene Girard's theories about mimetic desire, including this quote:
"Man is the creature who does not know what to desire, and he turns to others in order to make up his mind. We desire what others desire because we imitate their desires."
And this summary (not a quote):
Girard's idea proposes that all desire is merely an imitation of another's desire, and the desire only occurs because others have deemed said object as worthwhile. This means that a desirable object is only desired because of societal ideas, and is not based on personal preference like most believe.
As presented, at least, Girard's theory seems to be at least overstated:
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For most of the 20th century, homosexual desire was not socially acceptable, and yet homosexuals did discover their own desires, despite believing, almost certainly correctly, that acting on that desire would cause ostracism.
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Geeks are known for having obscure interests. Today there is, to some extent, a celebration of geekiness, but that was not the case in the 20th century: geeks pursued their interests despite a lack of social support.
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A dog's desire for food or a safe territory certainly doesn't stem from what the dog thinks those around him desire. Are human desires really so utterly different? Surely humans' desire for sex can be connected with animals' similar desires.
Overall, Girard's claim seems obviously false. "Forbidden desire", referring to desire that one believes one will suffer social consequences for acting on, is even a cliché.
So, is Girard playing philosophical games whose goal is to advance beautiful, baroque arguments for obviously untrue conclusions, such that his work is mostly interesting for the argumentation and not the conclusion it advances? Or have I misunderstood Girard's argument?
ChatGPT:
Great question — you’ve spotted a tension between the way Girard is often summarized and what he actually argues. Let’s unpack this carefully.
Girard’s central claim is not that all desire is only imitation, but rather that a significant portion of human desire is shaped by imitation of others. His distinction is between:
- Needs: things rooted in biology or survival (food, sleep, safety). These are not mimetic in his sense.
- Appetites: desires arising from physical or instinctual drives (sex, comfort, pleasure). These are partly natural, partly cultural.
- Desire proper (mimetic desire): when our attraction to an object is mediated by another person’s desire for it. For example, I may want a particular job, not just because of its material rewards, but because someone I admire wants it. Or I may covet someone else’s partner more because they are desired by others.
So, Girard’s famous line — “we desire what others desire” — is shorthand for this third category, not a literal statement about all desire.
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Homosexual desire despite social stigma You’re right that such desire emerges even when society discourages it. This shows that not all desire is mimetic. Girard would likely put sexual orientation under “appetite” — a drive rooted in biology, not imitation. Where he’d say mimesis comes in is in how that desire is expressed (e.g. which cultural forms of attraction, relationships, aesthetics become desirable).
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Geeks with obscure interests True, some pursue interests without strong social backing. But Girard might argue that even obscure interests take shape mimetically within subcultures or micro-communities. One doesn’t just “discover” the beauty of stamp collecting in a vacuum; usually there’s an admired figure, a peer, or even a text that mediates the discovery.
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Dogs and basic needs Exactly: animal desires like hunger or territory are pre-mimetic. Girard insists that human culture adds layers that make our desires different. A dog wants food. A human wants this particular meal, at that trendy restaurant, because others do.
Girard is especially interested in how mimetic desire leads to rivalry. If I want something because you want it, we end up in competition. He argues that human societies invented rituals, prohibitions, and scapegoating to control the violence that such mimetic rivalries generate. This is where “forbidden desire” enters: prohibitions don’t necessarily stop desire — they intensify it, because the forbidden object is precisely the one everyone else must resist, which makes it especially charged.
Not really. He’s polemical and often overstates things, but the project isn’t mere wordplay. He’s trying to offer a unifying theory of culture, religion, and violence. To do that, he deliberately downplays non-mimetic forms of desire, which makes him sound like he’s denying the obvious. Many critics have faulted him for overgeneralizing, but even they acknowledge the power of the insight: that much of what we think of as “authentic desire” is profoundly shaped by imitation.
- You’re right: the blanket claim “all desire is mimetic” is false.
- Girard’s real claim: the most socially significant desires are mimetic, and this has far-reaching consequences for rivalry, conflict, and culture.
- He overstates his case for rhetorical force, but his work isn’t just a game — it’s an attempt at a grand explanatory framework.
Would you like me to give you a few concrete, modern examples of mimetic desire at work (say, in markets, art, or social media), to show why Girard’s idea still has traction today?