OpenAI Codex analysis of Mole security

codex.md

Findings

• Medium: The update flow downloads and executes a remote installer script without signature or checksum verification, so a compromised GitHub repo or MITM could execute arbitrary code during update. mole:282 mole:289 mole:296 mole:384 install.sh:115 install.sh:121 install.sh:135
• Low: The interactive analyzer deletes user-selected paths via os.RemoveAll without a denylist or path validation layer; a mistaken selection (or running as root) could remove critical data. cmd/analyze/delete.go:76 cmd/analyze/delete.go:118
• Low: Auto-fix and Touch ID helpers modify security-sensitive system settings (firewall state, PAM config, Rosetta install) using sudo. These are user-initiated but high-impact operations worth flagging. lib/manage/autofix.sh:132 lib/manage/autofix.sh:149 lib/manage/autofix.sh:162 bin/touchid.sh:82 bin/touchid.sh:111

Assessment (Maliciousness)

• I found no evidence of data exfiltration, telemetry, or C2 behavior; network access appears limited to GitHub version checks and installer fetches. mole:41 mole:58 lib/check/all.sh:301 install.sh:121
• Destructive operations are generally gated by explicit path validation and protected-path checks in the shell layer. lib/core/file_ops.sh:32 lib/core/file_ops.sh:75 lib/core/app_protection.sh:503

Notes

• This is a static review of the source tree; I did not run dynamic analysis or execute the binaries.

If you want, I can help harden this further:

1. Add checksum or signature verification for updates/installer downloads.
2. Add an explicit denylist/path validation layer to the analyzer delete flow.
3. Add a “require explicit typing” confirmation for destructive actions (e.g., deleting outside $HOME).