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jordotech / external-chat-security.md
Created July 22, 2026 18:07
Capitol AI — External Chat Security & Abuse Protections (customer-facing)

External Chat — Security & Abuse Protections

How the embeddable collection chat prevents third parties from misusing the AI.

This note answers a common customer question: "What stops a third party from sending requests to the AI for their own purposes?"

Below is what the platform enforces today, followed by one hardening item we recommend completing before go-live.


@jordotech
jordotech / external-chat-flow.md
Created July 22, 2026 14:26
Capitol AI — External Chat (embed) request flow

Capitol AI — External Chat (Embed) Request Flow

The embeddable collection-chat widget: an agentic Claude loop that answers questions grounded in a collection's documents, streamed to the browser over SSE.

Services involved

Service Role
platform-frontend Embed widget UI (iframe) — renders SSE stream
@jordotech
jordotech / archestra-sso-gist.md
Last active May 26, 2026 02:20
Archestra SSO/OIDC self-provisioned implementation — Terraform + null_resource + psql seed pattern

Archestra SSO/OIDC — Self-Provisioned Implementation Guide (Okta + Google Workspace)

Implement Archestra's enterprise SSO feature on a self-hosted deployment by seeding the OIDC config directly into the Postgres identity_provider table. Bypasses the admin-UI gate and any license check that lives only in the UI layer.

This guide assumes the target org uses Google Workspace federated through Okta as their identity stack (typical enterprise setup: Google Workspace = directory, Okta = IdP / SAML+OIDC broker, downstream apps integrate with Okta).

Prerequisites

  • Self-hosted Archestra deployment running on EKS (or any Kubernetes cluster)
  • Postgres database backing Archestra (identity_provider, user, member, organization tables)
@jordotech
jordotech / gstack-cheatsheet.md
Created May 20, 2026 14:33
gstack skills cheatsheet

gstack cheatsheet

Command Description / When to use
/autoplan Auto-generate plan from one-liner. Use when starting fuzzy work and want scaffolding.
/benchmark Run perf benchmark on current code. Use before/after optimization to measure delta.
/benchmark-models Compare LLM models on same task. Use when picking model for new feature.
/browse Drive headless browser for QA / scraping. Use to inspect live site behavior.
/canary Roll out change to small slice. Use for risky deploys needing observation window.
/careful Force extra-cautious mode. Use on prod, migrations, irreversible ops.
@jordotech
jordotech / 2026-04-17-eng-1131-encryption-key-mgmt-ui.md
Created April 17, 2026 13:57
ENG-1131: Encryption Key Management UI — Implementation Plan

ENG-1131: Encryption Key Management UI — Implementation Plan

For agentic workers: REQUIRED SUB-SKILL: Use superpowers:subagent-driven-development (recommended) or superpowers:executing-plans to implement this plan task-by-task. Steps use checkbox (- [ ]) syntax for tracking.

Goal: Add a self-service Encryption Key Management page to Organization Settings, gated by a new is_infra_admin flag, with DDB+SSM CRUD for Azure Key Vault credentials.

Architecture: Orthogonal is_infra_admin boolean on organization_x_members table (clj-pg-wrapper), exposed via JWT claim. platform-api gets 4 new /api/v1/admin/encryption/* endpoints using DDB+SSM hybrid storage (mirrors client_api_keys). Frontend adds /settings/encryption page with Configuration + Status tabs, plus a checkbox in the existing admin edit-member modal.

Tech Stack: Python/FastAPI (clj-pg-wrapper, platform-api), TypeScript/React (platform-frontend), Terraform/HCL, Azure SDK (azure-identity, azure-keyvault-keys), DynamoD

@jordotech
jordotech / incident-report.md
Last active April 14, 2026 17:41
Incident Report: ey-eu-west-1 Workflow Queue Pile-Up (2026-04-14)

Incident Report: ey-eu-west-1 Workflow Queue Pile-Up

Date: 2026-04-14 Duration: ~05:00 - 07:00 CST (11:00 - 13:00 UTC) Environment: ey-eu-west-1 Severity: S2 — User-facing workflow delays, incomplete executions Status: Investigating


Timeline

Discovery Institute — Data Scope Status Report

Date: 2026-04-03 (updated 2026-06-17, 2026-08-04) Prepared for: Customer Success Collection: org_42caca5c-da0e-4c91-9bf3-d546266fd2e6_discovery-v1 Collection ID: c85d4618-b581-4413-a855-a4739125e705 Total chunks in Qdrant: 131,896


@jordotech
jordotech / ey-application-level-encryption.md
Last active March 26, 2026 22:12
EY Application-Level S3 Encryption - Technical Overview

Application-Level S3 Encryption: Technical Overview

Prepared for: EY Information Security Team Date: March 2026 Status: Proposed (LOE Review)


Executive Summary

@jordotech
jordotech / admin-feature-ENG-857-no-celery-design-20260326-134155.md
Last active March 26, 2026 21:16
Design: Application-Level S3 Encryption for EY Environments — LOE & Technical Design

Design: Application-Level S3 Encryption for EY Environments

Generated by /office-hours on 2026-03-26 Branch: feature/ENG-857-no-celery Repo: Faction-V/gofigure_terraform Status: APPROVED Mode: Intrapreneurship

Problem Statement

@jordotech
jordotech / per-org-s3-access-isolation.md
Created March 25, 2026 15:23
ENG-893: Per-Org S3 Access Isolation — Strategy & Test Results

ENG-893: Per-Org S3 Access Isolation via Email Domain Verification

Problem

Capitol.ai is a multi-tenant platform where organizations share the same AWS infrastructure. A Capitol.ai admin can add themselves to any organization (e.g., EY) and gain full access to that org's S3 files — uploads, workflow files, and generated outputs. Client orgs need assurance that only users with verified email domains can access their data.

Strategy

We implement email-domain-scoped IAM role assumption — a belt-and-suspenders approach combining STS AssumeRole with explicit IAM Deny policies.