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Hostname check bypassing vulnerability in SSL client (CVE-2013-4073) patches.
0001-Hostname-check-bypassing-vulnerability-in-SSL-client.patch is for 2.0.
0001-Hostname-check-bypassing-vulnerability-in-SSL-client.ruby_1_9_3.patch is for 1.9.3. *UPDATE* The patches could cause SSL crash bug. Please apply https://gist.github.com/nahi/5934959, too.
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| From ddaf5b57bdc051ccc1161ec5273a59d30fc2fb72 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 | |
| From: Hiroshi Nakamura <[email protected]> | |
| Date: Wed, 5 Jun 2013 23:14:16 +0900 | |
| Subject: [PATCH] Hostname check bypassing vulnerability in SSL client | |
| (CVE-2013-4073) | |
| Ruby's SSL client implements hostname identity check but the OpenSSL | |
| function it depends cannot properly handle hostnames in subjectAltName | |
| that contain null bytes. The fix parses DER encoded bytes of | |
| subjectAltName to extract GeneralName of dNSName and check it against | |
| hostname. | |
| = Vulnerability Summary = | |
| A vulnerability in Ruby's SSL client that could allow man-in-the-middle | |
| attackers to spoof SSL servers via valid certificate issued by a trusted | |
| certification authority. | |
| Ruby's SSL client implements hostname identity check but it does not | |
| properly handle hostnames in the certificate that contain null bytes. | |
| = Details = | |
| OpenSSL::SSL.verify_certificate_identity implements RFC2818 Server | |
| Identity check for Ruby's SSL client but it does not properly handle | |
| hostnames in the subjectAltName X509 extension that contain null bytes. | |
| Existing code in lib/openssl/ssl.rb uses OpenSSL::X509::Extension#value | |
| for extracting identity from subjectAltName. Extension#value depends | |
| OpenSSL function X509V3_EXT_print() and for dNSName of subjectAltName it | |
| utilizes sprintf() that is known as null byte unsafe. As the result | |
| Extension#value returns 'www.ruby-lang.org' if the subjectAltName is | |
| 'www.ruby-lang.org\0.example.com' and | |
| OpenSSL::SSL.verify_certificate_identity wrongly identifies the | |
| certificate is for 'www.ruby-lang.org'. | |
| When a CA a SSL client trusts allows to issue the server certificate | |
| that has null byte in subjectAltName, remote attackers can obtain the | |
| certificate for 'www.ruby-lang.org\0.example.com' from the CA to spoof | |
| 'www.ruby-lang.org' and do man-in-the-middle between Ruby's SSL client | |
| and SSL servers. | |
| = Credit = | |
| This vulnerability is found by William (B.J.) Snow Orvis and coordinated | |
| with [email protected] by David Thiel from iSEC Partners. | |
| --- | |
| ext/openssl/lib/openssl/ssl.rb | 18 +++++++++++++----- | |
| test/openssl/test_ssl.rb | 22 ++++++++++++++++++++++ | |
| 2 files changed, 35 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) | |
| diff --git a/ext/openssl/lib/openssl/ssl.rb b/ext/openssl/lib/openssl/ssl.rb | |
| index bc3b781..04eb592 100644 | |
| --- a/ext/openssl/lib/openssl/ssl.rb | |
| +++ b/ext/openssl/lib/openssl/ssl.rb | |
| @@ -98,14 +98,22 @@ module OpenSSL | |
| should_verify_common_name = true | |
| cert.extensions.each{|ext| | |
| next if ext.oid != "subjectAltName" | |
| - ext.value.split(/,\s+/).each{|general_name| | |
| - if /\ADNS:(.*)/ =~ general_name | |
| + id, ostr = OpenSSL::ASN1.decode(ext.to_der).value | |
| + sequence = OpenSSL::ASN1.decode(ostr.value) | |
| + sequence.value.each{|san| | |
| + case san.tag | |
| + when 2 # dNSName in GeneralName (RFC5280) | |
| should_verify_common_name = false | |
| - reg = Regexp.escape($1).gsub(/\\\*/, "[^.]+") | |
| + reg = Regexp.escape(san.value).gsub(/\\\*/, "[^.]+") | |
| return true if /\A#{reg}\z/i =~ hostname | |
| - elsif /\AIP Address:(.*)/ =~ general_name | |
| + when 7 # iPAddress in GeneralName (RFC5280) | |
| should_verify_common_name = false | |
| - return true if $1 == hostname | |
| + # follows GENERAL_NAME_print() in x509v3/v3_alt.c | |
| + if san.value.size == 4 | |
| + return true if san.value.unpack('C*').join('.') == hostname | |
| + elsif san.value.size == 16 | |
| + return true if san.value.unpack('n*').map { |e| sprintf("%X", e) }.join(':') == hostname | |
| + end | |
| end | |
| } | |
| } | |
| diff --git a/test/openssl/test_ssl.rb b/test/openssl/test_ssl.rb | |
| index f3c1aac..daaaa0a 100644 | |
| --- a/test/openssl/test_ssl.rb | |
| +++ b/test/openssl/test_ssl.rb | |
| @@ -337,6 +337,28 @@ class OpenSSL::TestSSL < OpenSSL::SSLTestCase | |
| } | |
| end | |
| + def test_verify_certificate_identity | |
| + # creating NULL byte SAN certificate | |
| + ef = OpenSSL::X509::ExtensionFactory.new | |
| + cert = OpenSSL::X509::Certificate.new | |
| + cert.subject = OpenSSL::X509::Name.parse "/DC=some/DC=site/CN=Some Site" | |
| + ext = ef.create_ext('subjectAltName', 'DNS:placeholder,IP:192.168.7.1,IP:13::17') | |
| + ext_asn1 = OpenSSL::ASN1.decode(ext.to_der) | |
| + san_list_der = ext_asn1.value.reduce(nil) { |memo,val| val.tag == 4 ? val.value : memo } | |
| + san_list_asn1 = OpenSSL::ASN1.decode(san_list_der) | |
| + san_list_asn1.value[0].value = 'www.example.com\0.evil.com' | |
| + ext_asn1.value[1].value = san_list_asn1.to_der | |
| + real_ext = OpenSSL::X509::Extension.new ext_asn1 | |
| + cert.add_extension(real_ext) | |
| + | |
| + assert_equal(false, OpenSSL::SSL.verify_certificate_identity(cert, 'www.example.com')) | |
| + assert_equal(true, OpenSSL::SSL.verify_certificate_identity(cert, 'www.example.com\0.evil.com')) | |
| + assert_equal(false, OpenSSL::SSL.verify_certificate_identity(cert, '192.168.7.255')) | |
| + assert_equal(true, OpenSSL::SSL.verify_certificate_identity(cert, '192.168.7.1')) | |
| + assert_equal(false, OpenSSL::SSL.verify_certificate_identity(cert, '13::17')) | |
| + assert_equal(true, OpenSSL::SSL.verify_certificate_identity(cert, '13:0:0:0:0:0:0:17')) | |
| + end | |
| + | |
| def test_tlsext_hostname | |
| return unless OpenSSL::SSL::SSLSocket.instance_methods.include?(:hostname) | |
| -- | |
| 1.8.1.2 | |
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| From 0eb55c28a7f696df3f57bb8532c6396588bd82cb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 | |
| From: Hiroshi Nakamura <[email protected]> | |
| Date: Sun, 23 Jun 2013 16:30:01 +0900 | |
| Subject: [PATCH] Hostname check bypassing vulnerability in SSL client | |
| (CVE-2013-4073) | |
| Ruby's SSL client implements hostname identity check but the OpenSSL | |
| function it depends cannot properly handle hostnames in subjectAltName | |
| that contain null bytes. The fix parses DER encoded bytes of | |
| subjectAltName to extract GeneralName of dNSName and check it against | |
| hostname. | |
| = Vulnerability Summary = | |
| A vulnerability in Ruby's SSL client that could allow man-in-the-middle | |
| attackers to spoof SSL servers via valid certificate issued by a trusted | |
| certification authority. | |
| Ruby's SSL client implements hostname identity check but it does not | |
| properly handle hostnames in the certificate that contain null bytes. | |
| = Details = | |
| OpenSSL::SSL.verify_certificate_identity implements RFC2818 Server | |
| Identity check for Ruby's SSL client but it does not properly handle | |
| hostnames in the subjectAltName X509 extension that contain null bytes. | |
| Existing code in lib/openssl/ssl.rb uses OpenSSL::X509::Extension#value | |
| for extracting identity from subjectAltName. Extension#value depends | |
| OpenSSL function X509V3_EXT_print() and for dNSName of subjectAltName it | |
| utilizes sprintf() that is known as null byte unsafe. As the result | |
| Extension#value returns 'www.ruby-lang.org' if the subjectAltName is | |
| 'www.ruby-lang.org\0.example.com' and | |
| OpenSSL::SSL.verify_certificate_identity wrongly identifies the | |
| certificate is for 'www.ruby-lang.org'. | |
| When a CA a SSL client trusts allows to issue the server certificate | |
| that has null byte in subjectAltName, remote attackers can obtain the | |
| certificate for 'www.ruby-lang.org\0.example.com' from the CA to spoof | |
| 'www.ruby-lang.org' and do man-in-the-middle between Ruby's SSL client | |
| and SSL servers. | |
| = Credit = | |
| This vulnerability is found by William (B.J.) Snow Orvis and coordinated | |
| with [email protected] by David Thiel from iSEC Partners. | |
| --- | |
| ext/openssl/lib/openssl/ssl-internal.rb | 18 +++++++++++++----- | |
| test/openssl/test_ssl.rb | 22 ++++++++++++++++++++++ | |
| 2 files changed, 35 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) | |
| diff --git a/ext/openssl/lib/openssl/ssl-internal.rb b/ext/openssl/lib/openssl/ssl-internal.rb | |
| index c70b5b8..356d4e8 100644 | |
| --- a/ext/openssl/lib/openssl/ssl-internal.rb | |
| +++ b/ext/openssl/lib/openssl/ssl-internal.rb | |
| @@ -88,14 +88,22 @@ module OpenSSL | |
| should_verify_common_name = true | |
| cert.extensions.each{|ext| | |
| next if ext.oid != "subjectAltName" | |
| - ext.value.split(/,\s+/).each{|general_name| | |
| - if /\ADNS:(.*)/ =~ general_name | |
| + id, ostr = OpenSSL::ASN1.decode(ext.to_der).value | |
| + sequence = OpenSSL::ASN1.decode(ostr.value) | |
| + sequence.value.each{|san| | |
| + case san.tag | |
| + when 2 # dNSName in GeneralName (RFC5280) | |
| should_verify_common_name = false | |
| - reg = Regexp.escape($1).gsub(/\\\*/, "[^.]+") | |
| + reg = Regexp.escape(san.value).gsub(/\\\*/, "[^.]+") | |
| return true if /\A#{reg}\z/i =~ hostname | |
| - elsif /\AIP Address:(.*)/ =~ general_name | |
| + when 7 # iPAddress in GeneralName (RFC5280) | |
| should_verify_common_name = false | |
| - return true if $1 == hostname | |
| + # follows GENERAL_NAME_print() in x509v3/v3_alt.c | |
| + if san.value.size == 4 | |
| + return true if san.value.unpack('C*').join('.') == hostname | |
| + elsif san.value.size == 16 | |
| + return true if san.value.unpack('n*').map { |e| sprintf("%X", e) }.join(':') == hostname | |
| + end | |
| end | |
| } | |
| } | |
| diff --git a/test/openssl/test_ssl.rb b/test/openssl/test_ssl.rb | |
| index cf0f1b7..58493bf 100644 | |
| --- a/test/openssl/test_ssl.rb | |
| +++ b/test/openssl/test_ssl.rb | |
| @@ -351,6 +351,28 @@ class OpenSSL::TestSSL < OpenSSL::SSLTestCase | |
| } | |
| end | |
| + def test_verify_certificate_identity | |
| + # creating NULL byte SAN certificate | |
| + ef = OpenSSL::X509::ExtensionFactory.new | |
| + cert = OpenSSL::X509::Certificate.new | |
| + cert.subject = OpenSSL::X509::Name.parse "/DC=some/DC=site/CN=Some Site" | |
| + ext = ef.create_ext('subjectAltName', 'DNS:placeholder,IP:192.168.7.1,IP:13::17') | |
| + ext_asn1 = OpenSSL::ASN1.decode(ext.to_der) | |
| + san_list_der = ext_asn1.value.reduce(nil) { |memo,val| val.tag == 4 ? val.value : memo } | |
| + san_list_asn1 = OpenSSL::ASN1.decode(san_list_der) | |
| + san_list_asn1.value[0].value = 'www.example.com\0.evil.com' | |
| + ext_asn1.value[1].value = san_list_asn1.to_der | |
| + real_ext = OpenSSL::X509::Extension.new ext_asn1 | |
| + cert.add_extension(real_ext) | |
| + | |
| + assert_equal(false, OpenSSL::SSL.verify_certificate_identity(cert, 'www.example.com')) | |
| + assert_equal(true, OpenSSL::SSL.verify_certificate_identity(cert, 'www.example.com\0.evil.com')) | |
| + assert_equal(false, OpenSSL::SSL.verify_certificate_identity(cert, '192.168.7.255')) | |
| + assert_equal(true, OpenSSL::SSL.verify_certificate_identity(cert, '192.168.7.1')) | |
| + assert_equal(false, OpenSSL::SSL.verify_certificate_identity(cert, '13::17')) | |
| + assert_equal(true, OpenSSL::SSL.verify_certificate_identity(cert, '13:0:0:0:0:0:0:17')) | |
| + end | |
| + | |
| def test_tlsext_hostname | |
| return unless OpenSSL::SSL::SSLSocket.instance_methods.include?(:hostname) | |
| -- | |
| 1.8.1.2 | |
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