what is the burden of value?
It is precisely this negative question: What is it for something to have value?” I.e.: what is the fundamental relationship of things with each other such that these things can have value at all? This is what Thomism, as we know, calls the “metaphysics of the tertium quid.” So, as already hinted, things are valuable only because of a relation to something else. In short: we cannot decide the question “What is it for something to be valuable?” or “What is valuable?” or “Why are things valuable?” or “What are the reasons for which things are valuable?” All we can do is ask the question “What makes something valuable?” Note that all of these questions can and should be reformulated in non-substantive language: What is it that accounts for the value of things? A: There are many kinds of value, but there is no reason to assume that they all are dependent on the same essence or nature.
with what must the burden of value begin?
that is, what is the essence or nature that makes things intrinsically valuable? I suppose the first task is to eliminate anything that seems obvious, such as "good is bad" or "being good is not a thing" These are all interesting, and potentially helpful, observations, but they are unhelpful for the present question. I suggest that "good is bad", like any existential claim, doesn't say anything at all about the nature of value. It merely defines what I call "logical goodness". Similarly, "good is not a thing" merely defines logical goodness as a condition. It is not a description of the nature of value.
why is logical goodness prior to chronological goodness?
chronological goodness does not exist in a logical mind. then logical goodness and value are prior to the thing and are concepts, they are abstract but are not mere projections of a mind. In metaphysics logical goodness is prior to chronological goodness. How can that be? The challenge is to show that the [principles] that account for the intrinsic goodness of some thing or thing-relationships are logically prior to those that account for the extrinsic goodness of the same thing or thing-relationship.
why do objects relate to themselves before they relate to others?
goodness would seem to have to come from the universe, and relate to all objects, but how does that relate to them? Is there a third category of thing? All things are related to all other things, but in different ways, and to different degrees. Your question seems to be suggesting that there is a different category of things, namely, objects, whose intrinsic nature is valued, and that this nature is a mere projection of the subject. In Thomistic metaphysics, things are related to all other things. Consider the question: What is the primary nature of an object? This can be answered in several ways. An object is a being, and a being is a composite of essence and existence. Alternatively, objects are composed of matter and form, which are, respectively, the matter and form of the composite of essence and existence. In this sense, objects are composed of, and related to, all other things, all other beings, and all other objects. There is nothing special about objects as objects. All objects are related to all other things, and all things are related to all other things. It is an unwarranted assumption that things are always and only related to other things as an object. However, you raise a very good question: What do things have to be related to in order to be an object? And, there is no short answer to this question. What is an object? is a great question, and a difficult question, because of the many different types of objects we consider. Object theory provides, as you have already remarked, multiple useful definitions, but they remain partial and sometimes inadequate, and so you have been given some very important questions for further investigation.
how must doxastic primacy re-orient the question in its interpretation?
i believe that doxastic primacy must be the origin of goodness. since "good" is defined, in part, as something that tends to do what good is, or the origin of goodness. at is, good. since, as Good, it can only be good. not because it is related to what is good. There is a considerable difference between "being good", and "doing good". To be good is to be the origin of goodness. To do good is to effect goodness. Consider, for example, that fire does not "do good" by being a good fire, nor water, or oxygen, nor any other. There is another aspect to this question. There is something peculiar about the verb "good", especially in relation to its object "good". In one sense, the object (good) is its primary nature, and it has secondary properties (or
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do object-relation dualisms continue the thought?
the answer is yes, but the question is not. The question is whether the thought is a good one. The answer is that it is not. The thought is a bad one. It is a bad one because it is a bad thought. It is a bad thought because it is a bad thought. It is a bad thought because it is a bad thought. It is a bad thought because it is a bad thought. It is a bad thought because it is a bad thought. It is a bad thought because it is a bad thought. It is a bad thought because it is a bad thought. It is a bad thought because it is a bad thought. It is a bad thought because it is a bad thought. It is a bad thought because it is a bad thought. It is a bad thought because it is a bad thought. It is a bad thought because it is a bad thought. It is a bad thought because it is a bad thought. It is a bad thought because it
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