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radio_10628b_radio_10628b_20241115_035124.txt
[00:00] and the fact that most people do not know that GDP is not a single indicator, but actually a family of indicator from which you need to choose the adequate one uh for the
[00:10] analysis you want to make. So, when you want to make an analysis comparing countries with very different internal level of prices and structure of the economy, you need to go
[00:20] to GDP corrected for the purchasing power parity. When you take that, you see basically that the Russian GDP is more than three times larger than the nominal GDP
[00:30] that people very frequently use. Secondly, there is no fiscal fragility. It's a fiscally disciplined country with a very, very low level of debt to GDP
[00:40] much, much lower than what is present in Europe nowadays. I believe that the last figure that I found in Fiscal Monitor, which is published by the IMF was 17
[00:50] percent of GDP, which is far, far below the average in Europe, which is around 80% or United States which is now running almost 130% of GDP
[01:00] the overall debt that they have. So, uh this is in my view, macroeconomically, a country and economy that is very hard to
[01:10] destabilize. And um people that have been talking about sanctions, I believe that they had something else in in mind. You know, smaller economies which with which they had
[01:20] experiences previously and um relative success. But I can tell you coming from a very small economy with sanctions back in the 90s, even our economy has survived.
[01:30] You know, there is always a possibility to sidestep some of the some of the sanctions. Obviously, there is much, much more a problem in in a small country like
[01:40] Serbia than in in an economy like Russia. Now, uh Serbia and Russia clearly have a historical tie, but I I do want to ask
[01:50] you as somebody who deals with hard matters of economy. I wonder if that quality of Russia to be disciplined about its financial matters or about its
[02:00] development is also uh something that attracts many of the countries to the BRICS format because personally speaking, this is something I think that to be respected. This
[02:10] you know, this quality of being not only self-sufficient, but also, you know, seeing your own witnesses appreciating your own strength and trying to
[02:20] build from that. Do you think there is any attraction in that in the in the world?
[02:30] I think that there is. I think that there is a potential for the the the countries in the south to start realizing and understanding that with these three Eurasian economies, China, India
[02:40] and Russia, you know, there is basically fewer and fewer need to cooperate with traditional West. Technology,
[02:50] industry, military capacity, overall economic strength, you know, it has actually shifted in geographical terms from the West to the East.
[03:00] And nowadays, if you if you really want to acquire anything that is substantial for any developing economy, I'm sure that they could, besides West, look also
[03:10] elsewhere and fulfill their needs in a in a in a good way. So, um you know, South South cooperation, in my view, should be increased.
[03:20] And also, you know, one of these very good ideas that had emerged after the Second World War, which have never been implemented. Unfortunately, you know, a little bit
[03:30] you know, put on the side and never really been developed. In those days, the end of 1940s and beginning of 1950s, it was also debated about
[03:40] creating commodities, um you know, reserves that would keep the prices of agricultural products and other commodities relatively stable. And that was something that would have, you know, very much helped the development of underdeveloped economies. However,
[03:50]
[04:00] that didn't realize. The only two institutions basically that stayed alive were World Bank and the IMF, and they have gradually, basically, been
[04:10] steered perhaps a little bit away from the real interest of the developing world. Let me ask you one more question about attractions because I think
[04:20] ever since the Soviet collapsed, it was assumed that the European Union is the main attraction for all European countries, that they all want to be part of this
[04:30] big club because of its values, as you mentioned, because of the high living standards. And there was a sort of presumption within European, Western European politicians
[04:40] that they can choose whom to befriend, and they can sort of impose preconditions on countries if they want to be in some sort of a relationship with
[04:50] the European Union. Does this still does this still hold true? Do you think the EU is still as attractive as it believes itself to be?
[05:00] We we don't really need to speculate too much. We have seen what happened with Brexit. Obviously, some people in United Kingdom, the majority was was there, obviously,
[05:10] in 2016 voted to get out of the EU. I'm not sure whether that was an optimal choice for the UK citizens in a long run, but it's obvious that
[05:20] Europe is in a sort of a crisis in terms of decision making, but also you see divisions within the EU coming from the Western Balkans. I can also say
[05:30] that we are waiting in line for 20 years. Nothing actually has happened. We are, you can say that we are not getting closer by waiting in line. We are drifting away from from European
[05:40] Union, you could say. There, to a certain extent, I believe that the the European Union has a problem if it wants to be called European and at the same
[05:50] time to exclude the largest economy on the continent, the country which has largest territory, which has largest population
[06:00] and obviously a very significant military power. I do not believe that European institutions should be, you know, growing on those grounds. I
[06:10] believe that they need to make a shift, and we'll see whether maybe some new political structures in Europe will be more aware of that fact. And one
[06:20] last question, if I may. One of the most common words I I heard being voiced at the BRICS Summit in Kazan was respect. And I want to ask
[06:30] you as an economist, how much respect matters when it comes to relationships between various countries?
[06:40] Diplomacy is such an important thing. It basically is grounded on mutual respect. And this thing is something that unfortunately is is quite um you know, put aside
[06:50] in in many relationships that we have seen that we have seen in past couple of decades. There are countries, especially some in West that basically try to impose
[07:00] solutions. They are not, you know, treating the other parties as an equal in discussions. They are not prone to discuss in a diplomatic manner and to solve problems before they erupt in undesirable fashion. So, I believe that there is also lack of, you know, capacity on the side of
[07:10]
[07:20] the current political elites, and the art of diplomacy, in my view, has been in decline. Well, Mr. Sash, and I believe it's also the Western phrase that what you give is
[07:30] what you get. So I guess it's not much a surprise that the West increasingly finds itself in a minority. Nevertheless, this is all we have time for. Thank you very
[07:40] much for being with us. Thank you very much for inviting me. Thank you. And thank you. Hope to see you again on Worlds Apart.
[07:50]
[08:00]
[08:10]
[08:20]
[08:30]
[08:40]
[08:50]
[09:00] You're listening to Radio Sputnik
[09:10] telling the untold.
[09:20] Hello everyone. This is the New Rules podcast, and I'm your host, Dimitri Siam Jr.. Today, we're coming to you with another Middle East update. And to that effect, I'm very pleased to welcome University of Tehran Professor, Said Muhammad Marandi.
[09:30]
[09:40] Professor Marandi, thank you so much for once again joining the program. Thank you very much for having me.
[09:50] So, Professor Marandi, I want to start with Israel's attack on Iran last Saturday, because there's been a lot of speculation about what Iran's next move will be. Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei said that Israel must be forced to realize the power of the Iranian nation.
[10:00] Meanwhile, a senior IRGC commander said that Iran will deliver a crushing blow against Israel in the coming days. What do you expect Iran to do next?
[10:10]
[10:20] I think that Iran will definitely respond. It will give a punishing response because it has to create deterrents.
[10:30] This regime is not a normal state. It's not a state. It's a genocidal entity that's carrying out a Holocaust in front of the eyes of the world.
[10:40] It's carrying out genocidal air strikes in Lebanon. It's slaughtering people in the West Bank.
[10:50] It's bombing Syria regularly. It is a lawless regime. So the only way to stop it is
[11:00] to slap it down. And the Iranians in the past showed a great deal of strategic patients with regards to the regime. When the Americans and the Israeli regime carried out a cyber attack on the Iranian nuclear program, many the Iranians showed strategic patients. When the Americans and Israelis assassinated
[11:10]
[11:20] Iranian scientists, one of them was a colleague of mine at the University of Tehran, who was murdered in front of his wife. Iran again showed strategic patients. When the Israeli regime murdered Iranian officers in Syria who were fighting ISIS and Al-Qaeda during the dirty war in Syria,
[11:30]
[11:40] again, Iran showed strategic patients. But after they bombed the Iranian Embassy in Damascus earlier this year, Iran felt it had to retaliate to create deterrents.
[11:50] But after that, that deterrents didn't last very long, and Israeli again murdered an official guest, the head of Hamas,
[12:00] in Tehran, who was in the country at the invitation of the president for his inauguration, and he was murdered in a government guest house. So Iran again had to retaliate.
[12:10] Now that the Israeli regime has struck Iran, true, it wasn't very successful. It was a more or less a failure with limited damage, but still, it was a major violation of Iranian sovereignty. So Iran will have to strike again, and I think this time, the Iranian retaliation
[12:20]
[12:30] will be significantly more damaging to the Israeli regime than the previous strike. So, on the theme of deterrence, what do you think Iran can do, needs to do in order to reestablish deterrence via Israel? And is it possible to do so without getting on a slippery slope to regional war?
[12:40]
[12:50] Well, Iran can definitely outgun the Israeli regime. Iran has many underground missile cities and drone cities across the country.
[13:00] Those were created to protect the country against a potential American attack.
[13:10] In 2003, when the Americans invaded Afghanistan and Iraq, and they effectively surrounded Iran, and they had a very huge presence in the Persian Gulf, Iran began to develop these underground missile and drone cities. They are very deeply They are very well protected. They're deep underground. And that is what deterred any American attack.
[13:20]
[13:30] The reason why the Americans never attacked Iran was because of Iran's ability to protect itself. So, the Israeli regime is very small, very vulnerable, completely dependent on the West. In any major exchange, the regime's infrastructure would be destroyed very swiftly. But Iran does
[13:40]
[13:50] take consideration of the fact that we do not want a regional war, and no one else does. It's only the Israelis that are looking for a regional war. They want the Americans to get involved. So on the one hand, the Iranians will have to punish the regime, hit them very hard, slap down Netanyahu to hopefully
[14:00]
[14:10] create deterrence so that the regime doesn't try this again in the future. But Iran wants to show the world, the global South in particular, the global majority that it is not trying to bring about a regional war, because a regional war would bring down the global economy.
[14:20] There's no doubt about that. If the Americans get involved, then all of its bases in the Persian Gulf region and Iraq will be swept away. But more importantly, all of those family dictatorships in the Persian Gulf, they will lose their boiling gas
[14:30]
[14:40] insulations. And that will lead to the collapse of these regimes, but far more importantly, it will lead to the collapse of the global economy. That's not what any sane person wants. But the Israeli regime is willing to sacrifice everyone for its own genocidal interest.
[14:50]
[15:00] So, you're right. Iran is looking for a It is It is carrying out a balancing act where on the one hand, it has to create this deterrence, because if Iran doesn't strike the Israeli regime,
[15:10] the regime will only do this again. It's clear. They will They will carry out further attacks. So, Iran has no option, but it does have to seek to balance things so that the war doesn't expand to to lead to a global catastrophe.
[15:20]
[15:30] Do you have any reasonable guesses on how Iran could slap Israel down, punish Israel for this attack? Obviously, you know, we can't know what exact decision the Supreme Leader, the IRGC will make. But I'm guessing there are some logical targets for Iran to consider.
[15:40]
[15:50] At this stage, it's impossible for me to be sure. I think that the Iranians this time round will strike much harder or significantly harder because the leader said that they have to see Iran's strength.
[16:00] In other words, the previous attack, which I think was quite impressive, and almost all Iran's missiles got through, and people across the world saw the strikes across Israeli regime, that was I think pretty impressive. So if Iran, if that wasn't a sign of a show of Iran strength,
[16:10]
[16:20] then Iran and this time round, he wants to show Iran strength, then I think the the strike will be far more substantial than last time round. Iran has hundreds of thousands of drones and missiles that are prepared for war, and Iran can launch almost 2,000 drones and missiles
[16:30]
[16:40] in one wave, and it can fire these wave after wave, and they go from across the country. So there's nothing really that the Israelis can do about it.
[16:50] The Iranian drones that were used in the first Iranian retaliation months ago were very old drones. Iran has very advanced drones and very advanced missiles. Iran's hypersonic missiles haven't been used yet at all.
[17:00]
[17:10] So, there are a lot of capabilities that Iran has not revealed. Until now, it's been focusing on gathering information, gathering intelligence, understanding Israeli regime's ability or lack of ability to defend itself. But as we move forward, I think the Iranians are going to get much more serious.
[17:20]
[17:30] So, before moving beyond this most recent attack, I want to look at what the pro-Israeli side is saying about it, because they're claiming that that they seriously damaged Iran's air defense capabilities and an important missile production facility. What do you make of these
[17:40]
[17:50] claims? Do you think that they have any sort of credibility? No, it's obvious that the regime is in trouble and it has to give its people it has to boost their morale. And of course, the West and Western media will help them as much as they can, because they are partners in this Holocaust in Gaza. They are They're partners in this these genocidal strikes on Lebanon.
[18:00]
[18:10] But everyone in Iran has cell phones. If these strikes, which were carried out near Tehran, had any major impact, we would have seen the explosions from Tehran. In fact, the Parchin military
[18:20]
[18:30] complex is right beside Tehran, and from parts of Tehran, it is visible because Tehran is a mountainous area. So if there were explosions, especially at night, people would see them. They would see the fire. Has anyone seen anything online?
[18:40] The Iranian air defenses were able to bring down most of the missiles.
[18:50] Some of the missiles just missed, and some of them struck their targets. We had four officers of the air defense that were martyred. But by and large, this was a failure. And I should also add that the Israeli regime is not able to destroy Iran's defense capabilities, because ever since the United States began threatening Iran decades ago,
[19:00]
[19:10] Iran began moving all of its key installations, military installations and assets underground. So all of the major factories or all of the centers that produce Iranian's key weapons and key technology, they are deep under
[19:20]
[19:30] ground, just like Iran's peaceful nuclear program. Why? To protect it from the Americans, not from the Israeli regime, which is much weaker than the Americans. There's just no comparison. So the Israelis do not have the ability to strike Iran's missile defense program. Only The only thing that is on the ground
[19:40]
[19:50] are small workshops that are spread out across the country so that in in case of American attack, it would be much more difficult for them to create real damage. And those workshops are not where the key assets are produced.
[20:00] So, no, the Israelis have failed. They do not have the capability to destroy Iran's air defenses, and they do not have the capability to destroy Iran's missile defenses. There is no evidence
[20:10]
[20:20] of that. We've seen in Ukraine whenever an S-300 blows up, or whenever there is a strike on a significant target, they have these huge explosions. We saw that in Israel, but we never saw that in Iran.
[20:30] So, I think that we should take it with not just a grain of salt, what Israeli regime says, but perhaps a kilo or two of salt. So, you had an interesting tweet after Israel's attack. I want to read it for our audience members who maybe didn't see it.
[20:40]
[20:50] You wrote, "I've been told Israel Israeli intelligence was badly deceived by dummies and decoys, as well as disinformation. Iran's air defense performed very well. Some footage will be later released. Iran has learned a lot about US military technology. This information will be used
[21:00]
[21:10] and shared." Could you elaborate on that? Yes. As I pointed out, the Iranian air defense system worked very effectively, and Iranian intelligence also obviously was capable of misinforming Israeli regime somehow, and they hit empty
[21:20]
[21:30] space or places which had nothing in them and as well as decoys. But most importantly, the Iranians gained a lot of information about the latest American technology because the technology that the Americans give to Israeli regime is their best technology.
[21:40] It's the sort of technology that they do not give to Ukraine. And there's no doubt that our friends in Moscow would be very interested in this sort of information, and so will our friends in China.
[21:50]
[22:00] So, the Iranians will definitely be sharing information to the Russians and the Chinese so that in future they can better protect themselves against any potential US aggression or aggression carried out by US proxies.
[22:10] So, returning to the possibility of Iran's retaliation against Israel, do you think that Hezbollah could potentially play a role in that? Because in previous attacks,
[22:20]
[22:30] one of the signs of Iranian restraint was that Hezbollah, other members of the access of resistance, they sat those attacks out. If Iran really wants to slap Israel down hard, do you expect Hezbollah would play an important role in that sort of retaliation?
[22:40]
[22:50] No, Iran does not need any of its allies to be involved. Iran can send up to 2,000 drones and missiles in one wave, and that is far greater than anything we've seen so far. And Iran can fire wave after wave of missiles. So, and drones.
[23:00]
[23:10] So, Iran does not need any third party to be involved. Iran will definitely hammer the Israeli regime when the time comes. It could be any day now.
[23:20] It could be tonight. It could be tomorrow. I don't know when it will happen, but there is no doubt that Iran will hit it hard. After the murder of Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran,
[23:30]
[23:40] many were saying that Iran wouldn't retaliate, and I and I said often that it is inevitable. And ultimately, we saw that it happened. Iran's retaliation for the attack by Israeli regime is inevitable, and it will be harsh. And I think Zionists should start thinking about leaving Palestine because this is not going to end well for Israeli regime.
[23:50] It's time to go. Go back to Europe. Go back to the United States and leave the natives alone. So, developing the question about Hezbollah, we saw Sheikh Naim Qassem
[24:00]
[24:10] appointed the new Secretary General of the organization. And I'm guessing that for most of our viewers, this is the first time they've heard about Qassim. Could you talk a little bit about him? What is known about him? What sort of reputation does he have? And what sort of direction can we expect him to take Hezbollah
[24:20] in?
[24:30] I've met him. I know him. I've actually been in a panel with him at a conference in Beirut. He's a very smart person, a very humble person, very well educated.
[24:40]
[24:50] He is one of the founders of Hezbollah, and he was always the second in command, the the second highest official in Hezbollah over the past years. He is of course, a person who was very close to Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah, and I think he is an appropriate choice.
[25:00]
[25:10] All of those people who were martyred in Hezbollah over the by competent officers and competent officials. And now they are much more protective of their officials and of their leaders and commanders than before.
[25:20]
[25:30] So, things are going to get bad for Israeli regime, and we already see that. We see that on the border, the regime has failed to make any real inroads. They were supposed to take Southern Lebanon. There was a
[25:40] supposed to create a buffer zone, but they failed to achieve anything so far. And Hezbollah has punished them, and the further this battle in Southern Lebanon progresses,
[25:50]
[26:00] the worse it is going to become for Israeli regime. The regime has bitten off much more than it can chew. It is being hammered in the north. It is still being hammered in Gaza.
[26:10] It has destroyed its image across the world. It is despised among peoples on all the different continents, especially the youth. And Iran is about to
[26:20]
[26:30] hit the regime very hard. So things are not going to end well for Israeli regime. When there is ultimately a ceasefire, it will be a ceasefire that will mean that Israeli regime has failed. And once ordinary Israelis wake up to the reality that they could not win this war
[26:40]
[26:50] against the Palestinian people, against the Lebanese people, against the people of the region, and once they realize that the entire world looks on upon them with disgust, I think that that will mean the end of the Zionist project.
[27:00] It may take a few years, but I think we are nearing the end. I'm confident that we're nearing the end of what is called Israel. In addition to the situation in Southern Lebanon, we're seeing interesting dynamics when it comes to Haifa. And in fact, during his first speech as Hezbollah Secretary General,
[27:10]
[27:20] Qassim declared that Haifa has become the beloved of our fighters' hearts. They send it messages every now and then. How does Haifa in particular fit into Hezbollah's strategic equation?
[27:30] Haifa has an important port, and we already know that Ansar Allah in Yemen has blocked the Red Sea to Israeli regime.
[27:40] And Haifa therefore has become even more important. The regime is even more dependent on Haifa today than before. And Haifa is very vulnerable
[27:50]
[28:00] to Hezbollah strikes, as we've seen over the past few weeks and past few days and past few hours. Israeli regime is much more vulnerable than it thinks, or perhaps it does know how vulnerable it is, but it doesn't tell its people. The people of Zionists in Israel, I think, are living
[28:10]
[28:20] in an alternative reality. From what we're seeing of their internal discussions, they really don't know what's going on in the broader world and how deeply despised they are, and how poorly their armed forces are performing in Gaza and in Lebanon.
[28:30] Slaughter is not an achievement. Israelis like to think that slaughtering women and children is an achievement because they consider them to be Amalek. But every child that is killed creates more hate across the world. But on the battlefield, Hezbollah has shown that it can severely hurt the regime.
[28:40]
[28:50] Not only is it killing soldiers, but it is wrecking Israeli economy. And we have to keep always keep in mind that the Israeli regime has far more to lose than does Lebanon.
[29:00]
[29:10] Lebanon has always been under US and Western sanctions. They've prevented the country from growing. Most people don't know, but people in Lebanon don't have electricity. Government electricity only lasts for a couple of hours a day. People across the country use generators. So it is a country which has been held back by the West. Israeli regime, on the other hand, is where the West has constantly been subsidizing industries and subsidizing high-tech companies.
[29:20]
[29:30] That makes it extremely vulnerable to Hezbollah strikes. And so as the resistance harms the Israeli military and harms Israeli infrastructure, that will basically be telling sending a message to businesses across the world that Palestine
[29:40]
[29:50] is no longer a place for investment. Israel's economy has been permanently destroyed. Professor Morandi, thank you so much for joining the program. Thank
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