nhphong · November 22, 2024 11:08
diff --git a/radio_10628b_radio_10628b_20241119_161736.txt b/radio_10628b_radio_10628b_20241119_161736.txt
 [00:00] hiccups and in its businesses that it previously enjoyed. So
 [00:05] grave damage is being done to Israeli society by this. Before you even get to the
 [00:10] the consequences of the essentially fascist cabinet around Mr. Netanyahu,
 [00:15] the effort to destroy judicial independence, uh the effort
 [00:20] to conscript the ultra-orthodox, uh when they've previously had the privilege of remaining
 [00:25] away from the army, the rising casualty numbers, the failure to address the hostage
 [00:30] issue where Mr. Netanyahu has basically applied the Hannibal directive, meaning it's
 [00:35] better for anyone taken hostage to be killed than to become the subject of a negotiation.
 [00:40] And then you have the economy, uh and uh the write-down of Israeli
 [00:45] credit by Moody's and other rating agencies. So, aiming
 [00:50] at Haifa does make some sense from a strategic point of view. Um if if
 [00:55] if Hezbollah's objective is to further weaken Israel. And of course, as I said earlier,
 [01:00] Israel has brought into being a coalition against it in the region that is
 [01:05] likely to be lasting. And uh it has become an international pariah as
 [01:10] seen in the walkout on Netanyahu's speech to the UN General Assembly. The West
 [01:15] is isolated on this issue. The collective West supports Israel. The rest of the world has
 [01:20] turned against it. For my final question, I can't help but return to the very
 [01:25] first question of this interview because looking at Israel's situation, it really
 [01:30] does seem unenviable in many ways. As you mentioned, the war in Gaza
 [01:35] is far from over. The war in Southern Lebanon is not as easy as they thought it would
 [01:40] They have a looming economic crisis and Hezbollah is continuing to batter its northern regions.
 [01:45] Doesn't that mean that Netanyahu
 [01:50] who has to do something dramatic in order to try and regain the strategic initiative and to try and quickly end this war on terms favorable to Israel.
 [01:55] 
 [02:00] I don't think he can do that um at this point. Um he's ensured that there's no one who effectively
 [02:05] speak for Hamas to call off the war. Hamas recruitment both in uh
 [02:10] in Palestine and in the Palestinian diaspora, which we shouldn't forget, millions and
 [02:15] millions of people is way up. Israel embarked on a war of terror, uh and will
 [02:20] receive terror in return. The same is true of Hezbollah. Uh so I don't see what he can do that
 [02:25] is dramatic. The problem is the basic strategy, which has always avoided
 [02:30] any offer of co peaceful coexistence either with Israel or with Israel's neighbors.
 [02:35] Israel ignores sovereignty, bombs and strafes at will over its borders,
 [02:40] launches preemptive attacks, and it has essentially brought down the entire edifice
 [02:45] of international law that might have protected it through a diplomatic solution. There
 [02:50] are two ways to reduce threats. Uh one is to try to bomb them out of existence, which has a very
 [02:55] poor record of success, and the other is try to reduce them by eliminating their causes. But
 [03:00] Israel has doubled down on the causes uh for the attacks on it and
 [03:05] I don't think they're going to end anytime soon. I want to make one final observation because it pertains
 [03:10] to us. And it it it applies to other situations like US-Russian relations,
 [03:15] US-Chinese relations and so forth. Uh US-Iran relations. In a democracy, when
 [03:20] when the political elite wishes to consolidate support for a war, it
 [03:25] demonizes the enemy. The preferred model for this is Adolf Hitler. So Saddam Hussein instantly became a Hitler in disguise. Xi Jinping is a Hitler, Putin is a
 [03:30] 
 [03:35] Hitler, uh and the Ayatollah Khamenei is a Hitler, and they're all implacable
 [03:40] enemies of of in this case, uh Israel, or in other cases, the United
 [03:45] States. They're incorrigible, incorrigibly bellicose. You can't talk to them.
 [03:50] If you do, they regard that as weakness. So you don't talk to them. So you adopt a pure
 [03:55] a policy that is purely military and relies entirely on deterrence.
 [04:00] So then you get into what political scientists call the security dilemma.
 [04:05] Uh we do things which we regard as necessary to deter the other side and thereby defend ourselves. They perceive these correctly as enhancing our
 [04:10] ability to attack them, and they then take countermeasures. And in the meantime, there
 [04:15] is no dialogue. During the Cold War, we had an active dialogue with Moscow. We have none
 [04:20] now. We had an active dialogue with Beijing for 40 years. We have virtually none now.
 [04:25] 
 [04:30] There is a pretense of communication, but there's no substance to it. We have no effective communication
 [04:35] with Iran. Therefore, our only options are military. And Israel is in exactly the same
 [04:40] position. It needs to alter its strategy. It needs to make a
 [04:45] decision to be part of the region in which it has been established. Every
 [04:50] country in the region is prepared to accept a two-state solution. That is not where they
 [04:55] began. They were originally against the establishment of Israel. Israel needs to embrace
 [05:00] a peaceful solution and rather than escalate militarily, because
 [05:05] that will lead nowhere but to the destruction of Israel itself. Ambassador Freeman, thank you so much
 [05:10] for joining the program. Take a better talk topic next time, please. Thank you all for
 [05:15] tuning in. Till next time.
 [05:20] Stuck in traffic?
 [05:25] No problem. Stay informed. Stay tuned to Radio Sputnik on 105
 [05:30] .5 FM or 1390 AM in the Washington DC area.
 [05:35] Need more? Follow us on Facebook or check us out on sputniknews.com.
 [05:40] Welcome to Sputnik Explains, where the printed page meets the airwaves.
 [05:45] In this show, we transform Sputnik News's most compelling articles into a radio format
 [05:50] that informs, enlightens, and sometimes challenges conventional
 [05:55] narratives. Today, we unravel the rich tapestry
 [06:00] of historical events and dissect the intricate geopolitics of our times.
 [06:05] As we mark the 70th anniversary of an extraordinary moment in history.
 [06:10] A moment when the Cold War security competition in Europe could have taken a very different turn.
 [06:15] We reflect on the Soviet Union's overtures to join the North Atlantic Treaty Organization,
 [06:20] NATO. Let's explore the recurring rejection of Moscow's advances and the reasons
 [06:25] behind the West's consistently hostile reactions. On March 31st, 1954,
 [06:30] astonishment rippled through the halls of power in the West as Soviet foreign minister Vyacheslav Molotov
 [06:35] extended an unprecedented offer. A diplomatic note suggested Moscow's readiness to join NATO,
 [06:40] an act that promised to transform the military block from a closed circle into a truly inclusive system ensuring collective
 [06:45] security in Europe. The potential of such collaboration to bolster universal peace was
 [06:50] profound. Washington mulled over the Soviet proposal for a month, ultimately dismissing
 [06:55] the idea on May 7th, 1954 as unrealistic and contradictory
 [07:00] to the defense system and security upon which Western states relied. It's important to note
 [07:05] that while publicly focusing on deterring so-called Soviet expansionism, behind
 [07:10] 
 [07:15] the scenes NATO's architecture as choreographed by the United States sought to manage European countries' internal affairs, keeping the Soviet Union out,
 [07:20] the Americans in, and the Germans down, as Lord Hastings Ismay, the first Secretary General
 [07:25] of the organization famously summarized. This 1954 episode wasn't
 [07:30] Moscow's first attempt at signaling its interest in fostering a European collective
 [07:35] security mechanism through NATO. As early as 1952, the indomitable
 [07:40] Soviet leader Joseph Stalin raised the possibility of joining the alliance, suggesting that a unified and neutral Germany could serve as a buffer between the Eastern and Western
 [07:45] 
 [07:50] blocs, a model later embodied by Austria's neutrality agreement in 1955.
 [07:55] 
 [08:00] Fast forward to the 1990s, and in the wake of the USSR's dissolution,
 [08:05] the newly formed Russian Federation once again extended an olive branch.
 [08:10] President Boris Yeltsin and his foreign minister, Andrey Kozyrev, engaged in eager negotiations with President Bill Clinton.
 [08:15] They hoped for an equal partnership and even contemplated Russian membership in the alliance.
 [08:20] However, these negotiations yielded little reciprocity, as the alliance expanded eastward, and Russia was met with
 [08:25] plications rather than partnership. Why then, the persistent rejection?
 [08:30] These episodes across decades reveal a consistent pattern. A Western block reluctant to cede strategic
 [08:35] 
 [08:40] advantage or control over the European security landscape. The uneasy dance
 [08:45] between East and West played out in a series of moves and countermoves where overt gestures of
 [08:50] peace met with strategic geopolitical considerations, often shrouded in a veneer of diplomatic courtesies.
 [08:55] While history has shown multiple Russian attempts to join or align with NATO, contemporary insights from President Vladimir Putin's discussions with then
 [09:00] President Bill Clinton hint at a deeper narrative of missed connections and clashing
 [09:05] ideologies. Vladimir Putin's recounting of his conversation with President Clinton,
 [09:10] as he shared with Tucker Carlson, is nothing short of revelatory. The Russian
 [09:15] president inquired about the possibility of Russia joining NATO. Clinton said, you know,
 [09:20] it's interesting. I think so, Putin recalled. Yet by evening, after conferring
 [09:25] with his advisors, the answer had shifted. It became a not possible now.
 [09:30] 
 [09:35] This brings us to question the real barriers between Russia and NATO. We turn
 [09:40] to the perspectives of experts and insiders, like former Pentagon analyst Michael Maloof. According
 [09:45] to him, the Cold War mentality was deeply entrenched in the West, causing ideological
 [09:50] friction that has persisted well beyond the collapse of the USSR. Both presidents
 [09:55] Yeltsin and Putin entertained the idea of NATO membership, indicating a genuine interest
 [10:00] in partnership from the Russian side. Ideological incompatibilities, a common
 [10:05] reason for denying Russian membership, spanned from fears of communism spread during the Cold War
 [10:10] to a misalignment in political systems post USSR. NATO, driven by its
 [10:15] own definition of democracy sets a bar which Russia, according to consensus, hasn't met, similar to Turkey's protracted journey to EU membership.
 [10:20] 
 [10:25] Experts further suggest that the deep state in Washington, more specifically the neoconservatives, has remained unyieldingly
 [10:30] antagonistic towards Russia. Individuals like Victoria Nuland personify
 [10:35] this agenda, focused on containing, or even dismantling, Russia, a task
 [10:40] that operatives in intelligence communities have found comfortable and familiar for over half
 [10:45] a century. Thus, the thaw of post-1991 relations felt alien
 [10:50] to many who were steeped in years of rivalry. Russia's inherent self-conception as a
 [10:55] great power necessitates its right to be viewed as an equal partner. This core belief
 [11:00] was palpable in the build-up to President Putin's red line declaration regarding NATO's expansion near
 [11:05] Russia's borders in December 2021. Russia's demand for a halt to this
 [11:10] encroachment was essentially met with a dismissive Western stance, reinforcing a sense
 [11:15] of not being taken seriously and exacerbating tensions. So, beneath the
 [11:20] surface of diplomatic interactions lies a complex interplay of ingrained ideologies,
 [11:25] historical apprehensions, strategic imperatives, and perennial power
 [11:30] dynamics. As we mark moments that could have redefined the global order, the essence
 [11:35] of these interactions reveals much about the continuity of geopolitical objectives
 [11:40] etched deep within the institutional memories of the players involved. As we delve deeper
 [11:45] into the complexities of NATO and Russia's historical interactions, we contemplate
 [11:50] an intriguing what-if scenario. What if the alliance and Russia had found common ground?
 [11:55] Experts argue that such total cooperation could have reaped immense benefits, not
 [12:00] just for securing peace, but also for bolstering economic ventures, especially with
 [12:05] respect to Europe. The notion raises a poignant counterfactual. Would it have been better for NATO
 [12:10] to dissolve in the wake of the Cold War, just as the Warsaw Pact did? The echo of that
 [12:15] sentiment resounds. The Warsaw Pact went away. NATO should have gone away.
 [12:20] Such a dissolution could have represented a profound turning point, signaling the end of an era
 [12:25] defined by diametrically opposed blocks and the advent of a more integrated global
 [12:30] security framework. Unfortunately, this is not the narrative that unfolded. Instead,
 [12:35] some argue that there are vested interests within the Western security establishment
 [12:40] who view the continuation and expansion of NATO as essential to their interests, a
 [12:45] rice bowl as a growth industry, so to speak. This perspective paints the alliance
 [12:50] as a tool for extending the hegemonic reach of the West into Asia, the Arctic,
 [12:55] and even the new frontier of outer space. Despite the various junctures where Moscow
 [13:00] hinted at joining the Western military block, whether in 1954, the early
 [13:05] 1990s or the early 2000s, wholehearted invitations were never extended.
 [13:10] Soviet Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov's 1954 vision of an
 [13:15] inclusive, effective system of collective security in Europe remained unrealized.
 [13:20] Had the USSR or Russia joined NATO, perhaps a new chapter of collective European
 [13:25] security might have been written together. Yet, when weighed against NATO's subsequent
 [13:30] military engagements from the Balkans to North Africa, one could argue it was perhaps for the
 [13:35] better that Russia remained outside the Western alliance.
 [13:40] The alliance's track record of interventions across the globe carries with it contentious legacies
 [13:45] and continues to fuel heated debate over its role and actions.
 [13:50] 
 [13:55] Radio Sputnik. We speak your
 [14:00] language. Find us at sputniknews.com.
 [14:05] 
 [14:10] We are in the midst of World War III.
 [14:15] Welcome to Geopolitics Demystified. I'm your host, Asel Quentin.
 [14:20] It may not seem like it, but the fact is we are in the midst of a World
 [14:25] War III. We're kind of sleepwalking into a gradual
 [14:30] World War III, step by step in different areas. And
 [14:35] actually, when you look back at say World War II, the same thing
 [14:40] happened. So for example, Hitler invaded Poland in 19
 [14:45] 39, but the US, UK, and France did
 [14:50] not immediately start attacking Germany. It took many years.
 [14:55] And it wasn't until 1944
	[00:00] hiccups and in its businesses that it previously enjoyed. So
	[00:05] grave damage is being done to Israeli society by this. Before you even get to the
	[00:10] the consequences of the essentially fascist cabinet around Mr. Netanyahu,
	[00:15] the effort to destroy judicial independence, uh the effort
	[00:20] to conscript the ultra-orthodox, uh when they've previously had the privilege of remaining
	[00:25] away from the army, the rising casualty numbers, the failure to address the hostage
	[00:30] issue where Mr. Netanyahu has basically applied the Hannibal directive, meaning it's
	[00:35] better for anyone taken hostage to be killed than to become the subject of a negotiation.
	[00:40] And then you have the economy, uh and uh the write-down of Israeli
	[00:45] credit by Moody's and other rating agencies. So, aiming
	[00:50] at Haifa does make some sense from a strategic point of view. Um if if
	[00:55] if Hezbollah's objective is to further weaken Israel. And of course, as I said earlier,
	[01:00] Israel has brought into being a coalition against it in the region that is
	[01:05] likely to be lasting. And uh it has become an international pariah as
	[01:10] seen in the walkout on Netanyahu's speech to the UN General Assembly. The West
	[01:15] is isolated on this issue. The collective West supports Israel. The rest of the world has
	[01:20] turned against it. For my final question, I can't help but return to the very
	[01:25] first question of this interview because looking at Israel's situation, it really
	[01:30] does seem unenviable in many ways. As you mentioned, the war in Gaza
	[01:35] is far from over. The war in Southern Lebanon is not as easy as they thought it would
	[01:40] They have a looming economic crisis and Hezbollah is continuing to batter its northern regions.
	[01:45] Doesn't that mean that Netanyahu
	[01:50] who has to do something dramatic in order to try and regain the strategic initiative and to try and quickly end this war on terms favorable to Israel.
	[01:55]
	[02:00] I don't think he can do that um at this point. Um he's ensured that there's no one who effectively
	[02:05] speak for Hamas to call off the war. Hamas recruitment both in uh
	[02:10] in Palestine and in the Palestinian diaspora, which we shouldn't forget, millions and
	[02:15] millions of people is way up. Israel embarked on a war of terror, uh and will
	[02:20] receive terror in return. The same is true of Hezbollah. Uh so I don't see what he can do that
	[02:25] is dramatic. The problem is the basic strategy, which has always avoided
	[02:30] any offer of co peaceful coexistence either with Israel or with Israel's neighbors.
	[02:35] Israel ignores sovereignty, bombs and strafes at will over its borders,
	[02:40] launches preemptive attacks, and it has essentially brought down the entire edifice
	[02:45] of international law that might have protected it through a diplomatic solution. There
	[02:50] are two ways to reduce threats. Uh one is to try to bomb them out of existence, which has a very
	[02:55] poor record of success, and the other is try to reduce them by eliminating their causes. But
	[03:00] Israel has doubled down on the causes uh for the attacks on it and
	[03:05] I don't think they're going to end anytime soon. I want to make one final observation because it pertains
	[03:10] to us. And it it it applies to other situations like US-Russian relations,
	[03:15] US-Chinese relations and so forth. Uh US-Iran relations. In a democracy, when
	[03:20] when the political elite wishes to consolidate support for a war, it
	[03:25] demonizes the enemy. The preferred model for this is Adolf Hitler. So Saddam Hussein instantly became a Hitler in disguise. Xi Jinping is a Hitler, Putin is a
	[03:30]
	[03:35] Hitler, uh and the Ayatollah Khamenei is a Hitler, and they're all implacable
	[03:40] enemies of of in this case, uh Israel, or in other cases, the United
	[03:45] States. They're incorrigible, incorrigibly bellicose. You can't talk to them.
	[03:50] If you do, they regard that as weakness. So you don't talk to them. So you adopt a pure
	[03:55] a policy that is purely military and relies entirely on deterrence.
	[04:00] So then you get into what political scientists call the security dilemma.
	[04:05] Uh we do things which we regard as necessary to deter the other side and thereby defend ourselves. They perceive these correctly as enhancing our
	[04:10] ability to attack them, and they then take countermeasures. And in the meantime, there
	[04:15] is no dialogue. During the Cold War, we had an active dialogue with Moscow. We have none
	[04:20] now. We had an active dialogue with Beijing for 40 years. We have virtually none now.
	[04:25]
	[04:30] There is a pretense of communication, but there's no substance to it. We have no effective communication
	[04:35] with Iran. Therefore, our only options are military. And Israel is in exactly the same
	[04:40] position. It needs to alter its strategy. It needs to make a
	[04:45] decision to be part of the region in which it has been established. Every
	[04:50] country in the region is prepared to accept a two-state solution. That is not where they
	[04:55] began. They were originally against the establishment of Israel. Israel needs to embrace
	[05:00] a peaceful solution and rather than escalate militarily, because
	[05:05] that will lead nowhere but to the destruction of Israel itself. Ambassador Freeman, thank you so much
	[05:10] for joining the program. Take a better talk topic next time, please. Thank you all for
	[05:15] tuning in. Till next time.
	[05:20] Stuck in traffic?
	[05:25] No problem. Stay informed. Stay tuned to Radio Sputnik on 105
	[05:30] .5 FM or 1390 AM in the Washington DC area.
	[05:35] Need more? Follow us on Facebook or check us out on sputniknews.com.
	[05:40] Welcome to Sputnik Explains, where the printed page meets the airwaves.
	[05:45] In this show, we transform Sputnik News's most compelling articles into a radio format
	[05:50] that informs, enlightens, and sometimes challenges conventional
	[05:55] narratives. Today, we unravel the rich tapestry
	[06:00] of historical events and dissect the intricate geopolitics of our times.
	[06:05] As we mark the 70th anniversary of an extraordinary moment in history.
	[06:10] A moment when the Cold War security competition in Europe could have taken a very different turn.
	[06:15] We reflect on the Soviet Union's overtures to join the North Atlantic Treaty Organization,
	[06:20] NATO. Let's explore the recurring rejection of Moscow's advances and the reasons
	[06:25] behind the West's consistently hostile reactions. On March 31st, 1954,
	[06:30] astonishment rippled through the halls of power in the West as Soviet foreign minister Vyacheslav Molotov
	[06:35] extended an unprecedented offer. A diplomatic note suggested Moscow's readiness to join NATO,
	[06:40] an act that promised to transform the military block from a closed circle into a truly inclusive system ensuring collective
	[06:45] security in Europe. The potential of such collaboration to bolster universal peace was
	[06:50] profound. Washington mulled over the Soviet proposal for a month, ultimately dismissing
	[06:55] the idea on May 7th, 1954 as unrealistic and contradictory
	[07:00] to the defense system and security upon which Western states relied. It's important to note
	[07:05] that while publicly focusing on deterring so-called Soviet expansionism, behind
	[07:10]
	[07:15] the scenes NATO's architecture as choreographed by the United States sought to manage European countries' internal affairs, keeping the Soviet Union out,
	[07:20] the Americans in, and the Germans down, as Lord Hastings Ismay, the first Secretary General
	[07:25] of the organization famously summarized. This 1954 episode wasn't
	[07:30] Moscow's first attempt at signaling its interest in fostering a European collective
	[07:35] security mechanism through NATO. As early as 1952, the indomitable
	[07:40] Soviet leader Joseph Stalin raised the possibility of joining the alliance, suggesting that a unified and neutral Germany could serve as a buffer between the Eastern and Western
	[07:45]
	[07:50] blocs, a model later embodied by Austria's neutrality agreement in 1955.
	[07:55]
	[08:00] Fast forward to the 1990s, and in the wake of the USSR's dissolution,
	[08:05] the newly formed Russian Federation once again extended an olive branch.
	[08:10] President Boris Yeltsin and his foreign minister, Andrey Kozyrev, engaged in eager negotiations with President Bill Clinton.
	[08:15] They hoped for an equal partnership and even contemplated Russian membership in the alliance.
	[08:20] However, these negotiations yielded little reciprocity, as the alliance expanded eastward, and Russia was met with
	[08:25] plications rather than partnership. Why then, the persistent rejection?
	[08:30] These episodes across decades reveal a consistent pattern. A Western block reluctant to cede strategic
	[08:35]
	[08:40] advantage or control over the European security landscape. The uneasy dance
	[08:45] between East and West played out in a series of moves and countermoves where overt gestures of
	[08:50] peace met with strategic geopolitical considerations, often shrouded in a veneer of diplomatic courtesies.
	[08:55] While history has shown multiple Russian attempts to join or align with NATO, contemporary insights from President Vladimir Putin's discussions with then
	[09:00] President Bill Clinton hint at a deeper narrative of missed connections and clashing
	[09:05] ideologies. Vladimir Putin's recounting of his conversation with President Clinton,
	[09:10] as he shared with Tucker Carlson, is nothing short of revelatory. The Russian
	[09:15] president inquired about the possibility of Russia joining NATO. Clinton said, you know,
	[09:20] it's interesting. I think so, Putin recalled. Yet by evening, after conferring
	[09:25] with his advisors, the answer had shifted. It became a not possible now.
	[09:30]
	[09:35] This brings us to question the real barriers between Russia and NATO. We turn
	[09:40] to the perspectives of experts and insiders, like former Pentagon analyst Michael Maloof. According
	[09:45] to him, the Cold War mentality was deeply entrenched in the West, causing ideological
	[09:50] friction that has persisted well beyond the collapse of the USSR. Both presidents
	[09:55] Yeltsin and Putin entertained the idea of NATO membership, indicating a genuine interest
	[10:00] in partnership from the Russian side. Ideological incompatibilities, a common
	[10:05] reason for denying Russian membership, spanned from fears of communism spread during the Cold War
	[10:10] to a misalignment in political systems post USSR. NATO, driven by its
	[10:15] own definition of democracy sets a bar which Russia, according to consensus, hasn't met, similar to Turkey's protracted journey to EU membership.
	[10:20]
	[10:25] Experts further suggest that the deep state in Washington, more specifically the neoconservatives, has remained unyieldingly
	[10:30] antagonistic towards Russia. Individuals like Victoria Nuland personify
	[10:35] this agenda, focused on containing, or even dismantling, Russia, a task
	[10:40] that operatives in intelligence communities have found comfortable and familiar for over half
	[10:45] a century. Thus, the thaw of post-1991 relations felt alien
	[10:50] to many who were steeped in years of rivalry. Russia's inherent self-conception as a
	[10:55] great power necessitates its right to be viewed as an equal partner. This core belief
	[11:00] was palpable in the build-up to President Putin's red line declaration regarding NATO's expansion near
	[11:05] Russia's borders in December 2021. Russia's demand for a halt to this
	[11:10] encroachment was essentially met with a dismissive Western stance, reinforcing a sense
	[11:15] of not being taken seriously and exacerbating tensions. So, beneath the
	[11:20] surface of diplomatic interactions lies a complex interplay of ingrained ideologies,
	[11:25] historical apprehensions, strategic imperatives, and perennial power
	[11:30] dynamics. As we mark moments that could have redefined the global order, the essence
	[11:35] of these interactions reveals much about the continuity of geopolitical objectives
	[11:40] etched deep within the institutional memories of the players involved. As we delve deeper
	[11:45] into the complexities of NATO and Russia's historical interactions, we contemplate
	[11:50] an intriguing what-if scenario. What if the alliance and Russia had found common ground?
	[11:55] Experts argue that such total cooperation could have reaped immense benefits, not
	[12:00] just for securing peace, but also for bolstering economic ventures, especially with
	[12:05] respect to Europe. The notion raises a poignant counterfactual. Would it have been better for NATO
	[12:10] to dissolve in the wake of the Cold War, just as the Warsaw Pact did? The echo of that
	[12:15] sentiment resounds. The Warsaw Pact went away. NATO should have gone away.
	[12:20] Such a dissolution could have represented a profound turning point, signaling the end of an era
	[12:25] defined by diametrically opposed blocks and the advent of a more integrated global
	[12:30] security framework. Unfortunately, this is not the narrative that unfolded. Instead,
	[12:35] some argue that there are vested interests within the Western security establishment
	[12:40] who view the continuation and expansion of NATO as essential to their interests, a
	[12:45] rice bowl as a growth industry, so to speak. This perspective paints the alliance
	[12:50] as a tool for extending the hegemonic reach of the West into Asia, the Arctic,
	[12:55] and even the new frontier of outer space. Despite the various junctures where Moscow
	[13:00] hinted at joining the Western military block, whether in 1954, the early
	[13:05] 1990s or the early 2000s, wholehearted invitations were never extended.
	[13:10] Soviet Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov's 1954 vision of an
	[13:15] inclusive, effective system of collective security in Europe remained unrealized.
	[13:20] Had the USSR or Russia joined NATO, perhaps a new chapter of collective European
	[13:25] security might have been written together. Yet, when weighed against NATO's subsequent
	[13:30] military engagements from the Balkans to North Africa, one could argue it was perhaps for the
	[13:35] better that Russia remained outside the Western alliance.
	[13:40] The alliance's track record of interventions across the globe carries with it contentious legacies
	[13:45] and continues to fuel heated debate over its role and actions.
	[13:50]
	[13:55] Radio Sputnik. We speak your
	[14:00] language. Find us at sputniknews.com.
	[14:05]
	[14:10] We are in the midst of World War III.
	[14:15] Welcome to Geopolitics Demystified. I'm your host, Asel Quentin.
	[14:20] It may not seem like it, but the fact is we are in the midst of a World
	[14:25] War III. We're kind of sleepwalking into a gradual
	[14:30] World War III, step by step in different areas. And
	[14:35] actually, when you look back at say World War II, the same thing
	[14:40] happened. So for example, Hitler invaded Poland in 19
	[14:45] 39, but the US, UK, and France did
	[14:50] not immediately start attacking Germany. It took many years.
	[14:55] And it wasn't until 1944