As of macOS 12 (Monterey), Apple's Virtualization framework has nice support for macOS guest virtual machines, but with severe limitations: For example you can't install a macOS guest on Intel Macs, install guests with newer versions of macOS than the host, copy and paste between the host and the guest, or install third party kernel extensions in the guest. As usual for Apple, the functionality they do support is nicely implemented, but they've left out so much that the result is only marginally useful -- at least compared to third-party implementations available on Intel Macs, like VMware Fusion and Parallels.
I've been working on the last of these limitations, and have found a workaround. It's rather complex, but should be very useful for those developing kernel extensions for macOS on Apple Silicon, or (more likely) porting existing Intel kexts to Apple Silicon. Developing kernel extensions on bare metal is a pain -- not least because you might end up damaging your nice new Apple Silicon Mac. But doing it in a virtual machine isolates the potential damage to the VM itself -- at worst you'll only need to trash it and create a replacement.
Parts of my workaround are interesting in themselves, even if you don't use them to run third party kernel extensions on macOS guest VMs. For example I've found a way to patch the VM's kernel cache (containing the kernel and built-in kernel extensions), which should be very useful in reverse engineering macOS.
Most of the discoveries here are ones I've made on my own, by trial and error. But I had a very helpful starting point -- NyanSatan's Virtual-iBoot-Fun project.
-
An Apple Silicon Mac running macOS 12 or higher. Mine is a 2020 Mac Mini (Macmini9,1).
-
A decent virtual machine host that uses Apple's Virtualization framework. I use UTM.
-
One or more decent disassemblers. I use Ghidra and Hopper Disassembler. I also installed Nick Botticelli's ghidra-iboot plugin
-
A decent hex editor. I use Hex Fiend. I change its default edit mode to "Overwrite" and its line number format to "Hexadecimal".
-
A binary diff tool. I use VBinDiff.
-
A calculator with support for radix modes. Apple's Calculator in Programmer mode will do.
My workaround patches three iBoot modules and the VM's kernel cache.
The iBoot modules load early in the macOS (and IOS) boot sequence,
before the kernel. There are at least three variants of iBoot, used in
three diffent "stages" -- Stage 0 (as I call it), Stage 1 and Stage
2. On bare metal, Stage 0 is implemented in hardware (in Apple's
"Secure Enclave").
Stage 1 (aka LLB) and Stage 2 (iBoot properly so called) are
implemented in software,
though only the Stage 2 iBoot exists (inside iBoot.img4
) in the
macOS file system.
By design, the Secure Enclave Processor (SEP) is inaccessible to
ordinary mortals. And on bare metal the LLB and iBoot modules are
encrypted (using a key held in the SEP). But for a VM, the modules for
all three stages are unencrypted. Stage 0 is implemented (on the host)
in /System/Library/Frameworks/Virtualization.framework/Resources/AVPBooter.vmapple2.bin
.
Stage 1 is embedded (in img4
format) in an AuxiliaryStorage
file
(on the host) associated with the DMG file (with an img
extension)
that stores the VM's image. Stage 2 (inside iBoot.img4
) exists in
the VM's file system.
None of the iBoot variants call any external functions, and none have any symbols. So they're difficult to decipher. But the fact that the Virtualization framework uses them without encryption is a golden opportunity to reverse engineer them, and understand them better.
It's apparently common knowledge that the iBoot modules all contain a
function to check the "digests" (DGST) of the many img4
images that
govern the macOS boot process (including LLB, iBoot.img4
and the
kernel cache itself). Each "digest" is a hash, used to ensure that
none of these images has changed since they were "signed" by
Apple. The source code for a similar function
(image4_validate_property_callback()
) is available
here.
The images in question are those to be loaded at the next stage. So
(among other things) Stage 0 iBoot checks the digest of the Stage 1
iBoot img4
image, Stage 1 iBoot checks the digest of the Stage 2
iBoot img4
file, and Stage 2 iBoot checks the digest of the
kernelcache
file. Aside from the file system itself, nothing checks
the integrity of the stage 0 iBoot file (AVPBooter.vmapple2.bin
). So
all you need to stop these integrity checks is to defeat the file
system's
protection
and patch this function (call it
image4_validate_property_callback()
) at every "stage".
As NyanSatan mentions, the standard approach is to patch out
image4_validate_property_callback()
completely -- to replace it with
code that "returns 0". I find this causes problems, so my patch is
more surgical -- I allow image4_validate_property_callback()
to
perform all its normal checks, and only patch its return value (to
'0') just before it returns.
Some time ago I discovered that failed calls to
_validate_acm_context()
in the VM's AppleVPBootPolicy.kext
stop
the VM from creating an auxiliary kext
cache. Since
third-party kexts are stored here, this prevents them from loading in
a Virtualization framework VM. The failed calls originate from two
other functions in AppleVPBootPolicy.kext
--
_command_create_linked_manifest()
and
_command_update_local_policy_for_kcos()
. My workaround is to patch
out the calls to _validate_acm_context()
from both of these
functions. This is a more "surgical" approach than patching out
_validate_acm_context()
itself, which is called from many additional
functions in AppleVPBootPolicy.kext
.
But this isn't enough by itself. An auxiliary kext cache does get
created (you can see it using kmutil inspect
). But macOS still
complains that your third-party kext needs to be rebuilt. To fix this
you need to go back to the Stage 2 iBoot module (inside
iBoot.img4
). One of its purposes is to fill the "device tree" with
all the appropriate devices. But it (or the variant available in a
Virtualization framework VM) refuses to allow any "AuxKC" entries to
be added to chosen/memory-map
in a VM, even when the auxiliary kext
cache is present. Fixing this requires finding the function that
checks whether a given boot object (originally in img4
format) should
be processed, and patching out the call to it. Its first parameter is
a four-character code -- for
example illb
, ibot
, krnl
or auxk
. validate_boot_object()
(my
name for this function) indirectly calls
image4_validate_property_callback()
. So if you patch out the former
you don't need to patch the latter. At some point I'll describe how I
found validate_boot_object()
.
To display the contents of chosen/memory-map
, run the following
command in a Terminal prompt:
ioreg -p IODeviceTree -n "memory-map" -w 0 -r -t
Some settings changes are required on the host by How to Defang macOS
System Protections,
which allows changes to AVPBooter.vmapple2.bin.
-
In System Settings, under Software Update, disable "Download new updates when available". Otherwise your host can become unbootable.
-
Boot into Recovery Mode, run Terminal and do the following:
csrutil disable
csrutil authenticated-root disable
You also, of course, need to create a macOS guest VM. Make sure it uses the Virtualization framework. In UTM this is accomplished by choosing "Virtualize" and then "macOS 12+".
Terminal will be used heavily below. So, to avoid lots of annoying prompts to give it permission to access files, it's best to give the Terminal app "full disk access" on the guest (in Privacy and Security in System Settings).
Then boot into Recovery Mode on the guest. On macOS 12 you'll need to use my hack to do this.
-
Run the Startup Security Utility. Choose Reduced Security and "Allow user management of kernel extensions from identified developers".
-
Run Terminal and do the following:
-
csrutil disable
, theny
to "Allow booting unsigned operating systems and any kernel extensions".
Below you'll create (and boot from) an APFS snapshot on your host
computer to accomodate changes to the Stage 0 iBoot module
(AVMBooter.vmapple2.bin
). You need to keep your host computer in
this state as long as you're using third party kernel extensions in
your macOS guest VM. (Without the patched AVPBooter.vmapple2.bin
it
will simply refuse to start.) You also need to keep csrutil's
"authenticated-root" disabled, and keep "Download new updates when
available" disabled under Software Update. But don't use Software
Update to update macOS on your host while it's booted from this custom
snapshot. I don't know that this will cause trouble, but I expect it
might.
Use the following command to revert your snapshot (and
AVPBooter.vmapple2.bin
), then reboot your computer:
sudo bless --mount / --last-sealed-snapshot
Release version macOS 13 and 14 guest VMs can be upgraded to newer
versions of macOS. But before you do so you should revert this
document's changes to the Stage 2 iBoot module (iBoot.img4
) and the
kernel cache (kernelcache
): Boot into Recovery Mode, run the Startup
Security Utility, and choose Full Security. Afterwards you'll need to
go through all the following steps again, from scratch. Among other
things you'll need to create new iBoot.img4.org
and
kernelcache.org
files, and possibly also a new LLB.img4.org
file.
macOS 12 guests can't be upgraded. The Virtualization process
(com.apple.Virtualization.VirtualMachine
) crashes and your VM
becomes unbootable. This is an Apple bug. I've seen it myself, and
have seen it documented
here. The same is true
for beta-version macOS 14
guests,
though the consequences are less severe.
In this case your only option is to create a new guest VM directly from an IPSW file, then work through the following steps.
This one's on the host, and is easy to find. Copy it and rename the
copy to AVPBooter.vmapple2.bin.org
.
/System/Library/Frameworks/Virtualization.framework/Resources/AVPBooter.vmapple2.bin
This one's also on the host, but is harder to find. By default, VMs created by UTM are stored in the following directory:
~/Library/Containers/com.utmapp.UTM/Data/Documents
Each VM is stored in a "package" with the extension .utm
. Inside the
package, in its Data
subdirectory, is a file named
AuxiliaryStorage
. LLB is embedded here, in img4
format. It's
followed immediately by an img4
format image of the "logo". You'll
need to get copies of both.
If you've upgraded your guest VM to a newer version of macOS, there
will be two copies of the LLB image in the AuxiliaryStorage
file,
each followed by a "logo" image. Only the second set will be active.
So that's the one you'll need to work on. And if you've already
patched a previous version of macOS in your guest VM (following the
instructions in this document), the second LLB image may still contain
your earlier patch. If so, you won't need to repatch it.
The first LLB image is always at offset 0x24000
. The second, if it
exists, should be at offset 0x224000
. To be sure you've found all
the LLB images, and their correct locations, search (in your hex
editor) on "illb" (the four character
code for the LLB image).
-
Open
AuxiliaryStorage
in a hex editor. I use Hex Fiend, and will tailor my steps to it specifically. -
Jump to offset
0x224000
. If an LLB image exists at this location, its first two bytes should be3083
. If not, jump to offset0x24000
. -
The
img4
image is in DER format (used by ASN1), so the first five bytes are3083
followed by a three digit hexadecimal number in big endian format (for example037FD1
). This number is the length of the image, exclusive of the length of its header. So the total length is0x37FD6
. -
Select the first five bytes of the image, then choose "Extend Selection". In this case, you'd extend it by
0x37FD1
bytes. Scroll down to the end of the selection (without disturbing it) and check that it's in the correct location (just before the "logo" image). If it is, CMD-C to copy the image, CMD-N to open a new window, CMD-V to paste in its contents, and save the file asLLB.img4.org
. -
The header for the "logo" image should be
3082
followed by a two digit hexdecimal number (for example36DA
). Select the first four bytes, extend the selection by0x36DA
bytes and scroll down to its end. The following bytes should be a bunch of NULLs (00
). CMD-C to copy the image, CMD-N to open another new window, CMD-V to paste in its contents, and save this second new file aslogo.img4.org
.
These modules are stored in files on the VM. So run the VM and do the following in it, at a Terminal prompt:
- Run
kmutil inspect
, and observe where the boot kernel cache exists in the VM's file system. The following is an example, which will get used in the following steps. The path's exact contents will differ from case to case.
/System/Volumes/Preboot/8467D650-E8D9-4F4C-9403-F51E736C25B0/boot/FB72884642D3490C1D6A0C25D6901AD49BFF7A168B2A851361DD40B393D5FE8E730EF7417B83303610CA04EF15C5CD83/System/Library/Caches/com.apple.kernelcaches/kernelcache
-
Note the long hexadecimal number just before
/System/Library/Caches
-- in this caseFB72884642D3490C1D6A0C25D6901AD49BFF7A168B2A851361DD40B393D5FE8E730EF7417B83303610CA04EF15C5CD83
. This is the "Next Stage Image4 Hash (nsih)", observable in the output ofsudo bputil -d
. -
Copy this file and rename it to
kernelcache.org
. -
cd /
andsudo find . -name iBoot.img4 -exec ls -al \{\} \;
. There will be at least two hits. Choose the one whose path contains the Next Stage Image4 Hash. Copy it and rename the copy toiBoot.img4.org
. You might find the originaliBoot.img4
here, for example:
/System/Volumes/Preboot/8467D650-E8D9-4F4C-9403-F51E736C25B0/boot/FB72884642D3490C1D6A0C25D6901AD49BFF7A168B2A851361DD40B393D5FE8E730EF7417B83303610CA04EF15C5CD83/usr/standalone/firmware/iBoot.img4
For this I use
Ghidra with the
ghidra-iboot plugin. Copy
AVPBooter.vmapple2.bin.org
to AVPBooter.vmapple2.bin
. Then run
Ghidra and create a new project. Then:
-
Run Ghidra's CodeBrowser and import
AVPBooter.vmapple2.bin
. -
Choose Search : Program Text : All Fields. Type "0x4447" ('DG' of DGST) in "Search for", then choose "Search All". You should find two hits, both in the same function. Click on one to move the cursor to its location.
-
Once again choose Search : Program Text : All Fields, and type "retab" in "Search For". Then choose "Next". Now you should see the code that runs just before the function returns. It will look something like as follows. In this example, you want to change the instruction at address
0x00102a0c
(mov x0,x20
) tomov x0,#0x0
. (AARCH64 machine code uses theX0
register to store a return value.)
001029f4 a8 83 5a f8 ldur x8,[x29, #local_68]
001029f8 29 f9 37 d0 adrp x9,0x70028000
001029fc 1f 20 03 d5 nop
00102a00 29 a1 40 f9 ldr x9,[x9, #0x140]=>DAT_70028140
00102a04 3f 01 08 eb cmp x9,x8
00102a08 21 06 00 54 b.ne LAB_00102acc
00102a0c e0 03 14 aa mov x0,x20
00102a10 fd 7b 4c a9 ldp x29=>local_10,x30,[sp, #0xc0]
00102a14 f4 4f 4b a9 ldp x20,x19,[sp, #local_20]
00102a18 f6 57 4a a9 ldp x22,x21,[sp, #local_30]
00102a1c f8 5f 49 a9 ldp x24,x23,[sp, #local_40]
00102a20 fa 67 48 a9 ldp x26,x25,[sp, #local_50]
00102a24 fc 6f 47 a9 ldp x28,x27,[sp, #local_60]
00102a28 ff 43 03 91 add sp,sp,#0xd0
00102a2c ff 0f 5f d6 retab
-
Right click on the
mov x0,0x20
instruction and choose "Patch Instruction". Then changex0,0x20
tox0,#0x0
. -
In Ghidra's CodeBrowser, choose File : Export Program. Then choose Format : Raw Bytes, and overwrite
AVPBooter.vmapple2.bin
. -
Use
vbindiff AVPBooter.vmapple2.bin.org AVPBooter.vmapple2.bin
to check your results. There should be just one change, to a four-byte value -- the length of one AARCH64 instruction.
All the other modules that need patching are "wrapped" in img4
format. So to get at their actual content you need to use
img4tool
to unpack
them. Then you'll patch them and rewrap them in new img4
format
files.
-
img4tool -e -p LLB.im4p.org LLB.img4.org
-
img4tool -e -m LLB.im4m.org LLB.img4.org
-
img4tool -e -o LLB.bin.org LLB.im4p.org
The iBoot Stage 1 module should now be in LLB.bin.org
. Copy it to
LLB.bin
and patch it according to the instructions for the iBoot
Stage 0 binary (AVPBooter.vmapple2.bin
) above. If you've upgraded
macOS in your guest VM from a version that you already patched,
LLB.bin.org
(and LLB.bin
) may still contain your previous
patch. In this case you don't need to repatch it, and may skip ahead
to iBoot Stage 2.
- Run
img4tool LLB.im4p.org
, which will produce output something like what follows. Use the information from it to run the next command. The value for "desc" differs from one version of macOS to another. Note that you do not want to use compression, even thoughimg4tool
supports it.img4tool
uses Apple'slibcompression.dylib
to implement its compression (and decompression). But, even though it's the same type ("bvx2"), it's incompatible with the decompression used by the iBoot binaries, which don't have access to any external modules.
img4tool version: 0.199-ed194718f9d6a035a432f2fdfe9fc639b72cba6c-RELEASE
Compiled with plist: YES
IM4P: ---------
type: illb
desc: iBoot-8422.141.2
size: 0x000369df
Compression: bvx2
Uncompressed size: 0x0006dc90
IM4P does not contain KBAG values
-
img4tool -c LLB.im4p -t illb -d "iBoot-8422.141.2" LLB.bin
-
img4tool -c LLB.img4 -p LLB.im4p -m LLB.im4m.org
The patched iBoot Stage 1 module should now be in LLB.img4
.
Once again you'll need to unwrap the iBoot Stage 2 binary, patch it,
and then rewrap it in img4
format. But this time the process is more
complicated: iBoot.im4p.org
contains a PAYP structure, tacked on to
its end, that you'll need to append to iBoot.im4p
by hand.
-
img4tool -e -p iBoot.im4p.org iBoot.img4.org
-
img4tool -e -m iBoot.im4m.org iBoot.img4.org
-
img4tool -e -o iBoot.bin.org iBoot.im4p.org
Here's how to copy the PAYP structure from iBoot.im4p.org
to a
seperate file, which you'll later append to iBoot.im4p
.
openssl asn1parse -inform der -in iBoot.im4p.org -i -dump
This outputs the entire iBoot.im4p.org
file in human-readable ASN1
format. The PAYP structure appears at the end, and looks something
like this. Use the structure's offset (259719
in this case) in the
next command.
259719:d=1 hl=2 l= 28 cons: cont [ 0 ]
259721:d=2 hl=2 l= 26 cons: SEQUENCE
259723:d=3 hl=2 l= 4 prim: IA5STRING :PAYP
259729:d=3 hl=2 l= 18 cons: SET
259731:d=4 hl=7 l= 11 cons: priv [ 1768907638 ]
259738:d=5 hl=2 l= 9 cons: SEQUENCE
259740:d=6 hl=2 l= 4 prim: IA5STRING :iocv
259746:d=6 hl=2 l= 1 prim: INTEGER :03
xxd -p -s 259719 iBoot.im4p.org iBoot.payp.hex
iBoot.payp.hex
is a hex dump. The following command will convert it
to a binary (in DER format):
xxd -p -r iBoot.payp.hex iBoot.payp.bin
Check the contents of iBoot.payp.bin
by running the following command:
openssl asn1parse -inform der -in iBoot.payp.bin -i
Now copy iBoot.bin.org
to iBoot.bin
. Then patch out the call to
validate_boot_object()
. As mentioned above, you can do this instead
of patching image4_validate_property_callback()
.
e5 03 04 aa
04 00 80 52
- In the Ghidra CodeBrowser, choose Search : For Instruction Patterns, then Edit Bytes and Input Mode Hex. Copy the above two lines of hexadecimal code and paste it into the Edit Bytes box, then choose Apply. Choose Search All and you should find one hit, with code that looks like the following:
FUN_700ac1fc XREF[1]: FUN_70063a78:70063fbc(c)
700ac1fc e5 03 04 aa mov x5,x4
700ac200 04 00 80 52 mov w4,#0x0
700ac204 01 00 00 14 b LAB_700ac208
LAB_700ac208 XREF[1]: 700ac204(j)
700ac208 7f 23 03 d5 pacibsp
700ac20c ff 03 03 d1 sub sp,sp,#0xc0
- Double-click on the cross reference (
FUN_70063a78:70063fbc(c)
in this case). That should take you to code that looks like this:
70063fb0 e1 e3 0c 91 add param_2,sp,#0x338
70063fb4 e4 43 03 91 add param_5,sp,#0xd0
70063fb8 e3 03 16 aa mov param_4,x22
70063fbc 90 20 01 94 bl FUN_700ac1fc undefined FUN_700ac1fc()
70063fc0 a0 03 00 34 cbz param_1,LAB_70064034
70063fc4 14 7b 00 51 sub w20,w24,#0x1e
70063fc8 07 00 00 14 b LAB_70063fe4
-
In this example, right-click on the
bl FUN_700ac1fc
instruction and change it tomov x0,#0x0
. -
On recent versions of macOS, there may be more than one cross reference. In this case you should double-click on each one, in turn, and change its target to
mov x0,#0x0
. -
Choose File : Export Program. Then choose Format : Raw Bytes, and overwrite
iBoot.bin
. -
Run
img4tool iBoot.im4p.org
, which will produce output something like this. Use the information from it to run the next command. The value of "desc" differs from one version of macOS to another.
img4tool version: 0.199-ed194718f9d6a035a432f2fdfe9fc639b72cba6c-RELEASE
Compiled with plist: YES
IM4P: ---------
type: ibot
desc: iBoot-8422.141.2
size: 0x0003f655
Compression: bvx2
Uncompressed size: 0x0007dde8
PAYP:
iocv: iocv: 3
IM4P does not contain KBAG values
-
img4tool -c iBoot.im4p -t ibot -d "iBoot-8422.141.2" iBoot.bin
-
dd if=iBoot.payp.bin >> iBoot.im4p
-
Use Hex Fiend to open
iBoot.im4p
and correct its length value. Make sure File : Mode is set to Override. -
Observe
iBoot.im4p
's five-byte header and length value -- for example308307DE0B
. Convert the length (0x7DE0B
) to decimal (515595
) and add30
(for the length ofiBoot.payp.bin
in this case). So the new length in this case is515625
(==0x7DE29
). -
Correct the length value. The header in this case will now be
308307DE29
. SaveiBoot.im4p
. -
img4tool -c iBoot.img4 -p iBoot.im4p -m iBoot.im4m.org
The patched Stage 2 module should now be in iBoot.img4
.
As with the iBoot Stage 2 module, you'll need to unwrap the kernel
cache, patch it, and rewrap it in img4
format.
-
img4tool -e -p kernelcache.im4p.org kernelcache.org
-
img4tool -e -m kernelcache.im4m.org kernelcache.org
-
img4tool -e -o kernelcache.bin.org kernelcache.im4p.org
kernelcache.im4p.org
, like iBoot.im4p.org
, has a PAYP structure at
its end. Copy the PAYP structure to a separate file, which you'll
later append to kernelcache.im4p
.
openssl asn1parse -inform der -in kernelcache.im4p.org -i -dump
This outputs the entire kernelcache.im4p.org
file in human-readable
ASN1 format. The PAYP structure appears at the end, and looks
something like this. Use the structure's offset (18030138
in this
case) in the next command.
18030138:d=1 hl=3 l= 186 cons: cont [ 0 ]
18030141:d=2 hl=3 l= 183 cons: SEQUENCE
18030144:d=3 hl=2 l= 4 prim: IA5STRING :PAYP
18030150:d=3 hl=3 l= 174 cons: SET
18030153:d=4 hl=7 l= 19 cons: priv [ 1801676144 ]
18030160:d=5 hl=2 l= 17 cons: SEQUENCE
18030162:d=6 hl=2 l= 4 prim: IA5STRING :kcep
18030168:d=6 hl=2 l= 9 prim: INTEGER :FFFFFE0007B7D488
18030179:d=4 hl=7 l= 14 cons: priv [ 1801677926 ]
18030186:d=5 hl=2 l= 12 cons: SEQUENCE
18030188:d=6 hl=2 l= 4 prim: IA5STRING :kclf
18030194:d=6 hl=2 l= 4 prim: INTEGER :030E4000
18030200:d=4 hl=7 l= 19 cons: priv [ 1801677935 ]
18030207:d=5 hl=2 l= 17 cons: SEQUENCE
18030209:d=6 hl=2 l= 4 prim: IA5STRING :kclo
18030215:d=6 hl=2 l= 9 prim: INTEGER :FFFFFE0007004000
18030226:d=4 hl=7 l= 14 cons: priv [ 1801677946 ]
18030233:d=5 hl=2 l= 12 cons: SEQUENCE
18030235:d=6 hl=2 l= 4 prim: IA5STRING :kclz
18030241:d=6 hl=2 l= 4 prim: INTEGER :AF0000
18030247:d=4 hl=7 l= 11 cons: priv [ 1801679462 ]
18030254:d=5 hl=2 l= 9 cons: SEQUENCE
18030256:d=6 hl=2 l= 4 prim: IA5STRING :kcrf
18030262:d=6 hl=2 l= 1 prim: INTEGER :00
18030265:d=4 hl=7 l= 14 cons: priv [ 1801679482 ]
18030272:d=5 hl=2 l= 12 cons: SEQUENCE
18030274:d=6 hl=2 l= 4 prim: IA5STRING :kcrz
18030280:d=6 hl=2 l= 4 prim: INTEGER :02C64000
18030286:d=4 hl=7 l= 14 cons: priv [ 1801680742 ]
18030293:d=5 hl=2 l= 12 cons: SEQUENCE
18030295:d=6 hl=2 l= 4 prim: IA5STRING :kcwf
18030301:d=6 hl=2 l= 4 prim: INTEGER :02C64000
18030307:d=4 hl=7 l= 13 cons: priv [ 1801680762 ]
18030314:d=5 hl=2 l= 11 cons: SEQUENCE
18030316:d=6 hl=2 l= 4 prim: IA5STRING :kcwz
18030322:d=6 hl=2 l= 3 prim: INTEGER :480000
xxd -p -s 18030138 kernelcache.im4p.org kernelcache.payp.hex
kernelcache.payp.hex
is a hex dump. The following command will
convert it to a binary (in DER format):
xxd -p -r kernelcache.payp.hex kernelcache.payp.bin
Check the contents of kernelcache.payp.bin
by running the following
command:
openssl asn1parse -inform der -in kernelcache.payp.bin -i
Now copy kernelcache.bin.org
to
kernelcache.bin
. Ghidra
doesn't work well with kernel cache files, so I use Hopper
Disassembler to patch kernelcache.bin
.
-
In Hopper choose Read Executable to Disassemble (CMD-SHIFT-O) and select
kernelcache.bin
. Then click on Loader, scroll down tocom.apple.security.AppleVPBootPolicy
and click OK. -
Select Labels, type "_validate_acm_context" and click on it in the list below. This should take you to the function, whose top few lines should look like this:
__validate_acm_context:
fffffe0008be57ec pacibsp
fffffe0008be57f0 sub sp, sp, #0x40
fffffe0008be57f4 stp x20, x19, [sp, #0x20]
fffffe0008be57f8 stp fp, lr, [sp, #0x30]
fffffe0008be57fc add fp, sp, #0x30
fffffe0008be5800 sturb wzr, [fp, var_11]
fffffe0008be5804 cbz w0, loc_fffffe0008be5868
-
You want to find the calls to
_validate_acm_context()
from_command_create_linked_manifest()
and_command_update_local_policy_for_kcos()
, and patch each one out by replacing it with anop
instruction. -
Click on
_validate_acm_context()
's first line (pacibsp
), then press the "x" key. This should open a dialog listing all the calls to_validate_acm_context()
from elsewhere inAppleVPBootPolicy
. Find_command_create_linked_manifest()
and_command_update_local_policy_for_kcos()
in this list, and click on each of them in turn. The calls to_validate_acm_context()
should look something like this:
fffffe0008bd4e74 add x22, x21, #0x66
fffffe0008bd4e78 mov w0, #0x1
fffffe0008bd4e7c mov x1, x22
fffffe0008bd4e80 bl __validate_acm_context
fffffe0008bd4e84 tbnz w0, 0x0, loc_fffffe0008bd4ea8
- Select the call to
_validate_acm_context()
(bl __validate_acm_context
) and change to Hexadecimal mode (from ASM mode). For each of the following four hex values, double-click on it and replace it with values from the following list (binary code for anop
instruction). (Hit Enter to update each value after you've typed in its replacement.)
1f 20 03 d5
-
Repeat the previous two steps until you've patched the calls to
_validate_acm_context()
from both_command_create_linked_manifest()
and_command_update_local_policy_for_kcos()
. -
Choose File : New Executable and overwrite
kernelcache.bin
-
Use
vbindiff kernelcache.bin.org kernelcache.bin
to check your results. There should be just two changes, each to a four-byte value -- the length of a single AARCH64 instruction. -
Run
img4tool kernelcache.im4p.org
, which will produce output something like this. Use the information from it to run the next command. The value of "desc" differs from one version of macOS to another. Note that the current version ofimg4tool
can't yet deal withkernelcache.im4p.org
's PAYP structure.
img4tool version: 0.199-ed194718f9d6a035a432f2fdfe9fc639b72cba6c-RELEASE
Compiled with plist: YES
IM4P: ---------
type: krnl
desc: KernelManagement_host-354.140.3
size: 0x01131df6
Compression: bvx2
Uncompressed size: 0x03bd4000
PAYP:
kcep: kcep: [Error] img4tool: failed with exception:
[exception]:
what=assure failed
code=15597586
line=238
file=ASN1DERElement.cpp
commit count=199
commit sha =ed194718f9d6a035a432f2fdfe9fc639b72cba6c
-
img4tool -c kernelcache.im4p -t krnl -d "KernelManagement_host-354.140.3" kernelcache.bin
-
dd if=kernelcache.payp.bin >> kernelcache.im4p
-
Use Hex Fiend to open
kernelcache.im4p
and correct its length value. Make sure File : Mode is set to Override. -
Observe
kernelcache.im4p
's six-byte header and length value -- for example308403BD4033
. Convert the length (0x03BD4033
) to decimal (62734387
) and add189
(for the length ofkernelcache.payp.bin
in this case). So the new length in this case is62734576
(==0x3BD40F0
). -
Correct the length value. The header in this case will now be
308403BD40F0
. Savekernelcache.im4p
. -
img4tool -c kernelcache -p kernelcache.im4p -m kernelcache.im4m.org
The patched kernel cache should now be in kernelcache
.
AVPBooter.vmapple2.bin
is a system file. By default it's protected
by the macOS file system, and can't be changed. To get around this I
borrow from How to Defang macOS System
Protections. Before
you follow these steps, you must make the settings changes I described
above under Settings Changes.
-
mkdir /tmp/mount
-
Run
mount
at a Terminal prompt and observe its results, for example as follows. Use the contents of the first line in the next command.
/dev/disk5s1s1 on / (apfs, sealed, local, read-only, journaled)
devfs on /dev (devfs, local, nobrowse)
/dev/disk5s6 on /System/Volumes/VM (apfs, local, noexec, journaled, noatime, nobrowse)
/dev/disk5s2 on /System/Volumes/Preboot (apfs, local, journaled, nobrowse)
/dev/disk5s4 on /System/Volumes/Update (apfs, local, journaled, nobrowse)
/dev/disk1s2 on /System/Volumes/xarts (apfs, local, noexec, journaled, noatime, nobrowse)
/dev/disk1s1 on /System/Volumes/iSCPreboot (apfs, local, journaled, nobrowse)
/dev/disk1s3 on /System/Volumes/Hardware (apfs, local, journaled, nobrowse)
/dev/disk5s5 on /System/Volumes/Data (apfs, local, journaled, nobrowse, protect)
/dev/disk2s3 on /Volumes/Boot3 (apfs, sealed, local, read-only, journaled)
/dev/disk7s3 on /Volumes/Boot2 (apfs, sealed, local, read-only, journaled)
/dev/disk4s1 on /Volumes/Boot4 - Data (apfs, local, journaled, nobrowse, protect)
/dev/disk2s1 on /Volumes/Boot3 - Data (apfs, local, journaled, nobrowse, protect)
/dev/disk4s3 on /Volumes/Boot4 (apfs, sealed, local, read-only, journaled)
/dev/disk6s1 on /Volumes/Boot1 - Data (apfs, local, journaled, nobrowse, protect)
/dev/disk6s3 on /Volumes/Boot1 (apfs, sealed, local, read-only, journaled)
/dev/disk7s1 on /Volumes/Boot2 - Data (apfs, local, journaled, nobrowse, protect)
map auto_home on /System/Volumes/Data/home (autofs, automounted, nobrowse)
-
sudo mount -o nobrowse -t apfs /dev/disk5s1 /tmp/mount
-
cd /tmp/mount/System/Library/Frameworks/Virtualization.framework/Resources
-
sudo cp /path/to/patched/AVPBooter.vmapple2.bin .
-
sudo bless --mount /tmp/mount --bootefi --create-snapshot
-
Reboot your host computer.
On reboot, check the contents of
/System/Library/Frameworks/Virtualization.framework/Resources/AVPBooter.vmapple2.bin
to make sure it's what you expect.
You need to keep your host computer in this state as long as you're
using third party kernel extensions in your macOS guest VM. (Without
the patched AVPBooter.vmapple2.bin
it will simply refuse to start.)
If need be, use the following command to revert your snapshot (and
AVPBooter.vmapple2.bin
), then reboot your host computer:
sudo bless --mount / --last-sealed-snapshot
You'll need to copy both LLB.img4
and logo.img4.org
over their
original contents in AuxiliaryStorage
. This is because LLB.img4
might be a different length than LLB.img4.org
, and Apple's
virtualization infrastructure expects the logo image to immediately
follow the LLB image. You can skip this section if you discovered
above that your existing LLB
image already contains a patch (applied to an earlier version of macOS
in your guest VM).
-
Use Hex Fiend to open
LLB.img4
,logo.img4.org
andAuxiliaryStorage
. Make sure Edit : Mode forAuxilaryStorage
is Overwrite. -
Jump to offset
0x224000
inAuxiliaryStorage
. If an LLB image exists at this location, its first two bytes should be3083
. If not, jump to offset0x24000
. -
Copy the contents of
LLB.img4
(CMD-A, CMD-C) and paste them intoAuxilaryStorage
. -
Copy the contents of
logo.img4.org
and paste them intoAuxiliaryStorage
, then save the file.
Copy these files to your macOS guest VM and do the following there:
- Run
kmutil inspect
, and observe where the boot kernel cache exists in the VM's file system. The following is an example, which will get used in the following steps. The path's exact contents will differ from case to case.
/System/Volumes/Preboot/8467D650-E8D9-4F4C-9403-F51E736C25B0/boot/FB72884642D3490C1D6A0C25D6901AD49BFF7A168B2A851361DD40B393D5FE8E730EF7417B83303610CA04EF15C5CD83/System/Library/Caches/com.apple.kernelcaches/kernelcache
-
Note the "Next Stage Image4 Hash" just before
/System/Library/Caches
-- in this caseFB72884642D3490C1D6A0C25D6901AD49BFF7A168B2A851361DD40B393D5FE8E730EF7417B83303610CA04EF15C5CD83
. -
sudo cp kernelcache /System/Volumes/Preboot/8467D650-E8D9-4F4C-9403-F51E736C25B0/boot/FB72884642D3490C1D6A0C25D6901AD49BFF7A168B2A851361DD40B393D5FE8E730EF7417B83303610CA04EF15C5CD83/System/Library/Caches/com.apple.kernelcaches/kernelcache
-
Run
cd /
andsudo find . -name iBoot.img4 -exec ls -al \{\} \;
. Observe the hit whose path contains the Next Stage Image4 Hash. Use the results in the following command. For example: -
sudo cp iBoot.img4 /System/Volumes/Preboot/8467D650-E8D9-4F4C-9403-F51E736C25B0/boot/FB72884642D3490C1D6A0C25D6901AD49BFF7A168B2A851361DD40B393D5FE8E730EF7417B83303610CA04EF15C5CD83/usr/standalone/firmware/iBoot.img4
Shut down your your macOS guest VM and reboot it into Recovery Mode. Then perform the following steps. You'll be looking for the same Next Stage Image4 Hash as in the previous steps.
Run Terminal in Recovery Mode, then do the following:
- Run
cd /
andfind . -name iBoot.img4 -exec ls -al \{\} \;
. Expect two hits this time, which should look like the following:
/System/Volumes/Preboot/8467D650-E8D9-4F4C-9403-F51E736C25B0/boot/FB72884642D3490C1D6A0C25D6901AD49BFF7A168B2A851361DD40B393D5FE8E730EF7417B83303610CA04EF15C5CD83/usr/standalone/firmware/iBoot.img4
/System/Volumes/Data/private/tmp/Recovery/8467D650-E8D9-4F4C-9403-F51E736C25B0/boot/FB72884642D3490C1D6A0C25D6901AD49BFF7A168B2A851361DD40B393D5FE8E730EF7417B83303610CA04EF15C5CD83/usr/standalone/firmware/iBoot.img4
- Copy
iBoot.img4
over both of them.
You may also see another hit that looks like the following. Ignore
it. You can tell by its date and file size that you already copied the
patched iBoot.img4
over it above.
/Volumes/Preboot/8467D650-E8D9-4F4C-9403-F51E736C25B0/boot/FB72884642D3490C1D6A0C25D6901AD49BFF7A168B2A851361DD40B393D5FE8E730EF7417B83303610CA04EF15C5CD83/usr/standalone/firmware/iBoot.img4
- Run
cd /
andfind . -name kernelcache -exec ls -al \{\} \;
. Once again expect two hits, which should look like the following (maybe plus one superfluous hit, as above).
/System/Volumes/Preboot/8467D650-E8D9-4F4C-9403-F51E736C25B0/boot/FB72884642D3490C1D6A0C25D6901AD49BFF7A168B2A851361DD40B393D5FE8E730EF7417B83303610CA04EF15C5CD83/System/Library/Caches/com.apple.kernelcaches/kernelcache
/System/Volumes/Data/private/tmp/Recovery/8467D650-E8D9-4F4C-9403-F51E736C25B0/boot/FB72884642D3490C1D6A0C25D6901AD49BFF7A168B2A851361DD40B393D5FE8E730EF7417B83303610CA04EF15C5CD83/System/Library/Caches/com.apple.kernelcaches/kernelcache
-
Copy
kernelcache
over both of them. -
Reboot your macOS guest VM and start playing with third-party kernel extensions on it!
Glad to hear it. Just now I tried with VirtualBuddy and had no problems.
You probably just made a mistake. The instructions are long and complex. I considered automating (scripting) some of them. But there's no way you can script them all. And I decided it'd be better to keep it all by hand. That way it's easier to interleave detailed explanatory comments.