2025_MandateForLeadership_FULL.txt

2025_MandateForLeadership_FULL.txt



Project 2025
P R ESI D EN T I A L T R A N S I TI O N P R OJE C T



© 2023 by The Heritage Foundation
214 Massachusetts Ave., NE
Washington, DC 20002
(202) 546-4400 | heritage.org
All rights reserved.
Printed in the United States of America.
ISBN: 978-0-89195-174-2



Foreword by Kevin D. Roberts, PhD
Edited by Paul Dans and Steven Groves



Contents
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix
THE PROJECT 2025 ADVISORY BOARD.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xi
THE 2025 PRESIDENTIAL TRANSITION PROJECT:
A NOTE ON “PROJECT 2025”.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xiii
AUTHORS.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xv
CONTRIBUTORS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xxv
FOREWORD: A PROMISE TO AMERICA.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Kevin D. Roberts, PhD

SECTION 1: TAKING THE REINS OF GOVERNMENT. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
1.
2.

WHITE HOUSE OFFICE.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23

Rick Dearborn

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
OF THE UNITED STATES. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
Russ Vought

CENTRAL PERSONNEL AGENCIES:
MANAGING THE BUREAUCRACY.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
Donald Devine, Dennis Dean Kirk, and Paul Dans

SECTION 2: THE COMMON DEFENSE. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91

Christopher Miller

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133

Ken Cuccinelli

DEPARTMENT OF STATE. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 171

Kiron K. Skinner

INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 201

Dustin J. Carmack

MEDIA AGENCIES. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 235
U.S. AGENCY FOR GLOBAL MEDIA. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 235
Mora Namdar

CORPORATION FOR PUBLIC BROADCASTING. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 246
Mike Gonzalez

9. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 253
Max Primorac



3.

SECTION 3: THE GENERAL WELFARE. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 283
10. DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 289
Daren Bakst

11. DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 319
Lindsey M. Burke

12. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

AND RELATED COMMISSIONS.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 363
Bernard L. McNamee

13. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 417
Mandy M. Gunasekara

14. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH

AND HUMAN SERVICES. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 449
Roger Severino

15. DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING

AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 503
Benjamin S. Carson, Sr., MD

16. DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 517
William Perry Pendley

17. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 545



Gene Hamilton

18. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR

AND RELATED AGENCIES. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 581
Jonathan Berry

19. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 619
Diana Furchtgott-Roth

20. DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS AFFAIRS.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 641
Brooks D. Tucker

SECTION 4: THE ECONOMY.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 657
21. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 663
Thomas F. Gilman

22. DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 691
William L. Walton, Stephen Moore, and David R. Burton

23. EXPORT–IMPORT BANK. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 717
THE EXPORT–IMPORT BANK SHOULD BE ABOLISHED.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 717
Veronique de Rugy

THE CASE FOR THE EXPORT–IMPORT BANK. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 724
Jennifer Hazelton

24. FEDERAL RESERVE. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 731
Paul Winfree

25. SMALL BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 745
Karen Kerrigan

26. TRADE. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 765
THE CASE FOR FAIR TRADE. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 765
Peter Navarro

THE CASE FOR FREE TRADE.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 796
Kent Lassman

27. FINANCIAL REGULATORY AGENCIES. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 829

SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION
AND RELATED AGENCIES.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 829
David R. Burton

CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION BUREAU. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 837
Robert Bowes

28. FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 845
Brendan Carr

29. FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 861
Hans A. von Spakovsky

30. FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 869
Adam Candeub

ONWARD!. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 883
Edwin J. Feulner



SECTION 5: INDEPENDENT REGULATORY AGENCIES. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 825



Acknowledgments

T

Paul Dans & Steven Groves

— ix —



his work, Mandate for Leadership 2025: The Conservative Promise, is a collective effort of hundreds of volunteers who have banded together in the
spirit of advancing positive change for America. Our work is by no means
the comprehensive compendium of conservative policies, nor is our group the
exclusive cadre of conservative thinkers. The ideas expressed in this volume are
not necessarily shared by all. What unites us is the drive to make our country better.
First and foremost, we thank the chapter authors and contributors who gave
so freely of their time in service of their country.
We were particularly grateful to have the help of dedicated members of The
Heritage Foundation’s management and policy teams. Executive Vice President
Derrick Morgan, Chief of Staff Wesley Coopersmith, Associate Director of Project
2025 Spencer Chretien, and Thomas A. Roe Institute for Economic Policy Studies
Director Paul Ray devoted a significant amount of their valuable time to reviewing
and editing the lengthy manuscript and provided expert advice and insight.
The job of transforming the work of dozens of authors and hundreds of
contributors into a cohesive manuscript fell upon Heritage’s formidable team of
editors led by Director of Research Editors Therese Pennefather, Senior Editor
William T. Poole, Marla Hess, Jessica Lowther, Karina Rollins, and Kathleen
Scaturro, without whose tireless efforts you would not be reading these words.
The talented work of Data Graphics Services Manager John Fleming, Manager of
Web Development and Print Projects Jay Simon, Director of Marketing Elizabeth
Fender, Senior Graphic Designer Grace Desandro, and Senior Designer Melissa
Bluey came together to bring the volume to life. We also thank the dedicated junior
staff who provided immeasurable assistance, especially Jordan Embree, Sarah
Calvis, and Jonathan Moy.
Most important, we are grateful to the leadership, supporters, and donors of
each of the Project 2025 advisory board member organizations and those of The
Heritage Foundation, without whom Project 2025 would not be possible.
Thank you.



The Project 2025
Advisory Board

— xi —



Alabama Policy Institute
Alliance Defending Freedom
American Compass
The American Conservative
America First Legal Foundation
American Accountability Foundation
American Center for Law and Justice
American Cornerstone Institute
American Council of Trustees and Alumni
American Legislative Exchange Council
The American Main Street Initiative
American Moment
American Principles Project
Center for Equal Opportunity
Center for Family and Human Rights
Center for Immigration Studies
Center for Renewing America
Claremont Institute
Coalition for a Prosperous America
Competitive Enterprise Institute
Conservative Partnership Institute
Concerned Women for America
Defense of Freedom Institute
Ethics and Public Policy Center
Family Policy Alliance
Family Research Council
First Liberty Institute
Forge Leadership Network
Foundation for Defense of Democracies
Foundation for Government Accountability
FreedomWorks
The Heritage Foundation
Hillsdale College
Honest Elections Project

Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise



Independent Women’s Forum
Institute for the American Worker
Institute for Energy Research
Institute for Women’s Health
Intercollegiate Studies Institute
James Madison Institute
Keystone Policy
The Leadership Institute
Liberty University
National Association of Scholars
National Center for Public Policy Research
Pacific Research Institute
Patrick Henry College
Personnel Policy Operations
Recovery for America Now Foundation
1792 Exchange
Susan B. Anthony Pro-Life America
Texas Public Policy Foundation
Teneo Network
Young America’s Foundation

— xii —

The 2025 Presidential
Transition Project

A NOTE ON
“PROJECT 2025”

— xiii —



W

e want you! The 2025 Presidential Transition Project is the conservative
movement’s
‌
unified effort to be ready for the next conservative
Administration
‌
to govern at 12:00 noon, January 20, 2025. Welcome
to the mission. By opening this book, you are now a part of it. Indeed, one set
of eyes reading these passages will be those of the 47th President of the United
States, and we hope every other reader will join in making the incoming Administration a success.
History teaches that a President’s power to implement an agenda is at its apex during
the Administration’s opening days. To execute requires a well-conceived, coordinated,
unified plan and a trained and committed cadre of personnel to implement it. In recent
election cycles, presidential candidates normally began transition planning in the late
spring of election year or even after the party’s nomination was secured. That is too late.
The federal government’s complexity and growth advance at a seemingly logarithmic
rate every four years. For conservatives to have a fighting chance to take on the Administrative State and reform our federal government, the work must start now. The entirety
of this effort is to support the next conservative President, whoever he or she may be.
In the winter of 1980, the fledging Heritage Foundation handed to President-elect
Ronald Reagan the inaugural Mandate for Leadership. This collective work by conservative thought leaders and former government hands—most of whom were not part of
Heritage—set out policy prescriptions, agency by agency for the incoming President.
The book literally put the conservative movement and Reagan on the same page, and
the revolution that followed might never have been, save for this band of committed and
volunteer activists. With this volume, we have gone back to the future—and then some.

Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise

It’s not 1980. In 2023, the game has changed. The long march of cultural Marxism
through our institutions has come to pass. The federal government is a behemoth,
weaponized against American citizens and conservative values, with freedom and
liberty under siege as never before. The task at hand to reverse this tide and restore
our Republic to its original moorings is too great for any one conservative policy shop
to spearhead. It requires the collective action of our movement. With the quickening
approach of January 2025, we have two years and one chance to get it right.
Project 2025 is more than 50 (and growing) of the nation’s leading conservative
organizations joining forces to prepare and seize the day. The axiom goes “personnel is policy,” and we need a new generation of Americans to answer the call and
come to serve. This book is functionally an invitation for you the reader—Mr. Smith,
Mrs. Smith, and Ms. Smith—to come to Washington or support those who can. Our
goal is to assemble an army of aligned, vetted, trained, and prepared conservatives
to go to work on Day One to deconstruct the Administrative State.
The project is built on four pillars.



l

l

l

l

Pillar I—this volume—puts in one place a consensus view of how major
federal agencies must be governed and where disagreement exists brackets
out these differences for the next President to choose a path.
Pillar II is a personnel database that allows candidates to build their own
professional profiles and our coalition members to review and voice their
recommendations. These recommendations will then be collated and shared
with the President-elect’s team, greatly streamlining the appointment process.
Pillar III is the Presidential Administration Academy, an online
educational system taught by experts from our coalition. For the newcomer,
this will explain how the government functions and how to function in
government. For the experienced, we will host in-person seminars with
advanced training and set the bar for what is expected of senior leadership.
In Pillar IV—the Playbook—we are forming agency teams and drafting transition plans to move out upon the President’s utterance of “so help me God.”

As Americans living at the approach of our nation’s 250th birthday, we have been
given much. As conservatives, we are as much required to steward this precious
heritage for the next generation. On behalf of our coalition partners, we thank you
and invite you to come join with us at project2025.org.
Paul Dans
Director, Project 2025

— xiv —

Authors
Daren Bakst is Deputy Director, Center for Energy and Environment, and Senior
Fellow at the Competitive Enterprise Institute (CEI). Before joining CEI, Daren
was a Senior Research Fellow at The Heritage Foundation, where he played a leading role in the launch of the organization’s new energy and environmental center.
For a decade, he led Heritage’s food and agricultural policy work, and he edited and
co-authored Heritage’s book Farms and Free Enterprise. He has testified numerous
times before Congress, has appeared frequently on media outlets, and has played
leadership roles in such organizations such as the Federalist Society, American
Agricultural Law Association, and Food and Drug Law Institute (serving on the
Food and Drug Law Journal’s editorial advisory board).

Lindsey M. Burke is Director of the Center for Education Policy at The Heritage
Foundation. Burke served on Virginia Governor Glenn Youngkin’s transition
steering committee and landing team for education. She serves on the Board
of Visitors for George Mason University, the board of the Educational Freedom Institute, and the advisory board of the Independent Women’s Forum’s
Education Freedom Center. Dr. Burke’s research has been published in such
journals as Social Science Quarterly, Educational Research and Evaluation, and
Research in Educational Administration and Leadership. She holds a BA from
Hollins University, an MA from the University of Virginia, and a PhD from George
Mason University.
David R. Burton is Senior Fellow in Economic Policy in the Thomas A. Roe
Institute for Economic Policy Studies at The Heritage Foundation. He focuses
on securities regulation, tax policy, business law, entrepreneurship, administrative law, financial privacy, the U.S. Department of Commerce, corporate welfare,

— xv —



Jonathan Berry is managing partner at Boyden Gray & Associates PLLC. He
served as acting Assistant Secretary for Policy at the U.S. Department of Labor,
overseeing all aspects of rulemaking and policy development. At the U.S. Department of Justice, he assisted with the development of regulatory policy and with
the nominations of Justice Neil Gorsuch and dozens of other judges. He previously served as Chief Counsel for the Trump transition and earlier clerked for
Associate Justice Samuel Alito and Judge Jerry Smith of the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit. He is a graduate of Yale College and Columbia University
School of Law.

Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise

international investment, international information sharing, the U.S. economic
relationship with China, and climate-related financial risk. Previously, Burton was
General Counsel at the National Small Business Association; a partner in the Argus
Group; Vice President, Finance, and General Counsel for New England Machinery;
and manager of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce’s Tax Policy Center. He holds a JD
from the University of Maryland School of Law and a BA in Economics from the
University of Chicago.



Adam Candeub is a professor of law at Michigan State University. His scholarly
research focuses on telecommunication, antitrust, and Internet issues. He served
as acting Assistant Secretary of Commerce and Deputy Associate Attorney General at the Justice Department during the Trump Administration. He received his
BA magna cum laude from Yale University and his JD magna cum laude from the
University of Pennsylvania Law School.
Dustin J. Carmack is Research Fellow for Cybersecurity, Intelligence, and Emerging Technologies in the Border Security and Immigration Center at The Heritage
Foundation. Previously, he served in the Intelligence Community as Chief of Staff
to the Director of National Intelligence, John Ratcliffe. In Congress, he served
as Chief of Staff to Congressman John Ratcliffe (TX-04) and Congressman Ron
DeSantis (FL-06). Mr. Carmack studied at Truman State University in Missouri
and Tel Aviv University in Israel.
Brendan Carr has nearly 20 years of private-sector and public-sector experience
in communications and tech policy. He currently serves as the senior Republican
on the Federal Communications Commission. Prior to this role, Carr served as
the Federal Communication Commission’s General Counsel. Earlier, he worked
as an attorney at Wiley Rein LLP. Previously, he clerked on the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. After graduating from Georgetown University,
he earned his JD magna cum laude from the Catholic University of America’s
Columbus School of Law where he served as an editor of the Catholic University Law Review.
Benjamin S. Carson, Sr., MD, is Founder and Chairman of the American Cornerstone Institute and previously served as the 17th Secretary of the U.S. Department
of Housing and Urban Development. Born in Detroit to a single mother with a
third-grade education, Dr. Carson was raised to love reading and education. He
attended Yale and earned his MD from the University of Michigan Medical School.
For nearly 30 years, Dr. Carson served as Director of Pediatric Neurosurgery at
the Johns Hopkins Children’s Center, where he performed the first separation of
twins conjoined at the back of the head.

— xvi —

Authors

Ken Cuccinelli served as Acting Director of U.S. Citizenship and Immigration
Services in 2019 and then, from November 2019 through the end of the Trump
Administration, as Acting Deputy Secretary for the U.S. Department of Homeland
Security. During his tenure as Acting Deputy Secretary, Ken also served as the Chief
Regulatory Officer for the Department of Homeland Security. He also has served
the Commonwealth of Virginia, first as a state senator and then as Virginia’s 46th
Attorney General.
Rick Dearborn served as Deputy Chief of Staff for President Donald Trump and
was responsible for the day-to-day operations of five separate departments of the
Executive Office of the President. He also served as Executive Director of the 2016
President-elect Donald Trump transition team. Before that, Rick served in several
roles, including as Chief of Staff, in the office of then-U.S. Senator Jeff Sessions
(R-AL) for nearly two decades. Between his two tours in Senator Sessions’ office,
he was appointed by President George W. Bush as Assistant Secretary of Energy for
Congressional Affairs. Earlier in his career, Rick worked for the National Republican Senatorial Committee, the Senate Republican Conference, and the Senate
Steering Committee. He graduated from the University of Oklahoma with a BA in
Public Administration and a minor in economics.

Donald Devine is Senior Scholar at The Fund for American Studies in Washington,
DC. He was President Ronald Reagan’s first-term Office of Personnel Management
Director when The Washington Post labeled him “Reagan’s Terrible Swift Sword of
the Civil Service” for cutting bureaucracy and reducing spending by billions of dollars. He was a professor at the University of Maryland and Bellevue University and
is a columnist and author of 10 books, including his recent The Enduring Tension.
Diana Furchtgott-Roth, an Oxford-educated economist, directs the Center for
Energy, Climate, and Environment at The Heritage Foundation and is adjunct
professor of economics at George Washington University. Diana served as Deputy
Assistant Secretary for Research and Technology at the U.S. Department of Transportation, where she directed the Department’s $1.2 billion research budget; the

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Veronique de Rugy is the George Gibbs Chair in Political Economy and Senior
Research Fellow at the Mercatus Center at George Mason University and a nationally syndicated columnist. Her primary research interests include the U.S. economy,
the federal budget, taxation, tax competition, and cronyism. De Rugy is the author
of a weekly opinion column for the Creators Syndicate, writes regular columns
for Reason magazine, and blogs about economics at National Review Online’s The
Corner. She received her MA in economics from the Paris Dauphine University and
her PhD in economics from the Panthéon-Sorbonne University.

Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise

Office of Positioning, Navigation and Timing and Spectrum Management; and the
University Transportation Center program. Diana worked in senior roles in the
White House under Presidents Ronald Reagan, George H.W. Bush, and George W.
Bush, where she was Chief of Staff of the Council of Economic Advisers.



Thomas F. Gilman served as Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Administration
and Chief Financial Officer of the U.S. Department of Commerce in the Trump
Administration. Currently, he is a Director of ACLJ Action and Chairman of Torngat Metals. Tom is the former CEO of Chrysler Financial and has had a 40-plus year
career as a senior executive and entrepreneur in the global automotive industry,
including roles at Chrysler Corporation, Cerberus Capital Management, Asbury
Automotive Group, TD Auto Finance, and Automotive Capital Services. He holds
a BS in finance from Villanova University.
Mandy M. Gunasekara of Oxford, Mississippi, is a principal at Section VII Strategies, a Senior Policy Analyst at the Independent Women’s Forum, and Visiting
Fellow in the Center for Energy, Climate, and Environment at The Heritage Foundation. During the Trump Administration, Mandy served as the Chief of Staff at
the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency as well as Principal Deputy Assistant
Administrator for the Office of Air and Radiation. She previously served in numerous roles at the U.S. House of Representatives and U.S. Senate, including as Majority
Counsel for the Senate Environment and Public Works Committee under Chairman Jim Inhofe. She received her BA from Mississippi College and her JD from
the University of Mississippi School of Law.
Gene Hamilton is Vice-President and General Counsel of America First Legal Foundation. Gene served as Counselor to the Attorney General at the U.S. Department of
Justice; Senior Counselor to the Secretary of Homeland Security; General Counsel on
the Senate Committee on the Judiciary; Assistant Chief Counsel at U.S. Immigration
and Customs Enforcement; and as an Attorney Advisor in the Secretary’s Honors
Program for Attorneys at the Department of Homeland Security. Gene graduated
from the Washington and Lee University School of Law magna cum laude and Order
of the Coif and has a BA in international affairs from the University of Georgia.
Jennifer Hazelton has worked as a senior strategic consultant for the Department of Defense in Industrial Base Policy and has held senior positions at USAID,
the Export–Import Bank of the United States, and the State Department. She was
also a communications director in the U.S. Congress and worked as an award-winning journalist for CNN and Fox News Channel. Hazelton holds an MA in business
administration from Emory University and earned her BA from the University of Georgia.

— xviii —

Authors

Karen Kerrigan is President and CEO of the Small Business & Entrepreneurship
Council and has helped to strengthen U.S. entrepreneurship and global business
growth for 28 years. She has provided counsel across the globe via training missions
focused on entrepreneurial development, effective advocacy, policy formation,
and implementation. Karen testifies regularly before Congress and has served on
numerous federal advisory boards representing the interests of entrepreneurs
and small businesses.
Dennis Dean Kirk is Associate Director for Personnel Policy with the 2025 Presidential Transition Project at The Heritage Foundation. Born and raised in Kansas,
he graduated with honors from Northern Arizona University and Washburn University Law School. Dennis has over 45 years of experience in private law and
public federal government counsel services. He served in President George Bush’s
Administration in the U.S. Army’s Office of General Counsel and later as Associate
General Counsel for Strategic Integration and Business Transformation, where
he was recognized with the Exceptional Civilian and Meritorious Civilian Service
Awards and other awards. During the Trump Administration, Dennis served in
senior positions at the Office of Personnel Management and was nominated by
President Trump to be Chairman of the Merit Systems Protection Board.

Bernard L. McNamee is an energy and regulatory attorney with a major law
firm and was formerly a member of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission.
He is also the Street Distinguished Visiting Professor of Law at the Appalachian
School of Law. In addition to serving as a Federal Energy Regulatory Commissioner,
McNamee has served in various senior policy and legal positions throughout his
career, including at the U.S. Department of Energy, for U.S. Senator Ted Cruz, and
for Virginia Governor George Allen. McNamee also served four attorneys general
in two states (Virginia and Texas).
Christopher Miller served in several positions during the Trump Administration,
including as Acting U.S. Secretary of Defense, Director of the National Counterterrorism Center, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
and Combating Terrorism, and Senior Director for Counterterrorism and Transnational Threats at the National Security Council. Before his civilian service in the

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Kent Lassman is President and CEO of the Competitive Enterprise Institute.
Educated at the Catholic University of America and North Carolina State University, he has written on telecommunications, privacy, environmental, antitrust, and
consumer protection regulation as well as trade policy and the design of regulatory
systems. Kent’s policy research and advocacy have taken him to 45 state capitals,
more than a dozen countries, and deep into the heart of the federal regulatory state.

Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise

Department of Defense, Miller was an Army Green Beret in the 5th Special Forces
Group with multiple combat tours in Iraq and Afghanistan, achieving the rank of
colonel. Miller earned a BA from George Washington University and an MA from
the Naval War College. He also graduated from the College of Naval Command and
Staff and the Army War College.



Stephen Moore is a conservative economist and author. He is currently a senior
economist at FreedomWorks, a Distinguished Fellow at The Heritage Foundation,
and a Fox News analyst. From 2005 to 2014, Moore served as the senior economics
writer for The Wall Street Journal editorial page and as a member of the Journal’s
editorial board. He still contributes regularly to the Journal’s editorial page. He is
a frequent lecturer to business investment and university audiences around the
world on the U.S. economic and political outlook in Washington, DC.
Mora Namdar is an attorney and Senior Fellow at the American Foreign Policy
Council. She speaks fluent Farsi and is an expert on U.S. national security, human
rights, global communications, the Middle East, and international law. Mora served
as senior advisor for critical issues at the U.S. State Department and was appointed
by President Donald Trump to perform the duties of the Assistant Secretary of
State for Consular Affairs. She also served as Vice President of Legal, Compliance,
and Risk at the U.S. Agency for Global Media.
Peter Navarro holds a PhD in economics from Harvard and was one of only three
senior White House officials to serve with Donald Trump from the 2016 campaign
to the end of the President’s first term. He was the West Wing’s chief China hawk
and trade czar and served as Director of the Office of Trade and Manufacturing
Policy and Defense Production Act Policy Coordinator. His books include The
Coming China Wars (2006); Death by China (2011); Crouching Tiger (2015); and his
White House memoirs In Trump Time (2021) and Taking Back Trump’s America
(2022). His top-rated Taking Back Trump’s America podcast appears on Apple
Podcasts and Google Podcasts.
William Perry Pendley was born in Cheyenne, Wyoming. He earned a BA and
an MA from George Washington University, was a U.S. Marine Corps captain, and
earned his JD from the University of Wyoming College of Law. He was an attorney
on Capitol Hill, a senior official for President Ronald Reagan, and leader of the
Bureau of Land Management for President Donald Trump. For 30 years, he was
president of Mountain States Legal Foundation where he argued and won cases
before the Supreme Court of the United States. He authored five books, including Sagebrush Rebel: Reagan’s Battle with Environmental Extremists and Why It
Matters Today.

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Authors

Max Primorac is Director of the Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign
Policy Studies at The Heritage Foundation. He was acting Chief Operating Officer
and Assistant to the Administrator, Bureau for Humanitarian Assistance, at the
U.S. Agency for International Development. Previously he was deputy director of
Iraq’s reconstruction program at the U.S. Department of State and a senior adviser
in the Office of the Secretary. Max was educated at Franklin and Marshall College
and the University of Chicago.
Roger Severino is Vice President of Domestic Policy at The Heritage Foundation. As director of the Office for Civil Rights at the U.S. Department of Health and
Human Services (HHS) from 2017 to 2021, he led a team of more than 250 staff
enforcing civil rights, conscience, and health information privacy laws. Roger subsequently founded the HHS Accountability Project at the Ethics & Public Policy
Center. He holds a JD from Harvard Law School, an MA in public policy from
Carnegie Mellon University, and a BA from the University of Southern California.

Brooks D. Tucker served in the U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs as Assistant Secretary for Congressional and Legislative Affairs from 2017 to 2021 and
as Acting Chief of Staff from 2020 to 2021. He helped to craft the policy framework for President-elect Trump’s transition team and served as the Senior Policy
Adviser for National Security and Veterans Affairs to Senator Richard Burr from
2010 to 2015. A retired Marine lieutenant colonel, Brooks served in Afghanistan,
Iraq, North Africa, the Caucasus, and the Western Pacific. He is a graduate of the
University of Maryland, Marine Corps Infantry Officer Course, and Marine Corps
Command and Staff College and holds a Certificate in Legislative Studies from
Georgetown University.
Hans A. von Spakovsky is Senior Legal Fellow and Manager of the Election Law
Reform Initiative in the Edwin Meese Center III Center for Legal and Judicial
Studies at The Heritage Foundation. He is a former member of President Donald
Trump’s Advisory Commission on Election Integrity. From 2006 to 2007, von

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Kiron K. Skinner is President and CEO of the Foundation for America and the
World, Taube Professor of International Relations and Politics at Pepperdine
University’s School of Public Policy, W. Glenn Campbell Research Fellow at the
Hoover Institution, and a Visiting Fellow and Senior Advisor at The Heritage
Foundation. Skinner served as Director of Policy Planning and Senior Advisor at
the U.S. Department of State from 2018 to 2019 and was a member of the Defense
Business Board at the U.S. Department of Defense in 2020. Skinner holds an MA
and a PhD in political science from Harvard University and undergraduate degrees
from Spelman College and Sacramento City College.

Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise

Spakovsky was a Commissioner on the Federal Election Commission. He served
as career Counsel to the Assistant Attorney General for Civil Rights at the U.S.
Department of Justice from 2002 to 2005.



Russ Vought is Founder and President of the Center for Renewing America. A
longtime conservative leader on Capitol Hill, Russ served in President Trump’s
Cabinet as Director of the Office of Management and Budget, where he oversaw
the implementation of the presidential budget, key policies on deregulation, and
a landmark effort to eliminate critical race theory and other radical ideologies in
executive agencies. Prior to his White House service, Russ spent nearly two decades
in the broader conservative movement on Capitol Hill, including as Policy Director for the House Republican Conference, Executive Director of the Republican
Study Committee, and Legislative Assistant to former U.S. Senator Phil Gramm.
Russ graduated with a BA from Wheaton College and received a JD from George
Washington University Law School.
William L. Walton is Chairman of the Resolute Protector Foundation and host
of The Bill Walton Show. In 2016 and 2017, Mr. Walton served in President-elect
Donald Trump’s transition team as Agency Action Leader for all the federal economic agencies. He served as Chairman of the Board and CEO of Allied Capital
Corporation, a $6 billion NYSE-traded private investment firm, from 1997 to 2010.
He is the immediate past President of the Council for National Policy. His extensive
board service includes The Heritage Foundation, American Conservative Union,
American Enterprise Institute, U.S. Chamber of Commerce, National Venture Capital Association, and Financial Services Roundtable.
Paul Winfree is Distinguished Fellow in Economic Policy and Public Leadership
at The Heritage Foundation. Before rejoining Heritage in 2018, Paul was Deputy
Assistant to the President, Deputy Director of the Domestic Policy Council, and
Director of Budget Policy at the White House. During the 2016 presidential transition, he led the team responsible for the Office of Management and Budget. He also
has served as a senior staff member for the U.S. Senate Committee on the Budget.
Paul served in both the Biden and Trump Administrations for three terms as the
Chair of the Fulbright Foreign Scholarship Board that oversees the Fulbright program and educational exchanges sponsored by the Department of State.
EDITORS
Paul Dans is Director of the 2025 Presidential Transition Project at The Heritage
Foundation, organizing policy and personnel recommendations and training for
appointees in the next presidential Administration. Before joining Heritage, he
served in the Trump Administration as Chief of Staff at the U.S. Office of Personnel

— xxii —

Authors

Management, as OPM’s White House liaison, and as a senior advisor at the U.S.
Department of Housing and Urban Development. Paul has extensive experience
in high-stakes commercial litigation and worked for several large international law
firms in New York City from 1997 to 2012 before founding his own law firm. He is a
graduate of the University of Virginia School of Law and received his graduate and
undergraduate degrees from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
Steven Groves is the Margaret Thatcher Fellow in the Margaret Thatcher Center
for Freedom at The Heritage Foundation. Groves served in the Trump Administration, first as Ambassador Nikki Haley’s Chief of Staff at the U.S. Mission to the
United Nations. He later joined the White House as Assistant Special Counsel,
representing the White House in the Mueller investigation. Groves also served as
White House Deputy Press Secretary. His prior positions include Senior Counsel
for the U.S. Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations and associate at
Boies, Schiller & Flexner LLP. Groves holds an LLM from Georgetown University
Law Center, a JD from Ohio Northern University's College of Law, and a BA from
Florida State University.



— xxiii —



Contributors

T

he contributors listed below generously volunteered their time and effort
to assist the authors in the development and writing of this volume’s 30
chapters. The policy views and reform proposals herein are not an all-inclusive catalogue of conservative ideas for the next President, nor is there unanimity
among the contributors or the organizations with which they are affiliated with
regard to the recommendations.

— xxv —



Mark Albrecht
Chris Anderson, Office of Senator Steve Daines
Jeff Anderson, The American Main Street Initiative
Michael Anton, Hillsdale College
EJ Antoni, The Heritage Foundation
Andrew “Art” Arthur, Center for Immigration Studies
Paul Atkins, Patomak Global Partners
Julie Axelrod, Center for Immigration Studies
James Bacon
James Baehr
Stewart Baker, Steptoe and Johnson LLP
Erik Baptist, Alliance Defending Freedom
Brent Bennett, Texas Public Policy Foundation
John Berlau, Competitive Enterprise Institute
Russell Berman, Hoover Institution
Sanjai Bhagat, University of Colorado Boulder
Stephen Billy, Susan B. Anthony Pro-Life America
Brad Bishop, American Cornerstone Institute
Willis Bixby, WWBX, LLC
Josh Blackman, South Texas College of Law
Jim Blew, Defense of Freedom Institute for Policy Studies
Robert Bortins, Classical Conversations
Rachel Bovard, Conservative Partnership Institute
Robert Bowes
Matt Bowman, Alliance Defending Freedom
Steven G. Bradbury, The Heritage Foundation
Preston Brashers, The Heritage Foundation
Jonathan Bronitsky, ATHOS
Kyle Brosnan, The Heritage Foundation



Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise

Patrick T. Brown, Ethics and Public Policy Center
Robert Burkett, ACLJ Action
Michael Burley, American Cornerstone Institute
David R. Burton, The Heritage Foundation
Jonathan Butcher, The Heritage Foundation
Mark Buzby, Buzby Maritime Associates, LLC
Margaret Byfield, American Stewards of Liberty
David Byrd, Korn Ferry
Anthony Campau, Center for Renewing America
James Jay Carafano, The Heritage Foundation
Frank Carroll, Professional Forest Management
Oren Cass, American Compass
Brian J. Cavanaugh, American Global Strategies
Spencer Chretien, The Heritage Foundation
Claire Christensen, American Cornerstone Institute
Victoria Coates, The Heritage Foundation
Ellie Cohanim, Independent Women’s Forum
Ezra Cohen
Elbridge Colby, Marathon Initiative
Earl Comstock
Lisa Correnti, Center for Family and Human Rights (C-Fam)
Monica Crowley, The Nixon Seminar
Laura Cunliffe, Independent Women’s Forum
Tom Dans, Amberwave Partners
Sergio de la Peña
Chris De Ruyter, National Center for Urban Operations
Corey DeAngelis, American Federation for Children
Caroline DeBerry, Paragon Health Institute
Arielle Del Turco, Family Research Council
Irv Dennis, American Cornerstone Institute
David Deptula, Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies
Donald Devine, The Fund for American Studies
Chuck DeVore, Texas Public Policy Foundation
C. Wallace DeWitt
James Di Pane, The Heritage Foundation
Matthew Dickerson, The Heritage Foundation
Michael Ding, America First Legal Foundation
David Ditch, The Heritage Foundation
Natalie Dodson, Ethics and Public Policy Center
Dave Dorey, The Fairness Center
Max Eden, American Enterprise Institute
Troy Edgar, IBM Consulting

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Contributors

— xxvii —



Joseph Edlow, The Heritage Foundation
Jen Ehlinger, Booz Allen Hamilton
John Ehrett, Office of Senator Josh Hawley
Kristen Eichamer, The Heritage Foundation
Robert S. Eitel, Defense of Freedom Institute for Policy Studies
Will Estrada, Parents Rights Foundation
Jon Feere, Center for Immigration Studies
Baruch Feigenbaum, Reason Foundation
Travis Fisher, The Heritage Foundation
George Fishman, Center for Immigration Studies
Leslie Ford, The Heritage Foundation
Aharon Friedman, Federal Policy Group
Bruce Frohnen, Ohio Northern University College of Law
Joel Frushone
Finch Fulton
Diana Furchtgott-Roth, The Heritage Foundation
Caleigh Gabel, American Cornerstone Institute
Christopher Gacek, Family Research Council
Alexandra Gaiser, River Financial Inc.
Mario Garza
Patty-Jane Geller, The Heritage Foundation
Andrew Gillen, Texas Public Policy Foundation
James S. Gilmore III, Gilmore Global Group LLC
Vance Ginn, Economic Consulting, LLC
Alma Golden, The Institute for Women’s Health
Mike Gonzalez, The Heritage Foundation
Chadwick R. Gore, Defense Forum Foundation
David Gortler, Ethics and Public Policy Center
Brian Gottstein, The Heritage Foundation
Dan Greenberg, Competitive Enterprise Institute
Rob Greenway, Hudson Institute
Rachel Greszler, The Heritage Foundation
DJ Gribbin, Madrus Consulting
Garrison Grisedale, American Cornerstone Institute
Joseph Grogan, USC Schaeffer School for Health Policy and Economics
Andrew Guernsey
Jeffrey Gunter, Republican Jewish Coalition
Joe Guy, Club for Growth
Joseph Guzman
Amalia Halikias, The Heritage Foundation
Gene Hamilton, America First Legal Foundation
Richard Hanania, Center for the Study of Partisanship and Ideology



Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise

Simon Hankinson, The Heritage Foundation
David Harlow
Derek Harvey, Office of Congressman Devin Nunes
Jason Hayes, Mackinac Center for Public Policy
Jennifer Hazelton
Lou Heinzer
Edie Heipel
Troup Hemenway, Personnel Policy Operations
Nathan Hitchen, Equal Rights Institute
Pete Hoekstra
Gabriella Hoffman, Independent Women’s Forum
Tom Homan, The Heritage Foundation
Chris Horner
Mike Howell, The Heritage Foundation
Valerie Huber, The Institute for Women’s Health
Andrew Hughes, American Cornerstone Institute
Joseph Humire, Center for a Secure Free Society
Christopher Iacovella, American Securities Association
Melanie Israel, The Heritage Foundation
Ken Ivory, Utah House of Representatives
Roman Jankowski, The Heritage Foundation
Abby Jones
Emilie Kao, Alliance Defending Freedom
Jared M. Kelson, Boyden Gray & Associates
Aaron Kheriaty, Ethics and Public Policy Center
Ali Kilmartin, Alliance Defending Freedom
Julie Kirchner, Federation for American Immigration Reform
Dan Kish, Institute for Energy Research
Kenneth A. Klukowski
Adam Korzeniewski, American Principles Project
Kathy Nuebel Kovarik, Sagitta Solutions, LLC
Bethany Kozma, Keystone Policy
Matthew Kozma
Julius Krein, American Affairs
Stanley Kurtz, Ethics and Public Policy Center
David LaCerte, Baker Botts, LLP
Paul J. Larkin, The Heritage Foundation
Kent Lassman, Competitive Enterprise Institute
James R. Lawrence III, Envisage Law
Paul Lawrence, Lawrence Consulting
Nathan Leamer, Targeted Victory
David Legates, University of Delaware (Ret.)

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Contributors

— xxix —



Marlo Lewis, Competitive Enterprise Institute
Ben Lieberman, Competitive Enterprise Institute
John Ligon
Evelyn Lim, American Cornerstone Institute
Mario Loyola, Competitive Enterprise Institute
John G. Malcolm, The Heritage Foundation
Joseph Masterman, Cooper & Kirk, PLLC
Earl Matthews, The Vandenberg Coalition
Dan Mauler, Heritage Action for America
Drew McCall, American Cornerstone Institute
Trent McCotter, Boyden Gray & Associates
Micah Meadowcroft, The American Conservative
Edwin Meese III, The Heritage Foundation
Jessica Melugin, Competitive Enterprise Institute
Frank Mermoud, Orpheus International
Mark Miller, Office of Governor Kristi Noem
Cleta Mitchell, Conservative Partnership Institute
Kevin E. Moley
Caitlin Moon, American Center for Law & Justice
Clare Morell, Ethics and Public Policy Center
Mark Morgan, The Heritage Foundation
Hunter Morgen, American Cornerstone Institute
Rachel Morrison, Ethics and Public Policy Center
Jonathan Moy, The Heritage Foundation
Iain Murray, Competitive Enterprise Institute
Ryan Nabil, National Taxpayers Union
Michael Nasi, Jackson Walker LLP
Lucien Niemeyer, The Niemeyer Group, LLC
Nazak Nikakhtar
Milan “Mitch” Nikolich
Matt O’Brien, Immigration Reform Law Institute
Caleb Orr, Boyden Gray & Associates
Michael Pack
Leah Pedersen
Michael Pillsbury, The Heritage Foundation
Patrick Pizzella, Leadership Institute
Robert Poole, Reason Foundation
Christopher B. Porter
Kevin Preskenis, Allymar Health Solutions
Pam Pryor, National Committee for Religious Freedom
Thomas Pyle, Institute for Energy Research
John Ratcliffe, American Global Strategies



Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise

Paul Ray, The Heritage Foundation
Joseph Reddan, Flexilis Forestry, LLC
Jay W. Richards, The Heritage Foundation
Jordan Richardson, Heise Suarez Melville, P.A.
Jason Richwine, Center for Immigration Studies
Shaun Rieley, The American Conservative
Lora Ries, The Heritage Foundation
Leo Rios
Mark Robeck, Energy Evolution Consulting LLC
James Rockas, ACLJ Action
Mark Royce, NOVA-Annandale College
Reed Rubinstein, America First Legal Foundation
William Ruger, American Institute for Economic Research
Austin Ruse, Center for Family and Human Rights (C-Fam)
Brent D. Sadler, The Heritage Foundation
Alexander William Salter, Texas Tech University
Jon Sanders, John Locke Foundation
Carla Sands, America First Policy Institute
Robby Stephany Saunders, Coalition for a Prosperous America
David Sauve
Brett D. Schaefer, The Heritage Foundation
Nina Owcharenko Schaefer, The Heritage Foundation
Matt Schuck, American Cornerstone Institute
Justin Schwab, CGCN Law
Jon Schweppe, American Principles Project
Marc Scribner, Reason Foundation
Darin Selnick, Selnick Consulting
Josh Sewell, Taxpayers for Common Sense
Kathleen Sgamma, Western Energy Alliance
Matt Sharp, Alliance Defending Freedom
Judy Shelton, Independent Institute
Nathan Simington
Loren Smith, Skyline Policy Risk Group
Zack Smith, The Heritage Foundation
Jack Spencer, The Heritage Foundation
Adrienne Spero, U.S. House Committee on Homeland Security
Thomas W. Spoehr, The Heritage Foundation
Peter St Onge, The Heritage Foundation
Chris Stanley, Functional Government Initiative
Paula M. Stannard
Parker Stathatos, Texas Public Policy Foundation
William Steiger, Independent Consultant

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Contributors

— xxxi —



Kenny Stein, Institute for Energy Research
Corey Stewart, Stewart PLLC
Mari Stull
Katharine T. Sullivan, 1792 Exchange
Brett Swearingen, Miller Johnson
Michael Sweeney
Robert Swope
Aaron Szabo, CGCN Group
Katy Talento, AllBetter Health
Tony Tata, Tata Leadership Group, LLC
Farnaz Farkish Thompson
Todd Thurman, American Cornerstone Institute
Brett Tolman, Tolman Group
Kayla M. Tonnessen, Recovery for America Now Foundation
Joe Trotter, American Legislative Exchange Council
Tevi Troy, Mercatus Center
Clayton Tufts
Erin Valdez, Texas Public Policy Foundation
Mark Vandroff
Jessica M. Vaughan, Center for Immigration Studies
John “JV” Venable, The Heritage Foundation
Morgan Lorraine Viña, Jewish Institute for National Security of America
Andrew N. Vollmer, Mercatus Center
Hans A. von Spakovsky, The Heritage Foundation
Greg Walcher, Natural Resources Group, LLC
David M. Walsh, Takota Group
Erin Walsh, The Heritage Foundation
Jacklyn Ward, American Cornerstone Institute
Emma Waters, The Heritage Foundation
Michael Williams, American Cornerstone Institute
Aaron Wolff
Jonathan Wolfson
Alexei Woltornist, ATHOS
Frank Wuco
Cesar Ybarra, FreedomWorks
John Zadrozny, America First Legal Foundation
Laura Zorc, FreedomWorks



Foreword

A PROMISE
TO AMERICA
Kevin D. Roberts, PhD

—1—



F

orty-four years ago, the United States and the conservative movement were
in dire straits. Both had been betrayed by the Washington establishment
and were uncertain whom to trust. Both were internally splintered and strategically adrift. Worse still, at that moment of acute vulnerability and division, we
found ourselves besieged by existential adversaries, foreign and domestic. The late
1970s were by any measure a historic low point for America and the political coalition dedicated to preserving its unique legacy of human flourishing and freedom.
Today, America and the conservative movement are enduring an era of division
and danger akin to the late 1970s. Now, as then, our political class has been discredited by wholesale dishonesty and corruption. Look at America under the ruling
and cultural elite today: Inflation is ravaging family budgets, drug overdose deaths
continue to escalate, and children suffer the toxic normalization of transgenderism with drag queens and pornography invading their school libraries. Overseas,
a totalitarian Communist dictatorship in Beijing is engaged in a strategic, cultural,
and economic Cold War against America’s interests, values, and people—all while
globalist elites in Washington awaken only slowly to that growing threat. Moreover,
low-income communities are drowning in addiction and government dependence.
Contemporary elites have even repurposed the worst ingredients of 1970s “radical
chic” to build the totalitarian cult known today as “The Great Awokening.” And
now, as then, the Republican Party seems to have little understanding about what
to do. Most alarming of all, the very moral foundations of our society are in peril.
Yet students of history will note that, notwithstanding all those challenges,
the late 1970s proved to be the moment when the political Right unified itself



Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise

and the country and led the United States to historic political, economic, and
global victories.
The Heritage Foundation is proud to have played a small but pivotal role in that
story. It was in early 1979—amid stagflation, gas lines, and the Red Army’s invasion of Afghanistan, the nadir of Jimmy Carter’s days of malaise—that Heritage
launched the Mandate for Leadership project. We brought together hundreds of
conservative scholars and academics across the conservative movement. Together,
this team created a 20-volume, 3,000-page governing handbook containing more
than 2,000 conservative policies to reform the federal government and rescue
the American people from Washington dysfunction. It was a promise from the
conservative movement to the country—confident, specific, and clear.
Mandate for Leadership was published in January 1981—the same month Ronald
Reagan was sworn into his presidency. By the end of that year, more than 60 percent
of its recommendations had become policy—and Reagan was on his way to ending
stagflation, reviving American confidence and prosperity, and winning the Cold War.
The bad news today is that our political establishment and cultural elite have
once again driven America toward decline. The good news is that we know the
way out even though the challenges today are not what they were in the 1970s.
Conservatives should be confident that we can rescue our kids, reclaim our culture,
revive our economy, and defeat the anti-American Left—at home and abroad. We
did it before and will do it again.
As Ronald Reagan put it:
Freedom is a fragile thing and it’s never more than one generation away from
extinction. It is not ours by way of inheritance; it must be fought for and
defended constantly by each generation[.]1

This is the duty history has put before us and the standard by which our generation of conservatives will be judged. And we should not want it any other way.
The legacy of Mandate for Leadership, and indeed of the entire Reagan Revolution, is that if conservatives want to save the country, we need a bold and
courageous plan. This book is the first step in that plan.
THE CONSERVATIVE PROMISE

This volume—The Conservative Promise—is the opening salvo of the 2025 Presidential Transition Project, launched by The Heritage Foundation and our many
partners in April 2022. Its 30 chapters lay out hundreds of clear and concrete policy
recommendations for White House offices, Cabinet departments, Congress, and
agencies, commissions, and boards.
Just as important as the scope of The Conservative Promise’s recommendations
is the breadth of its authorship. This book is the product of more than 400 scholars

—2—

Foreword

and policy experts from across the conservative movement and around the country.
Contributors include former elected officials, world-renowned economists, and
veterans from four presidential Administrations. This is an agenda prepared by
and for conservatives who will be ready on Day One of the next Administration to
save our country from the brink of disaster.
The Heritage Foundation is once again facilitating this work. But as our dozens
of partners and hundreds of authors will attest, this book is the work of the entire
conservative movement. As such, the authors express consensus recommendations
already forged, especially along four broad fronts that will decide America’s future:
1.

Restore the family as the centerpiece of American life and protect
our children.

2. Dismantle the administrative state and return self-governance to the
American people.
3.

Defend our nation’s sovereignty, borders, and bounty against global threats.

4.

Secure our God-given individual rights to live freely—what our Constitution
calls “the Blessings of Liberty.”


What makes these four pieces of the conservative promise so valuable to the
next President is that they cut through superficial distractions and focus on the
moral and foundational challenges America faces in this moment of history. This
was one of the secrets of conservatives’ success in the Reagan Era, one our generation should emulate.
As in the late 1970s, Americans today experience the failures of political and cultural elites in countless ways: in the job market and in the grocery store checkout
lines, on the streets and in our schools, in the media and within our institutions. But
in truth, these daily dysfunctions are not innumerable problems, but innumerable
manifestations of a few core crises.
In 1979, the threats we faced were the Soviet Union, the socialism of 1970s liberals, and the predatory deviancy of cultural elites. Reagan defeated these beasts
by ignoring their tentacles and striking instead at their hearts.
His approach to the Cold War? “We win and they lose.”
His economic agenda? The human dignity of work and its many rewards.
His platform in the culture wars? The “community of values embodied in these
words: family, work, neighborhood, peace and freedom.”
This book—and Project 2025 as a whole—will arm the next conservative President with the same kind of strategic clarity, but for a new age.

—3—

Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise



PROMISE #1: RESTORE THE FAMILY AS THE CENTERPIECE
OF AMERICAN LIFE AND PROTECT OUR CHILDREN.

The next conservative President must get to work pursuing the true priority of
politics—the well-being of the American family.
In many ways, the entire point of centralizing political power is to subvert the
family. Its purpose is to replace people’s natural loves and loyalties with unnatural ones. You see this in the popular left-wing aphorism, “Government is simply
the name we give to the things we choose to do together.” But in real life, most of
the things people “do together” have nothing to do with government. These are
the mediating institutions that serve as the building blocks of any healthy society.
Marriage. Family. Work. Church. School. Volunteering. The name real people give
to the things we do together is community, not government. Our lives are full of
interwoven, overlapping communities, and our individual and collective happiness
depends upon them. But the most important community in each of our lives—and
the life of the nation—is the family.
Today, the American family is in crisis. Forty percent of all children are born
to unmarried mothers, including more than 70 percent of black children. There
is no government program that can replace the hole in a child’s soul cut out by
the absence of a father. Fatherlessness is one of the principal sources of American poverty, crime, mental illness, teen suicide, substance abuse, rejection of the
church, and high school dropouts. So many of the problems government programs
are designed to solve—but can’t—are ultimately problems created by the crisis of
marriage and the family. The world has never seen a thriving, healthy, free, and
prosperous society where most children grow up without their married parents.
If current trends continue, we are heading toward social implosion.
Furthermore, the next conservative President must understand that using government alone to respond to symptoms of the family crisis is a dead end. Federal
power must instead be wielded to reverse the crisis and rescue America’s kids from
familial breakdown. The Conservative Promise includes dozens of specific policies
to accomplish this existential task.
Some are obvious and long-standing goals like eliminating marriage penalties
in federal welfare programs and the tax code and installing work requirements for
food stamps. But we must go further. It’s time for policymakers to elevate family
authority, formation, and cohesion as their top priority and even use government
power, including through the tax code, to restore the American family.
Today the Left is threatening the tax-exempt status of churches and charities
that reject woke progressivism. They will soon turn to Christian schools and clubs
with the same totalitarian intent.
The next conservative President must make the institutions of American civil
society hard targets for woke culture warriors. This starts with deleting the terms
sexual orientation and gender identity (“SOGI”), diversity, equity, and inclusion

—4—

Foreword

—5—



(“DEI”), gender, gender equality, gender equity, gender awareness, gender-sensitive, abortion, reproductive health, reproductive rights, and any other term used
to deprive Americans of their First Amendment rights out of every federal rule,
agency regulation, contract, grant, regulation, and piece of legislation that exists.
Pornography, manifested today in the omnipresent propagation of transgender
ideology and sexualization of children, for instance, is not a political Gordian knot
inextricably binding up disparate claims about free speech, property rights, sexual
liberation, and child welfare. It has no claim to First Amendment protection. Its
purveyors are child predators and misogynistic exploiters of women. Their product
is as addictive as any illicit drug and as psychologically destructive as any crime.
Pornography should be outlawed. The people who produce and distribute it should
be imprisoned. Educators and public librarians who purvey it should be classed
as registered sex offenders. And telecommunications and technology firms that
facilitate its spread should be shuttered.
In our schools, the question of parental authority over their children’s education
is a simple one: Schools serve parents, not the other way around. That is, of course,
the best argument for universal school choice—a goal all conservatives and conservative Presidents must pursue. But even before we achieve that long-term goal,
parents’ rights as their children’s primary educators should be non-negotiable in
American schools. States, cities and counties, school boards, union bosses, principals, and teachers who disagree should be immediately cut off from federal funds.
The noxious tenets of “critical race theory” and “gender ideology” should be
excised from curricula in every public school in the country. These theories poison
our children, who are being taught on the one hand to affirm that the color of their
skin fundamentally determines their identity and even their moral status while
on the other they are taught to deny the very creatureliness that inheres in being
human and consists in accepting the givenness of our nature as men or women.
Allowing parents or physicians to “reassign” the sex of a minor is child abuse and
must end. For public institutions to use taxpayer dollars to declare the superiority
or inferiority of certain races, sexes, and religions is a violation of the Constitution and civil rights law and cannot be tolerated by any government anywhere in
the country.
But the pro-family promises expressed in this book, and central to the next
conservative President’s agenda, must go much further than the traditional, narrow
definition of “family issues.” Every threat to family stability must be confronted.
This resolve should color each of our policies. Consider our approach to Big
Tech. The worst of these companies prey on children, like drug dealers, to get them
addicted to their mobile apps. Many Silicon Valley executives famously don’t let
their own kids have smart phones.2 They nevertheless make billions of dollars
addicting other people’s children to theirs. TikTok, Instagram, Facebook, Twitter,
and other social media platforms are specifically designed to create the digital

Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise



dependencies that fuel mental illness and anxiety, to fray children’s bonds with
their parents and siblings. Federal policy cannot allow this industrial-scale child
abuse to continue.
Finally, conservatives should gratefully celebrate the greatest pro-family win
in a generation: overturning Roe v. Wade, a decision that for five decades made a
mockery of our Constitution and facilitated the deaths of tens of millions of unborn
children. But the Dobbs decision is just the beginning. Conservatives in the states
and in Washington, including in the next conservative Administration, should
push as hard as possible to protect the unborn in every jurisdiction in America. In
particular, the next conservative President should work with Congress to enact the
most robust protections for the unborn that Congress will support while deploying
existing federal powers to protect innocent life and vigorously complying with
statutory bans on the federal funding of abortion. Conservatives should ardently
pursue these pro-life and pro-family policies while recognizing the many women
who find themselves in immensely difficult and often tragic situations and the heroism of every choice to become a mother. Alternative options to abortion, especially
adoption, should receive federal and state support.
In summary, the next President has a moral responsibility to lead the nation in
restoring a culture of life in America again.
PROMISE #2: DISMANTLE THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE AND
RETURN SELF-GOVERNANCE TO THE AMERICAN PEOPLE.

Of course, the surest way to put the federal government back to work for the
American people is to reduce its size and scope back to something resembling
the original constitutional intent. Conservatives desire a smaller government
not for its own sake, but for the sake of human flourishing. But the Washington
Establishment doesn’t want a constitutionally limited government because it
means they lose power and are held more accountable by the people who put
them in power.
Like restoring popular sovereignty, the task of reattaching the federal government’s constitutional and democratic tethers calls to mind Ronald Reagan’s
observation that “there are no easy answers, but there are simple answers.”
In the case of making the federal government smaller, more effective, and
accountable, the simple answer is the Constitution itself. The surest proof of this
is how strenuously and creatively generations of progressives and many Republican insiders have worked to cut themselves free from the strictures of the 1789
Constitution and subsequent amendments.
Consider the federal budget. Under current law, Congress is required to pass
a budget—and 12 issue-specific spending bills comporting with it—every single
year. The last time Congress did so was in 1996. Congress no longer meaningfully
budgets, authorizes, or categorizes spending.

—6—

Foreword

l

A combination of elected and unelected bureaucrats at the Environmental
Protection Agency quietly strangles domestic energy production through
difficult-to-understand rulemaking processes;

—7—



Instead, party leaders negotiate one multitrillion-dollar spending bill—several
thousand pages long—and then vote on it before anyone, literally, has had a chance
to read it. Debate time is restricted. Amendments are prohibited. And all of this
is backed up against a midnight deadline when the previous “omnibus” spending
bill will run out and the federal government “shuts down.”
This process is not designed to empower 330 million American citizens and
their elected representatives, but rather to empower the party elites secretly negotiating without any public scrutiny or oversight.
In the end, congressional leaders’ behavior and incentives here are no different from those of global elites insulating policy decisions—over the climate, trade,
public health, you name it—from the sovereignty of national electorates. Public
scrutiny and democratic accountability make life harder for policymakers—so they
skirt it. It’s not dysfunction; it’s corruption.
And despite its gaudy price tag, the federal budget is not even close to the worst
example of this corruption. That distinction belongs to the “Administrative State,”
the dismantling of which must a top priority for the next conservative President.
The term Administrative State refers to the policymaking work done by the
bureaucracies of all the federal government’s departments, agencies, and millions
of employees. Under Article I of the Constitution, “All legislative Powers herein
granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States, which shall consist of
a Senate and a House of Representatives.” That is, federal law is enacted only by
elected legislators in both houses of Congress.
This exclusive authority was part of the Framers’ doctrine of “separated powers.”
They not only split the federal government’s legislative, executive, and judicial
powers into different branches. They also gave each branch checks over the others.
Under our Constitution, the legislative branch—Congress—is far and away the most
powerful and, correspondingly, the most accountable to the people.
In recent decades, members of the House and Senate discovered that if they give
away that power to the Article II branch of government, they can also deny responsibility for its actions. So today in Washington, most policy is no longer set by Congress
at all, but by the Administrative State. Given the choice between being powerful but
vulnerable or irrelevant but famous, most Members of Congress have chosen the latter.
Congress passes intentionally vague laws that delegate decision-making over
a given issue to a federal agency. That agency’s bureaucrats—not just unelected
but seemingly un-fireable—then leap at the chance to fill the vacuum created by
Congress’s preening cowardice. The federal government is growing larger and less
constitutionally accountable—even to the President—every year.

Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise

l

l

l

l



l

Bureaucrats at the Department of Homeland Security, following the lead
of a feckless Administration, order border and immigration enforcement
agencies to help migrants criminally enter our country with impunity;
Bureaucrats at the Department of Education inject racist, anti-American,
ahistorical propaganda into America’s classrooms;
Bureaucrats at the Department of Justice force school districts to
undermine girls’ sports and parents’ rights to satisfy transgender extremists;
Woke bureaucrats at the Pentagon force troops to attend “training”
seminars about “white privilege”; and
Bureaucrats at the State Department infuse U.S. foreign aid programs with
woke extremism about “intersectionality” and abortion.3

Unaccountable federal spending is the secret lifeblood of the Great Awokening.
Nearly every power center held by the Left is funded or supported, one way or
another, through the bureaucracy by Congress. Colleges and school districts are
funded by tax dollars. The Administrative State holds 100 percent of its power at
the sufferance of Congress, and its insulation from presidential discipline is an
unconstitutional fairy tale spun by the Washington Establishment to protect its
turf. Members of Congress shield themselves from constitutional accountability
often when the White House allows them to get away with it. Cultural institutions
like public libraries and public health agencies are only as “independent” from
public accountability as elected officials and voters permit.
Let’s be clear: The most egregious regulations promulgated by the current
Administration come from one place: the Oval Office. The President cannot hide
behind the agencies; as his many executive orders make clear, his is the responsibility for the regulations that threaten American communities, schools, and
families. A conservative President must move swiftly to do away with these vast
abuses of presidential power and remove the career and political bureaucrats
who fuel it.
Properly considered, restoring fiscal limits and constitutional accountability
to the federal government is a continuation of restoring national sovereignty to
the American people. In foreign affairs, global strategy, federal budgeting and policymaking, the same pattern emerges again and again. Ruling elites slash and tear
at restrictions and accountability placed on them. They centralize power up and
away from the American people: to supra-national treaties and organizations, to
left-wing “experts,” to sight-unseen all-or-nothing legislating, to the unelected
career bureaucrats of the Administrative State.

—8—

Foreword

PROMISE #3: DEFEND OUR NATION’S SOVEREIGNTY,
BORDERS, AND BOUNTY AGAINST GLOBAL THREATS.

The United States belongs to “We the people.” All government authority derives
from the consent of the people, and our nation’s success derives from the character
of its people. The American people’s right to rule ourselves is the obverse of our
duty: We cannot outsource to others our obligation to ensure the conditions that
allow our families, local communities, churches and synagogues, and neighborhoods to thrive. The buck stops with each of us, so each of us must have the freedom
to pursue the good for ourselves and those entrusted to our care.

—9—



As monolithic as the Left’s institutional power appears to be, it originates with
appropriations from Congress and is made complete by a feckless President. A
conservative President must look to the legislative branch for decisive action. The
Administrative State is not going anywhere until Congress acts to retrieve its own
power from bureaucrats and the White House. But in the meantime, there are
many executive tools a courageous conservative President can use to handcuff the
bureaucracy, push Congress to return to its constitutional responsibility, restore
power over Washington to the American people, bring the Administrative State
to heel, and in the process defang and defund the woke culture warriors who have
infiltrated every last institution in America.
The Conservative Promise lays out how to use many of these tools including:
how to fire supposedly “un-fireable” federal bureaucrats; how to shutter wasteful
and corrupt bureaus and offices; how to muzzle woke propaganda at every level of
government; how to restore the American people’s constitutional authority over
the Administrative State; and how to save untold taxpayer dollars in the process.
Finally, the President can restore public confidence and accountability to our
most important government function of all: national defense. The American people
desire a military full of highly skilled servicemen and women who can protect the
homeland and our interests overseas. The next conservative President must end
the Left’s social experimentation with the military, restore warfighting as its sole
mission, and set defeating the threat of the Chinese Communist Party as its highest priority.
The next conservative President must possess the courage to relentlessly put
the interests of the everyday American over the desires of the ruling elite. Their
outrage cannot be prevented; it must simply be ignored. And it can be. The Left
derives its power from the institutions they control. But those institutions are only
powerful to the extent that constitutional officers surrender their own legitimate
authority to them. A President who refuses to do so and uses his or her office to
reimpose constitutional authority over federal policymaking can begin to correct
decades of corruption and remove thousands of bureaucrats from the positions
of public trust they have so long abused.



Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise

To most Americans, this is common sense. But in Washington, D.C. and other
centers of Leftist power like the media and the academy, this statement of basic
civics is branded hate speech. Progressive elites speak in lofty terms of openness,
progress, expertise, cooperation, and globalization. But too often, these terms are
just rhetorical Trojan horses concealing their true intention—stripping “we the
people” of our constitutional authority over our country’s future.
America’s corporate and political elites do not believe in the ideals to which our
nation is dedicated—self-governance, the rule of law, and ordered liberty. They
certainly do not trust the American people, and they disdain the Constitution’s
restrictions on their ambitions.
Instead, they believe in a kind of 21st century Wilsonian order in which the
“enlightened,” highly educated managerial elite runs things rather than the humble,
patriotic working families who make up the majority of what the elites contemptuously call “fly-over country.”
This Wilsonian hubris has spread like a cancer through many of America’s largest corporations, its public institutions, and its popular culture. Those who run our
so-called American corporations have bent to the will of the woke agenda and care
more for their foreign investors and organizations than their American workers
and customers. Today, nearly every top-tier U.S. university president or Wall Street
hedge fund manager has more in common with a socialist, European head of state
than with the parents at a high school football game in Waco, Texas. Many elites’
entire identity, it seems, is wrapped up in their sense of superiority over those
people. But under our Constitution, they are the mere equals of the workers who
shower after work instead of before.
This is as it should and must be. Intellectual sophistication, advanced degrees,
financial success, and all other markers of elite status have no bearing on a person’s knowledge of the one thing most necessary for governance: what it means
to live well. That knowledge is available to each of us, no matter how humble our
backgrounds or how unpretentious our attainments. It is open to us to read in
the book of human nature, to which we are all offered the key just by merit of
our shared humanity. One of the great premises of American political life is that
everyone who can read in that book must have a voice in deciding the course and
fate of our Republic.
Progressive policymakers and pundits in America either fail to understand this
premise or intentionally reject it. They enthusiastically support supranational
organizations like the United Nations and European Union, which are run and
staffed almost entirely by people who share their values and are mostly insulated
from the influence of national elections. That’s why they are eager for America to
sign international treaties on everything from pharmaceutical patents to climate
change to “the rights of the child”—and why those treaties invariably endorse policies that could never pass through the U.S. Congress. Like the progressive Woodrow

— 10 —

Foreword

— 11 —



Wilson a century ago, the woke Left today seeks a world, bound by global treaties
they write, in which they exercise dictatorial powers over all nations without being
subject to democratic accountability.
That’s why today’s progressive Left so cavalierly supports open borders despite
the lawless humanitarian crisis their policy created along America’s southern
border. They seek to purge the very concept of the nation-state from the American ethos, no matter how much crime increases or resources drop for schools
and hospitals or wages decrease for the working class. Open-borders activism is a
classic example of what the German theologian Dietrich Bonhoeffer called “cheap
grace”—publicly promoting one’s own virtue without risking any personal inconvenience. Indeed, the only direct impact of open borders on pro-open borders
elites is that the constant flow of illegal immigration suppresses the wages of their
housekeepers, landscapers, and busboys.
“Cheap grace” aptly describes the Left’s love affair with environmental extremism. Those who suffer most from the policies environmentalism would have us
enact are the aged, poor, and vulnerable. It is not a political cause, but a pseudo-religion meant to baptize liberals’ ruthless pursuit of absolute power in the
holy water of environmental virtue.
At its very heart, environmental extremism is decidedly anti-human. Stewardship and conservation are supplanted by population control and economic
regression. Environmental ideologues would ban the fuels that run almost all of the
world’s cars, planes, factories, farms, and electricity grids. Abandoning confidence
in human resilience and creativity in responding to the challenges of the future
would raise impediments to the most meaningful human activities. They would
stand human affairs on their head, regarding human activity itself as fundamentally
a threat to be sacrificed to the god of nature.
The same goals are the heart of elite support for economic globalization. For 30
years, America’s political, economic, and cultural leaders embraced and enriched
Communist China and its genocidal Communist Party while hollowing out America’s industrial base. What may have started out with good intentions has now been
made clear. Unfettered trade with China has been a catastrophe. It has made a
handful of American corporations enormously profitable while twisting their
business incentives away from the American people’s needs. For a generation, politicians of both parties promised that engagement with Beijing would grow our
economy while injecting American values into China. The opposite has happened.
American factories have closed. Jobs have been outsourced. Our manufacturing
economy has been financialized. And all along, the corporations profiting failed
to export our values of human rights and freedom; rather, they imported China’s
anti-American values into their C-suites.
Even before the rise of Big Tech, Wall Street ignored China’s serial theft of
American intellectual property. It outright cheered the elimination of American



Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise

manufacturing jobs. (“Learn to code!” they would gloat.) These were just the price
of progress. Engagement was at every step Beijing’s project, not America’s. The
Chinese Communist Party (CCP) dictated terms, only to break them whenever it
suited them. They stole our technology, spied on our people, and threatened our
allies, all with trillions of dollars of wealth and military power financed by their
access to our market.
Then came the rise of Big Tech, which is now less a contributor to the U.S.
economy than it is a tool of China’s government. In exchange for cheap labor and
regulatory special treatment from Beijing, America’s largest technology firms
funnel data about Americans to the CCP. They hand over sensitive intellectual
property with military and intelligence applications to keep the money rolling
in. They let Beijing censor Chinese users on their platforms. They let the CCP
set their corporate policies about mobile apps. And they run interference for our
rival’s political priorities in Washington. One side of Big-Tech companies’ business
model is old-fashioned American competitiveness and world-changing technological innovation; but increasingly, that side of these businesses is overshadowed
by their role as operatives in the lucrative employ of America’s most dangerous
international enemy.
If you want to understand the danger posed by collaboration between Big Tech
and the CCP, look no further than TikTok. The highly addictive video app, used by
80 million Americans every month and overwhelmingly popular among teenage
girls, is in effect a tool of Chinese espionage. The ties between TikTok and the
Chinese government are not loose, and they are not coincidental.
The same can be observed of many U.S. colleges and universities. Through the
CCP's Confucius Institutes, Beijing has been just as successful at compromising
and coopting our higher education system as they have at compromising and coopting corporate America.
A casual reader might take the last few pages as surveying a broad array of
challenges facing the American people and the next conservative President: supranational policymaking, border security, globalization, engagement with China,
manufacturing, Big Tech, and Beijing-compromised colleges.
But these really are not many issues, but two: (1) that China is a totalitarian
enemy of the United States, not a strategic partner or fair competitor, and (2) that
America’s elites have betrayed the American people. The solution to all of the above
problems is not to tinker with this or that government program, to replace this or
that bureaucrat. These are problems not of technocratic efficiency but of national
sovereignty and constitutional governance. We solve them not by trimming and
reshaping the leaves but by ripping out the trees—root and branch.
International organizations and agreements that erode our Constitution, rule
of law, or popular sovereignty should not be reformed: They should be abandoned. Illegal immigration should be ended, not mitigated; the border sealed, not

— 12 —

Foreword

PROMISE #4 SECURE OUR GOD-GIVEN INDIVIDUAL
RIGHT TO ENJOY “THE BLESSINGS OF LIBERTY.”

The Declaration of Independence famously asserted the belief of America’s
Founders that “all men are created equal” and endowed with God-given rights to
“Life, Liberty, and the pursuit of Happiness.” It’s the last—“the pursuit of Happiness”—that is central to America’s heroic experiment in self-government.
When the Founders spoke of “pursuit of Happiness,” what they meant might
be understood today as in essence “pursuit of Blessedness.” That is, an individual
must be free to live as his Creator ordained—to flourish. Our Constitution grants
each of us the liberty to do not what we want, but what we ought. This pursuit of the
good life is found primarily in family—marriage, children, Thanksgiving dinners,
and the like. Many find happiness through their work. Think of dedicated teachers or health care professionals you know, entrepreneurs or plumbers throwing
themselves into their businesses—anyone who sees a job well done as a personal
reward. Religious devotion and spirituality are the greatest sources of happiness

— 13 —



reprioritized. Economic engagement with China should be ended, not rethought.
Our manufacturing and industrial base should be restored, not allowed to deteriorate further. Confucius Institutes, TikTok, and any other arm of Chinese
propaganda and espionage should be outlawed, not merely monitored. Universities taking money from the CCP should lose their accreditation, charters, and
eligibility for federal funds.
The next conservative President should go beyond merely defending America’s
energy interests but go on offense, asserting them around the world. America’s
vast reserves of oil and natural gas are not an environmental problem; they are the
lifeblood of economic growth. American dominance of the global energy market
would be a good thing: for the world, and, more importantly, for “we the people.”
It’s not just about jobs, even though unleashing domestic energy production would
create millions of them. It’s not just about higher wages for workers who didn’t
go to college, though they would receive the raises they have missed out on for
two generations. Full-spectrum strategic energy dominance would facilitate the
reinvigoration of America’s entire industrial and manufacturing sector as we disentangle our economy from China. Globally, it would rebalance power away from
dangerous regimes in Russia and the Middle East. It would build powerful alliances
with fast-growing nations in Africa and provide us the leverage to counter Chinese ambitions in South America and the Pacific. Locally, it would drive billions
of dollars of private investment to the communities that have been hammered by
globalization since the 1990s. And it would clarify our intentions to Beijing that
the next President can ensure that a large part of America’s reindustrialization is in
the production of the equipment we will need to dissuade future foreign meddling
with U.S. vital interests.



Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise

around the world. Still others find themselves happiest in their local voluntary
communities of friends, their neighbors, their civic or charitable work.
The American Republic was founded on principles prioritizing and maximizing
individuals’ rights to live their best life or to enjoy what the Framers called “the
Blessings of Liberty.” It’s this radical equality—liberty for all—not just of rights but
of authority—that the rich and powerful have hated about democracy in America
since 1776. They resent Americans’ audacity in insisting that we don’t need them
to tell us how to live. It’s this inalienable right of self-direction—of each person’s
opportunity to direct himself or herself, and his or her community, to the good—
that the ruling class disdains.
With the Declaration and Constitution, our nation’s Founders handed to us
the means with which to preserve this right. Abraham Lincoln wrote of the Declaration as an “apple of gold” in a silver frame, the Constitution. So must the next
conservative President look to these documents when the elites mount their next
assault on liberty.
Left to our own devices, the American people rejected European monarchy
and colonialism just as we rejected slavery, second-class citizenship for women,
mercantilism, socialism, Wilsonian globalism, Fascism, Communism, and (today)
wokeism. To the Left, these assertions of patriotic self-assurance are just so many
signs of our moral depravity and intellectual inferiority—proof that, in fact, we
need a ruling elite making decisions for us.
But the next conservative President should be proud, not ashamed of Americans’
unique culture of social equality and ordered liberty. After all, the countries where
Marxist elites have won political and economic power are all weaker, poorer, and
less free for it.
The United States remains the most innovative and upwardly mobile society
in the world. Government should stop trying to substitute its own preferences
for those of the people. And the next conservative President should champion
the dynamic genius of free enterprise against the grim miseries of elite-directed socialism.
The promise of socialism—Communism, Marxism, progressivism, Fascism,
whatever name it chooses—is simple: Government control of the economy can
ensure equal outcomes for all people. The problem is that it has never done so.
There is no such thing as “the government.” There are just people who work for
the government and wield its power and who—at almost every opportunity—wield
it to serve themselves first and everyone else a distant second. This is not a failing
of one nation or socialist party, but inherent in human nature.
Nighttime satellite images of the Korean peninsula famously show the free-market South lit up, with homes, businesses, and cities electrified from coast to coast.
By contrast, Communist North Korea is almost completely dark, except for the
small dot of the capital city, Pyongyang, where a psychotic dictator and his cronies

— 14 —

Foreword

— 15 —



live. The same phenomenon is on display in the infuriating fact that four of the
six richest counties in the United States are suburbs of Washington, D.C.—a city
infamous for its lack of native productive industries.
We see the same corruption expressed on an individual level whenever billionaire climate activists, who want to outlaw carbon-fueled transportation, fly to A-list
conferences on their private jets. Or when COVID-19 shutdown politicians like
former House Speaker Nancy Pelosi and California Governor Gavin Newsom were
caught at the hair salon or dining at fancy restaurants after moralizing about how
everyone else must stay home and forgo such luxuries during the pandemic. For
socialists, who are almost always well-to-do, socialism is not a means of equalizing
outcomes, but a means of accumulating power. They never get around to helping
anyone else.
The Soviet empire was a social and economic failure. North Korea, despite the
opulence of its tyrants, is one of the poorest nations in the world. Cuba is so corrupt
that its people regularly risk their lives to escape to Florida on rafts. Venezuela was
once the richest nation in South America; today, a decade after a Marxist dictator
took over, 94 percent of Venezuelans live in poverty.4 Even socialist Senator Bernie
Sanders’ home state of Vermont was forced to repeal the state’s single-payer health
care system just three years after creating it.
In every case, socialist elites promised that if only they could direct the economy, everything would be better. Very quickly, everything got worse. In socialist
nation after socialist nation, the only way the government could keep its disgruntled people in line was to surveil and terrorize them.
By contrast, in countries with a high degree of economic freedom, elites are
not in charge because everyone is in charge. People work, build, invest, save, and
create according to their own interests and in service to the common good of their
fellow citizens.
There is a reason why the private economy hews to the maxim “the customer
is always right” while government bureaucracies are notoriously user-unfriendly,
just as there is a reason why private charities are cheerful and government welfare
systems are not. It’s not because grocery store clerks and PTA moms are “good”
and federal bureaucrats are “bad.” It’s because private enterprises—for-profit or
nonprofit—must cooperate, to give, to succeed.
So as the American people take back their sovereignty, constitutional authority,
respect for their families and communities, they should also take back their right
to pursue the good life.
The next President should promote pro-growth economic policies that spur
new jobs and investment, higher wages, and productivity. Yes, that agenda should
include overdue tax and regulatory reform, but it should go further and include
antitrust enforcement against corporate monopolies. It should promote educational opportunities outside the woke-dominated system of public schools and

Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise

universities, including trade schools, apprenticeship programs, and student-loan
alternatives that fund students’ dreams instead of Marxist academics. Just as
important as expanding opportunities for workers and small businesses, the
next President should crack down on the crony capitalist corruption that enables
America’s largest corporations to profit through political influence rather than
competitive enterprise and customer satisfaction.
Analogous pro-growth reforms for America’s voluntary civil society are also
in order. America is not an economy; it is a country. Economic freedom is not the
only important freedom. Freedom of religion, freedom of speech, and the freedom
to assemble also represent key components of the American promise. Today, in
addition to the problem of Big Tech censorship, we see speakers at universities
shouted down, parents investigated and arrested for attempting to speak at school
board meetings, and donors to conservative causes harassed and intimidated. The
next conservative President must defend our First Amendment rights.



BEST EFFORT

Ultimately, the Left does not believe that all men are created equal—they think
they are special. They certainly don’t think all people have an unalienable right to
pursue the good life. They think only they themselves have such a right along with
a moral responsibility to make decisions for everyone else. They don’t think any
citizen, state, business, church, or charity should be allowed any freedom until
they first bend the knee.
This book, this agenda, the entire Project 2025 is a plan to unite the conservative
movement and the American people against elite rule and woke culture warriors.
Our movement has not been united in recent years, and our country has paid
the price. In the past decade, though, the breakdown of the family, the rise of
China, the Great Awokening, Big Tech’s abuses, and the erosion of constitutional
accountability in Washington have rendered these divisions not just inconvenient
but politically suicidal. Every hour the Left directs federal policy and elite institutions, our sovereignty, our Constitution, our families, and our freedom are a step
closer to disappearing.
Conservatives have just two years and one shot to get this right. With enemies
at home and abroad, there is no margin for error. Time is running short. If we fail,
the fight for the very idea of America may be lost.
But we should take this small window of opportunity we have left to act with
courage and confidence, not despair. The last time our nation and movement were
so near defeat, we rallied together behind a great leader and great ideas, transcended our differences, rescued our nation, and changed the world. It’s time to
do it again.
Now, as then, we know who we are fighting and what we are fighting for: for
our Republic, our freedom, and for each other. The next conservative President

— 16 —

Foreword

will enter office on January 20, 2025, with a simple choice: greatness or failure. It
will be a daunting test, but no more so than every generation of Americans has
faced and passed.
The Conservative Promise represents the best effort of the conservative movement in 2023—and the next conservative President’s last opportunity to save
our republic.



ENDNOTES

1.
2.

3.

4.

Ronald Reagan, Inaugural Address, January 5, 1967, https://www.reaganlibrary.gov/archives/speech/january5-1967-inaugural-address-public-ceremony (accessed March 14, 2023).
Quispe López, “6 Tech Executives Who Raise Their Kids Tech-Free or Seriously Limit Their Screen Time,”
Business Insider, March 5, 2020, https://www.businessinsider.com/tech-execs-screen-time-children-bill-gatessteve-jobs-2019-9#google-ceo-sundar-pichais-middle-school-aged-son-doesnt-own-a-cell-phone-and-thetv-can-only-be-accessed-with-activation-energy-1 (accessed March 14, 2023).
Simon Hankinson, “‘Woke’ Public Diplomacy Undermines the State Department’s Core Mission and Weakens
U.S. Foreign Policy,” Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 3738, December 12, 2022, https://www.heritage.
org/global-politics/report/woke-public-diplomacy-undermines-the-state-departments-core-mission-and.
Michelle Nichols, “Venezuelans Facing ‘Unprecedented Challenges,’ Many Need Aid—Internal U.N. Report,”
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-venezuela-politics-un/venezuelans-facing-unprecedented-challengesmany-need-aid-internal-u-n-report-idUSKCN1R92AG (accessed March 14, 2023).

— 17 —



Section One

TAKING THE REINS
OF GOVERNMENT

— 19 —



A

merica’s
‌
Bicentennial, which culminated on July 4, 1976, was a spirited
and
‌ unifying celebration of our country, its Founding, and its ideals. As we
‌approach our nation’s 250th anniversary, which will take place during the
next presidency, America is now divided between two opposing forces: woke revolutionaries and those who believe in the ideals of the American revolution. The former
believe that America is—and always has been—“systemically racist” and that it is not
worth celebrating and must be fundamentally transformed, largely through a centralized administrative state. The latter believe in America’s history and heroes, its
principles and promise, and in everyday Americans and the American way of life. They
believe in the Constitution and republican government. Conservatives—the Americanists in this battle—must fight for the soul of America, which is very much at stake.
Just two years after the death of the last surviving Constitutional Convention
delegate, James Madison, Abraham Lincoln warned that the greatest threat to
America would come not from without, but from within. This is evident today:
Whether it be mask and vaccine mandates, school and business closures, efforts
to keep Americans from driving gas cars or using gas stoves, or efforts to defund
the police, indoctrinate schoolchildren, alter beloved books, abridge free speech,
undermine the colorblind ideal, or deny the biological reality that there are only
two sexes, the Left’s steady stream of insanity appears to be never-ending. The
next Administration must stand up for American ideals, American families, and
American culture—all things in which, thankfully, most Americans still believe.
Highlighting this need, former director of the Office of Management and Budget
Russ Vought writes in Chapter 2, “The modern conservative President’s task is to



Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise

limit, control, and direct the executive branch on behalf of the American people.”
At the core of this goal is the work of the White House and the central personnel
agencies. Article II of the Constitution vests all federal executive power in a President, made accountable to the citizenry through regular elections. Our Founders
wrote, “The executive Power shall be vested in a President of the United States
of America.” Accordingly, Vought writes, “it is the President’s agenda that should
matter to the departments and agencies,” not their own.
Yet the federal bureaucracy has a mind of its own. Federal employees are often
ideologically aligned—not with the majority of the American people—but with one
another, posing a profound problem for republican government, a government
“of, by, and for” the people. As Donald Devine, Dennis Kirk, and Paul Dans write
in Chapter 3, “An autonomous bureaucracy has neither independent constitutional status nor separate moral legitimacy.” Byzantine personnel rules provide the
bureaucrats with their chief means of self-protection. What’s more, knowledge of
such rules is used to thwart the President’s appointees and agenda. As Devine, Kirk,
and Dans write, “Managing the immense bureaucracy of the federal government
is impossible without an understanding of the key central personnel agencies and
their governing laws and regulations.”
Many of these laws and regulations governing a largely underworked, overcompensated, and unaccountable federal civilian workforce are so irrational that
they would be comical in a less important context. This is true whether it comes to
evaluating employees’ performance or hiring new employees. Only in the federal
government could an applicant in the hiring process be sent to the front of the
line because of a “history of drug addiction” or “alcoholism,” or due to “morbid
obesity,” “irritable bowel syndrome,” or a “psychiatric disorder.” The next Administration should insist that the federal government’s hiring, evaluation, retention,
and compensation practices benefit taxpayers, rather than benefiting the lowest
rung of the federal workforce.
In order to carry out the President’s desires, political appointees must be
given the tools, knowledge, and support to overcome the federal government’s
obstructionist Human Resources departments. More fundamentally, the new
Administration must fill its ranks with political appointees. Devine, Kirk, and Dans
observe that “the Trump Administration appointed fewer political appointees in
its first few months in office” than any other recent presidency. This left career
employees in charge in many places. This can occur even after departments have
been fully staffed with political appointees. Vought writes that the White House
Office of Management and Budget (OMB) should establish a “reputation as the
keeper of ‘commander’s intent,’” yet OMB is dominated by career employees who
often try to overrule political appointees serving in the various executive departments. Empowering political appointees across the Administration is crucial to
a President’s success.

— 20 —

Section 1: Taking the Reins of Government

— 21 —



Above all, the President and those who serve under him or her must be committed to the Constitution and the rule of law. This is particularly true of a conservative
Administration, which knows that the President is there to uphold the Constitution, not the other way around. If a conservative Administration does not respect
the Constitution, no Administration will. In Chapter 1, former deputy chief of
staff to the President Rick Dearborn writes that the White House Counsel “must
take seriously the duty to protect the powers and privileges of the President from
encroachments by Congress, the judiciary, and the administrative components of
departments and agencies.” Equally important, the President must enforce the
Constitution and laws as written, rather than proclaiming new “law” unilaterally.
Presidents should not issue mask or vaccine mandates, arbitrarily transfer student
loan debt, or issue monarchical mandates of any sort. Legislatures make the laws
in a republic, not executives.
It is crucial that all three branches of the federal government respect what Madison called the “double security” to our liberties: the separation of powers among
the three branches, and the separation of powers between the federal government
and the states. This double security has been greatly compromised over the years.
Vought writes that “the modern executive branch…writes federal policy, enforces
that policy, and often adjudicates whether that policy was properly drafted and
enforced.” He describes this as “constitutionally dire” and “in urgent need of repair,”
adding: “Nothing less than the survival of self-governance in America is at stake.”
When it comes to ensuring that freedom can flourish, nothing is more important than deconstructing the centralized administrative state. Political appointees
who are answerable to the President and have decision-making authority in the
executive branch are key to this essential task. The next Administration must not
cede such authority to non-partisan “experts,” who pursue their own ends while
engaging in groupthink, insulated from American voters. The following chapters
detail how the next Administration can be responsive to the American people (not
to entrenched “elites”); how it can take care that all the laws are “faithfully executed,” not merely those that the President desires to see executed; and how it can
achieve results and not be stymied by an unelected bureaucracy.



1

WHITE HOUSE OFFICE
Rick Dearborn

— 23 —



F

rom popular culture to academia, the American presidency has long been a
prominent fixture of the national imagination—naturally so since it is the
beating heart of our nation’s power and prestige. It has played, for instance,
a feature role in innumerable movies and television shows and has been prodded,
analyzed, and critiqued by countless books, essays, and studies. But like nearly
everything else in life, there is no substitute for firsthand experience, which this
manual has compiled from the experience of presidential appointees and provides
in accessible form for future use.
With respect to the presidency, it is best to begin with our Republic’s foundational document. The Constitution gives the “executive Power” to the President.1
It designates him as “Commander in Chief”2 and gives him the responsibility to
“take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.”3 It further prescribes that the
President might seek the assistance of “the principal Officer in each of the executive Departments.”4 Beginning with George Washington, every President has been
supported by some form of White House office consisting of direct staff officers as
well as a Cabinet comprised of department and agency heads.
Since the inaugural Administration of the late 18th century, citizens have chosen
to devote both their time and their talent to defending and strengthening our nation
by serving at the pleasure of the President. Their shared patriotic endeavor has
proven to be a noble one, not least because the jobs in what is now known as the
White House Office (WHO) are among the most demanding in all of government.
The President must rely on the men and women appointed to the WHO. There
simply are not enough hours in the day to manage the affairs of state single-handedly,

Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise

so delegation is not just advisable: It is essential. The decisions that assistants and
senior advisers make will directly impact the Administration, its legacy, and—most
important—the fate of the country. Their agenda must therefore be the President’s
agenda. Choosing who will carry out that agenda on a daily basis is not only one of
the first decisions a President makes in office, but also one of the most critical. The
tone and tempo of an administration are often determined on January 20.



CHIEF OF STAFF

As with most of the positions that will be covered in this first chapter, the Chief
of Staff is also an Assistant to the President. However, the chief is truly first among
equals. Of all presidential staff members, the chief is the most critical to implementation of the President’s vision for the country. The chief also has a dual role as manager
of the staffs of both the WHO and the Executive Office of the President (EOP).5
The Chief of Staff’s first managerial task is to establish an organizational chart
for the WHO. It should be simple and contain clear lines of authority and responsibility to avoid conflicts. It should also identify specific points of contact for each
element of the government outside of the White House. These contacts should
include the White House Liaisons who are selected by the Office of Presidential
Personnel (PPO).
Receiving guidance from the President, the chief endeavors to implement the
President’s agenda by setting priorities for the WHO. This process begins by taking
stock of the President’s campaign promises, identifying current and prospective
opportunities, and then delegating policy priorities among the departments and
agencies of the Cabinet and throughout the three White House policy councils:
l

The National Economic Council (NEC);

l

The Domestic Policy Council (DPC); and

l

The National Security Council (NSC).

The President is briefed on all of his policy priorities by his Cabinet and senior
staff as directed by the chief. The chief—along with senior WHO staff—maps out
the issues and themes that will be covered daily and weekly. The chief then works
with the policy councils, the Cabinet, and the Office of Communications and Office
of Legislative Affairs (OLA) to sequence and execute the rollout of policies and
announcements. White House Counsel and senior advisers and senior counselors
are also intimately involved.
All senior staff report to the Chief of Staff, either directly or through his two
or three deputies, unless the President determines that a particular Assistant to
the President reports directly to him. Most chiefs have interacted directly with

— 24 —

White House Office

Cabinet officers and a select number of direct reports. In most cases, the direct
reports to the chief are his two or three deputies, the Communications Director,
PPO Director, White House Counsel, and senior advisers. Occasionally, the Office
of Public Liaison (OPL), the Cabinet Secretary, and Intergovernmental Affairs
(IGA) also report directly to the chief. Usually, however, they report instead to a
Deputy Chief of Staff.
The Chief of Staff’s main challenge is time management. His use of his deputies,
meetings with senior staff, and direction provided to the WHO must all balance
with the daily needs of the President. A successful chief steers the West Wing using
his management of and influence with the various individuals and entities around
him. It goes without saying that selecting the right person to be chief is vital.
DEPUTY CHIEFS OF STAFF

In recent years, Presidents typically have appointed two Deputy Chiefs of Staff:
a Deputy Chief of Staff for Management and Operations and a Deputy Chief of
Staff for Policy. There also have been other types of deputy chiefs whose roles have
included, for example, overseeing strategy, planning, and implementation. Chiefs
of Staff have then occasionally appointed a principal Deputy Chief to be in charge
of guiding decision-making, organizational structure, and information flow.

Not all Chiefs of Staff have tapped a principal deputy. A major reason is that
doing so adds another layer of command complexity. When principal deputies
have been installed, their roles have varied based on the needs of particular chiefs.
Most principal deputies have functioned as doorkeepers, sorting through action
items, taking on those that can be handled at their own level, and passing up others
that truly require the attention of the Chief of Staff or the President. Principal
deputies also have assumed control of the scheduling functions, normally under
the operations deputy, and have worked directly with the policy councils at the
direction of the Chief of Staff. The OPL and Office of Political Affairs (OPA) also
have reported to a principal deputy.
Deputy Chief of Staff for Management and Operations. The Deputy Chief
of Staff for Management and Operations oversees the President’s schedule and
all logistical aspects of his movement within and outside of the White House (for
example, both air travel on Air Force One and Marine One and ground transportation). This deputy also interfaces directly with the Secret Service as well as the
military offices tasked with keeping the President and his family safe.
In the past, this deputy has also worked with the NSC, the Secretary of Defense,
the Secretary of State, and the Intelligence Community and on advancing all foreign
trips. If their roles are separated from that of the policy deputy, this deputy should
have a strong grasp of international affairs and robust foreign policy credentials.

— 25 —



PRINCIPAL DEPUTY CHIEFS OF STAFF

Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise

This deputy further manages all facets of the working White House: technology,
grounds management, support staff, personnel administration, and communications. This individual therefore needs to be meticulous and ideally should possess
a great deal of command-and-control experience.
Deputy Chief of Staff for Policy. In some Administrations, the functions of
the IGA, OPA, and OPL and other advisers within the WHO have fallen under the
Deputy Chief of Staff for Policy. For conservatives, this arrangement could help
to connect the WHO’s outreach to political and external groups and be a strong
conduit for state and local elected officials, state party organizations, and both
grasstop and grassroots groups.
This deputy chief works directly with the Chief of Staff, Cabinet officers, and
all three policy councils to support the development and implementation of the
President’s agenda. This deputy chief should therefore have impressive policy credentials in the realms of economic, domestic, and social affairs.



SENIOR ADVISERS

Presidents have surrounded themselves with senior advisers whose experience and interests are not necessarily neatly defined. In recent Administrations,
senior advisers have been appointed to offer broad guidance on political matters
and communications issues; others have acted as “czars” for specific projects or
policy areas.
The most powerful senior advisers frequently have had a long personal relationship with the President and often have spent a significant amount of time with him
within and outside of the White House. They have been asked not only to provide
guidance on a variety of policy issues, but also to offer instruction on communicating with the American people and the media.
In a number of Administrations, new offices—or “councils”—have been created
to support senior advisers. For the most part, their functions have been duplicative
or overlapping, as a result of which these offices have tended to be short-lived. Even
so, senior advisers should be provided the staff and resources that their portfolios require. To ensure that senior advisers are effective, their portfolios must be
clearly delineated and clearly communicated across the White House. This too is
a responsibility of the Chief of Staff.
OFFICE OF WHITE HOUSE COUNSEL

The Office of White House Counsel provides legal guidance to the President and
elements of the EOP on a host of issues, including presidential powers and privileges, ethics compliance, review of clemency applications, and judicial nominations.
The selection of White House Counsel is one of the most important decisions an
incoming President will make. The office is not designed to create or advance policies on its own initiative—nor should it do so. Rather, it is dedicated to guiding

— 26 —

White House Office

— 27 —



the President and his reports on how (within the bounds of the law) to pursue and
realize the President’s agenda.
While the White House Counsel does not serve as the President’s personal attorney in nonofficial matters, it is almost impossible to delineate exactly where an
issue is strictly personal and has no bearing on the President’s official function. The
White House Counsel needs to be deeply committed both to the President’s agenda
and to affording the President proactive counsel and zealous representation. That
individual directly advises the President as he performs the duties of the office,
and this requires a relationship that is built on trust, confidentiality, and candor.
The Office of White House Counsel is also responsible for ensuring that each
component of the White House adheres to all applicable legal and ethical guidelines, which often requires ongoing training and monitoring to ensure compliance.
This means ensuring that White House staff regularly consult with office attorneys on required financial disclosures, received gifts, potential conflicts of interest,
and other ethical concerns. The Office of White House Counsel is the first line of
defense for the EOP. Its staff must take seriously the duty to protect the powers
and privileges of the President from encroachments by Congress, the judiciary,
and the administrative components of departments and agencies.
In addition to the White House Counsel, the office includes deputies, assistants,
associates, and legal support staff. The assistant and associate attorneys are often
specialists in particular areas of the law and offer guidance to the EOP on issues
related to national security, criminal law, environmental law, and a host of administrative and regulatory matters. Attorneys working in the Office of White House
Counsel serve as legal advisers to the White House policy operation by reviewing
executive orders, agency regulations, and other policy-related functions. Here
again, subordinates should be deeply committed to the President’s agenda and
see their role as helping to accomplish the agenda through problem solving and
advocacy. They should not erect roadblocks out of an abundance of caution; rather,
they should offer practical legal advice on how to promote the President’s agenda
within the bounds of the law.
The White House Counsel’s office cannot serve as a finishing school to credential
the next set of white-shoe law firm attorneys or federal judges in waiting who cabin
their opinions for fear their elite credentials could be tarnished through a policy
disagreement. Rather, it should function more as an activist yet ethical plaintiffs’
firm that advocates for its client—the Administration’s agenda—within the limits
imposed by the Constitution and the duties of the legal profession.
The Office of White House Counsel also serves as the primary gateway for
communication between the White House and the Department of Justice (DOJ).
Traditionally, both the White House Counsel and the Attorney General have issued
a memo requiring all contact between the two institutions to occur only between
the Office of White House Counsel and the Attorney General or Deputy Attorney



Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise

General. The next Administration should reexamine this policy and determine
whether it might be more efficient or more appropriate for communication to occur
through additional channels. The White House Counsel also works closely with
the DOJ Office of Legal Counsel to seek opinions on, for example, matters of policy
development and the constitutionality of presidential power and privileges and
with OLA and the DOJ Office of Legal Policy on presidential judicial nominees.
When a new President takes office, he will need to decide expeditiously how to
handle any major ongoing litigation or other pending legal matters that might present a challenge to his agenda. To offer guidance, the White House Counsel must get
up to speed as quickly as possible on all significant ongoing legal challenges across
the executive branch that might affect the new Administration’s policy agenda and
must be prepared at the outset of the Administration to present recommendations to the President, including recommendations for reconsidering or reversing
positions of the previous Administration in any significant litigation. This review
will usually require consulting with the new political leadership at the Justice
Department, including during the transition period.
No day is predictable at the White House. Therefore, to handle the pace and
volatility of affairs, the Office of White House Counsel must offer measured legal
guidance in a timely manner. This often means forgoing law review–style memos
about esoteric legal concepts and instead quickly providing high-level yet incisive
guidance. Due to evolving world events, domestic affairs, and political pressures, the
office often faces legal questions for which there may not be a wealth of precedent.
Attorneys in the Office of White House Counsel must therefore work collaboratively
within the White House and the Department of Justice, relying on each other as a
team, to ensure that proper legal guidance is delivered to the President.
The President should choose a White House Counsel who is well-versed in
the Constitution, administrative and regulatory law, and the inner workings of
Congress and the political process. Instead of choosing a specialist, the President
should hire a counsel with extensive experience with a wide range of complex legal
subjects. Moreover, while a candidate with elite credentials might seem ideal, the
best one will be above all loyal to the President and the Constitution.
STAFF SECRETARY

The Office of the Staff Secretary is rarely visible to the outside world, but it
performs work of tremendous importance. The office is similar to a military commander’s adjutant as it is responsible for fielding and managing a vast amount of
information at the top of its organization. This includes information on its way into
the Oval Office as well as information flowing out from the Oval Office. Because
of its gatekeeping function, the position of Staff Secretary is one of extreme trust,
and the individual who possesses it should be vetted to work as an “honest broker”
in the President’s service.

— 28 —

White House Office

OFFICE OF COMMUNICATIONS

The Office of Communications, which operates under the Director of Communications, conveys the President’s agenda to the public through various media,
including speeches and remarks, press briefings, off-the-record discussions with
reporters, and social media. Depending on how a President chooses to structure
his White House, the Office of Communications may include the Office of the Press
Secretary (Press Office), but no matter how it is structured, the office must work
closely with the Press Office as well as the President’s speechwriters and digital
strategists.
Operational functions of the Office of Communications include scheduling and
running press briefings, interviews, meetings, media appearances, speeches, and a
range of other events. The Office of Communications must maintain robust relationships with the White House Press Corps, the White House Correspondents’
Association, regional stakeholders, and key interest groups. No legal entitlement exists for the provision of permanent space for media on the White House
campus, and the next Administration should reexamine the balance between media
demands and space constraints on the White House premises.
Leadership within the Office of Communications should include a Communications Director (who is a direct report to the Chief of Staff ), a Deputy

— 29 —



The Office of the Staff Secretary has been described as the last substantive
control point before papers reach the Oval Office. A great deal of information is
headed toward the Oval Office at any moment. This includes presidential decision
memos; bills passed by Congress (which may be accompanied by signing or veto
statements); and briefing books, reading materials, samples of constituent mail,
personal mail, and drafts of speeches. The Staff Secretary makes certain that these
materials are complete, well-ordered, and up to date before they reach the President. This necessarily means that the Staff Secretary plays a key role in determining
who weighs in on policy matters and when.
As noted above, the Staff Secretary also handles information leaving the Oval
Office. The President may have questions after reviewing incoming material, may
wish to seek more information, or may demand revisions. The Staff Secretary is
often responsible for directing these requests to the appropriate places and following up on them to ensure that they are completed.
One of the Staff Secretary’s critical functions is managing and overseeing the
clearance process for the President’s daily/nightly briefing book. This book is filled
with all the reading material and leading documentation the President needs in
the morning and the evening to help him make decisions. The Staff Secretary also
oversees the use of the President’s signature, whether by hand or by autopen, and
manages the Office of the Executive Clerk, Office of Records Management, and
Office of Presidential Correspondence.



Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise

Communications Director, a Deputy Director for Strategic Communications, and
a Press Secretary. This leadership team must work together closely to drive the
national narrative about the White House.
The best resource for the Office of Communications is the President. The President conveys the White House’s overall message through one or two inaugural
addresses, State of the Union addresses, speeches to Congress, and press conferences. The office must also ensure that the various White House offices disseminate
a unified message to the public. The Communications Director and Press Secretary
in particular should be careful to avoid contradicting the President or delivering
conflicting information.
The speechwriting team is a critical component of the communications team.
Speechwriting is a unique talent: The writers selected must understand policy,
should have a firm grasp of history and other liberal-arts disciplines, and should
be able to learn and adopt the President’s style of rhetoric and mode of delivery.
The Press Secretary is the President’s spokesperson, communicating to the
American people through the media. The Press Secretary engages with the White
House Press Corps formally through press briefings and informally through
impromptu gaggles and meetings. Individuals who serve in this role must be quick
on their feet, which means, when appropriate, deftly refuting and rebutting correspondents’ questions and comments.
The Communications Director must convey the President’s mission to the
American people. Especially for conservatives, this means navigating the mainstream media to ensure that the President’s agenda is conveyed effectively and
accurately. The Communications Director must be politically savvy and very aware
of the ongoing activities of the other White House offices. The new Administration
should examine the nature of the relationship between itself and the White House
Correspondents Association and consider whether an alternative coordinating
body might be more suitable.
OFFICE OF LEGISLATIVE AFFAIRS (OLA)

Created by President Dwight Eisenhower, the OLA has continued to serve as the
liaison between the White House and Congress. The White House must work with
congressional leaders to ensure presidential nominees, for roles such as Cabinet
secretaries and ambassadors, are confirmed by the Senate. The White House also
relies on Congress to enact reforms promised by the President on the campaign
trail, whether those promises relate to health care, education, or national defense.
Because Congress holds the power of the purse, White House staffers must ensure
that there is enough support on the Hill to secure the necessary funding through
the appropriations process to fulfill the President’s agenda.
The OLA reports directly to the Chief of Staff and in some Administrations has
done so under the guidance of a Deputy Chief of Staff (usually the Deputy Chief

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White House Office

OFFICE OF PRESIDENTIAL PERSONNEL (PPO)

The political axiom that “personnel is policy” was popularized under President
Ronald Reagan during the 1981 presidential transition. One of the most important
offices in the White House is the PPO, which was created under President Richard
Nixon to centralize political appointments. Departments and agencies had and still
have direct legal authority on hiring and firing, but the power to fill Schedule C positions—the core of political jobs—is vested with the President. Therefore, the White
House, not the department or agency, has the final word on political appointments.
PPO’s primary responsibility is to staff the executive branch with individuals
who are equipped to implement the President’s agenda. Although its focus should
be identifying and recruiting leaders to fill the approximately 1,000 appointments that
require Senate confirmation, PPO must also fill approximately 3,000 political jobs that
require dedicated conservatives to support the Administration’s political leadership.

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for Policy). Regardless of the person to whom the OLA reports, however, the office
exercises a certain autonomy on behalf of the President and the Chief of Staff in
directly influencing congressional leaders of both major political parties. The OLA
often must function as the mediator among the parties and find common ground
to facilitate the successful enactment of the President’s agenda.
As is the case with many White House offices (but especially the Office of Communications), the OLA must ensure that congressional leaders receive one unified
message. If other actors within the White House maintain their own relationships
with congressional leaders and staffers, it may appear that the President’s agenda
is fractured and lacks consensus. This dynamic has caused real problems for many
Presidents in the past.
Internally, OLA staffers need to be involved in policy discussions, budget reviews,
and other important meetings. They must also provide advice to policy staffers
regarding whether certain ideas are politically feasible. Externally, OLA staffers
have to communicate continuously with congressional offices of both parties in
both the House and the Senate to ensure that the President has enough support
to enact his legislative priorities or sustain votes.
The OLA requires staffers who are effective communicators and can provide a
dose of reality to other White House staffers when necessary. Although a policy
proposal from within the White House may be a great idea, OLA staffers must
ensure that it is politically feasible. OLA staffers must therefore be skilled in both
politics and policy. Furthermore, the President should seek out individuals who
can advance his agenda and at the same time forge pathways with members of the
opposing political party on other priorities.
Most important, the OLA must function as a well-oiled machine: precisely
synced. The President cannot afford to have a tennis player on—much less as the
leader of—his football team.

Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise

Frequently, many medium-tier and top-tier jobs have been filled by policy
experts tasked with accomplishing much of the work of the Administration. At
the same time, appointees in the entry-level jobs have brought invaluable energy
and commitment to the White House and have proved to be the “farm team” for
the conservative movement.
The Office of Presidential Personnel is responsible for:
l

l

l

Vetting potential political personnel by conducting political background
checks and reviewing any clearance and fitness assessments by departments
and agencies.
Making recommendations to the President and to other appointment
authorities on behalf of the President.
Identifying programmatic political workforce needs early and developing
plans (for example, Schedule F).



l

Identifying potential political personnel both actively through recruitment
and passively by fielding resumes and adjudicating requests from
political actors.

l

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l

Maintaining a strong relationship with the Office of Personnel Management
(OPM) both for operational purposes and to effectuate the President’s direct
Title 5 authorities. The President is in charge of the federal workforce and
exercises control principally by working through the Director of the Office
of Personnel Management.
Training and connecting political personnel.
Playing “bad cop” in a way that other White House offices cannot
(including serving as the office that takes direct responsibility for firings
and hirings).
Serving as a personnel link between conservative organizations and the
executive branch.

In most Administrations, PPO will staff more than 100 positions during a transition and thousands of noncareer positions during the President’s first term. Direct
authority and a strong relationship with the President are necessary attributes for
any PPO Director. Historically, PPO has had direct review and control of personnel
files, including security clearance dossiers.

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White House Office

At the highest level, PPO is tasked with long-term, strategic workforce development. The “billets” of political appointments are of immense importance in
credentialing and training future leaders. In addition, whatever one’s view of the
constitutionality of various civil service rules (for example, the Federal Vacancies
Reform Act of 19986) might be, it is necessary to ensure that departments and
agencies have robust cadres of political staff just below senior levels in the event
of unexpected vacancies.
OFFICE OF POLITICAL AFFAIRS (OPA)

OFFICE OF CABINET AFFAIRS (OCA)

The OCA’s role has changed to some degree over the course of various Administrations, but its overriding function remains the same: to ensure the coordination
of policy and communication between the White House and the Cabinet. Most
important, the OCA coordinates all Cabinet meetings with the President. It should
also organize and administer regular meetings of the Deputy Secretaries because
they also typically serve vital roles in the departments and agencies and, further,
often become acting secretaries when Cabinet members resign.

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The OPA is the primary office within the executive branch for managing the
President’s political interests. Although its specific functions vary from Administration to Administration, the OPA typically serves as the liaison between the
President and associated political entities: national committees, federal and state
campaigns, and interest groups. Within legal guidelines, the OPA engages in outreach, conducts casework, and—if the President is up for reelection—assists with
his campaign. The OPA may also monitor congressional campaigns, arrange presidential visits with other political campaigns, and recommend campaign staff to
the Office of Presidential Personnel for service in the executive branch.
The OPA further serves as a line of communication between the White House
and the President’s political party. This includes both relaying the President’s
ambitions to political interests and listening to the needs of political interests. This
relationship allows for the exchange of information between the White House and
political actors across the country. The OPA should have one director of political
affairs who reports either to the Chief of Staff or to a Deputy Chief of Staff. The
OPA should also include various deputy directors, each of whom is responsible for
a certain geographical region of the country.
Because nearly all White House activities are in some way inherently political,
the OPA needs to be aware of all presidential actions and activities—including
travel, policy decisions, speeches, nominations, and responses to matters of
national security—and consider how they might affect the President’s image. The
OPA must therefore have a designated staffer who communicates not only with
other White House offices, but also with the Cabinet and executive branch agencies.



Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise

There should be one Cabinet Secretary who reports to the Chief of Staff’s office,
either directly or through a deputy chief, according to the chief’s preference and
focus. The Cabinet Secretary maintains a direct relationship with all members of
the Cabinet.
The OCA further consists of deputies and special assistants who work with each
department’s principal, Deputy Secretary, Under Secretaries, Assistant Secretaries,
and other senior staff. The OCA also connects the departments to WHO offices.
The OCA coordinates with the Chief of Staff’s office and the Office of Communications to promote the President’s agenda through the Cabinet departments and
agencies. The Cabinet’s communications staffers are obviously another critical
component of this operation.
In prior Administrations, the OCA has played a vital role by tracking the President’s agenda for the Chief of Staff, Deputy Chiefs, and senior advisers. It has
worked with each department and agency to advance policy priorities. In the future,
amplifying this function would truly benefit both the President and the conservative movement.
From time to time throughout an Administration, travel optics, ethics challenges, and Hatch Act7 issues involving Cabinet members, deputies, and senior
staffers can arise. The OCA is normally tasked with keeping the WHO informed
of such developments and providing support if and when necessary.
The ideal Cabinet Secretary will have exceptional organizational skills and be
a seasoned political operative or attorney. Because many Cabinet officials have
been former presidential candidates, governors, ambassadors, and Members of
Congress, the ideal candidate should also possess the ability to interact with and
persuade accomplished individuals.
OFFICE OF PUBLIC LIAISON (OPL)

The OPL is critically important in building coalitions and support for the President’s agenda across every aligned social, faith-based, minority, and economic
interest group. It is a critical tool for shaping public opinion and keeping myriad
supporters, as well as “frenemies” and opponents alike who are within reach,
better informed.
The OPL is a notably large office. It should have one Director who reports to the
Chief of Staff’s office, either directly or through a deputy, according to the chief’s
preference and focus. The Director must maintain relationships not only with
other WHO heads, but also with the senior staff of every Cabinet department and
agency. Since a President’s agenda is always in motion, it is important for the OPL
to facilitate listening sessions to receive the views of the various leaders and members of key interest groups.
The OPL should also have a sufficient number of deputies and special assistants
to cover the vast number of disparate interest groups that are engaged daily. The

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White House Office

OFFICE OF INTERGOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS (IGA)

The IGA connects the White House to state, county, local, and tribal governments. In other words, it is the one-stop shop for disseminating an Administration’s
agenda to all non–federal government entities.
The IGA should have a Director to whom one or two Deputy Directors report.
The Director must ensure that the White House remains connected to all non–
federal government entities. The interests and perspectives of these entities are
represented in policy discussions, organized events with the West Wing, EOP
senior staff, and IGA staff throughout the departments and agencies.
The IGA can be staffed in a variety of ways, but two arrangements are
most common:
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l

Each deputy and that deputy’s staffers are responsible for a type of government.
A group of staffers is responsible for a specific geographical region of
the country.

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OPL has, by far, held more meetings in the Eisenhower Executive Office Building
(EEOB) and within the West Wing itself than any other office within the WHO.
The OPL is the chief White House enforcer and gatekeeper among these various interest groups. It has operated best whenever the Chief of Staff has given it
permission to use both the proverbial “carrot” and the proverbial “stick.” To make
this work, communication with the chief’s office is vital. Additionally, the OPL has
had an outsized role in presidential scheduling and both official and political travel.
The OPL Director should come from the President’s election campaign or Capitol Hill—but should not have deeply entrenched connections to a K Street entity
or any other potential stakeholder. Some prior relationships can create real or
perceived biases toward one group or another. The Director should be amiable,
gregarious, highly organized, and willing to shoulder criticism and pushback from
interest groups and other elements of the Administration.
Unlike the Director, OPL deputies and special assistants need a deep understanding of the capital, from K Street to Capitol Hill. They should have extensive
experience in private industry, the labor sector, the conservative movement, and
among the specific interest groups with which they will be asked to engage on
behalf of the White House.
OPL staffers work with more external and internal parties than any other WHO
staffers. In turn, they must be effective communicators and initiative-takers. They
must also be able to influence, persuade, and—most important—listen to various
stakeholders and ensure that they feel heard. All OPL staffers must understand
from the outset that their jobs might be modified or even phased out entirely as
the Administration’s priorities change.

Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise

The IGA, as suggested above, represents the interests and perspectives of non–
federal government entities, but its primary job is to make sure that these entities
understand an Administration’s agenda and ultimately support it.
The IGA must work with all other White House offices, especially the OPA and
the OPL, and manage its staff throughout the departments and agencies. IGA staffers must therefore have communication skills, understand political nuance, and
be willing to engage in complex policy discussions. They should also be not just
generally responsive, but also proactive in seeking out the interests and perspectives of non–federal government entities.
WHITE HOUSE POLICY COUNCILS

As the federal government has ballooned in size over the past century, it has
become increasingly difficult for the President alone to direct his agenda across
the executive branch. Three White House policy councils have come into existence
to help the President to control the bureaucracy and ensure continued alignment
between agency leadership and White House priorities. Those councils—as previewed above—are the NSC, NEC, and DPC. Each is headed by an Assistant to the
President and performs three significant functions.



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Policy Coordination. The primary role of the policy councils is to
coordinate the development of Administration policy. This frequently
includes developing significant legislative priorities, coordinating policy
decisions that impact multiple departments and agencies, and at times
coordinating policy decisions within a single department or agency. This
process must ensure that all relevant offices are included; that competing
or conflicting opinions are thoroughly discussed and evaluated; and, when
there is disagreement among White House senior staff or among Cabinet
members, a well-structured question is presented to the President for an
intermediate or final decision.
Policy Advice. By virtue of working in the White House, the heads of the
three policy councils will also function as independent policy advisers to
the President. This aspect of the role will vary depending on the individual
in this position and the President’s governing philosophy. Incumbents have
ranged from “honest brokers,” who mostly coordinate and ensure that all
opinions are fairly presented to the President, to “policy deciders,” who
largely drive a given policy topic on behalf of the President.
Policy Implementation. The policy councils also manage and mediate
the implementation of previous policy decisions. Implementation of a new
statute or an executive order frequently takes years and involves many

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White House Office

distinct and more granular policy decisions along the way. It is essential
to have a centralized process for evaluating and coordinating these
decisions, especially if they involve more than one Cabinet department
or agency with differing opinions on the best approach for securing the
President’s goals.
The above functions have recently been managed by policy councils through
a tiered interagency policy process. This process helps to identify differences of
opinion and reach a decision without having to take every issue to the President. It
can be used to address a single question or monitor a recurring issue on an ongoing
basis. Typically, the process involves multiple Cabinet departments and agencies
that have a pertinent role, policy interest, or disagreement. Each policy council’s
process could involve the following committees:
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Deputies Committee (DC). A DC is a meeting of presidentially appointed
executives chaired by the policy council’s Deputy Assistant to the President
and relevant Deputy Secretaries. It evaluates the options produced by the
PCC and frequently directs the PCC to add, expand, or reevaluate an option
or even to reach a compromise and resolve an issue at that level.
Principals Committee (PC). When questions are not resolved by a DC,
the Director of the Policy Council will chair a PC, which is attended by the
relevant Cabinet Secretaries and senior White House political staff. This is
the final opportunity for the President’s most senior advisers to discuss the
question, make sure that each principal’s position is carefully understood,
and see whether consensus or a compromise might be reached. If not,
the Chief of Staff’s office will schedule time for the PC to meet with the
President for a final decision.

Despite having seemingly clear and separate portfolios, the three policy councils frequently have areas of overlap, which can result in confusion, duplication,
or conflict. For example, there are the areas of immigration and border security

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l

Policy Coordinating Committee (PCC). A PCC is led by a Special
Assistant to the President from the policy council and includes political
Assistant Secretary–level experts from the relevant departments,
agencies, or offices. The purpose is to determine where consensus exists,
clearly identify where there are differing opinions, and develop options
for resolving the remaining questions. If no outstanding questions or
disagreements exist, the PCC may resolve the issue and move toward
implementation at the agency level.



Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise

(either NSC or DPC); health care, energy, and environment (either NEC or DPC);
and trade and international economic policy (either NSC or NEC). Identifying
these potentially problematic areas and assigning policy responsibilities to only
one council where possible will help to speed up the policy-coordination process.
While other chapters will cover specific policy goals for each department or
agency, incoming policy councils will need to move rapidly to lead policy processes
around cross-cutting agency topics, including countering China, enforcing immigration laws, reversing regulatory policies in order to promote energy production,
combating the Left’s aggressive attacks on life and religious liberty, and confronting
“wokeism” throughout the federal government.
National Security Council. The NSC is intended to be an interdepartmental body within the White House that can set national security policy with a
whole-of-government approach. Unlike the other policy councils, the NSC was
established by statute.8 Statutory members and advisers who are currently part of
the NSC include the President and Vice President; the Secretaries of State, Defense,
and Energy; the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; and the Director of National
Intelligence.9
The NSC staff, and particularly the National Security Adviser, should be
vetted for foreign and security policy experience and insight. The National Security Adviser and NSC staff advise the President on matters of foreign policy and
national security, serve as an information conduit in times of crisis, and as liaisons
ensuring that written communications are properly shared among NSC members.
Special attention should be given to the use of detailees to staff the NSC. In
recent years, the NSC’s staff size has been rightsized from its peak of 400 in 2015
down to 100–150 professional members. The next Administration should try to
limit the number of detailees to ensure more direct presidential control.
National Economic Council. The NEC was established in 1993 by executive
order and has four key functions:
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To “coordinate the economic policy-making process with respect to
domestic and international economic issues.”
To “coordinate economic policy advice to the President.”
To “ensure that policy decisions and programs are consistent with the
President’s stated goals” and “that those goals are being effectively pursued.”
To “monitor implementation of the President’s economic policy agenda.”10

The NEC Director coordinates and implements the President’s economic policy
objectives by working with Cabinet secretaries, their departments, and multiple

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— 39 —



agencies. The Director is supported by a staff of policy experts in various fields,
including infrastructure, manufacturing, research and development, agriculture,
small business, financial regulation, housing, technology and innovation, and
fiscal policy.
The NEC considers economic policy matters, and the DPC typically considers
anything related to domestic matters with the exception of economic policy matters. It also differs from the Council of Economic Advisers (CEA). Whereas the
NEC is in charge of policy development, the CEA acts as the White House’s internal
research arm for economic analysis.
It is therefore critically important to find people with the right qualifications to head both the NEC and the CEA. The CEA is almost always led by a
well-known academic economist, and the NEC is regularly led by someone with
expertise in directing the President’s economic policy process. Those who have
served in the role have ranged from former CEOs of the nation’s largest investment firms to financial-services industry managers to seasoned congressional
staffers who have managed the economic policy issues for top financial and
tax-writing committees.
Domestic Policy Council. The Domestic Policy Council (DPC) consists of
advisers to the President on noneconomic domestic policy issues as well as international issues with a significant domestic component (such as immigration). It is
one of the primary policy councils serving the President along with the NSC and
NEC. The Director serves as the principal DPC adviser to the President, along with
members of the Cabinet, and the Deputy Director chairs the committee responsible for coordinating domestic policy development at the Deputy Secretary level.
In this respect, both the Director and the Deputy Director have critical institutional functions that affect the development of domestic policy throughout the
Administration.
The DPC also has policy experts (for example, Special Assistants to the President or SAPs) who are responsible for developing and coordinating, as well as for
advising the President, on specific issues. It is essential that DPC policy expertise
reflect the most prominent issues that are before the Administration: issues such
as the environment, health care, housing, and immigration. In addition, DPC SAPs
should demonstrate a working knowledge of the rulemaking process (although
they need not necessarily be experts on regulation) because a working knowledge
of the rulemaking process will facilitate the DPC’s effectiveness in coordinating
Administration policy.
The DPC also needs to work closely with other offices within the Executive
Office of the President to promote economic opportunity and private-sector innovation. This includes working with the Office of Management and Budget and its
Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs as well as the Council of Economic
Advisers, Council on Environmental Quality, and Office of Science and Technology

Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise

Policy. To this end, the Director should chair a standing meeting with the principals from each of the other EOP offices to enhance coordination from within the
White House.
Several areas will be especially important as the DPC works to develop a
well-defined domestic policy agenda. One is the promotion of innovation as a
foundation for economic growth and opportunity. The President should establish
an economic opportunity working group, chaired by the DPC Director, to coordinate the development of policies that promote economic opportunity. Another
important area is the promotion of health care reform to bring down costs for the
American people and the pressure that spending on health programs puts on the
federal budget. Finally, DPC should coordinate with the NSC on a policy agenda
to enhance border security.



OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT (OVP)

In modern U.S. history, the Vice President has acted as a significant adviser to
the President. Once elected, the VP helps to promote and, in many instances, put
into place and execute the President’s agenda. The President may additionally
determine the inclusion of OVP staff in White House meetings, including Policy
Coordinating Committee, Deputies Committee, and Principals Committee discussions as has been done in various recent Administrations.
Recent Presidents have decided to give Vice Presidents space in the West Wing.
The VP’s proximity to the President—as well as to the Chief of Staff and additional
senior advisers—makes his or her role a powerful one within the West Wing.
Presidents typically tap VPs to lead various Administration efforts. These efforts
have included serving on the NSC Principals Committee, heading the National
Space Council, addressing immigration and border issues, leading the response
to health care crises, and supervising workforce programs. VPs traditionally also
spearhead projects of personal interest that have been authorized by the President.
The VP is also charged with breaking tie votes in the Senate and in recent years
has served abroad as a brand ambassador for the White House and more broadly
the United States, announcing Administration priorities and coordinating with
heads of state and other top foreign government officials. The Vice President, as
President of the Senate, could be a President’s emissary to the Senate.
OFFICE OF THE FIRST LADY/FIRST GENTLEMAN

The First Lady or First Gentleman plays an interesting role in the formation,
implementation, and execution of policy in concert with the President. Active
and interested first spouses often champion a select number of signature issues,
whether they be thorny social issues or deeper policy issues. One advantage of the
first spouse’s taking on hot-button social issues is that any political backlash will
be less severe than it would be for the President.

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White House Office

The first spouse normally appoints a chief of staff who has enough assistants
to support the spouse’s activities in the East Wing of the White House. This group
works exclusively with the first spouse and senior members of the White House
along with EOP personnel to implement and execute the first spouse’s priorities,
which reflect the first spouse’s passions and interests and are often identified as
important in discussions with the President. Executed well, they can be strategically useful in accelerating the Administration’s agenda. Past East Wing initiatives
have focused on such issues as combating bullying, fighting drug abuse, promoting
literacy, and encouraging physical education for young adults and children.
The first spouse is afforded significant resources. His or her staff also works with
the President’s policy team, members of the Cabinet, and other EOP staff.



AUTHOR’S NOTE: The preparation of this chapter was a collective enterprise of individuals involved in the

2025 Presidential Transition Project. All contributors to this chapter are listed at the front of this volume, but Edwin
Meese III, Donald Devine, Ambassador Andrew Bremberg, and Jonathan Bronitsky deserve special mention. The
author alone assumes responsibility for the content of this chapter, and no views expressed herein should be
attributed to any other individual.

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Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise
ENDNOTES

U.S. Constitution, art. II, § 1, https://constitution.congress.gov/constitution/article-2/ (accessed February 14, 2023).
U.S. Constitution, art. II, § 2.
U.S. Constitution, art. II, § 3.
U.S. Constitution, art. II, § 2.
See Chapter 2, “Executive Office of the President,” infra.
H.R. 4328, Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act, 1999, Public Law No. 105277, 105th Congress, October 21, 1998, Division C, Title I, § 151, https://www.congress.gov/105/plaws/publ277/
PLAW-105publ277.pdf (accessed February 15, 2023).
7. S. 1871, An Act to Prevent Pernicious Political Activities, Public Law No. 76-252, 76th Congress, August 2, 1939,
https://govtrackus.s3.amazonaws.com/legislink/pdf/stat/53/STATUTE-53-Pg1147.pdf (accessed March 7, 2023).
8. S. 758, National Security Act of 1947, Public Law No. 80-253, 80th Congress, July 26, 1947, https://govtrackus.
s3.amazonaws.com/legislink/pdf/stat/61/STATUTE-61-Pg495.pdf (accessed February 15, 2023). “The National
Security Council was established by the National Security Act of 1947 (PL 235 – 61 Stat. 496; U.S.C. 402),
amended by the National Security Act Amendments of 1949 (63 Stat. 579; 50 U.S.C. 401 et seq.). Later in 1949,
as part of the Reorganization Plan, the Council was placed in the Executive Office of the President.” The White
House, “National Security Council,” https://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/ (accessed February 15, 2023).
9. See Chapter 2, “Executive Office of the President,” infra.
10. President William J. Clinton, Executive Order 12835, “Establishment of the National Economic Council,”
January 25, 1993, in Federal Register, Vol. 58, No. 16 (January 27, 1993), pp. 6189–6190, https://www.govinfo.
gov/content/pkg/FR-1993-01-27/pdf/FR-1993-01-27.pdf (accessed March 7, 2023).



1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

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2

EXECUTIVE OFFICE
OF THE PRESIDENT
OF THE UNITED STATES
Russ Vought

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I

n its opening words, Article II of the U.S. Constitution makes it abundantly
clear that “[t]he executive power shall be vested in a President of the United
States of America.”1 That enormous power is not vested in departments or
agencies, in staff or administrative bodies, in nongovernmental organizations or
other equities and interests close to the government. The President must set and
enforce a plan for the executive branch. Sadly, however, a President today assumes
office to find a sprawling federal bureaucracy that all too often is carrying out its
own policy plans and preferences—or, worse yet, the policy plans and preferences
of a radical, supposedly “woke” faction of the country.
The modern conservative President’s task is to limit, control, and direct the
executive branch on behalf of the American people. This challenge is created
and exacerbated by factors like Congress’s decades-long tendency to delegate its
lawmaking power to agency bureaucracies, the pervasive notion of expert “independence” that protects so-called expert authorities from scrutiny, the presumed
inability to hold career civil servants accountable for their performance, and the
increasing reality that many agencies are not only too big and powerful, but also
increasingly weaponized against the public and a President who is elected by the
people and empowered by the Constitution to govern.
In Federalist No. 47, James Madison warned that “[t]he accumulation of all powers,
legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the same hands, whether of one, a few, or many,
and whether hereditary, self-appointed, or elective, may justly be pronounced the
very definition of tyranny.”2 Regrettably, that wise and cautionary note describes
to a significant degree the modern executive branch, which—whether controlled



Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise

by the bureaucracy or by the President—writes federal policy, enforces that policy,
and often adjudicates whether that policy was properly drafted and enforced. The
overall situation is constitutionally dire, unsustainably expensive, and in urgent need
of repair. Nothing less than the survival of self-governance in America is at stake.
The great challenge confronting a conservative President is the existential need
for aggressive use of the vast powers of the executive branch to return power—
including power currently held by the executive branch—to the American people.
Success in meeting that challenge will require a rare combination of boldness and
self-denial: boldness to bend or break the bureaucracy to the presidential will and
self-denial to use the bureaucratic machine to send power away from Washington
and back to America’s families, faith communities, local governments, and states.
Fortunately, a President who is willing to lead will find in the Executive Office
of the President (EOP) the levers necessary to reverse this trend and impose a
sound direction for the nation on the federal bureaucracy. The effectiveness of
those EOP levers depends on the fundamental premise that it is the President’s
agenda that should matter to the departments and agencies that operate under his
constitutional authority and that, as a general matter, it is the President’s chosen
advisers who have the best sense of the President’s aims and intentions, both with
respect to the policies he intends to enact and with respect to the interests that
must be secured to govern successfully on behalf of the American people. This
chapter focuses on key features of and recommendations for several of the EOP’s
important components.
U.S. OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET (OMB)

OMB assists the President in the execution of his policy agenda across the government by employing many statutory and executive procedural levers to bring
the bureaucracy in line with all budgetary, regulatory, and management decisions.
Properly understood, it is a President’s air-traffic control system with the ability and charge to ensure that all policy initiatives are flying in sync and with the
authority to let planes take off and, at times, ground planes that are flying off course.
OMB’s key roles include:
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Developing and enforcing the President’s budget and executing the
appropriations laws that fund the government;
Managing agency and personnel performance, procurement policy,
financial management, and information technology;
Developing the President’s regulatory agenda, reviewing new regulatory
actions, reviewing federal information collections, and setting and enforcing
federal information policy; and

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Executive Office of the President of the United States

l

Coordinating and clearing agency communications with Congress,
including testimonies and views on draft legislation.

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OMB cannot perform its role on behalf of the President effectively if it is not intimately involved in all aspects of the White House policy process and lacks knowledge
of what the agencies are doing. Internally to the EOP, ensuring that the policy-formulation procedures developed by the White House to serve the President include
OMB is one of any OMB Director’s major responsibilities. A common meme of those
who intend to evade OMB review is to argue that where “resources” are not being
discussed, OMB’s participation is optional. This ignores both OMB’s role in all downstream execution and the reality that it has the only statutory tools in the White
House that are powerful enough to override implementing agencies’ bureaucracies.
The Director must view his job as the best, most comprehensive approximation of the President’s mind as it pertains to the policy agenda while always being
ready with actual options to effect that agenda within existing legal authorities and
resources. This role cannot be performed adequately if the Director acts instead as
the ambassador of the institutional interests of OMB and the wider bureaucracy
to the White House. Once its reputation as the keeper of “commander’s intent”
is established, then and only then does OMB have the ability to shape the most
efficient way to pursue an objective.
Externally, the Director must ensure that OMB has sufficient visibility into
the deep caverns of agency decision-making. One indispensable statutory tool to
that end is to ensure that policy officials—the Program Associate Directors (PADs)
managing the vast Resource Management Offices (RMOs)—personally sign what
are known as the apportionments. In 1870, Congress passed the Anti-Deficiency
Act3 to prevent the common agency practice of spending down all appropriated
funding, creating artificial funding shortfalls that Congress would have to fill. The
law mandated that all funding be allotted or “apportioned” in installments. This
process, whereby agencies come to OMB for allotments of appropriated funding, is
essential to the effective financial stewardship of taxpayer dollars. OMB can then
direct on behalf of a President the amount, duration, and purpose of any apportioned funding to ensure against waste, fraud, and abuse and ensure consistency
with the President’s agenda and applicable laws.
The vast majority of these apportionments were signed by career officials—the
Deputy Associate Directors (DADs)—until the Trump Administration placed this
responsibility in the hands of the PADs and thereby opened wide vistas of oversight
that had escaped the attention of policy officials. The Biden Administration subsequently reversed this decision. No Director should be chosen who is unwilling
to restore apportionment decision-making to the PADs’ personal review, who is
not aggressive in wielding the tool on behalf of the President’s agenda, or who is
unable to defend the power against attacks from Congress.



Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise

It should be noted that each of OMB’s primary functions, along with other
executive and statutory roles, is carried out with the help of many essential OMB
support offices. The two most important offices for moving OMB at the will of a
Director are the Budget Review Division (BRD) and the Office of General Counsel
(OGC). The Director should have a direct and effective relationship with the head
of the BRD (considered the top career official within OMB) and transmit most
instructions through that office because the rest of the agency is institutionally inclined toward its direction and responds accordingly. The BRD inevitably
will translate the directions from policy officials to the career staff, and at every
stage, it is obviously vital that the Director ensure that this translation is an
accurate one.
In addition, many key considerations involved in enacting a President’s agenda
hinge on existing legal authorities. The Director must ensure the appointment
of a General Counsel who is respected yet creative and fearless in his or her ability to challenge legal precedents that serve to protect the status quo. This is vital
within OMB not only with respect to the adequate development of policy options
for the President’s review, but also with respect to agencies that attempt to protect
their own institutional interests and foreclose certain avenues based on the mere
assertion (and not proof ) that the law disallows it or that, conversely, attempt to
disregard the clear statutory commands of Congress.
In general, the Director should empower a strong Deputy Director with authority over the Deputy for Management, the PADs, and the Office of Information and
Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) to work diligently to break down barriers within OMB
and not allow turf disputes or a lack of visibility to undermine the agency’s principal budget, management, and regulatory functions. OMB should work toward a
“One OMB” position on behalf of the President and represent that view during the
various policymaking processes.
Budget. The United States today faces an untenable fiscal situation and owes
$31 trillion on a debt that is steadily increasing. The OMB Director should present
a fiscal goal to the President early in the budget development process to address
the federal government’s fiscal irresponsibility. This goal would help to align the
months-long process of developing the actual proposals for inclusion in the budget.
Though some mistakenly regard it as a mere paper-pushing exercise, the President’s budget is in fact a powerful mechanism for setting and enforcing public
policy at federal agencies. The budget team includes six Resource Management
Offices that, together with the BRD and other components, help the Director of
OMB to develop and execute detailed agency spending plans that bear on every
major aspect of policy formation and execution at federal agencies. Through initial
priority-setting and ongoing supervision of agency spending, OMB’s budget team
plays a key role in executing policy across the executive branch, including at many
agencies wrongly regarded as “independent.”

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Executive Office of the President of the United States

The RMOs, each of which is led by a political appointee known as the PAD and
a career DAD, are separated into six functional units:
l

National Security.

l

Natural Resources, Energy, and Science.

l

Health.

l

Education, Income Maintenance, and Labor.

l

Transportation, Justice, and Homeland Security.

l

Treasury, Commerce, and Housing.

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Because the RMOs are institutionally ingrained in nearly all policymaking and
implementation across the executive branch, they play a critical role in helping the
Director to implement the President’s public policy agenda. However, because each
RMO is responsible for formulating and supervising such a wide range of policy
details, many granular but critical policy decisions are effectively left to the career
professionals who serve across Administrations.
To enhance the OMB Director’s ability to help the President drive policy at the
agencies, the existing six RMOs should be divided into smaller subject-matter areas,
allowing for more PADs, and each of these PADs should have a Deputy PAD. This
expanded pool of RMOs with additional political leadership would enable more
comprehensive direction and oversight of policy development and implementation.
Regardless of whether Congress adopts the President’s full set of budget recommendations, the President should reintroduce the concept of administrative
pay-as-you-go, or administrative PAYGO. This simple procedural requirement
imposes budget neutrality on the discretionary choices of federal agencies, of
which there are many in nearly all areas of policymaking. This simple step forces
the executive branch to control what it can control. The principle may occasionally
yield to other overarching requirements, such as a presidential regulatory budget,
but in nearly all cases, administrative PAYGO plays a unique and indispensable
role in enforcing fiscal responsibility at federal departments and agencies.
The President should use every possible tool to propose and impose fiscal discipline on the federal government. Anything short of that would constitute abject failure.
Management. The Management Office of OMB (the “M-Side” as it is often
called) is responsible for carrying out several important agency oversight functions,
many of which are statutory. The Management team includes the following offices
led by presidentially appointed Senate-confirmed individuals:

Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise

l

The Office of Federal Procurement Policy (OFPP).

l

The Office of Performance and Personnel Management (OPPM).

l

The Office of Federal Financial Management (OFFM).

l

The Office of the Federal Chief Information Officer (OFCIO).



l

The Made in America Office (MIAO), which was added by the Biden
Administration and is not a Senate-confirmed slot.

Each of these offices has responsibilities and authorities that a President can
use to help drive policy across the government. It is vital that the Director and his
political staff, not the careerists, drive these offices in pursuit of the President’s
actual priorities and not let them set their own agenda based on the wishes of the
sprawling “good government” management community in and outside of government. Many Directors do not properly prioritize the management portfolio, leaving
it to the Deputy for Management, but such neglect creates purposeless bureaucracy
that impedes a President’s agenda—an “M Train to Nowhere.”
OFPP. This office plays a critical role in leading the development of new policies
and regulations concerning federal contracting and procurement. Through the
Federal Acquisition Regulatory Council, which is generally chaired by the OFPP
Administrator, OFPP helps the Director to set a wide range of policies for all of
those who contract with the executive branch. In the past, those governmentwide
contracting rules have played a key role in helping to implement the President’s
policy agenda. This office should be engaged early and often in OMB’s effort to drive
policy, including by obtaining transparency about entities that are awarded federal
contracts and grants and by using government contracts to push back against woke
policies in corporate America.
OPPM. Through this office, the Director helps federal agencies to establish their
performance goals and performance review processes. OPPM also works with the
U.S. Office of Personnel Management (OPM) to establish and manage personnel
policies and practices across the federal government. The Director should instruct
OPPM to establish annual performance goals and review processes for agencies
that reflect the President’s agenda. OPPM should also be part of the President’s
strategy to set and enforce sensible policies and practices for the federal workforce.
OFFM. This office helps the Director to root out waste, fraud, and abuse in federal programs—for example, through the Do Not Pay program. It should be part of
efforts to save precious taxpayer resources.
OFCIO. This office guides the federal government’s use and adoption of Internet-based technologies to improve government operations and save taxpayer

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money. As a function of its leadership role, it is critical in interagency discussions
on a wide range of technology issues. The office thus is an important part of the
President’s efforts to modernize, strengthen, and set technology-adoption policy
for the executive branch.
MIAO. Building on the example and work of the Trump Administration, President Biden established this office to centralize, carry out, and further develop the
federal government’s Buy-American and other Made-in-America commitments.
Its work ought to be continued and further strengthened.
Regulatory and Information Policy. OMB’s OIRA plays an enormous and
vital role in reining in the regulatory state and ensuring that regulations achieve
important benefits while imposing minimal burdens on Americans. The President
should maintain Executive Order (EO) 12866,4 the foundation of OIRA’s review
of regulatory actions. The Administration should likewise maintain the recent
extension of those standards to regulatory actions of the U.S. Department of the
Treasury.5 Regulatory analysis and OIRA review should also be required of the
historically “independent” agencies as the Office of Legal Counsel has found is
legally permissible.6
If the current Administration proceeds with its declared intent to modify
aspects of EO 12866 or review OMB Circular A-4,7 the related document that
provides the foundation for cost-benefit analysis, the next President should immediately begin to undo those changes and develop a rigorous, data-driven approach
that will result in the least burdensome rules possible. The next President should
also revive the directive in Executive Order 138918 that significant guidance documents also must pass through OIRA review.
Because OIRA review often leads to fewer regulatory burdens, more regulatory
benefits, and better coordination of regulatory policy, funding for OIRA tends to
pay large dividends. Yet over the years, funding for OIRA has diminished. This
trend should be reversed. The budget should also include sufficient full-time equivalent (FTE) employees to form regulatory advance teams that would consult with
agencies on cost-benefit analysis and good regulatory practices at the beginning
of the rulemaking process for the most important regulations. These teams would
help agencies take cost-benefit analysis into account from the beginning of their
rulemaking efforts, which in turn would result in higher-quality regulations and a
swifter eventual OIRA review. To preserve the integrity of OIRA review, the staff
who consult at the beginning of a rulemaking should not handle its eventual review.
The next President should also reinstate the many executive orders signed
by President Trump that were designed to make the regulatory process more
just, efficient, and transparent. Executive Orders 13771,9 13777,10 13891,11 13892,12
13893,13 13924 Section 6,14 13979,15 and 1398016 should be revived (with modifications as needed). Executive Order 1313217 on federalism should be strengthened
so that state regulatory and fiscal operations are not commandeered by the federal



Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise

government through so-called cooperative federalism programs. Additionally, the
President should revise and sign an updated version of President Ronald Reagan’s
Executive Order 1263018 on federal takings.
The next President should strengthen implementation of the Information Quality Act,19 robustly use the authority of the Paperwork Reduction Act,20 carefully
enforce the Privacy Act,21 and ensure the sound execution of OIRA’s statistical
and other information policy functions. Regulatory cooperation agreements can
also promote the further adoption of good regulatory practices, which improve
market conditions for America and her allies. OIRA should also work with other
components of OMB to revise and apply OMB’s uniform Guidance for Grants and
Agreements22 and ensure that federal contract and grant guidelines satisfy EO
12866 and other centralized standards as appropriate.
But executive reforms and actions, while vital, are not enough: Congress also
must act. The next President should work with Congress to pass significant regulatory policy and process reforms, which could go a long way toward reining in
the administrative state. Excellent examples of such legislation include the Regulatory Accountability Act,23 SMART Act,24 GOOD Act,25 Early Participation in
Regulations Act,26 Unfunded Mandates Accountability and Transparency Act,27
and REINS Act.28
Finally, the next President should work with Congress to maximize the utility
of the Congressional Review Act (CRA),29 which allows Congress to undo midnight
regulatory actions (including those disguised as “guidance”) on an accelerated
timeline. To leverage the CRA’s power to the maximum extent, Congress and
the President should enact the Midnight Rules Relief Act,30 which would help to
ensure that multiple regulatory actions could be packaged and voted on at the same
time. Immediate and robust use of the CRA would allow the President to focus
his rulemaking resources on major new regulatory reforms rather than devoting
months or years to undoing the final rulemakings of the Biden Administration.
Legislative Clearance and Coordination. OMB plays a critical role in ensuring that the executive branch is aligned on legislative proposals and language,
agency testimonies, and other communications with Congress. The Director should
use these authorities to enforce policy and message consistency aggressively and
promote the effective engagement of the executive branch in legislative processes.
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL (NSC)

The National Security Council (NSC) was established by statute to support the
President in developing and implementing national security policy by coordinating
across relevant departments and agencies, integrating authorities and resources
toward common ends, and objectively assessing progress toward established
goals. Led by the National Security Advisor (NSA), the NSC staff will be successful in implementing the President’s national security goals only if it is made up

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of personnel with technical expertise and experience as well as an alignment to
the President’s declared national security policy priorities. The NSC must then
chart a course that articulates and achieves the President’s national security goals
and objectives. The President should empower a strong NSC that not only has the
power to convene the policy process, but also is entrusted with the full power of
the presidency to drive the bureaucracy.
In organizing (by means of Presidential Directive31) an NSC staff that is more
responsive and aligned with the President’s goals and empowered to implement
them, the NSA should immediately evaluate and eliminate directorates that are
not aligned with the President’s agenda and replace them with new directorates as
appropriate that can drive implementation of the President’s signature national
security priorities. In addition to realigning the staff organization to the President’s
priorities, the NSA should assign responsibility for implementation of specific
policy initiatives to senior NSC officials from across the NSC staff structure. These
officials should develop, direct, and execute tangible action plans in coordination
with multiple agencies to achieve measurable, time-defined milestones.
Aligning NSC staff to the President’s national security goals will provide clearer
direction, a mandate for action, and a baseline of accountability that can be used
to evaluate staff performance and the NSC’s overall progress. Accountable senior
officials, themselves either political appointees or a minimum number of career
detailees, who are selected and vetted politically and report directly to political
staff should be the main day-to-day managers for interagency coordination and
implementation of their assigned national security policy objectives. They should
provide policy analysis for consideration by the broader NSC and relevant agencies
and ensure timely responses to decisions made by the President. The accountable
senior officials should be established at the direction of the NSA and draw on personnel and expertise from beyond the NSC, including OMB, the National Economic
Council, and relevant federal agencies.
The NSC staff and principals should work in tandem with the National Economic Council and OMB at all levels, presenting a united effort to achieve the
President’s goals and drawing on the latter’s statutory authorities to guide the
bureaucracy. To accomplish national objectives effectively, foreign policy should
fully incorporate the economic instruments of national power. National security
policy must also include the prioritized allocation of resources. When policies are
divorced from the resources required to implement them, they are stillborn—academic exercises that undermine our national security and leave departments and
agencies to their own devices.
The accountable senior officials should be empowered to identify, recruit, clear,
and hire staff who are aligned with and willing to shepherd the President’s national
security priorities. NSC staff leads, under the direction of the NSA, should have
the discretion to reduce the number of positions that need high-level clearances,



Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise

and the NSC should be adequately resourced and authorized to adjudicate and
hold security clearances internally with investigators who work directly for the
NSC and whose sole task is to clear NSC officials. If certain staff are determined
not to need high-level clearances, the question becomes whether they should be
part of the NSC at all.
The NSC should take a leading role in directing the drafting and thorough review
of all formal strategies: the National Security Strategy, the National Defense Strategy, the Nuclear Posture Review, the Missile Defense Strategy, etc. In particular,
the National Defense Strategy, which by tradition has evaded significant review,
should be prioritized for White House review by the NSC and OMB. Both should
also conduct reviews of operational war plans and global force planning and allocations with the Secretary of Defense to align them with presidential priorities and
review all key policy and guidance intended for implementation by the heads of the
Department of Defense, the Department of State, and the Intelligence Community
before they are authorized for distribution. The NSC should rigorously review all
general and flag officer promotions to prioritize the core roles and responsibilities
of the military over social engineering and non-defense matters, including climate
change, critical race theory, manufactured extremism, and other polarizing policies
that weaken our armed forces and discourage our nation’s finest men and women
from enlisting to serve in defense of our liberty.
The NSC staff will need to consolidate the functions of both the NSC and the
Homeland Security Council (HSC), incorporate the recently established Office of
the National Cyber Director, and evaluate the required regional and functional
directorates. Given the aforementioned prerequisites, the NSC should be properly resourced with sufficient policy professionals, and the NSA should prioritize
staffing the vast majority of NSC directorates with aligned political appointees
and trusted career officials. For instance, the NSA should return all nonessential detailees to their home agencies on their first day in office so that the new
Administration can proceed efficiently without the personnel land mines left by
the previous stewards and as soon as possible should replace all essential detailees
with staff aligned to the new President’s priorities. The HSC has overseen pandemic
response, and its incorporation is important.
In the end, change requires intervention, and the NSC staff should be appropriately recruited, manned, and empowered to achieve the President’s national
security and foreign policy objectives and maintain robust policy analysis and
discussion while minimizing resistance from those who have an agenda or who
jealously guard their resources and autonomy at the expense of national security
and sound policy development. This resistance and inertia can be inadvertently
enabled by a small and unempowered NSC.
Additionally, the White House Chief of Staff and NSA must ensure that the NSC
is functioning in tandem with the rest of the White House staff to benefit from

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Executive Office of the President of the United States

the best strategic thinking of the President’s top advisers. History shows that an
unsupervised NSC staff can stray from its statutory role and adversely affect a President and his policies. Moreover, while the NSC should be fully incorporated into
the White House, it should also be allowed to do its job without the impediment
of dually hatted staff that report to other offices. For instance, the NSC needs its
own counsel to inform what legal options can be provided to the President. The
White House Counsel should be part of that policy process as the President’s top
legal adviser. These recommendations provide a clear road map for rapidly sizing
and solidifying the NSC staff to support and achieve the President’s objectives
beginning on Inauguration Day.
NATIONAL ECONOMIC COUNCIL (NEC)

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The National Economic Council is one of the policy councils serving the President along with the NSC and the Domestic Policy Council (DPC). The Director
serves as principal adviser to the President on domestic and international economic policy and communicates the President’s economic message to the media.
The Deputy Director is responsible for the day-to-day operation of the council,
which includes chairing the committee that coordinates economic policy development at the Deputy Secretary level. In effect, the Director and Deputy Director
are the officials who are primarily responsible for the development of economic
policymaking for the Administration. Once a policy is adopted, it is the appropriate agency’s responsibility to implement it. The NEC’s policy process is also used
to determine whether the President should support or oppose legislation passed
by Congress.
In addition to its leadership, the NEC has policy experts (for example, Special
Assistants to the President or SAPs) who are responsible for developing and coordinating, as well as advising the President, on specific issues. It is essential that
the policy expertise of the NEC reflect the current environment’s most pressing
issues. Today, this would include (among other topics) taxes, energy and environment, technology, infrastructure, health care, financial services, workforce,
agriculture, antitrust and competition policy, and retirement programs. NEC’s
SAPs should have a working knowledge of how the Administration can implement
policy through the rulemaking process, although it is not necessary that they be
experts on regulation themselves, particularly given OMB’s role. This will facilitate
the NEC’s effectiveness in coordinating Administration policy.
The NEC needs to work closely with other offices within the Executive Office
of the President to promote innovation by the private sector and create an environment that will stimulate economic activity while reducing federal spending
and debt. This includes working with the DPC, NSC, OMB, Council of Economic
Advisers, Office of Intergovernmental Affairs, Office of Cabinet Affairs, White
House Counsel, Council on Environmental Quality, Office of Legislative Affairs,



Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise

and Office of Science and Technology Policy. To this end, the NEC Director should
chair a standing meeting with the principals from each of the other EOP offices to
enhance coordination from within the White House.
In the past, there has been tension among the DPC, NEC, and NSC over jurisdiction. It is important to set clear jurisdictions at the start of an Administration
to prevent needless and counterproductive turf fights. In addition, the Principal
Deputy for international economic policy is jointly appointed at NEC and NSC and
could end up serving two different interests. To avoid such problems, international
economic policy should be entirely coordinated from NEC.
It will be especially important for the NEC to work seamlessly with the Council
of Economic Advisers (CEA), which provides the President and the White House
offices with the latest economic data and forecasts, as well as estimates of the economic impact of proposed policies, and prepares the annual Economic Report of
the President. The CEA is not a policy council and therefore does not run policy
processes, which is the responsibility of the NEC, DPC, and NSC. However, the
CEA does play a key role in ensuring that any policy considered by the councils is
rigorously evaluated for its economic impacts.
The NEC works closely with the White House Office of Communications and
Office of Speechwriting to ensure that the White House’s messaging and media
engagement communicate the President’s economic policy effectively.
The NEC also plays a key role in advancing the President’s economic agenda
by advising the Office of Presidential Personnel on appointments to key economic
posts, including positions in financial regulatory agencies. The NEC helps to ensure
that each economic post is held by a person who shares the President’s policy priorities and works well with the rest of the Administration’s economic team. The
financial regulators are run partly by civil servants (some of whom were political appointees in prior liberal Administrations) who often resist a conservative
Administration’s policies. It is therefore critical that an Administration not only
appoints capable individuals to lead these agencies, but also has personnel who
can be hired into senior staff positions within the agencies.
A few areas will be especially important if the NEC is to develop a well-defined
economic policy agenda. One is the promotion of innovation as a foundation for
economic growth and opportunity. Another is the creation of an environment that
fosters economic growth through tax reform and the elimination of regulatory and
procedural barriers.
OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE (USTR)

The Office of the U.S. Trade Representative provides the President with the
internal White House resources necessary to formulate and execute a unified,
whole-of-government approach to trade policy. The President should ensure
that the USTR is empowered to serve in that leadership role, much as other

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EOP components organize and drive a coordinated policy agenda on behalf of
the President.
The People’s Republic of China’s predatory trade practices have disrupted the
open-market trading system that has provided mutual benefit to all participating
countries—including China—for decades. The failure of the World Trade Organization (WTO) to discipline China for abrogation of its trading commitments has
seriously undermined its credibility and made it a largely ineffective institution.
The United States, through an empowered USTR, must act to rebalance and refocus
international trading relationships in favor of democratic nations that embrace
free, fair, and open trade principles built on market-driven economies.
Chapter 26 of this book outlines recommended trade policy priorities for the
incoming President. However, regardless of the approach, successful implementation of that trade agenda will require the President to articulate a clear policy
direction and instructions for the executive branch to operate in a coordinated
fashion under the leadership of an empowered USTR.
To address these and other challenges, protect the American worker, and secure
free and open markets for our communities and businesses, the next President
must leverage the institutional resources and strength of the USTR and neither
allow institutional interests to drive a fragmented trade policy that is developed
from the ground up nor cater to parochial interests across government and Washington’s broader industry of influence.
The USTR’s mission is vitally important in reorienting the global trading system
in a direction that is open, fair, and prosperous. In order to achieve the President’s
policy goals, a strong USTR must be empowered to set trade policy from the White
House with the authority and resources to represent the interests of the President’s trade agenda with adequate budget, staff, analysis, and expertise to engage
meaningfully in internal and interagency policy deliberations. The USTR should
organize and harness existing interagency trade committees to serve the President’s trade agenda and drive a consensus among federal stakeholders, dispose
of legacy advisory committees with members who serve special interests, direct
action to implement policy priorities, measure progress toward implementing the
President’s agenda, and hold agencies and officials accountable for delivering the
President’s agenda. The USTR’s leadership should not only coordinate and enforce
the President’s agenda across the federal community, but also set and enforce the
President’s trade agenda internally.
Trade policy and priorities should be set by the President and implemented by
the U.S. Trade Representative in cooperation with the other economic and national
security officials, not by the range of governmental and nongovernmental interests
that attempt to force their policy preferences on the USTR. A strong USTR empowered with the necessary resources, authorities, and interagency cooperation will
protect U.S. interests in the global marketplace more effectively.

Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise



COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC ADVISERS (CEA)

Congress established the Council of Economic Advisers in 1946 to advise the
President on economic policy based on data, research, and evidence. The CEA is
one of the oldest congressionally created offices within the White House complex
and plays a broad role in bringing economic expertise to Administration policy
across a large range of policy areas. The CEA has one presidentially appointed
and Senate-confirmed chair, two presidentially appointed members who assist
and often have expertise that complements the chair, and approximately 40
staff employees.
Statutorily, the CEA is charged with being the President’s principal source of
economic advice. However, this role has diminished over time as its policy appraisal
and especially formulation and recommendation functions have been taken over or
diluted by other economic policy bodies within the White House. By law, the CEA
is required to publish an annual Economic Report of the President within 10 days
after submission of the budget. This report is not just a messaging document; it is
an opportunity to provide greater rigor in support of policy areas that the White
House is prioritizing and to build up the external credibility of those ideas.
A future conservative Administration should utilize the CEA as the senior internal White House economists much as the White House Counsel’s office functions
as the senior internal White House lawyers. This does not mean that there are no
economists in other offices. There are, just as there often are lawyers in the policy
councils and other White House offices, but the CEA’s role, like the White House
Counsel’s, is to employ its unique expertise (particularly on the technical side) to
ensure that sound analysis is contributing to and shaping the policy discussion.
In practice, this means that CEA staff do not “coordinate” the policy process in
the way that the DPC or NEC would, but they should be integral to the EOP’s policy
development processes. CEA staff should support sound policy development and
execution by actively contributing to running policy dialogues, proactively raising
issues that need to be addressed, consulting on questions that arise, and guiding
EOP and agency officials on the analytical foundations of policy. Structurally, the
White House Chief of Staff should ensure that the CEA has a seat at the policymaking table on all relevant policy.
Senior economists traditionally have not gone through the Office of Presidential
Personnel process and more often than not are hired on an academic-year cycle. As
a result, senior economists hired in the summer of a presidential election year tend
to remain on staff until the next summer even if a President from the opposite party
takes power and installs a new slate of CEA political appointees for chair, members,
etc. Although these hiring practices create some continuity, the presence of senior
economists who were never fully vetted for their alignment with White House
policy objectives or who were holdovers from a recently departed Administration can breed skepticism and distrust of the CEA by other units within the White

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Executive Office of the President of the United States

House, creating the risk that the CEA’s role in the policymaking process will be
diminished. A future Administration should consider hiring that reflects the White
House calendar (mid-January) and involves the Office of Presidential Personnel.
NATIONAL SPACE COUNCIL (NSPC)

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The National Space Council is responsible for providing advice and recommendations to the President on the formulation and implementation of space policy
and strategy. It is charged with conducting a whole-of-government approach to
the nation’s space interests: civil, military, intelligence, commercial, or diplomatic.
Historically, it has been chaired by the Vice President at the President’s direction,
and its members consist of members of the Cabinet and other senior executive
branch officials as specified by the President in Executive Order 13803.32 The
NSpC’s purpose is to ensure that the President’s priorities relative to space are
carried out and, as necessary, to resolve policy conflicts among departments and
agencies that are related to space.
Space projects and programs are risky, complex, expensive, and time consuming—although commercial space innovations are lowering costs and accelerating
schedules. Nevertheless, while fiscal discipline should not be ignored, long-term
policy stability is crucial to investors, innovators, industry, and agencies. Policy
stability is easier when policies and programs are aligned with long-term national
interests as opposed to those of particular advocacy groups or political factions.
The Trump Administration’s major space policies—including the U.S. Space Force,
the Artemis program to land the next Americans on the moon, and support for a
strong commercial space sector—have endured under the Biden Administration.
Major challenges remain in implementation and regulatory reform to keep up
with rapidly evolving space markets and competitors. These include the long-term
sustainability of space activities in light of increasing orbital debris; creation of
space situational awareness services for civil and commercial uses; management
of mega-constellations; licensing of new commercial remote sensing capabilities;
keeping up with licensing demands due to high launch rates; transitioning International Space Station operations to multiple, privately owned space platforms;
and (most important) accelerating the acquisition and fielding of national security
space capabilities in response to an increasingly aggressive China.
The Vice President should have a clear understanding with the National Security Advisor and the White House Counsel that they and their respective staffs
will work within the White House to determine the scope and leadership of policy
reviews that can overlap multiple areas of responsibility. A similar understanding
is necessary with the heads of other policy councils such as the NEC, DPC, and
National Science and Technology Council (NSTC).
As a result of the President’s direction and the Vice President’s leadership, the
NSpC under the Trump Administration was able to coordinate a wide range of

Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise

space policy reviews, legislative proposals, and regulatory reforms smoothly. The
NSpC generally led on space issues within the EOP, but other White House offices
also took on space topics.
l

l



l

As a member of the NSpC, and in coordination with other members, the
Office of Science and Technology Policy developed a national space weather
strategy, research and development (R&D) plans to mitigate the effects of
orbital debris, and protocols for planetary protection to avoid biological
contamination of celestial bodies.
The Council of Economic Advisers did research on the economic benefits of
space property rights.
OMB’s Office of Information and Regulatory Reform updated and
streamlined commercial launch licensing and commercial remote sensing
satellite rules.

During the Trump Administration, if a topic was purely military, such as standing up the U.S. Space Command, the NSC took the lead. If a topic cut across military,
civil, and commercial sectors, as was the case with cybersecurity in space, the NSpC
and NSC would cochair the policy review groups.
Trusted, collegial relationships across the White House complex are critical to
successful space policy development, implementation, and oversight. Nowhere
is this more important than in the relationship between the NSpC staff and OMB
staff who oversee civil and national security–related space spending. Teamwork
between the NSpC and OMB staff can communicate clear presidential priorities
to departments and agencies, facilitating smooth development of the President’s
budget request. The NSpC and OMB have many opportunities to collaborate in
promoting presidential priorities while finding offsets in lower-priority programs
and funding lines.
OFFICE OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY POLICY (OSTP)

The White House Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP) was created
by the National Science and Technology Policy, Organization, and Priorities Act
of 1976.33 Before its creation, Presidents received their advice and counsel on such
matters through advisers and boards that had no statutory authority. The Director
of OSTP is one of the few Senate-confirmed positions within the Executive Office
of the President. Consistent with other laws, the President may delegate to the
Director of OSTP directive authority over other elements of the executive branch.
Other EOP policy officials and organizations such as the NSC and NEC are formally
only advisory with relevant agency directives issued by the President.

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The OSTP’s functions, as contained in the law, are to advise the President of
scientific and technological considerations, evaluate the effectiveness of the federal
effort, and generally lead and coordinate the federal government’s R&D programs.
If science is being manipulated at the agencies to support separate political and
institutional agendas, the President should increase the prominence of the OSTP’s
Director either formally or informally. This would elevate the role of science in
policy discussions and subsequent outcomes and theoretically help to balance
out agencies like the Departments of Energy, State, and Commerce and the Environmental Protection Agency and Council on Environmental Quality. The OSTP
can also help to bring technical expertise to regulatory matters in support of OMB.
The OSTP should continue to play a lead role in coordinating federal R&D programs. Recent legislation, especially the CHIPS and Science Act,34 has expanded
federal policy and funding across the enterprise, and there is a need for more significant leadership in this area both to ensure effectiveness and to avoid duplication
of effort. As befitting its location in the White House, the OSTP must be concerned
with advancing national interests and not merely the parochial concerns of departments, agencies, or parts of the scientific community.
During the Trump and Biden Administrations, there has been a bipartisan focus
on prioritizing R&D funding around the so-called Industries of the Future (IOTF).
Under President Trump, IOTF priorities were artificial intelligence (AI), quantum
information science (QIS), advanced communications/5G, advanced manufacturing,
and biotechnology. Under President Biden, this list has been expanded to include
advanced materials, robotics, battery technology, cybersecurity, green products and
clean technology, plant genetics and agricultural technologies, nanotechnology, and
semiconductor and microelectronics technologies. These priorities should be evaluated and narrowed to ensure consistency with the next Administration’s priorities.
Given a long list of priorities, coordinating efforts across agencies and measuring success are extremely challenging. The OSTP and OMB are required to
work together on an annual basis to prioritize the funding requests and whatever
Congress adds on top of them, but there continues to be concern about mission
creep and funds expended on nonscientific R&D.
The President should also issue an executive order to reshape the U.S. Global
Change Research Program (USGCRP) and related climate change research programs. The USGCRP produces strategic plans and research (for example, the
National Climate Assessment) that reduce the scope of legally proper options in
presidential decision-making and in agency rulemakings and adjudications. Also,
since much environmental policymaking must run the gauntlet of judicial review,
USGCRP actions can frustrate successful litigation defense in ways that the career
bureaucracy should not be permitted to control. The process for producing assessments should include diverse viewpoints. The OSTP and OMB should jointly assess
the independence of the contractors used to conduct much of this outsourced



Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise

government research that serves as the basis for policymaking. The next President
should critically analyze and, if required, refuse to accept any USGCRP assessment
prepared under the Biden Administration.
The President should also restore related EOP research components to their
purely informational and advisory roles. Consistent with the Global Change
Research Act of 1990,35 USGCRP-related EOP components should be confined to
a more limited advisory role. These components should include but not necessarily
be limited to the OSTP; the NSTC’s Committee on Environment; the USGCRP’s
Interagency Groups (for example, the Carbon Cycle Interagency Working Group);
and the Federal Coordinating Council for Science, Engineering, and Technology.
As a general matter, the new Administration should separate the scientific risk
assessment function from the risk management function, which is the exclusive
domain of elected policymakers and the public.
Finally, the next Administration will face a significant challenge in unwinding
policies and procedures that are used to advance radical gender, racial, and equity
initiatives under the banner of science. Similarly, the Biden Administration’s
climate fanaticism will need a whole-of-government unwinding. As with other
federal departments and agencies, the Biden Administration’s leveraging of the
federal government’s resources to further the woke agenda should be reversed and
scrubbed from all policy manuals, guidance documents, and agendas, and scientific
excellence and innovation should be restored as the OSTP’s top priority.
COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY (CEQ)

The Council on Environmental Quality is the EOP component with the principal task of administering the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA)36 by
issuing regulations and interpretive documents and by overseeing the processes
of individual permitting agencies’ own NEPA regulations, including categorical
exclusions. The CEQ also coordinates environmental policy across the federal
government, and its influence has waxed and waned across Administrations.
The President should instruct the CEQ to rewrite its regulations implementing
NEPA along the lines of the historic 2020 effort and restoring its key provisions
such as banning the use of cumulative impact analysis. This effort should incorporate new learning and more aggressive reform options that were not included
in the 2020 reform package with the overall goal of streamlining the process to
build on the Supreme Court ruling that “CEQ’s interpretation of NEPA is entitled
to substantial deference.”37 It should frame the new regulations to limit the scope
for judicial review of agency NEPA analysis and judicial remedies, as well as to
vindicate the strong public interest in effective and timely agency action.
The Federal Permitting Improvement Steering Council (FPISC), of which the
CEQ is a part, has been empowered by Congress through significant new funding
and amendments to FAST-41.38 The President should build on this foundation to

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OFFICE OF NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL POLICY (ONDCP)

Congress created the Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) through
the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 198840 to serve as a coordinative auxiliary for the President on all matters related to drug policy. The next President’s top drug policy
priority must be to address the current fentanyl crisis and reduce the number of
overdoses and fatalities. This crisis resulted in the deaths of more than 100,000
Americans in 2021.
The next Administration must reaffirm a commitment to preventing drug use
before it starts, providing treatment that leads to long-term recovery, and reducing
the availability of illicit drugs in the United States. The drug trafficking environment is exponentially more dynamic and dangerous today than it was just five
years ago as powerful synthetic opioids (fentanyl and its analogues) are mixed
into other drugs of abuse. Drug trafficking organizations are extremely nimble and
able to adapt quickly to federal government actions and changes in user behavior.
Disrupting the flow of drugs across our borders and into our communities is of
paramount importance, both to save lives and to bolster our public health efforts.
For these reasons, the Director of ONDCP should make it a point to consult with
federal border enforcement officials.

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further empower the FPISC by making its Executive Director an EOP appointee
with delegated presidential directive authority over executive branch permitting
agencies. For instance, the implementation of Executive Order 13807’s One Federal
Decision39 revealed many ways that the systems established by EO 13807 can be
improved. The new President should seek to issue a new executive order to create
a unified process for major infrastructure projects that includes giving project
proponents more control of any regulatory clocks.
The President should issue an executive order establishing a Senior Advisor to
coordinate the policy development and implementation of relevant energy and
environment policy by officials across the EOP (for example, the policy staff of the
NSC, NEC, DPC, CEQ, and OSTP) and abolishing the existing Office of Domestic Climate Policy. The Senior Advisor would report directly to the Chief of Staff. The role
would be similar to the role that Brian Deese and John Podesta had in the Obama
White House. This energy/environment coordinator would help to lead the fight
for sound energy and environment policies both domestically and internationally.
The President should eliminate the Interagency Working Group on the Social
Cost of Carbon (SCC), which is cochaired by the OSTP, OMB, and CEA, and by
executive order should end the use of SCC analysis.
Finally, the President should work with Congress to establish a sweeping modernization of the entire permitting system across all departments and agencies that
is aimed at reducing litigation risk and giving agencies the authority to establish
programmatic, general, and provisional permits.

Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise

The National Drug Control Program agencies represented a total of $41 billion
in fiscal year 2022. Whereas the position for overseeing budget activities is traditionally held by a career official, it is imperative that a political appointee lead the
ONDCP budget office to ensure coordination between the OMB Program Associate
Director and the ONDCP budgetary appointee.
ONDCP grant-making activities have been controversial over the years, particularly within conservative Administrations concerned that the White House
lacks the expertise to oversee such programs directly. The ONDCP administers
two grant programs: the Drug-Free Communities Support Program and the High
Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas Program. While it makes sense to transfer these
programs eventually to the Department of Justice and Department of Health and
Human Services, respectively, it is vital that the ONDCP Director ensure in the
immediate term that these grant programs are funding the President’s drug control
priorities and not woke nonprofits with leftist policy agendas. Thus, the President
must insure that the ONDCP is managed by political appointees who are committed to the Administration’s agenda and not acquiesce to management by political
or career military personnel who oversaw the prior Administration’s ONDCP.



GENDER POLICY COUNCIL (GPC)

The President should immediately revoke Executive Order 1402041 and every
policy, including subregulatory guidance documents, produced on behalf of or
related to the establishment or promotion of the Gender Policy Council and its
subsidiary issues. Abolishing the Gender Policy Council would eliminate central
promotion of abortion (“health services”); comprehensive sexuality education
(“education”); and the new woke gender ideology, which has as a principal tenet
“gender affirming care” and “sex-change” surgeries on minors. In addition to eliminating the council, developing new structures and positions will have the dual
effect of demonstrating that promoting life and strengthening the family is a priority while also facilitating more seamless coordination and consistency across
the U.S. government.
Specifically, the President should appoint a position/point of contact with the
rank of Special Assistant to the President or higher to coordinate and lead the President’s domestic priorities on issues related to life and family in cooperation with
the Domestic Policy Council. This position would be responsible for facilitating
meetings, discussions, and agreements among personnel; coordinating Administration policy; and ensuring agency support for implementation of policies related
to the promotion of life and family in the United States.
OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT (OVP)

The Vice President is elected to the second highest office in the nation and plays
a constitutionally vital role as President-in-waiting. The Vice President is also

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the President of the Senate and is charged with breaking tie votes in that body. In
recent years, the Vice President has been granted office space in the West Wing
and the Eisenhower Executive Office Building.
The OVP is another one of the levers that the President should use to execute his
agenda. This is particularly true because there is significant and unique leverage
that the Vice President’s leadership of the OVP can evoke to shape policy discussions and outcomes. Every other appointed White House official serves at the
pleasure of the President, whereas the Vice President is elected, and the process
for filling vacancies in that Article II constitutional office, which includes confirmation of a replacement Vice President by a majority of both Houses of Congress,
is governed by the Twenty-Fifth Amendment.42
The Vice President has his or her own economic advisers, domestic policy and
national security staff, and daily intelligence briefings. The Vice President should
fill his or her office with strong and sound policy minds to effectively assist the
President in fulfilling his agenda.
The Vice President is also a statutory member of the National Security Council.43
In theory, in light of the fact that the Vice President is a member of the Smithsonian Institution’s Board of Regents,44 there is nothing to prevent Congress from
assigning the Vice President additional statutory duties.
All of the component councils and offices discussed in this chapter include real
policy development and implementation authority, and a robust OVP should be
fully integrated into all policy-formation procedures. Only a Vice President who
is deeply steeped in the interworking of the interagency and policy councils can
offer useful advice and prove helpful in accomplishing the President’s agenda. It
is also obvious, in view of the fact that many former Vice Presidents have gone on
to be elected President in their own right,45 that the Vice Presidency can act as a
training ground for presidential office.
In the past, the Vice President has been tasked with leading certain initiatives or
issues. For example, Mike Pence was tasked with coordinating the federal response
to COVID-19, and both Pence and Kamala Harris have chaired the National Space
Council. Vice Presidents Richard Cheney and Dan Quayle were also active on the
deregulatory front and in imposing regulatory moratoria. However, OVP officials should be fully integrated into each and every process from the start of a
new Administration and not have to wait to be invited to join various meetings or
working groups on an ad hoc basis. For example, the budget and regulatory review
processes are linchpins in the execution of policy, and the OVP should have a seat
at the table through every phase of policy development.
Past Vice Presidents have also spent significant time abroad serving as a type of
brand ambassador for the White House and, more broadly, for the United States,
announcing Administration priorities and coordinating with heads of state and
other top officials of foreign governments. The Vice President, as President of the

Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise



Senate, often serves as a presidential emissary to the Senate and thus can be especially helpful in securing passage of the President’s legislative agenda.
To the extent that he or she desires, a Vice President can have a direct role in
shaping Administration policy. A Vice President who regularly attends meetings
and disperses staff across the interagency and policy councils is a Vice President
whose voice will be heard.

AUTHOR’S NOTE: Special thanks to those who contributed to this chapter: Stephen Billy, Scott Pace, Casey

Mulligan, Edie Heipel, Mike Duffey, Vance Ginn, Iain Murray, Laura Cunliffe, Mario Loyola, Anthony Campau, Paige
Agostin, Molly Sikes, Paul Ray, Kenneth A. Klukowski, Michael Anton, Robert Greenway, Valerie Huber, James Rockas,
Paul Winfree, Aaron Hedlund, Brian McCormack, David Legates, Art Kleinschmidt, Paul Larkin, Kayla Tonnessen,
Jeffrey B. Clark, Jonathan Wolfson, and Bob Burkett.

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Executive Office of the President of the United States
ENDNOTES

1.
2.
3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

8.

10.

11.
12.

13.

14.

15.

16.

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9.

U.S. Constitution, Article II, Section 1, https://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution/articleii#section1 (accessed
January 30, 2023).
James Madison, The Federalist Papers No. 47, January 30, 1788, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/
Madison/01-10-02-0266 (accessed January 30, 2023).
31 U.S.C. §§ 1341(a)(1)(A) and 1341(a)(1)(B), https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/31/1341 (accessed
January 30, 2023); § 1342, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/31/1342 (accessed January 30, 2023); and
§ 1517(a), https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/31/1517(a) (accessed January 30, 2023).
President William J. Clinton, Executive Order 12866, “Regulatory Planning and Review,” September 30, 1993,
in Federal Register, Vol. 58, No. 190 (October 4, 1993), pp. 51735–51744, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/
FR-1993-10-04/pdf/FR-1993-10-04.pdf (accessed March 9, 2023).
Brent J. McIntosh, General Counsel, Department of the Treasury, and Neomi Rao, Administrator, Office of
Information and Regulatory Affairs, Memorandum of Agreement, “The Department of the Treasury and the
Office of Management and Budget Review of Tax Regulations Under Executive Order 12866,” April 11, 2018,
https://home.treasury.gov/sites/default/files/2018-04/04-11%20Signed%20Treasury%20OIRA%20MOA.pdf
(accessed January 31, 2023).
See Steven A. Engel, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, “Extending Regulatory Review
Under Executive Order 12866 to Independent Regulatory Agencies,” 43 Op. O.L.C. __ (Oct. 8, 2019), https://
www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/opinions/attachments/2020/12/30/2019-10-08-extend-reg-review.pdf
(accessed January 31, 2023).
Office of Management and Budget, Circular A-4, “Regulatory Analysis,” September 17, 2003, https://
www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/legacy_drupal_files/omb/circulars/A4/a-4.pdf (accessed
January 31, 2023).
President Donald J. Trump, Executive Order 13891, “Promoting the Rule of Law Through Improved Agency
Guidance Documents,” October 9, 2019, in Federal Register, Vol. 84, No. 199 (October 15, 2019), pp. 55235–
55238, https://home.treasury.gov/sites/default/files/2018-04/04-11%20Signed%20Treasury%20OIRA%20MOA.
pdf (accessed January 31, 2023).
President Donald J. Trump, Executive Order 13771, “Reducing Regulation and Controlling Regulatory Costs,”
January 30, 2017, in Federal Register, Vol. 82, No. 22 (February 3, 20170, pp. 9339–9341, https://www.govinfo.
gov/content/pkg/FR-2017-02-03/pdf/2017-02451.pdf (accessed January 31, 2023).
President Donald J. Trump, Executive Order 13777, “Enforcing the Regulatory Reform Agenda,” February 24,
2017, in Federal Register, Vol. 82, No. 39 (March 1, 2017), pp. 12285–12287, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/
pkg/FR-2017-03-01/pdf/2017-04107.pdf (accessed January 31, 2023).
See note 8, supra.
President Donald J. Trump, Executive Order 13892, “Promoting the Rule of Law Through Transparency and
Fairness in Civil Administrative Enforcement and Adjudication,” in Federal Register, Vol. 84, No. 199 (October
15, 2019), pp. 55239–55243, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2019-10-15/pdf/2019-22624.pdf
(accessed January 31, 2023).
President Donald J. Trump, Executive Order 13893, “Increasing Government Accountability for Administrative
Actions by Reinvigorating Administrative PAYGO,” October 10, 2019, in Federal Register, Vol. 84, No. 200
(October 16, 2019), pp. 55487–55488, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2019-10-16/pdf/2019-22749.
pdf (accessed January 31, 2023).
President Donald J. Trump, Executive Order 13924, “Regulatory Relief to Support Economic Recovery,” May 19,
2020, in Federal Register, Vol. 85, No. 100 (May 22, 2020), pp. 31353–31356, esp. 31355, https://www.govinfo.
gov/content/pkg/FR-2020-05-22/pdf/2020-11301.pdf (accessed January 31, 2023).
President Donald J. Trump, Executive Order 13979, “Ensuring Democratic Accountability in Agency
Rulemaking,” January 18, 2021, in Federal Register, Vol. 86, No. 13 (January 22, 2021), pp. 6813–6815, https://
www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2021-01-22/pdf/2021-01644.pdf (accessed January 31, 2023).
President Donald J. Trump, Executive Order 13980, “Protecting Americans from Overcriminalization
Through Regulatory Reform,” January 18, 2021, in Federal Register, Vol. 86, No. 13 (January 22, 2021),
pp. 6817–6820, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2021-01-22/pdf/2021-01645.pdf (accessed
January 31, 2023).



Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise
17. President William J. Clinton, Executive Order 13132, “Federalism,” August 4, 1999, in Federal Register, Vol. 64,
No. 153 (August 10, 1999), pp. 43255–43259, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-1999-08-10/pdf/9920729.pdf (accessed January 31, 2023).
18. President Ronald Reagan, Executive Order 12630, “Governmental Actions and Interference with
Constitutionally Protected Property Rights,” March 15, 1988, in Federal Register, Vol. 53, No. 53 (March 18,
1988), pp. 8859–8862, https://www.regulationwriters.com/downloads/Executive_Orders/EO_12630.pdf
(accessed January 31, 2023).
19. Section 115 in H.R. 4577, Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2001, Public Law No. 106-544, 106th Congress,
December 21, 2000, https://www.congress.gov/106/plaws/publ554/PLAW-106publ554.pdf (accessed
January 31, 2023).
20. H.R. 6410, Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980, Public Law No. 96-511, 96th Congress, December 11, 1980, https://
www.congress.gov/96/statute/STATUTE-94/STATUTE-94-Pg2812.pdf (accessed January 31, 2023).
21. S. 3418, An Act to Amend Title 5, United States Code, by Adding a Section 552a, to Safeguard Individual
Privacy from the Misuse of Federal Records, to Provide that Individuals Be Granted Access to Records
Concerning Them Which Are Maintained by Federal Agencies, to Establish a Privacy Protection Study
Commission, and for Other Purposes (Privacy Act of 1974), Public Law No. 93-579, 93rd Congress,
December 31, 1974, https://www.congress.gov/93/statute/STATUTE-88/STATUTE-88-Pg1896.pdf (accessed
January 31, 2023).
22. Office of Management and Budget, “Guidance for Grants and Agreements,” Final Guidance, Federal Register,
Vol. 85, No. 157 (August 13, 2020), pp. 49506–49582, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2020-08-13/
pdf/2020-17468.pdf (accessed January 31, 2023), and “Guidance for Grants and Agreements,” Correcting
Amendments, Federal Register, Vol. 86, No. 33 (February 22, 2021), pp. 10439–10440, https://www.govinfo.
gov/content/pkg/FR-2021-02-22/pdf/2021-02969.pdf (accessed January 31, 2023).
23. H.R. 5, Regulatory Accountability Act of 2017, 115th Congress, introduced January 3, 2017, https://www.
congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/house-bill/5 (accessed January 31, 20/23), and S. 951, Regulatory
Accountability Act of 2017, 115th Congress, introduced April 26, 2017, https://www.congress.gov/bill/115thcongress/senate-bill/951 (accessed January 31, 2023).
24. S. 2314, Social Media Addiction Reduction Technology Act (SMART Act), 116th Congress, introduced July 30,
2019, https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/senate-bill/2314/text (accessed January 31, 2023).
25. H.R. 1605, Guidance Out of Darkness Act (GOOD Act), 117th Congress, introduced March 8, 2021, https://www.
congress.gov/bill/117th-congress/house-bill/1605 (accessed January 31, 2023).
26. S. 2804, Early Participation in Regulations Act of 2021, 117th Congress, introduced September 22, 2021, https://
www.congress.gov/bill/117th-congress/senate-bill/2804 (accessed January 31, 2023).
27. S. 170, Unfunded Mandates Accountability and Transparency Act, 117th Congress, introduced February 2, 2021,
https://www.congress.gov/bill/117th-congress/senate-bill/170 (accessed January 31, 2023).
28. H.R. 277, Regulations from the Executive in Need of Scrutiny Act of 2023 (REINS Act), 118th Congress,
introduced January 11, 2023, https://www.congress.gov/bill/118th-congress/house-bill/277/all-info?r=217
(accessed January 31, 2023).
29. Subtitle E, “Congressional Review,” in H.R. 3136, Contract with America Advancement Act of 1996, Public Law
No. 104-121, 104th Congress, March 29, 1996, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/PLAW-104publ121/pdf/
PLAW-104publ121.pdf (accessed January 31, 2023).
30. H.R. 115, Midnight Rules Relief Act of 2023, 118th Congress, introduced January 9, 2023, https://www.congress.
gov/bill/118th-congress/house-bill/115/text?s=1&r=18 (accessed January 31, 2023).
31. See Federation of American Scientists, Intelligence Resource Program, “Presidential Directives and Executive
Orders,” https://irp.fas.org/offdocs/direct.htm (accessed February 1, 2023), and Library of Congress,
Researchers, Newspaper and Current Periodical Reading Room, “Presidential Directives and Where to Find
Them,” March 30, 2022, https://www.loc.gov/rr/news/directives.html (accessed February 1, 2023).
32. President Donald J. Trump, Executive Order 13803, “Reviving the National Space Council,” June 30, 2017, in
Federal Register, Vol. 82, No. 129 (July 7, 2017), pp. 31429–31432, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR2017-07-07/pdf/2017-14378.pdf (accessed February 1, 2023).

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33. H.R. 10230, National Science and Technology Policy, Organization, and Priorities Act of 1976, Public Law No.
94-282, 94th Congress, May 11, 1976, https://www.congress.gov/94/statute/STATUTE-90/STATUTE-90-Pg459.
pdf (accessed February 1, 2023).
34. H.R. 4346, CHIPS [Creating Helpful Incentives to Produce Semiconductors] and Science Act, Public Law No.
117-167, 117th Congress, August 9, 2022, https://www.congress.gov/117/plaws/publ167/PLAW-117publ167.pdf
(accessed February 1, 2023).
35. S. 169, Global Change Research Act of 1990, Public Law No. 101-606, 101st Congress, November 16, 1990,
https://www.congress.gov/101/statute/STATUTE-104/STATUTE-104-Pg3096.pdf (accessed February 1, 2023).
36. S. 1075, National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, Public Law No. 91-190, 91st Congress, January 1, 1970,
https://uscode.house.gov/statutes/pl/91/190.pdf (accessed February 1, 2023).
37. Andrus v. Sierra Club, 442 U.S. 347, 358 (1979), https://tile.loc.gov/storage-services/service/ll/usrep/usrep442/
usrep442347/usrep442347.pdf (accessed March 7, 2023).
38. Title XLI (41) in H.R. 22, Fixing America’s Surface Transportation Act (FAST Act), Public Law No. 114-94, 114th
Congress, December 4, 2015, https://www.congress.gov/114/statute/STATUTE-129/STATUTE-129-Pg1312.pdf
(accessed February 1, 2023).
39. President Donald J. Trump, Executive Order 13807, “Establishing Discipline and Accountability in the
Environmental Review and Permitting Process for Infrastructure Projects,” August 15, 2017, in Federal Register,
Vol. 82, No. 163 (August 24, 2017), pp. 40463–40469, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2017-08-24/
pdf/2017-18134.pdf (accessed February 1, 2023).
40. H.R. 5210, Anti-Drug Abuse of 1988, Public Law No. 100-690, 100th Congress, November 18, 1988, https://www.
congress.gov/100/statute/STATUTE-102/STATUTE-102-Pg4181.pdf (accessed February 1, 2023).
41. President Joseph R. Biden Jr., Executive Order 14020, “Establishment of the White House Gender Policy
Council,” March 8, 2021, in Federal Register, Vol. 86, No. 46 (March 11, 2021), pp. 13797–13801, https://www.
govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2021-03-11/pdf/2021-05183.pdf (accessed January 31, 2023).
42. U.S. Constitution, Amendment XXV, https://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution/amendmentxxv (accessed
March 9, 2023).
43. 50 U.S.C. § 3021(c)(1), https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/50/3021 (accessed March 9, 2023).
44. 20 U.S.C. § 20(a), https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/20/42#:~:text=The%20business%20of%20the%20
Institution%20shall%20be%20conducted,no%20two%20of%20them%20of%20the%20same%20State
(accessed March 9, 2023).
45. Vice Presidents Gerald Ford and Lyndon Johnson assumed (Ford) or initially assumed (Johnson) the office of
the presidency by a process of succession.



3

CENTRAL PERSONNEL AGENCIES:
MANAGING THE BUREAUCRACY
Donald Devine,
Dennis Dean Kirk,
and Paul Dans

OVERVIEW

l

The Office of Personnel Management (OPM);

l

The Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB);

l

The Federal Labor Relations Authority (FLRA); and

l

The Office of Special Counsel (OSC).

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From the very first Mandate for Leadership, the “personnel is policy” theme has been
the fundamental principle guiding the government’s personnel management. As the U.S.
Constitution makes clear, the President’s appointment, direction, and removal authorities are the central elements of his executive power.1 In implementing that power, the
people and the President deserve the most talented and responsible workforce possible.
Who the President assigns to design and implement his political policy agenda
will determine whether he can carry out the responsibility given to him by the
American people. The President must recognize that whoever holds a government
position sets its policy. To fulfill an electoral mandate, he must therefore give personnel management his highest priority, including Cabinet-level precedence.
The federal government’s immense bureaucracy spreads into hundreds of agencies and thousands of units and is centered and overseen at the top by key central
personnel agencies and their governing laws and regulations. The major separate
personnel agencies in the national government today are:



Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise

Title 5 of the U.S. Code charges the OPM with executing, administering, and
enforcing the rules, regulations, and laws governing the civil service.2 It grants the
OPM direct responsibility for activities like retirement, pay, health, training, federal
unionization, suitability, and classification functions not specifically granted to other
agencies by statute. The agency’s Director is charged with aiding the President, as
the President may request, in preparing such civil service rules as the President prescribes and otherwise advising the President on actions that may be taken to promote
an efficient civil service and a systematic application of the merit system principles,
including recommending policies relating to the selection, promotion, transfer, performance, pay, conditions of service, tenure, and separation of employees.
The MSPB is the lead adjudicator for hearing and resolving cases and controversies for 2.2 million federal employees.3 It is required to conduct fair and neutral
case adjudications, regulatory reviews, and actions and studies to improve the
workforce. Its court-like adjudications investigate and hear appeals from agency
actions such as furloughs, suspensions, demotions, and terminations and are
appealable to the U.S. Court of Appeals.
The FLRA hears appeals of agency personnel cases involving federal labor grievance procedures to provide judicial review with binding decisions appealable to
appeals courts.4 It interprets the rights and duties of agencies and employee labor
organizations—on management rights, OPM interpretations, recognition of labor
organizations, and unfair labor practices—under the general principle of bargaining in good faith and compelling need.
The OSC serves as the investigator, mediator, publisher, and prosecutor before
the MSPB with respect to agency and employees regarding prohibited personnel practices, Hatch Act5 politicization, Uniformed Services Employment and
Reemployment Rights Act6 issues, and whistleblower complaints.7
The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) has general responsibility for reviewing charges of employee discrimination against all civil rights
breaches. However, it also administers a government employee section that investigates and adjudicates federal employee complaints concerning equal employment
violations as with the private sector.8 This makes the agency an additional de facto
factor in government personnel management.
While not a personnel agency per se, the General Services Administration (GSA)
is charged with general supervision of contracting.9 Today, there are many more
contractors in government than there are civil service employees. The GSA must
therefore be a part of any personnel management discussion.
ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

OPM: Managing the Federal Bureaucracy. At the very pinnacle of the
modern progressive program to make government competent stands the ideal
of professionalized, career civil service. Since the turn of the 20th century,

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progressives have sought a system that could effectively select, train, reward,
and guard from partisan influence the neutral scientific experts they believe are
required to staff the national government and run the administrative state. Their
U.S. system was initiated by the Pendleton Act of 188310 and institutionalized by
the 1930s New Deal to set principles and practices that were meant to ensure that
expert merit rather than partisan favors or personal favoritism ruled within the
federal bureaucracy. Yet, as public frustration with the civil service has grown,
generating calls to “drain the swamp,” it has become clear that their project has
had serious unintended consequences.
The civil service was devised to replace the amateurism and presumed corruption of the old spoils system, wherein government jobs rewarded loyal partisans
who might or might not have professional backgrounds. Although the system
appeared to be sufficient for the nation’s first century, progressive intellectuals
and activists demanded a more professionalized, scientific, and politically neutral
Administration. Progressives designed a merit system to promote expertise and
shield bureaucrats from partisan political pressure, but it soon began to insulate
civil servants from accountability. The modern merit system increasingly made it
almost impossible to fire all but the most incompetent civil servants. Complying
with arcane rules regarding recruiting, rating, hiring, and firing simply replaced
the goal of cultivating competence and expertise.
In the 1970s, Georgia Democratic Governor Jimmy Carter, then a political
unknown, ran for President supporting New Deal programs and their Great Society expansion but opposing the way they were being administered. The policies
were not actually reducing poverty, increasing prosperity, or improving the environment, he argued, and to make them work required fundamental bureaucratic
reform. He correctly charged that almost all government employees were rated
as “successful,” all received the same pay regardless of performance, and even the
worst were impossible to fire—and he won the presidency.
President Carter fulfilled his campaign promise by hiring Syracuse University
Dean Alan Campbell, who served first as Chairman of the U.S. Civil Service Commission and then as Director of the OPM and helped him devise and pass the Civil
Service Reform Act of 1978 (CSRA)11 to reset the basic structure of today’s bureaucracy. A new performance appraisal system was devised with a five rather than
three distribution of rating categories and individual goals more related to agency
missions and more related to employee promotion for all. Pay and benefits were
based directly on improved performance appraisals (including sizable bonuses) for
mid-level managers and senior executives. But time ran out on President Carter
before the act could be fully executed, so it was left to President Ronald Reagan
and his new OPM and agency leadership to implement.
Overall, the new law seemed to work for a few years under Reagan, but the Carter–
Reagan reforms were dissipated within a decade. Today, employee evaluation is back



Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise

to pre-reform levels with almost all rated successful or above, frustrating any relation between pay and performance. An “outstanding” rating should be required for
Senior Executive Service (SES) chiefs to win big bonuses, but a few years ago, when
it was disclosed that the Veterans Administration executives who encouraged false
reporting of waiting lists for hospital admission were rated outstanding, the Senior
Executive Association justified it, telling Congress that only outstanding performers
would be promoted to the SES in the first place and that precise ratings were unnecessary.12 The Government Accountability Office (GAO), however, has reported that
pay raises, within-grade pay increases, and locality pay for regular employees and
executives have become automatic rather than based on performance—as a result
of most employees being rated at similar appraisal levels.13
OPM: Merit Hiring in a Merit System. It should not be impossible even
for a large national government to hire good people through merit selection. The
government did so for years, but it has proven difficult in recent times to select
personnel based on their knowledge, skills, and abilities (KSA) as the law dictates.
Yet for the past 34 years, the U.S. civil service has been unable to distinguish consistently between strong and unqualified applicants for employment.
As the Carter presidency was winding down, the U.S. Department of Justice
and top lawyers at the OPM contrived with plaintiffs to end civil service IQ examinations because of concern about their possible impact on minorities. The OPM
had used the Professional and Administrative Career Examination (PACE) general intelligence exam to select college graduates for top agency employment, but
Carter Administration officials—probably without the President’s informed concurrence—abolished the PACE through a legal consent court decree capitulating
to demands by civil rights petitioners who contended that it was discriminatory.
The judicial decree was to last only five years but still controls federal hiring and
is applied to all KSA tests even today.
General ability tests like the PACE have been used successfully to assess the usefulness and cost-effectiveness of broad intellectual qualities across many separate
occupations. Courts have ruled that even without evidence of overt, intentional
discrimination, such results might suggest discrimination. This doctrine of disparate impact could be ended legislatively or at least narrowed through the regulatory
process by a future Administration. In any event, the federal government has been
denied the use of a rigorous entry examination for three decades, relying instead
on self-evaluations that have forced managers to resort to subterfuge such as
preselecting friends or associates that they believe are competent to obtain qualified employees.
In 2015, President Barack Obama’s OPM began to introduce an improved merit
examination called USAHire, which it had been testing quietly since 2012 in a few
agencies for a dozen job descriptions. The tests had multiple-choice questions with
only one correct answer. Some questions even required essay replies: questions

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that would change regularly to depress cheating. President Donald Trump’s OPM
planned to implement such changes but was delayed because of legal concerns
over possible disparate impact.
Courts have agreed to review the consent decree if the Uniform Guidelines
on Employee Selection Procedures setting the technical requirements for sound
exams are reformed. A government that is unable to select employees based on
KSA-like test qualifications cannot work, and the OPM must move forward on this
very basic personnel management obligation.
The Centrality of Performance Appraisal. In the meantime, the OPM must
manage the workforce it has. Before they can reward or discipline federal employees,
managers must first identify who their top performers are and who is performing
less than adequately. In fact, as Ludwig von Mises proved in his classic Bureaucracy,14
unlike the profit-and-loss evaluation tool used in the private sector, government
performance measurement depends totally on a functioning appraisal system. If
they cannot be identified in the first place within a functioning appraisal system, it is
impossible to reward good performance or correct poor performance. The problem
is that the collegial atmosphere of a bureaucracy in a multifaceted appraisal system
that is open to appeals makes this a very challenging ideal to implement successfully.
The GAO reported more recently that overly high and widely spread performance ratings were again plaguing the government, with more than 99 percent of
employees rated fully successful or above by their managers, a mere 0.3 percent
rated as minimally successful, and 0.1 percent actually rated unacceptable.15 Why?
It is human nature that no one appreciates being told that he or she is less than
outstanding in every way. Informing subordinates in a closely knit bureaucracy
that they are not performing well is difficult. Rating compatriots is even considered rude and unprofessional. Moreover, managers can be and often are accused
of racial or sexual discrimination for a poor rating, and this discourages honesty.
In 2018, President Trump issued Executive Order 1383916 requiring agencies to reduce the time for employees to improve performance before corrective
action could be taken; to initiate disciplinary actions against poorly performing
employees more expeditiously; to reiterate that agencies are obligated to make
employees improve; to reduce the time for employees to respond to allegations
of poor performance; to mandate that agencies remind supervisors of expiring
employee probationary periods; to prohibit agencies from entering into settlement
agreements that modify an employee’s personnel record; and to reevaluate procedures for agencies to discipline supervisors who retaliate against whistleblowers.
Unfortunately, the order was overturned by the Biden Administration,17 so it will
need to be reintroduced in 2025.
The fact remains that meaningfully evaluating employees’ performance is a
critical part of a manager’s job. In the Reagan appraisal process, managers were
evaluated on how they themselves rated their subordinates. This is critical to



Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise

responsibility and improved management. It is essential that political executives
build policy goals directly into employee appraisals both for mission success and
for employees to know what is expected. Indistinguishable from their coworkers
on paper, hard-working federal employees often go unrewarded for their efforts
and are often the system’s greatest critics. Federal workers who are performing
inadequately get neither the benefit of an honest appraisal nor clear guidance on
how to improve. Political executives should take an active role in supervising performance appraisals of career staff, not unduly delegate this responsibility to senior
career managers, and be willing to reward and support good performers.
Merit Pay. Performance appraisal means little to daily operations if it is not tied
directly to real consequences for success as well as failure. According to a survey of
major U.S. private companies—which, unlike the federal government, also have a
profit-and-loss evaluation—90 percent use a system of merit pay for performance
based on some type of appraisal system. Despite early efforts to institute merit pay
throughout the federal government, however, compensation is still based primarily
on seniority rather than merit.
Merit pay for executives and managers was part of the Carter reforms and was
implemented early in the Reagan presidency. Beginning in the summer of 1982,
the Reagan OPM entered 18 months of negotiations with House and Senate staff
on extending merit pay to the entire workforce. Long and detailed talks between
the OPM and both Democrats and Republicans in Congress ensued, and a final
agreement was reached in 1983 that supposedly ensured the passage of legislation
creating a new Performance Management and Recognition System (PMRS) for all,
(not just management) GS-13 through GS-15 employees.
Meanwhile, the OPM issued regulations to expand the role of performance
related to pay throughout the entire workforce, but congressional allies of the
employee unions, led by Representative Steny Hoyer (D) of government employee–
rich Maryland, stoutly resisted this extension of pay-for-performance and, with
strong union support, used the congressional appropriations process to block OPM
administrative pay reforms. Bonuses for SES career employees survived, but performance appraisals became so high and widely distributed that there was little
relationship between performance and remuneration.
Ever since the original merit pay system for federal managers (GM-13 through
GM-15 grade levels, just below the SES) was allowed to expire in September 1993,
little to nothing has been done either to reinstate the federal merit pay program for
managers or to distribute performance rating evaluations for the SES, much less to
extend the program to the remainder of the workforce. A reform-friendly President
and Congress might just provide the opportunity to create a more comprehensive
performance plan; in the meantime, however, political executives should use existing pay and especially fiscal awards strategically to reward good performance to
the degree allowed by law.

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Central Personnel Agencies: Managing the Bureaucracy

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Making the Appeals Process Work. The nonmilitary government dismissal
rate is well below 1 percent, and no private-sector industry employee enjoys the
job security that a federal employee enjoys. Both safety and justice demand that
managers learn to act strategically to hire good and fire poor performers legally.
The initial paperwork required to separate poor or abusive performers (when they
are infrequently identified) is not overwhelming, and managers might be motivated
to act if it were not for the appeals and enforcement processes. Formal appeal in the
private sector is mostly a rather simple two-step process, but government unions
and associations have been able to convince politicians to support a multiple and
extensive appeals and enforcement process.
As noted, there are multiple administrative appeals bodies. The FLRA, OSC,
and EEOC have relatively narrow jurisdictions. Claims that an employee’s removal
or disciplinary actions violate the terms of a collective bargaining agreement
between an agency and a union are handled by the FLRA, employees who claim
their removal was the result of discrimination can appeal to the EEOC, and employees who believe their firing was retribution for being a whistleblower can go to the
OSC. While the MSPB specializes in abuses of direct merit system issues, it can
and does hear and review almost any of the matters heard by the other agencies.
Cases involving race, gender, religion, age, pregnancy, disability, or national
origin can be appealed to the EEOC or the MSPB—and in some cases to both—and
to the OSC. This gives employees multiple opportunities to prove their cases, and
while the EEOC, MSPB, FLRA, and OSC may all apply essentially the same burden
of proof, the odds of success may be substantially different in each forum. In fact,
forum shopping among them for a friendlier venue is a common practice, but frequent filers face no consequences for frivolous complaints. As a result, meritorious
cases are frequently delayed, denying relief and justice to truly aggrieved individuals.
The MSPB can and does handle all such matters, but it faces a backlog of an
estimated 3,000 cases of people who were potentially wrongfully terminated or
disciplined as far back as 2013. From 2017–2022 the MSPB lacked the quorum
required to decide appeals. On the other hand, as of January 2023, the EEOC had
a backlog of 42,000 cases.
While federal employees win appeals relatively infrequently—MSPB administrative judges have upheld agency decisions as much as 80 percent of the time—the
real problem is the time and paperwork involved in the elaborate process that
managers must undergo during appeals. This keeps even the best managers from
bringing cases in all but the most egregious cases of poor performance or misconduct. As a result, the MSPB, EEOC, FLRA, and OSC likely see very few cases
compared to the number of occurrences, and nonperformers continue to be paid
and often are placed in nonwork positions.
Having a choice of appeals is especially unique to the government. If lower-priority issues were addressed in-house, serious adverse actions would be less subject



Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise

to delay. With the proper limitation of labor union actions, the FLRA should
have limited reason for appeals. The EEOC’s federal employee section should be
transferred to the MSPB, and many of the OCS’s investigatory functions should be
returned to the OPM. The MSPB could then become the main reviewer of adverse
actions, greatly simplifying the burdensome appeal process.
Making Civil Service Benefits Economically and Administratively Rational. In recent years, the combined wages and benefits of the executive branch
civilian workforce totaled $300 billion according to official data. But even that
amount does not properly account for billions in unfunded liability for retirement
and other government reporting distortions. Official data also report employment
as approximately 2 million, but this ignores approximately 20 million contractors
who, while not eligible for government pay and benefits, do receive them indirectly
through contracting (even if they are less generous). Official data also claim that
national government employees are paid less than private-sector employees are
paid for similar work, but several more neutral sources demonstrate that public-sector workers make more on average than their private-sector counterparts.
All of this extravagance deserves close scrutiny.
Market-Based Pay and Benefits. According to current law, federal workers
are to be paid wages comparable to equivalent private-sector workers rather than
compared to all private-sector employees. While the official studies claim that
federal employees are underpaid relative to the private sector by 20 percent or
more, a 2016 Heritage Foundation study found that federal employees received
wages that were 22 percent higher than wages for similar private-sector workers;
if the value of employee benefits was included, the total compensation premium
for federal employees over their private-sector equivalents increased to between
30 percent and 40 percent.18 The American Enterprise Institute found a 14 percent
pay premium and a 61 percent total compensation premium.19
Base salary is only one component of a federal employee’s total compensation.
In addition to high starting wages, federal employees normally receive an annual
cost-of-living adjustment (available to all employees) and generous scheduled
raises known as step increases. Moreover, a large proportion of federal employees are stationed in the Washington, D.C., area and other large cities and are
entitled to steep locality pay enhancement to account for the high cost of living
in these areas.
A federal employee with five years’ experience receives 20 vacation days, 13 paid
sick days, and all 10 federal holidays compared to an employee at a large private
company who receives 13 days of vacation and eight paid sick days. Federal health
benefits are more comparable to those provided by Fortune 500 employers with
the government paying 72 percent of the weighted average premiums, but this is
much higher than for most private plans. Almost half of private firms do not offer
any employer contributions at all.

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Central Personnel Agencies: Managing the Bureaucracy

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The obvious solution to these discrepancies is to move closer to a market model
for federal pay and benefits. One need is for a neutral agency to oversee pay hiring
decisions, especially for high-demand occupations. The OPM is independent of
agency operations, so it can assess requirements more neutrally. For many years,
with its Special Pay Rates program, the OPM evaluated claims that federal rates
in an area were too low to attract competent employees and allowed agencies to
offer higher pay when needed rather than increased rates for all. Ideally, the OPM
should establish an initial pay schedule for every occupation and region, monitor
turnover rates and applicant-to-position ratios, and adjust pay and recruitment
on that basis. Most of this requires legislation, but the OPM should be an advocate
for a true equality of benefits between the public and private sectors.
Reforming Federal Retirement Benefits. Career civil servants enjoy retirement benefits that are nearly unheard of in the private sector. Federal employees
retire earlier (normally at age 55 after 30 years), enjoy richer pension annuities,
and receive automatic cost-of-living adjustments based on the areas in which they
retire. Defined-benefit federal pensions are fully indexed for inflation—a practice
that is extremely rare in the private sector. A federal employee with a preretirement income of $25,000 under the older of the two federal retirement plans will
receive at least $200,000 more over a 20-year period than will private-sector workers with the same preretirement salary under historic inflation levels.
During the early Reagan years, the OPM reformed many specific provisions of
the federal pension program to save billions administratively. Under OPM pressure, Reagan and Congress ultimately ended the old Civil Service Retirement
System (CSRS) entirely for new employees, which (counting disbursements for
the unfunded liability) accounted for 51.3 percent of the federal government's
total payroll. The retirement system that replaced it—the Federal Employees
Retirement System (FERS)—reduced the cost of federal employee retirement disbursements to 28.5 percent of payroll (including contributions to Social Security
and the employer match to the Thrift Savings Plan). More of the pension cost was
shifted to the employee, but the new system was much more equitable for the 40
percent who received few or no benefits under the old system.
By 1999, more than half of the federal workforce was covered by the new system,
and the government’s per capita share of the cost (as the employer) was less than
half the cost of the old system: 20.2 percent of FERS payroll vs. 44.3 percent of
CSRS payroll, representing one of the largest examples of government savings
anywhere. Although the government pension system has become more like private
pension systems, it still remains much more generous, and other means might be
considered in the future to move it even closer to private plans.
GSA: Landlord and Contractor Management. The General Services
Administration is best known as the federal government’s landlord—designing,
constructing, managing, and preserving government buildings and leasing and



Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise

managing outside commercial real estate contracting with 376.9 million square feet
of space. Obviously, as its prime function, real estate expertise is key to the GSA’s
success. However, the GSA is also the government’s purchasing agent, connecting
federal purchasers with commercial products and services in the private sector
and their personnel management functions. With contractors performing so many
functions today, the GSA therefore becomes a de facto part of governmentwide
personnel management. The GSA also manages the Presidential Transition Act
(PTA) process, which also directly involves the OPM. A recent proposal would
have incorporated the OPM and GSA (and OMB). Fortunately, this did not take
place in that form, but it would make sense for GSA and OPM leadership and staff
to hold regular meetings to work through matters of common interest such as
moderating PTA personnel restrictions and the relationships between contract
and civil service employees.
Reductions-in-Force. Reducing the number of federal employees seems an
obvious way to reduce the overall expense of the civil service, and many prior
Administrations have attempted to do just this. Presidents Bill Clinton and
Barack Obama began their terms, as did Ronald Reagan and Donald Trump, by
mandating a freeze on the hiring of new federal employees, but these efforts did
not lead to permanent and substantive reductions in the number of nondefense
federal employees.
First, it is a challenge even to know which workers to cut. As mentioned, there
are 2 million federal employees, but since budgets have exploded, so has the
total number of personnel with nearly 10 times more federal contractors than
federal employees. Contractors are less expensive because they are not entitled
to high government pensions or benefits and are easier to fire and discipline. In
addition, millions of state government employees work under federal grants, in
effect administering federal programs; these cannot be cut directly. Cutting federal
employment can be helpful and can provide a simple story to average citizens, but
cutting functions, levels, funds, and grants is much more important than setting
simple employment size.
Simply reducing numbers can actually increase costs. OMB instructions following President Trump’s employment freeze told agencies to consider buyout
programs, encouraging early retirements in order to shift costs from current budgets in agencies to the retirement system and minimize the number of personnel
fired. The Environmental Protection Agency immediately implemented such a
program, and OMB urged the passage of legislation to increase payout maximums
from $25,000 to $40,000 to further increase spending under the “cuts.” President
Clinton’s OMB had introduced a similar buyout that cost the Treasury $2.8 billion,
mostly for those who were going to retire anyway. Moreover, when a new employee
is hired to fill a job recently vacated in a buyout, the government for a time is paying
two people to fill one job.

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What is needed at the beginning is a freeze on all top career-position hiring
to prevent “burrowing-in” by outgoing political appointees. Moreover, four factors determine the order in which employees are protected during layoffs: tenure,
veterans’ preference, seniority, and performance in that order of importance.
Despite several attempts in the House of Representatives during the Trump years
to enact legislation that would modestly increase the weight given to performance
over time-of-service, the fierce opposition by federal managers associations and
unions representing long-serving but not necessarily well-performing constituents
explains why the bills failed to advance. A determined President should insist that
performance be first and be wary of costly types of reductions-in-force.
Impenetrable Bureaucracy. The GAO has identified almost a hundred actions
that the executive branch or Congress could take to improve efficiency and effectiveness across 37 areas that span a broad range of government missions and
functions. It identified 33 actions to address mission fragmentation, overlap, and
duplication in the 12 areas of defense, economic development, health, homeland
security, and information technology. It also identified 59 other opportunities for
executive agencies or Congress to reduce the cost of government operations or
enhance revenue collection across 25 areas of government.20
A logical place to begin would be to identify and eliminate functions and programs that are duplicated across Cabinet departments or spread across multiple
agencies. Congress hoped to help this effort by passing the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993,21 which required all federal agencies to define
their missions, establish goals and objectives, and measure and report their performance to Congress. Three decades of endless time-consuming reports later,
the government continues to grow but with more paper and little change either
in performance or in the number of levels between government and the people.
The Brookings Institution’s Paul Light emphasizes the importance of the
increasing number of levels between the top heads of departments and the people
at the bottom who receive the products of government decision-making. He estimates that there are perhaps 50 or more levels of impenetrable bureaucracy and no
way other than imperfect performance appraisals to communicate between them.22
The Trump Administration proposed some possible consolidations, but these
were not received favorably in Congress, whose approval is necessary for most such
proposals. The best solution is to cut functions and budgets and devolve responsibilities. That is a challenge primarily for Presidents, Congress, and the entire
government, but the OPM still needs to lead the way governmentwide in managing
personnel properly even in any future smaller government.
Creating a Responsible Career Management Service. The people elect a
President who is charged by Article 2, Section 3 of the Constitution23 with seeing
that the laws are “faithfully executed” with his political appointees democratically
linked to that legitimizing responsibility. An autonomous bureaucracy has neither



Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise

independent constitutional status nor separate moral legitimacy. Therefore, career
civil servants by themselves should not lead major policy changes and reforms.
The creation of the Senior Executive Service was the top career change introduced by the 1978 Carter–Campbell Civil Service Reform Act. Its aim was to
professionalize the career service and make it more responsible to the democratically elected commander in chief and his political appointees while respecting the
rights due to career employees, very much including those in the top positions. The
new SES would allow management to be more flexible in filling and reassigning
executive positions and locations beyond narrow specialties for more efficient
mission accomplishment and would provide pay and large bonuses to motivate
career performance.
The desire to infiltrate political appointees improperly into the high career
civil service has been widespread in every Administration, whether Democrat or
Republican. Democratic Administrations, however, are typically more successful
because they require the cooperation of careerists, who generally lean heavily to
the Left. Such burrowing-in requires career job descriptions for new positions that
closely mirror the functions of a political appointee; a special hiring authority that
allows the bypassing of veterans’ preference as well as other preference categories;
and the ability to frustrate career candidates from taking the desired position.
President Reagan’s OPM began by limiting such SES burrowing-in, arguing
that the proper course was to create and fill political positions. This simultaneously promotes the CSRA principle of political leadership of the bureaucracy and
respects the professional autonomy of the career service. But this requires that
career SES employees should respect political rights too. Actions such as career
staff reserving excessive numbers of key policy positions as “career reserved” to
deny them to noncareer SES employees frustrate CSRA intent. Another evasion
is the general domination by career staff on SES personnel evaluation boards, the
opposite of noncareer executives dominating these critical meeting discussions
as expected in the SES. Career training also often underplays the political role in
leadership and inculcates career-first policy and value viewpoints.
Frustrated with these activities by top career executives, the Trump Administration issued Executive Order 1395724 to make career professionals in positions
that are not normally subject to change as a result of a presidential transition but
who discharge significant duties and exercise significant discretion in formulating
and implementing executive branch policy and programs an exception to the competitive hiring rules and examinations for career positions under a new Schedule
F. It ordered the Director of OPM and agency heads to set procedures to prepare
lists of such confidential, policy-determining, policymaking, or policy-advocating
positions and prepare procedures to create exceptions from civil service rules when
careerists hold such positions, from which they can relocate back to the regular
civil service after such service. The order was subsequently reversed by President

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Central Personnel Agencies: Managing the Bureaucracy

l

l

l

Executive Order 13836, encouraging agencies to renegotiate all union
collective bargaining agreements to ensure consistency with the law and
respect for management rights;26
Executive Order 13837, encouraging agencies to prevent union
representatives from using official time preparing or pursuing grievances or
from engaging in other union activity on government time;27 and
Executive Order 13839, encouraging agencies both to limit labor grievances
on removals from service or on challenging performance appraisals and to
prioritize performance over seniority when deciding who should be retained
following reductions-in-force.28

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Biden25 at the demand of the civil service associations and unions. It should be
reinstated, but SES responsibility should come first.
Managing Personnel in a Union Environment. Historically, unions were
thought to be incompatible with government management. There is a natural limit
to the bargaining power of private-sector unions, but the financial bottom line of
public-sector unions is not similarly constrained. If private-sector unions push
too hard a bargain, they can so harm a company or so reduce efficiency that their
employer is forced to go out of business and eliminate union jobs altogether. There
is no such limit in government, which cannot go out of business, so demands can
be excessive without negatively affecting employee and union bottom lines.
Even Democratic President Franklin Roosevelt considered union representation in the federal government to be incompatible with democracy. Striking and
even threats of bargaining and delay were considered acts against the people and
thus improper. It was not until President John Kennedy that union representation
in the federal government was recognized—and then merely by executive order.
Labor bargaining was not set in statute until the Carter Administration was forced
by Congress to do so in order to pass the CSRA, although all bargaining was placed
under OPM review.
The CSRA was able to maintain strong management rights for the OPM and
agencies and forbade collective bargaining on pay and benefits as well as management prerogatives. Over time, OPM, FLRA, and agencies’ personnel offices and
courts, especially in Democratic Administrations, narrowed management rights
so that labor bargaining expanded as management rights contracted. But the management rights are still in statute, have been enforced by some Administrations,
and should be enforced again by any future OPM and agency managements, which
should not be intimidated by union power.
Rather than being daunted, President Trump issued three executive orders:



Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise

All were revoked by the Biden Administration29 and should be reinstated by the
next Administration, to include the immediate appointment of the FLRA General
Counsel and reactivation of the Impasses Panel.
Congress should also consider whether public-sector unions are appropriate
in the first place. The bipartisan consensus up until the middle of the 20th century held that these unions were not compatible with constitutional government.30
After more than half a century of experience with public-sector union frustrations
of good government management, it is hard to avoid reaching the same conclusion.
Fully Staffing the Ranks of Political Appointees. The President must rely
legally on his top department and agency officials to run the government and on top
White House staff employees to coordinate operations through regular Cabinet and
other meetings and communications. Without this political leadership, the career
civil service becomes empowered to lead the executive branch without democratic
legitimacy. While many obstacles stand in his way, a President is constitutionally
and statutorily required to fill the top political positions in the executive branch
both to assist him and to provide overall legitimacy.
Most Presidents have had some difficulty obtaining congressional approval of
their appointees, but this has worsened recently. After the 2016 election, President
Trump faced special hostility from the opposition party and the media in getting
his appointees confirmed or even considered by the Senate. His early Office of
Presidential Personnel (PPO) did not generally remove political appointees from
the previous Administration but instead relied mostly on prior political appointees and career civil servants to run the government. Such a reliance on holdovers
and bureaucrats led to a lack of agency control and the absolute refusal of the
Acting Attorney General from the Obama Administration to obey a direct order
from the President.
Under the early PPO, the Trump Administration appointed fewer political
appointees in its first few months in office than had been appointed in any recent
presidency, partly because of historically high partisan congressional obstructions
but also because several officials announced that they preferred fewer political
appointees in the agencies as a way to cut federal spending. Whatever the reasoning,
this had the effect of permanently hampering the rollout of the new President’s
agenda. Thus, in those critical early years, much of the government relied on senior
careerists and holdover Obama appointees to carry out the sensitive responsibilities that would otherwise belong to the new President’s appointees.
Fortunately, the later PPO, OPM, and Senate leadership began to cooperate to
build a strong team to implement the President’s personnel appointment agenda.
Any new Administration would be wise to learn that it will need a full cadre of
sound political appointees from the beginning if it expects to direct this enormous
federal bureaucracy. A close relationship between the PPO at the White House
and the OPM, coordinating with agency assistant secretaries of administration

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Central Personnel Agencies: Managing the Bureaucracy

and PPO’s chosen White House Liaisons and their staff at each agency, is essential
to the management of this large, multilevel, resistant, and bureaucratic challenge.
If “personnel is policy” is to be our general guide, it would make sense to give the
President direct supervision of the bureaucracy with the OPM Director available
in his Cabinet.
A REFORMED BUREAUCRACY

AUTHORS’ NOTE: The authors are grateful for the collaborative work of the individuals listed as contributors to

this chapter for the 2025 Presidential Transition Project. The authors alone assume responsibility for the content of
this chapter, and no views expressed herein should be attributed to any other individual.

— 83 —



Today, the federal government’s bureaucracy cannot even meet its own civil
service ideals. The merit criteria of ability, knowledge, and skills are no longer the
basis for recruitment, selection, or advancement, while pay and benefits for comparable work are substantially above those in the private sector. Retention is not
based primarily on performance, and for the most part, inadequate performance
is not appraised, corrected, or punished.
The authors have made many suggestions here that, if implemented, could
bring that bureaucracy more under control and enable it to work more efficiently
and responsibly, which is especially required for the half of civilian government
that administers its undeniable responsibilities for defense and foreign affairs.
While a better administered central bureaucracy is crucial for both those and
domestic responsibilities, the problem of properly running the government goes
beyond simple bureaucratic administration. The specific deficiencies of the federal bureaucracy—size, levels of organization, inefficiency, expense, and lack of
responsiveness to political leadership—are rooted in the progressive ideology that
unelected experts can and should be trusted to promote the general welfare in just
about every area of social life.
The Constitution, however, reserved a few enumerated powers to the federal
government while leaving the great majority of domestic activities to state, local,
and private governance. As James Madison explained: “The powers reserved to
the several States will extend to all the objects, which, in the ordinary course of
affairs, concern the lives, liberties and properties of the people; and the internal
order, improvement and prosperity of the state.”31 Modern progressive politics
has simply given the national government more to do than the complex separation-of-powers Constitution allows.
That progressive system has broken down in our time, and the only real solution
is for the national government to do less: to decentralize and privatize as much as
possible and then ensure that the remaining bureaucracy is managed effectively
along the lines of the enduring principles set out in detail here.

Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise
ENDNOTES

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.



13.

14.
15.

16.

17.

18.

19.

U.S. Constitution, Article II, Section 2, https://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution/articleii#section1 (accessed
February 1, 2023).
5 U.S. Code §§ 1101 et seq. and 1103(a)(5), https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/5/part-II/chapter-11
(accessed February 1, 2023).
5 U.S. Code § 1201, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/5/1201 (accessed February 1, 2023).
5 U.S. Code § 7101, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/5/7101 (accessed February 1, 2023), and § 7117,
https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/5/7117 (accessed February 1, 2023).
S. 1871, An Act to Prevent Pernicious Political Activities, Public Law No. 76-252, August 2, 1939, https://
govtrackus.s3.amazonaws.com/legislink/pdf/stat/53/STATUTE-53-Pg1147.pdf (accessed February 1, 2023).
H.R. 995, Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act of 1994, Public Law No. 103-353,
101st Congress, October 13, 1994, https://www.congress.gov/103/statute/STATUTE-108/STATUTE-108-Pg3149.
pdf (accessed February 1, 2023).
5 U.S. Code § 1206, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/5/1206 (accessed February 1, 2023).
42 U.S. Code § 2000e, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/42/2000e (accessed February 1, 2023).
40 U.S. Code § 581, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/40/581 (accessed February 1, 2023).
U.S. National Archives, “Milestone Documents: Pendleton Act (1883),” last reviewed February 8, 2022, https://
www.archives.gov/milestone-documents/pendleton-act (accessed February 2, 2023).
S. 2640, Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, Public Law No. 95-454, 95th Congress, October 13, 1978, https://
www.congress.gov/95/statute/STATUTE-92/STATUTE-92-Pg1111.pdf (accessed February 2, 2023).
Donovan Sack and Bill Theobald, “Veterans Affairs Pays $140 Million in Bonuses Amid Scandals,” USA Today,
November 11, 2015, https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2015/11/11/veterans-affairs-pays-142million-bonuses-amid-scandals/75537586/ (accessed March 15, 2023).
U.S. Government Accountability Office, “Federal Workforce: Distribution of Performance Ratings Across
the Federal Government, 2013,” GAO-16-520R, May 9, 2016, https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-16-520r.pdf
(accessed March 15, 2023); U.S. Government Accountability Office, Results-Oriented Management: OPM Needs
to Do More to Ensure Meaningful Distinctions Are Made in SES Ratings and Performance Awards, GAO-15189, January 2015, https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-15-189.pdf (accessed March 15, 2023); U.S. Government
Accountability Office, “Measuring Federal Employee Performance,” WatchBlog, posted October 18, 2016,
https://www.gao.gov/blog/2016/10/18/measuring-federal-employee-performance (accessed March 15, 2023);
Lisa Rein, “The Federal Workforce, Where Everyone’s Performance Gets Rave Reviews,” The Washington Post,
June 13, 2016, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/powerpost/wp/2016/06/13/heres-the-news-from-thefederal-government-where-everyone-is-above-average-way-above/ (accessed March 15, 2023).
Ludwig von Mises, Bureaucracy (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1944), https://ia902300.us.archive.
org/17/items/mises-pdfs/1944-01-01_LudwigVonMises_Bureaucracy.pdf (accessed February 2, 2023).
Figure 1, “Permanent, Non-Senior Executive Service Employee Performance Rating Outcomes (All Rating
Systems, Calendar Year 2013),” in U.S. Government Accountability Office, “Federal Workforce: Distribution of
Performance Ratings Across the Federal Government, 2013,” p. 6.
President Donald J. Trump, Executive Order 13839, “Promoting Accountability and Streamlining Removal
Procedures Consistent with Merit System Principles,” May 25, 2018, in Federal Register, Vol. 83, No. 106 (June 1,
2018), pp. 25343–25347, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2018-06-01/pdf/2018-11939.pdf (accessed
February 2, 2023).
President Joseph R. Biden Jr., Executive Order 14003, “Protecting the Federal Workforce,” January 22, 2021, in
Federal Register, Vol. 86, No. 16 (January 27, 2021), pp. 7231–7233, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR2021-01-27/pdf/2021-01924.pdf (accessed February 2, 2023).
Rachel Greszler and James Sherk, “Why It Is Time to Reform Compensation for Federal Employees,” The
Heritage Foundation, July 27, 2016, https://www.heritage.org/jobs-and-labor/report/why-it-time-reformcompensation-federal-employees.
Andrew G. Biggs and Jason Richwine, “Comparing Federal and Private Sector Compensation,” American
Enterprise Institute Working Paper No. 2011-02, revised June 2011, https://www.aei.org/wp-content/
uploads/2011/10/AEI-Working-Paper-on-Federal-Pay-May-2011.pdf?x91208 (accessed February 2, 2023).

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Central Personnel Agencies: Managing the Bureaucracy

— 85 —



20. See Gene L. Dodaro, Comptroller General of the United States, “Government Efficiency and Effectiveness:
Opportunities to Reduce Fragmentation, Overlap, and Duplication and Achieve Billions in Financial Benefits,”
testimony before the Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Spending Oversight, Committee on Homeland
Security and Governmental Affairs, U.S. Senate, GAO-21-544T, May 12, 2021, https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao21-544t.pdf (accessed February 2, 2023).
21. S. 20, Government Performance and Results Act of 1993, Public Law No. 103-62, 103rd Congress, August
3, 1993, https://www.congress.gov/103/statute/STATUTE-107/STATUTE-107-Pg285.pdf (accessed
February 2, 2023).
22. Paul Light, “The Real Crisis in Government,” The Capital Times (Madison, Wisconsin), January 22, 2010, https://
captimes.com/news/opinion/column/paul-c-light-the-real-crisis-in-government/article_9e139318-3d005898-908d-4c7aee1e105d.html (accessed March 15, 2023).
23. U.S. Constitution, Article II, Section 3, https://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution/articleii#section3 (accessed
February 2, 2023).
24. President Donald J. Trump, Executive Order 13957, “Creating Schedule F in the Excepted Service,” October 21,
2020, in Federal Register, Vol. 85, No. 207 (October 26, 2020), pp. 67631–67635, https://www.govinfo.gov/
content/pkg/FR-2020-10-26/pdf/2020-23780.pdf (accessed February 2, 2023).
25. See note 17, supra.
26. President Donald J. Trump, Executive Order 13836, “Developing Efficient, Effective, and Cost-Reducing
Approaches to Federal Sector Collective Bargaining,” May 25, 2018, in Federal Register, Vol. 83, No. 106 (June 1,
2018), pp. 25329–25334, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2018-06-01/pdf/2018-11913.pdf (accessed
February 2, 2023).
27. President Donald J. Trump, Executive Order 13837, “Ensuring Transparency, Accountability, and Efficiency
in Taxpayer-Funded Union Time Use,” May 25, 2018, in Federal Register, Vol. 83, No. 106 (June 1, 2018),
pp. 25335–25340, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2018-06-01/pdf/2018-11916.pdf (accessed
February 2, 2023).
28. See note 16, supra.
29. See note 17, supra.
30. Philip K. Howard, Not Accountable: Rethinking the Constitutionality of Public Employee Unions (Garden City,
NY: Rodin Books, 2023).
31. James Madison, The Federalist Papers No. 45, January 26, 1788, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/
Madison/01-10-02-0254 (accessed February 1, 2023).



Section Two

THE COMMON DEFENSE

— 87 —



W

‌hile the lives of Americans are affected in noteworthy ways, for better or
worse,
‌
by each part of the executive branch, the inherent importance of
national
‌
defense and foreign affairs makes the Departments of Defense
and State first among equals. Originating in the George Washington Administration, the War Department (as it was then known) was headed by Henry Knox,
America’s chief artillery officer in the Revolutionary War; Thomas Jefferson, the
primary author of the Declaration of Independence, was the first Secretary of State.
Despite such long and storied histories, neither department is currently living up
to its standards, and the success of the next presidency will be determined in part
by whether they can be significantly improved in short order.
“Ever since our Founding,” former acting secretary of defense Christopher Miller
writes in Chapter 4, “Americans have understood that the surest way to avoid war is
to be prepared for it in peace.” Yet the Department of Defense “is a deeply troubled
institution.” It has emphasized leftist politics over military readiness, “Recruiting
was the worst in 2022 that it has been in two generations,” and “the Biden Administration’s profoundly unserious equity agenda and vaccine mandates have taken a
serious toll.” Additionally, Miller writes that “the atrophy of our defense industrial
base, the impact of sequestration, and effective disarmament by many U.S. allies
have exacted a high toll on America’s military.” Moreover, our military has adopted
a risk-averse culture—think of masked soldiers, sailors, and airmen—rather than
instilling and rewarding courage in thought and action.
The good news is that most enlisted personnel, and most officers, especially
below the rank of general or admiral, continue to be patriotic defenders of liberty.



Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise

But this is now Barack Obama’s general officer corps. That is why Russ Vought
argues in Chapter 2 that the National Security Council “should rigorously review
all general and flag officer promotions to prioritize the core roles and responsibilities of the military over social engineering and non-defense related matters,
including climate change, critical race theory, manufactured extremism, and other
polarizing policies that weaken our armed forces and discourage our nation’s finest
men and women from enlisting.” Ensuring that many of America’s best and brightest continue to choose military service is essential.
“By far the most significant danger” to America from abroad, Miller writes, “is
China.” That communist regime “is undertaking a historic military buildup,” which
“could result in a nuclear force that matches or exceeds America’s own nuclear
arsenal.” Resisting Chinese expansionist aims “requires a denial defense” whereby
we make “the subordination of Taiwan or other U.S. allies in Asia prohibitively
difficult.” However, Miller adds that “[c]ritically, the United States must be able
to do this at a level of cost and risk that Americans are willing to bear.”
The best gauge of such willingness is congressional approval. Accordingly, we
must rediscover and adhere to the Founders’ wise division of war powers, whereby
Congress, the most representative and deliberative branch, decides whether to
go to war; and the executive, the most energetic and decisive branch, decides how
to carry it out once begun. As the past 75 years have repeatedly demonstrated in
different ways—from Korea, to Vietnam, to Iraq, to Afghanistan—we depart from
our constitutional design at our peril.
Miller writes that we “must treat missile defense as a top priority,” ensure that
more of our weapons are made in America, reform the budgeting process, and
sustain “an efficient and effective counterterrorism enterprise.” Across all of our
efforts, we must keep in mind that part of peace through strength is knowing when
to fight. As George Washington warned nearly two centuries ago, we must continue to be on guard against being drawn into conflicts that do not justify great
loss of American treasure or significant shedding of American blood. At the same
time, we must be prepared to defend our interests and meet challenges where and
when they arise.
An effective diplomatic corps is central to defending our interests and influencing world events. Whereas most military personnel have had leftist priorities
imposed from above, the problem at State comes largely from within. Former
State Department director of policy planning Kiron Skinner writes in Chapter
6, “[L]arge swaths of the State Department’s workforce are left-wing and predisposed to disagree with a conservative President’s policy agenda and vision.” She
adds that the department possesses a “belief that it is an independent institution
that knows what is best for the United States, sets its own foreign policy, and
does not need direction from an elected President”—a view that does not align
with the Constitution.

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Section 2: The Common Defense

— 89 —



The solution to this problem is strong political leadership. Skinner writes, “The
next Administration must take swift and decisive steps to reforge the department
into a lean and functional diplomatic machine that serves the President and, thereby,
the American people.” Because the Senate has been extraordinarily lax in fulfilling
its constitutional obligation to confirm presidential appointees, she recommends
putting appointees into acting roles until such time as the Senate confirms them.
Skinner writes that State should also stop skirting the Constitution’s treaty-making requirements and stop enforcing “agreements” as treaties. It should
encourage more trade with allies, particularly with Great Britain, and less with
adversaries. And it should implement a “sovereign Mexico” policy, as our neighbor
“has functionally lost its sovereignty to muscular criminal cartels that effectively
run the country.” In Africa, Skinner writes, the U.S. “should focus on core security,
economic, and human rights” rather than impose radical abortion and pro-LGBT
initiatives. Divisive symbols such as the rainbow flag or the Black Lives Matter flag
have no place next to the Stars and Stripes at our embassies.
When it comes to China, Skinner writes that “a policy of ‘compete where we
must, but cooperate where we can’…has demonstrably failed.” The People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) “aggressive behavior,” she writes, “can only be curbed through
external pressure.” Efforts to protect or excuse China must stop. She observes,
“[M]any were quick to dismiss even the possibility that COVID escaped from a
Chinese research laboratory.” Meanwhile, Skinner writes, “[g]lobal leaders including President Joe Biden…have tried to normalize or even laud Chinese behavior.”
She adds, “In some cases, these voices, like global corporate giants BlackRock and
Disney”—or the National Basketball Association (NBA)—“directly benefit from
doing business with Beijing.”
Former vice president of the U.S. Agency for Global Media Mora Namdar writes
in Chapter 8 that we need to have people working for USAGM who actually believe
in America, rather than allowing the agencies to function as anti-American, taxpayer-funded entities that parrot our adversaries’ propaganda and talking points.
Former acting deputy secretary of homeland security Ken Cuccinelli says in Chapter 5 that the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), a creation of the George
W. Bush era, should be closed, as it has added needless additional bureaucracy and
expense without corresponding benefit. He recommends that it be replaced with
a new “stand-alone border and immigration agency at the Cabinet level” and that
the remaining parts of DHS be distributed among other departments.
Former chief of staff for the director of National Intelligence Dustin Carmack
writes in Chapter 7 that the U.S. Intelligence Community is too inclined to look
in the rearview mirror, engage in “groupthink,” and employ an “overly cautious”
approach aimed at personal approval rather than at offering the most accurate,
unvarnished intelligence for the benefit of the country. And in Chapter 9, former
acting deputy administrator of the U.S. Agency for International Development Max

Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise



Primorac asserts that the United States Agency for International Development
(USAID) must be reformed, writing, “The Biden Administration has deformed the
agency by treating it as a global platform to pursue overseas a divisive political and
cultural agenda that promotes abortion, climate extremism, gender radicalism,
and interventions against perceived systematic racism.”
If the recommendations in the following chapters are adopted, what Skinner
says about the State Department could be true for other parts of the federal government’s national security and foreign policy apparatus: The next conservative
President has the opportunity to restructure the making and execution of U.S.
defense and foreign policy and reset the nation’s role in the world. The recommendations outlined in this section provide guidance on how the next President
should use the federal government’s vast resources to do just that.

— 90 —

4

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
Christopher Miller

— 91 —



T

he Constitution requires the federal government to “provide for the
common defence.”1 It assigns to Congress the authority to “raise and
support Armies” and to “provide and maintain a Navy”2 and specifies that the President is “commander in Chief” of America’s armed forces.3
Ever since our Founding, Americans have understood that the surest way to
avoid war is to be prepared for it in peace—but when deterrence fails, we must
fight and win.
The Department of Defense (DOD) is the largest part of our federal government.
It has almost 3 million people serving in uniform or a civilian capacity throughout
the world and consumes approximately $850 billion annually—more than 50 percent of our government’s discretionary spending.
The DOD is also a deeply troubled institution. Historically, the military has
been one of America’s most trusted institutions, but years of sustained misuse, a
two-tiered culture of accountability that shields senior officers and officials while
exposing junior officers and soldiers in the field, wasteful spending, wildly shifting
security policies, exceedingly poor discipline in program execution, and (most
recently) the Biden Administration’s profoundly unserious equity agenda and
vaccine mandates have taken a serious toll.
Our disastrous withdrawal from Afghanistan, our impossibly muddled China
strategy, the growing involvement of senior military officers in the political arena,
and deep confusion about the purpose of our military are clear signals of a disturbing decay and markers of a dangerous decline in our nation’s capabilities and will.
Additionally, more than 100,000 Americans die annually in large measure because

Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise

of illicit narcotics flows—more than four times as many people in one year as we
lost in our 20-year war against al-Qaeda.
We also are witnessing a transformation in the character of war. The democratization of technology and the collapse of time and space require dramatic,
thoughtful changes in how we defend, deter, and fight. As with any huge bureaucracy—and the DOD is one of the world’s largest—breaking the status quo requires
leadership and endurance. Technology is critical to maintaining our warfighting
primacy, but we must be leery of the siren song that technology alone can protect
us. More important is how new technologies are developed, tested, procured, and
used, and that relies on the true competitive advantages of our people: ingenuity,
common sense, and thoughtfulness grounded in a free society. Because war will
continue to be the most stressful and consequential human endeavor, the most
powerful weapon systems will remain the six inches between the ears of our citizens and the strength of their hearts and content of their souls.
Military service is the most difficult task we ask of our citizens, and our nation is
enormously blessed that so many young, patriotic Americans eagerly volunteer to
carry such a heavy burden. We owe them everything, and we must do better. To do
better, however, means recognizing and implementing four overriding priorities:



l

l

l

l

Priority No. 1: Reestablish a culture of command accountability,
nonpoliticization, and warfighting focus.
Priority No. 2: Transform our armed forces for maximum effectiveness in
an era of great-power competition.
Priority No. 3: Provide necessary support to Department of Homeland
Security (DHS) border protection operations. Border protection is a
national security issue that requires sustained attention and effort by all
elements of the executive branch.
Priority No. 4: Demand financial transparency and accountability.

This chapter offers recommendations for improving our armed forces and the
civilian organizations that support and oversee them.
DOD POLICY

By far the most significant danger to Americans’ security, freedoms, and prosperity is China. China is by any measure the most powerful state in the world other
than the United States itself. It apparently aspires to dominate Asia and then, from
that position, become globally preeminent. If Beijing could achieve this goal, it
could dramatically undermine America’s core interests, including by restricting

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Department of Defense

Needed Reforms
l

Prioritize a denial defense against China. U.S. defense planning should
focus on China and, in particular, the effective denial defense of Taiwan.

— 93 —



U.S. access to the world’s most important market. Preventing this from happening
must be the top priority for American foreign and defense policy.
Beijing presents a challenge to American interests across the domains of
national power, but the military threat that it poses is especially acute and significant. China is undertaking a historic military buildup that includes increasing
capability for power projection not only in its own region, but also far beyond as
well as a dramatic expansion of its nuclear forces that could result in a nuclear
force that matches or exceeds America’s own nuclear arsenal.
The most severe immediate threat that Beijing’s military poses, however, is to
Taiwan and other U.S. allies along the first island chain in the Western Pacific. If
China could subordinate Taiwan or allies like the Philippines, South Korea, and
Japan, it could break apart any balancing coalition that is designed to prevent Beijing’s hegemony over Asia. Accordingly, the United States must ensure that China
does not succeed. This requires a denial defense: the ability to make the subordination of Taiwan or other U.S. allies in Asia prohibitively difficult. Critically, the
United States must be able to do this at a level of cost and risk that Americans are
willing to bear given the relative importance of Taiwan to China and to the U.S.
The United States and its allies also face real threats from Russia, as evidenced
by Vladimir Putin’s brutal war in Ukraine, as well as from Iran, North Korea, and
transnational terrorism at a time when decades of ill-advised military operations
in the Greater Middle East, the atrophy of our defense industrial base, the impact
of sequestration, and effective disarmament by many U.S. allies have exacted a
high toll on America’s military.
This is a grim landscape. The United States needs to deal with these threats
forthrightly and with strength, but it also needs to be realistic. It cannot wish away
these problems. Rather, it must confront them with a clear-eyed recognition of the
need for choice, discipline, and adequate resources for defense.
In this light, U.S. defense strategy must identify China unequivocally as the
top priority for U.S. defense planning while modernizing and expanding the
U.S. nuclear arsenal and sustaining an efficient and effective counterterrorism
enterprise. U.S. allies must also step up, with some joining the United States in
taking on China in Asia while others take more of a lead in dealing with threats
from Russia in Europe, Iran, the Middle East, and North Korea. The reality is
that achieving these goals will require more spending on defense, both by the
United States and by its allies, as well as active support for reindustrialization
and more support for allies’ productive capacity so that we can scale our freeworld efforts together.

Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise

This focus and priority for U.S. defense activities will deny China the first
island chain.
1.

Require that all U.S. defense efforts, from force planning to employment
and posture, focus on ensuring the ability of American forces to prevail
in the pacing scenario and deny China a fait accompli against Taiwan.

2. Prioritize the U.S. conventional force planning construct to defeat
a Chinese invasion of Taiwan before allocating resources to other
missions, such as simultaneously fighting another conflict.
l

Increase allied conventional defense burden-sharing. U.S. allies must
take far greater responsibility for their conventional defense. U.S. allies
must play their part not only in dealing with China, but also in dealing with
threats from Russia, Iran, and North Korea.
1.

Make burden-sharing a central part of U.S. defense strategy with the
United States not just helping allies to step up, but strongly encouraging
them to do so.



2. Support greater spending and collaboration by Taiwan and allies
in the Asia–Pacific like Japan and Australia to create a collective
defense model.
3. Transform NATO so that U.S. allies are capable of fielding the great
majority of the conventional forces required to deter Russia while
relying on the United States primarily for our nuclear deterrent, and
select other capabilities while reducing the U.S. force posture in Europe.
4.

Sustain support for Israel even as America empowers Gulf partners to
take responsibility for their own coastal, air, and missile defenses both
individually and working collectively.

5. Enable South Korea to take the lead in its conventional defense against
North Korea.
l

Implement nuclear modernization and expansion. The United States
manifestly needs to modernize, adapt, and expand its nuclear arsenal.
Russia maintains and is actively brandishing a very large nuclear arsenal,
but China is also undertaking a historic nuclear breakout.

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Department of Defense

1.

Expand and modernize the U.S. nuclear force so that it has the size,
sophistication, and tailoring to deter Russia and China simultaneously.

2. Develop a nuclear arsenal with the size, sophistication, and tailoring—
including new capabilities at the theater level—to ensure that
there is no circumstance in which America is exposed to serious
nuclear coercion.
l

Increase allied counterterrorist burden-sharing. Transnational
terrorism remains a threat to Americans even as we pivot toward Asia.
1.

Sustain the military forces needed to deter, prevent, and combat
terrorism, but at a sustainable cost in concert with other elements of
national power and partner efforts.

2. Prioritize enhancing the capability of allies and partners to take the lead
in combating terrorism in their regions.
DOD ACQUISITION AND SUSTAINMENT (A&S)

Needed Reforms
l

Reform the planning, programming, budgeting, and execution
(PPBE) process.

1.

Enhance funding and authority for DOD mission-focused innovation
organizations and away from program-specific stovepipes that,
planned for and designed two or three years earlier, may no longer be

— 95 —



The DOD’s ability to acquire and field new and existing technologies is essential
to the ability of America’s military personnel to fight and win our nation’s wars.
To succeed in this endeavor, we must optimize the systems and personnel that
the department uses, but the inflexible bureaucratic structure and risk-adverse
culture that have developed over the decades make it difficult to provide the tools
that warfighters need at the speed of relevance.
The number one problem is the DOD budgeting process (instituted in 1961)
that requires acquisition spending to be locked years in advance. Because technologies change so rapidly and requirements can change overnight, this creates
situations in which military personnel not only go to war with outdated technology, but also may be fighting with equipment that is less capable than that of their
competitors. America owes its military many things, and the most important is
the resources they need to survive on the battlefield and carry out the tasks we
ask of them.

Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise

relevant. This allows the acquisition community to focus on portfolio
management and move money around more easily instead of being
locked into inflexible, multiyear procurement cycles.
2. The President should examine the recommendations of the
congressionally mandated Commission on Planning, Programming,
Budgeting, and Execution Reform4 and develop a strategy for
implementing those that the Administration considers to be in the best
interests of the American people. The commission’s final report is due
on September 1, 2023.
3. Develop legislation or other means of providing funding outside the
traditional PPBE process for the prototyping and experimentation of
emerging technologies that are deemed essential to modernization and
future conflict. Consider creating a “fast track” for projects that satisfy
the most pressing national security needs.



4. Require the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and
Sustainment, the Under Secretary for Research and Engineering,
and all service secretaries to conduct “Night Court” and use existing
authorities to terminate outdated or underperforming programs
so that money can be used for what works and will work. Require
the Under Secretaries and service secretaries to brief the Secretary
annually on the results.
5. Require the Office of the Secretary of Defense to research and report
on the acquisition processes used by America’s adversaries to improve
our understanding of how they are often able to innovate and field new
technologies on a faster timeline.
l

Strengthen America’s defense industrial base.
1.

Replenish and maintain U.S. stockpiles of ammunition and other
equipment that have been depleted as a result of U.S. support to Ukraine.
This will strengthen the defense industry supply chain and ensure that
adequate inventory exists if it is needed for a future conflict.

2. Collaborate with industry to develop a prioritized list of reforms that
the DOD and Congress can enact and implement to incentivize industry
to help America’s military innovate and field needed capabilities.

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Department of Defense

3. Strengthen the ability of acquisition authorities to engage in multiyear
procurements and block buys. This will improve private-sector rates of
return, thereby incentivizing defense contractors to partner with the
government. It will also reduce government overhead by reducing the
number of procurement competitions.
4. Prioritize the U.S. and allies under the “domestic end product”
and “domestic components” requirements of the Build America,
Buy America Act.5 Currently, defense companies are required to
manufacture defense items for the U.S. government that are 100
percent domestically produced and at least 50 percent composed of
domestically produced components. However, there are loopholes that
allow companies to manufacture these items overseas. This can create
supply chain and other issues, especially in wartime. Manufacturing
components and end products domestically and with allies spurs
factory development, increases American jobs, and builds resilience in
America’s defense industrial base.

6. Help small businesses to become medium-size and large vendors, which
encourages a more resilient industrial base and fosters competition.
Encourage and plan for durable supply chains for small businesses
so they also have commercial/private-sector customers and are not
solely dependent on defense orders, which can be highly specialized,
expensive, and irregular.
7.

l

Increase external engagement among small businesses to inform them
of DOD’s needs and how they could work with DOD to meet national
security priorities.

Optimize the DOD acquisition community.
1.

Create incentives to emphasize speed and agility in decision-making
for prototyping and program-of-record starts and terminations.
Most bureaucrats would rather follow a checklist and fail than go
outside the procedures and win because failure means negative

— 97 —



5. Review the sectors currently prioritized for onshoring or
“friendshoring” of manufacturing (kinetic capabilities, castings and
forgings, critical materials, microelectronics, space, and electric vehicle
batteries); evaluate them according to the strategic landscape; and
expand or reprioritize the list as appropriate.

Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise

career repercussions. Senior acquisition leaders should design a
system that allows decision-makers to stay within the law but bypass
unnecessary departmental regulations that are not in the best interest
of the government and hamper the acquisition of capabilities that
warfighters require.



2. The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment,
Under Secretary for Research and Engineering, and all service
secretaries should assess their acquisition workforces; determine what
additional personnel, resources, and training they need; and develop
implementation plans. The goal is to develop, prototype, acquire, and
field required capabilities at the speed of relevance to meet America’s
pacing threats and maintain a warfighting advantage.
3. Decentralize Defense Acquisition University (DAU) offerings and
expand the DAU mission to include accreditation of non-DOD
institutions. The critical shortage of trained and certified acquisition
personnel must be addressed with urgency in order to support DOD
mission objectives and goals. With the rapid evolution of training and
educational technologies, including remote and virtual practices, there
is no reason for DAU to maintain a monopoly on the knowledge and
certification that are required to perform as acquisition professionals.
Further, the cost to private contractors and non-DOD civilians who
aspire to such a role limits the supply of trained and certified candidates.
DAU has become an unnecessary barrier to entry in a career field that is
vital to the DOD mission.
DOD RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, TEST, AND EVALUATION (RDT&E)

The FY 2017 National Defense Authorization Act established the position of
Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering and assigned broad
responsibility for “all defense research and engineering, technology development, technology transition, prototyping, experimentation, and developmental
testing activities and programs, including the allocation of resources for defense
research and engineering, and unifying defense research and engineering efforts
across the Department,” to the new Under Secretary, who also was tasked with
“serving as the principal advisor to the Secretary on all research, engineering,
and technology development activities and programs in the Department.” 6 This
led to the single largest DOD structural change since the Goldwater–Nichols
act of 19867 and was organized effectively during President Donald Trump’s
Administration.

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Department of Defense

Needed Reforms
l

Champion, engage, and focus the American innovation ecosystem.
To maintain leadership in the era of great-power competition and
succeed against our adversaries, a key DOD effort must be the creation
of mechanisms and processes to embrace America’s most significant
competitive advantage: innovation.
1.

Engage and leverage all of America’s scientific, engineering, and hightech production communities to research, develop, prototype, and
rapidly deploy advanced technology capabilities on a continuing basis to
preserve our warfighting advantage.

2. Increase integration and collaboration among the DOD, government labs,
and private companies to solve the department’s most difficult problems.
3. Reduce the number of critical technology areas from 14 to a more
manageable number to concentrate effort and resources on those that
bear directly on great-power competition.

5. Move toward a much more comprehensive independent risk-reduction
approach to increase understanding of the technical risks by drawing
on the expertise in DOD laboratories and agencies to help acquisition
programs succeed.
l

Improve the rapid deployment of technology to the battlefield.
America’s military advantage has derived from the professionalism of our
servicemembers and our ability to manifest our technological advantage
in battlefield capability. The current era of great-power competition will
continue for the foreseeable future, and technology will be the currency of
competition. Our ability to prevail will rest on our ability to develop new
technologies and move them onto the battlefield more rapidly than our
adversaries can.
1.

Accelerate the prototyping cycle to meet immediate battlefield needs.

2. Require tighter integration with user communities to provide value.

— 99 —



4. Rebuild RDT&E infrastructure that resides in Cold War–era facilities
and is not well-suited to the current era of rapid development and
testing of advanced technology and concepts to the maturity level
necessary for acquisition and operational fielding.

Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise

3. Establish a pipeline of near-term, mid-term, and long-term technology
that is aimed at great-power competition (China) and can be matured,
prototyped, and evaluated to support major acquisitions (the ability to
produce at scale) to break the cycle of schedule delays and cost overruns
from underdeveloped and poorly understood technologies.
l

Develop a framework to protect the RDT&E enterprise from foreign
exploitation. Strategic competition and adaptive adversaries require new
thinking about how to protect technology. China has been relentless in
stealing U.S. technology, using the full range of measures from influence
operations to outright theft. This has been a major factor in its ability to
close the gap and in some cases to exceed U.S. capabilities.
1.

Implement a comprehensive approach to preserving U.S. technological
leadership that is based on outpacing our adversaries; clear about what we
need to protect; tailored to various specific sectors (for example, academia,
the defense industrial base, and laboratories); and underpinned with a full
range of consequences for attempted or actual theft.



DOD FOREIGN MILITARY SALES

The United States must regain its role as the “Arsenal of Democracy.” In fiscal
year (FY) 2021, U.S. government foreign military sales (FMS) nosedived to a low of
$34.8 billion from a record high of $55.7 billion in FY 2018.8 This decrease hinders
interoperability with partners and allies, decreases defense industrial base capacity, and increases the taxpayer burden on the U.S. military’s own procurements.
Under previous Administrations, the United States built its reputation as a reliable
partner with a strong defense industrial base that could supply military articles
and goods in a timely manner. Today’s FMS process is encumbered by byzantine
bureaucracy, long contracting times, high costs, and mundane technology.
The United States can change this downward trajectory by improving internal processes that incentivize partners and allies to procure U.S. defense systems,
thereby expanding our “defense ecosystem.” We must reverse the recent dip in
FMS to ensure both that our partners remain interoperable with the United States
and that our defense industrial base regains much-needed capacity in preparation
for future challenges.
Needed Reforms
l

Emphasize exportability with U.S. procurements. The record-low
FMS sales in 2021 were driven partly by the high costs of converting
weapon systems on the back end of production rather than emphasizing
exportability in initial capability planning.

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Department of Defense

1.

Ensure that senior U.S. military leadership emphasizes exportability in
the initial development of defense systems that are both available and
interoperable with our partners and allies.

2. Create a funding mechanism to incentivize exportability in initial
planning, which can be recouped after future FMS transactions.
l

End informal congressional notification. Informal congressional
notification or “tiered review” is a hinderance to ensuring timely sales to
our global partners. The tiered review process is not codified in law; it is
merely a practice by which the Department of State provides a preview of
prospective arms transfers before Congress is formally notified.9
1.

End the tiered review process to eliminate at least 20 days from the
FMS process.

2. Use the tiered review process only when unanimous congressional
support is guaranteed in order to eliminate the “weaponization” by
select Members of Congress that has prevented billions of dollars of
arms sales from moving into formal congressional notification.



l

Minimize barriers to collaboration. The high cost of developing
advanced defense platforms requires the United States to collaborate with
key allies to minimize waste, complement strengths, and supplement our
defense industrial base to create a system that is greater than that of the
United States alone.
1.

Enhance defense industrial base planning with partners to allow
them to focus on niche areas where there are cost advantages for the
United States.

2. Decrease International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) to facilitate
trade with such allies as the United Kingdom, Canada, and Australia.
3. Create opportunities to improve the health of the defense supply chain
with added opportunities for partners and allies to contribute.
l

Reform the FMS contracting process. The contracting timeline for the
FMS process is shockingly slow. On average, the DOD contracting timeline
takes approximately 18 months because of slow bureaucratic processes and
chronic understaffing.10

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Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise

1.

Immediately fund more contracting capacity in all services to decrease
the contracting timeline and improve the delivery of defense articles to
our global partners.

2. Rationalize and speed arms sales decision-making to preclude our
enemies from exploiting bureaucratic slothfulness and allow us to
manage the development of indigenous defense industrial bases.



DOD PERSONNEL

The men and women of America’s armed forces are the most critical component
of our national defense strategy, but in recent years, they have been overextended,
undervalued, and insufficiently resourced. Their families help them to carry the
burden of service, but the assistance they receive is disproportionately less than
the sacrifices they make. Young civilians who would thrive in a military environment are disenfranchised when educators and influencers discourage them from
learning about military service and preparing for the honor of wearing America’s uniform.
The United States military is an extraordinary institution, staffed by exceptional
people who have defended our nation and changed the course of history, but the
Biden Administration, through word and deed, has treated the armed forces as just
another place to work. We must restore our military to a place of honor and respect
and recruit and retain the individuals who will meet the rigorous standards of
excellence that are required for membership in the world’s greatest fighting force.
Needed Reforms
l

Rescue recruiting and retention. Recruiting was the worst in 2022 that it
has been in two generations and is expected to be even worse in 2023. Some
of the problems are self-inflicted and ongoing. The recruiting problem is not
service-specific: It affects the entire Joint Force.

1.

Appoint a Special Assistant to the President who will maintain liaison
with Congress, DOD, and all other interested parties on the issue of
recruiting and retention.

2. Improve recruiting by suspending the use of the recently introduced
MHS Genesis system that uses private medical records of potential
recruits at Military Entrance Processing Stations (MEPS), creating
unnecessary delays and unwarranted rejections.11
3. Improve military recruiters’ access to secondary schools and require
completion of the Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery

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Department of Defense

(ASVAB)—the military entrance examination—by all students in schools
that receive federal funding.12
4. Encourage Members of Congress to provide time to military recruiters
during each townhall session in their congressional districts.
5. Increase the number of Junior ROTC programs in secondary schools.
l

l

Restore standards of lethality and excellence. Entrance criteria for
military service and specific occupational career fields should be based on
the needs of those positions. Exceptions for individuals who are already
predisposed to require medical treatment (for example, HIV positive
or suffering from gender dysphoria) should be removed, and those with
gender dysphoria should be expelled from military service. Physical
fitness requirements should be based on the occupational field without
consideration of gender, race, ethnicity, or orientation.

1.

Strengthen protections for chaplains to carry out their ministry
according to the tenets of their faith.

2. Codify language to instruct senior military officers (three and four
stars) to make certain that they understand their primary duty
to be ensuring the readiness of the armed forces, not pursuing a
social engineering agenda. This direction should be reinforced
during the Senate confirmation process. Orders and direction
motivated by purely partisan motives should be identified as
threats to readiness.
3. Reinstate servicemembers to active duty who were discharged for
not receiving the COVID vaccine, restore their appropriate rank, and
provide back pay.
4. Eliminate Marxist indoctrination and divisive critical race theory
programs and abolish newly established diversity, equity, and inclusion
offices and staff.

— 103 —



Eliminate politicization, reestablish trust and accountability, and
restore faith to the force. In 2021, the Reagan National Defense Survey
found that only 45 percent of Americans have “a great deal of trust and
confidence in the military”—down from 70 percent in 2018.13

Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise

5. Restrict the use of social media solely for purposes of recruitment and
discipline any armed services personnel who use an official command
channel to engage with civilian critics on social media.
6. Audit the course offerings at military academies to remove Marxist
indoctrination, eliminate tenure for academic professionals, and
apply the same rules to instructors that are applied to other DOD
contracting personnel.
7.

l

Reverse policies that allow transgender individuals to serve in the
military. Gender dysphoria is incompatible with the demands of military
service, and the use of public monies for transgender surgeries or to
facilitate abortion for servicemembers should be ended.

Value the military family. Military service requires extreme sacrifices
by families.
Support legislation to increase wages and family allowances for activeduty enlisted personnel. No uniformed personnel should ever have to
rely on social benefits like as food stamps or public housing assistance.



1.

2. Improve base housing and consider the military family holistically when
considering change-of-station moves.
3. Improve spouse employment opportunities and protections, including
licensing reform,14 and expand childcare.
4. Audit all curricula and health policies in DOD schools for
military families, remove all inappropriate materials, and reverse
inappropriate policies.
5. Support legislation giving education savings account options to
military families.15
l

Reduce the number of generals. Rank creep is pervasive. The number
of 0-6 to 0-9 officers is at an all-time high across the armed services
(above World War II levels), and the actual battlefield experience of this
officer corps is at an all-time low. The next President should limit the
continued advancement of many of the existing cadre, many of whom
have been advanced by prior Administrations for reasons other than their
warfighting prowess.

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Department of Defense

DOD INTELLIGENCE

Our national defense establishment must evolve to meet the rapid, profound, and dynamic change in the global landscape, but absent significant effort
to evaluate and retool in critical areas—including our intelligence and security
portfolios—America’s competitive advantage against rivals and adversaries is at
serious risk. However, for any structural changes to succeed, the crisis in our Intelligence Community (IC)/Defense Intelligence Enterprise (DIE) leadership must
be addressed.16
The DIE accounts for the bulk of the Intelligence Community’s personnel and a
significant portion of its budget. Of the IC’s 17 elements, eight are within DOD,17 two
are independent,18 and seven belong to various other departments and agencies.19
Overall, “[t]he DoD provides 86 percent of the personnel who conduct intelligence
activities, both military and civilian.”20
The Defense Intelligence Enterprise must deliver accurate, unbiased, and
timely insights consistently and with clarity, objectivity, and independence. If they
continue on their current path, however, both the DIE and the Intelligence Community writ large will continue to provide inaccurate and politicized intelligence
assessments that mislead policymakers.
Needed Reforms

Improve the intelligence process. Defense intelligence assets have been
committed to the prosecution of operational campaigns since September 11,
2001, at the expense of our strategic objectives, and this has led to increased
risk.21 Further, the DIE has evolved into a “customer-based” model with
the DIE/IC trying to be supportive of policy direction at the expense
of analytical integrity. The result has been a significant politicization of
intelligence.

1.

Establish unbiased intelligence reporting from DIE/IC senior leaders.
As the leader of the DIE, the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence
and Security should provide a top-line, dissenting, or clarifying view of
DIE and IC assessments as needed.

2. Align collection and analysis with vital national interests (countering
China and Russia).
3. Establish an effective global federated intelligence framework
with allies and partners and our Combatant Commands. Avoid the
temptation to neglect areas that appear less pertinent but that support
a convergence of threats and the critical requirements to sustain
those threats.

— 105 —



l

Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise

4. Establish and sustain feedback loops to provide insight and direction
for continuous improvement and accountability.22 We must revisit
our assessments and understand where we got it right and where we
got it wrong.
5. Better exploit publicly available information (PAI) data and foster
innovation to improve collection and analysis. We must end the practice
of multiple DIE organizations paying to acquire the same PAI data and
invest more in machine learning (ML) and artificial intelligence (AI) to
exploit open-source and classified intelligence data.
6. Remove policy obstacles that impede available technical solutions
and tailored approaches in order to preclude corruption at the point
of collection.



7.

l

Develop statistical discrimination techniques based on relative value
to deal with the volume and velocity of available data and information,
which are rapidly exceeding our ability to exploit and analyze available
data and information efficiently.

Expand the integration of intelligence activities. The prevalence of
asymmetric warfare requires Defense Intelligence to leverage the unique
authorities and capabilities of U.S. departments and agencies, as well as our
partners and allies, to competitive advantage.
1.

Create an improved cyber defense and capability. We must reevaluate
the dual-hat structure between the National Security Agency (NSA) and
U.S. Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM).

2. Resurrect economic analysis capability to improve our ability to counter
Chinese whole-of-government strategies that combine security with
predatory economic objectives.
3. Resurrect critical thinking to provide true strategic intelligence that will
enable the U.S. to counter global adversaries and emerging technologies
(such as adversary advances in hypersonics, Unmanned Aerial Systems
(UAS), cyber domain, advanced fighter aircraft, and advanced undersea
capabilities) more effectively.
4. Rebuild human intelligence (HUMINT) and counterintelligence (CI) and
improve their integration with defensive and offensive cyber operations.

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Department of Defense

5. Establish true alignment between DOD and DHS both to improve the
defense of critical U.S. infrastructure and national border integrity
and to develop vital information that enables defense against foreign
targeted disruptions.23
l

Restore accountability and public trust. In recent years, public trust in
Defense Intelligence has been eroded by, for example, flawed assumptions
leading up to our Afghanistan withdrawal, flawed Russia–Ukraine
assessments, divergences in relations with key Gulf allies, and voids being
filled by Russia and China around the world. For trust to be restored and
sustained, officials must be held accountable.
1.

2. Elevate the DIE’s voice in national policy discussions, commensurate
with the DIE’s 75 percent share of the IC budget. Present defense
intelligence to senior policymakers, either independently to
avoid all-source bias or in consensus products like the National
Intelligence Estimates.
l

Eliminate peripheral intelligence obligations that do not advance
military readiness. In 2019, following the catastrophic 2015 data
breach at the U.S. Office of Personnel Management (OPM), the Defense
Counterintelligence and Security Agency (DCSA) accepted transfer of the
responsibility to conduct security clearance and suitability investigations
for 95 percent of the U.S. government’s civilian workforce. This decision,
which grew out of an intention to deconstruct OPM, was wrongheaded on
many levels and made the federal bureaucracy dependent on a new overlay
of DOD bureaucracy, in a sense instilling DOD control of civilian managers.
This function should be returned to OPM except for military security
clearance investigations.

— 107 —



Restore DIE critical thinking. Establish mechanisms to restore analytic
integrity and return to true intelligence-driven operations. The next
Administration should eliminate the conflict of interest in the current
customer-based model (in which the customer is always right) by
enforcing time-tested procedures that guarantee independent analysis,
even if it means challenging policymakers’ assumptions. The Under
Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security’s leadership role
should be expanded to include providing analytic top-line views and
improve DIE transparency by highlighting diverging views.

Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise

U.S. ARMY



The U.S. Army’s mission is “[t]o deploy, fight and win our nation’s wars by providing ready, prompt and sustained land dominance by Army forces across the full
spectrum of conflict as part of the joint force.”24 Today, however, the Army cannot
execute its land dominance mission.25 The U.S. Army is at an inflection point that
is marked by more than a decade of steadily eroding budgets and diluted buying
power, an appreciable degradation in readiness and training capacity, a near crisis
in the recruiting and retention of critical personnel, and a bevy of aging weapons
systems that no longer provide a qualitative edge over peer and near-peer competitors but will not be replaced in the near term.
All of these challenges are set against the backdrop of a complex and dynamic
global geopolitical environment that is exemplified and exacerbated by the triumph
of our adversaries in Afghanistan after a 20-year struggle there as well as recent
Russian outrages in the Ukraine and China’s bellicosity both on its borders and in
surrounding disputed regions. In spite of these ever-increasing operational pulls, our
Army is consistently being asked to do more with fewer resources. The status quo
is further marked by a pervasive politically driven top-down focus on progressive
social policies that emphasize matters like so-called diversity, equity, and inclusion
and climate change, often to the detriment of the Army’s core warfighting mission.
Needed Reforms
l

Rebuild the Army. The total Army budget has decreased by roughly 11
percent since 2018, perilously affecting the service’s readiness and ability to
train and to procure new personnel and equipment. Declining budgets and
decreased buying power have forced the Army to lower training standards
and opportunities to train, propose reductions in end strength, slash
military construction programs to historically low levels, and scale back
essential modernization programs.

1.

Increase the Army budget to remain the world’s preeminent land power.

2. Accelerate the development and procurement of the six current
Army modernization priorities (long-range precision fires, the NextGeneration Combat Vehicle, Future Vertical Lift, the Army network,
air and missile defense, and soldier lethality) to replace worn out and
outdated combat systems and ensure ground combat dominance.
3. Increase funding to improve Army training and operational readiness.
4. Increase the Army force structure by 50,000 to handle two major
regional contingencies simultaneously.

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Department of Defense

5. Reform recruiting efforts. The Army missed its 2022 recruitment goal
by 25 percent, or 15,000 soldiers.
l

Focus on deployability and sustained operations. The U.S. Army’s
very lethal ground force capability is irrelevant if it cannot quickly deploy
to locations for employment in decisive operations to secure our global
security interests. Additionally, Army logisticians provide the ground
transportation (of both personnel and equipment); fuel, food, and water;
munitions (bombs and bullets); medical supplies and services; and
veterinary services (food safety) that are critical to sustainment of the
other services.
1.

Immediately increase the production and stockpiling of critical
munitions and repair parts.

2. Prioritize expeditionary logistics in all force design and operational
planning to guarantee entry into a contested theater of war.
3. Increase the level of Joint Force training, synchronization, and
coordination focused on logistics.



4. Prepare to deploy forces from degraded U.S.-based transportation
infrastructure that is compromised by opposing forces.
l

Transform Army culture and training. The Army can no longer serve
as the nation’s social testing ground. A rebuilt Army that is focused again
on its core warfighting mission and empowered it with the tools, resources,
and authorities it needs to accomplish that mission must be the next
Administration’s highest defense priority.
1.

Stop using the Army as a test bed for social evolution. Misusing the
Army in this way detracts from its core purpose while doing little to
reshape the American social structure. The Army no longer reflects
national demographics to the degree that it did before 1974 when the
draft was eliminated.

2. Demand accountability in senior leaders to reverse the decline in public
support for military service.
3. Reestablish the experiential base for the planning, execution, and
leadership of Army formations in large-scale operations. Currently,

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Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise

there are no general or field-grade officers who served as planners or
commanders against a near-peer adversary in combat.
4. Examine the logic of emerging Army concepts about employing massed
long-range fires and effects without considering how to gain advantage
by closing with and dominating an adversary on land.
5. Recognize that high-intensity land combat operations cannot be
sustained through short-term individual or unit rotations in the style of
the sustained low-intensity campaigns conducted over the past 20 years.
6. Transform how the National Guard is employed during extended
operations short of declared war to preclude back-to-back federal and
state deployments of National Guard soldiers in order to stabilize and
preserve military volunteerism in our communities.



7.

Revamp Army school curricula to concentrate on preparation for largescale land operations that focus on defeating a peer threat.

8. Address the underlying causal issues driving increasing Army suicide
rates, which have surpassed pre–World War II rates and are now
eclipsing the rate among civilians.
U.S. NAVY

As noted at the beginning of this chapter, the U.S. Constitution gives Congress
the power to “provide and maintain a Navy.” Inherent in this phrase is a recognition
that there is a vital national interest in the maritime environment and that this
national interest requires sustained planning and investment. This is as true today
as it was almost 250 years ago and will remain true into the future.
The U.S. Navy (USN) exists for two primary reasons: to project prompt, sustained, and effective combat power globally, both at sea and ashore, and to deter
aggression by potential adversaries by maintaining a forward operating presence
in conjunction with allies and partners. Today, the People’s Republic of China People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) can challenge the USN’s ability to accomplish
its mission in the Pacific and Indian Oceans.
In the production, employment, and control of maritime forces, the USN must
consider the scope and rate of technological change and, where appropriate, adapt
its processes and workforce development. In balancing the necessary long-term
industrial model of naval platforms against emerging short-term opportunities,
the USN must take account of advances that may present vulnerabilities and risks
as well as what is assured and secure.

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Department of Defense

Needed Reforms
l

Invest in and expand force structure. The USN’s organizing principle
remains platform-centered: vessels manned by sailors. The manned surface
and subsurface forces act in concert with land-based, air-based, and spacebased forces to project power outside sovereign territory, principally by
operating in international waters. Investments must be closely coordinated
with these other elements of military power.

1.

Build a fleet of more than 355 ships.26

2. Develop and field unmanned systems to augment the manned forces.
3. Require that range and lethality be the key factors in all procurement
and sustainment decisions for ships, aircraft, and munitions.
l

Establish a Rapid Capabilities Office. The USN must transition
technology into warfighting capability more rapidly. It must foster a culture
of innovation that includes connecting theoretical and intangible ideas with
real production environments that produce tangible and practical outcomes
and adapting proven processes to advance material solutions.
1.

Harness innovation and willingness to tolerate risk so that “good
enough” systems can be fielded rapidly.

2. Use the Space Development Agency as a model.
3. Establish an oversight Board of Directors made up of the service chief,
service secretary, and Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and
Sustainment.

— 111 —



l

Reestablish the General Board. In contrast with the Navy General
Board that served ship development so well during the interwar period,
the current joint process27 for defining the requirements for major
defense acquisitions is not well-suited to long-term planning of the
sort that is needed for USN fleet architecture and shipbuilding. The
interwar General Board should serve as a model, empowered with
final decision authority over all requirements documents concerning
ships and the major defense systems fielded on ships. The individual
board members would ensure a broad base of knowledge as well as
independent thinking.28

Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise

l

Accelerate the purchase of key munitions. It takes years to build and
maintain navies but only hours to expend their ordnance in combat. The
USN must be prepared to expend large quantities of air-launched and
sea-launched stealthy, precision, cruise missiles against targets both at
sea and ashore. Additionally, modern air defense requires the use of highperformance surface-to-air missiles.
1.

Produce key munitions at the maximum rate with significant capacity.

2. Working with the Congress, employ the widest possible range of
techniques to enhance the munitions supply chains and workforce.
l

Enhance warfighter development. The USN requires a variety of
documented qualifications for personnel to advance in their careers and
assume leadership positions. It also requires individual professional
qualifications that are focused on warfighting.
Mandate qualifications that demonstrate an understanding of core
competence in collective, integrated warfighting, especially based on
current plans and technologies.



1.

2. Elevate the Headquarters Staff focused on Warfighter Development
(N7) within the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (OPNAV) and
empower it to develop such requirements.
3. Require that war games be utilized as experiential learning environments
for the participants as a prerequisite for achieving career milestones
(department heads, commanding officers, and major commanders).
4. Highlight in training and leader development that USN forces can and
must maintain the ability to operate from and/or defend sovereign
territory to include our allies and partners.
5. Train to balance effects from kinetic to nonkinetic and from lethal to
nonlethal through effective command and control.
U.S. AIR FORCE

The U.S. Air Force today lacks a force structure with the lethality, survivability, and capacity to fight a major conflict with a great power like China, deter
nuclear threats, and meet its other operational requirements under the National
Defense Strategy.29 For 30 years, the Air Force has received less annual funding

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Department of Defense

Needed Reforms
l

Increase spending and budget accuracy in line with a threat-based
strategy. Returning the U.S. military to a force that can achieve deterrence
or win in a fight if necessary requires returning to a threat-based defense
strategy. Real budget growth combined with a more equitable distribution
of resources across the armed services is the only realistic way to create a
modernized Air Force with the capacity to meet the needs of the National
Defense Strategy. Additionally, as noted above, pass-through funding causes
numbers cited in current DOD budget documents to be higher than the
dollar amounts actually received by the Air Force.

1.

Adopt a two-war force defense strategy with scenarios for each service
that will allow the Air Force to attain the resources it requires by
developing a force-sizing construct that reflects what is required to
accomplish strategic objectives.

2. Eliminate pass-through funding, which has grown to more than
$40 billion per year and has caused the Air Force to be chronically
underfunded for decades.

— 113 —



(if pass-through funding, defined as money in the Air Force budget that does not
go to the Air Force, is removed from the equation) than the Army and Navy have
received. This underfunding has forced the Air Force to cut its forces and forgo
modernizing aging weapons systems that were never designed to operate in current
threat environments and are structurally and mechanically exhausted. The result
is an Air Force that is the oldest, smallest, and least ready in its history.
The decline in Air Force capacity and capability is occurring at the same time
the security environment demands the very options that the Air Force uniquely
provides. Combatant commanders routinely request more Air Force capabilities
than the service has the capacity to provide. The Air Force today simply cannot
accomplish all of the missions it is required to perform.
The Air Force has consistently stated on the official record that it is not sized to
meet the mission demands placed on it by the various U.S. Combatant Commands.
A 2018 study, “The Air Force We Need,”30 showed a 24 percent deficit in Air Force
capacity to meet the needs of the National Defense Strategy. Those conclusions
remain valid and are more pronounced today because of subsequent aircraft retirements. The demand is also higher because of world events. To understand these
trends, one needs only to consider that the Air Force’s future five-year budget plan
retires 1,463 aircraft while buying just 467. This makes for a reduction of 996 aircraft by 2027. The net result is a force that is smaller, older, and less ready at a time
when demand is burgeoning.

Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise

3. Increase the Air Force budget by 5 percent annually (after adjusting for
inflation) to reverse the decline in size, age, and readiness and facilitate
the transition to a more modern, lethal, and survivable force.
l

Reduce near-term and mid-term risk. Increasing the Air Force’s
acquisition of next-generation capabilities that either are or soon will be in
production will increase the ability of the United States to deter or defeat
near-term to mid-term threats.
1.

Increase F-35A procurement to 60–80 per year.

2. Build the capacity for a B-21 production rate of 15–18 aircraft per year along
with applicable elements of the B-21 long-range strike family of systems.
3. Increase Air Force airlift and aerial refueling capacity to support agile
combat employment operations that generate combat sorties from a
highly dispersed posture in both Europe and the Pacific.



4. Develop and buy larger quantities of advanced mid-range weapons (50
nm to 200 nm) that are sized to maximize targets per sortie for stealth
aircraft flying in contested environments against target sets that could
exceed 100,000 aimpoints.
5. Accelerate the development and production of the Sentinel
intercontinental ballistic missile to reduce the risk inherent in an aging
Minuteman III force in light of China’s nuclear modernization breakout.
6. Increase the number of EC-37B electronic warfare aircraft from 10 to 20
in order to achieve a minimum capacity to engage growing threats from
China across the electromagnetic spectrum.
l

Invest in future Air Force programs and efforts. Increasingly capable
adversaries require new capabilities to enable victory against those adversaries.
1.

Attain an operationally optimized advanced battle management system
as the Air Force element of the DOD Joint All Domain Command and
Control enterprise.

2. Produce the next-generation air dominance system of systems (air
moving target indication, other sensors, communications, command
and control, weapons, and uninhabited aerial vehicles).

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Department of Defense

3. Achieve moving target engagement capability and capacity against sea,
surface, and ground mobile targets at the scale necessary to meet the
needs of the National Defense Strategy.
4. Build resilient basing, sustainment, and communications for
survivability in a contested environment.
5. Establish a vigorous and sufficiently funded electromagnetic spectrum
operations recovery plan to make up for more than 20 years of neglect of
this mission area.
U.S. MARINE CORPS

Needed Reforms
l

Divest systems to implement the Force Design 2030 transformation.32
Divesting equipment that is less relevant to distributed, low-signature
operations in a contested maritime environment will make funds available
for modernization.

— 115 —



The U.S. Marine Corps (USMC) is the maritime land force of the Department
of Defense and Department of the Navy. It serves a critical role as an expeditionary amphibious force that can project power from sea to shore and beyond while
performing other specialized missions like securing America’s diplomatic outposts abroad.
Between the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, and the conclusion of U.S.
military operations in Afghanistan in August 2022, the Marine Corps engaged
in extended operations ashore as directed by the Secretary of Defense, leaving it
with little opportunity or ability to train for and execute the naval and amphibious
operations for which it is uniquely suited and directed by law. This lengthy divergence from its primary mission led to deep concern that the Corps had become a
“second land army,” prompting senior Marine Corps leaders to push for the service
to return to the sea. In addition, the USMC spent nearly two decades fighting counterinsurgency wars in Afghanistan and Iraq and developed capabilities that were
specifically geared to those fights but have limited utility in scenarios involving
evenly matched and advanced enemies or amphibious operations that are necessary for the projection of naval power.
As a result, Marine Corps Commandant General David H. Berger developed
and began to implement Force Design 2030,31 a plan that, if completed, would be
the most radical transformation of the Marine Corps since World War II. The successful implementation of this force redesign, coupled with reforms in the Marine
Corps’ personnel system and the Navy’s amphibious shipbuilding plans, will be
critical to ensuring the Corps’ future combat effectiveness.

Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise

1.

Transform USMC force structure.
a. Eliminate all USMC law enforcement battalions.
b. Transform at least one Marine Infantry Regiment into a Marine
Littoral Regiment.
c. Reduce the size of remaining infantry battalions.

2. Divest systems or equipment that are better suited to heavier
U.S. Army units.
a. Maintain divestment of M1 Abrams tanks.
b. Eliminate the majority of tube artillery (M777) batteries.
c. Reduce the number of Advanced Amphibious Assault Vehicles and
the number of their replacements.
3. Use funds made available by divestment of systems to support new
systems that are geared to the likely needs of future conflicts.



a. Increase the number of rocket artillery batteries (HIMARS).
b. Increase the number of upgraded Light Armored Vehicle
(LAV) companies.
c. Increase the number of Unmanned Aerial Systems and anti-air
systems (including counter-UAS systems).
d. Develop long-range strike missiles and anti-ship missiles for the Corps.
e. Modernize USMC infantry equipment.

l

Transform the USMC personnel paradigm. More than other services,
the USMC relies heavily on junior noncommissioned officers (NCOs) to staff
key positions across the force but especially in combat arms. For example,
E-4s routinely hold squad leader billets when the Army normally has E-6s in
those billets. The nature of more distributed operations and the increasingly
complex responsibilities of a Marine Corps rifle squad and platoon under
Force Design 2030 will only put more responsibility on the backs of squad
leaders and platoon sergeants, increasing the need for more senior Marines
in those critical positions. Additionally, the Corps needs to improve its
retention of junior NCOs after their first enlistments (the Marines have
much lower rates of reenlistment than other branches).33
1.

Align the USMC’s combat arms rank structure with the U.S. Army’s (squad
leader billets are for E-6s, and platoon sergeant billets are for E-7s).

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Department of Defense

2. Create better incentives to retain talented junior NCOs, especially in
infantry and other critical military occupational specialties.
3. Reduce unnecessary deployments to increase dwell time in order to
enable more robust primary military education.
l

Align Navy amphibious shipbuilding with Force Design 2030. The U.S.
Navy has struggled for decades to maintain an amphibious fleet that could
support USMC war plans around large-scale amphibious operations. In
addition, amphibious shipbuilding has often had to compete against other
priorities within a constrained budget and limited shipbuilding capacity.
1.

Develop and produce light amphibious warships (LAWs) to support
more distributed amphibious operations, especially in the Pacific.34

2. Maintain between 28 and 31 larger amphibious warships as opposed to
the 25 specified in current Navy shipbuilding plans and the 38 specified
before 2020.35
U.S. SPACE FORCE

Needed Reforms
l

Reverse the Biden Administration’s defensive posture. The Biden
Administration has eliminated almost all offensive deterrence capabilities
and instead will rely solely on defensive capabilities of disaggregation,
maneuver, and reconstitution—the most costly, the slowest, and ultimately
the most fragile architecture selection.

— 117 —



U.S. space forces conduct global space operations to sustain and enhance air,
land, and sea effectiveness, lethality, and superiority by providing secure broadband global communications (precision position, navigation, and timing accuracy);
attack warning and threat tracking and targeting capability (real-time intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance information); and their assured continuity of
operations both by defending U.S. assets and by conducting offensive operations
that are capable of imposing unacceptable losses on adversaries that might seek
to attack them.
The U.S. Space Force (USSF) was established to assure continuous global and
theater combat support from space, to deter attacks against U.S. space assets, and
to prevail in space should deterrence fail. The USSF posture was conceived as a
balance of offensive and defensive deterrent capabilities designed for maximum
effectiveness.

Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise

1.

Reestablish offensive capabilities to guarantee a favorable balance of
forces, efficiently manage the full deterrence spectrum, and seriously
complicate enemy calculations of a successful first strike against U.S.
space assets.

2. Restore architectural balance in U.S. space forces, both offensive and
defensive, to restore deterrence dominance efficiently and quickly.
3. Rapidly expand space control capability, to include cis-lunar space (the
region beginning at geosynchronous altitude and encompassing the
moon), to provide early warning of an enemy attack.
4.

Reduce overclassification. The USSF must move beyond the Cold War–
era culture of secrecy and overclassification that surrounded military space
to facilitate greater coordination and synchronization of efforts across the
government and commercial sectors.



l

Seek arms control and “rules of the road” understandings only when
they are unambiguously in the interests of the U.S. and its allies, and
prohibit their unilateral implementation.

Declassify appropriate information about terrestrial and on-orbit space
capabilities that threaten the U.S. space constellation, as well as those
being pursued by our competitors, to secure the principled right to
counter them offensively.
l

Implement policies suited to a mature USSF. No longer a “newborn,” the
USSF has entered its fourth year of existence, and the lessons learned can be
incorporated across all facets of the force to increase its effectiveness.
1.

Restructure from the current “unity of effort” structure to “unity
of command.”

2. Lead the U.S. government’s development of a clear and unambiguous
declaratory policy that the United States will operate at will in space
and enforce these operations with capabilities that ensure effective
deterrence and the ability to impose our will if necessary.
3. End the current study phase of concept development and issue
necessary guidance for the development and fielding of offensive
capabilities.

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Department of Defense

4. Alter the Space Development Agency’s current “fail-early” approach
and transition to a methodology that maintains aggressive timelines but
with significantly greater engineering rigor, with special attention to
sustainment, support, and fully integrated space operations.
5. Increase the number of general officer positions to ensure the Space
Force’s ability to compete for resources on a common basis with the
other services.
6. Explore creation of a Space Force Academy to attract top aero–astro
students, engineers, and scientists and develop astronauts. The academy
could be attached initially to a large existing research university like
the California Institute of Technology or MIT, share faculty and
funding, and eventually be built separately to be on par with the other
service academies.
U.S. CYBER COMMAND

Needed Reforms
l

Ensure that USCYBERCOM is properly focused. Mission creep
is leading to wasteful overlap with the Department of Homeland
Security, National Security Agency, Department of Defense, and Central
Intelligence Agency.
1.

Separate USCYBERCOM from the National Security Agency per
congressional direction.

2. Conduct effective offensive cyber-effects operations at the tactical and
strategic levels.

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USCYBERCOM was established in 2010 by the Department of Defense to unify
the direction of cyberspace operations, strengthen DOD cyberspace capabilities,
and integrate and enhance U.S. cyber expertise. Cyber capabilities and threats are
evolving rapidly. Accordingly, a conservative Administration should be especially
sensitive to and prepared to meet the challenges presented by bureaucratic silos,
inappropriately rigid tactical doctrine, and strategic thinking’s historic tendency
to lag behind technological capability.
The preliminary evidence from the war in Ukraine suggests that existing cyber
doctrine and certain capability and target assumptions may be incorrect or misplaced. The following recommendations therefore presuppose that there will be
a rigorous “lessons learned” analysis and review of existing U.S. doctrine in light
of the battlefield evidence.

Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise

3. Expand defensive cyber-effects operations authorized by President
Trump's classified National Security Presidential Memorandum 13,
“United States Cyber Operations Policy.”36
4. End USCYBERCOM’s participation in federal efforts to “fortify”
U.S. elections to eliminate the perception that DOD is engaging in
partisan politics.
l

Increase USCYBERCOM’s effectiveness.
1.

Accelerate the integration of cyber and electronic warfare (EW)
doctrine and capabilities, abiding by the time-tested norms of
combined-arms warfare.

2. Mandate that development teams will include both coders and soldiers,
aircrew, and sailors with kinetic experience at the platoon level.
3. Break the paradigm of cyber authorities held at the strategic level.



4. Increase cyber resilience by, for example, protecting the Nuclear
Command, Control, and Communications Network and the Air Force’s
Cyber Resiliency Office for Weapons Systems (CROWS).
5. Expand coordination of joint operations with allies.
6. Implement the Government Accountability Office’s recommendation
that the DOD Chief Information Officer, Commander of USCYBERCOM,
and Commander of Joint Force Headquarters–DOD Information
Network “align policy and system requirements to enable DOD to have
enterprise-wide visibility of cyber incident reporting to support tactical,
strategic, and military strategies for response.”37
l

Rationalize strategy and doctrine.
1.

Update the October 2022 National Security Strategy to define DOD
roles and responsibilities beyond existing platitudes.

2. Apply traditional deterrence strategies and principles for using cyber/
EW in retaliation for foreign cyberattacks and/or EW actions against
U.S. infrastructure and citizens.

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Department of Defense

SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES

Even though America’s conventional war in Afghanistan was a failure, Special
Operations Forces of the United States Special Operation Command (USSOCOM)
executed an extremely effective counterterrorism campaign: There has not been
another major attack on the homeland, global terrorist threats are reduced and
managed, collaboration with international partners is effective, and units under
USSOCOM are the most capable and experienced warfighters in two generations.
There is a movement to reduce the scope and scale of USSOCOM’s mission in
favor of other service priorities in great-power competition. This would be a mistake because USSOCOM can be employed effectively in great-power competition.
It makes sense to capitalize on USSOCOM’s experience and repurpose its mission to include irregular warfare within the context of great-power competition,
thereby providing a robust organization that is capable of achieving strategic
effects that are critical both to our national defense and to the defense of our
allies and partners around the globe. Irregular warfare should be used proactively
to prevent state and nonstate actors from negatively affecting U.S. policies and
objectives while simultaneously strengthening our regional partnerships. If we
maintain irregular warfare’s traditional focus on nonstate actors, we limit ourselves
to addressing only the symptoms (nonstate actors), not the problems themselves
(China, Russia, North Korea, and Iran).



Needed Reforms
l

Make irregular warfare a cornerstone of security strategy. The U.S.
can project strength through unified action with our Interagency,38 allies,
and partners by utilizing irregular warfare capabilities synchronized
with elements of national power. Broadly redefining irregular warfare to
address current state and nonstate actors is critical to countering irregular
threats that range from the Chinese use of economic warfare to Russian
disinformation and Islamist terrorism. A broad definition of irregular
warfare in the National Security Strategy would allow for a whole-ofgovernment approach, thereby providing resources and capabilities to
counter threats and ultimately serve as credible deterrence at the strategic
and tactical levels.

1.

Define irregular warfare as “a means by which the United States uses all
elements of national power to project influence abroad to counter state
adversaries, defeat hostile nonstate actors, deter wider conflict, and
maintain peace in great-power competition.”

2. Characterize the state and nonstate irregular threats facing the U.S. by
region in the National Security Strategy.

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Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise

3. Direct that irregular warfare resources, capabilities, and strategies be
incorporated directly into the overall National Defense Strategy instead
of being relegated to a supporting document.
4. Establish an Irregular Warfare Center of Excellence to help DOD train,
equip, and organize to conduct irregular warfare as a core competency
across the spectrum of competition, crisis, and conflict.
l

Counter China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) globally. DOD, in
conjunction with the Interagency, allies, and partner nations, must work
proactively to counter China’s BRI around the globe.
1.

Task USSOCOM and corresponding organizations in the Pentagon
with conceptualizing, resourcing, and executing regionally based
operations to counter the BRI with a focus on nations that are key
to our energy policy, international supply chains, and our defense
industrial base.



2. Use regional and global information operations to highlight Chinese
violations of Exclusive Economic Zones, violations of human rights, and
coercion along Chinese fault lines in Xinjiang Province, Hong Kong, and
Taiwan in addition to China’s weaponization of sovereign debt.
3. Directly counter Chinese economic power with all elements of national
power in North America, Central America, and the Caribbean to
maintain maritime freedom of movement and protect the digital
infrastructure of nations in the region.
l

Establish credible deterrence through irregular warfare to protect
the homeland. A whole-of-government approach and willingness to
employ cyber, information, economic, and counterterrorist irregular
warfare capabilities should be utilized to protect the homeland.
1.

Include the designation of USSOCOM as lead for the execution of
irregular warfare against hostile state and nonstate actors in the
National Defense Strategy.

2. Demonstrate a willingness to employ offensive cyber capabilities against
adversaries who conduct cyberattacks against U.S. infrastructure,
businesses, personnel, and governments.

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Department of Defense

3. Employ a “name and shame” approach by making information regarding
the names of entities that target democratic processes and international
norms available in a transparent manner.
4. Work with the Interagency to employ economic warfare, lawfare, and
diplomatic pressure against hostile state and nonstate actors.
5. Maintain the authorities necessary for an aggressive counterterrorism
posture against threats to the homeland.
NUCLEAR DETERRENCE

Nuclear deterrence is one of the most critical elements of U.S. national security,
as it forms a backstop to U.S. military forces. Every operational plan relies on the
assumption that nuclear deterrence holds. Ever since the U.S. first acquired nuclear
weapons, Administrations of both parties have pursued a strategy designed to deter
nuclear and non-nuclear attack; assure allies; and, in the event of nuclear employment, restore deterrence at the lowest possible cost to the U.S. Today, however,
America’s ability to meet these goals is increasingly challenged by the growing
nuclear threats posed by our adversaries.

l

China is pursuing a strategic breakout of its nuclear forces, significantly
shifting the nuclear balance and forcing the U.S. to learn how to deter two
nuclear peer competitors (China and Russia) simultaneously for the first
time in its history.
Russia is expanding its nuclear arsenal and using the threat of nuclear
employment as a coercive tactic in its war on Ukraine.

l

North Korea is advancing its nuclear capabilities.

l

Iran is inching closer to nuclear capability.

Meanwhile, all U.S. nuclear capabilities and the infrastructure on which they
rely date from the Cold War and are in dire need of replacement. The next Administration will need to focus on continuing the effort to modernize the nuclear triad
while updating our strategy and capabilities to meet the challenges presented by
a more threatening nuclear environment.
Needed Reforms
l

Prioritize nuclear modernization. All components of the nuclear triad are
far beyond their intended lifetimes and will need to be replaced over the next

— 123 —



l

Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise

decade. This effort is required for the U.S. to maintain its nuclear triad—and
will be the bare minimum needed to maintain U.S. strategic nuclear deterrence.
1.

Accelerate the timelines of critical modernization programs including the
Sentinel missile, Long Range Standoff Weapon (LRSO), Columbia-class
ballistic missile submarine, B-21 bomber, and F-35 Dual Capable Aircraft.

2. Reject any congressional proposals that would further extend the
service lives of U.S. capabilities such as the Minuteman III ICBM.
3. Ensure sufficient funding for warhead life extension programs (LEP),
including the B61-12, W80-4, W87-1 Mod, and W88 Alt 370.
Develop the Sea-Launched Cruise Missile-Nuclear (SLCM-N). In 2018,
the Trump Administration proposed restoring the SLCM-N to help fill a
growing gap in U.S. nonstrategic capabilities and improve deterrence against
limited nuclear attack.39 The Biden Administration canceled this program
in its 2022 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR).40 The next President should
support and accelerate funding for development of the SLCM-N with the
goal of deployment by the end of the decade.



l

l

Account for China’s nuclear expansion. To ensure its ability to deter
both Russia and the growing Chinese nuclear threat, the U.S. will need more
than the bare minimum of nuclear modernization. President Biden’s 2022
NPR described the problem but proposed no recommendations to restore or
maintain nuclear deterrence.
1.

Consider procuring more modernized nuclear systems (such as the
Sentinel missile or LRSO) than currently planned.

2. Improve the ability of the U.S. to utilize the triad’s upload capacity in
case of a crisis.
3. Review what capabilities in addition to the SLCM-N (for example,
nonstrategic weapons or new warhead designs) are needed to deter the
unique Chinese threat.
l

Restore the nuclear infrastructure. The United States must restore
its necessary nuclear infrastructure so that it is capable of producing and
maintaining nuclear weapons.

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Department of Defense

1.

Accelerate the effort to restore plutonium pit production, which is essential
both for modern warhead programs and for recapitalizing the stockpile.

2. Continue to invest in rebuilding infrastructure, including facilities at
the National Laboratories that support nuclear weapons development.
3. Restore readiness to test nuclear weapons at the Nevada National
Security Site to ensure the ability of the U.S. to respond quickly to
asymmetric technology surprises.
l

Correctly orient arms control. The U.S. should agree to arms control
agreements only if they help to advance the interests of the U.S. and its allies.
1.

Reject proposals for nuclear disarmament that are contrary to the goal
of bolstering deterrence.

2. Pursue arms control as a way to secure the national security interests of
the U.S. and its allies rather than as an end in itself.

MISSILE DEFENSE

Missile defense is a critical component of the U.S. national security architecture.
It can help to deter attack by instilling doubt that an attack will work as intended,
take adversary “cheap shots” off the table, and limit the perceived value of missiles as tools of coercion. It also allows space for diplomacy during a crisis and can
protect U.S. and allied forces, critical assets, and populations if deterrence fails.41
Adversaries are relying increasingly on missiles to achieve their aims.
l

l

l

China and Russia, in addition to their vast and growing ballistic missile
inventories, are deploying new hypersonic glide vehicles and investing in
new ground-launched, air-launched, and sea-launched cruise missiles that
uniquely challenge the United States in different domains.
North Korea has pursued an aggressive missile testing program and is
becoming increasingly belligerent toward South Korea and Japan.
Iran continues to maintain a missile arsenal that is capable of striking U.S.
and allied assets in the Middle East and Europe, and its rocket launches
demonstrate that it either has or is developing the ability to build ICBMs.

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3. Prepare to compete in order to secure U.S. interests should arms control
efforts continue to fail.

Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise

Missile defense has been underprioritized and underfunded in recent years. In
light of these growing threats, the incoming Administration should treat missile
defense as a top priority.
Needed Reforms
l

Champion the benefits of missile defense. Despite its deterrence and
damage-limitation benefits, opponents argue incorrectly that U.S. missile
defense is destabilizing because it threatens Russian and Chinese secondstrike capabilities.

1.

Reject claims made by the Left that missile defense is destabilizing
while acknowledging that Russia and China are developing their own
advanced missile defense systems.

2. Commit to keeping homeland missile defense off the table in any arms
control negotiations with Russia and China.42



l

Strengthen homeland ballistic missile defense. The United States
currently deploys 44 Ground-Based Interceptors (GBIs) as part of its
Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) system to defend the homeland
against North Korea, but as North Korea improves its missile program, this
system is at risk of falling behind the threat.43
1.

Buy at least 64 of the Next Generation Interceptor (NGI), which is more
advanced than the GBI, for an eventual uniform fleet of interceptors.44
The Biden Administration currently plans to buy only 20.

2. Consider additional steps to strengthen the GMD system such as a
layered missile defense or a third interceptor site on the East Coast.
l

l

Increase the development of regional missile defense. As the Ukraine
conflict amply demonstrates, U.S. regional missile defense capabilities are
very limited. The United States has been unable to supply our partners
reliably with any capabilities, and the number and types of regional missile
defense platforms are less than the U.S. needs for its own defense. The U.S.
should prioritize procurement of more regional defense systems such as
Theater High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD), Standard Missile-3, and
Patriot missiles.
Change U.S. missile defense policy. Historically, the U.S. has chosen
to rely solely on deterrence to address the Russian and Chinese ballistic

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Department of Defense

missile threat to the homeland and to use homeland missile defense only
against rogue nations.
1.

Abandon the existing policy of not defending the homeland against
Russian and Chinese ballistic missiles and focus on how to improve
defense as the Russian and Chinese missile threats increase at an
unprecedented rate.45

2. Invest in future advanced missile defense technologies like directed
energy or space-based missile defense that could defend against more
numerous missile threats.
l

Invest in new track-and-intercept capabilities. The advent of
hypersonic missiles and increased numbers of cruise missile arsenals by
threat actors poses new challenges to our missile defense capabilities.
1.

Invest in cruise missile defense of the homeland.46

2. Accelerate the program to deploy space-based sensors that can detect
and track missiles flying on nonballistic trajectories.47



3. Accelerate the Glide Phase Interceptor, which is intended to counter
hypersonic weapons.

AUTHOR’S NOTE: The mission of the Department of Defense is to provide the military forces needed to deter

war and ensure our nation’s security. This chapter provides a blueprint to ensure that the Department can meet our
national security needs. Its preparation was a collective enterprise of individuals involved in the 2025 Presidential
Transition Project. All contributors to this chapter are listed at the front of this volume, but Sergio de la Pena and
Chuck DeVore deserve special mention. The author alone assumes responsibility for the content of this chapter, and
no views expressed herein should be attributed to any other individual.

— 127 —

Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise
ENDNOTES

1.
2.
3.
4.

5.

6.

7.

8.



9.

10.

11.

12.
13.
14.

15.

16.
17.

18.
19.

U.S. Constitution, Preamble, https://constitution.congress.gov/constitution/preamble/ (accessed
February 16, 2023).
U.S. Constitution, Article I, § 8, https://constitution.congress.gov/constitution/article-1/ (accessed
February 16, 2023).
U.S. Constitution, Article II, § 2, https://constitution.congress.gov/constitution/article-2/ (accessed
February 16, 2023).
Established pursuant to S. 1605, National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2022, Public Law No. 117-81,
117th Congress, December 27, 2021, Division A, Title X, § 1004, https://www.congress.gov/117/plaws/publ81/
PLAW-117publ81.pdf (accessed February 16, 2023).
H.R. 3684, Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act, Public Law No. 117-58, 117th Congress, November 15, 2021,
Division G, Title IX, §§ 70901–70953, https://www.congress.gov/117/plaws/publ58/PLAW-117publ58.pdf
(accessed February 16, 2023).
S. 2943, National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017, Public Law 114-328, 114th Congress, December
23, 2016, Division A, Title IX, § 901, https://www.congress.gov/114/statute/STATUTE-130/STATUTE-130-Pg2000.
pdf (accessed February 16, 2023).
H.R. 3622, Goldwater–Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, Public Law No. 99-433,
99th Congress, October 1, 1986, https://www.congress.gov/99/statute/STATUTE-100/STATUTE-100-Pg992.pdf
(accessed February 16, 2023).
U.S. Department of Defense, Defense Security Cooperation Agency, Historical Sales Book, Fiscal Years
1950–2021, p. 7, https://www.dsca.mil/sites/default/files/dsca_historical_sales_book_FY21.pdf (accessed
February 15, 2023).
Paul K. Kerr, “Arms Sales: Congressional Review Process,” Congressional Research Service Report for Members
and Committees of Congress No. RL31675, updated June 10, 2022, p. 1, https://sgp.fas.org/crs/weapons/
RL31675.pdf (accessed February 15, 2023).
Keith Webster, “How to Reform America’s Military Sales Process,” The Hill Congress Blog, October 6, 2022,
https://thehill.com/opinion/congress-blog/3675933-how-to-reform-americas-military-sales-process/
(accessed February 15, 2023).
See Thomas W. Spoehr, “The Administration and Congress Must Act Now to Counter the Worsening Military
Recruiting Crisis, Heritage Foundation Issue Brief No. 5283, July 28, 2022, https://www.heritage.org/sites/
default/files/2022-07/IB5283.pdf.
Ibid.
Ronald Reagan Institute, “Reagan National Defense Survey,” conducted November 2021, p. 4, https://www.
reaganfoundation.org/media/358085/rndf_survey_booklet.pdf (accessed February 16, 2023).
See Paul J. Larkin, “Protecting the Nation by Employing Military Spouses,” Heritage Foundation Commentary,
June 6, 2019, https://www.heritage.org/jobs-and-labor/commentary/protecting-the-nation-employingmilitary-spouses.
See Jude Schwalbach, “Military Families Deserve Flexible Education Options,” Heritage Foundation
Commentary, April 14, 2021, https://www.heritage.org/education/commentary/military-families-deserveflexible-education-options.
See Chapter 7, “The Intelligence Community,” infra.
The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA); the National Security Agency (NSA); the National GeospatialIntelligence Agency (NGA); the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO); and the intelligence and
counterintelligence elements of the military services: U.S. Air Force Intelligence, U.S. Navy Intelligence, U.S.
Army Intelligence, and U.S. Marine Corps Intelligence, which also receive guidance and oversight from the
Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (USDI).
The Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).
The Department of Energy’s Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence; the Department of Homeland
Security’s Office of Intelligence and Analysis and the intelligence and counterintelligence elements of the
U.S. Coast Guard; the Department of Justice’s Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Drug Enforcement
Administration’s Office of National Security Intelligence; the Department of State’s Bureau of Intelligence and
Research; and the Department of the Treasury’s Office of Intelligence and Analysis.

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Department of Defense

— 129 —



20. Staff Study, IC21: Intelligence Community in the 21st Century, Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence,
U.S. House of Representatives, 104th Congress, 1996, p. 71, https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA315088.pdf
(accessed February 15, 2023).
21. Ronald O’Rourke, “Great Power Competition: Implications for Defense—Issues for Congress,” Congressional
Research Service Report for Members and Committees of Congress No. R43838, updated November 8, 2022,
https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R43838/93 (accessed February 15, 2023).
22. U.S. Government Accountability Office, Defense Intelligence and Security: DOD Needs to Establish Oversight
Expectations and to Develop Tools That Enhance Accountability, GAO-21-295, May 2021, https://www.gao.gov/
assets/gao-21-295.pdf (accessed February 15, 2023).
23. The U.S. military has a long history of providing support to civil authorities, particularly in response to
disasters but for other purposes as well. The Defense Department currently defines defense support of civil
authorities (DSCA) as “Support provided by U.S. Federal military forces, DoD civilians, DoD contract personnel,
DoD Component assets, and National Guard forces (when the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the
Governors of the affected States, elects and requests to use those forces in Title 32, U.S.C., status) in response
to requests for assistance from civil authorities for domestic emergencies, law enforcement support, and
other domestic activities, or from qualifying entities for special events. Also known as civil support.” U.S.
Department of Defense, Directive No. 3025.18, “Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA),” December 29,
2010, p. 16, https://www.dco.uscg.mil/Portals/9/CG-5R/nsarc/DoDD%203025.18%20Defense%20Support%20
of%20Civil%20Authorities.pdf (accessed February 15, 2023).
24. U.S. Army, “Who We Are: The Army’s Vision and Strategy,” https://www.army.mil/about/ (accessed
February 17, 2023).
25. “[T]he Army’s internal assessment must be balanced against its own statements that unit training is focused
on company-level operations [reflective of counterintelligence requirements] rather than battalion or brigade
operations [much less division or corps to meet large-scale ground combat operations against a peer
competitor such as Russia or China]. Consequently, how these ‘ready’ brigade combat teams would perform
in combat operations is an open question.” “Executive Summary” in 2023 Index of U.S. Military Strength,
ed. Dakota L. Wood (Washington: The Heritage Foundation, 2023), p. 16, http://thf_media.s3.amazonaws.
com/2022/Military_Index/2023_IndexOfUSMilitaryStrength.pdf (accessed February 15, 2023).
26. For background on the USN’s fleet size, see Brent D. Sadler, “Rebuilding America’s Military: The United States
Navy,” Heritage Foundation Special Report No. 242, February 18, 2021, https://www.heritage.org/sites/default/
files/2021-02/SR242.pdf, and Ronald O’Rourke, “Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background
and Issues for Congress,” Congressional Research Service Report for Members and Committees of Congress
No. RL32665, December 21, 2022, https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/RL/RL32665 (accessed
February 15, 2023).
27. The Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS) is the process by which the services
develop and the Joint Staff approves the requirements for major defense acquisitions. See Defense
Acquisition University, “Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDA),” https://www.dau.
edu/acquipedia/pages/articledetails.aspx#!371 (accessed February 15, 2023).
28. The board would seek to balance a mix of active military and civilians with expertise in and responsibility
for major acquisitions and former military and civilians with experience in strategy and acquisitions. The
proposed composition would include the Vice Chief of Naval Operations as Chairman, with three-star level
membership from the Joint Staff, the Navy and Defense Acquisition Executives, and the Naval Sea Systems
Command. In addition, there would be four-star retired naval officers/Navy civil servants as members, one
each named by the Chairmen of the House and Senate Armed Services Committees, the Secretary of the
Navy, and the Secretary of Defense. Finally, there would be a member appointed by the Secretary of the Navy
who had previous senior experience in the defense industry.
29. See James Mattis, Secretary of Defense, Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United States
of America: Sharpening the American Military’s Competitive Edge, U.S. Department of Defense, https://
dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2018-National-Defense-Strategy-Summary.pdf (accessed
February 17, 2023), and U.S. Department of Defense, 2022 National Defense Strategy of the United States of
America Including the 2022 Nuclear Posture Review and the 2022 Missile Defense Review, https://oldcc.gov/
resource/2022-national-defense-strategy (accessed February 17, 2023).



Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise
30. U.S. Air Force, “The Air Force We Need: 386 Operational Squadrons,” September 17, 2018, https://www.
af.mil/News/Article-Display/Article/1635070/the-air-force-we-need-386-operational-squadrons/ (accessed
February 17, 2023).
31. General David H. Berger, Commandant of the Marine Corps, “Force Design 2030,” U.S. Department of the
Navy, U.S. Marine Corps, March 2020, https://www.hqmc.marines.mil/Portals/142/Docs/CMC38%20Force%20
Design%202030%20Report%20Phase%20I%20and%20II.pdf?ver=2020-03-26-121328-460 (accessed
February 17, 2023).
32. Department of the Navy, United States Marine Corps, “Force Design 2030,” March 2020, https://www.hqmc.
marines.mil/Portals/142/Docs/CMC38%20Force%20Design%202030%20Report%20Phase%20I%20and%20II.
pdf?ver=2020-03-26-121328-460 (accessed February 15, 2023).
33. Philip Athey, “Here Are Some of the Ways the Marines Are Trying to Improve Retention,” Marine Corps Times,
November 15, 2021, https://www.marinecorpstimes.com/news/your-marine-corps/2021/11/15/treat-peoplelike-human-beings-here-are-some-of-the-ways-the-marines-are-trying-to-improve-retention/ (accessed
February 15, 2023).
34. Megan Eckstein, “Marines, Navy Near Agreement on Light Amphibious Warship Features,” Defense News,
October 5, 2022, https://www.defensenews.com/naval/2022/10/05/marines-navy-near-agreement-on-lightamphibious-warship-features/ (accessed February 16, 2023).
35. Megan Eckstein, “Marines Explain Vision for Fewer Traditional Amphibious Warships,” Defense News, June
21, 2021, https://www.defensenews.com/naval/2021/06/21/marines-explain-vision-for-fewer-traditionalamphibious-warships-supplemented-by-new-light-amphib/ (accessed February 16, 2023).
36. See Sidney J. Freedberg Jr., “Trump Eases Cyber Ops, but Safeguards Remain: Joint Staff,” Breaking Defense,
September 17, 2018, https://breakingdefense.com/2018/09/trump-eases-cyber-ops-but-safeguards-remainjoint-staff/ (accessed March 7, 2023); Dustin Volz, “White House Confirms It Has Relaxed Rules on U.S. Use
of Cyberweapons,” The Wall Street Journal, September 20, 2018, https://www.wsj.com/articles/white-houseconfirms-it-has-relaxed-rules-on-u-s-use-of-cyber-weapons-1537476729 (accessed March 7, 2023); and
Federation of American Scientists, Intelligence Resource Program, “National Security Presidential Memoranda
[NSPMs]: Donald J. Trump Administration,” updated March 7, 2022, https://irp.fas.org/offdocs/nspm/index.
html (accessed March 7, 2023).
37. U.S. Government Accountability Office, DOD Cybersecurity: Enhanced Attention Needed to Ensure Cyber
Incidents Are Appropriately Reported and Shared, GAO-23-105084, November 2022, p. 36, https://www.gao.
gov/assets/gao-23-105084.pdf (accessed February 17, 2023).
38. See Paul Evancoe, “Special Operations and the Interagency Team,” U.S.Military.com, https://usmilitary.
com/special-operations-and-the-interagency-team/#:~:text=Seldom%20considered%20are%20those%20
other%20government%20agency%20%28OGA%29,response%20and%20consequence%20management%20
to%20name%20a%20few (accessed February 17, 2023).
39. U.S. Department of Defense, Nuclear Posture Review, February 2018, pp. 54–55, https://media.defense.
gov/2018/Feb/02/2001872886/-1/-1/1/2018-NUCLEAR-POSTURE-REVIEW-FINAL-REPORT.PDF (accessed
February 17, 2023).
40. U.S. Department of Defense, 2022 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America Including the
2022 Nuclear Posture Review and the 2022 Missile Defense Review, pp. 3 and 20.
41. Patty-Jane Geller, “Missile Defense,” in 2023 Index of U.S. Military Strength, ed. Dakota L. Wood (Washington:
The Heritage Foundation, 2023), pp. 507–508, http://thf_media.s3.amazonaws.com/2022/Military_
Index/2023_IndexOfUSMilitaryStrength.pdf.
42. Matthew R. Costlow, “The Folly of Limiting U.S. Missile Defenses for Nuclear Arms Control,” National
Institute for Public Policy Information Series, Issue No. 505, October 18, 2021, https://nipp.org/wp-content/
uploads/2021/10/IS-505.pdf (accessed February 16, 2023).
43. Forum for American Leadership, “Don’t Hand North Korea a Win in the Missile Defense Review,” January 4,
2022, https://forumforamericanleadership.org/dprk-missile-threat (accessed February 16, 2023).
44. Patty-Jane Geller, “It’s Time to Get Homeland Missile Defense Right,” Defense News, January 4, 2021, https://
www.defensenews.com/opinion/commentary/2021/01/04/its-time-to-get-homeland-missile-defenseright/#:~:text=Restoring%20our%20eroding%20edge%20when,advanced%20technology%20and%20
new%20capabilities.%E2%80%9D (accessed February 16, 2023).

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Department of Defense
45. Forum for American Leadership, “How Biden's Missile Defense Review Can Succeed,” October 21, 2021, https://
forumforamericanleadership.org/missile-defense-review (accessed February 16, 2023).
46. Tom Karako, Matt Strohmeyer, Ian Williams, Wes Rumbaugh, and Ken Harmon, North America Is a Region,
Too: An Integrated, Phased, and Affordable Approach to Air and Missile Defense for the Homeland, Center
for Strategic and International Studies, Missile Defense Project, July 2022, https://csis-website-prod.
s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/publication/220714_Karako_North_America.pdf?VersionId=BhIKa8jHHF_
kV94NXRMx6D4m2o6LQqUf (accessed February 16, 2023).
47. Rebeccah Heinrichs, “Why America Needs the Ability to Track Enemy Missiles from Space,” The Hill, April 16,
2019, https://thehill.com/opinion/national-security/438939-why-america-needs-the-ability-to-track-enemymissiles-from-space/ (accessed February 16, 2023).



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5

DEPARTMENT OF
HOMELAND SECURITY
Ken Cuccinelli

PRIMARY RECOMMENDATION

l

l

U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) be combined with
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE); U.S. Citizenship
and Immigration Services (USCIS); the Department of Health and
Human Services (HHS) Office of Refugee Resettlement (ORR); and
the Department of Justice (DOJ) Executive Office for Immigration
Review (EOIR) and Office of Immigration Litigation (OIL) into a standalone border and immigration agency at the Cabinet level (more than
100,000 employees, making it the third largest department measured
by manpower).
The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) be moved to
the Department of Transportation.

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Our primary recommendation is that the President pursue legislation to dismantle the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). After 20 years, it has not
gelled into “One DHS.” Instead, its various components’ different missions have
outweighed its decades-long attempt to function as one department, rendering
the whole disjointed rather than cohesive. Breaking up the department along its
mission lines would facilitate mission focus and provide opportunities to reduce
overhead and achieve more limited government. In lieu of a status quo DHS, we
recommend that:

Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise

l

l

l

l



l

The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) be moved to the
Department of the Interior or, if combined with CISA, to the Department of
Transportation.
The U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) be moved to DOJ and, in time of full-scale
war (i.e., threatening the homeland), to the Department of Defense (DOD).
Alternatively, USCG should be moved to DOD for all purposes.
The U.S. Secret Service (USSS) be divided in two, with the protective
element moved to DOJ and the financial enforcement element moved to the
Department of the Treasury.
The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) be privatized.
The Science and Technology Directorate (S&T) be moved to DOD and the
Office of Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction be moved to the FBI.

All of the remaining supporting components could be dismantled because
their functions already exist in the moving components as well as the receiving departments. Cutting these costs would save the American taxpayers
significant sums.
Unless and until this dismantling recommendation is pursued and achieved,
however, DHS will statutorily continue to exist, and it needs many reforms. Accordingly, we now turn to recommended changes in DHS as it exists now.
MISSION STATEMENT

The Department of Homeland Security protects the American homeland from
and prepares for terrorism and other hazards in both the physical and cyber realms,
provides for secure and free movement of trade and travel, and enforces U.S. immigration laws impartially.
OVERVIEW

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) was created in the aftermath of
the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, and subsequent mailings of anthrax
spores. The Homeland Security Act of 2002,1 which created the department, states
that DHS’s primary mission is to prevent terrorist attacks within the U.S.; reduce
the nation’s vulnerability to terrorism; minimize the damage from and assist in the
recovery from any terrorist attacks; prepare and respond to natural and manmade
crises and emergencies; and monitor connections between illegal drug trafficking
and terrorism, coordinate efforts to sever such connections, and interdict illegal
drug trafficking.

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Department of Homeland Security

l

Secure and control the border;

l

Thoroughly enforce immigration laws;

l

l

l

Correctly and efficiently adjudicate immigration benefit applications while
rejecting fraudulent claims;
Secure the cyber domain and collaborate with critical infrastructure sectors
to maintain their security;
Provide states and localities with a limited federal emergency response and
preparedness;

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Unfortunately for our nation, the federal government’s newest department
became like every other federal agency: bloated, bureaucratic, and expensive. It also
lost sight of its mission priorities. DHS has also suffered from the Left’s wokeness and
weaponization against Americans whom the Left perceives as its political opponents.
To truly secure the homeland, a conservative Administration needs to return
the department to the right mission, the right size, and the right budget. This would
include reorganizing the department and shifting significant resources away from
several supporting components to the essential operational components. Prioritizing border security and immigration enforcement, including detention and
deportation, is critical if we are to regain control of the border, repair the historic
damage done by the Biden Administration, return to a lawful and orderly immigration system, and protect the homeland from terrorism and public safety threats.
This also includes consolidating the pieces of the fragmented immigration system
into one agency to fulfill the mission more efficiently.
The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) is a DHS component that the Left has weaponized to censor speech and affect elections at the
expense of securing the cyber domain and critical infrastructure, which are threatened daily.2 A conservative Administration should return CISA to its statutory and
important but narrow mission.
The bloated DHS bureaucracy and budget, along with the wrong priorities,
provide real opportunities for a conservative Administration to cut billions in
spending and limit government’s role in Americans’ lives. These opportunities
include privatizing TSA screening and the Federal Emergency Management
Agency (FEMA) National Flood Insurance Program, reforming FEMA emergency
spending to shift the majority of preparedness and response costs to states and
localities instead of the federal government, eliminating most of DHS’s grant programs, and removing all unions in the department for national security purposes.
A successful DHS would:

Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise

l

l

l

Secure our coasts and economic zones;
Protect political leaders, their families, and visiting heads of state or
government; and
Oversee transportation security.



OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY (SEC)

In the next Administration, the Office of the Secretary should take on the following key issues and challenges to ensure the effective operation of DHS.
Expansion of Dedicated Political Personnel. The Secretary of Homeland
Security is a presidentially appointed and Senate-confirmed political appointee,
but for budgetary reasons, he or she has historically been unable to fund a dedicated team of political appointees. A key first step for the Secretary to improve
front-office functions is to have his or her own dedicated team of political appointees selected and vetted by the Office of Presidential Personnel, which is not reliant
on detailees from other parts of the department, to help ensure the completion of
the next President’s agenda.
An Aggressive Approach to Senate-Confirmed Leadership Positions.
While Senate confirmation is a constitutionally necessary requirement for
appointing agency leadership, the next Administration may need to take a novel
approach to the confirmations process to ensure an adequate and rapid transition.
For example, the next Administration arguably should place its nominees for key
positions into similar positions as “actings” (for example, putting in a person to
serve as the Senior Official Performing the Duties of the Commissioner of CBP
while that person is going through the confirmation process to direct ICE or
become the Secretary). This approach would both guarantee implementation of
the Day One agenda and equip the department for potential emergency situations
while still honoring the confirmation requirement. The department should also
look to remove lower-level but nevertheless important positions that currently
require Senate confirmation from the confirmation requirement, although this
effort would require legislation (and might also be mooted in the event of legislation that closes portions of the department that currently have Senate-confirmed
leadership).
Clearer, More Durable, and Political-Only Line of Succession. Based on
previous experience, the department needs legislation to establish a more durable
but politically oriented line of succession for agency decision-making purposes.
The ideal sequence for line of succession is certainly debatable, except that in circumstances where a career employee holds a leadership position in the department,
that position should be deemed vacant for line-of-succession purposes and the next
eligible political appointee in the sequence should assume acting authority. Further,

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Department of Homeland Security

l

l

Certification by applicants that they comply with all aspects of federal
immigration laws, including the honoring of all immigration detainers.
Certification by applicants that they are both registered with E-Verify
and using E-Verify in a transparent and nonevasive manner. For states

— 137 —



individuals wielding acting Secretary authority should have explicit authority to
finalize agency actions, including regulations, to ensure that the department’s
homeland security mission is fulfilled.
Soft Closure of Unnecessary Offices. Pending a possible presidential decision to shrink or eliminate DHS itself, the next Administration will still have the
obligation to protect the homeland as required by law. The Secretary therefore
can and should use his or her inherent, discretionary leadership authority to “soft
close” ineffective and problematic corners of the department. While those corners
are to be determined, the Secretary could shift personnel, funding, and operational responsibility to mission-essential components of the department, including
the Office of the Secretary itself. This effort not only would make the department
more efficient, but also would support a legislative move to shrink or dismantle
the department by showing that the agency can fulfill national security–critical
functions without its current bloated bureaucracy.
Restructuring and Redistribution of Career Personnel. To strengthen
political decision-making and ensure that taxpayer dollars are being used legally
and efficiently, the Secretary should make major changes in the distribution of
career personnel throughout the department. For example, personnel from parts
of the department undergoing soft closure could be redistributed to what will be
workload-intensive corners of the department, including national security–critical
and transparency functions. All personnel with law enforcement capacity should
be removed immediately from office billets and deployed to field billets to maximize law enforcement capacity.
Compliance for Grants and Other Federal Funding. The next Administration should take steps to restore lawfulness and integrity to the department’s
massive regimen of federal grant programs, most of which are managed and distributed by the Federal Emergency Management Agency. The Secretary should
direct FEMA to ensure that all FEMA-issued grant funding for states, localities,
and private organizations is going to recipients who are lawful actors, can demonstrate that they are in compliance with federal law, and can show that their mission
and actions support the broader homeland security mission. All applicants and
potential recipients of such grant funding should be required to meet certain preconditions for eligibility (except for receipt of post-disaster or nonhumanitarian
funding) or should simply be considered ineligible for funding. Such preconditions
should include at least the following:

Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise

and localities, that would include certification that all components of that
government, and not just the applicant agency, are registered with and
use E-Verify.
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If the applicant is a state or locality, commitment by that state or locality to
total information-sharing in the context of both federal law enforcement
and immigration enforcement. This would include access to department of
motor vehicles and voter registration databases.

Non-Use of Discretionary Guest Worker Visa Authorities. To stop facilitating the availability of cheap foreign labor in order to support American workers
(particularly poor and middle-class American workers) and follow congressional
intent, the Secretary should explicitly cease using at least two discretionary authorities as part of his or her broader effort to support American workers.
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The Secretary should make it clear that he or she will not use the Secretary’s
existing discretionary authority to increase the number of H-2B (seasonal
non-agricultural) visas above the statutorily set cap.
The Secretary should not issue any regulations in support of the “H-2
eligible” country list, the effect of which would prevent favoring certain
foreign nationals seeking an H-2 guest worker visa based simply on their
nationality.

Restoration of Honesty and Transparency. The Secretary should use his or
her inherent authority as leader of the department to follow up with congressional
and other partners to disclose information and provide the transparency that has
been obstructed during the Biden Administration. The Secretary should proceed
from the assumption that congressional inquiries and public information requests
were unfulfilled and then seek to fulfill them.
Replacement of the Entire Homeland Security Advisory Committee. The
Secretary should plan to quickly remove all current members of the Homeland
Security Advisory Committee and replace them as quickly as is feasible.
U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION (CBP)

If all immigration agencies are not merged, including USCIS and ORR, then
an appropriate third alternative would be to consolidate ICE and CBP to form
a combined Border Security and Immigration Agency (BSIA). This would integrate critical interdiction, enforcement, and investigative resources, enhancing
coordination and refocusing collective efforts on the vast and complex cross-border threats impacting our nation’s health, safety, and national security. It would

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also simultaneously add efficiencies to our nation’s capacity to facilitate lawful
trade and travel.
The BSIA should establish clear mission requirements, responsibilities, and
mandates under existing law regarding the persistent need for and utilization of
U.S. military personnel and resources to assist BSIA with increasing whole-of-government efforts and long-term strategy to secure our nation’s borders effectively.
In addition, appropriate elements within the newly created BSIA should be designated as part of the U.S. National Security and Intelligence Community.
A conservative Administration should eliminate any prohibitive guidance,
direction, or mandate from DHS or the Administration that curtails or limits CBP
from publishing detailed border security and enforcement data not impacting
intelligence, interdiction, and investigative operations, methods, or sources. DHS
should issue a regulation mandating that CBP publish accurate and timely border
security data, readily available to the public, on a regular basis that avoid White
House and DHS leadership review and approval.
The White House should grant the authority for CBP and DHS executives to
utilize component aviation assets under the Office of Air and Marine (OAM). CBP
and DHS have worldwide missions with personnel and facilities that are deployed
across the globe and in every state in the U.S. With a CBP workforce alone of more
than 60,000 people (240,000-plus for DHS) encompassing more than a thousand
sea, land, and airports, it is essential that the Commissioner, Deputy Commissioner,
Secretary, and Deputy Secretary can travel efficiently to facilities to maintain
appropriate situational awareness across the department’s vast mission set and
interact with the expansive workforce. Although CBP operates one of the largest
aviation components of any domestic U.S. law enforcement agency, executives are
prohibited from utilizing the agency’s aviation assets to facilitate official travel.
Executives are required to fly on commercial airlines, and this requirement significantly limits their ability to have classified communications and takes them
offline for extended periods of time.
Border Patrol (BP) and OAM should be combined within CBP. BP has more than
20,000 personnel, and OAM has approximately 1,800. OAM’s assets are dedicated
in support of BP operations the vast majority of the time, yet redundant approvals, strategies, and independent hierarchal commands serve as impediments to
efficient and practical resource deployments.
CBP should restart and expand use of the horseback-mounted Border Patrol. As
part of this announcement, the Secretary should clear the records and personnel
files of those who were falsely accused by Secretary Alejandro Mayorkas of whipping migrants and issue a formal apology on behalf of DHS and CBP.
The Secretary should combine the Office of Trade (OT) and Trade Relations
with the Office of Field Operations (OFO). The OT is the smallest of CBP’s components, and its operational counterpart, OFO, has a workforce of more than 30,000.



Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise

OT’s function is interwoven with that of its OFO operational counterpart. Combining OT with OFO would achieve streamlined operations and increase OT’s capacity
and capability by leveraging OFO’s expansive resources.
CBP, ICE, and USCIS all have authority to issue Notices to Appear (NTA) to
removable aliens in their presence, which begins removal proceedings. In most
instances, CBP should turn illegal aliens over to ICE for detention, and ICE can
then issue any needed NTA. CBP should issue NTAs only in limited situations
for humanitarian reasons, such as medical emergencies. In addition, CBP should
eliminate use of Notices to Report (NTR) altogether.
CBP’s established national standards of Transport, Escort, Detention, and
Search (TEDS) have been widely interpreted and expanded by lower courts. This
has resulted in unrealistic and differing detention standards for CBP facilities based
on the jurisdiction within which they fall, negatively impacting operations. ICE has
suffered similarly. A single nationwide detention standard should be codified that
prevents individual states from mandating that federal government agencies adhere
to widely expansive and ever-changing sets of standards. Such standards should allow
the flexibility to use large numbers of temporary facilities such as tents.
The annual costs associated with establishing and maintaining temporary facilities to address the flow of illegal migration and associated care, transportation,
and processing are prohibitive, and CBP’s budget is inadequate. CBP is forced to
forgo critical mission-essential endeavors to fund the additional associated costs.
Often, this requires the reprogramming of funding at the DHS level, which has a
negative impact on other DHS components’ operations. This predictable cost that
has to be paid from existing CBP and DHS funding levels reduces CBP’s operational
readiness and ability to accomplish its diverse and critical missions to protect the
American people. The next President should request a realistic budget that fully
pays for these costs.
Increased funding is needed for BP to hire additional support personnel, which
would relieve uniformed BP agents from administrative duties associated with
processing aliens and allow them to return to their national security mission.
Congress should increase funding for facility upgrades at strategic land Ports of
Entry (POEs), including expanding state-of-the-art technology such as Non-Intrusive Inspection equipment. Today, the cartels exploit the aging facilities and lack
of adequate technology to smuggle illicit drugs, contraband, and more successfully
through our nation’s POEs.
U.S. IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT (ICE)
Needed Reforms

Since the formation of DHS, ICE has increasingly been tasked with auxiliary
missions that have little or nothing to do with either immigration or customs

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enforcement. To return ICE to its primary mission, any new Administration that
wishes to restore the rule of law to our immigration enforcement efforts should:
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Direct ICE to stop ignoring criminal aliens identified through the
287(g) program.4 Ultimately, Congress should prevent ICE from ignoring
criminal aliens identified by local law enforcement agencies that are partners
in the 287(g) program. However, before congressional action, ICE should
be directed to take custody of all aliens with records for felonies, crimes of
violence, DUIs, previous removals, and any other crime that is considered a
national security or public safety threat as defined under current laws.
Eliminate T and U visas. Victimization should not be a basis for an
immigration benefit. If an alien who was a trafficking or crime victim is
actively and significantly cooperating with law enforcement as a witness,
the S visa is already available and should be used. Pending elimination of the
T and U visas, the Secretary should significantly restrict eligibility for each
visa to prevent fraud.
Issue clear guidance regarding detention and bond for aliens.
Thousands of illegal aliens are allowed to bond out of immigration detention
only to disappear into the interior of the United States where many commit
crimes and many others disappear, never to be heard from again. This
occurs primarily because of poorly worded bond regulations, contradictory
bond policy memoranda, and poor practices for managing released
aliens and the Alternatives to Detention (ATD) Program, which requires
significant reform.
Prioritize national security in the Student and Exchange Visitor
Program (SEVP). ICE should end its current cozy deference to educational
institutions and remove security risks from the program. This requires
working with the Department of State to eliminate or significantly reduce
the number of visas issued to foreign students from enemy nations.

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Order ICE to stop closing out pending immigration cases and apply
the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) as written by Congress.3
The Biden Administration closed out tens of thousands of immigration
cases that had already been prepared and were slated for expedited removal
processing or hearings before the U.S. Immigration Court. This misguided
action constituted an egregious example of lawlessness that allowed
thousands of illegal aliens and other immigration violators to go free in the
United States.

Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise

Most of the foregoing can be accomplished rapidly and effectively through executive action that is both lawful and appropriate. Additionally, ICE should clarify
who is responsible for enforcing its criminal and civil authorities. It should also
remove self-imposed limitations on its nationwide jurisdiction.
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Homeland Security Investigations (HSI) Special Agents in the 1811
series should enforce Title 8 and 18 crimes as the biggest part of their
portfolio. Alien smuggling, trafficking, and cross-border crime as defined
under Title 85 and Title 186 should be the focus of ICE operations.
The role of ICE Deportation Officers should be clarified. ICE
Enforcement and Removal Operations (ERO) should be identified as being
primarily responsible for enforcing civil immigration regulations, including
the civil arrest, detention, and removal of immigration violators anywhere
in the United States, without warrant where appropriate, subject only to the
civil warrant requirements of the INA where appropriate.
All ICE memoranda identifying “sensitive zones” where
ICE personnel are prohibited from operating should be
rescinded. Rely on the good judgment of officers in the field to avoid
inappropriate situations.
To maximize the efficient use of its resources, ICE should make full
use of existing Expedited Removal (ER) authorities. The agency has
limited the use of ER to eligible aliens apprehended within 100 miles of the
border. This is not a statutory requirement.

New Policies

U.S. national security and public safety interests would be well-served if ICE
were to be combined with CBP and USCIS, as mentioned above. Additionally, ICE/
HSI, along with CBP, should be full participants in the Intelligence Community.
The use of Blackies Warrants should be operationalized within ICE. These civil
search warrants are commonly used for worksite enforcement when agents have
probable cause that illegal aliens are employed at a business. This would streamline investigations.
Safeguarding Americans will require not just securing the border, but continuous vetting and investigations of many aliens who exploited President
Biden’s open border for potentially nefarious purposes, including some Afghan
evacuees sent directly to the U.S. during America’s disastrous withdrawal from
Afghanistan.

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Department of Homeland Security

Budget
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Congress should mandate and fund additional bed space for alien
detainees. ICE should be funded for a significant increase in detention
space, raising the daily available number of beds to 100,000.
Congress should fund ICE for at least 20,000 ERO officers and 5,000
Office of the Principal Legal Advisor (OPLA) attorneys.

U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION SERVICES (USCIS)

U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) is the agency tasked with
administering the legal immigration and certain temporary visa programs.
Needed Reforms

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Since January 2021, USCIS’s priorities have been misaligned, and this has transformed it into an open-borders agency, ignoring the critical role that it plays in
national security, public safety, and safeguarding the integrity of our immigration
system. USCIS should be returned to operating as a screening and vetting agency.
Regulatory efforts have focused on easing asylum eligibility in a manner that is
guaranteed to exacerbate asylum fraud as people surge at the border. Emphasis
also has been placed on removing legal barriers to immigration, such as the use
of public benefits. These actions violate statutes, erode congressional intent, and
provide a significant magnet for continued illegal immigration.
Additionally, USCIS resources have been misappropriated to focus more on
creating and expanding large-scale parole and temporary status programs that
violate the law and are otherwise contrary to congressional intent instead of focusing on a more secure and efficient process for those who are seeking benefits. The
ever-increasing number of applications filed has made it difficult to vet applications adequately for eligibility, fraud, and specific national security and public
safety problems.
The Fraud Detection and National Security Directorate (FDNS) is currently a
small directorate with assigned officers reporting through the chain of command in
the field, and this has led to stovepiping, lack of coordination in national policy, and
inconsistencies throughout the agency. To prioritize vetting and fraud detection,
FDNS should undergo a structural shift focused on direct reporting from the field
to headquarters, reclassification of leadership, and FDNS directives taking precedence over those of other component entities. Correcting the current misalignment
of agency priorities and resources should begin with this primary shift in focus to
vetting and fraud detection. These actions would reform the agency, returning it
to its screening and vetting mission in protecting the homeland.
Other structural changes should include reimplementation of the USCIS denaturalization unit—an effort to maintain integrity in the system by identifying and

Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise



prosecuting criminal and civil denaturalization cases, in combination with the
Department of Justice, for aliens who obtained citizenship through fraud or other
illicit means. Additionally, USCIS should create a criminal enforcement component within the agency to investigate immigration benefits fraud under Title 8
(perhaps requiring additional legislative and regulatory authorities for the officers themselves) and to prosecute cases through Special Assistant U.S. Attorneys
(SAUSAs) with substantive knowledge in the field. Particular attention should be
given to addressing increasing incidents of forced labor trafficking in temporary
work visa programs.
While the Biden regulatory agenda has focused on at least two major rules—the
credible fear rule and the public charge rule—USCIS has utilized other policy and
internal procedural mechanisms to extend employment authorization to large
groups of people who are in the country without legal status. The agency has
taken quiet steps to cut corners and lessen adjudicatory standards. During a transition period, a complete audit of agency policies, memoranda, and management
directives issued during the Biden Administration should be completed, and rescission documents should be prepared for issuance within the first few days of the
incoming Administration. Additionally, regulatory documents should be drafted
to review or reverse all regulations promulgated during the Biden Administration.
New Policies

To advance the national interest, the three core immigration agencies—USCIS,
ICE, and CBP—should remerge and have immigration elements outside of DHS
(such as ORR of HHS) included. The fragmented immigration enforcement framework that developed in the wake of the Homeland Security Act has weakened
each agency and should be remediated. Combining these critical agencies would
strengthen their capabilities, ensure cooperation, and promote information-sharing. Agency responsibilities and the delineation of authorities, such as inconsistent
use of deferred action and issuance of NTAs by each agency, have long been a point
of contention that would be addressed much more easily if they were recombined
into a single entity.
Alternatively, new policies for USCIS as it currently exists should focus on matters that can be addressed through administrative action.
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The workforce should be realigned and, as necessary, retrained on base
eligibility and fraud detection rather than speed in processing.
Training should be returned to Federal Law Enforcement Training Centers
(FLETC), which would underscore the enforcement role of USCIS as a
vetting agency, and be rebranded accordingly.

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Department of Homeland Security

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Management Directives and policies should realign to ensure that the
workforce, while adaptable and able to handle the bulk of the USCIS mission,
is not allowed to be pulled off mission work to focus on unlawful programs
(DACA, mass parole for Afghans, Ukrainians, Venezuelans, etc.), which
divert resources away from nuclear family and employment programs.

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Improve the integrity of the temporary work visa programs;

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Repeal Temporary Protected Status (TPS) designations;

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The regulatory agenda should include the immediate submission of notices of
proposed rulemaking for the Trump Administration’s public charge rule (including aspects from its original notice of proposed rulemaking), temporary work
visa reform, employment authorization reform rules, asylum bars rule, and a
third-country transit rule. At a minimum, an enhanced regulatory agenda should
include rules strengthening the integrity of the asylum system, parole reform, and
U visa reform that prioritizes relief for victims of heinous crimes and ensures that
we protect the truest and most deserving victims of crime.
Not all policy changes require formal rulemaking, however, as internal guidance
documents are generally exempt under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).7
In this subregulatory space, USCIS policy memos and operational guidance should
reduce the validity of employment authorization documents and end the COVID
flexibilities, including the reliance on biometrics reuse. USCIS should also enforce
existing regulations by rejecting incomplete applications and petitions, ensuring
both that they are completed before accepted for filing and that FDNS signs off on
all approved applications and petitions before approval notices are sent to the alien
or petitioner. Other efforts should be focused on adjudication standards returning
to nearly 100 percent interview requirements for all appropriate cases.
The incoming Administration should spearhead an immigration legislative
agenda focused on creating a merit-based immigration system that rewards highskilled aliens instead of the current system that favors extended family–based and
luck-of-the-draw immigration. To that end, the diversity visa lottery should be
repealed, chain migration should be ended while focusing on the nuclear family,
and the existing employment visa program should be replaced with a system to
award visas only to the “best and brightest.”
Internal efforts to limit employment authorization should be matched by congressional action to narrow statutory eligibility to work in the United States and
mitigate unfair employment competition for U.S. citizens. The oft-abused H-1B
program should be transformed into an elite program through which employers
are vying to bring in only the top foreign workers at the highest wages so as not to
depress American opportunities. Additionally, Congress should:

Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise

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Permanently authorize and make mandatory E-Verify; and

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End parole abuse by legislating specific parole standards.

USCIS should make it clear that where no court jurisdiction exists, it will not
honor court decisions that seek to undermine regulatory and subregulatory efforts.
Finally, USCIS still requires access to all relevant national security and law enforcement databases in the same vein as any other agency in the intelligence space. This
is a key concept that should be addressed as USCIS is returned to functioning
primarily as a vetting agency.



Budget

USCIS is primarily fee-funded, operating on revenue derived by those who are
seeking immigration benefits, work permits, and naturalization. The total agency
budget requested for fiscal year (FY) 2023, including both fees and a small appropriation, is slightly less than $6 billion.8 The bulk of funds are derived from application
fees through the Immigrant Examinations Fee Account. As a general principle, adjudication of applications and petitions should be paid by applicants, not American
taxpayers. It is critical that any changes in the budget, even in the wake of a realigned
agency combined with ICE and CBP, should retain a fee-funded model.
Given the Obama and Biden Administrations’ lack of will, fees should be
increased agencywide to keep in step with inflation and the true cost of the adjudications. The incoming Administration should immediately submit a fee rule
that reflects such an increase. Aside from an increase in all fees, the rule should
drastically limit the availability for fee waivers and should implement a fee for
asylum applications. Additionally, Congress should allow for a 10 percent acrossthe-board increase in all fees for all fee rules to account for the fact that new fee
rules always lag behind budget requirements.
USCIS should strive to increase opportunities for premium processing, a benefit by which applicants can expedite their processing times. While this places
time burdens on adjudicators, it provides an opportunity for a significant influx
of money into the agency, which is not currently available. While simply raising
fees to the necessary levels to make the agency run efficiently would be preferable, without the need for expanded premium processing, this short-term measure
should be utilized, particularly if longer-term fee rules are unsuccessful.
At least until USCIS is caught up on all case backlogs, all applicants rejected for
any benefit or status adjudication should be required to leave the U.S. immediately.
Ordinary process can resume once all case backlogs have been adjudicated.
Finally, USCIS should pause the intake of applications in a benefit category
when backlogs in that category become excessive. Once USCIS adjudicators can
decrease that caseload to a manageable number, application intake should resume.

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Department of Homeland Security

Personnel

USCIS should be classified as a national security–sensitive agency, and all of
its employees should be classified as holding national security–sensitive positions. Leaks must be investigated and punished as they would be in a national
security agency, and the union should be decertified. Any employees who cannot
accept that change and cannot conform their behavior to the standards required
by such an agency should be separated. USCIS’s D.C. personnel presence should
be skeletal, and agency employees with operational or security roles should be
rotated out to offices throughout the United States. These USCIS employees
should live and work in the communities that are most affected by their daily
duties and decisions.
NECESSARY BORDER AND IMMIGRATION STATUTORY,
REGULATORY, AND ADMINISTRATIVE CHANGES

Legislative Proposals
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Title 42 authority in Title 8. Create an authority akin to the Title 42
Public Health authority that has been used during the COVID-19 pandemic
to expel illegal aliens across the border immediately when certain nonhealth conditions are met, such as loss of operational control of the border.
Mandatory appropriation for border wall system infrastructure. The
monies appropriated would be used to fund the construction of additional
border wall systems, technology, and personnel in strategic locations in
accordance with the Border Security Improvement Plan (BSIP).

Appropriation for Port of Entry infrastructure. Border security is not
addressed solely by systems in between the ports of entry. POEs require
technology and physical upgrades as well as an influx of personnel to meet
capacity demands and act as the literal gatekeepers for the country. This is
the first line of defense against drug and human smuggling operations.

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The current border security crisis was made possible by glaring loopholes
in our immigration system. The result was a preventable and predictable historic increase in illegal and inadmissible encounters along our southern border.
This pulled limited resources from the front lines of our nation’s borders and
away from their national security mission, releasing a vast and complex set
of threats into our country. To regain our sovereignty, integrity, and security,
Congress must pass meaningful legislation to close the current loopholes and
prevent future Administrations from exploiting them for political gain or personal ideology.

Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise

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Unaccompanied minors
1.

Congress should repeal Section 235 of the William Wilberforce
Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2008 (TVPRA),9
which provides numerous immigration benefits to unaccompanied
alien children and only encourages more parents to send their children
across the border illegally and unaccompanied. These children too often
become trafficking victims, which means that the TVPRA has failed.

2. If an alternative to repealing Section 235 of the TVPRA is necessary,
the section should be amended so that all unaccompanied children,
regardless of nationality, may be returned to their home countries in a
safe and efficient manner. Currently, the TVPRA allows only children
from contiguous countries (Canada and Mexico) to be returned while
every other unaccompanied minor must be placed into a lengthy
process that usually results in the minor’s landing in the custody of an
illegal alien family member.



3. Congress must end the Flores Settlement Agreement by explicitly
setting nationwide terms and standards for family and unaccompanied
detention and housing. Such standards should focus on meeting human
needs and should allow for large-scale use of temporary facilities (for
example, tents).
4. Congress should amend the Homeland Security Act and portions of
the TVPRA to move detention of alien children expressly from the
Department of Health and Human Services to DHS.
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Asylum reform
1.

The standard for a credible fear of persecution should be raised and
aligned to the standard for asylum. It should also account specifically for
credibility determinations that are a key element of the asylum claim.

2. Codify former asylum bars and third-country transit rules.
3. Congress should eliminate the particular social group protected ground
as vague and overbroad or, in the alternative, provide a clear definition
with parameters that at a minimum codify the holding in Matter of A-Bthat gang violence and domestic violence are not grounds for asylum.10

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Department of Homeland Security

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Parole reform. Congress should end the widespread abuse of parole in
contravention of statute and return it to its origins as an extraordinary
remedy for very limited purposes.
NGOs and processing. Congress should halt funds given to
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) to process and transport
illegal aliens into and throughout the United States. Such funds and
infrastructure, including the DHS joint processing centers, should be
redirected to secure the border, detain aliens, and provide space for
immigration court proceedings.
Other pathways for border crossers. While Congress should use its
oversight authority to ensure that Expedited Removal is used to the fullest
extent and followed to the letter of the law, other paths for border crossers
should be included in a legislative package.
1.

Migrant protection protocols. Update the statutory language
providing the basis for the Remain in Mexico program as needed to
withstand judicial scrutiny and executive inaction.

3. Other expedited pathways. Congress should explicitly permit
programs akin to the Prompt Asylum Claim Review (PACR) and
Humanitarian Asylum Review Process (HARP) programs.
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Employment authorization
1.

Congress should reassert control of employment authorization, which is
subject to rampant regulatory abuse, and limit it to certain categories of
legal immigrants and non-immigrants.

2. Congress should also permanently authorize E-Verify and make
it mandatory.
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State and local law enforcement

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2. Asylum Cooperative Agreements. While the agreements themselves
must be negotiated, Congress should mandate that the executive branch
work faithfully to negotiate and execute ACAs and set parameters
to ensure that an unwilling executive cannot renege on an existing
agreement or abandon the effort.

Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise

1.

Congress should unequivocally authorize state and local law
enforcement to participate in immigration and border security actions
in compliance with Arizona v. United States.11

2. Congress should require compliance with immigration detainers to
the maximum extent consistent with the Tenth Amendment and set
financial disincentives for jurisdictions that implement either official or
unofficial sanctuary policies.
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Prosecutorial discretion. Congress should restrict the authority for
prosecutorial discretion to eliminate it as a “catch-all” excuse for limiting
immigration enforcement.
Mandatory detention. Congress should eliminate ambiguous
discretionary language in Title 8 that aliens “may” be detained and clarify
that aliens “shall” be detained. This language, which contrasts with other
“shall detain” language in statute, creates unhelpful ambiguity and allows the
executive branch to ignore the will of Congress.



Regulations
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Withdraw Biden Administration regulations and reissue new
regulations in the following areas:
1.

Credible Fear/Asylum Jurisdiction for Border Crossers.

2. Public Charge.
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T-Visa and U-Visa reform. Unless and until T and U visas are repealed,
each program needs to be reformed to ensure that only legitimate victims
of trafficking and crimes who are actively providing significant material
assistance to law enforcement are eligible for spots in the queue.
Repeal TPS designations.
H-1B reform. Transform the program into an elite mechanism
exclusively to bring in the “best and brightest” at the highest wages while
simultaneously ensuring that U.S. workers are not being disadvantaged by
the program. H-1B is a means only to supplement the U.S. economy and to
keep companies competitive, not to depress U.S. labor markets artificially in
certain industries.

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Employment authorization. Along with the legislative proposal, take
regulatory action to limit the classes of aliens eligible for work authorization.

Executive Orders
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Pathways for border crossers

1.

Direct the Department of State and the Department of Homeland
Security to reinstate Asylum Cooperative Agreements with Northern
Triangle Countries immediately.

2. Recommence negotiations with Mexico to fully implement the Remain
in Mexico Protocols.
3. Reinstate, to the extent possible, expedited pathways with full credible
fear/immigration court process (PACR and HARP).
4. Prohibit the use of Notices to Report, the use of any funds for travel
into the interior of the United States, and government flights or
transportation for aliens.

6. Eliminate the use of ATD for border crossers except in rare cases and
only with the explicit authority of the Secretary.
7.

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Prohibit the use of parole except in matters that are certified by the
Secretary of Homeland Security as requiring action for humanitarian or
significant public benefit reasons, and prohibit the use of parole in any
categorical circumstance.

Enforcement
1.

Restrict prosecutorial discretion to eliminate it as a “catch-all” excuse
for limiting immigration enforcement.

2. Mandate the use of E-Verify for anyone doing business with
the government.

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5. Mandate that ICE use all detention space in full compliance with
Section 235 of the INA, issue weekly reports on detention capacity, and
provide authority for low-level temporary capacity (for example, tents)
once permanent space is full.

Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise

3. Designate USCIS as Intelligence Community–adjacent, ensuring that it
has access to national security and law enforcement databases.
4. Rescind all memoranda limiting enforcement of immigration laws
including those identifying sensitive zones.
5. End ICE’s widespread use of termination and administrative closure of
cases in immigration court.
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Averting or curtailing a mass migration event



1.

Provide that whenever the Secretary of Homeland Security determines
that an actual or anticipated mass migration of aliens en route to or
arriving off the coast of the U.S. presents urgent circumstances requiring
an immediate federal response, the Secretary may make, subject to the
approval of the President, rules and regulations prohibiting in whole or
in part the introduction of persons from such countries or places as he
or she shall designate in order to avert or curtail such mass migration
and for such period of time as is deemed necessary, including through
the expulsion of such aliens. Such rule and regulation making shall not
be subject to the requirements of the Administrative Procedures Act.

2. Provide that notwithstanding any other provision of law, when the
Secretary makes such a determination and then promulgates, subject to
the approval of the President, such rules and regulations, the Secretary
shall have the authority to waive all legal requirements of Title 8 that
the Secretary, in his or her sole discretion, determines are necessary to
avert or curtail the mass migration.
Subregulatory Matters
l

USCIS priorities/structural changes

1.

Ensure that focus is returned to vetting, base eligibility of applicants,
and fraud detection.

2. Realign the Fraud Detection and National Security Directorate (FDNS)
to ensure agencywide consistency on implementation of fraud detection
and vetting policies.
3. Review and repeal any internal agency memo that is inconsistent with
the priorities described in this chapter.

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Department of Homeland Security

l

l

l

287(g) program. Issue a memo prohibiting any jurisdiction that applies
from being denied access to the program unless good cause is shown.
Homeland Security Investigations (HSI) priorities. Issue Department
Management Directive (and ICE companion Directive) to refocus HSI
on immigration offenses and criminal offenses typically associated with
immigration (for example, human trafficking). All criminal investigative
work without a clear nexus to the border or otherwise to Title 8 should be
turned over to the appropriate federal agency.
Blackie’s Warrants. ICE OPLA, ERO, and HSI should issue a joint internal
memo on operationalizing Blackie’s Warrants for immediate use on
worksite enforcement and other appropriate investigations and operations.

FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY (FEMA)
Needed Reforms

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FEMA is the lead federal agency in preparing for and responding to disasters,
but it is overtasked, overcompensates for the lack of state and local preparedness
and response, and is regularly in deep debt. After passage of the 1988 Stafford Act,12
the number of declared federal disasters rose dramatically as most disaster costs
were shifted from states and local governments to the federal government. In
addition, state-friendly FEMA regulations, such as a “per capita indicator,” failed
to maintain the pace of inflation and made it easy to meet disaster declaration
thresholds. This combination has left FEMA unprepared in both readiness and
funding for the truly catastrophic disasters in which its services are most needed.
Reform of FEMA requires a greater emphasis on federalism and state and local
preparedness, leaving FEMA to focus on large, widespread disasters.
Under the Stafford Act, FEMA has the authority to adjust the per capita indicator for damages, which creates a threshold under which states and localities are
not eligible for public assistance. FEMA should raise the threshold because the per
capita indicator has not kept pace with inflation, and this over time has effectively
lowered the threshold for public assistance and caused FEMA’s resources to be
stretched perilously thin. Alternatively, applying a deductible could accomplish
a similar outcome while also incentivizing states to take a more proactive role in
their own preparedness and response capabilities. In addition, Congress should
change the cost-share arrangement so that the federal government covers 25 percent of the costs for small disasters with the cost share reaching a maximum of 75
percent for truly catastrophic disasters.
FEMA is also responsible for the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP),
nearly all of which is issued by the federal government. Washington provides

Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise

insurance at prices lower than the actuarially fair rate, thereby subsidizing flood
insurance. Then, when flood costs exceed NFIP’s revenue, FEMA seeks taxpayer-funded bailouts. Current NFIP debt is $20.5 billion, and in 2017, Congress
canceled $16 billion in debt when FEMA reached its borrowing authority limit.
These subsidies and bailouts only encourage more development in flood zones,
increasing the potential losses to both NFIP and the taxpayer. The NFIP should
be wound down and replaced with private insurance starting with the least risky
areas currently identified by the program.



Budget Issues

FEMA manages all grants for DHS, and these grants have become pork for states,
localities, and special-interest groups. Since 2002, DHS/FEMA have provided
more than $56 billion in preparedness grants for state, local, tribal, and territorial
governments. For FY 2023, President Biden requested more than $3.5 billion for
federal assistance grants.13 Funds provided under these programs do not provide
measurable gains for preparedness or resiliency. Rather, more than any objective
needs, political interests appear to direct the flow of nondisaster funds.
The principles of federalism should be upheld; these indicate that states better
understand their unique needs and should bear the costs of their particularized
programs. FEMA employees in Washington, D.C., should not determine how billions of federal tax dollars should be awarded to train local law enforcement officers
in Texas, harden cybersecurity infrastructure in Utah, or supplement migrant
shelters in Arizona. DHS should not be in the business of handing out federal tax
dollars: These grants should be terminated. Accomplishing this, however, will
require action by Members of Congress who repeatedly vote to fund grants for
political reasons. The transition should focus on building resilience and return
on investment in line with real threats.
Personnel

FEMA currently has four Senate-confirmed positions. Only the Administrator
should be confirmed by the Senate; other political leadership need not be confirmed by the Senate. Additionally, FEMA’s “springing Cabinet position” should be
eliminated, as this creates significant unnecessary challenges to the functioning of
the whole of DHS at points in time when coordinated responses are most needed.
CYBERSECURITY AND INFRASTRUCTURE SECURITY AGENCY (CISA)
Needed Reforms

CISA is supposed to have two key roles: (1) protection of the federal civilian
government networks (.gov) while coordinating the execution of national cyber
defense and sharing information with non-federal and private-sector partners

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Department of Homeland Security

U.S. COAST GUARD (USCG)
Needed Reforms

The U.S. Coast Guard fleet should be sized to the needs of great-power competition, specifically focusing efforts and investment on protecting U.S. waters, all
while seeking to find (where feasible) more economical ways to perform USCG
missions. The scope of the Coast Guard’s mission needs to be focused on protecting
U.S. resources and interests in its home waters, specifically its Exclusive Economic
Zone (200 miles from shore). USCG’s budget should address the growing demand
for it to address the increasing threat from the Chinese fishing fleet in home waters
as well as narcotics and migrant flows in the Caribbean and Eastern Pacific. Doing
this will require reversing years of shortfalls in shipbuilding, maintenance, and
upgrades of shore facilities as well as seeking more cost-effective ship and facility
designs. In wartime, the USCG supports the Navy, but it has limited capability and
capacity to support wartime missions outside home waters.

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and (2) national coordination of critical infrastructure security and resilience. Yet
CISA has rapidly expanded its scope into lanes where it does not belong, the most
recent and most glaring example being censorship of so-called misinformation
and disinformation.
CISA’s funding and resources should align narrowly with the foregoing two
mission requirements. The component’s emergency communications and Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards (CFATS) roles should be moved to FEMA;
its school security functions should be transferred to state homeland security
offices; and CISA should refrain from duplicating cybersecurity functions done
elsewhere at the Department of Defense, FBI, National Security Agency, and U.S.
Secret Service.
Of the utmost urgency is immediately ending CISA’s counter-mis/disinformation efforts. The federal government cannot be the arbiter of truth. CISA began
this work because of alleged Russian misinformation in the 2016 election, which
in fact turned out to be a Clinton campaign “dirty trick.” The Intelligence Community, including the NSA or DOD, should counter foreign actors. At the time of this
writing, release of the Twitter Files has demonstrated that CISA has devolved into
an unconstitutional censoring and election engineering apparatus of the political
Left. In any event, the entirety of the CISA Cybersecurity Advisory Committee
should be dismissed on Day One.
For election security, CISA should help states and localities assess whether
they have good cyber hygiene in their hardware and software in preparation for
an election—but nothing more. This is of value to smaller localities, particularly by
flagging who is attacking their websites. CISA should not be significantly involved
closer to an election. Nor should it participate in messaging or propaganda.

Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise



New Policies

The Coast Guard’s mission set should be scaled down to match congressional budgeting in the long term, with any increased funding going to acquisitions
based on an updated Fleet Mix Analysis. The current shipbuilding plan is insufficient based on USCG analysis, and the necessary numbers of planned Offshore
Patrol Cutters and National Security Cutters are not supported by congressional
budgets. The Coast Guard should be required to submit to Congress a long-range
shipbuilding plan modeled on the Navy’s 30-Year Shipbuilding Plan. Ideally this
should become part of the Navy plan in a new comprehensive naval long-range
shipbuilding plan to ensure better coherency in the services’ requirements.
Outside of home waters, and following the Caribbean and Eastern Pacific, the
Coast Guard should prioritize limited resources to the nation’s expansive Pacific
waters to counter growing Chinese influence and encroachment. Expansion of
facilities in American Samoa and basing of cutters there is one clear step in this
direction and should be accelerated; looking to free association states (Palau, the
Federated States of Micronesia, and the Republic of the Marshall Islands) for
enhanced and persistent presence, assuming adequate congressional funding, is
another such step.
The Secretary of the Navy should convene a naval board to review and reset
requirements for Coast Guard wartime mission support. To inform and validate
these updated requirements, the Chief of Naval Operations and the Coast Guard
Commandant should execute dedicated annual joint wartime drills focused on
USCG’s wartime missions in the Pacific (the money for these activities should be
allocated from DOD). An interagency maritime coordination office focused on
developing and overseeing comprehensive efforts to advance the nation’s maritime interests and increase its military and commercial competitiveness should
be established.
Given the USCG’s history of underfunded missions, if the Coast Guard is to continue to maintain the Arctic mission, money to do so adequately will be required
over and above current funding levels. Consideration should be given to shifting
the Arctic mission to the Navy. Either way, the Arctic mission should be closely
coordinated with our Canadian, Danish, and other allies.
Personnel

USCG is facing recruitment challenges similar to those faced by the military
services. The Administration should stop the messaging on wokeness and diversity
and focus instead on attracting the best talent for USCG. Simultaneously, consistent with the Department of Defense, USCG should also make a serious effort to
re-vet any promotions and hiring that occurred on the Biden Administration’s
watch while also re-onboarding any USCG personnel who were dismissed from
service for refusing to take the COVID-19 “vaccine,” with time in service credited

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Department of Homeland Security

to such returnees. These two steps could be foundational for any improvements
in the recruiting process.
U.S. SECRET SERVICE (USSS)
Needed Reforms

New Policies

USSS should transfer to the Department of Justice and Department of the
Treasury all investigations that are not related to its protective function. It should
begin the logistical operation of closing all field offices throughout the country and
internationally to the extent they are not taken over by Treasury or Justice. USSS
agents stationed outside of Washington, D.C., should be transferred to work in
Immigration and Customs Enforcement field offices where they would continue to
be the “boots on the ground” to follow up on threat reports throughout the country
and liaise with local law enforcement for visits by protectees.

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The U.S. Secret Service must be the world’s best protective agency. Currently, the
agency is distracted by its dual mission of protection and financial investigations.
The result has been a long series of high-profile embarrassments and security failures, perhaps most notably its allowing of then-Vice President-elect Kamala Harris
to be inside the Democratic National Committee office on January 6, 2021, while
a pipe bomb was outside. Despite the great size and scope of the January 6 investigation, this high-profile incident of danger to a protectee remains unresolved.
The failures of the USSS protective mission are too numerous to list here. A
December 2015 bipartisan report from the House Oversight Committee listed
dozens of such incidents as well as needed recommendations for reform.14 This
chapter adopts those findings and recommendations in whole, especially the
finding that USSS’s dual-mission structure detracts from the agency’s protective
capabilities.
At the time of that report, USSS agents spent only one-third of their work hours
on protection-related activities as opposed to investigative activities. USSS was
established initially to investigate counterfeit currency, but its mission has evolved
over the decades to prioritize electronic financial crimes. For example, as this chapter was being written, all 15 of the USSS’s most wanted individuals were wanted
for financial crimes, many of them international in nature.
Notably, the last head of the agency left not for a protection-related job, but to be
the Chief Security Officer of social media company SnapChat. This is a pattern that
has developed over the years, with agents seeking to burnish their online financial
crimes credentials to secure corporate security jobs. Coupled with some of the
lowest morale in the federal government, the agency has completely lost sight of
the primacy of its protective mission.

Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise

The only investigations not related to USSS’s protective function that agents
should pursue would be directed by HSI and relate to tracking the financial crimes
associated with illegal immigration. This should include tracing remittances, any
funds that are used to pay coyotes or the cartels, and payments by businesses to
illegal aliens and all other crimes associated with illegal immigration.
USSS should keep visitor logs for all facilities where the President works or
resides. The Biden Administration has evaded such transparency with President
Biden spending a historic amount of time for a President at his Delaware residence.
This has left the American people in the dark as to who is influencing the highest
levels of their own government.
Budget

The suggested reforms would result in a significant USSS budget reduction,
primarily because the agency would relinquish dozens of physical offices throughout the U.S. and internationally. Some amount of savings should be used to fix the
personnel problems and for recruitment initiatives aimed at individuals who are
inclined to join a protection-focused agency.



Personnel

As documented extensively in the above-referenced 2015 bipartisan congressional report, low morale and high turnover are key drivers of USSS problems. With
their mission focused on protection, agents would no longer spend the bulk of
their time developing unrelated skillsets. Instead, USSS agents could hone their
protection skills and pursue a protection career path in the agency rather than
quickly leaving USSS for high-paying corporate security jobs.
The Uniform Division (UD) of USSS requires a significant staffing increase.
As documented in the bipartisan report, understaffing results in unpredictable
and long hours, which in turn result in high turnover, which only compounds
the problem.
Another key issue is that UD officers lack the ability to enforce criminal laws
outside the immediate vicinity of the White House. As the District of Columbia
is a federal jurisdiction and currently is beholden to the trend of progressive procrime policies, UD officers should enforce all applicable laws. The result would
be to allow UD officers to gain more law enforcement experience—an attractive
credential that would improve morale.
TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATION (TSA)

The TSA model is costly and unwisely makes TSA both the regulator and the
regulated organization responsible for screening operations. As part of an effort
to shrink federal bureaucracies and bring private-sector know-how to government programs, TSA is ripe for reform. The U.S. should look to the Canadian and

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Department of Homeland Security

European private models of providing aviation screening manpower to lower TSA
costs while maintaining security. Until it is privatized, TSA should be treated as a
national security provider, and its workforce should be deunionized immediately.
TSA could privatize the screening function by expanding the current Screening
Partnership Program (SPP) to all airports. TSA would turn screening operations
over to airports that would choose security contractors that meet TSA regulations
and would oversee and test airports for compliance. Alternatively, it could adopt
a Canadian-style system, turning over screening operations to a new government
corporation that contracts screening service to private contractors. Contractors
would bid to provide their services to a set of airports in a particular region, likely
with around 10 regions nationally. TSA would continue to set security regulations
and test airports for compliance, and the new corporation would establish any operating procedures or customer service standards. With either model, the intelligence
function for domestic travel patterns should remain with the U.S. government.
The federal government could expect to save 15 percent–20 percent from the
existing aviation screening budget, but savings could be significantly larger. Service
to travelers should also improve.
MANAGEMENT DIRECTORATE (MGMT)

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The Management Directorate is unnecessarily large because each individual
component also maintains its own respective management office. Too much overlap and red tape exist between headquarters (HQ) and components with regard
to such functions as hiring, information technology, and procurement. Finance
is unique given that HQ needs to address reprogramming, and component budgets need to roll up into all-department budgets. The Directorate requires intense
reform, the specifics of which should be further assessed given its expansive nature.
Front Office (FO). Immediately place a small team of advisers with a deep
understanding of operational management—but who have some experience in
government because they will need to understand the nuance of Reduction in Force
(RIF), appropriations hurdles when dealing with U.S. government reorganization,
etc.—to sit in the MGMT FO (reporting to the Secretary, ultimately either S1 or S2).
One of these advisers should understand U.S. government employment law and
be prepared to relocate personnel and downsize offices accordingly. This includes
reverting to the original understanding of the function of individuals appointed
to the Senior Executive Service: competent managers who can work capably with
any subject matter and in any location.
Over the first few months of the Administration, the advisers’ role should be
to assess what structural and procedural changes are appropriate. They should
dissect the current standing Management Directives and the approval processes
in place to implement and/or change them; Office of the Chief Human Capital
Officer’s processes and procedures; hurdles to the Office of Chief Procurement



Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise

Officer’s procurement of innovative technology; and the facilities plan, including
the consolidation into the St. Elizabeth’s campus. They should also be prepared
to help implement any end to unionization of DHS components in response to an
executive order pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 7103.15
Office of the Chief Financial Officer (OCFO). DHS responsibilities to work with
Congress have been split between the Office of Legislative Affairs (OLA) and OCFO.
OLA deals with the authorizing committees on policy issues, and OCFO works with
the appropriations committees on budget planning, execution, and reprogramming.
This split creates communication and visibility issues within DHS and inconsistency in
answers to Congress. This is an issue not only within the HQ model, but also throughout the components. Either appropriations personnel should be moved to OLA and
there should be a “dotted line” reporting structure to OCFO, or a policy that OLA personnel must be included on communications to Congress should be implemented.
To avoid “answer shopping” by congressional staff, particularly appropriations
staff, all budget communications from the OCFO, including from the CFO him/
herself, should first be provided to the Director of OLA to ensure consistency of
information, messaging, and answers. This may be deemed awkward given that the
OCFO is a Senate-confirmed position, but it is necessary to avoid inaccuracies and
inconsistencies in messaging.
Federal Protective Service (FPS). FPS needs federal agents to develop, share,
and receive operational information and maintain direct contact with the Secretary
in the midst of heightened threats. Before the summer 2020 civil unrest, positioning FPS under MGMT was justified, but given the current climate, they should not
be reporting through MGMT. This may be especially problematic if a Management
Directorate Under Secretary lacking law enforcement or military experience is in place
when a situation like summer 2020 arises. FPS should report to the Secretary as other
components (e.g., FLETC) do. This would add little to the Secretary’s current burden
unless or until civil unrest arises, at which point reporting to the Secretary creates a
direct line between the primary DHS decision-maker (S1 or S2) and the FPS Director.
Regarding operational communication, there should be information-sharing
mandates (MOAs)—which are applicable under specific circumstances where federal facilities are involved—between FPS and the U.S. Marshals, U.S. Park Police,
and FBI. Agreements with U.S. Capitol Police and Supreme Court Police should
also be considered, but it is noteworthy that those entities are jurisdictionally outside of the executive branch.
OFFICE OF STRATEGY, POLICY, AND PLANS (PLCY)

Department-Level Reforms. PLCY should perform a complete inventory,
analysis, and reevaluation of the department’s domestic terrorism lines of effort
to ensure that they are consistent with the President’s priorities, congressional
authorization, and Americans’ constitutional rights.

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Department of Homeland Security

OFFICE OF INTELLIGENCE AND ANALYSIS (I&A)

The Office of Intelligence and Analysis should be eliminated both because
it has not added value and because it has been weaponized for domestic political purposes.
The Intelligence Community (IC) already provides raw intelligence to DHS
components. In addition, the FBI, National Counter Terrorism Center, and other
agencies where necessary already provide holistic threat assessment products to
federal, state, local, tribal, and territorial governments as well as to private-sector
entities at both the classified and unclassified levels where appropriate. I&A’s work
as an interlocuter between the IC and DHS components’ individual intelligence
operations on the one hand and government and the private sector on the other,
as well as between the IC and the components, is at best duplicative. At worst, it
is used and discussed in the media as a political tool, resulting in more harm than
good to the U.S. government and IC writ large.
The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, which is not a member
of the IC, should create cyber intelligence products in a collaborative fashion with
the National Security Agency and U.S. Cyber Command. Such efforts would lead
to timelier usable classified and unclassified products for stakeholders that exceed
the quality and capability of I&A’s efforts. This same principle applies to other

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PLCY should likewise do a complete inventory, analysis, and evaluation of any
of the department’s work, in coordination with social media outlets, to censor or
otherwise change or affect Americans’ speech. PLCY should comprehensively
report on and publish this history in full so that the American people can know
the facts. The department should remove all personnel who participated in any
of this activity.
The department has significant authority and budget to provide grants for various purposes. This effort is diffused across components and lacks central policy
thought and coordination. PLCY should set a departmentwide policy that establishes how granting choices are to be made and is consistent with the President’s
priorities. PLCY should clear all granting decisions to ensure that they are consistent with the new policy.
PLCY-Wide Reforms. PLCY should work with Congress to streamline the
department’s reporting requirements. Because there has not been a departmental reauthorization bill and these requirements have been added piecemeal over
two decades, they significantly overlap and even conflict—wasting resources and
distracting from the department’s mission. PLCY should seek the elimination of
the Quadrennial Homeland Security Review.
Issue-Area Reforms. PLCY should bolster its Immigration Statistics program
and make it the one-stop shop for the timely production of all department immigration statistics and analysis.

Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise

components as well: CBP, TSA, etc. all have their own intelligence operations and
are better situated with their subject-matter experts to make their own assessments.
The National Operations Center (NOC) within the Office of Operations Coordination (OPS) should absorb those select I&A functions and tactically proficient
personnel that need to be maintained (for example, technical support to the
National Vetting Center). The remainder of I&A should be eliminated. The OPS
entity should maintain IC status, and the only intelligence mission set should be
to provide situational awareness and the dissemination of operational information
or raw intelligence (no analysis or products) at classified and unclassified levels to
executive leadership across the department, not outside of DHS.
OFFICE OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL (OGC)



Needed Reforms

OGC should advise principals as to how DHS can execute its missions within
the law instead of advising principals as to why they cannot execute regulations,
policies, and programs.
Instead of each component’s chief counsel reporting to the Headquarters General Counsel (with a solid line) and indirectly to his or her component head (with
a dotted line), the accountability should be reversed. Due to the different missions
throughout the department, the components can better manage the legal issues
of their specific mission than headquarters can. Thus, the chief counsel (or equivalent) of each component should report directly to the component head, report
indirectly to the DHS General Counsel, and be accountable to the component head.
The report to the General Counsel is to ensure consistency of advice across DHS.
OGC should hire significantly more Schedule C/political appointees who in
turn supervise career staff and manage their output. DHS’s mission is politically
charged, and the legal function cannot be allowed to thwart the Administration’s
agenda by providing stilted or erroneous legal positions and decision-making.
OGC should serve as the center of the response to the legal challenges facing the
department to ensure a streamlined, consistent response to a litany of issues facing
the department. It is important to ensure consistency across all potential legal
positions taken by the department, including those arising in litigation, congressional oversight, and inquiries received from the Inspector General, U.S. Government
Accountability Office (GAO), and Congressional Research Service and pursuant to
the Freedom of Information Act.
OGC should invest in e-discovery software and contract with a vendor to manage
the department’s e-discovery. This would be beneficial both in litigation and in
responding to congressional oversight. Removing delays in e-discovery processing
would also reduce the issuance of subpoenas to the department and the generation
of negative press for the Administration that comes from delayed responses.

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Department of Homeland Security

The old practice of relying on Executive Secretary taskings to pull documents for
congressional requests does not work: It is slow, the metrics for what documents
are gathered and how are unclear, and the components do not gather responsive
material in an efficient manner. Document gathering should come from the Office
of the Chief Information Officer or a relevant technological element within the
department that can pull responsive communications quickly.
OFFICE OF LEGISLATIVE AFFAIRS (OLA); OFFICE
OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS (OPA); AND OFFICE OF
PARTNERSHIP AND ENGAGEMENT (OPE)

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DHS’s external communications function should be consolidated and reformed
so that the President’s agenda can be implemented more effectively. The Office of
Partnership and Engagement should be merged into the Office of Public Affairs.
In many Cabinet agencies, outreach to companies and partner organizations is
similarly performed by the Office of Public Affairs. This would also accomplish a
needed DHS organizational and management reform to decrease the number of
direct reports to the Secretary.
Both public and legislative affairs staff in the components should report directly
to their respective headquarters equivalent. This would help to avoid a failure by
the department to speak with one voice. It would also allow the component staff to
perform more efficiently, overseen by expert managers in their trade. This would
also allow DHS to respond to crises effectively by shifting staff as needed to the
most pressing issues and better use underutilized staff at less active components.
Only political appointees in OLA should interact directly with congressional staff
on all inquiries, including budget and appropriations matters. To prevent congressional staff from answer shopping among HQ OLA, the DHS OCFO, and components,
DHS legislative affairs appropriations staff should be moved from MGMT OCFO
into OLA. Regarding components, budget/appropriations staff should move from
component budget offices into component legislative affairs offices.
Because dozens of congressional committees and subcommittees either have or
claim to have jurisdiction over some DHS function, DHS staff from the Secretary
on down spend so much time responding to congressional hearing and briefing
requests, letters, and questions for the record that they are left with little time
to do their assigned job of protecting the homeland. The next President should
reach an agreement with congressional leadership to limit committee jurisdiction
to one authorizing committee and one appropriations committee in each chamber. If congressional leadership will not limit their committees’ jurisdiction over
DHS, DHS should identify one authorizing and appropriations committee in each
chamber and answer only to it.
To focus more precisely on the DHS mission, OLA staff should also identify
outdated and needless congressional reporting requirements and notify Congress

Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise

that DHS will cease reporting on such matters. For other congressional reports,
OLA should implement a sunset date so that Congress must regularly demonstrate
the need for specific data.
In both OPA and OLA, a change in mission and culture is needed. The clients
of both components are the President and the Secretary, not the media, external
organizations, or Congress. OPA and OLA should change from being compliance
correspondents for outside entities airing grievances to serving as messengers and
advocates for the President and the Secretary.



OFFICE OF OPERATIONS COORDINATION (OPS)

OPS was originally conceived by then-Secretary Jeh Johnson as an entity tasked
with coordinating cross-DHS assets on an as-needed basis using a joint operations
approach. This role is particularly challenging because of the disparate nature of
mission sets across DHS.
OPS should absorb a very small number of tactical intelligence professionals from
I&A as the rest of I&A is shut down. Such intelligence officers would be a subordinate
element within OPS placed within the National Operations Center. The intelligence
officers would provide tactical intelligence support for upcoming or ongoing operations in addition to liaising with their agency/component counterparts. There would
be no strategic intelligence analysis done as part of OPS or its new I&A sub-element.
In addition to facilitating all-of-DHS coordination on a task-by-task basis, OPS
would be responsible for ongoing situational awareness for the Secretary and
Deputy Secretary.
In addition to long-term staffing, OPS would have cycling billets from each of
the major agencies and components to facilitate its most effective working relationships across DHS.
OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS AND CIVIL LIBERTIES
(CRCL) AND PRIVACY OFFICE (PRIV)

The Homeland Security Act established only an Officer of CRCL, not an office.
The only substantive function Congress then assigned to the officer was to review
and assess information alleging abuses of civil rights. Since then, Congress and
CRCL itself have significantly expanded CRCL’s scope and size well beyond its
original intent or helpful purpose. CRCL now operates and views itself as a quasi-­
DHS Office of Inspector General. This results in a considerable waste of limited
component resources, which are routinely tasked to address redundant, overly
burdensome, and uninformed demands from CRCL. It is therefore important to
recalibrate CRCL’s scope and reach.
The organizational structure of both CRCL and the Privacy Office should be
changed to ensure proper alignment with the department’s mission. The Office
of General Counsel should absorb both CRCL’s and PRIV’s necessary functions

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Department of Homeland Security

OFFICE OF THE IMMIGRATION DETENTION OMBUDSMAN
(OIDO) AND OFFICE OF THE CITIZENSHIP AND
IMMIGRATION SERVICES OMBUDSMAN (CISOMB)

OIDO. The Office of the Immigration Detention Ombudsman should be
eliminated. This requires a statutory change in Section 106 of the Consolidated
Appropriations Act of 2020.18
OIDO was designed to create another impediment to detention through an
additional layer of so-called oversight. Several agencies already perform detention
oversight. ICE conducts internal audits of facilities and investigates complaints
against ICE agents through the Office of Professional Responsibility. Similarly, CBP
accepts individual complaints regarding facilities through the Joint Intake Center

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and staff. Although the CRCL Officer and the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA)
Officer/Privacy Officer are statutory, their offices are not mandatory. CRCL and
PRIV Officers and employees should report to a Deputy General Counsel, who
would be a political appointee.
The CRCL Officer should focus on equal employment opportunity (EEO)
compliance and the civil liberties function and investigate matters only within
Headquarters or support components. Operational components’ civil liberties officers should investigate incidents regarding their own agencies. The CRCL Officer
should ensure that all civil liberties or civil rights complaints are sent to the Office
of Inspector General (OIG) for review. If the OIG chooses not to investigate, the
CRCL Officer should only provide supportive information on possible courses of
action for complainants.
The PRIV Officer and FOIA Officer should focus on FOIA, Privacy Compliance
Policy, and Privacy Incident Response. The Deputy General Counsel should provide
guidance to DHS leadership regarding Privacy Compliance and Privacy Incident
Response. To ensure that only U.S. persons and Lawful Permanent Residents are
provided protections as required by the Privacy Act, all DHS issuances should be
updated to reflect that DHS protects the privacy of individuals as required by the
Privacy Act (U.S. persons and lawful permanent residents);16 the Judicial Redress
Act of 2015;17 and any U.S.–European Union Data Protection and Privacy Agreement.
Because of the lack of public trust in the Office of Intelligence and Analysis,
CRCL and PRIV staff should no longer review intelligence products or provide
guidance on any intelligence products or reports.
A consistent, clear, and singular message is necessary for DHS’s mission.
Therefore, all communications and/or meetings with any federal, state, local, or
nongovernment groups should be limited to the Deputy General Counsel. In addition, given the narrower scope of work, OGC should disband the outside advisory
boards and the more than 50 working groups in which CRCL and PRIV currently
participate. Finally, CRCL and PRIV should no longer issue bulletins or periodicals.



Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise

and manages complaints against agents through the OPR. In addition, CRCL, OIG,
GAO, and Congress all perform detention oversight. These multiple bodies place
unmanageable and unreasonable burdens on ICE to manage several sometimes
inconsistent audits/inspections at the same time.
If OIDO remains a DHS component, the Secretary should immediately issue a directive stripping CRCL of its immigration portfolio. OIDO is in a better position with
dedicated resources and immigration experts to perform this function than CRCL is.
Allowing both offices to conduct detention oversight is duplicative and wasteful.
The Secretary should conduct a thorough review of the effectiveness of Directive 0810.1,19 which is widely interpreted as requiring a wholesale referral of cases
to OIG. In reality, OIG investigates only a small fraction of them and often sits on
cases for longer than the five-day window specified in the directive. Meanwhile,
the other agencies wait in limbo to execute their duties.
CISOMB. The Office of the Citizenship and Immigration Services Ombudsman
should be eliminated. The DHS bureaucracy is too large, and the Secretary has too
many direct reports. CISOMB’s policy functions can be performed (and sometimes
already are) by OIG and GAO. The specialized case work can be moved into USCIS
as a special unit, much like the IRS Taxpayer Advocate. This would require a statutory change to Section 452 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002.20
If CISOMB continues as a DHS component, a policy should be issued that
prohibits CISOMB from assisting illegal aliens to obtain benefits. Currently,
approximately 15 percent–20 percent of CISOMB’s workload consists of helping
DACA applicants obtain and renew benefits, including work authorization. This
is not the role of an ombudsman. In addition, the government should be a neutral
adjudicator, not an advocate for illegal aliens.
AGENCY RELATIONSHIPS

It is critical to the achievement of the President’s policy objectives that all agencies and departments touching immigration policy work in sync with one another.
While there are numerous areas in which such cooperation is critical, immigration
has proven to be the most difficult. Accordingly, several objectives will be necessary
for each of the following departments.
l

l

Department of Health and Human Services: Agree to move the Office
of Refugee Resettlement (ORR) to DHS or, alternatively, implement an
aggressive and regular effort by the Secretary of HHS to ensure that ORR is
fully pursuing presidential objectives in support of DHS.
Department of Defense: Assist in aggressively building the border wall
system on America’s southern border. Additionally, explicitly acknowledge
and adjust personnel and priorities to participate actively in the defense

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Department of Homeland Security

of America’s borders, including using military personnel and hardware to
prevent illegal crossings between ports of entry and channel all cross-border
traffic to legal ports of entry.
l

l

l

Department of Justice: Agree to move the Executive Office for
Immigration Review and the Office of Immigration Litigation to DHS
and/or, alternatively, to treat the administrative law judges (immigration
judges and Board of Immigration Appeals) as national security personnel,
decertify their union, and move to increase hiring significantly to enable the
processing of more immigration cases.
Department of State: Allow DHS to lead international engagement in
the Western Hemisphere on issues of security and migration. Additionally,
quickly and aggressively address recalcitrant countries’ failure to accept
deportees by imposing stiff sanctions until deportees are in fact accepted for
return (not just promised to be taken).
Department of Housing and Urban Development: Ensure that only
U.S. citizens and lawful permanent residents utilize or occupy federally
subsidized housing.



l

l

l

l

Department of Education: Deny loan access to those who are not U.S.
citizens or lawful permanent residents, and deny loan access to students at
schools that provide in-state tuition to illegal aliens.
Department of Labor: Eliminate the two (of four) lowest wage levels for
foreign workers.
Department of the Treasury: Implement all necessary regulations both to
equalize taxes between American citizens and working visa holders and to
provide DHS with all tax information of illegal aliens as expeditiously as possible.
Intelligence Community: Cooperate in the shrinking or elimination
of the I&A role in the IC while replacing it with CBP and HSI
representation to the IC.

AUTHOR’S NOTE: I had the honor of coordinating the efforts of the experts listed as contributors to this

book, nearly all of whom have spent more time inside or interacting with the Department of Homeland Security
than myself. I wrote only a small portion of the chapter and relied on the contributors’ experience and expertise
to give the chapter both its depth and policy impact. No views expressed herein should be attributed to any
single contributor.

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Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise
ENDNOTES

1.
2.

3.

4.

5.
6.
7.



8.

9.

10.
11.
12.

13.

14.

15.
16.
17.
18.

H.R. 5005, Homeland Security Act of 2002, Public Law No. 107-296, 107th Congress, November 25, 2002, §
101(b)(1), https://www.congress.gov/107/plaws/publ296/PLAW-107publ296.pdf (accessed March 14, 2023).
See, for example, “Elon Musk Slams CISA Censorship Network as ‘Propaganda Platform,’” Kanekoa News,
December 28, 2022, https://kanekoa.substack.com/p/elon-musk-slams-cisa-censorship-network (accessed
March 14, 2023).
H.R. 2680, An Act to Amend the Immigration and Nationality Act, and for Other Purposes, Public Law No.
89-236, 89th Congress, October 3, 1965, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/STATUTE-79/pdf/STATUTE-79Pg911.pdf (accessed March 14, 2023).
Added to the Immigration and Nationality Act by the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant
Responsibility Act of 1996. See H.R. 3610, Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act, 1997, Public Law No.
104-208, 104th Congress, September 30, 1996, Division C, https://www.congress.gov/104/plaws/publ208/
PLAW-104publ208.pdf (accessed March 14, 2023).
8 U.S. Code, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/8 (accessed March 14, 2023).
18 U.S. Code, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/18 (accessed March 14, 2023).
5 U.S. Code §§ 551–559, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/5/part-I/chapter-5/subchapter-II (accessed
March 14, 2023).
Table, “United States Citizenship and Immigration Services Budget Comparison and Adjustments
Appropriation and PPA Summary,” in U.S. Department of Homeland Security, United States Citizenship
and Immigration Services, Department of Homeland Security, United States Citizenship and Immigration
Services, Budget Overview, Fiscal Year 2023 Congressional Justification, p. CIS-4, https://www.uscis.gov/
sites/default/files/document/reports/U.S._Citizenship_and_Immigration_Services%E2%80%99_Budget_
Overview_Document_for%20Fiscal_Year_2023.pdf#:~:text=The%20FY%202023%20Budget%20includes%20
%24913.6M%2C%204%2C001%20positions%3B,of%20%24444.1M%20above%20the%20FY%202022%20
President%E2%80%99s%20Budget (accessed March 14, 2023), and Table, “United States Citizenship and
Immigration Services Comparison of Budget Authority and Request,” in ibid., p. CIS-5.
H.R. 7311, William Wilberforce Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2008, Public Law No.
110-457, 110th Congress, December 23, 2008, § 235, https://www.congress.gov/110/plaws/publ457/PLAW110publ457.pdf (accessed March 15, 2023).
Matter of A-B-, Respondent, 27 I&N Dec. 316 (A.G. 2018), https://www.justice.gov/eoir/page/file/1070866/
download (accessed January 18, 2023).
Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387 (2012), https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/567/387/ (accessed
January 18, 2023).
Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act [Public Law 93–288; Approved May 22, 1974]
[As Amended Through P.L. 117–328, Enacted December 29, 2022], https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/
COMPS-2977/pdf/COMPS-2977.pdf (accessed March 15, 2023).
U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency, Department of Homeland
Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency, Budget Overview, Fiscal Year 2023 Congressional
Justification, p. FEMA-24, https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/2022-03/Federal%20Emergency%20
Management%20Agency_Remediated.pdf (accessed March 15, 2023).
Report, United States Secret Service: An Agency in Crisis, Committee on Oversight and Government Reform,
U.S. House of Representatives, 114th Congress, December 9, 2015, https://republicans-oversight.house.gov/
wp-content/uploads/2015/12/Oversight-USSS-Report.pdf (accessed January 18, 2023).
5 U.S. Code § 7103, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/5/7103 (accessed March 15, 2023).
S. 3418, Privacy Act of 1974, Public Law No. 93-579, 93rd Congress, December 31, 1974, https://www.govinfo.
gov/content/pkg/STATUTE-88/pdf/STATUTE-88-Pg1896.pdf (accessed March 15, 2023).
H.R. 1428, Judicial Redress Act of 2015, Public Law No. 114-126, 114th Congress, February 24, 2016, https://www.
congress.gov/114/plaws/publ126/PLAW-114publ126.pdf (accessed March 15, 2023).
H.R. 1158, Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2020, Public Law No. 116-93, 116th Congress, December 20, 2019,
https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/house-bill/1158 (accessed January 18, 2023).

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Department of Homeland Security
19. U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Office of Inspector General, Management Directive No. 0810.1, June 10,
2004, https://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/foia/mgmt_directive_0810_1_the_office_of_inspector_general.
pdf (accessed March 15, 2023).
20. H.R. 5005, Homeland Security Act of 2002, Public Law No. 107-296, 107th Congress, November 25, 2002,
https://www.congress.gov/bill/107th-congress/house-bill/5005 (accessed January 18, 2023).



— 169 —



6

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Kiron K. Skinner

— 171 —



T

he U.S. Department of State’s mission is to bilaterally, multilaterally, and
regionally implement the President’s foreign policy priorities; to serve U.S.
citizens abroad; and to advance the economic, foreign policy, and national
security interests of the United States.
Since the U.S. Founding, the Department of State has been the American government’s designated tool of engagement with foreign governments and peoples
throughout the world. Country names, borders, leaders, technology, and people
have changed in the more than two centuries since the Founding, but the basics of
diplomacy remain the same. Although the Department has also evolved throughout
the years, at least in the modern era, there is one significant problem that the next
President must address to be successful.
There are scores of fine diplomats who serve the President’s agenda, often
helping to shape and interpret that agenda. At the same time, however, in all
Administrations, there is a tug-of-war between Presidents and bureaucracies—
and that resistance is much starker under conservative Presidents, due
largely to the fact that large swaths of the State Department’s workforce are
left-wing and predisposed to disagree with a conservative President’s policy
agenda and vision.
It should not and cannot be this way: The American people need and deserve
a diplomatic machine fully focused on the national interest as defined through
the election of a President who sets the domestic and international agenda for
the nation. The next Administration must take swift and decisive steps to reforge
the department into a lean and functional diplomatic machine that serves the

Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise

President and, thereby, the American people. Below is the basic but essential roadmap for achieving these repairs.



HISTORY AND CONTEXT

Founded in 1789, the Department of State was one of the first Cabinet-level
agencies in the new American government. The first Secretary of State, Thomas
Jefferson, oversaw a small staff, diplomatic posts in London and Paris, and 10 consular posts.1 Today, the Department of State has almost 80,000 total employees
(including 13,517 foreign service employees and 11,683 civil service employees) in
275 embassies, consulates, and other posts around the world.2
In theory, the State Department is the principal agency responsible for carrying
out the President’s foreign policy and representing the United States in other nations
and international organizations. To the extent consistent with presidential policy and
federal law, the department also supports U.S. citizens and businesses in other nations
and vets foreign nationals seeking temporary or permanent entrance to the United
States. The State Department also provides humanitarian, security, and other assistance
to non-U.S. populations in need, and otherwise advances and supports U.S. national
interests abroad. Properly led, the State Department can be instrumental for communicating and implementing a foreign policy vision that best serves American citizens.
As the U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century (the Hart–Rudman
Commission) observed more than 20 years ago, the State Department is a “crippled institution” suffering from “an ineffective organizational structure in which
regional and functional policies do not serve integrated goals, and in which sound
management, accountability, and leadership are lacking.”3 Unfortunately, this
critique remains accurate.
The State Department’s failures are not due to a lack of resources. As one
expert has observed, the department “has significantly more at its disposal than
was the case at the end of the Cold War, in the mid-1990s, and at the height of the
Iraq and Afghanistan wars.”4 A major source, if not the major source, of the State
Department’s ineffectiveness lies in its institutional belief that it is an independent
institution that knows what is best for the United States, sets its own foreign policy,
and does not need direction from an elected President.
The next President can make the State Department more effective by providing
a clear foreign policy vision, selecting political officials and career diplomats that
will enthusiastically turn that vision into a policy agenda, and firmly supporting
the State Department as it makes the necessary institutional adjustments.
POLITICAL LEADERSHIP AND BUREAUCRATIC
LEADERSHIP AND SUPPORT

Focusing the State Department on the needs and goals of the next President
will require the President’s handpicked political leadership—as well as foreign

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— 173 —



service and civil service personnel who share the President’s vision and policy
agendas—to run the department. This can be done by taking these steps at the
outset of the next Administration.
Exert Leverage During the Confirmation Process. Notwithstanding the
challenges and slowness of the modern U.S. Senate confirmation process, the next
President can exert leverage on the Senate if he or she is willing to place State
Department appointees directly into those roles, pending confirmation. Doing so
would both ensure that the department has immediate senior political leadership
and would force the Senate to act on nominees’ appointments instead of being
allowed to engage in dilatory tactics that cripple the State Department’s functionality for weeks, months, or even years.
Assert Leadership in the Appointment Process. The next Administration
should assert leadership over, and guidance to, the State Department by placing
political appointees in positions that do not require Senate confirmation, including
senior advisors, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretaries, and Deputy Assistant Secretaries. Given the department’s size, the next Administration should also increase
the number of political appointees to manage it.
To the extent possible, all non-confirmed senior appointees should be selected
by the President-elect’s transition team or the new President’s Office of Presidential Personnel (depending on the timing of selection) and be in place the first day
of the Administration. No one in a leadership position on the morning of January
20 should hold that position at the end of the day. These recommendations do not
imply that foreign service and civil service officials should be excluded from key
roles: It is hard to imagine a scenario in which they are not immediately relevant to
the transition of power. The main suggestion here is that as many political appointees as possible should be in place at the start of a new Administration.
Support and Train Political Appointees. The Secretary of State should use
his or her office and its resources to ensure regular coordination among all political
appointees, which should take the form of strategy meetings, trainings, and other
events. The secretary should also take reasonable steps to ensure that the State
Department’s political appointees are connected to other departments’ political
appointees, which is critical for cross-agency effectiveness and morale. The secretary should capitalize on the more experienced political appointees by using
them as the foundation for a mentorship program for less experienced political
appointees. The interaction of political appointees must be routine and operational
rather than incidental or occasional, and it must be treated as a crucial dimension
for the next Administration’s success.
Maximize the Value of Career Officials. Career foreign service and civil
service personnel can and must be leveraged for their expertise and commitment to the President’s mission. Indeed, the State Department has thousands of
employees with unparalleled linguistic, cultural, policy, and administrative skills,



Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise

and large numbers of them have been an enormous resource to the Secretaries of
State under which they have served. The secretary must find a way to make clear
to career officials that despite prior history and modes of operation, they need
not be adversaries of a conservative President, Secretary of State, or the team of
political appointees.
Reboot Ambassadors Worldwide. All ambassadors are required to submit
letters of resignation at the start of a new Administration. Previous Republican
Administrations have accepted the resignations of only the political ambassadors
and allowed the foreign service ambassadors to retain their posts, sometimes for
months or years into a new Administration.5 The next Administration must go
further: It should both accept the resignations of all political ambassadors and
quickly review and reassess all career ambassadors. This review should commence
well before the new Administration’s first day.
Ambassadors in countries where U.S. policy or posture would substantially
change under the new Administration, as well as any who have evinced hostility
toward the incoming Administration or its agenda, should be recalled immediately.
The priority should be to put in place new ambassadors who support the President’s agenda among political appointees, foreign service officers, and civil service
personnel, with no predetermined percentage among these categories. Political
ambassadors with strong personal relationships with the President should be prioritized for key strategic posts such as Australia, Japan, the United Kingdom, the
United Nations, and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).
RIGHTING THE SHIP

Ensuring the State Department is accountable for serving American citizens first will require—at a minimum—that the following steps be implemented
immediately:
Review Retroactively. Before inauguration, the President-elect’s department
transition team should assess every aspect of State Department negotiations and
funding commitments. Upon inauguration, the Secretary of State should order an
immediate freeze on all efforts to implement unratified treaties and international
agreements, allocation of resources, foreign assistance disbursements, domestic
and international contracts and payments, hiring and recruiting decisions, etc.,
pending a political appointee-driven review to ensure that such efforts comport
with the new Administration’s policies. The quality of this review is more important than speed. The posture of the department during this review should be an
unwavering desire to prioritize the American people—including a recognition that
the federal government must be a diligent steward of taxpayer dollars.
Implement Repair. The State Department must change its handling of
international agreements to restore constitutional governance. Under prior
Administrations, unnecessary institutional factors in the department caused

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— 175 —



numerous logistical challenges in negotiating, approving, and implementing treaties and agreements. This is particularly true under the Biden Administration. For
example, under the Biden Administration, the State Department was considered
sufficiently unreliable in terms of alignment and effectiveness such that its political
leadership invoked its Circular 175 (C-175) authority to delegate its diplomatic
capacity to other agencies such as the Department of Homeland Security.
At time of publication, the State Department is negotiating (or seeking to negotiate) large-scale, sovereignty-eroding agreements that could come at considerable
economic and other costs to the American people. Although such agreements
should be evaluated and approved as are treaties, the Biden Administration is
likely to simply call them “agreements.” The Biden State Department not only
approves but also enforces treaties that have not been ratified by the U.S. Senate.
This practice must be thoroughly reviewed—and most likely jettisoned.
The next President should recalibrate how the State Department handles treaties and agreements, primarily by restoring constitutionality to these processes.
He or she should direct the Secretary of State to freeze any ongoing treaty or international agreement negotiations and assess whether those efforts align with the
new President’s foreign policy direction. The next Administration should also
direct the secretary to order an immediate stand-down on enforcement of any
treaties that have not been ratified by the Senate, and order a thorough review of
the degree to which such enforcement has impacted the department’s functions,
policies, and use of resources.
The Secretary of State, in cooperation with the Office of the Attorney General
and the White House Counsel’s Office, should also conduct a review to identify
“agreements” that are really treaty commitments within the ordinary public meaning of the Constitution,6 and suspend compliance pending presidential transmittal
of those agreements to the Senate for advice and consent. The next Administration
should also move to withdraw from treaties that have been under Senate consideration for 20 years or more, with the understanding that those treaties are unlikely
to be ratified. Under circumstances in which ratification of a stale treaty before
the Senate still serves national interests, the treaty letter of transmittal and submission should be updated for current circumstances. The Secretary of State must
revoke most outstanding C-175 authorities that have been granted to other agencies during previous Administrations, although such revocations should be closely
coordinated with the White House for logistical reasons.
Coordinate with Other Agencies. Interagency engagement in this new
environment must be similarly adjusted to mirror presidential direction. Indeed,
coordination among federal agencies is challenging even in the most well-oiled
Administrations. Although such coordination is inescapable and sometimes productive, agencies tend to leverage each other’s resources in ways that occasionally have
off-mission consequences for the agency or agencies with the resources. Ideally, the



Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise

Secretary of State should work as part of an agile foreign policy team along with the
National Security Advisor, the Secretary of Defense, and other agency heads to flesh
out and advance the President’s foreign policy. Bureaucratic stovepipes of the past
should be less important than commitment to, and achievement of, the President’s
foreign policy agenda. The State Department’s role in these interagency discussions
must reflect the President’s clear direction and disallow resources and tools to be
used in any way that detracts from the presidentially directed mission.
Coordinate with Congress. Congress has both the statutory and appropriations authority to impact the State Department’s operations and has a strong
interest in key aspects of American foreign policy. The department must therefore
take particular care in its interaction with Congress, since poor interactions with
Congress, regardless of intentions, could trigger congressional pushback or have
other negative impacts on the President’s agenda.
This will require particularly strong leadership of the Department of State’s
Bureau of Legislative Affairs. The Secretary of State and political leadership should
ensure full coordination with the White House regarding congressional engagement on any State Department responsibility. This may lead to, for example, the
President authorizing the State Department to engage with Members of Congress
and relevant committees on certain issues (including statutorily designated congressional consultations), but to remain “radio silent” on volatile or designated
issues on which the White House wants to be the primary or only voice. All such
authorized department engagements with Congress must be driven and handled
by political appointees in conjunction with career officials who have the relevant
expertise and are willing to work in concert with the President’s political appointees on particularly sensitive matters.
Respond Vigorously to the Chinese Threat. The State Department recently
opened the Office of China Coordination, or “China House.” This office is intended
to bring together experts inside and outside the State Department to coordinate
U.S. government relations with China “and advance our vision for an open, inclusive international system.”7 Whether China House will streamline U.S. government
communication, consensus, and action on China policy—given the presence of
other agencies with strong competing or adverse interests—remains to be seen.
The unit is dependent on adequate and competent staff being assigned by other
bureaus within the State Department.
Nonetheless, the concept is one a Republican Administration should support
mutatis mutandis. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has been “at war” with
the U.S. for decades. Now that this reality has been accepted throughout the government, the State Department must be prepared to lead the U.S. diplomatic effort
accordingly. The centralization of efforts in one place is critical to this end.
Review Immigration and Domestic Security Requirements. Arguably, the
department’s most noteworthy challenge on the global stage has been its handling

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Department of State

of immigration and domestic security issues, which are inextricably related. The
State Department’s apparent posture toward these two issues, which are of paramount importance to the American people, has historically been that they are of
lesser importance than other issues and that they can be treated as concessions in
broader diplomatic engagements. In other instances in which access to the U.S. in
the form of immigrant (permanent) and nonimmigrant (temporary) visas could
potentially serve as diplomatic leverage, it is almost never used. To some degree,
the State Department and many of its personnel appear to view the U.S. immigration system less as a tool for strengthening the United States and more as a global
welfare program.
To ensure the safety, security, and prosperity of all Americans, this must change.
Below are several key areas in which the department’s formal and informal postures
must adjust to reflect the current immigration and domestic security environment:
l

l

Section 243(d) visa sanctions. Visa sanctions under section 243(d) of
the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA),8 enacted into law to motivate
countries to accept the return of any nationals who have been ordered
removed from the U.S., should be quickly and fully enforced. Recalcitrant
countries that do not accept receipt of their returned nationals will risk the
suspension of issuance of all immigrant visas, all nonimmigrant visas, or
all visas. These country-specific sanctions should remain in place until the
sanctioned country accepts the return of all its removal-pending nationals
and formally commits to future, regular acceptance of its nationals. Blackletter implementation of this law will demonstrate a heretofore lacking
seriousness to the international community that other nations must respect
U.S. immigration laws and work with federal authorities to accept returning
nationals—or lose access to the United States.
Rightsizing refugee admissions. The Biden Administration has
engineered what is nothing short of a collapse of U.S. border security and

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l

Visa reciprocity. The United States should strictly enforce the doctrine
of reciprocity when issuing visas to all foreign nationals. For too long, the
U.S. has provided virtually unfettered access to foreign nationals from
countries that do not respond in kind—including countries that are actively
hostile to U.S. interests and nationals. Mandatory reciprocity will convey
the necessary reality that other countries do not have an unfettered right
to U.S. access and must reciprocally offer favorable visa-based access to U.S.
nationals. The State Department’s reaction time to other countries’ changes
in visa policies with respect to the U.S. must be streamlined to ensure it can
be updated in real time.

Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise

interior immigration enforcement. This Administration’s humanitarian
crisis—which is arguably the greatest humanitarian crisis in the modern
era, one which has harmed Americans and foreign nationals alike—will
take many years and billions of dollars to fully address. One casualty of the
Biden Administration’s behavior will be the current form of the U.S. Refugee
Admission Program (USRAP).
The federal government’s obligation to shift national security–essential
screening and vetting resources to the forged border crisis will necessitate
an indefinite curtailment of the number of USRAP refugee admissions. The
State Department’s Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration, which
administers USRAP, must shift its resources to challenges stemming from
the current immigration situation until the crisis can be contained and
refugee-focused screening and vetting capacity can reasonably be restored.



l

l

Strengthening bilateral and multilateral immigration-focused
agreements. Restoration of both domestic security and the integrity of
the U.S. immigration system should start with rapid reactivation of several
key initiatives in effect at the conclusion of the Trump Administration.
Reimplementation of the Remain in Mexico policy, safe third-country
agreements, and other measures to address the influx of non-Mexican
asylum applicants at the United States–Mexico border must be Day
One priorities. Although the State Department must rein in the C-175
authorities of other agencies, the Department of Homeland Security should
retain (or regain) C-175 authorities for negotiating bilateral and multilateral
security agreements.
Evaluation of national security–vulnerable visa programs. To protect
the American people, the State Department, in coordination with the White
House and other security-focused agencies, should evaluate several key
security-sensitive visa programs that it manages. Key programs include, but
should not be limited to, the Diversity Visa program, the F (student) visa
program, and J (exchange visitor) visa program. The State Department’s
evaluation must ensure that these programs are not only consistent with
White House immigration policy, but also align with its national security
obligations and resource limitations.

PIVOTING ABROAD

Personnel and management adjustments are crucial preludes to refocus the
State Department’s mission, which is implementing the President’s foreign policy
agenda and, in so doing, ensuring that the interests of American citizens are given

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Department of State

priority. That said, the next President must significantly reorient the U.S. government’s posture toward friends and adversaries alike—which will include much
more honest assessments about who are friends and who are not. This reorientation could represent the most significant shift in core foreign policy principles
and corresponding action since the end of the Cold War.
Although not every country or issue area can be discussed in this chapter, below
are examples of several areas in which a shift in U. S. foreign policy is not only important, but arguably existential. The point is not to assert that everyone in the evolving
conservative movement, or, in some cases, the growing bipartisan consensus, will
agree with the details of this assessment. Rather, what is presented below demonstrates the urgency of these issues and provides a general roadmap for analysis.
In a world on fire, a handful of nations require heightened attention. Some represent existential threats to the safety and security of the American people; others
threaten to hurt the U.S. economy; and others are wild cards, whose full threat
scope is unknown but nevertheless unsettling. The five countries on which the next
Administration should focus its attention and energy are China, Iran, Venezuela,
Russia, and North Korea.
The People’s Republic of China

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The designs of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the Chinese Communist Party, which runs the PRC, are serious and dangerous.9 This tyrannical
country with a population of more than 1 billion people has the vision, resources,
and patience to achieve its objectives. Protecting the United States from the PRC’s
designs requires an unambiguous offensive-defensive mix, including protecting
American citizens and their interests, as well as U.S. allies, from PRC attacks and
abuse that undermine U.S. competitiveness, security, and prosperity.
The United States must have a cost-imposing strategic response to make Beijing’s aggression unaffordable, even as the American economy and U.S. power grow.
This stance will require real, sustained, near-unprecedented U.S. growth; stronger
partnerships; synchronized economic and security policies; and American energy
independence—but above all, it will require a very honest perspective about the
nature and designs of the PRC as more of a threat than a competitor.10 The next
President should use the State Department and its array of resources to reassess
and lead this effort, just as it did during the Cold War. The U.S. government needs
an Article X for China,11 and it should be a presidential mandate. Along with the
National Security Council, the State Department should draft an Article X, which
should be a deeply philosophical look at the China challenge.
Many foreign policy professionals and national leaders, both in government and
the private sector, are reluctant to take decisive action regarding China. Many are
vested in an unshakable faith in the international system and global norms. They
are so enamored with them they cannot brook any criticisms or reforms, let alone



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acknowledge their potential for being abused by the PRC. Others refuse to acknowledge Beijing’s malign activities and often pass off criticism as conspiracy theories.
For instance, many were quick to dismiss even the possibility that COVID-19
escaped from a Chinese research laboratory. The reality, however, is that the PRC’s
actions often do sound like conspiracy theories—because they are conspiracies. In
addition, some knowingly or not parrot the Communist line: Global leaders including President Joe Biden, have tried to normalize or even laud Chinese behavior.
In some cases, these voices, like the global corporate giants BlackRock and Disney,
directly benefit from doing business with Beijing.
On the other hand, others acknowledge the dangers posed by the PRC, but
believe in a moderating approach to accommodate its rise, a policy of “compete
where we must, but cooperate where we can,” including on issues like climate
change. This strategy has demonstrably failed.
As with all global struggles with Communist and other tyrannical regimes, the
issue should never be with the Chinese people but with the Communist dictatorship that oppresses them and threatens the well-being of nations across the globe.12
That said, the nature of Chinese power today is the product of history, ideology,
and the institutions that have governed China during the course of five millennia,
inherited by the present Chinese leaders from the preceding generations of the
CCP.13 In short, the PRC challenge is rooted in China’s strategic culture and not
just the Marxism–Leninism of the CCP, meaning that internal culture and civil
society will never deliver a more normative nation. The PRC’s aggressive behavior
can only be curbed through external pressure.
The Islamic Republic of Iran

The ongoing protests in the Islamic Republic of Iran (Iran), which are widely
viewed as a new revolution, have shown that the Islamic regime, which has been
in power since 1979 when Ayatollah Khomeini became the leader, is at its weakest
state in its history and is at odds not only with its own people but also its regional
neighbors. Iran is home to a proud and ancient culture, yet its people have struggled to achieve democracy and have had to endure a hostile theocratic regime that
vehemently opposes freedom. The time may be right to press harder on the Iranian
theocracy, support the Iranian people, and take other steps to draw Iran into the
community of free and modern nations.
Unfortunately, the Obama and Biden Administrations have propped up the
brutal Islamist theocracy that has hurt the Iranian people and threatened nuclear
war. For example, the Obama Administration’s 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of
Action, commonly referred to as the Iran nuclear deal, gave the Islamic regime a
crucial monetary lifeline after the Green Movement protests in 2009, which, while
ultimately unsuccessful, did succeed in weakening the regime and showing the
world that younger Iranians want freedom.

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Instead of pressuring the Iranian theocracy to move toward democracy, the
Obama Administration threw the brutal regime an economic lifeline by giving
hundreds of billions of dollars to the Iranian government and providing other sanctions relief. This economic relief did not moderate the regime, but emboldened its
brutality, its efforts to expand its nuclear weapons programs, and its support for
global terrorism. Former President Obama has admitted his lack of support for the
Green Movement during his Administration was an error and blamed it on poor
advisors—yet those same advisors are involved with the Biden Administration’s
insistence on reducing pressure on the theocracy and resurrecting a nuclear deal.
The next Administration should neither preserve nor repeat the mistakes of
the Obama and Biden Administrations. The correct future policy for Iran is one
that acknowledges that it is in U.S. national security interests, the Iranian people’s
human rights interests, and a broader global interest in peace and stability for the
Iranian people to have the democratic government they demand. This decision
to be free of the country’s abusive leaders must of course be made by the Iranian
people, but the United States can utilize its own and others’ economic and diplomatic tools to ease the path toward a free Iran and a renewed relationship with
the Iranian people.
The Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela

Russia

One issue today that starkly divides conservatives is the Russia–Ukraine conflict. The common ground seems to be recognition that presidential leadership
in 2025 must chart the course.

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Once a model of democracy and a true U.S. ally, the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela (Venezuela) has all but collapsed under the Communist regimes of the late
Hugo Chavez and Nicolas Maduro. In the 24 years since Hugo Chavez was first
elected Venezuelan president in 1999, the country has violently cracked down on
pro-democracy citizens and organizations, shattered its once oil-rich economy,
empowered domestic criminal cartels, and helped fuel a hemispheric refugee crisis.
Venezuela has swung from being one of the most prosperous, if not the most
prosperous, country in South America to being one of the poorest. Its Communist
leadership has also drawn closer to some of the United States’ greatest international foes, including the PRC and Iran, which have long sought a foothold in the
Americas. Indeed, Venezuela serves as a reminder of just how fragile democratic
institutions that are not maintained can be. To contain Venezuela’s Communism
and aid international partners, the next Administration must take important steps
to put Venezuela’s Communist abusers on notice while making strides to help the
Venezuelan people. The next Administration must work to unite the hemisphere
against this significant but underestimated threat in the Southern Hemisphere.

Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise

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One school of conservative thought holds that as Moscow’s illegal war of
aggression against Ukraine drags on, Russia presents major challenges to
U.S. interests, as well as to peace, stability, and the post-Cold War security
order in Europe. This viewpoint argues for continued U.S. involvement
including military aid, economic aid, and the presence of NATO and U.S.
troops if necessary. The end goal of the conflict must be the defeat of
Russian President Vladimir Putin and a return to pre-invasion border lines.
Another school of conservative thought denies that U.S. Ukrainian support
is in the national security interest of America at all. Ukraine is not a member
of the NATO alliance and is one of the most corrupt nations in the region.
European nations directly affected by the conflict should aid in the defense
of Ukraine, but the U.S. should not continue its involvement. This viewpoint
desires a swift end to the conflict through a negotiated settlement between
Ukraine and Russia.
The tension between these competing positions has given rise to a third
approach. This conservative viewpoint eschews both isolationism and
interventionism. Rather, each foreign policy decision must first ask the
question: What is in the interest of the American people? U.S. military
engagement must clearly fall within U.S. interests; be fiscally responsible;
and protect American freedom, liberty, and sovereignty, all while recognizing
Communist China as the greatest threat to U.S. interests. Thus, with respect to
Ukraine, continued U.S. involvement must be fully paid for; limited to military
aid (while European allies address Ukraine’s economic needs); and have a
clearly defined national security strategy that does not risk American lives.

Regardless of viewpoints, all sides agree that Putin’s invasion of Ukraine
is unjust and that the Ukrainian people have a right to defend their homeland.
Furthermore, the conflict has severely weakened Putin’s military strength and
provided a boost to NATO unity and its importance to European nations.
The next conservative President has a generational opportunity to bring resolution to the foreign policy tensions within the movement and chart a new path
forward that recognizes Communist China as the defining threat to U.S. interests
in the 21st century.
The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea

Peace and stability in Northeast Asia are vital interests of the United States. The
Republic of Korea (South Korea) and Japan are critical allies for ensuring a free
and open Indo–Pacific. They are indispensable military, economic, diplomatic, and
technology partners. The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK, or North

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Korea) must be deterred from military conflict. The United States cannot permit
the DPRK to remain a de facto nuclear power with the capacity to threaten the
United States or its allies. This interest is both critical to the defense of the American homeland and the future of global nonproliferation. The DPRK must not be
permitted to profit from its blatant violations of international commitments or to
threaten other nations with nuclear blackmail. Both interests can only be served
if the U.S. disallows the DPRK’s rogue regime behavior.
OTHER INTERNATIONAL ENGAGEMENTS
Western Hemisphere

The United States has a vested interest in a relatively united and economically
prosperous Western Hemisphere. Nonetheless, the region now has an overwhelming number of socialist or progressive regimes, which are at odds with the freedom
and growth-oriented policies of the U.S. and other neighbors and who increasingly
pose hemispheric security threats. A new approach is therefore needed, one that
simultaneously allows the U.S. to re-posture in its best interests and helps regional
partners enter a new century of growth and opportunity.
The following core policies must be part of this new direction:

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A “sovereign Mexico” policy. Mexico is currently a national security
disaster. Bluntly stated, Mexico can no longer qualify as a first-world nation;
it has functionally lost its sovereignty to muscular criminal cartels that
effectively run the country. The current dynamic is not good for either
U.S. citizens or Mexicans, and the perfect storm created by this cartel state
has negative effects that are damaging the entire hemisphere. The next
Administration must both adopt a posture that calls for a fully sovereign
Mexico and take all steps at its disposal to support that result in as rapid a
fashion as possible.
A fentanyl-free frontier. The same cartels that parasitically run Mexico
are also working with the PRC to fuel the largest drug crisis in the history
of North America. These Mexican cartels are working closely with Chinese
fentanyl precursor chemical manufacturers, importing those precursor
chemicals into Mexico, manufacturing fentanyl on Mexican soil, and
shipping it into the United States and elsewhere. The highly potent narcotic
is having an unprecedented lethal impact on the American citizenry. The
next Administration must leverage its new insistence on a sovereign Mexico
and work with other Western Hemisphere partners to halt the fentanyl
crisis and put a decisive end to this unprecedented public health threat.

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Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise

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A hemisphere-centered approach to industry and energy. The
next Administration has a golden opportunity to make key economic
changes that will not only provide tremendous economic opportunities
for Americans but will also serve as an economic boon to the entire
Western Hemisphere.
First, the United States must do everything possible, with both resources
and messaging, to shift global manufacturing and industry from more
distant points around the globe (especially from the increasingly hostile
and human rights-abusing PRC) to Central and South American countries.
“Re-hemisphering” manufacturing and industry closer to home will not only
eliminate some of the more recent supply-chain issues that damaged the U.S.
economy but will also represent a significant economic improvement for
parts of the Americas in need of growth and stabilization.



Similarly, the United States must work with Mexico, Canada, and other
countries to develop a hemisphere-focused energy policy that will reduce
reliance on distant and manipulable sources of fossil fuels, restore the free
flow of energy among the hemisphere’s largest producers, and work together
to increase energy production, including for nations that are looking for
dramatic economic expansion.
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A “local” approach to security threats. Western Hemisphere nations,
including those in the Caribbean, arguably have stronger cultural and
historical ties to the United States than most other countries and regions
in the world. Yet Central and South America are moving rapidly into the
sphere of anti-American, external state actors, including the PRC, Iran, and
Russia. Specific countries in the Americas, such as Venezuela, Colombia,
Guyana, and Ecuador, are either increasingly regional security threats
in their own rights or are vulnerable to hostile extra-continental powers.
The U.S. has an opportunity to lead these democratic neighbors to fight
against the external pressure of threats from abroad and address local
regional security concerns. This leadership and collaboration must span all
tools at the disposal of U.S. allies and partners, including security-focused
cooperation.

Middle East and North Africa

The next Administration must re-engage with Middle Eastern and North African nations and not abandon the region. Without U.S. leadership, the region may
tumble further into chaos or fall prey to American adversaries. This recommendation requires a multi-dimensional strategy.

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Second, the next Administration should build on the Trump
Administration’s diplomatic successes by encouraging other Arab states,
including Saudi Arabia, to enter the Abraham Accords. Related policies
should include reversing, as appropriate, the Biden Administration’s
degradation of the long-standing partnership with Saudi Arabia. The
Palestinian Authority should be defunded. A further key priority is keeping
Türkiye in the Western fold and a NATO ally. This includes a vigorous
outreach to Türkiye to dissuade it from “hedging” toward Russia or China,
which is likely to require a rethinking of U.S. support for YPG/PKK [People’s
Protection Units/Kurdistan Worker’s Party] Kurdish forces, which Ankara
believes are an existential threat to its security. For the foreseeable future—
and much longer than one new Administration—Middle Eastern oil will
play a key role in the world economy. Therefore, the U.S. must continue
to support its allies and compete with its economic adversaries, including
China. Relations with Saudi Arabia should be strengthened in a way that
seriously curtails Chinese influence in Riyadh.
Third, it is in the U.S. national interest to build a Middle East security
pact that includes Israel, Egypt, the Gulf states, and potentially India, as a
second “Quad” arrangement. Protecting freedom of navigation in the Gulf
and in the Red Sea/Suez Canal is vital to the world economy and therefore
to U.S. prosperity as well. In North Africa, security cooperation with
European allies, especially France, will be vital to limit growing Islamist
threats and the incursion of Russian influence through positionings of the
Wagner Group.
The U.S. cannot neglect a concern for human rights and minority rights,
which must be balanced with strategic and security considerations. Special
attention must be paid to challenges of religious freedom, especially the
status of Middle Eastern Christians and other religious minorities, as well as
the human trafficking endemic to the region.

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First, the U.S. must prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear technology and
delivery capabilities and more broadly block Iranian ambitions. This means,
inter alia, reinstituting and expanding Trump Administration sanctions;
providing security assistance for regional partners; supporting, through
public diplomacy and otherwise, freedom-seeking Iranian people in
their revolt against the mullahs; and ensuring Israel has both the military
means and the political support and flexibility to take what it deems to be
appropriate measures to defend itself against the Iranian regime and its
regional proxies Hamas, Hezbollah, and Palestinian Islamic Jihad.

Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise

Sub-Saharan Africa

Africa’s importance to U.S. foreign policy and strategic interests is rising and
will only continue to grow. Its explosive population growth, large reserves of
industry-dependent minerals, proximity to key maritime shipping routes, and its
collective diplomatic power ensure the continent’s global importance. Yet as Africa’s strategic significance has grown, the U.S.’s relative influence there has declined.
Terrorist activity on the continent has increased, while America’s competitors are
making significant gains for their own national interests. The PRC’s companies
dominate the African supply chain for certain minerals critical to emerging technologies. African nations comprise major country-bloc elements that shield the
PRC and Russia from international isolation for their human rights abuses—and
African nations staunchly support PRC foreign policy goals on issues such as Hong
Kong occupation, South China Seas dispute arbitration, and Taiwan.
The new Administration can correct this strategic failing of existing policy by
prioritizing Africa and by undertaking fundamental changes in how the United
States works with African nations.
At a bare minimum, the next Administration should:



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Shift strategic focus from assistance to growth. Reorient the focus of
U.S. overseas development assistance away from stand-alone humanitarian
development aid and toward fostering free market systems in African
countries by incentivizing and facilitating U.S. private sector engagement
in these countries. Development aid alone does little to develop countries
and can fuel corruption and violent conflict. While the United States should
always be willing to offer emergency and humanitarian relief, both U.S. and
African long-term interests are better served by a free market-based, private
growth-focused strategy to Africa’s economic challenges.
Counter malign Chinese activity on the continent. This should include
the development of powerful public diplomacy efforts to counter Chinese
influence campaigns with commitments to freedom of speech and the free
flow of information; the creation of a template “digital hygiene” program
that African countries can access to sanitize and protect their sensitive
communications networks from espionage by the PRC and other hostile
actors; the recognition of Somaliland statehood as a hedge against the U.S.’s
deteriorating position in Djibouti; and a focus on supporting American
companies involved in industries important to U.S. national interests or that
have a competitive advantage in Africa.
Counter the furtherance of terrorism. African country-based terrorist
groups like Boko Haram may currently lack the capability to attack the

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United States, but at least some of them would eventually try if allowed to
consolidate their operations and plan such attacks. The immediate threat
they pose lies in their abilities and willingness to strike American targets in
their regions of operation or to harm U.S. interests in other ways. The U.S.
should support capable African military and security operations through
the State Department and other federal agencies responsible for granting
foreign military education, training, and security assistance.
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Build a coalition of the cooperative. Rather than thinning limited federal
resources by spreading funds across all countries (including some that are
unsupportive or even hostile to the United States,) the next Administration
should focus on those countries with which the U.S. can expect a mutually
beneficial relationship. After being designated focus countries by the
State Department, such nations should receive a full suite of American
engagement. That said, the next Administration should still maintain a
baseline level of contact even with those countries with which it has lessthan-fruitful relationships in order to encourage positive developments and
to be in position to seize unexpected diplomatic opportunities as they arise.

Europe

American foreign policy has long benefited from cooperation with the countries
of Europe (generally, the EU), and any conservative Administration should build
on this resource. Yet the transatlantic relationship is complex, with security, trade,
and political dimensions.
First, the Europe, Eurasia, and Russia region is made up of relatively wealthy
and technologically advanced societies that should be expected to bear a fair share
of both security needs and global security architecture: The United States cannot
be expected to provide a defense umbrella for countries unwilling to contribute
appropriately. At stake after 2024 will be examining the status of the Wales Pledge
of 2 percent of gross domestic product toward defense by NATO members. The
new Administration will also want to encourage nations to exceed that pledge.
Second, transatlantic trade is a significant part of the global economy, and it is
in the U.S. national interest to amplify it, especially because this means weaning

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Focus on core diplomatic activities, and stop promoting policies
birthed in the American culture wars. African nations are particularly
(and reasonably) non-receptive to the U.S. social policies such as abortion
and pro-LGBT initiatives being imposed on them. The United States should
focus on core security, economic, and human rights engagement with
African partners and reject the promotion of divisive policies that hurt the
deepening of shared goals between the U.S. and its African partners.

Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise

Europe of its dependence on China. However, there are also transatlantic trade
tensions that disturb the U.S.–EU relationship and that have been evident across
Administrations. The U.S. must undertake a comprehensive review of trade
arrangements between the EU and the United States to assure that U.S. businesses
are treated fairly and to build productive reciprocity. Outside the EU, trade with
the post-Brexit U.K. needs urgent development before London slips back into the
orbit of the EU.
Third, in the wake of Brexit, EU foreign policy now takes place without U.K.
input, which disadvantages the United States, given that the U.K. has historically
been aligned with many U.S. positions. Therefore, U.S. diplomacy must be more
attentive to inner-EU developments, while also developing new allies inside the
EU—especially the Central European countries on the eastern flank of the EU,
which are most vulnerable to Russian aggression.



South and Central Asia

Many key American interests and responsibilities are found in South and
Central Asia. Specifically, continuing to advance the bilateral relationship with
India to mutual benefit is a crucial objective for U.S. policy. India plays a crucial
role in countering the Chinese threat and securing a free and open Indo–Pacific.
It is a critical security guarantor for the key routes of air and sea travel linking
East and West and an important emerging U.S. economic partner. For instance,
the 2019 Department of Defense Indo–Pacific Strategy Report noted that the
Indian Ocean area “is at the nexus of global trade and commerce, with nearly
half of the world’s 90,000 commercial vessels and two thirds of global oil trade
traveling through its sea lanes. The region boasts some of the fastest-growing
economies on Earth.”14
Meanwhile, the threat of transnational terrorism remains acute. The humiliating withdrawal of U.S. troops from Afghanistan after a 20-year military campaign
has created new challenges. It has provided an opportunity to reset the deeply
troubled U.S.–Pakistan relationship and reassess U.S. counterterrorism strategy
in the region. The long-standing India–Pakistan rivalry and tensions regarding the
disputed territory of Kashmir continue to pose risks to regional stability, especially
because both countries are nuclear powers.
The State Department’s role in strengthening the regional security and economic framework linking the U.S and India is crucial. In addition, the department
has important functional responsibilities in dealing with a range of threats from
nuclear proliferation to transnational proliferation. While American statecraft
should also seek to improve bilateral relations throughout the region, U.S. policy
must be clear-eyed and realistic about the perfidiousness of the Taliban regime in
Afghanistan and the military–political rule in Pakistan. There can be no expectation of normal relations with either.

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The priority for statecraft is advancing the U.S.–Indian role as a cornerstone
of the Quad, a cooperative framework including the U.S., India, Japan, and Australia. The Quad is comprised of the key nations in coordinating efforts for a free
and open Indo–Pacific. It is an overarching group that nests the key U.S. bilateral
and trilateral cooperative efforts that facilitate U.S. collaborative efforts across
the Indo–Pacific. The State Department should also encourage the “Quad-Plus”
concept that allows other regional powers to participate in Quad coordination on
issues of mutual interest. Further, the State Department must support an integrated federal effort to deliver a revamped regional strategy for South Asia, as well
as leading the execution of key tasks to implement the strategy.15
The Arctic

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Because of Alaska, the U.S. is an Arctic nation. The Arctic is a vast expanse of
land and sea rich in resources including fish, minerals, and energy. For example,
the region is estimated to contain 90 million barrels of oil and one-quarter of the
world’s undiscovered natural gas reserves.16 The Arctic is lightly populated: Only
4 million people in the world live above the Arctic Circle, with more than half of
those living in Russia. Only around 68,000 people in Alaska live above the Arctic
Circle.17 However, the sheer immensity of the Alaskan Arctic means its population
density is less than one person per square mile.18
The United States has several strong interests in the Arctic region. The rate of
melting ice during summer months has led to increased interest not only from
shipping and tourism sectors, but also from America’s global competitors, who
are interested in exploiting the region’s strategic importance and accessing its
bounty of natural resources.
In the not-too-distant future, there will be a growing interest in the Arctic from
both state and non-state actors alike. China has been open about its interest in
the region, primarily as a highway for trade but also for its rich natural resources.
While the PRC’s increasing intervention in Arctic affairs is a bit strained because
it does not have an Arctic coastline, Russia does—and Russia has made no secret
of its view that the Arctic is vital for economic and military reasons. Russia has
invested heavily in new and refurbished Arctic bases and cold-weather equipment
and capabilities. The north star of U.S. Arctic policy should remain national sovereignty, safeguarded through robust capabilities as well as through diplomatic,
economic, and legal attentiveness.
The next Administration should embrace the view that NATO must acknowledge that it is, in part, an Arctic alliance. With the likely accession of Finland and
Sweden to NATO, every Arctic nation except for Russia will be a NATO member
state. NATO has been slow to appreciate that the Arctic is a theater that it must
defend, especially considering Russia’s brazen aggression against Ukraine. NATO
must develop and implement an Arctic strategy that recognizes the importance of



Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise

the region and ensures that Russian use of Arctic waters and resources does not
exceed a reasonable footprint.
The U.S. should unapologetically pursue American interests in the Arctic by
promoting economic freedom in the region. Economic freedom spurs prosperity,
innovation, respect for the rule of law, jobs, and sustainability. Most important,
economic freedom can help to keep the Arctic stable and secure.
The U.S. should work to ensure that shipping lanes in the Arctic remain available to all global commercial traffic and free of onerous fees and burdensome
administrative, regulatory, and military requirements. While this should be the
next Administration’s policy with respect to all countries that might seek to block
free-flowing commercial traffic, the next Administration will clearly have to exert
substantial attention toward Russia.
Both the U.S. Coast Guard and the U.S. Navy are vital tools to ensure an unmonopolized Arctic. It is imperative that the Navy and Coast Guard continue to
expand their fleets, including planned icebreaker acquisitions, to assure Arctic
access for the United States and other friendly actors. The remote and harsh conditions of the Arctic also make unmanned system investment and use particularly
appealing for providing additional situational awareness, intelligence, surveillance,
and reconnaissance. The Coast Guard should also consider upgrading facilities,
such as its Barrow station, to reinforce its Arctic capabilities and demonstrate a
greater commitment to the region.
The People’s Republic of China has declared itself a “near-Arctic state,” which
is an imaginary term non-existent in international discourse. The United States
should work with like-minded Arctic nations, including Russia, to raise legitimate
concerns about the PRC’s so-called Polar Silk-Road ambitions.
Concerning Greenland, the opening of a U.S. consulate in Nuuk is welcome. A
formal year-round diplomatic presence is an effective way for the U.S. to better
understand local political and economic dynamics. Furthermore, given Greenland’s geographic proximity and its rising potential as a commercial and tourist
location, the next Administration should pursue policies that enhance economic
ties between the U.S. and Greenland.
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

Defending and protecting the American people and advancing their interests
requires the United States to engage in a broad spectrum of bilateral and multilateral
relationships, including participating in international organizations. Working with
other governments through international organizations like the United Nations
(U.N.) can be tremendously useful—but membership in these organizations must
always be understood as a means to attain defined goals rather than an end in itself.
Engagement with international organizations is one relatively easy way for the
U.S. to defend its interests and to seek to address problems in concert with other

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— 191 —



nations, but it is not the only option—and American diplomats should be cleareyed about international organizations’ strengths and weaknesses. When such
institutions act against U.S. interests, the United States must be prepared to take
appropriate steps in response, up to and including withdrawal. The manifest failure
and corruption of the World Health Organization (WHO) during the COVID-19
pandemic is an example of the danger that international organizations pose to U.S.
citizens and interests.
The next Administration must end blind support for international organizations. If an international organization is effective and advances American
interests, the United States should support it. If an international organization
is ineffective or does not support American interests, the United States should
not support it. Those that are effective will still require constant pressure from
U.S. officials to ensure that they remain effective. Serious consideration should
also be given to withdrawal from organizations that no longer have value, quietly
undermine U.S. interests or goals, or disproportionately rely on U.S. financial contributions to survive.
The Trump Administration’s “tough love” approach to international organizations served American interests. For example, the Trump Administration withdrew
from, or terminated funding for, the United Nations Human Rights Council, the
United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, the United
Nations Relief and Works Agency, and the WHO. The results were redeployment
of taxpayer dollars to better uses—and other organizations “getting the message”
that the United States will not allow itself and its money to be used to undermine
its own interests.
The Biden Administration reversed many of these decisions. Currently, U.S.
funding for international organizations is more than $16 billion in fiscal year
2021—a sharp increase from $10.8 billion in fiscal year 2015.19 Millions of American
taxpayer dollars go to support policies and initiatives that hurt the United States
and American citizens.
The next Administration should direct the Secretary of State to initiate a
comprehensive cost-benefit analysis of U.S. participation in all international
organizations. This review should take into account long-standing provisions in
federal law that prohibit the use of taxpayer dollars to promote abortion, population control, and terrorist activities, as well as other applicable restrictions on
funding for international organizations and agencies with a view to withholding
U.S. funds in cases of abuses.
International organizations should not be used to promote radical social policies as if they were human rights priorities. Doing so undermines actual human
rights and weakens U.S. credibility abroad. The next Administration should use
its voice, influence, votes, and funding in international organizations to promote authentic human rights and respect for sovereignty based on the binding



Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise

international obligations contained in treaties that have been constitutionally
ratified by the U.S. government. It must promote a strict text-based interpretation of treaty obligations that does not consider human rights treaties as “living
instruments” both within the State Department and within international organizations that receive U.S. funding, including by making respect for sovereignty and
authentic human rights a litmus test of personnel decisions and elections processes
within international organizations.
The U.S. Commission on Unalienable Human Rights focused on the primacy
of civil and political rights in its inaugural report, which remains an important
guidepost for bilateral and multilateral engagements on human rights. The commission’s report is a roadmap for revamping and reenergizing U.S. human rights
policy and should be the basis for both structural and policy changes throughout
the State Department.20 All U.S. multilateral engagements must be reevaluated
in light of the work of the commission, and initiatives that promote controversial
policies must be halted and rolled back.
It is paramount to create a healthy culture of respect for life, the family, sovereignty, and authentic human rights in international organizations and agencies. To
support this goal, the U.S. led an effort during the Trump Administration to forge a
consensus among like-minded countries in support of human life, women’s health,
support of the family as the basic unit of human society, and defense of national
sovereignty. The result was the Geneva Consensus Declaration on Women’s Health
and Protection of the Family.21 All U.S. foreign policy engagements that were produced and expanded under the Obama and Biden Administrations must be aligned
with the Geneva Consensus Declaration and the work of the U.S. Commission on
Unalienable Human Rights.
The U.S. government should not and cannot promote or fund abortion in international programs or multilateral organizations. Technically, the United States can
prevent its international funding from going toward abortions, but the U.S. will
have a greater impact by including like-minded nations and building on the coalition launched through the Geneva Consensus Declaration, with a view to shaping
the work of international agencies by functioning as a united front.
The COVID-19 pandemic made it painfully clear that both international organizations—and some countries—are only too willing to trample human rights in the
name of public health. For example, the WHO was, and remains, willing to support
the suppression of basic human rights, partially because of its close relationship
with human rights abusers like the PRC.
The next Administration should unequivocally embrace the premise that
humanity and the international community can simultaneously tackle pandemics and other emergent health threats without impeding the rights of people. It
must also become a vocal surrogate for people in countries where rights are being
suppressed in the name of health. This will likely require greater restrictions on

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the supply of federal dollars to the WHO and other health-focused international
organizations pending adjustment of their policies.
The United States must return to treating international organizations as vehicles for promoting American interests—or take steps to extract itself from those
organizations.
SHAPING THE FUTURE

l

Develop a reorganization strategy. Despite periodic attempts by
previous Administrations (including the Trump Administration) to make
more than cosmetic changes to the State Department, its structure has
remained largely unchanged since the 20th century.23 The State Department
will better serve future Administrations, regardless of party, if it were to
be meaningfully streamlined. The next Administration should develop
a complete hypothetical reorganization of the department—one which
would tighten accountability to political leadership, reduce overhead,
eliminate redundancy, waste fewer taxpayer resources, and recommend
additional personnel-related changes for improvement of function.
Such reorganization could be creative, but also carefully review specific
structure-related problems that have been documented over the years.
This reorganization effort would necessarily assess what office closures

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Development of a grand foreign policy strategy is key to the next Administration’s success, but without addressing structural and related issues of the State
Department, this strategy will be at risk. The Hart–Rudman Commission called for
a significant restructuring of the State Department specifically and foreign assistance programs generally, stating that funding increases could only be justified if
there was greater confidence that institutions would use their funding effectively.22
Sadly, the exact opposite has occurred. The State Department has metastasized in
structure and resources, but neither the function of the department nor the use of
taxpayer dollars has improved. The next Administration can take steps to remedy
these deficiencies.
The State Department’s greatest problem is certainly not an absence of
resources. As noted, the department boasts tens of thousands of employees and
billions of dollars of funding—including significant amounts of discretionary funding. It also exists among a broader array of federal agencies that are duplicative,
particularly when it comes to the provision of direct and indirect foreign assistance.
Realistically, meaningful reform of the State Department will require significant
streamlining.
Below are some key structural and operational recommendations that will be
essential for the next Administration’s success, and which will lay crucial foundations for other necessary reforms.

Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise

can be carried out with and without congressional approval. Timelines for
action on these fronts should be developed accordingly, but speed should
be a priority.
l

Consolidate foreign assistance authorities. Foreign assistance is a
critical foreign policy tool that is too often disconnected from the federal
government’s practice of foreign policy. Bureaucrats spend significant
energy resisting the use of non-emergency foreign assistance to leverage
positive results for the United States, even though it is a perfectly
reasonable proposition. The coordination of foreign assistance dollars is
also difficult because the foreign assistance budget and foreign loan issuance
authorities are divided across numerous Cabinet departments, smaller
agencies, and other offices.



The next Administration should take steps to ensure that future foreign
assistance clearly and unambiguously supports the President’s foreign
policy agenda. For example, the next administrator of the U.S. Agency
for International Development, which is technically subordinate to the
State Department, should be authorized to take on the additional role
of Director of Foreign Assistance with the rank of Deputy Secretary and
oversee all foreign assistance. This role—which existed briefly during
the George W. Bush Administration before it was eliminated by the
Obama Administration—would empower the dual-hatted official to better
align and coordinate with the manifold foreign assistance programs
across the federal government. The next Administration should also
evaluate whether these multiple sources of foreign assistance are in
the national interest and, if not, develop a plan to consolidate foreign
assistance authorities.
l

Make public diplomacy and international broadcasting serve
American interests. A key part of U.S. foreign policy is the ability to
communicate with not only governments but with the peoples of the world.
Indeed, in some ways, communicating directly with the public is more
important than communicating with governments, particularly in times of
governmental conflict or disagreement. Public diplomacy has historically
been, and remains, vital to American foreign policy success. Unfortunately,
U.S. public diplomacy, which largely relies on taxpayer-funded international
broadcasting outlets, has been deeply ineffective in recent years.
The U.S. government’s first foray into international broadcasting started
with the Voice of America radio broadcast in 1942, which was intended as

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a tool to communicate directly with the people of Europe during World
War II. During the next half-century, America’s international broadcasting
efforts both expanded and increased in sophistication as the United States
shifted out of its “hot” war in Europe and into the Cold War with the
Soviet Union. U.S. international broadcasting prowess, and the confident
willingness to communicate the correctness of American ideals in the face
of global resistance, arguably hit its peak near the conclusion of the Cold
War in the late 1980s.
Since the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the subsequent collapse
of Soviet and Eastern Bloc Communism, factors including the false
appeal of a so-called peace dividend triggered a slide in the U.S. ability to
communicate a pro-freedom message to the rest of the world and in its
commitment to do so. Ironically, this slide accompanied the rise of the
Internet and mobile phone technologies, which arguably facilitated the
most significant revolution in human communication since the invention of
the printing press.

l

Engage in cyber diplomacy. Cyberspace has become an arena for
competition between the U.S. and nations that seek and export digital
authoritarianism. Cyberspace protection is critical to national security and
deserving of commensurate diplomatic resources. Defined as “the use of
diplomatic tools to address issues arising in and through cyberspace,” cyber
diplomacy is a key part of the U.S. government’s toolkit for preventing and
addressing cyber threats.24
The model for cyberspace that the U.S. espouses is based on democracy
and freedom of information. It is “an open, interoperable, secure, reliable,
market-drive, domain that reflects democratic values and protects privacy.”25
Russia and China, meanwhile, are authoritarian regimes that use the
Internet to limit public opposition and control information. They have
created technological tools to enforce dominance over their peoples, and
at the U.N. and international organizations dealing with cyberspace, they
strive to push standards that assist their totalitarian efforts and undermine
Western nations.

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The United States must reassert its public diplomacy obligations by
restoring its international broadcasting infrastructure as part of the broader
U.S. foreign policy framework, consolidating broadcasting resources and
recommitting to people-focused and pro-freedom messaging and content.

Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise

Simultaneously, Russia, China, and lesser adversaries exploit the more
open networks of countries like the U.S. to undermine democracy through
disinformation and propaganda. They have attempted to influence U.S.
elections; enabled or encouraged actors to exploit cyber vulnerabilities
to commit theft of real or intellectual property; and have challenged
U.S. governmental, military, and critical infrastructure networks with
targeted malware.



In short, the cyberspace era has gradually evolved from one of exploration,
innovation, and cooperation to one that retains these features but is also
marked by aggressive competition and persistent threats. To meet this
reality, the State Department must move beyond its traditional model of
attempting to establish non-binding, informal world standards of acceptable
cyberspace behavior. The State Department should work with allies to
establish a clear framework of enforceable norms for actions in cyberspace,
moving beyond the voluntary norms of the United Nations Group of
Governmental Experts.26
The State Department should also assist the Department of Defense to go
“on offence” against adversaries. “Deterrence as a strategic approach has not
stemmed the onslaught of cyber aggression below the level of armed conflict.”27
The traditional U.S. defensive approach based on deterrence followed by
reaction to crossed “red lines” is no longer effective. Adversaries can evade
this strategy through multiple tactical lines of action below the level of
armed conflict, and such actions have a cumulative strategic effect. The State
Department’s role should be to work with allies and engage with adversaries
when necessary to draw clear lines of unacceptable conduct. Global financial
infrastructure, nuclear controls, and public health are particularly important
areas in which consensus may even be found across ideological lines.
These mission-essential institutional initiatives should be joined with others
to establish a presidentially directed and durable U.S. foreign policy.
CONCLUSION

The next conservative President has the opportunity and the duty to restructure
the creation and execution of U.S. foreign policy so that it is focused on his or her
vision for the nation's role in the world. The policy ideas and reform recommendations outlined in this chapter provide guidance about how the State Department
can contribute to this objective.
In the main, this chapter refocuses attention away from the special interests
and social experiments that are used in some quarters to capture U.S. foreign policy.

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Department of State

The ideas and recommendations herein are premised on the belief that a rigorous
adherence to the national interest is the most enduring foundation for U.S. grand
strategy in the 21st century.



AUTHOR’S NOTE: Thanks to the entire State Department chapter team, the leaders and staff of the 2025

Presidential Transition Project, and my colleagues at The Heritage Foundation’s Davis Center. In particular, I would
like to acknowledge the following colleagues: Russell Berman, Sarah Calvis, James Carafano, Spencer Chretien,
Wesley Coopersmith, Paul Dans, Steven Groves, Simon Hankinson, Joseph Humire, Michael Pillsbury, Max Primorac,
Reed Rubenstein, Brett Schaefer, Jeff Smith, Hillary Tanoff, Erin Walsh, and John Zadrozny.

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Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise
ENDNOTES

1.
2.

3.
4.

5.

6.
7.

8.
9.



10.

11.

12.

13.
14.

15.
16.
17.

18.

19.

20.

U.S. Department of State, “About the U.S. Department of State: Our History,” https://www.state.gov/about/
(accessed March 9, 2023).
The balance of employment is 2,149 eligible family members and 50,223 locally employed staff. U.S.
Department of State, “GTM Fact Sheet: Facts About Our Most Valuable Asset—Our People,” Global Talent
Management, December 31, 2022, https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2023/01/GTM_Factsheet1222.
pdf (accessed March 9, 2023).
U.S. Commission on National Security, Road Map for National Security: Imperative for Change, Phase III Report,
February 15, 2001, p. x, http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/nssg/PhaseIIIFR.pdf (accessed March 9, 2023).
See Brett D. Schaefer, “How to Make the State Department More Effective at Implementing U.S. Foreign
Policy,” Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 3115, April 20, 2016, https://www.heritage.org/politicalprocess/report/how-make-the-state-department-more-effective-implementing-us-foreign.
Historically, roughly one-third of ambassadorial appointments have been political appointments, although
Republican Administrations have generally had a higher ratio of political appointments than Democratic
Administrations.
U.S. Constitution, art. 2, sec. 2, cl. 2.
News release, “Secretary Blinken Launches the Office of China Coordination,” U.S. Department of State,
December 16, 2022, https://www.state.gov/secretary-blinken-launches-the-office-of-china-coordination/
(accessed March 9, 2023).
Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S. Code § 1101 et seq., § 1253.
See Michael Pillsbury, The Hundred Year Marathon: China’s Secret Strategy to Replace the United States as a
Global Superpower (NY: St. Martin’s Griffin, 2016).
For additional context regarding how countering China fits in a more robust U.S. strategy, see James Jay
Carafano et al., “Foreign Policy: Strategy for a Post-Biden Era,” Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 3715,
July 21, 2022, https://www.heritage.org/defense/report/foreign-policy-strategy-post-biden-era.
The Article X for China would follow George Kennan’s Article X for U.S.–Soviet competition. See George F.
Kennan, “The Sources of Soviet Conduct,” Foreign Affairs, July 1947, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/
russian-federation/1947-07-01/sources-soviet-conduct (accessed March 22, 2023).
Dean Cheng et al., “Assessing Beijing’s Power: A Blueprint for the U.S. Response to China Over the Next
Decades,” Heritage Foundation Special Report No. 221, February 20, 2010, https://www.heritage.org/asia/
report/assessing-beijings-power-blueprint-the-us-response-china-over-the-next-decades.
Eric W. Orts, “The Rule of Law in China,” Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law, Vol. 34, No. 1 (January 2001),
https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1686&context=vjtl (accessed March 9, 2023).
U.S. Department of Defense, Indo–Pacific Strategy Report: Preparedness, Partnerships, and Promoting a
Networked Region, June 1, 2019, https://media.defense.gov/2019/Jul/01/2002152311/-1/-1/1/DEPARTMENT-OFDEFENSE-INDO-PACIFIC-STRATEGY-REPORT-2019.PDF (accessed July 28, 2022).
See Jeff Smith, “South Asia: A New Strategy,” Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 3721, August 29, 2022,
https://www.heritage.org/asia/report/south-asia-new-strategy.
Emma Bryce, “Why Is There So Much Oil in the Arctic?” Live Science, August 3, 2019, https://www.livescience.
com/66008-why-oil-in-arctic.html (accessed February 9, 2023).
“Changes in the Arctic: Background and Issues for Congress,” Congressional Research Service Report for
Congress, updated January 26, 2021, p. 6, https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R41153/177 (accessed
March 9, 2023).
U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Science and Technology, “Snapshot: Overcoming the Tyranny of
Distance in the Arctic,” April 20, 2020, https://www.dhs.gov/science-and-technology/news/2020/04/20/
snapshot-overcoming-tyranny-distance-arctic (accessed February 9, 2023).
U.S. Department of State, “U.S. Contributions to International Organizations, 2021,” September 20, 2022,
https://www.state.gov/u-s-contributions-to-international-organizations-2021/ (accessed March 9, 2023), and
U.S. Department of State, “U.S. Contributions to International Organizations, 2015,” November 1, 2016, https://
www.state.gov/u-s-contributions-to-international-organizations-2015/ (accessed March 9, 2023).
U.S. Department of State, Report on the Commission of Inalienable Rights, https://www.state.gov/wp-content/
uploads/2020/07/Draft-Report-of-the-Commission-on-Unalienable-Rights.pdf (accessed March 9, 2023).

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21. “Geneva Consensus Declaration on Promoting Women’s Health and Strengthening the Family,” October
22, 2021, https://www.theiwh.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/GCD-Declaration-2021-2.pdf (accessed
March 13, 2023).
22. U.S. Commission on National Security, Road Map for National Security.
23. U.S. Department of State, “Organization Chart,” November 2004, https://2009-2017.state.gov/s/d/rm/rls/
perfrpt/2004/html/39764.htm (accessed March 9, 2023); U.S. Department of State, “Organization Chart,”
November 2016, https://2009-2017.state.gov/documents/organization/263637.pdf (accessed March 9, 2023);
U.S. Department of State, “Organization Chart,” February 2020, https://2017-2021.state.gov/wp-content/
uploads/2021/01/Dept-Org-Chart-Feb-2020-508.pdf (accessed March 9, 2023); U.S. Department of State,
“DOS Org Chart August 2021,” August 2021, https://www.state.gov/department-of-state-organization-chart/
dos-org-chart-august-2021/ (accessed March 9, 2023); and U.S. Department of State, “Organization Chart,”
May 2022, https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/05/DOS-Org-Chart-5052022-Non-Accessible.
pdf (accessed March 9, 2023).
24. Emily O. Goldman, “Cyber Diplomacy for Strategic Competition: Fresh Thinking and New Approaches
Are Needed on Diplomacy’s Newest Frontier,” Foreign Service Journal, June 2021, http://afsa.org/cyberdiplomacy-strategic-competition (accessed March 9, 2023).
25. Emily Goldman, “From Reaction to Action: Adopting a Competitive Posture in Cyber Diplomacy,” Texas
National Security Review, Vol. 3, No. 4 (Fall 2020), https://tnsr.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/TNSR-Vol3Iss4-Goldman.pdf (accessed March 9, 2023).
26. United Nations General Assembly, “Group of Government Experts on Advancing Responsible State Behaviour
in Cyberspace in the Context of International Security,” A/76/135, July 14, 2021, https://front.un-arm.org/wpcontent/uploads/2021/08/A_76_135-2104030E-1.pdf (accessed March 10, 2023).
27. Goldman, “Cyber Diplomacy.”



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7

INTELLIGENCE
COMMUNITY
Dustin J. Carmack

MISSION STATEMENT

OVERVIEW

The United States Intelligence Community (IC) is a vast, intricate bureaucracy
spread throughout 18 independent and Cabinet subagencies.1 According to the
Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI), the IC’s mission is “to collect, analyze, and deliver foreign intelligence and counterintelligence information
to America’s leaders so they can make sound decisions to protect our country.”2
An incoming conservative President needs to use these intelligence authorities
aggressively to anticipate and thwart our adversaries, including Russia, Iran, North
Korea, and especially China, while maintaining counterterrorism tools that have
demonstrated their effectiveness. This means empowering the right personnel
to manage, build, and effectively execute actions dispersed throughout the IC to
deliver intelligence in an ever-challenging world. It also means removing redundancies, mission creep, and IC infighting that could prevent these collection tools
from providing objective, apolitical, and empirically backed intelligence to the IC’s
premier customer: the President of the United States.
Today, as Abraham Lincoln famously said, “The occasion is piled high with
difficulty, and we must rise with the occasion…. [W]e must think anew, and act

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To arm a future incoming conservative President with the knowledge and tools
necessary to fortify the United States Intelligence Community; to defend against
all foreign enemies and ensure the security and prosperity of our sovereign nation,
devoid of all political motivations; and to maintain constitutional civil liberties.



Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise

anew.”3 The Intelligence Community maintains an incredible capacity to achieve
its mission, but both the IC and the somewhat antiquated infrastructure that supports it often place too high a priority on yesterday’s threats and methodologies
instead of trying to identify possible future threats or the methodologies that
might be needed to combat them. The IC also often spends too much time overcorrecting for past mistakes. The unintended consequences include hesitancy,
groupthink, and an overly cautious approach that allows personal incentives to
drive preset courses.
The IC must be perceived as a depoliticized protector of America’s civil rights
and security. The American people are understandably frustrated by the fact that
those who abuse power are rarely held to account for their actions. This must
change, beginning with leadership that is both committed to ensuring that these
agencies faithfully execute the laws of the land under the Constitution and resolved
to punish and remove any officials who have abused the public trust.
The IC must also start to look forward, not backward. A concerted, disciplined,
leadership-led initiative must be undertaken to refocus and shift IC prioritization,
funding, and authorities to new and emerging threats, technologies, and methodologies if the United States is to prevail against its global adversaries.4 Unfortunately,
America’s major strategic threat is a nation-state peer and possibly ahead of the
U.S. in strategic areas. An incoming President must understand that today’s intelligence competition could well require analyzing technologies the U.S. does not
have or compartmentalizing certain information as was done during the Cold
War because of intelligence penetration. A future President’s ability to drive the
resources needed to defeat another nation-state giant should therefore be the
focus of near-term IC reforms.
OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE (ODNI)

The ODNI was established in the aftermath of the attacks on 9/11 and intelligence failures leading up to the 2003 U.S. war in Iraq. The office and its functions
stem from authorities established under executive orders promulgated by
President George W. Bush in 2004, followed by statutory authorizations in the
Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (IRTPA).5
Proponents of an ODNI hoped to establish reforms similar to the Goldwater–
Nichols Department of Defense (DOD) reforms of the 1980s, which identified
recurring problems within DOD’s command-and-control architecture and led to
unified Combatant Commands with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as
the senior ranking member of the armed forces and principal military adviser to
the President. The ODNI was envisioned as a small but powerful IC coordinating
agency led by a Director of National Intelligence (DNI). As the President’s principal
intelligence adviser, the DNI would lead and provide oversight of the President’s
intelligence authorities while wielding a cudgel—budget and appointment

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Intelligence Community

Prior DNIs were the head of the IC only on paper and were routinely
accustomed to yielding IC actions and decisions to the preferences of the
CIA and other agencies. My ability to begin reversing that capitulation was
accomplished solely because President Trump made it repeatedly clear to the
entire national security apparatus that he expected all intelligence matters to
go through the DNI.9

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authorities—to break institutional silos that had caused past intelligence integration failures.
Originally envisioned by the 9/11 Commission as a strengthened, authoritative
position, the final congressionally negotiated product signed by President Bush
has led to ambiguous and vague authorities that are dependent on who is selected
as DNI and Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Director and their level of support
from the White House and National Security Council (NSC). 9/11 Commission
Executive Director Philip Zelikow warned in a 2004 hearing that creating a new
agency “lacking any existing institutional base…would require authorities at least
as strong as those we have proposed or else it would create a bureaucratic fifth
wheel that would make the present situation even worse.”6 The ODNI has become
that bureaucratic fifth wheel about which Zelikow warned.
For example, under the Bush Administration’s initial legislative proposal, the
CIA Director would have been under the “authority, direction, and control” of the
DNI and no longer the head of an autonomous agency. Additional mechanisms
envisioned full budget authority for the DNI, including within DOD’s intelligence
components, as opposed to coordinating authority. Through arduous “sausage-making” and relatively quick negotiations, lawmakers produced statutorily
vague authorities that traded away the DNI’s ability to direct budgetary authority
across the entire IC, including DOD, and left the CIA a subordinate but independent agency with duties to report to the DNI without explicit directing authority.
These statutory developments were what led President Bush’s first choice to
serve as DNI, Robert Gates, to turn down the position. In discussions with the
White House over the post, Gates noted that the “legislation weakened the leadership of the community” and that “instead of a stronger person, you ended up
with a weaker person because the DNI had no troops and no additional powers
really on the budget, hiring, and firing.”7 Gates noted that success would require
the President to “make explicit publicly that the DNI is head of the Intelligence
Community, not some budgeter or coordinator,” and that “[t]he position’s only
prayer of success is for the president to say plainly…how he sees the job. Without
his explicit mandate…the endeavor is doomed to fail.”8
One of the two DNIs confirmed by the Senate during the Trump Administration, John Ratcliffe, acknowledged that Gates’s theoretical concerns became the
practical reality that he inherited:



Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise

To help further the legislative intent behind IRTPA, DNI Ratcliffe advised
during the transition of incoming Biden DNI Avril Haines that the DNI should
be the only Cabinet-level intelligence official.10 While his recommendation was
adopted and has corrected the previously allowed imbalance by making the DNI
the only Cabinet official and head of the IC at the table, the ODNI’s effectiveness
and direction leave much to be desired.
A conservative President must decide how to empower an individual to oversee
and manage the Intelligence Community effectively. To be successful, the DNI
and ODNI must be able to lead the IC and implement the President’s intelligence
priorities. This includes being able to exercise both budget and personnel authority
and being able to rely on timely, useful feedback from subordinate components of
the IC, many of which are located within other Cabinet agencies.
The ODNI needs to direct, not replicate in-house, the other IC agencies’ analytic,
operational, and management functions. Considerations like mismanagement
of human resources, joint-duty assignments, and accelerated growth in senior
personnel can cause a President to dictate to his incoming DNI a desire to slash
redundant positions and expenditures while simultaneously giving the DNI the
authority to drive necessary changes throughout the IC to deal with the nation’s
most compelling threats, including those emanating from China. As John Ratcliffe
has noted, “These are essential to the DNI having the abilities and authorities to
effectively direct, coordinate, and tackle the immense national security challenges
ahead for the Intelligence Community as intended under IRTPA.”11
Otherwise, other Cabinet and subordinate IC agencies will continue to regard
the ODNI as an annoyance and not as a positive contributor to the National Intelligence Program (NIP) budget. They will continue to work around or circumvent
ODNI leadership decisions with appropriators and the Office of Management and
Budget (OMB) or seek to wait out an Administration or DNI to prevent a policy or
intelligence priority from reaching fruition.
Intelligence and interagency coordination has improved significantly since
9/11. Nevertheless, interagency rivalries and festering issues continue to cause
duplication of effort on intelligence analysis and technology purchases as well as
overclassification and ever-increasing compartmentalization. Additional issues
include the abuse of mandated onboarding approval and reciprocity timelines by
some agencies, recruitment and retention failures, and a lack of will to remove
underperforming or timely adjudicate the misconduct of senior managers and
other employees.
Finally, future IC leadership must address the widely promoted “woke” culture that has spread throughout the federal government with identity politics and
“social justice” advocacy replacing such traditional American values as patriotism,
colorblindness, and even workplace competence.

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Intelligence Community

EXECUTIVE ORDER 12333

l

Address the threats to the United States and its allies in cyberspace.
These threats range from cyberwarfare to information operations. The
amended order should clearly delineate the roles and responsibilities of
the various U.S. government cyber missions, including the recently created
National Cyber Director’s Office and power centers at the NSC, while
protecting the privacy and civil liberties of U.S. citizens.
Under the DNI’s direction, the cyber mission should explicitly identify
how information in the cyber domain will be shared promptly with the
warfighters, from law enforcement agencies to the broader IC and state,

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IRTPA was passed in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks against the homeland. It
was intended to improve the sharing of information among the elements of the
IC, recognizing that the nature of the threats we now face blurs the lines between
foreign and domestic intelligence in detecting and countering national security
threats against the homeland. An equally important objective in passing the most
significant intelligence reform since the National Security Act of 194712 was creation of the position of DNI, charged with assuming two of the three principal roles
that formerly belonged to the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI): serving as
principal intelligence adviser to the President and leading the IC as an enterprise.
Nearly two decades later, the DNI’s record of effectiveness in improving the
sharing of information and operating the IC as an enterprise is mixed. Implementation of the DNI’s roles as leader of the IC and principal intelligence adviser to
the President has been challenging. However, despite flaws in the legislation and
intelligence agencies’ bureaucratic jockeying that undermine the DNI, it is impossible to know what would emerge if Congress were to revisit the act. Seeking a
legislative solution therefore might carry with it more risks than benefits. Instead,
an incoming conservative President’s immediate focus should be on modifying
Executive Order 12333, the President’s direction for implementing IRTPA.13
Executive Order 12333 was last amended on July 30, 2008, by President George
W. Bush.14 The revisions were aligned with IRTPA with significant emphasis on
having the IC address the threats to the homeland from international terrorism
and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. There is scant mention of
cyber threats and the evolving national security challenges posed by China, Russia,
and other U.S. adversaries. By extension, the revised order fell short of stipulating how the DNI would execute his authority to organize the IC in a manner that
improves the delivery of timely intelligence to a wide array of customers.
Executive Order 12333 should be amended to take account of the changing
landscape of threats and improve the functional aspects of America’s intelligence
enterprise. To that end, a revised order should:

Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise

local, and tribal elements. The order should consider stipulating what to
do with DOD cyber agencies, most notably the NSA, in terms of strategic
(for example, the President and the DNI) vs. tactical support (for example,
support for the warfighter) in conjunction with ongoing congressionally
mandated reviews of the future dual-hatted relationship.
l

Enhance the DNI’s role in overseeing execution of the National
Intelligence Program budget under the President’s authority. This
should be done in a manner that is consistent with Congress’s intent as
embodied in IRTPA. Under the executive order as written today, the DNI
“shall oversee and direct the implementation of the National Intelligence
Program.” In practice, the DNI’s authority to oversee execution of the IC’s
budget remains constrained by an inability to address changing intelligence
priorities and mandate the implementation of appropriated NIP funding to
higher intelligence priorities.



The DNI should have the President’s direction to address emerging but
catastrophic threats such as those posed by bioweapons. Clarifying how
much budget authority the DNI has in conjunction (within the limits of
congressional appropriations) with OMB and IC-member Cabinet officials
to move around money and personnel is crucial, but positions will not
always be fungible. It will probably be necessary to hold IC leadership
accountable at intransigent agencies and to restructure areas through
executive orders in close conjunction with OMB, as needed.
l

Clarify the DNI’s role as leader of the IC as an enterprise in building the
IC’s capabilities around its open-source collection and analytic missions.
The exponential growth in open-source information, often called OSINT, is not
disputed. In the IC, the use of publicly available information, notwithstanding
the authorities within IRTPA for the DNI to manage OSINT, remains
disaggregated. The explosion of private-sector intelligence products and
expertise should signal to IC leadership that duplicative efforts are unnecessary
and that limited resources should be focused on problematic collection tasks.
The IC should avoid duplication of what is already being done well in
the private sector and focus instead on complex questions that cannot
be answered by conventional and frequently increasing numbers of
commercial tools and capabilities. If necessary, for lack of results from the
National Open Source Committee, the DNI should appoint the Principal
Deputy Director of National Intelligence (PDDNI) as chairman to prioritize
and promote accountability for the IC’s 18 agencies toward this effort.

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l

Prioritize security clearance reform. Security clearance reform has
made significant progress under Trusted Workforce 2.0, a governmentwide
background investigation reform that was implemented beginning in 2018
with the goal of creating one system with reciprocity across organizations.
This included allowing movement from periodic reinvestigations toward
a Continuous Vetting (CV) program with automated records checks,
adjudication of flags, the “mitigat[ion of ] personnel security situations
before they become a larger problem,” or the suspension or revocation of
clearances.15 However, human resources onboarding operations in major
agencies such as the CIA, FBI, and NSA remain to be resolved.

l

l

Ensure the DNI’s authority. The DNI’s authority should be similar to an
orchestra conductor’s. An incoming conservative President will appoint
whomever he chooses as DNI, but there should be agreement between the
incoming DNI and President with advice and counsel from the Presidential
Personnel Office on selecting positions overseen by the DNI throughout
subordinate agencies, as well as concurrence by relevant Cabinet officials
and the CIA. This exists by executive order, but many Presidents, PPOs, and
Cabinet agency heads do not follow executive order guidance and necessary
norms. The importance of trust, character, and the ability to work together
to achieve a joint set of intelligence goals established by the President
cannot be overstated: It is a mission that can be accomplished only with the
conductor and his orchestra playing in sync.
Provide additional support for such economic and supply chain–
focused agencies as the Department of Commerce. Information sharing
and feedback can help subagencies like the Commerce Department’s
Bureau of Industry and Security to improve their understanding of the

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As executive agent for security clearances, the DNI must require results
from agencies that resist implementation, enforce the 48-hour reciprocity
guidance, and target human resources operations that fail to attract and
expediently onboard qualified personnel. Additional “carrots and sticks”
from executive order reform language, including moving the Security
Services Directorate from NCSC to ODNI with elevated status, may be
necessary. It is unacceptable for agencies to hinder opportunities for crossagency assignments, use public–private partnerships inefficiently because
of constraints on the transferability of security clearances, and lose future
talent because of extraordinary delays in backend operations. Proper vetting
to speed the onboarding of personnel with much-needed expertise is vital to
the IC’s future.

Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise

threat from China and thereby counter it more effectively. They can also
aid the development of export control mechanisms and potential outbound
investment screening where necessary. Brief, specific governance language
should be considered that would apply counterterrorist authority models to
the broader functions of the U.S. government insofar as they are needed to
counter 21st century nation-state threats.
The success of any DNI rests with support from the President. Any revised
Executive Order 12333 must serve to express unequivocal support for the DNI in
executing the mandates that an amended order would provide.



CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA)

The CIA is a foreign intelligence collection service tasked with collecting human
intelligence (HUMINT), providing all-source intelligence analysis and reporting, and conducting covert action when required to do so by the President. The
CIA has its roots in the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), which the United States
established during World War II as a paramilitary and intelligence collection organization. After World War II, President Harry Truman disbanded the OSS, and the
CIA was established in law by the National Security Act of 1947.
As with every agency in government, the President's election sets a new agenda
for the country. Public servants must be mindful that they are required to help
the President implement that agenda while remaining apolitical, upholding the
Constitution and laws of the United States, and earning the public trust. The President requires a CIA that provides unbiased and apolitical foreign intelligence
information and, when necessary, can act capably and effectively on any covert
action findings.
Executing the Mission. The CIA’s success depends on firm direction from the
President and solid internal CIA Director–appointed leadership. Decisive senior
leaders must commit to carrying out the President’s agenda and be willing to take
calculated risks. Therefore:
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The next President-Elect and incoming Presidential Personnel Office
should identify a Director nominee who can foster a mission-driven culture
by making necessary personnel and structural changes.
The President-Elect should choose a Deputy Director who, without
needing Senate confirmation, can immediately begin to implement the
President’s agenda. This includes halting all current hiring to prevent
the “burrowing in” of outgoing political personnel. Additional appointees
should be placed within the agency as needed to assist the Director in
supervising its functioning.

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l

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The Director and Deputy Director should request briefings on all CIA
activities and presence overseas, as well as any CIA-controlled access
programs and existing covert action findings, without exception.
The Director and Deputy Director should meet with all directorates and
mission centers, prioritizing those that are aligned most closely with the
President’s priorities and calibrating collection and operations based on
the President’s intelligence requirements. This includes any areas where
the CIA might be conducting its own diplomacy parallel to official State
Department policy. It must be clear that the CIA’s liaison relationships
overseas must follow and not contradict those set at the policy level by the
President through the State Department.

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The other principal offices responsible for executing the CIA’s mission include
the Directorate of Operations, Directorate of Analysis, Directorate of Science and
Technology, Directorate of Support, and Directorate of Digital Innovation. If senior
leadership finds any program or operation to be inconsistent with the President’s
agenda, the Director should immediately halt that program or operation.
Reining in Bureaucracy. The CIA’s bureaucracy continues to grow. Because
mid-level managers lack accountability, there are areas in which personnel are not
responsive to any authority, including the President. The President should instruct
the Director to hire or promote new individuals to lead the various directorates
and mission centers. This new crop of mid-level leaders should carry out clear
directives from senior CIA leadership, which means more accountability and new
ways of thinking to benefit the mission.
In addition, the President should task the Director with significantly broadening
recruitment, expediting onboarding practices, and shifting resources away from
headquarters, including terminal generalist GS-15s when OPM buyouts, forced
rotations, or up-and-out personnel policies are set for particular positions. The
CIA must find creative ways to align mission requirements with hiring needs,
recruit diverse sets of individuals with unique backgrounds, and become more
open to hiring private-sector experts directly into senior positions. In addition,
the Director should break the cabal of bureaucrats in D.C. by permanently moving
various directorates, such as Support and Science and Technology, out of Virginia
and possibly open campuses outside of D.C. where analysts and other experts could
contribute virtually.
Redirecting Resources. Certain CIA employees and offices have focused on
promoting divisive ideological or cultural agendas and fostering a damaging culture of risk aversion and complacency. As soon as possible, the Director should
divert resources from any activities that promote unnecessary and distracting
social engineering. The Director should implement changes in promotion criteria

Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise

that reward individuals for creative thinking and quality of recruitments and products rather than numeric metrics or the achievement of benchmarks that are not
essential to the mission.
Not all careers in espionage are created equal, and the Director should incentivize and reward applicants who are willing to accept high risks over those who are
climbing the ranks simply by doing business as usual. The Director should refocus
the CIA to an OSS-like culture and mandate that all CIA employees acquire, as a
condition of securing senior (GS-14+) rank, additional or enhanced language skills,
technical or cyber expertise, or field training or serve in overseas assignments.



COVERT ACTION

Covert action can be a valuable tool in helping further the President’s foreign
policy agenda if implemented in concert with other forms of government power.
As codified in the U.S. Code, “the term ‘covert action’ means an activity or activities
of the United States Government to influence political, economic, or military conditions abroad, where it is intended that the role of the United States Government
will not be apparent or acknowledged publicly….”16
The President initiates a covert action with a written finding that explains why
“such an action is necessary to support identifiable foreign policy objectives of the
United States and is important to the national security of the United States.”17 The
statute assumes the President will use the CIA as the principal action element to
achieve the objectives of covert action findings; however, the President need not
feel constrained to utilize only the CIA: “[E]ach finding shall specify each department, agency, or entity of the United States Government authorized to fund or
otherwise participate in any significant way in such action.”18
For example, the Department of Defense maintains certain clandestine capabilities under Title 10 authorities that may resemble but far exceed in scale similar
capabilities outside of DOD. Generally, such DOD capabilities can be employed
outside a combat theater only if they are determined to be traditional military
activities. In practical terms, this means that many DOD capabilities, including
those in the space and cyber domains, can be employed only after the initiation of
armed conflict.19 Given the range of global threats the United States faces today,
the President should consider whether DOD’s complete set of capabilities should
be used to support potential covert actions.
The problem, unfortunately, is that certain elements in the State Department,
IC, and DOD trade on risk aversion or political bureaucracy to delay execution
of the President’s foreign policy goals. A future conservative President should
therefore identify individuals on the transition team who are familiar with the
implementation of covert action with a view to placing them in key NSC, CIA,
ODNI, and DOD positions. These knowledgeable teams can assist in any review
of current covert actions and, potentially, planning for new actions.

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Immediately after the inauguration, the President should task the NSC’s Senior
Director for Intelligence Programs with conducting a 60-day review of any current
covert action findings, including their effectiveness; evaluating new covert actions
that might be needed to implement the President’s foreign policy goals; and reporting back to the President. Such an assessment should be conducted independently
of the agencies responsible for the actions under review. As part of the review, the
Senior Director for Intelligence Programs should identify which departments or
agencies, such as the CIA or DOD, are best equipped to achieve the objectives set
out in new and existing findings.
After the 60-day review, the President should demand creative thinking and a
clear strategy as to how covert action fits within the President’s broader foreign
policy strategy, to include possibly modifying or rescinding any current findings,
drafting new findings, and streamlining or eliminating needless bureaucracy, particularly at State, to facilitate more expeditious decisions on tactical covert action.
Careful thought should be given to the metrics by which the effectiveness of covert
action programs will be measured to ensure the appropriate use of government
resources and to guard against the possibility of covert action’s being used with
little scrutiny in ways that are inconsistent with overt foreign policy goals.
ODNI AND CIA ORGANIZATIONAL RECOMMENDATIONS

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The ODNI and CIA operate under authority provided by the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949,20 which means they have greater latitude than the rest
of the federal government with respect to the hiring and firing of personnel. Both
organizations and other areas of the IC have struggled from a human resources
and talent management standpoint to recruit, onboard, and maintain personnel
in a timely fashion to fill the IC’s ever-changing needs. At a time when the Intelligence Community needs significantly more personnel with the proper technical,
language-capable, and diverse backgrounds, including applicants from elements
of the business community, the incoming Directors of both agencies need to make
this effort a top priority.
Past DNIs’ Chiefs of Staff and additional front-office staff historically have come
from outside the IC, commonly under a misconstrued “staff-reserve” structure
that is intended to avoid a Schedule C designation within the IC. The Director
should handpick qualified, properly cleared personnel for front-office and managerial leadership positions, such as the DNI’s Chief of Staff and heads of Legislative
Affairs and Strategic Communications, to oversee those divisions with career IC
staff reporting to them.
The incoming DNI and CIA Director should also consider changes in the Senior
National Intelligence Service (SNIS)/Senior Intelligence Services (SIS). Senior
officers should be required to sign mobility agreements that allow ODNI and CIA
leadership to move them within the IC every two years if necessary. Many qualified



Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise

and distinguished senior officers serve throughout the IC, but some long-serving
generalist officers no longer perform at a high capacity, are management-driven,
do not serve the IC’s changing needs, and limit junior officers’ prospects for growth
and advancement. An incoming Administration should consider studying and
implementing additional requirements as a condition for promotion to GS-15/
SNIS/SIS and explore concepts such as “Up and Out” beginning at the GS-14/15
levels and above for some fields.
The IC should evaluate areas of bloat and underperforming cadre and work
with OPM on authority for voluntary separation buyouts. Allowing ODNI and CIA
leadership to shrink size and reduce duplication of effort while promoting healthy
turnover within their senior ranks would encourage new ideas and perspectives
from mid-career officers and, potentially, from employees hired from outside
their agencies. The ODNI and CIA should maximize their direct-hire and incentive-building authorities to bring in talented and properly cleared individuals to
serve in positions requiring technical, language, and cyber expertise.
Finally, the human resources and talent management systems for onboarding
purposes at the ODNI, CIA, and some other elements of the IC are fundamentally
broken. For example, according to current CIA Director William Burns, it recently
took more than 600 days, on average, for a CIA applicant to receive his or her
necessary security clearance.21 Although security clearance procedures have been
somewhat improved in recent years and Burns has committed CIA to reducing that
to no more than 180 days, degradation in other areas of the process has limited the
IC’s capacity to attract qualified and needed expertise.
PREVENTING THE ABUSE OF INTELLIGENCE
FOR PARTISAN PURPOSES

The intelligence function must be protected from bottom-up and top-down
politicization if it is to play its proper role in our national security decision-making process. Unfortunately, both types of politicization have occurred recently to
the detriment of the Intelligence Community’s reputation and credibility. More
important, the politicization of intelligence risks contributing to policy failures (as we saw with the Iraq War) or even undermining our democratic system
here at home.
In particular, the IC must restore confidence in its political neutrality to rectify
the damage done by the actions of former IC leaders and personnel regarding the
claims of Trump–Russia collusion following the 2016 election and the suppression
of the Hunter Biden laptop investigation and media revelations of its existence
during the 2020 election. But the problem is not confined to the executive branch
struggle between the IC and policymakers; it also relates to the IC’s relationship
with Congress as evinced by DNI James Clapper’s failure to answer honestly in
response to congressional questions about government surveillance programs.

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Intelligence Community

The ODNI and CIA are undergoing a crisis of confidence based on several factors.
First, President Barack Obama’s CIA Director, John Brennan, gravely damaged the
CIA by minimizing the Directorate of Operations and exploiting intelligence analysis as a political weapon after he left office. Brennan's role in the letter signed by 51
former intelligence officials before the 2020 election is unclear, but in dismissing
the Hunter Biden laptop as “Russian disinformation,” the CIA was discredited, and
the shocking extent of politicization among some former IC officials was revealed.
Restoring respect for the IC as an independent provider of information and
analysis while also ensuring that it is responsive to the legitimate needs of policymakers will require reinforcing essential norms and institutions. However, we
should also recognize that achieving the perfect balance that avoids the pathologies
of too much distance or too much closeness and responsiveness to policymakers
is not only difficult, but probably impossible.22 Thus, given the very nature of the
business and the political process, much will depend on the promotion of certain
norms or virtues on both sides of the principal–agent relationship. Specifically:
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The President should direct the DNI and the Attorney General, by direction
of the respective Inspectors General and IC Analytic Ombudsman, to
conduct a further audit of all IC equities of past politicization and abuses
of intelligence information. For example, a recent IC ombudsman analysis
during the 2020 election cycle noted, “If our political leaders in the White
House and Congress believe we are withholding intelligence because of
organizational turf wars or political considerations, the legitimacy of the
Intelligence Community’s work is lost.”23
The President should immediately revoke the security clearances of any
former Directors, Deputy Directors, or other senior intelligence officials
who discuss their work in the press or on social media without prior
clearance from the current Director. IC agencies, including the CIA, should
minimize their public presence and vigorously investigate any and all leaks

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l

The DNI and CIA Director should use their authority under the National
Security Act of 1947 to expedite the clearance of personnel to meet mission
needs and remove IC employees who have abused their positions of trust.
An area of particular concern is that personnel under investigation for
improprieties have been allowed to retire before internal investigations
have been completed. Directors of both agencies must instill further
confidence in their workforces, Congress, and the American people that
they can and will deal effectively with personnel that fail to live up to their
oath to the Constitution, adhere to ethical and moral standards as expected
by America’s taxpayers, and faithfully execute the law.

Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise

of information, classified or otherwise. The ODNI and CIA should fire or
refer for prosecution any employee who is suspected of leaking information,
and penalties should include the removal of pension benefits for those who
are found guilty. Additional tools are needed to prevent leaked intelligence
from being used as a weapon in policy debates by IC leaders or decisionmakers in the executive branch or Congress.
l

Military and civilian IC training should include stronger emphasis
on the norm of political neutrality, including a mandatory course on
professionalism and repercussions for abuse in the execution of duties in all
degree programs at the National Intelligence University.



l

In addition, the Department of Justice should use all of the tools at its
disposal to investigate leaks and should rescind damaging guidance by
Attorney General Merrick Garland that limits investigators’ ability to
identify records of unauthorized disclosures of classified information to
the media. Personnel have sufficient access to legitimate whistleblower
claims under protections provided by Inspectors General and Congress. The
Director and IC must prioritize hiring additional counterintelligence and
security personnel to assist in this effort.

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Intelligence leaders need to model norms of neutrality and respect for the
decision-making authority of the President, appointed officials, and Congress.
This includes building trust with key decision-makers by not using their
positions and privileged access to information to influence policymaking
indirectly or directly in an inappropriate fashion (especially by engaging in
threat inflation). IC leaders should practice extreme restraint in engaging
with the public and the media. They should seek to work in the shadows
rather than in the limelight. Potential restrictions on such appearances could
supplement this norm, preventing political leaders from using IC officials to
support an Administration position as they do with military leaders.
Retired IC leaders should similarly support the neutrality norm by not
becoming public figures.
Congress should not use IC leaders as pawns in policy struggles with the
President or the other party during their appearances before committees of
the House and Senate. While Congress has a proper oversight role, it should
distinguish between information that needs to be public and information
that should be discussed in private with members of the IC. A DNI should
call “balls and strikes” to those on both sides of the aisle on Capitol

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Hill who attempt to weaponize the use of selective intelligence to feed
political narratives.
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Political leaders should avoid “manipulation-by-appointment,” a practice
by which intelligence leaders are selected for their policy views or political
loyalties instead of their skilled expertise.24 Presidents should also avoid
public rebukes and pressure from the intelligence profession, which can
include intimidation and bullying, to shape IC analysis. This will be easier if
IC leaders live by the norms of neutrality and thus are not seen as political
actors, for whom political responses are deemed necessary.
Intelligence leaders and professionals should never “cook the books” for
Presidents or change or shape their analysis to preserve access or status.25

FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT (FISA)

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A future President should understand the importance of FISA26 while also seeking reforms and accountability for any abuses of its authorities. When discussing
FISA and what changes may need to be made, it is important to note and recognize
that there are stark differences among the individual FISA authorities.
Section 702 of FISA, for example, allows the IC to target foreign terrorists, spies,
cyber hackers, and other bad actors (but only if they are non-U.S. persons) when
their communications pass through the United States. While this authority may
lapse if Congress does not resolve the issue by the end of 2023, Section 702 should
be understood as an essential tool in the fight against terrorism, malicious cyber
actors, and Chinese espionage. These are two major national security priorities
for an incoming President, and it is imperative that the need to use properly maintained and accountable authorities to counter these challenges be recognized.
Section 702 is a vital program that often provides the lion’s share of intelligence
used in the President’s Daily Brief (PDB).27 An independent review by the Privacy
and Civil Liberties Oversight Board (PCLOB) found that it was not abused. Nevertheless, Congress should review the PCLOB’s upcoming 2023 report to help it
determine whether any reforms or codification of recent administrative changes
in FISA processes are needed.
Other authorities in Title I and Title III, often referred to as “traditional” FISA,
have elicited valid concerns about the politicization of intelligence collection
authority in recent years. When seeking surveillance of Trump campaign adviser
Carter Page, for example, the FBI and the Department of Justice concealed vital
information from a specialized court and submitted applications that were riddled
with errors. An incoming conservative President should consider reforms designed
to prevent future partisan abuses of national security authority. A package of strong
provisions to protect against such partisanship might include:

Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise

l

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Stiffer penalties and mandatory investigations when intelligence leaks are
aimed at domestic political targets,
Tighter controls on otherwise lawful intercepts that also collect the
communications of domestic political figures,
An express prohibition on politically motivated use of intelligence
authorities, and
Reforms to improve the accountability of the Justice Department and the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court.



To keep intelligence credentials from being used for partisan purposes, former
high-ranking intelligence officials who retain a clearance should remain subject to
the Hatch Act after they leave government to deter them from tying their political
stands or activism to their continuing privilege of access to classified government
information. The IC should be prohibited from monitoring so-called domestic
disinformation. Such activity can easily slip into suppression of an opposition
party’s speech, is corrosive of First Amendment protections, and raises questions
about impartiality when the IC chooses not to act.
CHINA-FOCUSED CHANGES, REFORMS, AND RESOURCES

The term “whole of government” is all too frequently overused, but in
responding to the generational threat posed by the Chinese Communist Party,
that is exactly the approach that our national security apparatus should adopt.
CIA Director William Burns has formally established a China Mission Center
focused on these efforts, but it can be successful only if it is given the necessary
personnel, cross-community collaboration, and resources. That is uncertain at
this point, and just how seriously the organization is taking the staffing of the
center is unclear.
A critical strategic question for an incoming Administration and IC leaders will be: How, when, and with whom do we share our classified intelligence?
Understanding when to pass things to liaisons and for what purpose will be vital
to outmaneuvering China in the intelligence sphere. Questions for a President
will include:
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What is our overarching conception of the adversarial relationship and
competition?
How does intelligence-sharing fit into that conception?

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Some Members of Congress have said that intelligence relationships such as
the Five Eyes28 should be expanded to include other allies in the Asia–Pacific in, for
example, a “Nine Eyes” framework. This fails to take into account the fact that any
blanket expansion would necessarily involve protecting the sources and methods of
a larger and quite possibly more diverse group of member countries that might or
might not have congruent interests. That being said, however, a future conservative
President should consider what resources and information-sharing relationships
could be included in an ad hoc or quasi-formal intelligence expansion (for example,
with the Quad) among nations trying to counter the threat from China.
Significant technology, language skills, and financial intelligence resources
are needed to counter China’s capabilities.29 The IC was caught flat-footed by the
recent discovery of China’s successful test of a nuclear-capable hypersonic missile.
No longer can America’s information and technological dominance be assumed.
China’s gains and intense focus on emerging technologies have taken it in some
areas from being a near-peer competitor to probably being ahead of the United
States. China’s centralized government allocates endless resources (sometimes
inefficiently) to its strategic “Made in China 2025” and military apparatuses, which
combine government, military, and private-sector activities on quantum information sciences and technologies, artificial intelligence (AI), machine learning,
biotechnologies, and advanced robotics.
The IC must do more than understand these advancements: It must rally nongovernment and allied partners and inspire unified action to counter them. In
addition, to combat China’s economic espionage, authorities and loopholes in the
Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA)30 will have to be examined and addressed
in conjunction with the Attorney General.
Many issues within the broader government can be tied back to a more general
congressional understanding of the threat due to the compartmentalization of
committee jurisdictions and the responsibilities of executive agencies to brief on
the nature of the threat. Broader committee jurisdictions should receive additional
intelligence from IC agencies as necessary to inform China’s unique and more comprehensive threat across layers of the U.S. government bureaucracy and economy.
Former DNI John Ratcliffe increased the intelligence budget as it related to
China by 20 percent. “When people ask me why I did that,” he explained in an
interview, “I say, ‘Because no one would let me increase it by 40%.’ I had an $85
billion combined annual budget for both the national intelligence program and
military intelligence program. My perspective was, ‘Whatever we’re spending on
countering China, it isn’t enough.’”31 From an intelligence standpoint, the need
to understand Chinese motivations, capabilities, and intent will be of paramount
importance to a future conservative President. It is therefore also of paramount
importance that the “whole of government” be rowing together.

Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise



NATIONAL COUNTERINTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY CENTER (NCSC)

The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI) has taken a keen interest in possibly updating the codified language underpinning much of the nation’s
counterintelligence apparatus. “Spy vs. spy” threats continue to exist, but the rise
of China and (to an extent) Russia’s machinations move beyond the governmental
sphere to technological, economic, supply chain, cyber, academic, state, and local
espionage threats at a level our country has never seen. The asymmetric threat
includes cyber, nontraditional collection, and issues involving legitimate businesses serving as collection platforms.
Barring statutory changes that could occur before 2025, a future conservative President should further empower and resource the IC by executive order or
through suggested changes in the Counterintelligence Enhancement Act (CEA)
of 2002.32 NCSC was given some authority for outreach efforts on behalf of the IC
for counterintelligence education, insider threats, and broader U.S. government
best practices, but there remain significant deltas between Title 50 and non–Title
50 entities’ protections. Primary operational elements should remain at the FBI
and CIA, with the Bureau and NCSC collaborating on nongovernmental outreach.
While there is no need to create a separate agency, a future President and DNI
should amplify NCSC’s authorities and roles with respect to counterintelligence
strategy, policy, outreach, and governance, including supporting necessary Joint
Duty Assignments (JDA) for FBI and CIA personnel. At the same time, the FBI
requires significant additional resources and legal authorities to fulfill its statutory role as the lead operational counterintelligence agency in dealing with the
ever-growing threats posed by our adversaries. The CEA should be updated to
include foreign espionage efforts aimed at universities.
Corporate America, technology companies, research institutions, and academia
must be willing, educated partners in this generational fight to protect our national
security interests, economic interests, national sovereignty, and intellectual property as well as the broader rules-based order—all while avoiding the tendency
to cave to the left-wing activists and investors who ignore the China threat and
increasingly dominate the corporate world. Reinstitution of the National Security
Higher Education Advisory Board and the National Security Business Alliance
Council should be prioritized with leadership from the NCSC, the FBI, or a combination of both entities.
When the CCP steals at least $400 billion–$600 billion in intellectual property each year, it is time to devote some strategic thinking to exactly how and to
what degree counterintelligence efforts can help to protect America’s commercial
endeavors. If Chinese strategic technology gains are happening almost entirely in
transnational commercial space, for example, and the private sector is also gathering and analyzing some critical intelligence, these essential data points should
assist in national-level counterintelligence efforts.

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Intelligence Community

The NCSC was created in the aftermath of 9/11 as the Terrorist Threat Integration Center (TTIC), which later became the National Counterterrorism Center
(NCTC) pursuant to President George W. Bush’s Executive Order 13354.33 The
NCTC was an organization of approximately three dozen detainees from across
the U.S. government with a mandate to integrate counterterrorism intelligence
and missions, including terrorist screening. Eventually:
In November 2014 the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) established
NCSC by combining [the Office of the National Counterintelligence
Executive] with the Center for Security Evaluation, the Special Security
Center and the National Insider Threat Task Force, to effectively integrate
and align counterintelligence and security mission areas under a single
organizational construct. The Director of NCSC serves in support of the DNI’s
role as Security Executive Agent (SecEA) to develop, implement, oversee and
integrate personnel security initiatives throughout the U.S. Government.34

ADDITIONAL AREAS FOR REFORM

Analytical Integrity. The “tradecraft” of intelligence analysis is mostly a collection of lessons learned over decades about what works and does not work in a
profession whose high-stakes work is performed by thousands but that also bears
little outside scrutiny and provides few metrics by which to gauge success or failure
on a regular basis. These lessons have accumulated from:
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l

l

The perceived misuse of intelligence by consumers as was the case with
respect to war-related assessments in the Johnson and Bush Administrations;
Failures such as the failures to warn of the collapse of the Soviet Union and
the specific threat of 9/11;
Successes in piecing together tactical and often technical puzzles such as
estimates of Iranian nuclear program maturation; and
Strategic victories such as anticipating critical geopolitical developments
that have been years in the making.

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NCSC has added value in such areas as fusing cross-community intelligence for
terrorism watchlisting purposes and improving information sharing while carrying
roughly half of the overall cadre for the ODNI. An incoming Administration should
focus NCTC on integrative tasks, many of which cannot be carried out elsewhere
in the IC, but should not use personnel and resources for redundant analyses that
duplicate the work of such other IC entities as the FBI and CIA.



Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise

Historically, this tradecraft has been passed on in the form of unwritten rules
learned on the job and in agency-specific training classes, but increasingly since the
intelligence reforms of 2004, they have been codified IC-wide under the direction
of the Deputy Director of National Intelligence for Mission Integration.
A RAND study of U.S. intelligence tradecraft notes that the “vast majority of
intelligence analysts reside outside the Central Intelligence Agency and do work
that is tactical, operational, and current.”35 The study goes on to note that the
Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) has as many analysts as the CIA has and that
the National Security Agency (NSA) has several times as many analysts, as does
the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA), indicating both the breadth
of the IC’s technical collection and its emphasis both on developing analysts who
can interpret secret human or technical intelligence in quick-turnaround pieces
and on countering tactical, asymmetric threats like terrorism.
During the Cold War, however, there was a more balanced analytic focus with
greater emphasis on strategic intelligence issues as a means of outcompeting the
Soviet Union. This kind of analysis deals not only in secrets, but also in mysteries—making well-founded but ultimately unknowable predictions about future
actions by a competitor or adversary. The tradecraft necessary to succeed in strategic analysis requires substantive regional and topical expertise developed over
the years to supplement experience in the daily collection and understanding
of secrets. Institutionally, it also requires that agencies’ analytic processes be
open to discussion, debate, and dissent because analysts must work together to
describe a probable range of future outcomes and warn about unproven current
threats rather than using the collection to solve a single puzzle with a definitive answer.
Regarding its mission to follow longer-term issues, the IC is falling short in
resourcing and in openness to dissenting opinions, which (if taken seriously) can
help responsible officials respond more effectively to threats and threat actors.
The IC Analytic Ombudsman has expressed concern that hyperpartisanship “has
threatened to undermine the foundations of our Republic, penetrating even into
the Intelligence Community.”36
For example, the Ombudsman noted in a report on the IC’s handling of election-threat analysis in 2020 that, in his view, CIA officials had deliberately
downplayed dissenting views and coordination comments expressed by experts
at the National Intelligence Council and elsewhere who felt there was evidence of
Beijing’s intent to exert at least some influence on the 2020 election as opposed
to the consensus view that Beijing did not interfere in U.S. elections. Senior CIA
analysts and leaders made it “difficult to have a healthy analytic conversation in
a confrontational environment” while violating multiple official IC tradecraft
standards. By not allowing dissents or considering alternatives, the CIA exercised
“undue influence on intelligence.”37 Subsequent exposure of China-linked online

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influence and the FBI’s warnings about continued efforts through the 2022 midterms highlight the folly of undue certainty without consideration of alternatives.
On election influence and other controversial issues, such as the origin of
COVID-19, analysts at the most powerful intelligence agencies have increasingly
tended to use the leeway they have been given to insert their political views into
their work in order to influence (if possibly even control) the analytic process. They
do this in ways that attempt to squash dissent and impair the creation of a culture
in which entrenched views are challenged and unpopular analytical lines can survive or not according to their merits.
To help the United States and its leaders to outcompete China across multifaceted societal, economic, military, and technological threats, the IC’s
capability to conduct strategic intelligence analysis that is relevant to policymakers in both parties must be rebuilt and strengthened. Because Beijing may be a
peer or even exceed U.S. capabilities in some areas, the post-9/11 analytic focus
on quick-turnaround secrets is not good enough. Strategic planning—informed
by intelligence—must take place for the United States to stay ahead of whatever
new threats China may pose.
An incoming conservative President will have the opportunity to signal the
demand for such strategic products and prioritize their production through
communications to intelligence leaders and formal mechanisms such as shifting
priorities within the National Intelligence Priority Framework and structuring the
President’s Daily Brief. The incoming DNI should also emphasize implementing
the recommendations in the Ombudsman’s report, especially regarding objectivity, the inclusion of dissenting viewpoints, and more serious efforts to hold senior
leaders accountable for backchannel attempts to change or suppress analytic views.
Accounting for the long history of intelligence failures and surprises, an incoming conservative President must appreciate the ambiguity, complexity, limits, and
assumptions inherent in intelligence assessments. Intelligence often deals with the
human dimension in complex decision systems within a foreign country or organization, and this makes consistently accurate predictions difficult if not impossible
to develop. Seeing something and understanding what you are seeing are two different things, so a President should consistently and patiently press the IC about
its potential biases, assumptions, methodology, and sourcing.
With regard to election-threat analysis and politically controversial topics,
agency leaders should take seriously the Ombudsman’s admonition that we need
to maintain tradecraft standards across all countries and topics by ensuring that
equitable standards apply across all foreign threat actors. Analysis should be put
forward without regard to the domestic political ramifications of intelligence
conclusions.
“Obligation to Share” and Real-Time Auditing Capability. The federal government has made admirable progress in recent years by being more



Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise

forward-leaning in sharing cyber threat intelligence with private-sector partners
and the public, emphasizing that the protective nature of such information is of
value only if put into the right hands at the right time. Since critical infrastructure
and services are overwhelmingly owned, managed, and defended by the private
sector in the United States, there has been an increasing emphasis on declassifying intelligence and sharing actionable information with private-sector partners,
often through industry-specific Information Sharing and Analysis Centers (ISACs);
regional meetings of government and private-sector experts called InfraGard, run
by the FBI; direct public notification from the Department of Homeland Security,
the FBI, and (increasingly) the NSA; and more discreet one-on-one engagements
led by the collecting agencies.
These programs properly recognize the private sector’s role in providing cybersecurity for Americans; in practice, however, the intelligence shared by the U.S.
government through these venues is too often already known or no longer relevant
by the time it makes its way through the downgrade process for sharing. In addition,
government-shared information often needs to take advantage of the opportunity
to provide contexts, such as attribution, trends, and size of the observed cyber
problem. As warranted, additional context should be provided to the private sector
as a matter of routine.
To continue improving the U.S. government’s ability to defend the country’s
most vital networks, the IC must adopt an “obligation to share” policy process,
including the capacity for “write to release” intelligence products whereby
newly discovered technical indicators, targeting, and other intelligence relevant
to cyber defense are automatically provided either to the public or to targeted
entities within 48 hours of their collection—which is how counterterrorism intelligence has been managed for years when it comes to a “duty to warn.” Under this
policy, agency heads should still have the flexibility to withhold intelligence for
operational or counterintelligence reasons but would need to report regularly
to Congress on the number of and justification for exceptions. This policy would
make sharing intelligence and defending networks the default, as it already is in
the rest of the cybersecurity community outside the IC, to improve the quantity,
relevance, and timeliness of defensive information while ensuring accountability
for top leaders when they must withhold this information.
One of the most significant challenges within the IC is presented by the need to
share information promptly among the 18 elements of the intelligence enterprise.
The only long-term solution to the understandable tension between the need to
share information and the need to protect intelligence sources and methods is a
robust real-time auditing capability that electronically flags unauthorized access.
Under an identity management system with real-time audit, even the most sensitive information acquired by America’s intelligence agencies can be shared, and the
access to and use of that information are appropriately monitored. Establishing

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a real-time auditing capability is essential to decreasing the risk for the heads of
intelligence agencies in meeting their statutory requirements to ensure that they
protect sources and methods associated with the classified information their agencies collect.
Overclassification. There is broad consensus across the U.S. government and
among stakeholders that the system for classifying, declassifying, and otherwise
marking and handling sensitive information is at a crossroads. Exorbitant amounts
of classified data are created daily, and agency personnel often mistakenly choose
classification as the default selection to ensure national security. At the same time,
the effectiveness of downgraded and carefully declassified information to support
foreign policy efforts has been borne out in, for example, alerting the broader world
of Russia’s buildup and likely plans for its invasion of Ukraine.
Two executive orders principally govern how the U.S. government handles classified and sensitive information.
l

l

Executive Order 13526, “Classified National Security Information,”
issued in 2009,38 prescribes the classification levels and procedures for
declassification.

The current system for declassifying classified national security information
(CNSI) is extraordinarily analog, requiring experts’ review of individual records.
Declassification policies are based on human review of paper and need to contemplate and handle the proliferation and volume of digital records created by
agencies. The U.S. government will soon reach the point at which manual review is
impossible. The declassification of CNSI should support key U.S. national security
objectives, reflect mission priorities, and not serve solely as a necessary procedural
function. Reforms should include:
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Tighter definitions and greater specificity for categories of information
requiring protection.
More stringent policies to effect significant reductions in the number of
Original Classification Authorities (OCAs).
Stricter accountability measures at the OCA level and more detailed
security classification guides.

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Executive Order 13556, “Controlled Unclassified Information,” issued in
2010,39 aimed to establish a uniform program for managing all unclassified
information that requires safeguarding or dissemination controls.



Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise

l

Enhanced metrics for accuracy of classification.

l

A general simplification of the overall system for the benefit of users.

On the back end, an ODNI-run declassification process that is faster, nimbler,
default-to-automated, and larger-scale should be a priority.
Additionally, investments in IT are required to deal with the growing volumes
of CNSI collected and produced in the digital age, along with many years’ worth of
existing analog and digital holdings that could provide valuable historical insights.
An incoming Administration needs to explore options to prioritize funding for
innovation in declassification management: for example, by establishing a budget
line item specifically for the modernization of declassification or designating funding for program classification management as a special-interest item.
The Administration will also need to transition to using technology, including
tools and services for managing Big Data (which provide a robust electronic record
repository, making information within and across agencies easier to organize and
locate and facilitating more rapid review and release capabilities for records of
emerging interest); artificial intelligence/machine learning (which, when incorporated into existing business practices, enables machine interpretation of
unstructured text and data, applies decision support technology to enable more
consistent classification decisions, and expedites reviews between agencies); and
expansion of Commercial Cloud services (which facilitate the rapid testing and
deployment of new tools and technologies).
However, technology is not a panacea; human expertise in information holdings
and routine validation of the technology will always be necessary. With or without machine assistance, agencies will require more people and more varied skill
sets to improve their ability to meet the electronic records era’s classification and
declassification demands and serve an incoming Administration’s goals.
Broader U.S. Government and IC Intelligence Needs. Increasingly, conflicts among U.S. adversaries such as China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea are
conducted in the realms of technology and finance.40 This challenge requires new
tools, authorities, and technological expertise across the U.S. government, particularly at the Commerce Department’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS)
and the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS), which
is housed at the Treasury Department.
An incoming conservative President should task his DNI and Secretary of
Commerce with increasing coordination, the resources needed for BIS and SCIF
capacity, and proper and necessary intelligence sharing to counter the activities of
multifaceted adversaries such as China. This would include additional work with
private-sector expertise, granting clearances to niche sector experts and United
States citizen commercial and financial partners as needed.

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Cover in the Digital Age. Even in the public domain, it is becoming increasingly clear that protecting the identities of undercover intelligence officers is
difficult in the digital age.41 The truth is that as our daily activities are conducted
predominantly in the digital domain, our antiquated system for providing cover to
undercover officers has lagged woefully behind the threat from foreign adversaries.
The DIA, CIA, and FBI are increasingly aware of this threat and are devoting
resources to the problem. Their back-office infrastructure, however, is such that
they are still using methods for providing cover from decades past that put valuable
intelligence officers at unnecessary risk. How intelligence officers and their families are taught to use smartphones and social media, travel, conduct banking, and
take and share pictures—even how and when they are paid—can make it difficult
to protect identities.42 Legends, fake backstories, and identities are often weak,
incomplete, and unable to stand up to a basic Google search.43 Officers operating under nonofficial cover are offered even less protection and training to help
them succeed.
In addition, ubiquitous technical surveillance (UTS) techniques being refined by
technologies emanating from the regimes in China and Russia will continue to be
highly challenging for intelligence officers. An incoming Administration will need
to double down on resourcing and training so that members of the IC will have the
expertise they need to operate clandestinely (and successfully) against hard targets.
Privacy Shield. For many years, the European Union (EU) has tried to force U.S.
companies operating in Europe to follow its data privacy regulations. Misleading
claims in the 2013 Snowden leaks destroyed the initial Safe Harbor Framework44
that allowed American companies to transfer data across the Atlantic; its successor, the Privacy Shield Framework,45 was struck down by European courts on the
grounds that it provides insufficient protections for EU citizens against hypothetical U.S. government surveillance. Those same European courts exempted the
intelligence services of EU member states from the standards applied to the U.S.,
suggesting that trade protectionism may be the real motive behind data privacy
regulations.
In 2022, the Biden Administration negotiated a new agreement, the Trans-Atlantic Data Privacy Framework,46 intended to withstand European legal challenges.
Given the fate of its predecessors, it is not certain that it will survive. Executive
Order 14086, “Enhancing Safeguards for United States Signals Intelligence Activities,”47 implements this new framework by attempting to align signals intelligence
collection practices with European privacy regulations. At most, the executive
order’s changes will be helpful support for the framework in future European
litigation; at worst, they could throw sand in the gears of important intelligence programs.
An incoming conservative President should reset Europe’s expectations. Brussels has always arbitraged the difference between being a military ally against, for



Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise

example, Russia and conducting a full-blown trade conflict with the United States.
Restrictions on data exports have been part of the trade conflict, but now they could
seriously harm our military and intelligence capabilities. Moreover, restrictions
on U.S. intelligence collection hurt the Europeans themselves, especially as the
United States shares unprecedented amounts of intelligence on Russia’s invasion
of Ukraine with Europeans.48
Europe is telling the United States to meet intelligence oversight standards
that no European country meets. At the same time, exports of data to China are
unexamined and (so far) free from legal challenges. That violates World Trade
Organization agreements as an arbitrary and discriminatory data protection standard. It is a betrayal by a nominally allied jurisdiction. European court rulings that
struck down prior data privacy frameworks were grounded not in constitutional
law but in a treaty among European nations. If the EU accepted an international
agreement that data may flow to the United States under a more reasonable standard than the one adopted by the court, that interpretation would be binding, at
least as a gloss on the earlier treaty.
The United States has never seriously pushed back against the EU; now is the
time. An incoming President should ask for an immediate study of the implementation of Executive Order 14086 and suspend any provisions that unduly burden
intelligence collection. At the same time, in negotiations with the Europeans, the
United States should make clear that the continued sharing of intelligence with
EU member states depends on successful resolution of this issue within the first
two years of a President’s term. It is time for a real solution, not the 30 years of
stopgaps imposed by Brussels.
President’s Daily Brief (PDB). An incoming conservative President should
make clear what the President’s Daily Brief is and is not. The PDB should be for
the President specifically, with a much narrower distribution and addressing areas
of strategic concern. During the transition, the future National Security Advisor,
along with the DNI, should conduct a review of current PDB recipients and determine which should remain recipients when the President’s term begins.
Instead of being used as the statement of record for the agencies, the PDB often
misses the areas of interest for Presidents and their senior advisers. The President
should want the PDB to focus on providing the information needed for the often
imperfect and complex decisions that a President needs to make, which should
always be based on the best intelligence that can be gathered. Where consensus
and agreement are possible, an IC-coordinated product is excellent, but insights
provided by properly channeled dissent can lead a President to ask relevant questions of his DNI and IC.
A future DNI determines the PDB briefer based on recommendations made by
the Deputy Director of National Intelligence for Mission Integration (MI). Historically, briefers have come from the CIA, but a future President and DNI should

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consider a primary briefer or a rotation of briefers from other IC elements. Additionally, the entirety of the PDB staff and production should be located at ODNI.
National Intelligence Council (NIC). The National Intelligence Council is
the IC’s premier analytic organization and includes more than a dozen National
Intelligence Officers (NIOs), each of whom leads the IC’s analysis within a regional
(China, Russia, Iran, etc.) or functional (cyber, counterproliferation, economics,
etc.) mission area. This includes authoring National Intelligence Estimates on
major strategic issues with the entire IC, overseeing and deconflicting the annual
analytic plans of each agency, and weighing in on day-to-day major analytical issues,
sometimes individually (for example, by writing the NIC’s strategic memos or providing detailed expert briefings to the President before major decisions).
Historically part of the CIA, the NIC was reorganized into the ODNI as was
the PDB. It retains the CIA’s objective analytic culture and is staffed primarily
with CIA officers; however, as many as 25 percent of its NIOs over the decades
have come from academia or the private sector, bringing in much-needed outside
expertise to collate and understand intelligence with perspective and skills that
are not necessarily nurtured within the IC. In recent years, there has been a greater
emphasis on encouraging officers from other agencies—particularly the DIA, NSA,
and FBI—to serve as NIOs or as their deputies.
To encourage greater analytic independence and debate, the incoming Administration should require that non-CIA officers comprise at least 50 percent of the
NIC’s membership and that the first-among-equals NIC Chairman is an outsider
from one of the three major IC agencies with reporting responsibility to the PDDNI.
Opening these senior analytic roles to the best analysts regardless of agency would
also encourage the continued maturation of analytic cadres and tradecraft at those
agencies and give them an equal voice in interagency analytical disputes, which in
turn would give the President access to the best thinking and a variety of sources
and perspectives from across the entire IC rather than from the CIA alone.
IC Chief Information Officer. The Intelligence Community Chief Information Officer (ICCIO) directs and oversees all aspects of the classified IT budget for
all of the IC’s 18 elements. As the DNI’s principal adviser for technology, the ICCIO
must be well-versed in technology, acquisitions, operations, and intra-agency cooperation to advance our technical prowess and simultaneously direct a bureaucracy
that, left unchecked, will serve each element’s own preferences. To ensure that
procured and implemented technology and policy reflect the Administration’s
agenda, the ICCIO must have the support of the DNI and possess the ability to
command cooperation between and promote interoperability across IC members.
Because of the unique responsibilities entrusted to this position, incumbency
has seesawed between political appointees and career civilians; due to its congressionally capped salary, the position is often filled by an SES-level member
administratively detailed to support the DNI. At times, the ICCIO is incorrectly

Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise

referred to as the ODNI CIO. By law, and to secure unbiased execution across all of
the IC’s 18 elements, the same individual may not serve as ICCIO and ODNI CIO.
They are two distinct positions.
Critical areas and IC IT portfolio priorities for the ICCIO include but are
not limited to:
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Recognized and uniform security access for people, systems, and capabilities
to enable interoperability across IC elements;
5G/6G data transmission and network interoperability, which is vital to IC
element operations;

l

Artificial intelligence and machine learning;

l

Quantum cryptography and post-quantum encryption (PQE); and

l



Transparent accounting and allocation of IT investments across the IC,
including commercial cloud computing and storage (C2E);

Cybersecurity infrastructure where Biden Administration changes have
realigned and reassigned management oversight and IT architecture
responsibilities to NSA and DHS/CISA, conflicting with ICCIOdelineated roles.

An incoming Administration should appoint the ICCIO as a primary member
of the DNI staff along with the ODNI General Counsel, IC Chief Financial Officer,
and ODNI Chief Operating Officer.
The President-Elect should require immediate reviews of the progress in implementing post-quantum encryption at a minimum for IC and Defense systems but
preferably throughout the government. The President’s National Security Memorandum specifying “the goal of mitigating as much of the quantum risk as is feasible
by 2035”49 needs to be revised in light of the magnitude of the threat. Accounting
for the investment that will be needed to secure IT systems for national security
should be a top priority.
ODNI, CIA, and IC Technology Issues. In recent years, the IC has had a
mandate from multiple Administrations to advance technology needs for intelligence—needs that have seen massive changes as a result of such threats as China’s
advancements in technology and data infrastructure. Many of the projects coming
out of ODNI and CIA’s Science and Technology Directorate (S&T) focus on expensive, AI-driven open-source work, but there is likely duplication of effort in areas
where the private sector and entrepreneurs are already making progress.

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l

Expand collaboration with partners. For too many decades, the
IC and DOD have acquired and operated satellites independently. To
improve their ability to meet the threat posed by China and Russia, the IC
and DOD should:

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The Intelligence Advanced Research Projects Activity (IARPA) and S&T should
focus primarily on challenging technology problems. Avoiding duplication of what
is already being done well in the private sector in such areas as practical defense
cyber intelligence and artificial intelligence research would help to focus the agencies on the complex shadow tasks at hand while simultaneously freeing limited
resources for advancement in other areas.
President’s Intelligence Advisory Board and PIAB Intelligence Oversight
Board. The President’s Intelligence Advisory Board (PIAB) is charged with providing the President with an independent source of advice on the IC’s effectiveness
while offering insights into the IC’s future plans. The Board is meant to have access
to all information needed to perform its functions and to have direct access to the
President. The Intelligence Oversight Board is a standing committee within the
PIAB. These entities should be tasked with giving independent, informed advice
and opinion concerning major matters of national security focused on long-term,
enduring issues central to advancing and protecting American interests. This
should include taking a broader, deeper look at critical trends, developments, and
their implications for U.S. national and economic security relying on unclassified
and open-source information.
The Importance of Space. With China developing increasingly capable space
and counterspace technologies and Russia taking more aggressive action in space,
space has emerged as the latest warfighting domain. In response, the DNI created the Office of the Space Executive (OSX) in 2018 as an experiment to promote
greater integration of IC space activities without incurring excessive overhead.
The DNI mandated greater collaboration across the enterprise without adding
personnel, altering authorities, and increasing budgets.
The Space Executive’s design reflects the original design principles of the ODNI.
The ODNI was explicitly not designed to be a departmental headquarters with command and control of the 18 agencies’ vast bureaucracies. Rather, it was designed
to be small and lightweight with a mission to coordinate and integrate the critical activities of the IC’s 18 agencies without creating new bureaucracy. That goal
should remain in force, and calls by outside entities or Congress to add new centers
and layers should be rejected.
The Office of the Space Executive has been recognized as an effective governance
model and has spawned similar efforts, including the Election Threats Executive,
Economic and Threat Finance Executive, and Cyber Executive. With this in mind,
the following initiatives should be pursued:

Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise

1.

Explore new methods for better integrating our space assets,

2. Examine the possibility of joint programs, and
3. Fully utilize unique Title 10 and Title 50 authorities to execute space
defense (and offense) strategies jointly.
Additionally, the IC should support building international alliances with
like-minded partners beyond the Five Eyes intelligence-sharing nations.
Increasingly, potential allied nations (and their commercial companies) are
developing innovative space capabilities to augment and strengthen the U.S.
space defense and intelligence posture.
l

Refocus space-related intelligence collection. The IC has developed a
space threats collection posture predicated on three assumptions:



1.

The best information on developing space threats comes from collection
against the adversaries’ military institutions on Earth,

2. There should be a clear dividing line between DOD’s intelligence
activities and the IC’s, and
3. Only government-developed “exquisite” capabilities can inform threat
analysis and decision-making effectively.
Developments by our adversaries and the emergence of a vibrant
commercial space marketplace over the past decade have rendered all three
assumptions false and even dangerous. The IC must therefore refocus and
invest in methods that will enable it to characterize accurately the threats
that already exist in space, not just on the ground; break down barriers
to information sharing and collaboration with the DOD; and embrace
commercially derived capabilities that can be adapted to a national security
mission—all while emphasizing the need to protect critical supply chains
and the cybersecurity needs that result from an increasingly government–
commercial low Earth orbit.
Our nation’s economic and national security depends on being able to
advance America’s leadership position in space, which is eroding in the face
of increasing threats from adversaries and our own inaction.

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AN UNFINISHED EXPERIMENT

The Intelligence Community, including specifically the role of the DNI and
ODNI, is an unfinished experiment. The envisioned design principle was a conservative one: a small, network-centric model for enterprise coordination as opposed
to a large monolithic bureaucracy like DHS. The ODNI, however, has reverted
in some ways to a bureaucratic and hierarchical model characterized by limited
effectiveness.
Historically, the CIA has undercut the DNI and maintains primacy in the IC
hierarchy, especially regarding the White House. An incoming conservative President can right the ship and return the IC governance model to first principles
by using a limited but empowered leadership and coordination design to serve
the nation’s intelligence and national security needs while reclaiming the public
trust with fiscal responsibility, political neutrality, personnel accountability, technological prowess, and necessary human capital needed to counter the immense
nation-state and asymmetrical threats facing our country.



AUTHOR’S NOTE: The preparation of this chapter was a collective enterprise of individuals involved in

the 2025 Presidential Transition Project. No particular policy statement, reform recommendation, or other view
expressed herein should be attributed to any individual contributor or to the author.

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ENDNOTES

1.

2.

3.
4.

5.



6.

7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.

14.

15.
16.
17.
18.

“Two independent agencies—the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) and the Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA); Nine Department of Defense elements—the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA),
the National Security Agency (NSA), the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA), the National
Reconnaissance Office (NRO), and intelligence elements of the five DoD services; the Army, Navy, Marine
Corps, Air Force, and Space Force. Seven elements of other departments and agencies—the Department of
Energy’s Office of Intelligence and Counter-Intelligence; the Department of Homeland Security’s Office of
Intelligence and Analysis and U.S. Coast Guard Intelligence; the Department of Justice’s Federal Bureau of
Investigation and the Drug Enforcement Agency’s Office of National Security Intelligence; the Department of
State’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research; and the Department of the Treasury’s Office of Intelligence and
Analysis.” Office of the Director of National Intelligence, “What We Do: Members of the IC,” https://www.dni.
gov/index.php/what-we-do/members-of-the-ic (accessed March 8, 2023).
Office of the Director of National Intelligence, “Mission,” https://www.intelligence.gov/mission#:~:text=The%20
Intelligence%20Community's%20mission%20is,law%20enforcement%2C%20and%20the%20military
(accessed February 24, 2023).
Abraham Lincoln, Second Annual Message to Congress, December 1, 1862, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/
documents/second-annual-message-9 (accessed March 6, 2023).
Christopher Porter, “Seven Questions the Next President Will Need the Intelligence Community to Answer
to Win the Technology Competition with China,” LinkedIn, March 14, 2023, https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/
seven-questions-next-president-need-intelligence-community-porter/?trackingId=Dl9RF5CnSwWnAO7r9gg
HiQ%3D%3D (accessed March 18, 2023).
H.R. 2845, Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Public Law No. 108-458, 108th Congress,
December 17, 2004, https://www.congress.gov/108/plaws/publ458/PLAW-108publ458.pdf (accessed
March 6, 2004).
Testimony of Philip Zelikow, Executive Director, National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United
States, in hearing, Assessing America’s Counterterrorism’s Capabilities, Committee on Governmental Affairs,
U.S. Senate, 108th Congress, 2d Session, August 3, 2004, p. 55, https://ia802906.us.archive.org/31/items/gov.
gpo.fdsys.CHRG-108shrg95506/CHRG-108shrg95506.pdf (accessed March 19, 2023).
Michael Allen, Blinking Red: Crisis and Compromise in American Intelligence After 9/11 (Dulles, VA: Potomac
Books, 2013), p. 155; Interview with Robert Gates, April 19, 2012.
Allen, Blinking Red, p. 154; Robert Gates e-mail to Andy Card, January 11, 2005; handwritten note from Robert
Gates, January 20, 2005.
Interview with John Ratcliffe, December 15, 2022.
Ibid.
Ibid.
S. 258, National Security Act of 1947, Public Law No. 80-253, 80th Congress, July 26, 1947, https://govtrackus.
s3.amazonaws.com/legislink/pdf/stat/61/STATUTE-61-Pg495.pdf (accessed March 6, 2023).
President Ronald Reagan, Executive Order 12333, “United States Intelligence Activities,” December 4, 1981, in
Federal Register, Vol. 46, No. 235 (December 8, 1981), pp. 59941–59954, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/
pkg/FR-1981-12-08/pdf/FR-1981-12-08.pdf (accessed March 6, 2023).
President George W. Bush, Executive Order 13470, “Further Amendments to Executive Order 12333, United
States Intelligence Activities,” July 30, 2008, in Federal Register, Vol. 73, No. 150 (August 4, 2008), pp.
45325–45342, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2008-08-04/pdf/E8-17940.pdf (accessed March
6, 2023). See also President George W. Bush, Executive Order 13355, “Strengthened Management of
the Intelligence Community,” August 27, 2004, in Federal Register, Vol. 69, No. 169 (September 1, 2004),
pp. 53593–53597, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2004-09-01/pdf/04-20051.pdf (accessed
March 6, 2023).
U.S. Department of Defense, Defense Counterintelligence and Security Agency, “Trusted Workforce 2.0 and
Continuous Vetting,” https://www.dcsa.mil/mc/pv/cv/ (accessed March 9, 2023).
50 U.S. Code § 3093(e), https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/50/3093 (accessed February 24, 2023).
50 U.S. Code § 3093(a).
50 U.S. Code § 3093(a)(4).

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Intelligence Community

— 233 —



19. Michael E. DeVine, “Covert Action and Clandestine Activities of the Intelligence Community: Selected
Definitions,” Congressional Research Service Report for Members and Committees of Congress No. R45175,
updated November 29, 2022, https://sgp.fas.org/crs/intel/R45175.pdf (accessed February 24, 2023).
20. H.R. 2663, Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949, Public Law No. 81-110, 81st Congress, June 20, 1949, https://
govtrackus.s3.amazonaws.com/legislink/pdf/stat/63/STATUTE-63-Pg208.pdf (accessed March 6, 2023).
21. Nicole Ogrysko, “Intelligence Community Workforce Is More Diverse, but Still Struggles with Retention and
Promotion,” Federal News Network, October 27, 2021, https://federalnewsnetwork.com/workforce/2021/10/
intelligence-community-workforce-is-more-diverse-but-still-struggles-with-retention-and-promotion/
(accessed March 18, 2023).
22. See James J. Wirtz, “The Intelligence Policy Nexus,” in Loch K. Johnson, ed., Strategic Intelligence, Volume
1: Understanding the Hidden Side of Government (Westport, CT: Prager, 2007), and Richard K. Betts,
“Analysis, War, and Decision: Why Intelligence Failures Are Inevitable,” World Politics, Vol. 30, No. 1 (October
1978), pp. 61–89.
23. Letter from Barry A. Zulauf, IC Analytic Ombudsman, Office of the Director of National Intelligence, to
Senator Marco Rubio, Acting Chairman, and Senator Mark Warner, Vice Chairman, Select Committee on
Intelligence, U.S. Senate, “RE: SSCI #2020-3029,” January 6, 2021, https://int.nyt.com/data/documenttools/
ic-ombudsman-election-interference-with-responses/c50e548011fd6168/full.pdf (accessed March 14, 2023).
24. Joshua Rovner, Fixing the Facts: National Security and the Politics of Intelligence (Ithaca, NY: Cornell
University Press, 2011), pp. 30–31.
25. Joshua Rovner, “Is Politicization Ever a Good Thing?” Intelligence and National Security, Vol. 28, No. 1
(2013), p. 58.
26. S. 1566, Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, Public Law No. 95-511, 95th Congress, October
25, 1978, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/STATUTE-92/pdf/STATUTE-92-Pg1783.pdf (accessed
March 6, 2023).
27. The Cipher Brief, “702 Reauthorization: Defending a Key Intelligence Tool,” remarks of Benjamin Powell,
former General Counsel to the Director of National Intelligence, stating that FISA 702 provides “between
40 and 60 percent” of the intelligence in the PDB, December 18, 2017, https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=mRJ09GHVRFk&ab_channel=TheCipherBrief (accessed March 18, 2023).
28. An intelligence alliance that includes Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the United
States. Office of the Director of National Intelligence, National Counterintelligence and Security Center, “Five
Eyes Intelligence Oversight and Review Council (FIORC),” https://www.dni.gov/index.php/ncsc-how-wework/217-about/organization/icig-pages/2660-icig-fiorc (accessed March 10, 2023).
29. Porter, “Seven Questions the Next President Will Need the Intelligence Community to Answer to Win the
Technology Competition with China.”
30. H.R. 1591, An Act to Require the Registration of Certain Persons Employed by Agencies to Disseminate
Propaganda in the United States and for Other Purposes, Public Law No. 75-583, 75th Congress, June 8, 1938,
https://govtrackus.s3.amazonaws.com/legislink/pdf/stat/52/STATUTE-52-Pg631.pdf (accessed March 6, 2023).
31. Kristina Wong, “Exclusive: Former DNI John Ratcliffe Pleased CIA Following His Lead on China Threat,”
Breitbart, October 13, 2021, https://www.breitbart.com/politics/2021/10/13/exclusive-john-ratcliffe-pleasedcia-following-lead-china-threat/ (accessed March 11, 2023).
32. H.R. 4628, Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003, Public Law No. 107-306, 107th Congress,
November 27, 2002, Title IX, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/STATUTE-116/pdf/STATUTE-116-Pg2383.pdf
(accessed March 6, 2023).
33. President George W. Bush, Executive Order 13354, “National Counterterrorism Center,” August 27, 2004, in
Federal Register, Vol. 69, No. 169 (September 1, 2004), pp. 53589–53592, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/
pkg/FR-2004-09-01/pdf/04-20050.pdf (accessed March 6, 2023).
34. Office of the Director of National Intelligence, National Counterintelligence and Security Center, “Who
We Are: History of NCSC,” https://www.dni.gov/index.php/ncsc-who-we-are/ncsc-history (accessed
March 11, 2023).
35. Gregory F. Treverton and C. Bryan Gabbard, Assessing the Tradecraft of Intelligence Analysis, RAND
Corporation, National Security Research Division Technical Report, 2008, p. 6, https://www.rand.org/pubs/
technical_reports/TR293.html (accessed March 1, 2023).



Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise
36. Letter from Barry A. Zulauf, IC Analytic Ombudsman, Office of the Director of National Intelligence, to
Senator Marco Rubio, Acting Chairman, and Senator Mark Warner, Vice Chairman, Select Committee on
Intelligence, U.S. Senate, “RE: SSCI #2020-3029,” January 6, 2021, https://int.nyt.com/data/documenttools/
ic-ombudsman-election-interference-with-responses/c50e548011fd6168/full.pdf (accessed March 6, 2023).
37. “Independent IC Analytic Ombudsman’s [Report] on Politicization of Intelligence,” attached to January 6,
2021, Zulauf letter.
38. President Barack Obama, Executive Order 13526, “Classified National Security Information,” December 29,
2009, in Federal Register, Vol. 75, No. 2 (January 5, 2010), pp. 707–731, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/
FR-2010-01-05/pdf/E9-31418.pdf (accessed March 7, 2023).
39. President Barack Obama, Executive Order 13556, “Controlled Classified Information,” November 4, 2010, in
Federal Register, Vol. 75, No. 216 (November 9, 2010), pp. 68675–68677, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/
pkg/FR-2010-11-09/pdf/2010-28360.pdf (accessed March 7, 2023).
40. Agathe Demarais, “How the U.S.–Chinese Technology War Is Changing the World,” Foreign Policy, November
19, 2022, https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/11/19/demarais-backfire-sanctions-us-china-technology-warsemiconductors-export-controls-biden/ (accessed February 28, 2023).
41. Scott Stewart, “The Risk to Undercover Operatives in the Digital Age,” Stratfor Worldview, October 29, 2015,
https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/risk-undercover-operatives-digital-age (accessed February 24, 2023).
42. Lauren Pitruzzello, “Human Intelligence: Former CIA Officer Talks About Espionage in the Digital Age,
University of Delaware UDaily, March 22, 2012, https://www1.udel.edu/udaily/2012/mar/global-agendagrenier-032212.html (accessed February 24, 2023).
43. Jenna McLaughlin and Zach Dorfman, “‘Shattered’: Inside the Secret Battle to Save America’s Undercover
Spies in the Digital Age,” Yahoo News, December 30, 2019, https://news.yahoo.com/shattered-insidethe-secret-battle-to-save-americas-undercover-spies-in-the-digital-age-100029026.html (accessed
February 24, 2023).
44. U.S. Federal Trade Commission, “U.S.–Safe Harbor Framework,” https://www.ftc.gov/business-guidance/
privacy-security/us-eu-safe-harbor-framework (accessed March 11, 2023).
45. “Fact Sheet: Overview of the EU–U.S. Privacy Shield Network,” U.S. Department of Commerce,
https://2014-2017.commerce.gov/sites/commerce.gov/files/media/files/2016/eu-us_privacy_shield_fact_
sheet.pdf (accessed March 11, 2023).
46. “Fact Sheet: United States and European Commission Announce Trans-Atlantic Data Privacy Framework,” The
White House, March 25, 2022, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/03/25/
fact-sheet-united-states-and-european-commission-announce-trans-atlantic-data-privacy-framework/
(accessed March 11, 2023).
47. President Joseph R. Biden Jr., Executive Order 14086, “Enhancing Safeguards for United States Signals
Intelligence Activities,” October 7, 2022, in Federal Register, Vol. 87, No. 198 (October 14, 2022), pp. 62283–
62297, (accessed March 7, 2023).
48. Warren P. Strobel, “Release of Ukraine Intelligence Represents New Front in U.S. Information War with Russia,”
The Wall Street Journal, updated April 4, 2022, https://www.wsj.com/articles/release-of-secrets-representsnew-front-in-u-s-information-war-with-russia-11649070001 (accessed February 24, 2023).
49. President Joseph R. Biden Jr., “National Security Memorandum on Promoting United States Leadership in
Quantum Computing While Mitigating Risks to Vulnerable Cryptographic Systems,” The White House, May
4, 2022, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/05/04/national-securitymemorandum-on-promoting-united-states-leadership-in-quantum-computing-while-mitigating-risksto-vulnerable-cryptographic-systems/#:~:text=To%20mitigate%20this%20risk%2C%20the%20United%20
States%20must,the%20quantum%20risk%20as%20is%20feasible%20by%202035 (accessed March 12, 2023).
See also President Joseph R. Biden Jr., Executive Order 14073, “Enhancing the National Quantum Initiative
Advisory Committee,” May 4, 2022, in Federal Register, Vol. 87, No. 89 (May 9, 2022), pp. 27909–27911, https://
www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2022-05-09/pdf/2022-10076.pdf (accessed March 12, 2023); and “Fact
Sheet: President Biden Announces Two Presidential Directives Advancing Quantum Technologies,” The White
House, May 4, 2022, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/05/04/factsheet-president-biden-announces-two-presidential-directives-advancing-quantum-technologies/ (accessed
March 12, 2023).

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8

MEDIA AGENCIES
U.S. AGENCY FOR GLOBAL MEDIA
Mora Namdar



MISSION STATEMENT

The mission of United States Agency for Global Media (USAGM) is to inform,
engage, and connect people around the world in support of freedom and democracy.1 However, this mission statement does not reflect the current work of the
agency. The mission is noble, but the execution is lacking. To fulfill its mission,
USAGM should also aim to present the truth about America and American policy—
not parrot America’s adversaries’ propaganda and talking points.2
OVERVIEW

Originally formed as the Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG) in 1994, the BBG
changed its name in 2018 to the United States Agency for Global Media. The USAGM is
a sub-Cabinet agency of the U.S. government with a budget of just under $1 billion. The
agency oversees two government broadcasting networks: the Voice of America (VOA)
and the Office of Cuba Broadcasting (OCB). USAGM also oversees 100 percent of the
grant funding for several “independent” grantee organizations, including the Middle
East Broadcasting Network (MBN), Radio Free Asia (RFA), Radio Free Europe/Radio
Liberty (RFE/RL), and the newly formed Open Technology Fund (OTF).3
l

The Voice of America provides news and information in 48 languages to
a weekly audience of more than 326 million people worldwide. For more

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Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise

than 80 years, VOA journalists have supplied news and information about
the U.S., audience-specific regions of interest and concern, and the world at
large. VOA radio and television signals are broadcast to approximately 3,500
affiliates, and satellite transmissions reach countries where free speech is
banned or where civil society is under threat.4
VOA uses digital, web, and mobile media as well, which, while sometimes
useful in propagating valuable information globally, has created specific
violations of the agency’s prohibition against broadcasting to the domestic
U.S. audience—particularly with regard to flagrantly political content, as
has been the practice with recent and current VOA content directors and
managers.5 The network once had a generally well-received brand value,
but it has deteriorated under decades of poor leadership and a loss of its
once-prized unbiased reporting. There are bright spots within VOA, but
mismanagement and declining production values have diluted its oncegreat reputation as a singular voice in American news broadcasting abroad.



l

l

l

The Office of Cuba Broadcasting oversees Radio and Television Martí, a
multimedia hub of news, information, and analysis that provides the people
of Cuba with programs through satellite television, radio, and digital media.
These programs present news and information about Cuba’s oppressive
government from the outside world that would otherwise be heavily
restricted.6 The OCB remains a critical avenue of truth to the Cuban people
but has been threatened with crippling budget and operational constraints,
including empathetic attitudes toward Communist Cuban leadership
coupled with organizational hostility toward the OCB by certain elements
of USAGM leadership. During the Biden Administration, the OCB has been
threatened with closure, while also suffering chilling reductions in force.7
The Middle East Broadcasting Network is an Arabic-language news
organization with a weekly audience of 27.4 million people in 22 countries
in the Middle East and North Africa. The MBN consists of two television
networks, radio, websites, and social media platforms. Together, they deliver
news and analysis on the region, American policies, and Americana. The
MBN has correspondents throughout the Middle East and North Africa.8
Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty is a private, nonprofit, multimedia
broadcasting corporation that serves as a surrogate media source in 27
languages and 23 countries, including Afghanistan, Iran, Pakistan, Russia,
and Ukraine.

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Media Agencies: U.S. Agency for Global Media

Founded in the early days of the Cold War (Radio Free Europe in 1949
and Radio Liberty in 1953) and merged in 1976, Radio Free Europe and
Radio Liberty were intended to execute edgy and daring information
operations and unrestricted news reporting deep behind the Iron Curtain.
Unfortunately, like other broadcast organizations under USAGM, RFE/RL
has surrendered much of its rich history to an approach that favors political
trends as opposed to operations that support and represent America abroad.
While there are some bright spots within RFE/RL, much of the network has
redundant programming with certain VOA language services, often with
competing, counterproductive, or dissimilar messaging.
The recent addition of RFE/RL’s Hungarian-language service, Szabad
Európa, falls outside the intended scope of RFE/RL’s charter by targeting a
democratically elected, pro-American European and NATO ally.
Not least, RFE/RL has been plagued by several serious espionage-related
security risks within its ranks.9
l

Several reports from the Office of the Inspector General (OIG) were released
showing waste and self-dealing, including security vulnerabilities and RFA leadership awarding insiders millions of dollars of grant funding.11 For example, as
the OIG stated in one report, the then-president of RFA “established the Freedom2Connect Foundation (Foundation)” and thereafter “awarded two contracts,
totaling $1.2 million” to the foundation she herself founded.12 Furthermore:
[The] OIG found that RFA did not comply with Federal procurement
requirements for grantees. OIG identified instances in which RFA and
its agents did not comply with OMB [Office of Management and Budget]
conflict-of-interest procurement requirements for grantees. Specifically,
OIG found that RFA entered into 14 contracts, totaling $4.0 million
(51 percent of the amount of OTF FYs 2012 and 2013 project-related
contracts), with organizations that had some affiliation with either RFA
officials or members of OTF Advisory Council.13

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Radio Free Asia is a private, nonprofit multimedia news corporation that
brings news and uncensored content to people in six Asian countries that
restrict free speech, freedom of the press, and access to reliable information.
RFA also provides educational and cultural programming, as well as forums
for audiences to engage in open dialogue and freely express opinions. RFA
utilizes on-the-ground reporters and networks of in-country sources, citizen
journalists, and eyewitnesses who provide leads, tips, images, and video.10

Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise

This same leadership proceeded to wastefully form the Open Technology
Fund as its own independent grantee with the help of USAGM senior
management prior to the tenure of Trump-appointed leadership.



l

The Open Technology Fund’s goal is to provide funding to support
the research, development, and implementation of Internet freedom
technologies that circumvent censorship. OTF was formed under dubious
circumstances by using consolidation rules to usurp the mission and
funding of USAGM’s pre-existing Office of Internet Freedom (OIF), which
funded far more diverse technologies with much greater transparency. OTF,
however, operates with far less transparency and strictly restricts funding to
“open source” technology. OTF does not support any technology with even
partially “closed source” code, notwithstanding that such closed-source
code would provide more protection against hacking.
Although OTF touts large user numbers, this could not be substantiated
upon requests for information, and it was discovered by former senior
USAGM leadership that OTF makes extremely small, insubstantial
donations to much larger messaging applications and technology to bolster
its unsubstantiated claims.14 Despite its vibrant self-lobbying and publicity
efforts, OTF remains a wasteful and redundant boondoggle. Its grantee
status was suspended by Trump-appointed USAGM leadership for a number
of reasons, including noncompliance with its grant terms and for actions
that resulted in several fraud and waste investigations.15
The OIF, which predates OTF, was historically under USAGM’s Office of
Chief Strategy Officer and for years had been performing the same tasks as
OTF within USAGM headquarters for the benefit of all USAGM broadcast
networks. With much greater transparency, OIF succeeded with fewer staff
while simultaneously fielding more diverse and robust technologies. Absent
a meaningful organizational impact analysis to justify the wastefulness of
the decision-making process, OTF usurped the entire OIF budget and was
set up as a new grantee organization.
Exacerbating matters, OIF was shut down in order to provide massive
grants to the opaque activities of OTF and its founding leadership, who went
on a free-spending boondoggle for high-end Washington, D.C., office space,
furnishings, and top salaries for its leadership team. Numerous career staff
whistleblowers came forward to sound the alarm about OTF to Trumpappointed leadership, citing concerns about the OIG reports, wasteful
spending, and other substantive performance matters.16 Nonetheless, the

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Media Agencies: U.S. Agency for Global Media

Biden Administration reinstated OTF to full operational status and ceased
all investigations immediately after assuming office.
ATTEMPTS AT REFORM

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Late in the Trump Administration, following the long-delayed Senate confirmation of Michael Pack as USAGM Chief Executive Officer (CEO),17 agency leadership
rapidly initiated long-overdue and necessary reforms,18 including security reforms
repeatedly requested by the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) and the Office
of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) that had been ignored by USAGM
leadership.19 Unfortunately, as was the case with the OTF, the Biden Administration
immediately reinstated personnel who had been fired for gross security violations,
placing the agency back into its previously failed posture—one that poses a danger
to national security.
The Firewall Saga. The vital error in USAGM’s current organizational/cultural calculus is the agency’s selective application of a journalistic “firewall.” The
amorphous interpretation of a firewall shifts, depending on which Administration
is in office and who is asking questions.
Although a firewall should ensure journalistic independence, it has been used
without formal regulation for decades in order to shirk legitimate oversight of
everything from promoting adversaries’ propaganda to ignoring journalistic safety.
Often, the “firewall” is touted when journalists are either promoting anti-American
propaganda that parrots adversarial regime talking points or promoting politically
biased viewpoints in opposition to the VOA charter.20
Such weak oversight, alien to any other large media network or news organization—particularly one derivative of U.S. foreign policy and national security
goals—was erroneously enshrined in a document known as the Firewall Regulation.21 The Firewall Regulation was entered into the Federal Register on the eve
of the Senate confirmation of President Donald Trump’s USAGM CEO, Michael
Pack. It was the quintessential “midnight reg” designed to throttle the statutory
and executive authority of the agency head. It stipulated that agency management,
by standards unknown to most large broadcast companies, was forbidden from
engaging in oversight and direction of content in any way—even false content.
It ran counter to the law, including the Smith–Mundt Act,22 and it was harmful
to the agency itself and to the foreign policy and national security goals of the
U.S. government.
Even content that went well beyond fair and accurate reporting on U.S. domestic
and political problems could not be reined in by front office leadership under the
Firewall Regulation. Soon, VOA’s White House correspondent was posting content
highly critical of, and personally insulting to, the U.S. President—in contradiction
of VOA’s own journalistic standards, policies, and procedures. USAGM career officials considered such content sacrosanct and bravely independent “journalistic”



Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise

content protected by the “spirit of” the Firewall Regulation—despite ample evidence to the contrary.
Late in the Trump Administration, USAGM political leadership, following an
intensive U.S. Department of Justice review, revoked the Firewall Regulation over
the protests of journalistic organizations—none more vociferous than VOA itself.23
While the abuses of the Firewall Regulation are particularly disconcerting, they
encompass just a fraction of similar overreaches of the agency’s journalistic mission.
Current and former USAGM/VOA leadership who wanted to maintain virtually
zero accountability and oversight waged a campaign of interference, resistance, and
disinformation to stifle change at the agency. Perhaps not coincidentally, various
media outlets with relationships to former and future USAGM leadership published
near-daily criticisms of Trump Administration appointees and also of grantee organization leaders who were appointed by CEO Pack to implement long-overdue reforms.24
Agency Mission Failure. Currently, the USAGM, by and large, is not fulfilling
its mission, which remains so ill-defined and ambiguous that it enables the organization to go about its business largely unguided with little to no oversight. Rather
than providing news and information in an accurate, reliable way that promotes
and supports freedom and democracy, the agency is mismanaged, disorganized,
ineffective, and rife with waste and redundancy.
These shortfalls are either oriented toward, or directly contribute to, the agency’s media organizations joining the mainstream media’s anti-U.S. chorus and
denigrating the American story—all in the name of so-called journalistic independence. Indeed, content during the Trump Administration was rife with typical
mainstream media talking points assailing the President and his staff. The few
bright spots within VOA and the OCB are often stifled instead of supported. Toplevel talent often leaves the agency or is met with obstacles rather than support.25
Opportunities for modernization and effective strategy are ignored, and wasteful
spending and misallocation of resources are the norm in an environment in which
nepotism is rampant and political gamesmanship protects bad actors.
Amanda Bennett26 was confirmed as USAGM CEO in 2022 after two years
of being blocked by several Members of Congress. Legal advocacy organization
America First Legal Foundation even wrote to President Joe Biden asking him to
withdraw her nomination,27 citing several severe national security failures while
she was director of VOA.28 Her tenure as director during the Obama Administration
(and her holdover into the beginning of the Trump Administration) was marred
with operational failures, security failures, and credibility failures. Those failures
are reportedly ongoing during her current tenure as CEO.29
NECESSARY REFORMS

Security Issues. The Office of Personnel Management30 and the Office of
the Director of National Intelligence flagged severe security failures during four

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Media Agencies: U.S. Agency for Global Media

— 241 —



extensive investigations of the USAGM, each conducted during a 10-year period
between 2010 and 2020.31 Security personnel and former agency senior leadership
ignored these issues and allowed them to persist.32
In brief, the USAGM is vulnerable to exploitation by foreign spies. During the
last six months of the Trump Administration, known foreign intelligence operatives were removed from the OCB and RFE/RL. During the 10-year period between
2010 and 2020, both the OPM and the ODNI found that the USAGM’s Office of
Security (under the Office of Management) had grossly ignored and flouted many
of the federal government’s most critical and long-standing information and personnel security protocols, regulations, and practices.33
During the investigative period—in which the findings were largely, if not
wholly, ignored by agency senior leadership—over 1,500 USAGM personnel
(nearly 40 percent of its total workforce) were performing their Tier 3 and Tier 5
national-security-sensitive positions with falsified and/or unauthorized suitability-for-employment determinations and with access to sensitive federal buildings
and information systems. In many cases, records (including Social Security numbers), were falsified or replaced with notional placeholders, and fingerprints (in
many dozens of cases) were never submitted to the Federal Bureau of Investigation
for basic background investigations.
By the time these issues were addressed by members of the Trump Administration, more than 500 personnel with unauthorized access and clearances had
left the USAGM and rolled into other federal agencies with reciprocal clearance
authorizations. Many others disappeared into U.S. society. As of January 2021, the
USAGM had not yet determined the whereabouts of these individuals.34
The USAGM must never again be entrusted with delegated authority over its
personnel security programs and suitability determinations until such time as it
can prove that these failures will not happen again. These responsibilities must
remain with the Department of Defense and the Office of Personnel Management,
to which they were transferred in the final weeks of the Trump Administration.
Journalists’ Security. Agency journalists, both on and off American soil, have
faced danger,35 yet their superiors have done little to protect them. Whistleblowers
and Trump Administration officials found that protection of USAGM American
and foreign journalists employed by USAGM networks and grantee organizations
was severely lacking.
Against often-significant resistance, political appointees forced action to
enable broadcasters (who were under verified threats) to broadcast from remote
locations while being protected by federal law enforcement officers. Likewise,
political appointees met resistance from senior career officials when insisting
that foreign-based journalists in high-risk countries make their locations known
to the agency in the event they required rescue, extraction, or safe housing. Such
safety measures, argued career officials, would somehow represent a violation of



Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise

journalistic independence. With only rare exceptions, resistance to the most basic
journalist safety measures was the knee-jerk response from USAGM career officials.
Wasting Taxpayer Dollars. The USAGM’S current operations, properly managed, can be conducted on less than $700 million per year. Prior to the arrival of
President Donald Trump’s appointees in June 2020, budgeting, financial responsibility, and spending totaled over $800 million per year, with virtually no oversight
or supervision. Waste, unnecessary spending, nepotism for pet projects, redundant
programs, and unnecessary hiring abounded.
Consolidation and Reduction of Redundant Services. Currently, the USAGM
funds numerous redundant services through its own offices, through Voice of America and the Office of Cuba Broadcasting, and through its grantees. For example, VOA
has a Mandarin-language service but also funds redundant services through Radio
Free Asia. VOA also has a Farsi-language service that duplicates one funded through
Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. Surplus services in the same languages are often
unnecessary and counterproductive. Fiscal responsibility and transparency should
return to the USAGM, with consolidation being a cornerstone of the strategy.
As noted previously, the Open Technology Fund duplicates activities that
already existed at the USAGM in the Office of Internet Freedom. Numerous career
whistleblowers came forward to sound the alarm to President Trump’s USAGM
political team about OTF’s abuse and overreach.36 Its opaque, expensive, and
unnecessary usurpation of an existing USAGM office is an egregious example of
government waste and illustrates the general disdain for U.S. taxpayers that is rife
within this agency. Full reinstatement of OIF would allow full agency and congressional oversight into how so-called “Internet freedom” money is being spent.37
J-1 Visa Program Abuses. Rather than use the appropriate I visa38 intended
for foreign journalists, the USAGM uses the J-1 “cultural exchange” visas to allow
foreign nationals to transition easily into jobs that American citizens with cultural and linguistic expertise could satisfy. The J-1 visa is intended for cultural and
academic exchange programs, among others—none of which include journalism.39
Additionally, J-1 visas are meant for non-immigrant temporary exchanges. The
USAGM’s J-1 visa holders often go on to apply for permanent residency, which
violates the intention of this visa.
Shortwave Transmission Upgrades and Improvements. Non-web-based
technologies that are proven and durable, such as shortwave radio transmission
stations, have been grossly deemphasized in budgeting in favor of newer webbased technologies. This move is dangerously short-sighted and puts the U.S. at a
perilous strategic disadvantage in the event of a major conflict, particularly with
Russia or China.
There is great concern about the vulnerability of undersea cable trunks that
make up the Internet cloud. The vast majority of global Internet traffic—95 percent—is transmitted through these cables, including news transmissions and

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Media Agencies: U.S. Agency for Global Media

web-based content produced by the USAGM’s broadcast networks. While the
robust and popular use of the Internet is ideal during peacetime, during times of
major conflict, widespread damage to the undersea cables that carry communications across the globe can reasonably be expected. Long-lasting power outages
are also likely, such as those Ukraine experienced in the aftermath of Russia’s
2022 invasion.
The USAGM’s responsibility for the only U.S. global shortwave radio capability is
of critical strategic importance if America is to carry its message to people seeking
information and freedom within conflict zones. Shortwave technologies also make
it possible to carry broadcasts in areas where Internet traffic is severely restricted,
as it is in many authoritarian states today.
ORGANIZATIONAL ISSUES

Relevant Government Entities
l

The White House. As an executive branch agency, the USAGM ostensibly
should report to the President and coordinate activities with the
National Security Council (NSC)—especially given the direct and implied
national security aspects of the agency’s messaging globally. However,
there currently is no specific office in the White House or NSC liaison
for the USAGM.

The original network, VOA, functioned under the Office of Coordinator
of Information as early as 1941, the War Department’s Office of War
Information from 1942 to 1945, the State Department from 1945 to 1953,
and the U.S. Information Agency from 1953 until the creation of the
independent Broadcasting Board of Governors in 1999. Although some
oversight and management functions of the agency are provided by the
State Department, the USAGM otherwise has little connectivity to larger
departments or agencies and even less to the White House. With the
dissolution of the U.S. Information Agency in 1999, the USAGM has virtually
been under its own supervision and guidance. The results have been dismal.

— 243 —



Personnel. Personnel is one of the biggest concerns for the USAGM and its
grantees. Attracting talented staff who will stay and letting go of poorly performing personnel are hurdles. Additionally, whistleblowers have come forward with
numerous credible allegations of illegal nepotism and improper hiring practices.40 Past agency leaders have ignored national security procedures when hiring
and have failed to adequately vet staff.41 Government hiring policies and federal
law must be followed, and serious policy changes must be implemented to end
these practices.

Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise

l

The State Department. VOA was most effective before and during the
Cold War when it was under the direct supervision and control of the War
and State Departments, respectively. If VOA is not put in the direct chain of
command under the NSC, serious consideration should be given to putting
VOA under the direct supervision of the Office of Global Public Affairs at the
Department of State. The Office of Global Public Affairs was formed during
the Trump Administration by consolidation of the State Department’s Bureau
of International Information Programs and Bureau of Global Public Affairs.



Ensuring that taxpayer-funded TV, radio, and messaging tells America’s
story is imperative and should be coordinated with the existing foreignlanguage social media platforms at the State Department. Currently, VOA’s
foreign-language TV programming is unreliable in telling America’s story,
given its amorphous interpretation of its independence firewall and its
waning adherence to certain provisions of the Smith–Mundt Act depending
on which political party is in office.
The VOA firewall is meant to protect broadcasters from government
interference with content; however, USAGM staff have abused the firewall
and used it as an offensive measure to block oversight. Additionally, the
Smith–Mundt Act stipulates that USAGM services are meant to tell the
American story abroad—never to domestic audiences—but the agency has
used its taxpayer funding to promote partisan messaging in the U.S. One of
the most egregious examples was when, in 2020, it bought ads on its foreignlanguage social media sites to disseminate a Biden campaign ad and targeted
it to a major Muslim population in Michigan.42 Moreover, VOA often airs
foreign adversaries’ propaganda, which is antithetical to its congressionally
mandated core mission. State Department oversight or “command” may be
one way to ensure that VOA and the rest of the USAGM returns and adheres
to its original mission.
Clear lines of command and communications between the USAGM and an
appropriate office of the National Security Council are also sorely lacking,
as has been any reasonable accountability for USAGM senior leadership
and strategy. The State Department’s Assistant Secretary for Global Public
Affairs and Undersecretary for Diplomacy and Public Affairs should also
be in the accountability loop for agency actions. While the U.S. Secretary of
State technically has a seat on the board of the agency, it is a toothless seat
that is often deferred to the undersecretary and/or assistant secretaries
noted above. This position should be relevant and directive when U.S.
foreign policy and strategic communications are at stake.

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Media Agencies: U.S. Agency for Global Media

For example, the years-long delay in confirming the Trump-appointed
CEO left disastrous holdover leadership from the previous Administration.
Employing effective leadership, even in an acting capacity, while a new CEO is
awaiting Senate confirmation is necessary to prevent a repeat of this behavior.
l

l

Congress. The USAGM receives its budget and mandates directly from
Congress. Often, changes in major functions at the agency happen because
of the lobbying efforts of a few connected individuals—often grantees
lobbying for more funds and less accountability. Those changes can and
do handcuff leadership from any meaningful oversight. An overhaul of the
agency with review from Congress to modernize, streamline, and reduce
waste must be done with congressional support.
Key nongovernmental stakeholders, allies, and non-allies. These include
industry groups, nonprofits, trade associations, foundations, and activist
organizations, for example, America First Legal Foundation,43 USAGM
Watch,44 BBG-USAGM Watch,45 and Whistleblower Protection Project.46

CONCLUSION

AUTHOR’S NOTE: The preparation of this chapter was a collective effort involving many individuals to

whom thanks is owed. These individuals include, but are not limited to, Victoria Coates, Michael Pack, Frank
Wuco, and several brave whistleblowers who prefer not to be named. Their efforts were integral to the chapter
and are greatly appreciated.

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The USAGM is a story of a lost opportunity both to help restore the world’s confidence in the promise and ideals of America and to set a high mark for journalistic
integrity and unbiased reporting. These two areas have suffered severely under two
decades of USAGM mismanagement and lack of oversight. Finding solutions to
these problems and the restoration of the agency’s networks must be the priorities
of future agency leadership.
To accomplish this, the USAGM must be fully reformed top to bottom with
congressional and White House support. The possibility of consolidating not only
the agency’s subparts, but bringing the entire agency under the supervision of the
NSC, the State Department, or both would dramatically aid that reform.
If the de facto aim of the agency simply remains to compete in foreign markets
using anti-U.S. talking points that parrot America’s adversaries’ propaganda, then
this represents an unacceptable burden to the U.S. taxpayer and a negative return
on investment. In that case, the USAGM should be defunded and disestablished.
If, however, the agency can be reformed to become an effective tool, it would be
one of the greatest tools in America’s arsenal to tell America’s story and promote
freedom and democracy around the world.

Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise

CORPORATION FOR PUBLIC BROADCASTING
Mike Gonzalez



E

very Republican President since Richard Nixon has tried to strip the Corporation for Public Broadcasting (CPB) of taxpayer funding. That is significant not
just because it means that for half a century, Republican Presidents have failed to
accomplish what they set out to do, but also because Nixon was the first President
in office when National Public Radio (NPR) and the Public Broadcasting Service
(PBS), which the CPB funds, went on air.
In other words, all Republican Presidents have recognized that public funding
of domestic broadcasts is a mistake. As a 35-year-old lawyer in the Nixon White
House, one Antonin Scalia warned that conservatives were being “confronted with
a long-range problem of significant social consequences—that is, the development
of a government-funded broadcast system similar to the BBC.”47
All of which means that the next conservative President must finally get
this done and do it despite opposition from congressional members of his
own party if necessary. To stop public funding is good policy and good politics.
The reason is simple: President Lyndon Johnson may have pledged in 1967
that public broadcasting would become “a vital public resource to enrich our
homes, educate our families and to provide assistance to our classrooms,”48
but public broadcasting immediately became a liberal forum for public affairs
and journalism.
Not only is the federal government trillions of dollars in debt and unable to
afford the more than half a billion dollars squandered on leftist opinion each year,
but the government should not be compelling the conservative half of the country
to pay for the suppression of its own views. As Thomas Jefferson put it, “To compel
a man to furnish contributions of money for the propagations of opinions which
he disbelieves and abhors, is sinful and tyrannical.”49

A DEMONSTRATED PATTERN OF BIAS

Conservatives will thus reward a President who eliminates this tyrannical situation. PBS and NPR do not even bother to run programming that would attract
conservatives. As Pew Research demonstrated in 2014, 25 percent of PBS’s audience is “mostly liberal,” and 35 percent is “consistently liberal.” That is 60 percent
liberal compared to 15 percent conservative (11 percent “mostly conservative” and
4 percent “consistently conservative”).50
NPR’s audience is even to the Left of that, with 67 percent liberal (41 percent
“consistently liberal” and 26 percent “mostly liberal”), compared with 12 percent
conservative (3 percent and 9 percent “consistently conservative” and “mostly conservative,” respectively).51 That may be an acceptable business model for MSNBC
or CNN, but not for a taxpayer-subsidized broadcaster.

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Media Agencies: Corporation for Public Broadcasting

DEFUNDING THROUGH THE BUDGETARY PROCESS

PUBLIC INTEREST VS. PRIVILEGE

Stripping public funding would, of course, mean that NPR, PBS, Pacifica Radio,
and the other leftist broadcasters would be shorn of the presumption that they act
in the public interest and receive the privileges that often accompany so acting.
They should no longer, for example, be qualified as noncommercial education stations (NCE stations), which they clearly no longer are. NPR, Pacifica, and the other
radio ventures have zero claim on an educational function (the original purpose
for which they were created by President Johnson), and the percentage of on-air
programming that PBS devotes to educational endeavors such as “Sesame Street”
(programs that are themselves biased to the Left) is small.
Being an NCE comes with benefits. The Federal Communications Commission, for example, reserves the 20 stations at the lower end of the radio frequency
(between 88 and 108 MHz on the FM band) for NCEs. The FCC says that “only
noncommercial educational radio stations are licensed in the 88–92 MHz ‘reserved’
band,” while both commercial and noncommercial educational stations may

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Cutting off the CPB is logistically easy. The solution lies in the budgetary
process. In 2022, the CPB submitted to the Labor, Health and Human Services,
Education, and Related Agencies Subcommittees of the House and Senate Appropriations Committees its budget justification for fiscal year (FY) 2023. In it, the
CPB requested that Congress give it a $565 million advance appropriation—a $40
million increase compared to its FY 2022 funding.52 Unlike most other agencies,
the CPB receives advance appropriations that provide them with funding two years
ahead of time, which insulates the agency from Congress’s power of the purse and
oversight. This special budgetary treatment is unjustified and should be ended.
The 47th President can just tell the Congress—through the budget he proposes
and through personal contact—that he will not sign an appropriations spending bill
that contains a penny for the CPB. The President may have to use the bully pulpit,
as NPR and PBS have teams of lobbyists who have convinced enough Members of
Congress to save their bacon every time their taxpayer subsidies have been at risk
since the Nixon era.
Defunding CPB would by no means cause NPR or PBS—or other public broadcasters that benefit from CPB funding, including the even-further-to-the Left
Pacifica Radio and American Public Media—to file for bankruptcy. The membership model that the CPB uses, along with the funding from corporations and
foundations that it also receives, would allow these broadcasters to continue to
thrive. As George Will wrote, “If ‘Sesame Street’ programming were put up for
auction, the danger would be of getting trampled by the stampede of potential
bidders.”53 Indeed, “Sesame Street” is on HBO now, which shows its potential as
a money earner.

Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise



operate in the “non-reserved” band.54 This confers advantages, as lower-frequency
stations can be heard farther away and are easier to find as they lie on the left end
of the radio dial (figuratively as well as ideologically).
The FCC also exempts NCE stations from licensing fees. It says that “Noncommercial educational (NCE) FM station licensees and full service NCE television
broadcast station licensees are exempt from paying regulatory fees, provided that
these stations operate solely on an NCE basis.”55
NPR and PBS stations are in reality no longer noncommercial, as they run ads
in everything but name for their sponsors. They are also noneducational. The next
President should instruct the FCC to exclude the stations affiliated with PBS and
NPR from the NCE denomination and the privileges that come with it.

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Media Agencies
ENDNOTES

1.
2.

3.
4.
5.

6.
7.

8.
9.
10.
11.

15.
16.
17.
18.

19.

20.

21.
22.
23.

24.

— 249 —



12.
13.
14.

U.S. Agency for Global Media, https://www.usagm.gov/ (accessed March 20, 2023).
Ben Weingarten, “Security Failures USG Media Agency Prove Need to Hire Americans First,” Newsweek,
August 10, 2020, https://www.newsweek.com/security-failures-usg-media-Agency-prove-need-hireamericans-first-opinion-1523895 (accessed March 20, 2023).
U.S. Agency for Global Media, “Who We Are,” https://www.usagm.gov/who-we-are/history/ (accessed
March 20, 2023).
U.S. Agency for Global Media, “Voice of America,” https://www.usagm.gov/networks/voa/ (accessed
March 20, 2023).
Daniel Lippman, “Deleted Biden Video Sets Off a Crisis at Voice of America,” Politico July 30, 2020, https://
www.politico.com/news/2020/07/30/deleted-biden-video-sets-off-a-crisis-at-voice-of-america-388571
(accessed March 20, 2023).
U.S. Agency for Global Media, “Office of Cuba Broadcasting,” https://www.usagm.gov/networks/ocb/
(accessed March 20, 2023).
Rafael Bernal, “Bipartisan Group Asks Office of Cuba Broadcasting to Rescind Layoffs,” September 13, 2022,
The Hill, https://thehill.com/latino/3641445-bipartisan-group-asks-office-of-cuba-broadcasting-to-rescindlayoffs/ (accessed March 20, 2023).
U.S. Agency for Global Media, “Middle East Broadcasting Networks,” https://www.usagm.gov/networks/mbn/
(accessed March 20, 2023).
U.S. Agency for Global Media, Consolidation Report, p. 13, https://docs.house.gov/meetings/FA/
FA00/20210930/114085/HMKP-117-FA00-20210930-SD002.pdf (accessed March 22, 2023).
U.S. Agency for Global Media, “Radio Free Asia,” https://www.usagm.gov/networks/rfa/ (accessed
March 20, 2023).
U.S. Department of State and the Broadcasting Board of Governors, Office of the Inspector General, Audit of
Radio Free Asia Expenditures, June 2015, https://www.stateoig.gov/uploads/report/report_pdf_file/aud-fmib-15-24_1.pdf (accessed March 22, 2023).
Ibid.
Ibid., p. 16.
Susan Crabtree, “‘Lax’ Internet Freedom Group Balks at New Pack Oversight,” https://www.realclearpolitics.
com/articles/2020/08/24/lax_internet_freedom_group_balks_at_new_pack_oversight_144043.html
(accessed March 22, 2023).
Ibid.
Ibid.
Nomination of Michael Pack to the Broadcasting Board of Governors, 116th Cong., 2nd Sess. (2020), https://
www.congress.gov/nomination/116th-congress/1590 (accessed March 20, 2023).
James Robbins, “More Rot at America’s Public Diplomacy Mouthpiece,” The Hill, November 7, 2020, https://
thehill.com/opinion/national-security/524924-more-rot-at-americas-public-diplomacy-mouthpiece/
(accessed March 20, 2023).
U.S. Office of Personnel Management, Suitability Agency Executive Programs, Follow Up Review of U.S.
Agency for Global Media, July 2020, https://bbgwatch.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/08/OPM-SuitEAJuly-2020.pdf (accessed March 20, 203).
If the agency were not an extension of U.S. foreign policy and national security goals, then its staffing
positions would not be classified in their entirety as Tier 3 and Tier 5 national-security sensitive positions,
which they are. See U.S. Agency for Global Media, Consolidation Report, p. 13.
Federal Register, Vol. 85, No. 115 (June 15, 2020), pp. 36150–36153.
U.S. Information and Educational Exchange Act of 1948 (“Smith–Mundt Act”), Public Law 80–402.
Jessica Jerreat, “USAGM CEO Criticized Over Move to Rescind Firewall Regulation,” October 28, 2020, https://
www.voanews.com/a/usa_usagm-ceo-criticized-over-move-rescind-firewall-regulation/6197671.html
(accessed March 20, 2023).
Byron York, “America’s Lost Voice,” Washington Examiner, February 4, 2021, https://www.washingtonexaminer.
com/politics/americas-lost-voice (accessed March 20, 2023).



Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise
25. Sasha Gong, “VOA Problems: Racism, Xenophobia, Mediocrity, and Nepotism,” BBG-USAGM Watch, December
25, 2018, archived at https://web.archive.org/web/20220105101300/https://bbgwatch.com/bbgwatch/voaproblems-racism-xenophobia-mediocrity-and-nepotism/ (accessed March 20, 2023).
26. U.S. Agency for Global Media Watch, “Big Mistake in Rewarding Failed Voice of America (VOA) Managers
U.S. Agency for Global Media Managers,” November 11, 2022, https://www.usagmwatch.com/big-mistakein-rewarding-failed-voice-of-america-voa-and-u-s-Agency-for-global-media-usagm-managers/ (accessed
March 20, 2023).
27. America First Legal Foundation,“AFL Asks Biden Administration to Withdraw Nomination of Amanda
Bennett Citing National Security and Related Failures,” June 30, 2022, https://aflegal.org/afl-asks-bidenadministration-to-withdraw-nomination-of-amanda-bennett-citing-national-security-and-related-failures/
(accessed March 20, 2023).
28. U.S. Agency for Global Media, Consolidation Report, p. 13.
29. U.S. Agency for Global Media Watch, “Extraordinary Leadership Dysfunction at USAGM Continues,” October 4,
2022, https://www.usagmwatch.com/extraordinary-leadership-dysfunction-at-usagm-continues/ (accessed
March 20, 2023).
30. U.S. Office of Personnel Management, Follow-Up Review of the U.S. Agency for Global Media
Suitability Program.
31. Ibid.
32. U.S. Agency for Global Media, Consolidation Report, p. 13.
33. U.S. Office of Personnel Management, Follow-Up Review of the U.S. Agency for Global Media
Suitability Program.
34. Robbins, “More Rot at America’s Public Diplomacy Mouthpiece.”
35. U.S. Department of Justice, “Manhattan U.S. Attorney Announces Kidnapping Conspiracy Charges Against
an Iranian Intelligence Officer And Members Of An Iranian Intelligence Network,” July 13, 2021, https://www.
justice.gov/usao-sdny/pr/manhattan-us-attorney-announces-kidnapping-conspiracy-charges-against-iranian
(accessed March 20, 2023).
36. James Robbins, “The Trouble with the Open Technology Fund,” Newsweek, August 9, 2020, https://www.
newsweek.com/trouble-open-technology-fund-opinion-1528998 (accessed March 20, 2023).
37. Susan Crabtree, “Lax Internet Freedom Group Balks at New Pack Oversight,” Real Clear Politics, August 24,
2020, https://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2020/08/24/lax_internet_freedom_group_balks_at_new_
pack_oversight_144043.html (accessed March 20, 2023).
38. U.S. Department of State, “Visas for Members of the Foreign Media, Press, and Radio,” https://travel.state.
gov/content/travel/en/us-visas/employment/visas-members-foreign-media-press-radio.html (accessed
March 20, 2023).
39. Authorized positions for J-1 visas include: au pair, camp counselor, college/university student, government
visitor, intern, international visitor, physician, professor, research scholar, secondary school student, short-term
scholar, specialist, STEM initiatives, summer work travel, teacher, and trainee. See U.S. Department of State,
“Exchange Visitor Visa,” https://travel.state.gov/content/travel/en/us-visas/study/exchange.html (accessed
March 20, 2023).
40. News release, “McCaul Demands Answers on USAGM Personnel and Management,” Foreign Affairs
Committee, October 28, 2021, https://foreignaffairs.house.gov/press-release/mccaul-demands-answers-onusagm-personnel-and-management/ (accessed March 20, 2023).
41. U.S. Agency for Global Media Watch, “USAGM: Past Leaders Ignored National Security Procedures, Failed to
Adequately Vet Staff,” August 8, 2020, https://www.usagmwatch.com/usagm-past-agency-leaders-ignorednational-security-procedures-failed-to-adequately-vet-staff/ (accessed March 20, 2023).
42. U.S. Agency for Global Media, “CEO Pack Launches Investigation Into Pro-Biden VOA Content, U.S. Election
Interference,” July 30, 2020, https://www.usagm.gov/2020/07/30/ceo-pack-launches-investigation-into-probiden-voa-content-u-s-election-interference/ (accessed March 22, 2023).
43. America First Legal Foundation, “AFL Asks Biden Administration to Withdraw Nomination of Amanda
Bennet Citing National Security and Related Failures,” June 30, 2022, https://aflegal.org/afl-asks-bidenadministration-to-withdraw-nomination-of-amanda-bennett-citing-national-security-and-related-failures/
(accessed March 20, 2023).

— 250 —

Media Agencies

— 251 —



44. U.S. Agency for Global Media Watch, https://www.usagmwatch.com/ (accessed March 20, 2023).
45. BBG-USAM Watch, https://bbgwatch.com/bbgwatch/ (accessed March 20, 2023).
46. Whistleblower Protection Project, “Congress Releases Long-Awaited Investigative Report on Chronically
Mismanaged USAGM,” February 9, 2022, https://whipproj.org/congress-releases-long-awaited-usagminvestigative-report-revealing-Agencys-chronic-mismanagement/ (accessed March 20, 2023).
47. National Telecommunications and Information Administration, “Nixon Administration Public Broadcasting
Papers, Summary of 1971,” February 23, 1979, https://current.org/1979/02/nixon-administration-publicbroadcasting-papers-summary-of-1971/ (accessed March 21, 2023).
48. President Lyndon B. Johnson, State of the Union Address, January 10, 1967, https://www.infoplease.com/
primary-sources/government/presidential-speeches/state-union-address-lyndon-b-johnson-january-10-1967
(accessed March 21, 2023).
49. Joyce Appleby and Terence Ball, eds., Jefferson: Political Writings (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge
University Press, 1999), p. 390.
50. Pew Research Center, “Where News Audiences Fit on the Political Spectrum,” October 21, 2014, http://www.
journalism.org/interactives/media-polarization/outlet/pbs/ (accessed March 21, 2023.
51. Ibid.
52. Corporation for Public Broadcasting, Corporation for Public Broadcasting Appropriation Request and
Justification FY 2023/FY 2025, Submitted to the Labor, Health and Human Services, Education and Related
Agencies Subcommittee of the House Appropriations Committee and the Labor, Health and Human Services,
Education and Related Agencies Subcommittee of the Senate Appropriations Committee, March 28, 2022,
p. 2, https://www.cpb.org/sites/default/files/appropriation/FY-2023-2025-CPB-Budget-Justification.pdf
(accessed March 21, 2023).
53. George F. Will, “Public Broadcasting’s Immortality Defies Reason,” The Washington Post, June 2, 2017, https://
www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/public-broadcastings-immortality-defies-reason/2017/06/02/f5de02be46fe-11e7-a196-a1bb629f64cb_story.html?utm_term=.8df3a01f6ca6 (accessed March 21, 2023).
54. Federal Communications Commission, “FM Radio,” https://www.fcc.gov/general/fm-radio (accessed
March 21, 2023).
55. Federal Communications Commission, “Regulatory Fee Exemptions for FY 2021,” FCC Regulatory Fees
Factsheet No. DA-21-1142, September 10, 2021, p. 2.



9

AGENCY FOR
INTERNATIONAL
DEVELOPMENT
Max Primorac

MISSION

OVERVIEW

USAID was established during the presidency of John F. Kennedy pursuant
to the Foreign Assistance Act of 19611 to promote the foreign policy, security, and
national interests of the United States. At the height of the Cold War with the
Soviet Union, it sought to halt the spread of Communism by assisting peoples in the
developing world in their efforts to advance economically, socially, and politically.
The agency helped to transition Central and Eastern Europe from socialism to
free market–based democracies. Today, USAID leads the U.S. government’s global
development and humanitarian disaster assistance responses.
Over the years, USAID expanded the number of countries assisted, the scope
and size of its activities, and especially its budget. The Trump Administration faced

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The U.S. Agency for International Development leads the U.S. government’s
international development and disaster assistance programs. USAID helps communities to lead their own development journeys by reducing the impact of conflict;
preventing hunger and the spread of pandemic disease; and counteracting the drivers of violence, instability, transnational crime, and other threats. In alignment
with U.S. national security interests, the agency promotes American prosperity
through initiatives that expand markets for U.S. exports; encourage innovation;
create a level playing field for U.S. businesses; and support more stable, resilient,
and democratic societies that are less likely to act against American interests and
more likely to respect family, life, and religious liberty.



Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise

an institution marred by bureaucratic inertia: programmatic incoherence; wasteful spending; and dependence on huge awards to a self-serving and politicized aid
industrial complex of United Nations agencies, international nongovernmental
organizations (NGOs), and for-profit contractors. Once started, programs continue
almost indefinitely—in many countries, for decades. USAID’s multibillion-dollar
humanitarian programs that were once 80 percent in response to natural disasters
are now 80 percent in response to violent, man-made crises and have become a
permanent and immiserating feature of the global landscape.
Under the Trump Administration, USAID focused on ending the need for foreign aid by placing countries onto a Journey to Self-Reliance.2 The Administration
restructured the agency to reflect this strategic approach to development, streamlined procurement procedures to diversify its partner base, increased awards to
cost-effective local (including faith-based) organizations, and improved internal governance. It instituted pro-life and family-friendly policies. It promoted
international religious freedom as a pillar of the agency’s work and built up an
unprecedented genocide-response infrastructure.
The Biden Administration has deformed the agency by treating it as a global
platform to pursue overseas a divisive political and cultural agenda that promotes
abortion, climate extremism, gender radicalism, and interventions against perceived
systemic racism. It has dispensed with decades of bipartisan consensus on foreign
aid and pursued policies that contravene basic American values and have antagonized our partners in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. It has decoupled U.S. assistance
from free-market reforms that are the keystone of economic and political stability
and has teamed with global institutions to impose central planning diktats on an
unprecedented scale. Wasteful budget increases requested by the Administration
and appropriated by Congress have outstripped USAID’s capacity to spend funds
responsibly, and U.S. foreign aid has been transformed into a massive and openended global entitlement program captured by—and enriching—the progressive Left.
The next conservative Administration should scale back USAID’s global footprint by, at a minimum, returning to the agency’s 2019 pre–COVID-19 pandemic
budget level. It should deradicalize USAID’s programs and structures and build
on the conservative reforms instituted by the Trump Administration. This will
require working closely with the U.S. Congress to make deep cuts in the international affairs “150 Account” while granting USAID greater flexibility in spending
its appropriated funds to achieve better developmental outcomes.
KEY ISSUES

Aligning U.S. Foreign Aid to U.S. Foreign Policy. U.S. foreign aid is too often
disconnected from the strategy and practice of U.S. foreign policy. Its coordination
is made difficult as the aid budget is divided among approximately 20 offices, agencies, and departments that provide some form of foreign assistance.

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l

Inaugurated a robust counter-China response called Clear Choice3
that contrasted America’s development approach based on liberty,
sovereignty, and free markets with China’s mercantilist authoritarianism
that pursued predatory financing schemes and economic and political
subordination to Beijing.

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The USAID Administrator should be authorized to take on the additional role
of Director of Foreign Assistance (DFA) with the rank of Deputy Secretary at the
Department of State in charge of all U.S. foreign assistance. The DFA role would
empower this person to align and coordinate the countless foreign assistance
programs across the U.S. government and carry out the agenda of the next conservative President more effectively. A version of this role existed during the last
two years of the George W. Bush Administration, but the Obama Administration
eliminated it in 2009.
Countering China’s Development Challenge. Through its trillion-dollar
Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), the Peoples Republic of China (PRC) has directed
billions of dollars in loans and investments to advance its geostrategic objective
of displacing the United States as the premier global power. The PRC leverages
its transactions—termed “debt traps” by many critics—to strengthen its global
influence, extract natural resources, isolate Taiwan, win political support at
international fora, and access ports and bases for its military. In Latin America,
25 of 29 countries participate in the BRI, and the PRC ranks as the region’s largest
trading partner. Since 2005, Chinese state-owned banks have issued $138 billion
in loans to Latin American countries, and other Chinese entities have invested
an additional $140 billion. In Africa, China has issued $160 billion in loans and
dominates the continent’s rare earth mining sector, which is critical to global
energy development.
The World Bank estimates that 60 percent of all BRI loans are in financial
distress, leading many countries to seek emergency financial help from Western
donors. Chinese-funded projects are known for employing substandard labor and
environmental practices, fueling corruption, promoting wasteful financial decisions by governments, advancing China’s geostrategic interests, and creating an
unequal trade relationship in which China secures raw materials from developing
countries and sells those countries manufacturing products. For example, Brazil,
a world leader in shoe production, saw its industry collapse under a flood of cheap
Chinese imports. China’s mercantilist penetration of the developing world and
the negative consequences for developing countries’ healthy economic growth
have undercut U.S. strategic relationships in those countries and wasted billions
in U.S. foreign aid.
During the Trump Administration, USAID:

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l

l

l

Struck bilateral development relationships with Japan, Israel, Kuwait, Qatar,
the United Arab Emirates, and Taiwan to support projects in sub-Saharan
Africa, Asia, Latin America, and the Middle East.
Established an office in Greenland to help counter China’s claims of being “a
near Arctic state” and reoriented its programming across Asia—including
establishing a USAID Mission to Central Asia—in line with America’s IndoPacific strategy.5
Joined with the U.S. Department of Homeland Security and National
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration to help coastal countries
detect and halt illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing and confront
criminal activities practiced by state-run Chinese fishing fleets that violate
international norms, ravage fishing industries in developing countries,
worsen food insecurity, rob vulnerable communities of their livelihoods,
and deplete maritime resources.



l

Launched its first Digital Strategy4 to promote safe 5G access in emerging
markets and combat Beijing’s efforts to equip regimes with tools to
stifle democracy.

USAID built an organizational infrastructure to carry out its multiple lines of
counter-China operations. An agencywide Clear Choice Executive Council and
USAID–U.S. International Development Finance Corporation Working Group
reviewed all proposed assistance programs and proposals through a counter-China
lens. A senior executive–level Clear Choice Coordinator, reporting to the Administrator, advised the agency’s leadership on initiatives to counter China, supported
by a fully dedicated six-person Secretariat.
The Biden Administration discontinued these programs and allowed USAID’s
counter-China architecture to waste away, subordinating our national security
interests to progressive climate politics in which Communist China is viewed as
a global partner.
The next conservative Administration should restore and build on the Trump
Administration’s counter-China infrastructure at USAID, end the climate policy
fanaticism that advantages Beijing, and assess bilateral aid through the lens of
U.S. national security interests, rewarding those countries that resist China’s
debt diplomacy. It should finance programs designed to counter specific Chinese
efforts in strategically important countries and eliminate funding to any partner
that engages with Chinese entities directly or indirectly. USAID’s Bangkok-based
Regional Development Mission for Asia should focus its strategic attention on
supporting cross-border initiatives designed to counter Chinese influence.

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Climate Change. Upon taking office, President Biden issued executive orders
to “put the climate crisis at the center of U.S. foreign policy and national security”
and mitigate “the devastating inequalities that intersect with gender, race, ethnicity, and economic security.”6 USAID subsequently declared itself “a climate agency”
and redirected its private-sector engagement strategy—teaming with America’s
corporate sector to wean countries off foreign aid through private investment and
trade—to support the Administration’s global policy to “transition from fossil fuels
to renewable energy.”
The Administration has incorporated its radical climate policy into every
USAID initiative. It has joined or funded international partnerships dedicated to
advancing the aims of the Paris Climate Agreement and has supported the idea of
giving trillions of dollars more in aid transfers for “climate reparations.”
The Biden Administration’s extreme climate policies have worsened global
food insecurity and hunger. Its anti–fossil fuel agenda has led to a sharp spike in
global energy prices. Inflation has hit the poor the hardest as they expend a higher
proportion of income on food purchases. Farmers in poor countries can no longer
afford to buy expensive natural gas–based fertilizers that are key to achieving high
yields of food production. Under advice from climate radicals, the government of
Sri Lanka even banned chemical fertilizers entirely without having any replacements in place. The result has been hunger and violent political instability.
The aid industry claims that climate change causes poverty, which is false.
Enduring conflict, government corruption, and bad economic policies are the
main drivers of global poverty. USAID’s response to man-made food insecurity
is to provide more billions of dollars in aid—a recipe that will keep scores of poor
countries underdeveloped and dependent on foreign aid for years to come.
The impact on Africa is especially acute. South Africa, for example, relies on
coal-powered plants to generate 80 percent of its power needs. It would need $26
billion in foreign aid to make the full transition away from coal. Multiplying this
amount by dozens of other countries on the continent, the financial resources
needed to transition away from fossil fuels are unachievable. In Latin America,
countries that are global leaders in oil and gas production have sharply curtailed
their energy production in line with climate activists, upending the hemisphere’s
major source of export revenues and condemning it to years of economic and political instability.
USAID should cease its war on fossil fuels in the developing world and support
the responsible management of oil and gas reserves as the quickest way to end
wrenching poverty and the need for open-ended foreign aid. The next conservative
Administration should rescind all climate policies from its foreign aid programs
(specifically USAID’s Climate Strategy 2022–20307); shut down the agency’s offices,
programs, and directives designed to advance the Paris Climate Agreement; and
narrowly limit funding to traditional climate mitigation efforts. USAID resources



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are best deployed to strengthen the resilience of countries that are most vulnerable to climatic shifts. The agency should cease collaborating with and funding
progressive foundations, corporations, international institutions, and NGOs that
advocate on behalf of climate fanaticism.
Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion Agenda. USAID installed advisers on
Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion (DEI) committees “in all its Bureaus, Offices, and
[overseas] Missions” and created “an agency-wide dashboard and DEI scorecard
for all bureaus, offices, and missions” to track staff compliance with the Administration’s DEI directives. A Chief DEI Officer oversees this DEI infrastructure and
sits in the Administrator’s office. DEI directives are now part of all agency policies
and are incorporated as standard clauses in all contract and grant awards. Those
seeking to do business with the agency must “describe the approaches they will
use to diversify their partner base.”8 USAID often ties DEI to “gender and climate
equity,” corrupting every aspect of the agency’s overseas work.
The upshot has been to racialize the agency and create a hostile work environment for anyone who disagrees with the Biden Administration’s identity politics.
This pursuit of ideological purity threatens merit-based professional advancement
for staff who do not overtly conform, hyperpoliticizes what should be a nonpartisan
federal workplace environment, creates an institutionalized cadre of progressive
political commissars, corrupts the award process, and discourages potential contractors and grantees that disagree with this radical agenda from applying for
USAID funding.
The next conservative Administration should dismantle USAID’s DEI apparatus
by eliminating the Chief Diversity Officer position along with the DEI advisers and
committees; cancel the DEI scorecard and dashboard; remove DEI requirements
from contract and grant tenders and awards; issue a directive to cease promotion
of the DEI agenda, including the bullying LGBTQ+ agenda; and provide staff a
confidential medium through which to adjudicate cases of political retaliation
that agency or implementing staff suffered during the Biden Administration. It
should eliminate funding for partners that promote discriminatory DEI practices
and consider debarment in egregious cases.
As federal departments and agencies cannot play partisan politics, staff—irrespective of hiring mechanism—as well as implementers and grantees that engage
in ideological agitation on behalf of the DEI agenda should be dismissed, and entities should be debarred. The next conservative Administration should return the
authority over all civil rights issues at USAID to the agency’s Office of Civil Rights,
which is the appropriate locus for ensuring that all Americans have guaranteed
equality of career opportunity at USAID.
Refocusing Gender Equality on Women, Children, and Families. Instead
of protecting women’s and children’s unalienable human rights and propelling
their ability to thrive in society, past Democrat Administrations have nearly erased

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what females are and what femininity is through “gender” policies and practices.
For instance, these Administrations have diluted USAID’s focus on assisting vulnerable women, children, and families around the globe by adding protections for
and ideological advocacy on behalf of progressive special-interest groups. USAID
now aggressively promotes abortion on demand under the guise of “sexual and
reproductive health and reproductive rights,” “gender equality,” and “women’s
empowerment” and advocates for those who claim minority status or vulnerability.
Families are the basic unit of and foundation for a thriving society. Without
women, there are no children, and society cannot continue. As evidenced by the
confirmation testimony of now-Associate Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson, the
progressive Left has so misused and altered the definition of what a “woman” is
that one of our U.S. Supreme Court Justices was unable to delineate clearly the
fundamental biological and sexual traits that define the group of which she is a
part. USAID cannot advocate for and protect women when they have been erased
globally along with the values and traditional structures that have supported them.
The next conservative Administration should rename the USAID Office of
Gender Equality and Women’s Empowerment (GEWE) as the USAID Office of
Women, Children, and Families; refocus and realign resources that currently
support programs in GEWE to the Office of Women, Children, and Families; redesignate the Senior Gender Coordinator as an unapologetically pro-life politically
appointed Senior Coordinator of the Office of Women, Children, and Families; and
eliminate the “more than 180 gender advisors and points of contact…embedded in
Missions and Operating Units throughout the Agency.”9
In addition, the next conservative Administration should rescind President
Biden’s 2022 Gender Policy and refocus it on Women, Children, and Families
and revise the agency’s regulation on “Integrating Gender Equality and Female
Empowerment in USAID’s Program Cycle.”10 It should remove all references, examples, definitions, photos, and language on USAID websites, in agency publications
and policies, and in all agency contracts and grants that include the following
terms: “gender,” “gender equality,” “gender equity,” “gender diverse individuals,” “gender aware,” “gender sensitive,” etc. It should also remove references to
“abortion,” “reproductive health,” and “sexual and reproductive rights” and controversial sexual education materials.
In the past, the word “gender” was a polite alternative to the word “sex” or term
“biological sex.” The Left has commandeered the term “gender,” which used to
mean either “male” or “female,” to include a spectrum of others who are seeking to
alter biological and societal sexual norms. The promotion of gender radicalism is
anathema to the traditional norms of many societies where USAID works, causes
resentment by tying lifesaving assistance to rejecting the aid recipient’s own firmly
held fundamental values regarding sexuality, and produces unnecessary consternation and confusion among and even outright bias against men.



Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise

The next Administration should ensure that USAID’s goal in service of its
mission is to help protect and propel all members of society—women, children,
and men—from conception to natural death. To do so, USAID’s Office of Women,
Children, and Families should strive to ensure that communities have their basic
human needs, without which they will be unable to thrive, met first and foremost.
Basic human needs include equal and safe access to potable water, sanitation, food,
education, health care, houses of worship, justice, pregnancy and family resource
centers, working capital, electricity, technology, and business opportunities. The
Office of Women, Children, and Families should implement the Geneva Consensus Declaration on Women’s Health and Protection of the Family and prioritize
partnerships with local organizations, including faith-based organizations (FBOs).
Protecting Life in Foreign Assistance. Protecting life should be among the
core objectives of United States foreign assistance. Shortly after taking office, however, President Biden issued a memorandum that reversed a myriad of pro-life
policies and revoked the Protecting Life in Global Health Assistance (PLGHA)
policy, widely known as the Mexico City Policy. Biden also restored funding to
the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), which supports and implements
China’s coercive abortion and sterilization regimen.
PLGHA requires foreign NGOs, as a condition of receiving assistance, to agree
not to perform or actively promote abortions as a method of family planning in
foreign countries. Previous pro-life Presidents beginning with Ronald Reagan
applied these conditions to family planning assistance, but President Trump for
the first time expanded the Mexico City Policy to protect “global health assistance
furnished by all departments or agencies” (estimated to be $8.8 billion annually).
The Biden Administration restored abortion subsidies to pro-abortion NGOs
including Planned Parenthood International and MSI Reproductive Choices. In
reversing PLGHA, Biden declared a radical assault on the policy of protecting life,
choosing instead to promote abortion on demand around the world under the
guise of “sexual and reproductive health and rights.” USAID’s priority of funding
the global abortion industry negates programs that promote life, women’s health,
and the family.
Even under PLGHA, several loopholes allowed support for the global abortion
industry to continue. International NGOs that perform and promote abortions
overseas like Population Services International, Pathfinder, PATH, the Population
Council, EngenderHealth, and WomanCare Global International continued to
receive funding from USAID under PLGHA and now, under Biden, receive tens
of millions more in U.S. taxpayer dollars in foreign assistance annually without
any oversight. When the United Nations Secretariat promoted abortion and abortion-inducing drugs under the umbrella of “sexual and reproductive health” as
an element of its COVID-19 Global Humanitarian Response Plan in May 2020,
the exemptions in PLGHA for humanitarian aid and multilateral organizations

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illuminated another loophole in the policy’s effectiveness in safeguarding U.S. taxpayer dollars from being used to promote abortion.
Pro-abortion groups also have received funds under other categories of foreign
aid that fall outside the scope of global health assistance, including women-related
and economic assistance programs. Members of Congress have advocated closing
these loopholes by extending PLGHA to all foreign assistance through the Protecting Life in Foreign Assistance Act, sponsored by Senator Mike Lee (R–UT) and
Representative Virginia Foxx (R–NC).11 Current law in the Foreign Assistance Act
gives the President broad authority to set “such terms and conditions as he may
determine” on foreign assistance, which legally empowers the next conservative
President to expand this pro-life policy.
To stop U.S. foreign aid from supporting the global abortion industry, the next
conservative Administration should issue an executive order that, at a minimum,
reinstates PLGHA and summarily blocks funding to UNFPA but also closes loopholes by applying the policy to all foreign assistance, including humanitarian aid,
and improving its enforcement. The executive order to reinstate PLGHA should
be drafted broadly to apply to all foreign assistance. It should simultaneously
rescind President Biden’s memorandum entitled “Protecting Women’s Health at
Home and Abroad,” issued on January 28, 2021.12 The new pro-life executive order
should apply to foreign NGOs, including subgrantees and subcontractors, and
remove exemptions for U.S.-based NGOs, public international organizations, and
bilateral government-to-government agreements. All entities funded by USAID,
both directly and indirectly, should report their compliance with the PLGHA, and
USAID should institute penalties, including debarment from future federal funding,
for violations of it. The new executive order also should instruct the Administrator
of USAID to publish reports on implementation of the PLGHA by both prime and
sub-prime recipients.
In addition, the Helms Amendment should continue to be applied, as it has been
by both Republican and Democratic Administrations for more than 50 years, as a
complete ban on the use of taxpayer dollars to pay for abortions abroad.
International Religious Freedom. Conservatives believe international
religious freedom is central to USAID’s development efforts. President Trump’s
Executive Order 13926 on “Advancing International Religious Freedom”13
instructed the Secretary of State, in consultation with the USAID Administrator,
to budget at least $50 million a year for programs that advance international religious freedom and “ensure that faith-based and religious entities, including eligible
entities in foreign countries, are not discriminated against on the basis of religious
identity or religious belief when competing for Federal funding.”
Under the Trump Administration, the agency set up a senior-level Chief Adviser
for International Religious Freedom who reported directly to the Administrator with the task of coordinating a “whole-of-USAID” approach to achieving this



Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise

priority. It created a robust genocide-response capability. USAID affirmed the
agency’s partnerships with faith-based organizations through its rule on “Participation by Religious Organizations in USAID Programs;”14 “Partnership Guidance
and Answers to Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs) for Faith Based Organizations;”
and “Legal Guidance and Answers to FAQs for USAID Staff.”
Today, USAID officials and their progressive partners have resisted efforts to
promote religious freedom, especially as it relates to abortion and gender ideology,
which are anathema to the traditional societies where USAID funds programs (in
addition to many U.S. taxpayers). U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken repudiated
his predecessor’s focus on religious freedom.
The next conservative Administration must champion the core American value
of religious freedom, which correlates significantly with poverty reduction, economic growth, and peace. It should train all USAID staff on the connection between
religious freedom and development; integrate it into all of the agency’s programs,
including the five-year Country Development and Coordination Strategies due
for updates in 2025; strengthen the missions’ relationships with local faith-based
leaders; and build on local programs that are serving the poor. Congress should
appropriate funding to USAID specifically to support persecuted religious minorities in line with Executive Order 13926.
Streamlining Procurement and Localizing the Partner Base. USAID is a
grantmaking and contracting agency that disburses billions of dollars of federal
funding in developing countries through implementing partners, such as U.N. agencies, international NGOs, for-profit companies, and local nongovernmental entities.
In rare instances, such as in Jordan and Ukraine, the agency provides direct budget
support to finance the operations of host-country governments. USAID far more
often counts on expensive and ineffective large contracts and grants to carry out
its programs. It justifies these practices based on speed and a lower administrative
burden on its institutional capacity.
Partnering and procurement reform was a pillar of the Trump Administration’s
effort to secure better development results, cut costs, and advance the Journey to
Self-Reliance strategy of exiting countries from aid. In December 2018, USAID
launched its first Acquisition and Assistance Strategy to streamline procurement
processes; introduce innovation into its programming; and diversify its partner
base away from large, expensive, and partisan implementers. The strategy counted
on local NGOs, including faith-based entities already on the ground, to provide
the agency with less costly and more effective alternatives to the aid giants. The
strategy also prioritized global partnerships with the private sector—corporations,
investors, diasporas, and private philanthropies—the source of real capital investment, innovation, and efficiencies that can maximize the impact of taxpayer dollars.
Under the Biden Administration, despite rhetoric to the contrary, the aid industrial
complex has recaptured the agency and stifled further reforms.

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The next conservative Administration should immediately implement language
on key policy topics as standard provisions in all grants, cooperative agreements,
and contracts. These provisions should include language on implementing the
Policy on Protecting Life in Foreign Assistance, imposing conditions on funding
to multilateral organizations, and increasing accountability and transparency.
To ensure that USAID exercises its existing authorities to streamline procurement processes, the next conservative Administration should name a political
appointee as the agency’s Senior Procurement Executive and Director of the agency’s Office of Assistance and Acquisitions (OAA) in the Bureau of Management (M).
The head of M/OAA is one of the most important positions at USAID, as the office is
ground zero for controlling the disbursement of U.S. foreign aid. The White House
should empower the Administrator and his or her designees to make determinations concerning the scale and scope of awards and increase the transparency and
accountability of subawards, which can escape public scrutiny and promote progressive policies during conservative Administrations. USAID should use existing
authority to use program funds to expand its roster of contracting and agreement
officers to accelerate the delivery of funds for disaster responses to a more diverse
collection of implementers.
Accomplishing the next conservative Administration’s policy goals at USAID
will require that political appointees have knowledge of, responsibility for, and
visibility into the design and awarding of grants, contracts, and cooperative
agreements. The Administration should restore the Senior Official Accountability Review (SOAR) or create a similar process to ensure that proposed programs
above a certain dollar threshold in Total Estimated Cost/Total Estimated Amount
receive a close review by policymakers in each bureau and office and, for large
awards, in the agency’s front office.
“Localization” is a buzzword within the aid community but correctly assumes
that more funding through local organizations produces better aid outcomes. Shifting from giant U.S.-based implementers has proved difficult to achieve, however,
given intense internal bureaucratic resistance; opposition from the aid industrial
complex; and foot-dragging from progressives, who view local NGOs—especially
faith-based NGOs prominent in Africa and Latin America—as obstacles to promoting abortion, gender radicalism, climate extremism, and other woke ideas.
The President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) has shown that
localization at scale is possible within a short time span. Over the four years of the
Trump Administration, the multibillion-dollar program increased the amount
of funding disbursed to local entities from about 25 percent to nearly 70 percent
with positive overall results. This model should be replicated across all of USAID.
In addition, the next conservative Administration should expand use of the New
Partnership Initiative (NPI) to every bureau and office; reset the requirements for
USAID’s overseas missions to craft and execute NPI action plans; and assign each



Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise

mission a minimum percentage of its portfolio that must go to new, underutilized,
and local partners. Crucial to the strategy will be increasing the use of open competition that lowers barriers to entry and fixed-amount awards that carry less of
a compliance burden along with eliminating cost-plus reimbursement contracts
that favor large companies. Before advancing a new program, the agency should
be required to assess existing local activities to avoid undercutting or duplicating
them. At every opportunity, USAID should build on existing local initiatives.
Global Health. The United States is the world’s largest funder of global health
initiatives. For more than 60 years, the American people have offered health assistance to the world and saved millions of lives. The USAID Bureau for Global Health
(GH), the second largest within USAID, oversees a multibillion-dollar operation
to support maternal and child health; voluntary family planning; PEPFAR and
the President’s Malaria Initiative (PMI) (both started under President George W.
Bush); and other initiatives against other infectious and neglected tropical diseases.
Effective use of funds is essential to maximize care for the world’s neediest people.
Countries with strong health institutions and sound public health practices
responded quickly to and recovered more rapidly from the COVID-19 pandemic.
This demonstrates the importance of “localization,” by which USAID helps governments and the private sector in developing countries to strengthen their
own ability to address needed training, services, accountability, and organizational capacity.
Unfortunately, many USAID-funded global health activities remain rooted in
patterns that began decades ago and measure improvements in terms of inputs—
money spent—instead of outcomes achieved. From the 1950s to 1970s, the major
recognized threats to human health were infectious diseases such as polio and
smallpox, and USAID funded programs “in” a country, not “with” a country. Maternal and child health, food, water, and sanitation programs were often intermittent.
USAID consistently financed population control, contraception, and abortion as
essential to “development.” Most programs focused on one disease or condition
but had little integration with other global health activities. Chronic diseases
were ignored.
Consequently, the next conservative Administration should focus on updating
the Global Health Bureau’s portfolio, emphasizing a comprehensive approach to
supporting women, children, and families; building host-country institutional
capacity; increasing awards to local and faith-based partners (expanding what
occurred during the Trump Administration with the NPI); and improving USAID’s
ability to coordinate with local partners.
Updating Funding Priorities. The Bureau should identify and eliminate outdated and ineffective concepts and focus on funding innovation. A rigorous review
is necessary to ensure that current programs and funding streams avoid wasting
taxpayer dollars and prioritize what is needed now and what works.

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Focusing on Holistic Health Care and Support for Women, Children, and
Families. The continued high rate of maternal and infant mortality is a persistent
global tragedy. Contrary to current publicity, this problem is not solved by abortion.
Families genuinely cherish children. The next leadership at USAID must focus
attention on women and children’s health (including unborn children) as well
as health risks across life spans, including childhood infections, cervical cancer,
adolescent risks, and family stability, by utilizing a coordinated approach. The
Bureau should implement a “Request for Application for Resilient Families” that
harvests collaborative funds from siloed programs and makes individuals and the
family, not diseases or conditions, the true focus of intervention.
Increasing USAID Collaboration with Faith-Based Organizations. FBOs
historically have been much more successful in outreach to remote and vulnerable
populations, based on trust built through decades of service. The value of collaborating with FBOs was demonstrated in the October 2020 Evidence Summit on
Religious Engagement. In sub-Saharan Africa, FBOs often provide more than 80
percent of health care, especially to the extremely poor. In contrast, the Global
Health Bureau historically has provided 85 percent of its funding to large U.S. NGOs
with significant overhead costs, as a result of which only 20 percent–30 percent of
funding reaches people in need.15
Leveraging the Strength and Experience of Presidential Initiatives. Millions of people are alive today because of the American people’s investment in
PEPFAR and PMI. The training, laboratory, clinical intervention, health education, data collection, and organizational platforms of these programs became the
bedrock for responding to the COVID pandemic. It is time for these programs to
become part of an integrated, strong, and sustainable network of health care and
public health in developing countries. A smooth transition to national ownership
and funding, however, will require better coordination of USAID’s own stovepiped
programs with PEPFAR and PMI.
Strengthening the Collection and Use of Data. Good decisions are based on
accurate data. For decades, global health programs have relied mostly on statistical modeling (rather than actual data) or survey data (the weakest type of data).
Poor data quality undermines both the evaluation and improvement of desired
outcomes achieved by our global health programs. The Trump Administration
implemented critical updates of PEPFAR’s systems for the collection and reporting
of data to increase transparency and hold funded partners and overseas missions
accountable. The next conservative Administration should apply these reforms
to all of USAID’s global health programs.
Strengthening Private-Sector Engagement. The Bureau’s Center for Innovation and Impact (CII) should be empowered to expand networks of private
and faith-based health organizations that can develop projects using development-impact bonds, capital funds, and innovative technologies, including with the



Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise

Millennium Challenge Corporation and the new U.S. International Development
Finance Corporation. More flexible and agile CII funding will spur innovation
within the Bureau and help to enhance countries’ self-reliance in the provision
of health care.
Improving Bureau Hiring, Staffing, and Recruitment Practices. The
Global Health Bureau should address its own management challenges by modifying
the high ratio of contractors to direct hires, holding career leadership accountable
for effective management, and building more flexibility in emergency responses.
Bureau personnel suffer from “mission drift,” burnout, and a lack of vision. New
directives, social agendas, and extra layers of review have obscured core activities
and caused talent to leave the agency. Conservative leadership must return the
focus to development and improved workforce morale and focus on global outcomes and the efficient use of taxpayer dollars.
Holding the U.N., the World Health Organization (WHO), and Other Multilateral Organizations Accountable. Leadership should designate a political
appointee to help coordinate cross-agency efforts to hold the U.S. government’s
multilateral partners (U.N. and WHO agencies and other international organizations) to a higher level of financial and programmatic accountability, including
assurances that language promoting abortion will be removed from U.N. documents, policy statements, and technical literature. The United States must have
more prominent representation in international technical committees and regulation-setting organizations to ensure the proper execution of American resources,
the preservation of our values, the protection of innovation, and the vitality of our
biomedical sector.
Global Humanitarian Assistance. The U.S. government is the world’s largest
humanitarian actor, annually disbursing billions of dollars in lifesaving assistance—
food, water, shelter, emergency health care, and related protection support—to
tens of millions of vulnerable people. Funded by the U.S. Congress through the
International Disaster Assistance (IDA) account, USAID pays for nearly half of the
budget of the Nobel Prize–winning U.N. World Food Programme (WFP) as well
as dozens of simultaneous operations that range from responses to hurricanes in
Central America to tackling outbreaks of Ebola in Central Africa and caring for
millions of people displaced by ongoing conflicts.
USAID’s emergency responses once were focused primarily on natural cataclysms such as hurricanes, floods, and earthquakes. Today, the agency spends more
than 80 percent of its humanitarian budget on chronic man-made crises. Most of
these “emergency responses” began years ago and absorb billions of dollars annually with no end in sight. Every year sees financial demands grow in response to
new conflicts, most recently Ukraine. The budget of the Bureau for Humanitarian
Assistance (BHA) has doubled compared to just a few years ago, and BHA can no
longer manage its funds responsibly. A politically powerful foreign aid industry that

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benefits financially from extending and expanding these large-scale programs for
years, even decades, ensures little scrutiny of these ever-increasing appropriations.
The massive growth in “emergency” aid distorts humanitarian responses, worsens corruption in the countries we support, and exacerbates the misery of those
we intend to help. The permanence of this assistance, particularly in countries
where we have little to no in-country presence and must rely on U.N. agencies to
self-monitor, has morphed into a co-governance scheme in which the U.S. government effectively finances the social services obligations of corrupt regimes that
threaten the United States. These governments can then redirect scarce budget
resources away from costly health and education toward financing their wars, supporting terrorism, repressing their citizens, and enriching themselves. Examples
of this abuse are spread throughout the world.
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Yemen, once the breadbasket of the Arabian Peninsula, is now dependent
on billions of dollars of aid as formerly productive Yemeni farmers cannot
compete against “free food” while irrigation systems remain in disrepair,
leaving the country to suffer from water shortages during long summer
droughts and flooding during its rainy season. Iran-backed Houthi rebels
divert substantial amounts of aid to support their war efforts.
In Afghanistan, the aid infrastructure built over 20 years of American
military presence that three Presidents wanted to end collapsed with the
failure of U.S.-trained Afghan forces to repel the Taliban’s 2021 advances.
Yet the country has received nearly $1 billion more in U.S. humanitarian aid
since the Taliban’s takeover and absent a U.S. embassy to ensure that it is not
diverted to the Taliban and other terrorist groups.
In Burma, U.S. aid finances all of the food and medical care for hundreds of
thousands of persecuted Rohingya that the military regime forces to live in
open-air concentration camps.
In northern Iraq, hundreds of thousands of Yazidis—targeted for genocidal
extermination by ISIS—remain in miserable camps unable to return home
because of the Iraqi government’s refusal to clear out Iran-backed militias
occupying their homeland.

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Over the past decade, the U.S. government has expended $14 billion in aid to
Syria where the bloody regime of Bashar al-Assad—a close ally of Iran and
Russia—skims nearly half of foreign aid through inflated official exchange
rates, the diversion of food baskets to its military units, and procurement
arrangements with compromised local contractors.

Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise

In effect, humanitarian aid is sustaining war economies, creating financial
incentives for warring parties to continue fighting, discouraging governments
from reforming, and propping up malign regimes.
Nefarious actors reap billions of dollars in profits from diversions of our humanitarian assistance, but so do international organizations. The WFP charges 36
percent in overhead while Oxfam International’s overhead has reached 70 percent
in Yemen, reflecting the high costs of foreign staff, security, and logistics. With powerful lobbies in Washington, D.C., and in leadership positions throughout USAID
and the Department of State, the aid industry adroitly exploits Congress’s disposition to increase funding year on year to assist those in dire need but provides no
evidence to justify the mounting budget requests.
In 2020, USAID’s leadership fused formerly bifurcated food and nonfood
emergency relief operations into a single Bureau for Humanitarian Assistance
to improve the management of the agency’s largest portfolio, but this reform was
not sufficient to address the problem. The next Administration should resize and
repurpose USAID’s humanitarian aid portfolio to restore its original purpose of
providing emergency short-term relief, prepare vulnerable communities for transition, and do no harm in the following ways:



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Work with Congress to make deep cuts in the IDA budget by ending
programs that do more harm than good in places controlled by malign
actors, such as in Yemen, Syria, and Afghanistan, where our aid is consumed
by fraud, diversion, and partner overhead costs.
Require USAID and the State Department to devise country-based exit
strategies that term-limit the duration of humanitarian responses and
transition funding from emergency to development projects. This will
require robust diplomacy to press host governments to integrate displaced
persons in lieu of keeping them in expensive and dehumanizing camps
financed by the international community.
Transition from large awards to expensive, inefficient, and corrupt U.N.
agencies, global NGOs, and contractors to local, especially faith-based,
entities that are already operating on the ground. This approach provides
a far less expensive and more effective alternative for aid delivery. Local
partners more ably navigate corrupt environments and are more likely
to steer vulnerable populations away from dependence on aid toward
self-sufficiency.
Require that BHA avail itself of existing IDA authorities that it fails to use,
including to dispense with the cost-reimbursement model that disqualifies

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undercapitalized local NGOs; accept other donor vetting of local partners;
streamline the award-approval process; and expand the use of fixed-amount
awards to rein in cost overruns.
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Direct USAID’s Bureau for Management to hire more procurement officers
for BHA to strengthen the Bureau’s award management capacity and reduce
the incentives to issue large awards to aid industry giants.
Allow BHA to manage the process of hiring Personal Services Contractors.
Require BHA’s partners to adopt stricter vetting procedures to prevent aid
from being diverted to terrorists.
Increase efforts to obtain greater contributions, not just pledges, for
humanitarian operations from other donors and make this a condition for
receiving additional U.S. aid.

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Leveraging Foreign Aid to Unleash the Power of America’s Private Sector.
During the 1960s, when USAID was launched, 80 percent of financial flows from
the United States to the developing world was in the form of U.S. government
assistance. Today, that figure is under 10 percent, overtaken by private investment,
remittances, and private charities, all demonstrating the power of America’s private sector to promote wealth-generating economic development in poor countries.
Leaders in the developing world routinely press U.S. officials about their preference
for “trade and investment, not aid.”
Instead, the Biden Administration is leveraging private-sector financing to
promote its climate and other progressive agendas worldwide. The next conservative Administration must return USAID to a foreign aid model that leverages
its resources to promote private-sector solutions to the world’s true development
problems and end the need for future foreign aid. Private capital investment in
these markets is the greatest enabler of job creation and sustainable economic
growth throughout the developing world.
A key tool of American soft-power leadership is the U.S. Development Finance
Corporation (DFC). Launched in December 2019, DFC sought to unleash the power
of America’s private sector to advance our interests by providing emerging markets
with blended financing opportunities to help end wretched poverty, create new
markets for U.S.-made products, strengthen bilateral partnerships in strategic
parts of the world, and offset China’s predatory loans and investments. The Trump
Administration launched a USAID–DFC Working Group to maximize development
outcomes and review individual investment projects through a counter-China lens
and ensure a cohesive interagency development response.



Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise

As development agencies, USAID and DFC must do a better job of aligning
their respective activities and closely integrate both structurally and operationally. The easiest way to foster this alignment is to “dual hat” the role of DFC’s
chief development officer so that he or she serves simultaneously in both institutions. Like all U.S. federal bodies, DFC should be restored to its original intent of
deploying its commercial risk-reducing financial services instead of its current
misuse as another global vehicle to promote economy-killing climate programs,
meet irrelevant diversity objectives, and overfocus on low-impact or misguided
gender-based activities.
Branding. A deeply embedded culture within the foreign aid bureaucracy
views public recognition of U.S. assistance as secondary to a larger philanthropic
mission and is embarrassed by the American flag. Citing vaguely defined security concerns, USAID’s implementers—U.N. agencies, international NGOs, and
contractors—often fail to credit the American people for the billions of dollars in
assistance they provide the rest of the world even as they engage in self-promoting
public relations to raise other donor funds. This approach has negative foreign
policy implications as China relentlessly promotes its own self-serving efforts to
gain influence and resources. Worst of all, malign actors sometimes appropriate
credit for unbranded U.S. assistance: Houthi terrorists, for example, claim to provide for the people under their occupation with anonymous U.S. humanitarian aid.
The United States is in a struggle for influence with China, Russia, and other
competitors, and American generosity must not go unacknowledged. The next
conservative Administration should build on the Trump Administration’s branding policy, which revamped ADS Chapter 320, to force the aid bureaucracy to fully
credit the American people for the aid they are providing. The Senior Advisor for
Brand Management in the Bureau for Legislative and Public Affairs (LPA) (discussed infra) should be a political appointee who is responsible for maximizing the
visibility of U.S. assistance by enforcing branding policy on every grant, cooperative agreement, and contract. The LPA should liaise with counterparts at the U.S.
Agency for Global Media (USAGM) to ensure local media pickup of these activities.
OTHER OFFICES AND BUREAUS

Office of Administrator. The next conservative Administration should leave
in place the current structure of two presidentially appointed, Senate-confirmed
Deputy Administrators, one for Policy and one for Management. The Deputy
Administrators and the Chief of Staff must be individuals with extensive previous
service in the executive branch, ideally at foreign-affairs agencies, and be fluent in
the language and practice of federal procurement.
Bureau for Foreign Assistance. As noted above, the next conservative
Administration should name the USAID Administrator as Director of Foreign
Assistance (F) at the Department of State with the rank of Deputy Secretary. It

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should reorient the bulk of F staff from focusing on the formulation of the annual
President’s budget proposal to the execution of already appropriated resources.
This should include eliminating the duplicative Mission and Bureau Resource
Requests; speeding up the availability of appropriations by delivering to Congress
within 60 days the report required by Section 653(a) of the Foreign Assistance Act
(FAA); and fast-tracking the approval of Congressional Notifications (CNs) and
other pre-obligation requirements.
Management Bureau. As indicated previously, the next conservative Administration should name a political appointee as USAID’s Senior Procurement
Executive and Director of the agency’s Office of Acquisition and Assistance (M/
OAA). Political appointees with the appropriate credentials (including warrants)
should be placed within M/OAA, and the agency should exercise its authority to
engage qualified experts from other federal departments and agencies and outside
of government (if they are free of conflicts of interest) on the Technical Committees that review applications for USAID’s contract and grant competitions. The
Administration should change the designation of USAID’s Competition Advocate
to an individual favorable to innovative types of contracts that can reduce the aid
oligopoly’s grip on the agency.
Office of Human Capital and Talent Management. As soon as possible after
Inauguration Day, the next conservative Administration should name a political
appointee as USAID’s Chief Human Capital Officer (CHCO) and Director of the
Office of Human Capital and Talent Management. USAID’s White House Liaison
must be an individual with substantial experience with federal personnel systems. The White House Office of Presidential Personnel should allow the USAID
Administrator to explore with counterparts at the Office of Personnel Management
whether the agency could hire personnel under both the Administratively Determined authority and Schedule C of the Excepted Service of the Federal Civil Service.
USAID should be one of the agencies to pilot-test a reinstated Executive Order
13957,16 which created a Schedule F within the Excepted Service, and should aggressively recruit and place candidates into term-limited positions under Schedule A
of the Excepted Service (especially veterans). The new CHCO should examine how
the existing members of the Senior Executive Service (SES) at USAID should be
reworked throughout the agency and should institute an SES Mobility Program to
encourage the regular rotation of senior career leaders, including through details
to other departments and agencies.
Bureau for Policy, Planning, and Learning. The next conservative Administration should shift the policy functions of the Bureau for Policy, Planning, and
Learning (PPL) to the Office of Budget and Resource Management (BRM), located
in the Office of the Administrator. It should rename BRM the Office of Budget,
Policy, and Resource Management (BPRM) and staff the policy team with political
appointees. The Administration should also move the responsibility for reviewing



Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise

and processing proposed changes in USAID’s policy bible, the Automated Directives System (ADS), from the Management Bureau to the new BPRM.
Even before these changes, the Assistant Administrator for PPL should decree
an immediate freeze on changes in the ADS and agencywide policy documents to
allow for the priority publication of amendments to reflect the new Administration’s viewpoint. All major agency policies should be reviewed and amended or
withdrawn within the new Administration’s first calendar year in office.
Bureau for Legislative and Public Affairs. The next conservative Administration should invest no more than 10 percent of USAID’s allocation of
Administratively Determined politically appointed positions in the Bureau for
Legislative and Public Affairs. A priority for these positions (combined with hires
under Schedule A) should be the review and editing of the agency’s public-facing
web pages and social media accounts to eliminate material that does not conform to
the new Administration’s policies. The agency should accelerate the review of Congressional Notifications within LPA and publish all CNs and congressional reports.
To ensure consistency and clarity of public messaging, LPA should gain direct
authority over the communications staff scattered through USAID’s various
Bureaus and Offices. LPA should expand its public-facing efforts to include conservative allies that are active in global development and humanitarian aid work,
including industry groups, nonprofits, trade associations, foundations, and advocacy organizations, and correspondingly reduce the aid industrial complex’s grip
on USAID’s corporate relationships.
Office of General Counsel. Along with the Director of M/OAA, the General
Counsel is one of the two or three most important positions at USAID and should
be a priority for immediate appointments. Because proper legal interpretation
of executive orders and internal USAID policy is crucial, the next conservative
Administration should recruit and appoint a commanding team of Schedule C
attorneys in the Office of the General Counsel (OGC). Within weeks of Inauguration Day, OGC should issue clear guidance on the eligibility of faith-based
organizations for USAID funding.
Office of Budget Resources and Management. The Director of Budget
Resources and Management should be a political appointee empowered as part of
the Administrator’s senior management team. BRM’s highest priorities should be
to prepare the report required by Section 653(a) according to the Administrator’s
guidance, institute a fast-track process for the submission of Congressional Notifications, and identify already appropriated resources to reprogram immediately to fund
the new Administration’s priorities. The next conservative Administration should
consider prioritizing the placing of young political appointees in BRM over LPA.
Bureau for Democracy, Development, and Innovation. A key outcome of
the transformation of USAID undertaken during the Trump Administration, the
Bureau for Democracy, Development, and Innovation (DDI) is the home for most

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of the agency’s non-health, nonhumanitarian funding as well as almost all of its
sectoral appropriations directives, including those that reflect the pet projects of
individual Members of Congress. The Bureau is the policy and financial nexus at
USAID for most of the Biden Administration’s radical priorities in foreign assistance, including gender, climate change, and the promotion of identity-based
politics. On the positive side, DDI is also the Bureau in charge of areas that will
be crucial to a reorientation of USAID, including trade, economic growth, innovation, partnerships with the private sector, and the agency’s relationship with
communities of faith.
The next conservative Administration should make the rapid staffing of key DDI
positions a high priority. Besides the Senate-confirmed Assistant Administrator,
the Directors of each of the Centers and Hubs in the Bureau will need political
leadership. Almost every one of the agencywide policies that cover DDI’s areas of
responsibility will need to be edited or rewritten entirely as soon as possible. The
next conservative Administration should harvest DDI’s central appropriations to
fund new priorities, especially working with ethnic and religious minorities and
faith-based organizations and joint ventures with the private sector in education
and energy. All DDI programs should issue funding opportunities restricted to
new and underutilized partners modeled on the NPI.



REGIONS

Asia. Asia is the most populous continent and ground zero in the battle against
Communist China’s efforts to exploit the development needs of poor countries for
geopolitical gain. America’s Indo-Pacific Strategy should guide USAID’s approaches
to disbursing foreign aid in the region.
USAID should intensify its bilateral relationships with pro–free market Japan,
Australia, South Korea, and India so that they can jointly advance private-sector
solutions to secure financing for power generation, infrastructure, digital connectivity, investment and trade expansion, and other economic activities. USAID
enjoys a strong in-country presence in India, buttressed by recent coordination
on the global response to COVID-19 as India is a global leader in vaccine production. Those ties should be expanded. So too should development cooperation with
Taiwan, which boasts effective pandemic response capacity that should be shared
with developing countries.
China’s island-hopping efforts to capture vulnerable Pacific states is a direct
strategic threat to U.S. maritime supremacy and homeland security, and USAID
and its allied donors should neutralize these efforts through the deployment of
targeted assistance such as helping countries combat the effects of China’s illegal fishing. While China outpaces the ability of the democratic alliance to deploy
state-backed financing to developing countries, it is unable to compete with our
collective private-sector capacity to deploy trillions of dollars of capital.

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Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise

Pakistan is a prime example of foreign aid policies disconnected from U.S.
national interests. The country has been the recipient of more than $12 billion in
U.S. foreign aid since 2010, yet it remains intensely anti-American and corrupt, has
backed the Taliban continuously since 2001, jump-started North Korea’s nuclear
bomb program, brutalizes its religious minorities, and is a willing client of China
while taking on unrepayable loans from the U.S. taxpayer-funded International
Monetary Fund and World Bank.
Middle East. The Middle East is far more vulnerable today than it was in 2020
because the Biden Administration’s strategy for the region is adrift. Tunisia has
slid into autocracy, Iraq is plummeting further into Iran’s orbit, and U.S. soldiers
continue to risk their lives for unclear ends amid the ruins of Syria. Meanwhile,
billions of dollars in U.S. foreign aid props up regimes allied with Iran.
President Trump’s Abraham Accords signaled the end of the centrality of the
Arab–Israeli conflict, which paralyzed U.S. approaches to the region, and focused
instead on Iran as the principal threat to America from this region. During the
Trump Administration, USAID’s allocations reflected the new opportunities
created by the Accords and sought to strengthen regional alliances against Iran
through expanded regional trade and investment and to promote genuine political stability tethered to strong American leadership. USAID formally partnered
with the United Arab Emirates, Israel, Morocco, Qatar, and Kuwait to catalyze
regional partnerships in Africa. Under the Biden Administration, however, USAID
has returned to a model that deepens the region’s dependence on aid.
A new conservative President should reset USAID’s programming in the Middle
East in line with our national security interests and committed to the goal of ending
the need for foreign aid through development that is led by the private sector.
Specifically:
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Foreign aid must advance the Abraham Accords. Increased trade and
investment between Israel and its Arab neighbors represent the most
effective path toward reducing poverty, fostering the emergence of a middle
class, and solidifying peace. USAID should therefore focus its development
assistance on countries such as Morocco and Sudan through joint
investment collaboration with the more economically advanced economies
such as the UAE and Israel.
USAID should consider cutting aid to states allied to Iran, limiting
assistance in these countries to the advancement of narrow strategic
priorities and support for basic American values, such as aid to persecuted
religious minorities. USAID continues to expend hundreds of millions of
dollars in nonhumanitarian aid to antagonistic regimes in Iraq, Lebanon,
and the Palestinian territories. After billions of dollars of aid and many

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years of effort, these countries remain hopelessly dysfunctional—a fact
that exposes the failure of a foreign aid model that is disconnected to our
national security and without exit strategies to promote self-reliance. We
must admit that USAID’s investments in the education sector, for example,
serve no other purpose than to subsidize corrupt, incompetent, and
hostile regimes.
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USAID should undergo operational changes to secure better development
outcomes by reducing its missions’ footprints in the Middle East given that
most personnel in the region are unable to leave their highly protected and
expensive compounds and carry out their oversight functions. It should
redirect program funding away from expensive and poorly performing
international partners to more cost-effective local entities that require a
minimal USAID field presence.

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Africa. Since its inception, USAID has had a strong presence in Africa, saving
millions of lives through its pandemic and infectious disease responses, especially
for malaria and HIV-AIDS. It has led global efforts to provide lifesaving emergency
assistance to those who are fleeing conflict and suffering from devastating natural
disasters. American generosity knows no equal.
Yet the agency’s efforts to reduce poverty and hunger have failed as it spends
ever-higher amounts of aid partnering with a costly and ineffective aid industrial complex that has little interest in “working itself out of a job.” Long-term,
multibillion-dollar humanitarian responses lack exit strategies, while numerous development projects lead neither to measurable results nor to government
reforms. Despite the tens of billions of dollars spent, the continent remains poor,
unstable, and riven with conflict, corruption, and Islamic terrorism. This situation
has also resulted in vast illegal migration from the continent.
Failure to generate wealth has provided opportunities for China to step in and
become the continent’s leader in trade, loans, and investment. As a result, Beijing
controls most of the continent’s strategic minerals that are critical to advanced
technology. Moreover, USAID is criticized by Africans for exporting cultural values
that are anathema to their traditional norms, further abetting Chinese continental supremacy.
The Biden Administration’s radical global climate policies have cut off billions
in investment to develop clean fossil fuels, denying Africa’s billion-plus people
access to cheap energy to further their own development and finance their own
social services in health, water, education, and agriculture, while increasing its
dependence on China’s renewables industry. It has exacerbated hunger by increasing the costs of fertilizers to levels that many African farmers can no longer afford.
Poverty-inducing dependence on aid grows daily.

Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise

USAID efforts in Africa require a rethink. In 2025, USAID will update its fiveyear Country Development and Cooperation Strategies. This will give the next
Administration an opportunity to pursue a new development course for Africa
that promotes economic self-reliance, catalyzes private-sector solutions for job
creation through increased trade and investment, terminates legacy and nonperforming programs, and supports diversified energy approaches. Critically, it must
hold China accountable for its extractive investments that violate international
labor, environmental, and anticorruption norms and practices; undercut business
opportunities for U.S. companies; and sabotage Africa’s development.
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USAID, in collaboration with the U.S. International Development Finance
Corporation, U.S. Department of State, U.S. Department of the Treasury,
and U.S. Department of Commerce’s Foreign Commercial Service, should
use its convening power, diplomatic heft, and risk-reducing instruments
to facilitate U.S.–African business relationships and expand Prosper Africa,
launched by the Trump Administration to “bring[] together services from
across the U.S. Government to help companies and investors do business in
U.S. and African markets.”17
The Africa Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA)18 provides Africa dutyfree access to U.S. markets. The next Administration should extend AGOA
beyond its 2025 term but within a strategic framework that rewards good
governance and pro–free market economic policies. There is no point in
wasting massive sums of aid to countries whose governments fail to keep
their promises to reform.
USAID should build on, not compete with, private-sector initiatives
launched by global churches, corporate philanthropists, and diaspora
groups that have already invested billions of dollars in self-reliance–
based projects.

Japan has committed $30 billion in aid to Africa over three years to stem China’s
economic and political grip on the continent. Gulf-based sovereign funds also are
investing billions in African energy, infrastructure, mining, water, food production,
information and communications technology, and other strategic industries. Other
allied donors are promoting investment-based aid. There is no lack of funding to
support Africa’s economic rise. What is lacking is strategic direction among U.S.
government foreign aid agencies.
PEPFAR has saved countless lives over the years and constitutes America’s most
successful aid program. During the Trump Administration, PEPFAR increased the
share of funding to local entities from about 20 percent to nearly 70 percent with

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commensurate improvements that have had lasting impact. The next Administration should extend that localization model to all global health and humanitarian
assistance in view of how local African entities have strengthened their capacity for
direct management of U.S. programs. Correspondingly, USAID should aggressively
ramp down its partnerships with wasteful, costly, and politicized U.N. agencies,
international NGOs, and Beltway contractors. All new programs in Africa should
build on existing local initiatives that enjoy the support of the African people.
Latin America. U.S. foreign assistance throughout the Western Hemisphere
is designed to respond to national security threats that emanate from the region,
such as illicit drug and arms trafficking; illegal immigration flows; terrorism;
pandemics; and strategic threats from China, Russia, and Iran. Over the past
decade, the United States has provided billions of dollars in security, humanitarian, and development assistance in Central America and the Andes, including
$1 billion in food and non-food emergency aid to millions of Venezuelan refugees who have fled the Maduro dictatorship. USAID is always first to respond to
natural disasters in Central America and the Caribbean and employs a network
of dedicated experts in the region to deliver this assistance. During the COVID
pandemic, the United States provided millions of doses of vaccines and other
emergency health support.
Yet years of foreign aid have failed to bring peace, prosperity, and stability to
the hemisphere. Poverty, joblessness, and social unrest have led to leftist electoral
victories from Mexico to Chile. These regimes are hostile to American interests and
private enterprise, breed corruption, implement radical policies that will further
impoverish their people and threaten their democracies, and are more open to
striking partnerships with Communist China. Left-wing authoritarian kleptocracies in Cuba, Nicaragua, and Venezuela deny their people basic freedoms, violently
and ruthlessly suppress any dissent, repress communities of faith, and generate
such misery that hundreds of thousands of their citizens have attempted to cross
our southern border over the past two years. No recent Administration has made
any progress in reducing the chaos and desperation in Haiti.
Conversely, Latin America is a major global source of energy and food, which
generates substantial income that can finance internal social and economic development. The nations of the hemisphere share a natural and massive geographic
trade and investment advantage through their proximity to the United States,
supplemented by free-trade agreements. The United States remains the favored
destination for higher education and business opportunities for Latin Americans.
Successful diasporas in the United States serve as powerful economic, cultural,
and political bridges to every country in the region.
The Trump Administration focused on promoting trade and investment,
especially in infrastructure, through an interagency effort called América Crece
(America Grows), by which USAID played a key role in providing technical

Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise

assistance to create a more enabling environment to attract private investment.
The Biden Administration canceled the program.
The next conservative Administration should reassess all programs of U.S. foreign aid to Latin America and terminate those that have failed to achieve results
after years of effort. Instead, USAID should:
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Focus its resources on strengthening the fundamentals of free markets, such
as clear property rights and a functioning judiciary, and on promoting labor
and pension reforms, lower taxes, and deregulation in order to increase
trade and investment within the region and with the United States as the
genuine path to economic and political stability.
Challenge the socialist ideas that have captured too many of the region’s
governments and their nations’ youth.
Fund partnerships with the private sector and support civil-society groups,
including university centers and think tanks that advocate for pro–free
market and democratic ideas.

Finally, Latin America is the perfect proving ground for reducing USAID’s reliance on large U.S.-based implementers, and the agency should commit to shifting
all of its portfolio in the region to local organizations by 2030.
PERSONNEL

The Trump Administration agenda for USAID was undercut from the outset
both by recalcitrant career personnel and by inexperienced political personnel.
The next conservative Administration should implement personnel policies from
the beginning so that the agency can be effectively managed according to high standards. The rapid deployment of reforms will require key experienced personnel
installed quickly at USAID’s headquarters and missions. Delay will only impede
progress. In general, areas of focus should be appointing effective lawyers in key
positions, reforming career hiring/firing mechanisms, and getting a grip on the
grantmaking process.
The Administration should staff the Office of the General Counsel with at least
four politically appointed attorneys (besides the General Counsel). The General
Counsel should have two political deputies, one of whom should cover Human
Capital and Talent Management (HCTM) and the other the Office of Acquisition
and Assistance (OAA).
The Administration should name a political appointee with long experience in
federal personnel systems as USAID’s Chief Human Capital Officer and Director
of HCTM. This appointee would help to scope and shepherd position descriptions,

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clearances, and other components of the hiring process that are necessary for
immediate onboarding while coordinating with the White House to bring in new
appointees and make internal career employee changes. On Day One, USAID
should halt all agencywide training and replace it with training modules to advance
the President’s agenda.
The Administration should appoint a Senior Accountable Official (SAO) to
report on the agency’s adherence to Administration policy priorities, including on
Protecting Life in Foreign Assistance, critical race theory, climate change, gender,
and diversity and inclusion. It should also create a program to staff hard-to-fill
positions overseas.
Finally, the Administration should create a recruiting program for veterans
and other groups to participate in career job opportunities at USAID. Former missionaries, veterans, members of diasporas, and faith community stakeholders with
overseas experience should be recruited to work at USAID on Schedule A appointments, as Institutional Services Contractors, as Personal Services Contractors, and
as Foreign Service Officers.
CONCLUSION

AUTHOR’S NOTE: The preparation of this chapter was a collective enterprise of individuals involved in

the 2025 Presidential Transition Project. All contributors to this chapter are listed at the front of this volume,
but Dr. William Steiger, Bethany Kozma, and Dr. Alma Golden deserve special mention. The author assumes
full responsibility for the content of this chapter, and no views expressed therein should be attributed to any
other individual.

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The next conservative Administration will have a unique opportunity to realign
U.S. foreign assistance with American national interests and the principles of good
governance and more accurately reflect the U.S. taxpayer’s unmatched charitable desire to help those in need. It can build on a strong baseline of conservative
reforms undertaken by the Trump Administration to counter Communist China’s
strategy of world domination. However, this will require that bold steps are taken
on Day One to undo the gross misuse of foreign aid by the current Administration
to promote a radical ideology that is politically divisive at home and harms our
global standing.

Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise
ENDNOTES

1.
2.

3.

4.

5.



6.

7.
8.

9.
10.

11.

12.

13.

14.
15.

S. 1983, Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, Public Law No. 87-195, 87th Congress, September 4, 1961, https://www.
govinfo.gov/content/pkg/STATUTE-75/pdf/STATUTE-75-Pg424-2.pdf (accessed January 19, 2023).
U.S. Agency or International Development, “Journey to Self-Reliance Fact Sheet,” June 3, 2020,
https://2017-2020.usaid.gov/documents/1870/journey-self-reliance-fact-sheet#:~:text=WHAT%20
IS%20THE%20JOURNEY%20TO%20SELF-RELIANCE%3F%20USAID%20is,greater%20
developmentoutcomesandworktowardatimewhenforeignassistanceisnolongernecessary.%20
It%E2%80%99s%20called%20the%20Journey%20to%20Self-Reliance (accessed March 17, 2023).
News release, “U.S. Agency for International Development Administrator Mark Green’s Interview with
C-Span’s ‘Newsmakers’ Host Susan Swain and Washington Post’s Carl Morello and Wall Street Journal’s Ben
Kesling,” U.S. Agency for International Development, November 26, 2018, https://2017-2020.usaid.gov/newsinformation/press-releases/nov-26-2018-administrator-mark-green-interview-cspan-newsmakers (accessed
March 17, 2023).
U.S. Agency for International Development, Digital Strategy 2020–2024, https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/
files/2022-05/USAID_Digital_Strategy.pdf.pdf://www.usaid.gov/digital-development/usaid-digital-strategy
(accessed March 17, 2023).
“U.S. Strategic Framework for the Indo-Pacific,” declassified in part by Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs Robert C. O’Brien, January 5, 2021, https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/wpcontent/uploads/2021/01/IPS-Final-Declass.pdf (accessed March 18, 2023), and Robert C. O’Brien, Assistant
to the President for National Security Affairs, “A Free and Open Indo-Pacific,” January 5, 2021, https://
trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/OBrien-Expanded-Statement.pdf (accessed
March 18, 2023).
News Release, “Fact Sheet: Prioritizing Climate in Foreign Policy and National Security,” The White House,
October 21, 2021, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/10/21/fact-sheetprioritizing-climate-in-foreign-policy-and-national-security/ (accessed January 28, 2023).
U.S. Agency for International Development, Climate Strategy 2020–2030, April 2022, https://www.usaid.gov/
sites/default/files/2022-11/USAID-Climate-Strategy-2022-2030.pdf (accessed March 18, 2023).
Adva Saldinger, “USAID Steps Up ‘Languishing’ Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion Effort,” Devex.com, December
15, 2021, http://www.devex.com/news/usaid-steps-up-languishing-diversity-equity-and-inclusioneffort-102316 (accessed January 28, 2021).
U.S. Agency for International Development, “Gender Equity and Women Empowerment,” https://www.usaid.
gov/gender-equality-and-womens-empowerment (accessed January 30, 2023).
U.S. Agency for International Development, “Integrating Gender Equality and Female Empowerment in
USAID’s Program Cycle,” ADS Chapter 25, partial revision date January 22, 2021, https://www.usaid.gov/sites/
default/files/2022-12/205.pdf (accessed March 18, 2023).
S. 137, Protecting Life in Foreign Assistance Act, 117th Congress, introduced January 28, 2021, https://
www.congress.gov/bill/117th-congress/senate-bill/137#:~:text=Protecting%20Life%20in%20Foreign%20
Assistance%20Act.%20This%20bill,support%20for%20an%20entity%20that%20conducts%20
such%20activities (accessed January 20, 2023), and H.R. 534, Protecting Life in Foreign Assistance
Act, 117th Congress, introduced January 28, 2021, https://www.congress.gov/bill/117th-congress/housebill/534?s=1&r=450 (accessed January 20, 2023).
President Joseph R. Biden Jr., “Memorandum on Protecting Women’s Health at Home and Abroad,”
Memorandum for the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of Health and Human
Services, and the Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development, The White House,
January 28, 2021, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/presidential-actions/2021/01/28/memorandumon-protecting-womens-health-at-home-and-abroad/ (accessed March 18, 2023).
President Donald J. Trump, Executive Order 13926, “Advancing International Religious Freedom,” June 2, 2020,
in Federal Register, Vol. 85, No. 109 (June 5, 2020), pp. 34951–34953, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/
FR-2020-06-05/pdf/2020-12430.pdf (accessed January 20, 2023).
22 Code of Federal Regulations § 205.1, https://www.ecfr.gov/current/title-22/chapter-II/part-205 (accessed
March 18, 2023).
Contributor’s notes from internal USAID meetings.

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Agency for International Development
16. President Donald J. Trump, Executive Order 13957, “Creating Schedule F in the Excepted Service,” October 21,
2020, in Federal Register, Vol. 85, No. 207 (October 26, 2020), pp. 67631–67635, https://www.govinfo.gov/
content/pkg/FR-2020-10-26/pdf/2020-23780.pdf (accessed March 18, 2023).
17. Prosper Africa, “Increasing Trade & Investment Between the U.S. and African Countries,” https://www.
prosperafrica.gov/ (accessed March 18, 2023).
18. H.R. 434, Trade and Development Act of 2000, Public Law 106-200, 106th Congress, May 18, 2000, Title I,
Subtitle A, https://agoa.info/images/documents/2385/AGOA_legal_text.pdf (accessed March 18, 2023).



— 281 —



Section Three

THE GENERAL WELFARE

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W

hen our Founders wrote in the Constitution that the federal government
would
‌
“promote the general Welfare,” they could not have fathomed a
massive
‌
bureaucracy that would someday spend $3 trillion in a single
year—roughly the sum, combined, spent by the departments covered in this section
in 2022. Approximately half of that colossal sum was spent by the Department of
Health and Human Services (HHS) alone—the belly of the massive behemoth that
is the modern administrative state.
HHS is home to Medicare and Medicaid, the principal drivers of our $31 trillion
national debt. When Congress passed and President Lyndon B. Johnson signed
into law these programs, they were set on autopilot with no plan for how to pay
for them. The first year that Medicare spending was visible on the books was 1967.
From that point on through 2020—according to the American Main Street Initiative’s analysis of official federal tallies—Medicare and Medicaid combined cost $17.8
trillion, while our combined federal deficits over that same span were $17.9 trillion.
In essence, our deficit problem is a Medicare and Medicaid problem.
HHS is also home to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC)
and the National Institutes of Health (NIH), the duo most responsible—along
with President Joe Biden—for the irrational, destructive, un-American mask and
vaccine mandates that were imposed upon an ostensibly free people during the
COVID-19 pandemic. All along, it was clear from randomized controlled trials—
the gold standard of medical research—that masks provide little to no benefit in
preventing the spread of viruses and might even be counterproductive. Yet the
CDC ignored these high-quality RCTs, cherry-picked from politically malleable



Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise

“observational studies,” and declared that everyone except children and infants
below the age of two should don masks. Under COVID, as former director of HHS’s
Office of Civil Rights Roger Severino writes in Chapter 14, the CDC exposed itself
as “perhaps the most incompetent and arrogant agency in the federal government.”
Nor is the CDC the only villain in this play. Severino writes of the National
Institutes of Health, “Despite its popular image as a benign science agency, NIH
was responsible for paying for research in aborted baby body parts, human animal
chimera experiments”—in which the genes of humans and animals are mixed, “and
gain-of-function viral research that may have been responsible for COVID-19.”
Severino writes that “Anthony Fauci’s division of the NIH”—the National Institute
of Allergy and Infectious Diseases—“owns half the patent for the Moderna COVID19 vaccine,” and “several NIH employees” receive “up to $150,000 annually from
Moderna vaccine sales.” That would be the same experimental mRNA vaccine that
the CDC now wants to force on children, who are at little to no risk from COVID-19
but at great risk from public health officials.
The incestuous relationship between the NIH, CDC, and vaccine makers—with
all of the conflict of interest it entails—cannot be allowed to continue, and the
revolving door between them must be locked. As Severino writes, “Funding for
scientific research should not be controlled by a small group of highly paid and
unaccountable insiders at the NIH, many of whom stay in power for decades. The
NIH monopoly on directing research should be broken.” What’s more, NIH has long
“been at the forefront in pushing junk gender science.” The next HHS secretary
should immediately put an end to the department’s foray into woke transgender activism.
HHS also pushes abortion as a form of “health care,” skirting and sometimes
blatantly defying the Hyde Amendment in the process. Severino writes that the
“FDA should…reverse its approval of chemical abortion drugs because the politicized approval process was illegal from the start.” In addition, HHS programs
often violate the spirit, and sometimes the letter, of conscience-protection laws.
Severino writes that the HHS “Secretary should pursue a robust agenda to protect the fundamental right to life, protect conscience rights, and uphold bodily
integrity rooted in biological realities, not ideology.” The next secretary should
also reverse the Biden Administration’s focus on “‘LGBTQ+ equity,’ subsidizing
single-motherhood, disincentivizing work, and penalizing marriage,” replacing
such policies with those encouraging marriage, work, motherhood, fatherhood,
and nuclear families.
If there is another department that has gone off the rails like HHS during the
Obama and Biden Administrations, it is the once proud Department of Justice
(DOJ). As former counselor to the attorney general Gene Hamilton writes in Chapter 17, the department “has a long and noble history”—Edmund Randolph, the
first attorney general, took office the same year as President Washington—yet its

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Section 3: The General Welfare

— 285 —



longstanding reputation has been marred by the Biden Administration’s abuse of
the department’s powers for its own ends. Hamilton writes that the department’s
“unprecedented politicization and weaponization” under Biden and Attorney
General Merrick Garland, resulting in “politically motivated and viewpoint-based
prosecutions” of political enemies and indifference to the crimes of political allies,
has made the department “a threat to the Republic.” The most important thing for
the next attorney general to do is to refocus the department on its core functions of
“protecting public safety and defending the rule of law,” while restoring its “values
of independence, impartiality, honesty, integrity, respect, and excellence.”
This is especially true of the Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI). A bloated,
arrogant, increasingly lawless organization, especially at the top, “the FBI views
itself as an independent agency” that is “on par with the Attorney General,” rather
than as an agency that is under the AG and fully accountable to him or her. To rein
in this “completely out of control” bureau and remind it of its place within—rather
than at the top of—the DOJ hierarchy, Hamilton writes that the FBI’s separate
Office of General Counsel (with “approximately 300 attorneys”), separate Office
of Legislative Affairs, and separate Office of Public Affairs should all be abolished.
Requiring the FBI to get its legal advice from the wider department “would serve
as a crucial check on an agency that has recently pushed past legal boundary after
legal boundary.” Indeed, Hamilton writes, “[t]he next conservative Administration should eliminate any offices within the FBI that it has the power to eliminate
without any action from Congress.”
Elsewhere, DOJ should target violent and career criminals, not parents; work
to dismantle criminal organizations, partly by rigorously prosecuting interstate
drug activity; and restart the Trump Administration’s “China Initiative” (to address
Chinese espionage and theft of trade secrets), which the Biden Administration “terminated…largely out of a concern for poor ‘optics.’” It should also enforce existing
federal law that prohibits mailing abortifacients, rather than harassing pro-life
demonstrators; respect the constitutional guarantee of the freedom of speech,
rather than trying to police speech on the internet; and enforce federal immigration laws, rather than pretending there is no border.
In contrast to DOJ’s long history, the Department of Education (the department, or ED), discussed by Lindsey Burke in Chapter 11, is a creation of the Jimmy
Carter Administration. The department is a convenient one-stop shop for the woke
education cartel, which—as the COVID era showed—is not particularly concerned
with children’s education. Schools should be responsive to parents, rather than to
leftist advocates intent on indoctrination—and the more the federal government
is involved in education, the less responsive to parents the public schools will be.
This department is an example of federal intrusion into a traditionally state and
local realm. For the sake of American children, Congress should shutter it and
return control of education to the states.



Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise

Short of this, the Secretary of Education should insist that the department
serve parents and American ideals, not advocates whose message is that children
can choose their own sex, that America is “systemically racist,” that math itself
is racist, and that Martin Luther King, Jr.’s ideal of a colorblind society should
be rejected in favor of reinstating a color-conscious society. The next head of
this department will have a lot to do—hopefully culminating in the department’s
closure and the salutary restoration of educational control to states, localities,
and parents.
The next Secretary of Energy will similarly have much work to do. Under the
next President, the Department of Energy should end the Biden Administration’s
unprovoked war on fossil fuels, restore America’s energy independence, oppose
eyesore windmills built at taxpayer expense, and respect the right of Americans
to buy and drive cars of their own choosing, rather than trying to force them
into electric vehicles and eventually out of the driver’s seat altogether in favor of
self-driving robots. As former commissioner of the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission Bernard L. McNamee says in Chapter 12, “A conservative President
must be committed to unleashing all of America’s energy resources and making
the energy economy serve the American people, not special interests.”
In Chapter 10, Daren Bakst writes that the Biden Administration’s Department
of Agriculture claims to be “transforming the food system as we know it.” But the
government “does not need to transform the food system”; instead, “it should
respect American farmers, truckers,” and families. In Chapter 13, former chief of
staff at the Environmental Protection Agency Mandy Gunasekara writes that the
EPA’s “current activities and staffing levels far exceed its congressional mandates
and purpose,” whereas its “initial success” in its “infancy” (in the 1970s) was a
product of “clear mandates, a streamlined structure, [and] recognition of the states’
prominent role.” Having since become a “coercive” agency, full of embedded activists, its “structure and mission should be greatly circumscribed.”
Former secretary of the Department of Housing and Urban Development Dr.
Benjamin S. Carson writes in Chapter 15 that HUD is beset with “mission creep”
and regularly crosses the line into exercising quasi-legislative powers. In the next
Administration, it should refocus on its core duties and keep “noncitizens…from
living in federally assisted housing,” provide enhanced “oversight of foreign ownership of [U.S.] real estate,” and “reinvigorate paths to upward economic mobility”
and economic “self-sufficiency.” In Chapter 18, former acting assistant secretary
of policy at the Department of Labor Jonathan Berry writes that the department
and related agencies should pursue pro-family, pro-worker policies to help “restore
the family-supporting job as the centerpiece of the American economy,” in lieu of
the current Administration’s “left-wing social-engineering agenda”—“the most
assertive” in history—which empowers race, gender, and climate-change activists
at the expense of American workers.

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Section 3: The General Welfare

In Chapter 19, on the Department of Transportation (DOT), former DOT deputy
assistant director for research and technology Diana Furchtgott-Roth writes, “In
pursuit of an anti-fossil-fuel climate agenda never approved by Congress, the Biden
Administration has raised fuel economy requirements to levels that cannot realistically be met” by most gas-powered cars, thereby reducing Americans’ freedom
while increasing costs. Lastly, former acting chief of staff at the Department of
Veterans Affairs Brooks D. Tucker, echoing concerns expressed in other chapters,
writes in Chapter 20 that the Veterans Affairs (VA) must be “accountable to the
needs and problems of veterans, not subservient to the parochial preferences of
the bureaucracy.”



— 287 —



10

DEPARTMENT OF
AGRICULTURE
Daren Bakst

MISSION STATEMENT

The current mission statement as stated by the Biden Administration highlights
the broad scope of the USDA:
To serve all Americans by providing effective, innovative, science-based
public policy leadership in agriculture, food and nutrition, natural resource

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A

merican
‌
farmers efficiently and safely produce food to meet the needs of
individuals
‌
around the globe. Because of the innovation and resilience
‌of the nation’s farmers, American agriculture is a model for the world. If
farmers are allowed to operate without unnecessary government intervention,
American agriculture will continue to flourish, producing plentiful, safe, nutritious,
and affordable food.
The U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) can and should play a limited role,
with much of its focus on removing governmental barriers that hinder food production or otherwise undermine efforts to meet consumer demand. The USDA
should recognize what should be self-evident: Agricultural production should first
and foremost be focused on efficiently producing safe food.
This chapter provides important background on the USDA and identifies many
of the USDA-specific issues that will be faced by an incoming Administration. It
provides specific recommendations for the next Administration about how to
address these issues and lays out a conservative vision for what the USDA should
look like in the future.

Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise

protection and management, rural development, and related issues with a
commitment to delivering equitable and climate smart opportunities that
inspire and help America thrive.1

The first part of the mission statement regarding the issues covered is not new
to the Biden Administration; it reflects the overly broad nature of the USDA’s work.
However, the language bringing in equity and climate change is new to the Biden
Administration and part of the USDA’s express effort to transform agricultural
production.2
The USDA’s new vision statement illuminates the focus of this effort:



An equitable and climate smart food and agriculture economy that protects and
improves the health, nutrition and quality of life of all Americans, yields healthy
land, forests and clean water, helps rural America thrive, and feeds the world.3

This effort is one of a federal central plan to put climate change and environmental issues ahead of the most important requirements of agriculture—to
efficiently produce safe food. The USDA would apparently use its power to change
the very nature of the food and agriculture economy into one that is “equitable and
climate smart.” As an initial matter, the USDA should not try to control and shape
the economy, but should instead remove obstacles that hinder food production.
Further, it should not place ancillary issues, such as environmental issues, ahead
of agricultural production itself.
A Proper Mission Statement. Even before the Biden Administration’s radical effort to reshape the USDA’s work, the USDA’s mission was and is too broad,
including serving as a major welfare agency through implementation of programs
such as food stamps. This far-reaching mission is not the fault of the USDA, but of
Congress, which has given the department its extensive power.
Congress must limit the USDA’s role. A proper mission would clarify that the
department’s primary focus is on agriculture and that the USDA serves all Americans. The USDA’s “client” is the American people in general, not a subset of
interests, such as farmers, meatpackers, environmental groups, etc.
Within this agricultural focus, the USDA should develop and disseminate
information and research (the historical role of the USDA); identify and address
concrete threats to public health and safety arising directly from food and agriculture; remove unjustified foreign trade barriers blocking market access for
American agricultural goods; and generally remove government barriers that
undermine access to safe and affordable food across the food supply chain.
Core principles should be included within any mission statement, including
a recognition that farmers, and the food system in general, should be free from
unnecessary government intervention. Further, there should be clear statements

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Department of Agriculture

about the importance of sound science to inform the USDA’s work and respect for
personal freedom and individual dietary choices, private property rights, and the
rule of law.
Taking these factors into account, below is a model USDA mission statement:
To develop and disseminate agricultural information and research, identify and
address concrete public health and safety threats directly connected to food and
agriculture, and remove both unjustified foreign trade barriers for U.S. goods
and domestic government barriers that undermine access to safe and affordable
food absent a compelling need—all based on the importance of sound science,
personal freedom, private property, the rule of law, and service to all Americans.
OVERVIEW

MAJOR PRIORITY ISSUES AND SPECIFIC RECOMMENDATIONS

For an incoming Administration, there are numerous issues that should be
addressed at the USDA. This chapter identifies and discusses many of the most
important issues. The initial issues discussed should be priority issues for the next
Administration:
Defend American Agriculture. It is deeply unfortunate that the first issue
identified must be a willingness of the incoming Administration to defend American agriculture, but this is precisely what the top priority for that Administration

— 291 —



In 1862, President Abraham Lincoln signed into law the legislation that created
the USDA.4 The department had a very narrow mission focused on the dissemination of information connected to agriculture and “to procure, propagate and
distribute among the people new valuable seeds and plants.”5 During the last 160
years, the scope of the USDA’s work has expanded well beyond that narrow mission—and well beyond agriculture itself. In addition to being a distributor of farm
subsidies, the USDA runs the food stamp program and other food-related welfare programs and covers issues including conservation, biofuels, forestry, and
rural programs.
Based on the USDA’s fiscal year (FY) 2023 budget summary, outlays are estimated at $261 billion: $221 billion for mandatory programs and $39 billion for
discretionary programs.6 These outlays are broken down as follows: nutrition assistance (70 percent); farm, conservation, and commodity programs (14 percent); “all
other,” which includes rural development, research, food safety, marketing and
regulatory, and departmental management (11 percent); and forestry (5 percent).7
The USDA has provided a summary of its size, explaining, “Today, USDA is comprised of 29 agencies organized under eight Mission Areas and 16 Staff Offices,
with nearly 100,000 employees serving the American people at more than 6,000
locations across the country and abroad.”8

Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise

should be. As previously discussed, the Biden Administration is seeking to use
the federal government to transform the American food system.9 The USDA web
site explains:



The U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), alongside Biden–Harris
Administration leadership and the people of this great country, has embarked
on another historic journey: transforming the food system as we know it—
from farm to fork, and at every stage along the supply chain.10

The federal government does not need to transform the food system or develop
a national plan to intervene across the supply chain. Instead, it should respect
American farmers, truckers, and everyone who makes the food supply chain so
resilient and successful. One of the important lessons learned during the COVID19 pandemic was how critical it is to remove barriers in the food supply chain—not
to increase them.
The Biden Administration’s centrally planned transformational effort minimizes the importance of efficient agricultural production and instead places issues
such as climate change and equity front and center. The USDA’s Strategic Plan
Fiscal Years 2022–2026 identifies six strategic goals, the first three of which focus
on issues such as climate change, renewable energy, and systemic racism. In the
Secretary of Agriculture’s message, there is only one mention of affordable food—
and nothing about efficient production and the incredible innovation and respect
for the environment that already exists within the agricultural community.11
The Biden Administration’s USDA strongly supported12 the recent United
Nations (U.N.) Food Systems Summit. According to the USDA:
The stated goal of the Food Systems Summit was to transform the way the
world produces, consumes and thinks about foods within the context of the
2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and to meet the challenges of
poverty, food security, malnutrition, population growth, climate change, and
natural resource degradation.13

Not unlike those who oppose reliable and affordable energy production, there
is a disdain, especially by some on the Left, for American agriculture and the food
system.14 The Biden Administration’s vision of a federal government developing
a plan that “fixes” agriculture and focuses on issues secondary to food production
is very disturbing.
A recent USDA-created program captures both the disrespect for American
farmers and the Biden Administration’s effort to dictate agricultural practices.
The USDA explained that it was concerned with farmers not transitioning to
organic farming, and therefore announced that it will dedicate $300 million to

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Department of Agriculture

induce farmers to adopt organic farming.15 There was no recognition that farmers
know how to farm better than D.C. politicians16 or a that organic food is expensive17
and land-intensive.18 The Biden Administration has also been pushing so-called
“climate-smart”19 agricultural practices which received additional support in the
partisan Inflation Reduction Act.20
American agriculture should not need defending. According to the USDA’s latest
data, farm output nearly tripled (a 175 percent increase) from 1948 to 2019, while
the amount of land farmed decreased. In fact, as farm output increased by 175
percent, all agricultural inputs increased by only 4 percent.21
In 2021, despite high food prices—a major problem and regressive—American consumers spent an average of about 10 percent of their personal disposable
income on food, which is close to historic lows. For decades, this share has been in
decline.22 America’s farmers efficiently produce food using fewer resources, making
it possible for food to be affordable. This reality is not only something that should
be defended but also touted as a prime example of what makes American agriculture so successful. The connection between efficiency and affordability seems lost
in the Biden Administration’s effort to transform the food system.
RECOMMENDATIONS

l

l

l

l

Remove the U.S. from any association with U.N. and other efforts to push
sustainable-development schemes connected to food production.
Defend American agriculture and advance the critical importance of
efficient and innovative food production, especially to advance safe and
affordable food.
Stress that ideal policy should remove obstacles imposed on American
farmers and individuals across the food supply chain so that they can meet
the food needs of Americans.
Clarify the critical importance of efficiency to food affordability, and why a
failure to recognize this fact especially hurts low-income households who
spend a disproportionate share of after-tax income on food compared to
higher-income households.23

To accomplish these objectives, a new Administration should announce its
principles through an executive order, the USDA should remove all references

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Proactively Defend Agriculture. From the outset, the next Administration
should: Denounce efforts to place ancillary issues like climate change ahead of
food productivity and affordability when it comes to agriculture.



Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise

to transforming the food system on its web site and other department-disseminated material, and it should expressly and regularly communicate the
principles informing the objectives listed above, as well as promote these principles through legislative efforts. The USDA should also carefully review existing
efforts that involve inappropriately imposing its preferred agricultural practices
onto farmers.
Address the Abuse of CCC Discretionary Authority. With the exception of
federal crop insurance, the Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC) is generally the
means by which agricultural-related farm bill programs are funded. The CCC is a
funding mechanism, which, in simple terms, has $30 billion a year at its disposal.24
Section 5 of the Commodity Credit Corporation Charter Act (Charter Act)25
gives the Secretary of Agriculture broad discretionary authority to spend “unused”
CCC money. However, in general, past Agriculture Secretaries have not used this
power to any meaningful extent. This changed dramatically during the Trump
Administration, when this discretionary authority was used to fund $28 billion
in “trade aid” to farmers, consisting primarily of the Market Facilitation Program.
In 2020, this authority was used for $20.5 billion in food purchases and income
subsidies in response to the COVID-19 pandemic.26
At the time, critics warned that this use of the CCC, which in effect created a
USDA slush fund, would lead future Administrations to abuse the CCC, such as
by pushing climate-change policies.27 Predictably, this is precisely what the Biden
Administration has done, using the discretionary authority to create programs
out of whole cloth, arguably without statutory authority,28 for what it refers to as
climate-smart agricultural practices.29
The merits of the various programs funded through the CCC discretionary
authority is not the focus of this discussion. The major problem is that the Secretary of Agriculture is empowered to use a slush fund. Billions of dollars are being
used for programs that Congress never envisioned or intended.
Concern about this type of abuse is not new. In fact, from 2012 to 2017, Congress
expressly limited the Agriculture Secretary’s discretionary spending authority
under the Charter Act.30 And this was before the recent massive discretionary CCC
spending occurred.
The use of the discretionary power is a separation of powers problem, with
Congress abrogating its spending power. This power is ripe for abuse—as could be
expected with any slush fund—and it is a possible way to get around the farm bill
process to achieve policy goals not secured during the legislative process.
The next Administration should:
l

Refrain from using section 5 discretionary authority. The USDA can
address this abuse on its own by following the lead of most Administrations
and not using this discretionary authority.

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Department of Agriculture

l

Promote legislative fixes to address abuse. Ideally, Congress would
repeal the Secretary’s discretionary authority under section 5 of the Charter
Act. There is no reason to maintain such authority. If Congress needs to
spend money to assist farmers, it has legislative tools, including the farm bill
and the annual appropriations process, to do so in a timely fashion. While
not an ideal solution, Congress could also amend the Charter Act to require
prior congressional approval through duly enacted legislation before any
money is spent.
At a minimum, Congress should amend the Charter Act to:

l

l

l

Prohibit the CCC from being used to assist parties beyond farmers and ranchers.
Clarify that spending is only to address problems that are temporary in
nature and ensure that funding is targeted to address such problems.
Tighten the discretion within section 5 and identify ways for improper
application of the Charter Act to be challenged in court.

Reform Farm Subsidies. Too often, agricultural policy becomes synonymous
with farm subsidy policy. This is unfortunate, because making them synonymous fails to recognize that agricultural policy covers a wide range of issues,
including issues that are outside the proper scope of the USDA, such as environmental regulation.
However, there is no question that farm subsidies are an important issue
within agricultural policy that should be addressed by any incoming Administration. There are several principles that even subsidy supporters would likely
agree upon, including the need to reduce market distortions. Subsidies should not
influence planting decisions, discourage proper risk management and innovation,
incentivize planting on environmentally sensitive land, or create barriers to entry
for new farmers. Farm subsidies can lead to these market distortions and therefore, it would hardly be controversial to ensure that any subsidy scheme should
be designed to avoid such problems.
The overall goal should be to eliminate subsidy dependence. Despite what
might be conventional wisdom, many farmers receive few to no subsidies,31 with
most subsidies going to only a handful of commodities. According to the Congressional Research Service (CRS), from 2014 to 2016, 94 percent of farm program

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l

Limit spending to directly help farmers and ranchers address issues due
to unforeseen events not already covered by existing programs and that
constitute genuine emergencies that must be addressed immediately.



Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise

support went to just six commodities—corn, cotton, peanuts, rice, soybeans, and
wheat—that together account for only 28 percent of farm receipts.32 Although many
farmers do not receive much in the way of subsidies, especially those in the areas
of livestock and specialty crops (fruit, vegetable, and nuts),33 there are still a significant number of farmers growing row crops like corn and cotton that do receive
significant farm subsidies.
The primary subsidy programs include the Agriculture Risk Coverage (ARC)
program,34 the Price Loss Coverage (PLC) program,35 and the federal crop insurance program.36 Farmers can participate on a crop-by-crop basis in the ARC
program or the PLC program. These programs cover about 20 different crops.37 The
ARC program protects farmers from what are referred to as “shallow” losses, providing payments when their actual revenues fall below 86 percent of the expected
revenues for their crops.38 The PLC program provides payments to farmers when
commodity prices fall below a fixed, statutorily established reference price.39
The federal crop insurance program is broader in scope than ARC and PLC,
and in crop year 2019 covered 124 commodities.40 Farmers pay a portion of a
premium to participate in the program. Taxpayers on average pay about 60 percent41 of the premium. As explained by CRS, “Revenue Protection was the most
frequently purchased policy type in 2019, accounting for almost 70 [percent] of
policies purchased.”42
While there are certainly other subsidy programs besides ARC, PLC, and federal
crop insurance, one program that deserves special mention is the federal sugar
program. This program, unlike most other subsidy programs, intentionally tries
to restrict supply43 and thereby drives up prices. The program costs consumers as
much as $3.7 billion a year.44
When it comes to reforming subsidy programs, the next Administration will
primarily have to look to legislative solutions. The next Administration should
champion legislation that would:
l

l

Repeal the federal sugar program. The federal government should
not be in the central planning business, and the sugar program is a prime
example of harmful central planning. Its very purpose is to limit the sugar
supply in order to increase prices. The program has a regressive effect, since
lower-income households spend more of their money to meet food needs
compared to higher income households.45
Ideally, repeal the ARC and PLC programs. Farmers eligible to
participate in ARC or PLC are generally already able to purchase federal
crop insurance, policies that protect against shortfalls in expected revenue
whether caused by lower prices or smaller harvests. The ARC program is
especially egregious because farmers are being protected from shallow

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losses, which is another way of saying minor dips in expected revenue.
This is hardly consistent with the concept of providing a safety net to help
farmers when they fall on hard times. The Congressional Budget Office
(CBO), in one of its options to reduce the federal deficit, has once again
identified repealing all Title I farm programs, including ARC, PLC, and the
federal sugar program.46
l

l

Stop paying farmers twice for price and revenue losses during the
same year. Farmers can receive support from the ARC or PLC programs
and the federal crop insurance program to cover price declines and revenue
shortfalls during the same year. Congress should prohibit this duplication by
prohibiting farmers from receiving an ARC or PLC payment the same year
they receive a crop insurance indemnity.

CBO has found that reducing the premium subsidy to 47 percent would
save $8.1 billion over 10 years and have little impact on crop insurance
participation or on the number of covered acres.49 In that analysis, there
would be a reduction in insured acres of just one-half of 1 percent, and
only 1.5 percent of acres would have lower coverage levels. 50 This reform
is basically all benefit with little to no cost. In its recently released report
identifying options to reduce the federal deficit, CBO found that reducing
the premium subsidy to 40 percent would save $20.9 billion over 10 years.51
Beyond these legislative reforms, the next Administration should:
l

Communicate to Congress the necessity of transparency and a genuine
reform process. The White House and the USDA should make it very clear
that the farm bill process, including reform of farm subsidies, must be conducted through an open process with time for mark-up and the opportunity
for changes to be made outside the Agriculture Committee process.
The farm bill too often is developed behind closed doors and without any
chance for real reform. The White House, given the power of the bully pulpit,

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Reduce the premium subsidy rate for crop insurance. On average,
taxpayers cover about 60 percent47 of the premium cost for policies
purchased in the federal crop insurance program. One of the most widely
supported and bipartisan policy reforms is to reduce the premium subsidy
that taxpayers are forced to pay.48 At a minimum, taxpayers should not pay
more than 50 percent of the premium. After all, taxpayers should not have
to pay more than the farmers who benefit from the crop insurance policies.

Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise

must demand a genuine reform process and express unwavering support
for a USDA that shapes a safety net that considers the interests of farmers,
while also remembering the interests of taxpayers and consumers. Any
safety net for farmers should be a true safety net—one that helps farmers
when they have experienced serious unforeseen losses (preferably when
there has been a disaster or unforeseen natural event causing damage) and
that exists to help them in unusual situations.



l

Separate the agricultural provisions of the farm bill from the
nutrition provisions. To have genuine reform and proper consideration
of the issues, agricultural programs should be considered in separate
legislation distinct from food stamps and the nutrition part of the farm bill,
and reauthorization of such programs should be fixed on different timelines
to ensure this separation. Agricultural and nutritional programs, which are
distinct from each other, have been combined together for political reasons,
something which is readily admitted by proponents of this logrolling. When
it comes to American agriculture and welfare programs, they deserve sound
policy debates, not political tactics at the expense of thoughtful discourse.

Move the Work of the Food and Nutrition Service. The USDA implements
many means-tested federal support programs, including the largest food assistance program, Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP, also known
as food stamps), and the Special Supplemental Nutrition Program for Women,
Infants, and Children (WIC) Food Program. The Food and Nutrition Service (FNS)
oversees these programs and other food and nutrition programs, including the
Center for Nutrition Policy and Promotion,52 which handles the USDA’s work on
the “Dietary Guidelines for Americans” (Dietary Guidelines).53 Food nutrition
programs include: SNAP; WIC; the National School Lunch Program (NSLP); the
School Breakfast Program (SBP); the Child and Adult Care Food Program; the
Nutrition Program for the Elderly; Nutrition Service Incentives; the Summer Food
Service Program; the Commodity Supplemental Food Program; the Temporary
Emergency Food Program; the Farmer’s Market Nutrition Program; and the Special Milk Program.
The next Administration should:
l

Move the USDA food and nutrition programs to the Department of
Health and Human Services. There are more than 89 current meanstested welfare programs, and total means-tested spending has been
estimated to surpass $1.2 trillion between federal and state resources.54
Because means-tested federal programs are siloed and administered in
separate agencies, the effectiveness and size of the welfare state remains

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largely hidden. There are means-tested food-support programs in the
USDA (specially FNS), whereas most means-tested programs are at the
Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). All means-tested antipoverty programs should be overseen by one department—specifically HHS,
which handles most welfare programs.
Reform SNAP. Ostensibly, SNAP sends money through electronic-benefit-transfer (EBT) cards to help “low-income” individuals buy food. It is the largest
of the federal nutrition programs. Food stamps are designed to be supplemented by
other forms of income—whether through paid employment or nonprofit support.
SNAP serves 41.1 million individuals—an increase of 4.3 million people during the
Biden years.55 In 2020, the food stamp program cost $79.1 billion. That number
continued to rise—by 2022, outlays hit $119.5 billion.56
The next Administration should:
l

Re-implement work requirements. The statutory language covering
food stamps allows states to waive work requirements that otherwise
apply to work-capable individuals—that is, adult beneficiaries between the
ages 18 and 50 who are not disabled and do not have any children or other
dependents in the home.57


Even in a strong economy, work expectations are fairly limited: Individuals
who are work-capable and without dependents are required to work or
prepare for work for 20 hours per week.58 The work requirements are then
implemented unless the state requests a waiver from the USDA’s Food and
Nutrition Services.59 Waivers from statutory work requirements can be
approved in two instances: an unemployment rate of more than 10 percent
or a lack of sufficient jobs.60
The Trump Administration bolstered USDA work expectations in the
food stamp program. In February 2019, FNS issued a modest regulatory
change that applied only to able-bodied individuals without dependents—
beneficiaries aged 18 to 49, not elderly or disabled, who did not have children
or other dependents in the home (ABAWD).61 The FNS rule changed
when a state could receive a waiver from implementing the ABAWD work
requirement.
Under the new rule, in order to waive the work requirement, the state’s
unemployment rate had to be above 6 percent for more than 24 months.
The rule also defined “area” in such a way that states would be unable to
combine non-contiguous counties in order to maximize their waivers.62 Of

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Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise

the more than 40 million food stamp beneficiaries, the Trump rule would
have applied only to 688,000 individuals in fiscal year 2021.63
The Trump reform was scheduled to go into effect, but a D.C. district court
federal judge enjoined the rule.64 The USDA filed an appeal in late December
2020,65 but the Biden Administration withdrew from defending the
challenge, and the rule was never implemented.66
Beyond the able-bodied work requirement, FNS should implement better
regulation to clarify options for states to implement the general work
requirement. This requirement is an option states can apply to workcapable beneficiaries aged 16 to 59. If beneficiaries’ work hours are below
30 hours a week, states can implement the general work requirements to
oblige beneficiaries to register for work or participate in SNAP Employment
and Training or workfare assigned by the state SNAP agency.67 Increased
clarity for states would include items like states being required to offer
employment and training spots for those that request them—not simply
budgeting for every currently enrolled able-bodied adult.



l

Reform broad-based categorical eligibility. Federal law permits states
to enroll individuals in food stamps if they receive a benefit from another
program, such as the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF)
program. However, under an administrative option in TANF called broadbased categorical eligibility (BBCE), ”benefit” is defined so broadly that it
includes simply receiving distributed pamphlets and 1–800 numbers.68 This
definition, with its low threshold to trigger a “benefit,” allows individuals to
bypass eligibility limits—particularly the asset requirement (how much the
applicant has in resources, such as bank accounts or property).69 Adopting
the BBCE option has even allowed millionaires to enroll in the food
stamp program.70
The Trump Administration proposed to close the loophole with a rule
to “increase program integrity and reduce fraud, waste, and abuse.”71 The
regulation was not finalized before the end of the Trump Administration.

l

Re-evaluate the Thrifty Food Plan. In a dramatic overreach, the Biden
Administration unilaterally increased food stamp benefits by at least 23
percent in October 2021.72 Through an update to the Thrifty Food Plan, in
which the USDA analyzes a basket of foods intended to provide a nutritious
diet, the USDA increased food stamp outlays by between $250 billion and
$300 billion over 10 years.73

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Department of Agriculture

Although the 2018 farm bill instructed FNS to update the Thrifty Food Plan
by 2023 and every five years thereafter, every previous Thrifty Food Plan
has been always cost-neutral ( just an inflation update)—exactly what CBO
estimated as cost of the 2018 farm bill.74
The Biden Administration may have skirted regulations and congressional
authority to increase the overall cost of the program. In fact, Senate and
House Republicans requested that the Government Accountability Office
investigate the legal authorities and process that the USDA undertook to
arrive at such an unprecedented increase.75
l

Eliminate the heat-and-eat loophole. States can artificially boost a
household’s food stamp benefit by using the heat-and-eat loophole. The
amount of food stamps a household receives is based on its “countable”
income (income minus certain deductions). Households that receive
benefits from the Low-Income Heat and Energy Assistance Program
(LIHEAP) are eligible for a larger utility deduction. In order to make
households eligible for the higher deduction, and thus for greater food
stamp benefits, states have distributed LIHEAP checks for amounts as small
as $1 to food stamp recipients.


The 2014 farm bill tightened this loophole by requiring that a household must
receive more than $20 annually in LIHEAP payments to be eligible for the larger
utility deduction and subsequently higher food stamp benefits.76 Nonetheless,
states continue to inflate their standard utility allowances. Under the Trump
Administration, the USDA proposed a rule, which was not finalized, that would
have standardized the utility allowance.77
Reform WIC. Turning to WIC, this program distributes money through EBT
cards to help low-income women, infants, and children under six purchase nutrition-rich foods and nutrition education (including breastfeeding support). As of
August 2022, approximately 6.3 million people participated in WIC each month
to purchase food.78 In 2021, WIC federal outlays were $5 billion.79
The next Administration should:
l

Reform the state voucher system. State agencies control WIC costs
by approving only one brand of infant formula through competitive
bidding for infant formula rebate contracts. Because 50 percent of baby
formula is purchased through the federal WIC program, it is vital that
regulation for these competitive bidding contracts does not unintentionally
create monopolies.

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Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise



l

Re-evaluate excessive regulation. As for baby formula regulations
generally, labeling regulations and regulations that unnecessarily delay the
manufacture and sale of baby formula should be re-evaluated.80 During the
Biden Administration, there have been devastating baby formula shortages.

Return to the Original Purpose of School Meals. Federal meal programs for
K–12 students were created to provide food to children from low-income families
while at school.81 Today, however, federal school meals increasingly resemble entitlement programs that have strayed far from their original objective and represent
an example of the ever-expanding federal footprint in local school operations.
The NSLP and SBP are the two largest K–12 meal programs provided by federal
taxpayer money. The NSLP launched in 1946 and the SBP in 1966, both as options
specifically for children in poverty.82 During the COVID-19 pandemic, federal
policymakers temporarily expanded access to school meal programs, but some
lawmakers and federal officials have now proposed making this expansion permanent.83 Yet even before the pandemic, research found that federal officials had
already expanded these programs to serve children from upper-income homes,
and these programs are rife with improper payments and inefficiencies.
Heritage Foundation research from 2019 found that after the enactment of
the Community Eligibility Provision (CEP) in 2010, the share of students from
middle- and upper-income homes receiving free meals in states that participated in
CEP doubled, and in some cases tripled—all in a program meant for children from
families with incomes at or below 185 percent of the federal poverty line (Children
from homes at or below 130 percent of the federal poverty line are eligible for free
lunches, while students from families at or below 185 percent of poverty are eligible
for reduced-priced lunches).84
Under CEP, if 40 percent of students in a school or school district are eligible for
federal meals, all students in that school or district can receive free meals. However,
the USDA has taken it even further, improperly interpreting the law85 to allow a
subset of schools within a district to be grouped together to reach the 40 percent
threshold, As a result, a school with zero low-income students could be grouped
together with schools with high levels of low-income students, and as a result all
the students in the schools within that group (even schools without a single low-income student) can receive free federal meals.86 Schools can direct resources meant
for students in poverty to children from wealthier families.
Furthermore, the NSLP and SBP are among the most inaccurate federal
programs according to PaymentAccuracy.gov, a project of the U.S. Office of Management and Budget and the Office of the Inspector General.87 Before federal
auditors reduced the rigor of annual reporting requirements in 2018, the NSLP
had wasted nearly $2 billion in taxpayer resources through payments provided to
ineligible recipients.88 Even after the auditing changes, which the U.S. Government

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Department of Agriculture

Accountability Office said results in the USDA not “regularly assess[ing] the programs’ fraud risks,” the NSLP wasted nearly $500 million in FY 2021.89 The SBP
now wastes nearly $200 million annually.90
Despite the ongoing effort to expand school meals under CEP and the evidence
of waste and inefficiency, left-of-center Members of Congress and President Biden’s
Administration have nonetheless proposed further expansions to extend federal
school meals to include every K–12 student—regardless of need.91 The Administration recently proposed expanding federal school meal programs offered during the
school year to be offered during the summer as part of the “American Families Plan,”
and also proposed expanding CEP. Other federal officials, including Senator Bernie
Sanders (I–VT), have, in recent years, proposed expanding the NSLP to all students.92
To serve students in need and prevent the misuse of taxpayer money, the next
Administration should focus on students in need and reject efforts to transform
federal school meals into an entitlement program.
Specifically, the next Administration should:
l

l

Work with lawmakers to eliminate CEP. The NSLP and SBP should be
directed to serve children in need, not become an entitlement for students
from middle- and upper-income homes. Congress should eliminate CEP.
Further, the USDA should not provide meals to students during the summer
unless students are taking summer-school classes. Currently, students can
get meals from schools even if they are not in summer school, which has, in
effect, turned school meals into a federal catering program.93
Restore programs to their original intent and reject efforts to create
universal free school meals. The USDA should work with lawmakers
to restore NSLP and SBP to their original goal of providing food to K–12
students who otherwise would not have food to eat while at school.

Federal school meals should be focused on children in need, and any efforts
to expand student eligibility for federal school meals to include all K–12 students
should be soundly rejected. Such expansion would allow an inefficient, wasteful
program to grow, magnifying the amount of wasted taxpayer resources.
Reform Conservation Programs. Farmers, in general, are excellent stewards
of the land, if not for moral or ethical considerations, then out of self-interest to

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l

Promulgate a rule properly interpreting CEP. The USDA should issue
a rule that clarifies that only an individual school or a school district as a
whole, not a subset of schools within a district, must meet the 40-percent
criteria to be eligible for CEP. Education officials should be prohibited from
grouping schools together.



Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise

make sure their land and—by extension, their livelihoods—remain intact. Farmers
are often called the original conservationists.94
When evaluating federal conservation programs, it is important to remember
the importance of the land to farmers. In terms of USDA federal conservation
programs, both the USDA’s Farm Service Agency (FSA) and Natural Resources
Conservation Service (NRCS) oversee numerous programs.95
As a general matter, the next Administration should ensure that these programs
address genuine and specific environmental concerns with a focus on currently
existing environmental problems, not those that are speculative in nature. These
conservation programs should have clearly identifiable goals, with the success or
failure of these programs being directly measurable. Any assistance to farmers to
take specific actions should not be provided unless the assistance will directly and
clearly help to address a specific environmental problem. Further, any assistance
to encourage farmers to engage in certain practices should only be provided if
farmers would not have adopted the practices in the first place.
There are specific issues that the next Administration should address. The
Conservation Reserve Program,96 which is run by FSA, pays farmers to not farm
some of their land. This program has recently received attention, as agricultural
groups rightfully seek to farm without penalty voluntarily idled land, in light of
the consequences to food prices of Russia invading Ukraine.97
There is also a need to reform USDA’s conservation easements. These easements
are a powerful tool to incentivize long-term preservation of ecosystems while still
allowing farmers to benefit economically. However, when farmers and ranchers
sign conservation easements with the USDA, they can be enforced in perpetuity.
Future generations, be they the descendants of the landowner or new residents,
are bound by those conditions.
Ecosystems and topography naturally change over time, but without legislative
change, easement requirements will not.
The next Administration should:
l

l

Champion the elimination of the Conservation Reserve Program.
Farmers should not be paid in such a sweeping way not to farm their land. If
there is a desire to ensure that extremely sensitive land is not farmed, this
should be addressed through targeted efforts that are clearly connected to
addressing a specific and concrete environmental harm. The USDA should
work with Congress to eliminate this overbroad program.
Reform NRCS wetlands and erodible land compliance and appeals.
Problematic NRCS overreach could be avoided entirely by removing its
authority to prescribe specific practices on a particular farm operation in
order to ensure continued eligibility to participate in USDA farm programs,

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Department of Agriculture

and to require instead that each farm (as a function of eligibility) must have
created a general best practices plan. Such a plan could be approved by the
local county Soil and Water Conservation District (SWCD). The local SWCD
commissioners are elected by their peers in each respective county and are
better suited than the NRCS to provide guidance for farm operations in
their respective jurisdictions.
At a minimum, a new Administration should support legislation to divest
more power to the states (and possibly local SWCDs) regarding erodible
land and wetlands conservation.98
l

Reform easements. The new Administration should, to the extent
authorized by law, limit the use of permanent easements and
collaborate with lawmakers to prohibit the USDA from creating new
permanent easements.99

l

Promote legislation that would allow state-inspected meat to be sold
in interstate commerce. These barriers to the sale of meat and poultry
from USDA-approved state-inspected facilities should be removed.

Eliminate or Reform Marketing Orders and Checkoff Programs. Marketing orders and checkoff programs for agricultural commodities are similar in
many ways. They both allow private actors within an industry to collaborate with
the federal government to compel other competitors within an industry to fund the
respective marketing order or checkoff program. There are currently 22 checkoff

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Other Major Issues and Specific Recommendations. Although the following
issues have not been listed as “priority,” these issues are still extremely important,
and the next Administration should address them.
Only meat and poultry from federally inspected facilities can be sold in interstate commerce.100 Even meat and poultry from USDA-approved state-inspected
facilities may only be sold in intrastate commerce, with limited exceptions. 101
This is despite the fact that states with USDA-approved inspection programs
must meet and enforce requirements that are “at least equal to” those imposed
under the Federal Meat and Poultry Products Inspection Acts and the Humane
Methods of Slaughter Act of 1978.102 This is an unnecessary regulatory barrier
that makes it difficult to get meat and poultry into interstate commerce to create
more options for consumers and farmers. Legislation entitled the New Markets for State-Inspected Meat and Poultry Act of 2021 would help to remove
this obstacle.103
The next Administration should:

Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise

programs,104 and they focus on research and promotion of commodities such as beef
and eggs. Marketing orders cover research and promotion, but also cover issues
such as quality regulations and volume controls. The latter issue, volume controls,
is a means to restrict supply, which drives up prices for consumers. Fortunately,
there are few active volume controls.105
Marketing orders and checkoff programs are some of the most egregious programs run by the USDA. They are, in effect, a tax—a means to compel speech—and
government-blessed cartels. Instead of getting private cooperation, they are tools
for industry actors to work with government to force cooperation.
The next Administration should:



l

l

l

Reduce the number and scope of marketing orders and checkoff
programs. The USDA should reject any new requests for marketing orders
and checkoff programs to the extent authorized by law and eliminate
existing programs when possible. While the programs work differently,
there are often petition processes and other ways that make it difficult for
affected parties to get rid of the marketing orders and checkoff programs,106
and the USDA itself may not even be required to honor requests to
terminate a program.107 The USDA should make the process easier. Further,
the USDA should reject any effort to bring back volume controls to limit
supplies of commodities.
Work with Congress to eliminate marketing orders and checkoff
programs. These programs should be eliminated, and if industry actors
want to collaborate, they should do so through private means, not using the
government to compel cooperation.
Promote legislation that would require regular votes. There should
be regular voting for parties subject to checkoff programs and marketing
orders. For example, the voting should occur at least every five years, to
determine whether a marketing order or checkoff program should continue.
The USDA should be required to honor the results of such a vote. Through
regular voting, parties can demonstrate their support for a marketing order
or checkoff program and ensure that those administering them will be held
accountable.

Focus on Trade Policy, Not Trade Promotion. The USDA’s Foreign Agricultural Service (FAS) covers numerous issues, including “trade policy,” which
is a reference to removing trade barriers, among other things, to ensure an environment conducive to trade.108 It also covers trade promotion.109 This includes
programs like the Market Access Program110 that subsidizes trade associations,

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businesses, and other private entities to market and promote their products
overseas. FAS should play a proactive and leading role to help open upmarkets
for American farmers and ranchers. There are numerous barriers, such as sanitary and phytosanitary measures, blocking American agricultural products from
gaining access to foreign markets.111 However, FAS should not help businesses and
industries promote their exports, something these businesses and industries can
and should do on their own.
The next Administration should:
l

Push legislation to repeal export promotion programs. The USDA
should work with Congress to repeal market development programs like the
Market Access Program and similar programs.

l

l

l

Counter scare tactics and remove obstacles. The USDA should strongly
counter scare tactics regarding agricultural biotechnology and adopt
policies to remove unnecessary barriers to approvals and the adoption of
biotechnology.
Repeal the federal labeling mandate. The USDA should work with
Congress to repeal the federal labeling law, while maintaining federal
preemption, and stress that voluntary labeling is allowed.
Use all tools available to remove improper trade barriers against
agricultural biotechnology. The USDA should work closely with the Office
of the United States Trade Representative to remove improper barriers
imposed by other countries to block U.S. agricultural goods.

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Remove Obstacles for Agricultural Biotechnology. Innovation is critical to
agricultural production and the ability to meet future food needs. The next Administration should embrace innovation and technology, not hinder its use—especially
because of scare tactics that ignore sound science. One of the key innovations in
agriculture is genetic engineering. According to the USDA, “[C]urrently, over 90
percent of U.S. corn, upland cotton, and soybeans are produced using GE [genetically engineered] varieties.”112
Despite the importance of agricultural biotechnology, in 2016, Congress passed
a federal mandate to label genetically engineered food.113 This legislation was arguably just a means to try to provide a negative connotation to GE food. There are
other challenges as well for agricultural biotechnology. For example, Mexico plans
to ban the importation of U.S. genetically modified yellow corn.114
The next Administration should:



Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise

Reform Forest Service Wildfire Management. The United States Forest
Service is one of four federal government land management agencies that administer 606 million acres, or 95 percent of the 640 million acres of surface land area
managed by the federal government.115 Located within the USDA, the Forest Service
manages the National Forest System, which is comprised of 193 million acres.116
As explained by the USDA, “The USDA Forest Service’s mission is to sustain the
health, diversity, and productivity of the nation’s forests and grasslands to meet
the needs of present and future generations.”117
The Forest Service should focus on proactive management of the forests and
grasslands that does not depend heavily on burning. There should be resilient
forests and grasslands in the wake of management actions. Wildfires have become
a primary vegetation management regime for national forests and grasslands.118
Recognizing the need for vegetation management, the Forest Service has adopted
“pyro-silviculture” using “unplanned” fire,119 such as unplanned human-caused fires,
to otherwise accomplish vegetation management.120
The Forest Service should instead be focusing on addressing the precipitous
annual amassing of biomass in the national forests that drive the behavior of
wildfires. By thinning trees, removing live fuels and deadwood, and taking other
preventive steps, the Forest Service can help to minimize the consequences
of wildfires.
Increasing timber sales could also play an important role in the effort to change
the behavior of wildfire because there would be less biomass. Timber sales and
timber harvested in public forests dropped precipitously in the early 1990s and
still remain very low. For example, in 1988, the volume of timber sold and harvested
by volume was about 11 billion and 12.6 billion board feet (BBF), respectively.121 In
2021, timber sold was 2.8 BBF and timber harvested was 2.4 BBF.
In 2018, President Donald Trump issued Executive Order 13855 to, among
other things, promote active management of forests and reduce wildfire risks.122
The executive order stated, “Active management of vegetation is needed to treat
these dangerous conditions on Federal lands but is often delayed due to challenges
associated with regulatory analysis and current consultation requirements.”123 It
further explained the need to reduce regulatory obstacles to fuel reduction in
forests created by the National Environmental Policy Act and the Endangered
Species Act.124
The next Administration should:
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Champion executive action, consistent with law, and proactive
legislation to reduce wildfires. This would involve embracing Executive
Order 13855, building upon it, and working with lawmakers to promote
active management of vegetation, reduce regulatory obstacles to reducing
fuel buildup, and increase timber sales.

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l

l

Work with lawmakers to repeal the Dietary Guidelines. The USDA
should help lead an effort to repeal the Dietary Guidelines.
Minimally, the next Administration should reform the Dietary
Guidelines. The USDA, with HHS, should develop a more transparent
process that properly considers the underlying science and does not
overstate its findings. It should also ensure that the Dietary Guidelines
focus on nutritional issues and do not veer off-mission by focusing on
unrelated issues, such as the environment, that have nothing to do with
nutritional advice. In fact, if environmental concerns supersede or water
down recommendations for human nutritional advice, the public would
be receiving misleading health information. The USDA, working with
lawmakers, should codify these reforms into law.

ORGANIZATIONAL ISSUES

Based on the recommended reforms identified as ideal solutions, the USDA
would look different in many respects. One of the biggest changes would be a USDA
that is not focused on welfare, given that means-tested welfare programs would

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Eliminate or Reform the Dietary Guidelines. The USDA, in collaboration
with HHS, publishes the Dietary Guidelines every five years.125 For more than 40
years, the federal government has been releasing Dietary Guidelines,126 and during
this time, there has been constant controversy due to questionable recommendations and claims regarding the politicization of the process.
In the 2015 Dietary Guidelines process, the influential Dietary Guidelines Advisory Committee veered off mission and attempted to persuade the USDA and HHS
to adopt nutritional advice that focused not just on human health, but the health
of the planet.127 Issues such as climate change and sustainability infiltrated the
process. Fortunately, the 2020 process did not get diverted in this manner. However, the Dietary Guidelines remain a potential tool to influence dietary choices to
achieve objectives unrelated to the nutritional and dietary well-being of Americans.
There is no shortage of private sector dietary advice for the public, and nutrition
and dietary choices are best left to individuals to address their personal needs. This
includes working with their own health professionals. As it is, there is constantly
changing advice provided by the government, with insufficient qualifications on
the advice, oversimplification to the point of miscommunicating important points,
questionable use of science, and potential political influence.
The Dietary Guidelines have a major impact because they not only can influence
how private health providers offer nutritional advice, but they also inform federal
programs. School meals are required to be consistent with the guidelines.128
The next Administration should:



Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise

be moved to HHS. The Food and Nutrition Service that administers the food and
nutrition programs would be eliminated.
The Farm Service Agency, which administers many of the farm subsidy programs, would be significantly smaller in size if the ideal farm subsidy reforms
were adopted.
Most important, a conservative USDA, as envisioned, would not be used as a
governmental tool to transform the nation’s food system, but instead would respect
the importance of efficient agricultural production and ensure that the government
does not hinder farmers and ranchers from producing an abundant supply of safe
and affordable food.
For a conservative USDA to become a reality, and for it to stay on course with
the mission as outlined, the White House must strongly support these reforms and
install strong USDA leaders. These individuals almost certainly will be faced with
opposition from some in the agricultural community who would fight changing
subsidies in any fashion, although many of the reforms would likely be embraced
by those in agriculture.
There would be strong opposition from environmental groups and others who
want the federal government to transform American agriculture to meet their ideological objectives. Finally, there would be opposition from left-of-center groups
who do not want to reform SNAP and would expand welfare and dependency—such
as through universal free school meals—as opposed to reducing dependency.
Reducing the scope of government and promoting individual freedom may not
always be easy, but it is something that conservatives regularly should strive for.
The listed reforms to the U.S. Department of Agriculture would help to accomplish these objectives and are well worth fighting for to achieve a freer and more
prosperous nation.
CONCLUSION

This chapter started with a discussion of the incredible success of American
farmers and American agriculture in general. This is how the chapter should close
as well. Americans are blessed with an agricultural sector, and a food system in
general, which are worthy of incredible respect. A conservative USDA should
appreciate this while recognizing that its role is to serve the interests of all Americans, not special interests. By being a champion of unleashing the potential of
American agriculture, a conservative USDA would help to ensure a future with
an abundant supply of safe and affordable food for individuals and families in the
United States and across the globe.
AUTHOR’S NOTE: The author would like to thank all the contributors for their assistance, expertise, and insight

into the development of this chapter. In addition, special thanks are due to Rachael Wilfong, who was instrumental
in getting the chapter ready for submission.

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ENDNOTES

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

6.
7.
8.
9.

13.
14.

15.

16.
17.

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10.
11.
12.

U.S. Department of Agriculture, Fiscal Year 2023 Budget Summary, p.1, https://www.usda.gov/sites/default/
files/documents/2023-usda-budget-summary.pdf (accessed December 14, 2022).
See, for example, U.S. Department of Agriculture, “Transforming the U.S. Food System,” https://www.usda.
gov/fst (accessed December 14, 2022).
U.S. Department of Agriculture, Fiscal Year 2023 Budget Summary, p.1.
U.S. Department of Agriculture, “USDA Celebrates 150 Years,” https://www.usda.gov/our-agency/about-usda/
history (accessed December 16, 2022).
The law stated, “[T]here is hereby established at the seat of government of the United States a Department
of Agriculture, the general designs and duties of which shall be to acquire and to diffuse among the people
of the United States useful information on subjects connected with agriculture in the most general and
comprehensive sense of that word, and to procure, propagate, and distribute among the people new and
valuable seeds and plants.” Gladys L. Baker et al., Century of Service: The First 100 Years of the United States
Department of Agriculture, (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1963) p. 13, https://babel.
hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=uc1.b4254098&view=1up&seq=33 (accessed December 16, 2022).
U.S. Department of Agriculture, Fiscal Year 2023 Budget Summary, p. 2.
Ibid., p. 2.
U.S. Department of Agriculture, Strategic Plan: Fiscal Years 2022–2026, p. 3, https://www.usda.gov/sites/
default/files/documents/usda-fy-2022-2026-strategic-plan.pdf (accessed December 14, 2022).
News release, “USDA Announces Framework for Shoring Up the Food Supply Chain and Transforming the
Food System to Be Fairer, More Competitive, More Resilient,” U.S. Department of Agriculture, June 1, 2022,
https://www.usda.gov/media/press-releases/2022/06/01/usda-announces-framework-shoring-food-supplychain-and-transforming (accessed December 14, 2022).
U.S. Department of Agriculture, “Transforming the U.S. Food System.”
U.S. Department of Agriculture, Strategic Plan: Fiscal Years 2022–2026, pp. 1–2.
U.S. Department of Agriculture, “Background on the U.S. Approach to the 2021 UN Food Systems Summit,”
August 4, 2021, https://www.usda.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Background-on-US-approach-2021-UNFood-Systems-Summit.pdf (accessed December 14, 2022).
U.S. Department of Agriculture, “UN Food Systems Summit,” https://www.usda.gov/oce/sustainability/unsummit (accessed December 14, 2022).
Mark Bittman et al., “How a National Food Policy Could Save Millions of American Lives,” The Washington
Post, November 7, 2014, https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/how-a-national-food-policy-couldsave-millions-of-american-lives/2014/11/07/89c55e16-637f-11e4-836c-83bc4f26eb67_story.html (accessed
December 14, 2022); Daren Bakst and Gabriella Beaumont-Smith, “No, We Don’t Need to Transform the
American Food System,” The Daily Signal, February 26, 2021, https://www.dailysignal.com/2021/02/26/
no-we-dont-need-to-transform-the-american-food-system/ (accessed December 14, 2022); and Daren
Bakst, “Biden’s Food Conference Should Put People First, Not Environmental Extremism,” The Daily Signal,
September 22, 2022, https://www.dailysignal.com/2022/09/22/bidens-food-conference-should-put-peoplefirst-not-environmental-extremism/ (accessed December 14, 2022).
News release, “USDA to Invest Up to $300 Million in New Organic Transition Initiative,” U.S. Department of
Agriculture, August 22, 2022, https://www.usda.gov/media/press-releases/2022/08/22/usda-invest-300million-new-organic-transition-initiative (accessed December 14, 2022).
Gary Baise, “Sri Lanka’s Green New Deal Was a Disaster,” Farm Futures, November 14, 2022, https://www.
farmprogress.com/commentary/sri-lankas-green-new-deal-was-disaster (accessed December 16, 2022).
See, for example, Catherine Greene et al., “Growing Organic Demand Provides High-Value Opportunities for Many
Types of Producers,” Economic Research Service, U.S. Department of Agriculture, February 6, 2017, https://www.
ers.usda.gov/amber-waves/2017/januaryfebruary/growing-organic-demand-provides-high-value-opportunitiesfor-many-types-of-producers/#:~:text=ERS%20research%20shows%20that%20many,flavor%20desired%20
by%20the%20consumer (accessed December 14, 2022), and Andrea Carlson, “Investigating Retail Price Premiums
for Organic Foods,” Economic Research Service, U.S. Department of Agriculture, May 24, 2016, https://www.ers.
usda.gov/amber-waves/2016/may/investigating-retail-price-premiums-for-organic-foods/ (accessed December
16, 2022). Further, there are many myths, such as those regarding the alleged health benefit of organic food. One



Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise
meta study found that “[t]he published literature lacks strong evidence that organic foods are significantly more
nutritious than conventional foods.” Crystal Smith-Spangler et al., “Are Organic Foods Safer or Healthier Than
Conventional Alternatives,” Annals of Internal Medicine, Vol. 157, No. 5 (September 4, 2012), pp. 348–366, https://
www.acpjournals.org/doi/epdf/10.7326/0003-4819-157-5-201209040-00007 (accessed December 16, 2022).
18. Steve Savage, “USDA Data Confirm Organic Yields Significantly Lower Than With Conventional Farming,”
Genetic Literacy Project, February 16, 2018, https://geneticliteracyproject.org/2018/02/16/usda-data-confirmorganic-yields-dramatically-lower-conventional-farming/ (accessed December 16, 2022).
19. See, for example, U.S. Department of Agriculture, “Notice: Climate-Smart Agriculture and Forestry
Partnership Program, Request for Comments,” USDA–2021–0010, October 21, 2021, https://www.regulations.
gov/document/USDA-2021-0010-0001 (accessed December 16, 2022).
20. Inflation Reduction Act of 2022, Public Law 117–169.
21. U.S. Department of Agriculture, Economic Research Service, “Productivity Growth in U.S. Agriculture
(1948–2019),” https://www.ers.usda.gov/data-products/agricultural-productivity-in-the-u-s/productivitygrowth-in-u-s-agriculture-1948-2019/ (accessed December 14, 2022).
22. U.S. Department of Agriculture, Economic Research Service, “Total Food Budget Share Increased from 9.4
Percent of Disposable Income to 10.3 Percent in 2021,” July 15, 2022, https://www.ers.usda.gov/data-products/
chart-gallery/gallery/chart-detail/?chartId=76967 (accessed December 14, 2022).
23. U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, “Quintiles of Income Before Taxes: Annual Expenditure
Means, Shares, and Standard Errors, and Coefficients of Variation, Consumer Expenditure Surveys,” 2021,
Table 1101, https://www.bls.gov/cex/tables/calendar-year/mean-item-share-average-standard-error/cuincome-quintiles-before-taxes-2021.pdf (accessed December 16, 2022), and Daren Bakst and Patrick Tyrrell,
“Big Government Policies That Hurt the Poor and How to Address Them,” Heritage Foundation Special Report
No.176, April 5, 2017, p. 7, https://www.heritage.org/sites/default/files/2017-04/SR176.pdf.
24. Daren Bakst and Joshua Sewell, “Congress Should Stop Abrogating Its Spending Power and Rein in the USDA
Slush Fund,” Heritage Foundation Issue Brief No. 6052, February 19, 2021, p. 2, https://www.heritage.org/
budget-and-spending/report/congress-should-stop-abrogating-its-spending-power-and-rein-the-usda.
25. Commodity Credit Corporation Charter Act of 1948, Public Law 80–806.
26. Bakst and Sewall, “Congress Should Stop Abrogating Its Spending Power.”
27. Ibid., p. 3.
28. Daren Bakst, “Comment from Bakst, Darren” on “Notice: Climate-Smart Agriculture and Forestry Partnership
Program, Request for Comments,” USDA–2021–0010, October 21, 2021,” November 1, 2021, https://www.
regulations.gov/document/USDA-2021-0010-0001/comment?filter=bakst (accessed December 16, 2022).
29. U.S. Department of Agriculture, “Notice: Climate-Smart Agriculture and Forestry Partnership Program.”
30. Megan Stubbs, “The Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC),” Congressional Research Service Report for
Congress, updated January 14, 2021, https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R44606 (accessed
December 16, 2022).
31. “Overall, 34 percent of all farms reported receiving some type of Government payment in 2021,” and “[o]verall,
14 percent of U.S. farms participated in Federal crop insurance programs.” Christine Whitt, Noah Miller, and
Ryan Olver, “America’s Farms and Ranches at a Glance: 2022 Edition,” U.S. Department of Agriculture,
Economic Research Service, pp. 24 and 26, https://www.ers.usda.gov/webdocs/publications/105388/eib-247.
pdf?v=527.4 (accessed March 18, 2023). This data, which apparently does not cover crop insurance, included
payments beyond just commodity payments, such as conservation payments.
32. Randy Schnepf, “Farm Safety-Net Payments Under the 2014 Farm Bill: Comparison by Program Crop,”
Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, August 11, 2017, https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R44914.pdf
(accessed December 14, 2022).
33. Although livestock and specialty crop producers do receive some subsidies, former American Farm Bureau
Federation President Bob Stallman captured the subsidy issue well. He “dismisse[d] outright the claim that
farmers couldn’t survive without subsidy money. ‘Why does the livestock industry survive without subsidies?’
he ask[ed]. ‘Why does the specialty crop [fruit and vegetable] industry survive?’” Tamar Haspel, “Why Do
Taxpayers Subsidize Rich Farmers?” The Washington Post, March 15, 2018, https://www.washingtonpost.
com/lifestyle/food/why-do-taxpayers-subsidize-rich-farmers/2018/03/15/50e89906-27b6-11e8-b79df3d931db7f68_story.html (accessed March 18, 2023).

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34. U.S. Department of Agriculture, Farm Service Agency, “ARC/PLC Program,” https://www.fsa.usda.gov/
programs-and-services/arcplc_program/index (accessed December 16, 2022).
35. Ibid.
36. U.S. Department of Agriculture, Economic Research Service, “Crop Insurance at a Glance,” May 31, 2022,
https://www.ers.usda.gov/topics/farm-practices-management/risk-management/crop-insurance-at-a-glance/
(accessed December 16, 2022).
37. U.S. Department of Agriculture, “Agriculture Risk Coverage (ALC) & Price Loss Coverage (PLC),” Farm
Service Agency Fact Sheet, August 2019, https://www.fsa.usda.gov/Assets/USDA-FSA-Public/usdafiles/
FactSheets/2019/arc-plc_overview_fact_sheet-aug_2019.pdf (accessed December 16, 2022).
38. See, for example, U.S Department of Agriculture, Farm Service Agency, Agriculture Risk Coverage and Price
Loss Coverage Handbook, last amended October 5, 2020, https://www.fsa.usda.gov/Internet/FSA_File/1arcplc_r01_a10.pdf (accessed March 18, 2023); Mesbah Motamed, “Federal Commodity Programs Price Loss
Coverage and Agriculture Risk Coverage Address Price Yield Risks Faced by Producers,” U.S. Department
of Agriculture, Economic Research Service, August 6, 2018, https://www.ers.usda.gov/amber-waves/2018/
august/federal-commodity-programs-price-loss-coverage-and-agriculture-risk-coverage-address-priceand-yield-risks-faced-by-producers/ (accessed March 18, 2023); and Taxpayers for Common Sense, “Shallow
Loss Agriculture Programs 101,” https://www.taxpayer.net/agriculture/shallow-loss-agriculture-programs-101/
(accessed March 18, 2023).
39. Ibid.
40. Stephanie Rosch, “Federal Crop Insurance: A Primer,” Congressional Research Service Report for Congress,
February 18, 2021, p. 1, https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R46686 (December 14, 2021).
41. Congressional Budget Office, Options for Reducing the Deficit, 2023 to 2032: Volume II; Smaller Reductions,
December 2022, p. 6, https://www.cbo.gov/system/files/2022-12/58163-budget-options-small-effects.pdf
(accessed December 14, 2022).
42. Rosch, “Federal Crop Insurance: A Primer,” p. 17.
43. “Farm Bill Primer: Sugar Program,” Congressional Research Service In Focus, updated May 15, 2018, https://
www.everycrsreport.com/files/2018-05-15_IF10689_42900e56be67f5cfa17e40953ad9acb54561d3db.pdf
(accessed December 16, 2022).
44. See, for example, Agralytica, “Economic Effects of the Sugar Program Since the 2008 Farm Bill & Policy
Implications for the 2013 Farm Bill,” June 3, 2013, p. 1, https://fairsugarpolicy.org/wordpress/wp-content/
uploads/2018/03/AgralyticaEconomicEffectsPaperJune2013.pdf (accessed December 16, 2022).
45. U.S. Department of Labor, “Quintiles of Income Before Taxes,” and Bakst and Tyrrell, “Big Government Policies
That Hurt the Poor and How to Address Them.”
46. Congressional Budget Office, Options for Reducing the Deficit, 2023 to 2032, p. 3. See also Congressional
Budget Office, “Reduce Subsidies in the Crop Insurance Program,” in Congressional Budget Office, “Options
for Reducing the Deficit: 2021 to 2030,” December 9, 2020, https://www.cbo.gov/budget-options/56815
(accessed December 14, 2022).
47. Congressional Budget Office, Options for Reducing the Deficit, 2023 to 2032, p. 6.
48. “Reduce Premium Subsidies in the Federal Crop Insurance Program,” Budget Blueprint for Fiscal Year 2023,
https://www.heritage.org/budget/pages/recommendations/2.350.171.html.
49. Congressional Budget Office, “Reduce Subsidies in the Crop Insurance Program.”
50. Ibid.
51. Congressional Budget Office, Options for Reducing the Deficit, 2023 to 2032, p. 6.
52. U.S. Department of Agriculture, Food and Nutrition Service, “Center for Nutrition Policy and Promotion
(CNPP),” https://www.fns.usda.gov/cnpp (accessed December 16, 2022), and U.S. Department of
Agriculture, “About CNPP,” Food and Nutrition Service, https://www.fns.usda.gov/about-cnpp (accessed
December 16, 2022).
53. Dietary Guidelines for Americans, “Purpose of the Dietary Guidelines,” https://www.dietaryguidelines.gov/
about-dietary-guidelines/purpose-dietary-guidelines (accessed December 16, 2022).
54. Robert Rector and Vijay Menon, “Understanding the Hidden $1.1 Trillion Welfare System and How to Reform
It,” Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 3294, April 5, 2018, https://www.heritage.org/welfare/report/
understanding-the-hidden-11-trillion-welfare-system-and-how-reform-it.



Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise
55. U.S. Department of Agriculture, “SNAP Data Tables,” Food and Nutrition Service, December 9, 2022, https://
www.fns.usda.gov/pd/supplemental-nutrition-assistance-program-snap (accessed December 16, 2022).
56. Ibid.
57. U.S. Department of Agriculture, Food and Nutrition Service, “SNAP Work Requirements,” May 2019, https://
www.fns.usda.gov/snap/work-requirements#:~:text=Work%20at%20least%2080%20hours,least%2080%20
hours%20a%20month (accessed December 16, 2022).
58. 7 U.S. Code § 2015, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/7/2015 (accessed December 16, 2022).
59. Ibid.
60. 7 U.S. Code § 2015(o)(4). The USDA has approved nearly all waivers under the “lack of sufficient jobs” option.
61. Federal Register, Vol. 84, No. 234 (December 5, 2019) p. 66782, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR2019-12-05/pdf/2019-26044.pdf (accessed December 14, 2022).
62. Ibid., p. 66795.
63. Ibid., pp. 66807–66810.
64. District of Columbia, et al. v. U.S. Department of Agriculture, 496 F. Supp. 3d 213 (2020), https://oag.dc.gov/
sites/default/files/2020-10/SNAP-ABAWD-Opinion.pdf (accessed December 16, 2022).
65. Ibid. On December 16, 2020, the Trump Administration appealed the District Court decision. See, for example,
News release “Fudge Slams Administration for Appealing ABAWD Ruling,” House Committee on Agriculture,
December 16, 2020, https://agriculture.house.gov/news/documentsingle.aspx?DocumentID=2069 (accessed
December 16, 2022).
66. News release, “Statement by Agriculture Secretary Tom Vilsack on D.C. Circuit Court’s Decision
Regarding ABAWDs Rule,” U.S. Department of Agriculture, March 24, 2021, https://www.usda.gov/media/
press-releases/2021/03/24/statement-agriculture-secretary-tom-vilsack-dc-circuit-courts (accessed
December 16, 2022).
67. U.S. Department of Agriculture, “SNAP Employment and Training Screening and Referral Guidance,” July 13,
2022, https://www.fns.usda.gov/snap/et-screening-and-referral-guidance (accessed December 16, 2022).
68. U.S. Department of Agriculture, Food and Nutrition Service, “Regulatory Reform at a Glance: Proposed Rule;
Revision of SNAP Categorical Eligibility,” July 2019, https://www.usda.gov/sites/default/files/documents/
BBCE_Fact_Sheet_%28FINAL%29_72219-PR.pdf (accessed December 14, 2022).
69. 7 Code of Federal Regulations § 273.8 (1978), https://www.law.cornell.edu/cfr/text/7/273.8 (accessed
December 16, 2022).
70. Kristina Rasmussen, “How Millionaires Collect Food Stamps,” Wall Street Journal, January 15, 2018, https://
www.wsj.com/articles/how-millionaires-collect-food-stamps-1516044026 (accessed December 14, 2022).
71. Federal Register, Vol. 84, No. 142 (July 24, 2019), pp. 35570–55581, https://www.federalregister.gov/
documents/2019/07/24/2019-15670/revision-of-categorical-eligibility-in-the-supplemental-nutritionassistance-program-snap (accessed December 14, 2022).
72. News release, “USDA Modernizes the Thrifty Food Plan, Updates SNAP Benefits,” U.S. Department of
Agriculture, August 16, 2021, https://www.usda.gov/media/press-releases/2021/08/16/usda-modernizesthrifty-food-plan-updates-snap- (accessed December 14, 2022).
73. Phillip L. Swagel, Director, Congressional Budget Office, letter to Congressman Jason Smith, June 23, 2022, p.
2, https://www.cbo.gov/system/files/2022-06/58231-Smith.pdf (accessed December 14, 2022).
74. Congressional Budget Office, “H.R. 2, as Passed by the House of Representatives and as Passed by the Senate,”
July 24, 2018, https://www.cbo.gov/publication/54284 (accessed December 16, 2022).
75. News release, “Republican AG Committee Leadership Urge GAO Review of USDA Thrifty Food Plan Scheme,”
U.S. House Committee on Agriculture, August 13, 2021, https://republicans-agriculture.house.gov/news/
documentsingle.aspx?DocumentID=7013 (accessed December 14, 2022).
76. “The 2014 Farm Bill: Changing the Tradition of LIHEAP Receipt in the Calculation of SNAP Benefits,” updated
February 12, 2014, Congressional Research Service Report for Congress R42591, https://crsreports.congress.
gov/product/pdf/R/R42591/24 (accessed March 18, 2023).
77. Federal Register, Vol. 84, No. 192 (October 3, 2019), pp. 52809–52815, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/
FR-2019-10-03/pdf/2019-21287.pdf (accessed December 16, 2022).
78. U.S. Department of Agriculture, “Special Supplemental Nutrition Program for Women, Infants, and Children
(WIC) Data Series, 2018 to 2022,” https://www.fns.usda.gov/pd/wic-program (accessed December 14, 2022).

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79. U.S. Department of Agriculture, Food and Nutrition Service, “WIC Data Tables,” December 9, 2022, https://
www.fns.usda.gov/pd/wic-program (accessed December 16, 2022).
80. U.S. Food and Drug Administration, “Regulations and Information on the Manufacture and Distribution of
Infant Formula,” May 16, 2022, https://www.fda.gov/food/infant-formula-guidance-documents-regulatoryinformation/regulations-and-information-manufacture-and-distribution-infant-formula (accessed
December 14, 2022).
81. U.S. Department of Agriculture, Food and Nutrition Service, “History of the National School Lunch Program,”
January 17, 2008, https://www.fns.usda.gov/nslp/program-history (accessed December 14, 2022).
82. U.S. Department of Agriculture, Food and Nutrition Service, “School Breakfast Program History,” July 24,
2013, https://www.fns.usda.gov/sbp/program-history (accessed December 14, 2022), and U.S. Department of
Agriculture, Food and Nutrition Service, “History of the National School Lunch Program.”
83. Crystal FitzSimons, “Free School Meals for All Is the Key to Supporting Education and Health Outcomes,”
Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, Vol 41, No. 1 (2022), pp. 358–364, https://econpapers.repec.org/
article/wlyjpamgt/v_3a41_3ay_3a2022_3ai_3a1_3ap_3a358-364.htm (accessed December 14, 2022).
84. Jonathan Butcher and Vijay Menon, “Returning to the Intent of Government School Meals: Helping Students
in Need,” Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 3399, March 22, 2019, https://www.heritage.org/sites/
default/files/2019-03/BG3399.pdf.
85. Daren Bakst and Jonathan Butcher, “A Critical Fix to the Federal Overreach on School Meals,” Heritage
Foundation Issue Brief No. 4976, July 11, 2019, https://www.heritage.org/hunger-and-food-programs/report/
critical-fix-the-federal-overreach-school-meals.
86. Ibid., and U.S. Department of Agriculture, Food and Nutrition Service, “Community Eligibility Provision,” April
19, 2019, https://www.fns.usda.gov/cn/community-eligibility-provision (accessed December 16, 2022).
87. See Payment Accuracy, https://www.paymentaccuracy.gov/ (accessed December 16, 2022).
88. Payment Accuracy, “Payment Integrity Scorecard,” https://www.cfo.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/Q3/
FNS%20National%20School%20Lunch%20Program%20(NSLP)%20Payments%20Integrity%20Scorecard%20
FY%202022%20Q3.pdf (accessed December 14, 2022).
89. U.S. Government Accountability Office, “School Meals Programs: USDA Has Reported Taking Some Steps to
Reduce Improper Payments But Should Comprehensively Assess Fraud Risks,” GAO–19–389, May 21, 2022,
https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-19-389 (accessed December 14, 2022).
90. Payment Accuracy, “Payment Integrity Scorecard.”
91. White House, “Fact Sheet: The American Families Plan,” April 28, 2021, https://www.whitehouse.gov/
briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/04/28/fact-sheet-the-american-families-plan/ (accessed
December 14, 2022).
92. Universal School Meals Program Act of 2021, S. 1530, 117th Cong., 1st Sess., https://www.congress.gov/
bill/117th-congress/senate-bill/1530 (accessed December 14, 2022).
93. See, for example, U.S. Department of Agriculture, “Find Meals for Kids When Schools Are Closed,” Food and
Nutrition Service, September 22, 2022, https://www.fns.usda.gov/meals4kids (accessed December 16, 2022),
and U.S. Department of Agriculture, Food and Nutrition Service, “Seamless Summer and Other Options for
School,” July 16, 2013, https://www.fns.usda.gov/sfsp/seamless-summer-and-other-options-schools (accessed
December 16, 2022).
94. Tom Driscoll, “From the Field: Farmers Are the Original Conservationists,” National Farmers Union, August
30, 2017, https://nfu.org/2017/08/30/from-the-field-farmers-are-the-original-conservationists/ (accessed
December 16, 2022).
95. U.S. Department of Agriculture, Farm Service Agency, “Conservation Programs,” https://www.fsa.usda.gov/
programs-and-services/conservation-programs/index (accessed December 16, 2022), and U.S. Department of
Agriculture, Natural Resources Conservation Service, “Programs and Initiatives,” https://www.nrcs.usda.gov/
programs-initiatives (accessed December 16, 2022).
96. U.S. Department of Agriculture, Farm Service Agency, “Conservation Reserve Program: About the
Conservation Reserve Program (CRP),” https://www.fsa.usda.gov/programs-and-services/conservationprograms/conservation-reserve-program/ (accessed December 16, 2022).



Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise
97. American Bakers Association et al., letter to U.S. Department of Agriculture Secretary Tom Vilsack, March 23,
2022, https://www.dropbox.com/s/yfyv04ilkom11zd/USDA%20Letter%20to%20Secretary%20Vilsack%20on%20
Tools%20to%20Address%20Global%20Commodity%20Supply%20Challenges%203.23.22_.pdf?dl=0 (accessed
December 15, 2022). It is also necessary to increase food production to mitigate high food inflation. Approximately
25 percent of idled land is considered prime farmland. Therefore, one-quarter of idled land is merely idling,
not producing food—and this does not include other land that may viably be used for food production. The
Conservation Reserve Program should be eliminated. There are also two issues connected to property rights and
fairness that should be addressed: challenging NRCS determinations and problems with USDA easements. To be
eligible for many USDA programs, farmers must comply with certain conservation provisions enforced by NRCS.
Conservation compliance of wetlands and highly erodible lands consist of federal restrictions that prevent farmers
from using parts of their property. If farmers plant crops or modify the areas federal officials deem protected,
farmers can lose all access to USDA programs and support. For farmers, there are real, practical concerns to
challenging NRCS determinations, including the time and costs of challenging the federal bureaucracy. NRCS is
empowered to declare areas wetlands and highly erodible areas, which are therefore off limits for farming. If these
wetland-or-erodible-declared areas are used in a manner deemed unacceptable by federal officials, NRCS may
revoke access to federal resources and subsidies by making technical determinations that carry potential penalties.
There must be a fair and reasonable process for farmers to challenge such actions. See Daren Bakst, “Food Price
Inflation Continues to Worsen. Here’s What Should Be Done About It,” The Daily Signal, April 25, 2022, https://
www.dailysignal.com/2022/04/25/food-price-inflation-continuing-to-worsen-heres-what-should-be-doneabout-it/ (accessed December 15, 2022); American Bakers Association et.al., letter to Vilsack; U.S. Department of
Agriculture, Natural Resources Conservation Service, “Conservation Compliance Appeals Process,” https://www.
nrcs.usda.gov/getting-assistance/compliance/conservation-compliance-appeals-process (accessed December 15,
2022); and Chris Bennett, “Regulatory Hell: Farmer and Veteran Wins 10-Year Wetlands Fight With Government,”
AG Web, August 30, 2021, https://www.agweb.com/news/crops/crop-production/regulatory-hell-farmer-andveteran-wins-10-year-wetlands-fight (accessed December 15, 2022).
98. Fortunately, there are already resources available to help states establish their own wetlands conservation
programs. One particular example, the American Legislative Exchange Council’s Wetlands Mapping and
Protection Act model policy, is available for states to define the procedures, guidelines, and administration of
wetlands programs. American Legislative Exchange Council, “Wetlands Mapping and Protection Act,” November
16, 2017, https://alec.org/model-policy/wetlands-mapping-and-protection-act/ (accessed December 16, 2022). The
new Administration should focus on best practices instead of imposing prescriptive federal practices. It should
support the policies contained within the “NRCS Wetland Compliance and Appeals Reform Act” and modify NRCS
compliance rules to protect farmers and ranchers by adding protections against regulatory overreach—such as
banning the practice of re-engaging farmers in new technical determinations appeals processes for the same
areas of their farms. See NRCS Wetland Compliance and Appeals Reform Act, S. 4931, 117th Cong., 2nd Sess.,
https://www.congress.gov/bill/117th-congress/senate-bill/4931?s=1&r=8 (accessed December 15, 2022).
99. Ibid
100. See, for example, Daren Bakst and Jeremy Dalrymple, “Reducing Federal Barriers for the Sale of Meat,”
Heritage Foundation Issue Brief No. 5078, June 1, 2020, https://www.heritage.org/agriculture/report/
reducing-federal-barriers-the-sale-meat, and U.S. Department of Agriculture, Food Safety and Inspection
Service, “State Inspection Programs,” updated January 12, 2023, https://www.fsis.usda.gov/inspection/stateinspection-programs (accessed December 15, 2022).
101. U.S. Department of Agriculture, Food Safety and Inspection Service, “Cooperative Interstate Shipping
Program,” September 7, 2022, https://www.fsis.usda.gov/inspection/state-inspection-programs/cooperativeinterstate-shipping-program (accessed December 15, 2022).
102. U.S. Department of Agriculture, “State Inspection Programs.”
103. The Senate bill removes obstacles for both meat and poultry. The House version does not appear to cover
poultry. New Markets for State-Inspected Meat and Poultry Act of 2021, S. 107, 117th Cong., 1st Sess., https://
www.congress.gov/bill/117th-congress/senate-bill/107#:~:text=This%20bill%20allows%20meat%20and,be%20
sold%20in%20interstate%20commerce (accessed December 15, 2022), and Expanding Markets for StateInspected Meat Processors Act of 2021, H.R. 1998, 117th Cong., 1st Sess., https://www.congress.gov/bill/117thcongress/house-bill/1998 (accessed December 15, 2022).

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Department of Agriculture

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104. U.S. Department of Agriculture, Agricultural Marketing Service, “Specialty Crops Marketing Orders &
Agreements,” https://www.ams.usda.gov/rules-regulations/moa/fv (accessed December 15, 2022).
105. See, for example, U.S. Department of Agriculture, Agricultural Marketing Service, “Commodities Covered
by Marketing Orders,” https://www.ams.usda.gov/rules-regulations/moa/commodities (accessed March
18, 2023), and Elayne Allen and Darren Bakst, “How the Government Is Mandating Food Waste,” August 19,
2016, https://www.dailysignal.com/2016/08/19/how-the-government-is-mandating-food-waste/ (accessed
March 18, 2023).
106. U.S. Department of Agriculture, Agricultural Marketing Service, “Frequently Asked Questions Regarding the
Beef Checkoff Program Petition Process,” https://www.ams.usda.gov/rules-regulations/research-promotion/
beef/petition (accessed December 16, 2022); “Beef Producers: Do You Want to Vote on the Checkoff?” Beef
Magazine, July 28, 2020, https://www.beefmagazine.com/marketing/beef-producers-do-you-want-votecheckoff (accessed December 16, 2022); and Steve White, “Group Seeking Beef Checkoff Referendum Asks for
Access to Producer Database,” Nebraska TV, May 4, 2021, https://nebraska.tv/news/ntvs-grow/group-seekingbeef-checkoff-referendum-asks-for-access-to-producer-database (accessed December 16, 2022). As reported,
“There has not been a referendum of the mandatory National Beef Checkoff Program in 35 years.”
107. See, for example, Federal Register, Vol. 86, No. 213 (November 8, 2021), p. 61718, https://www.govinfo.gov/
content/pkg/FR-2021-11-08/pdf/2021-24301.pdf (accessed December 16, 2022).
108. U.S. Department of Agriculture, Foreign Agricultural Service, “Topics,” https://www.fas.usda.gov/topics
(accessed December 15, 2022).
109. Ibid.
110. U.S. Department of Agriculture, Foreign Agricultural Service, “Market Access Program (MAP),” https://www.fas.
usda.gov/programs/market-access-program-map (accessed December 16, 2022).
111. To learn about trade barriers for food and agricultural products, see, for example, News release, “USTR
Releases 2022 National Trade Estimate Report on Foreign Trade Barriers,” Office of the U.S. Trade
Representative, March 31, 2022, https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2022/
march/ustr-releases-2022-national-trade-estimate-report-foreign-trade-barriers (accessed
December 16, 2022).
112. U.S. Department of Agriculture, Economic Research Service, “Recent Trends in GE Adoption,” September 14,
2022, https://www.ers.usda.gov/data-products/adoption-of-genetically-engineered-crops-in-the-u-s/recenttrends-in-ge-adoption/ (accessed December 15, 2022).
113. National Bioengineered Food Disclosure Standard, Public Law 114–216.
114. Noi Mahoney, “Trade Dispute Arising Over Mexico’s Plan to Block Imports of Genetically Modified Corn,”
Freight Waves, November 22, 2022, https://www.freightwaves.com/news/trade-dispute-arising-overmexicos-plan-to-block-imports-of-gm-corn (accessed December 15, 2022), and News release, “Grassley, Ernst,
Urge USTR to Intervene In Mexico’s Ban on American Corn,” Office of Chuck Grassley, November 14, 2022,
https://www.grassley.senate.gov/news/news-releases/grassley-ernst-urge-ustr-to-intervene-in-mexicos-banon-american-corn (accessed December 15, 2022).
115. “The Federal Land Management Agencies,” Congressional Research Service In Focus, updated February 16,
2021, https://sgp.fas.org/crs/misc/IF10585.pdf (accessed December 16, 2022).
116. Ibid.
117. U.S. Department of Agriculture, U.S. Forest Service, Fiscal Year 2023: Budget Justification, March 2022, p. 1,
https://www.usda.gov/sites/default/files/documents/30a-2023-FS.pdf (accessed December 16, 2022).
118. Forests and Rangelands, The National Strategy: The Final Phase in the Development of the National Cohesive
Wildland Fire Management Strategy, April 2014, https://www.forestsandrangelands.gov/documents/strategy/
strategy/CSPhaseIIINationalStrategyApr2014.pdf (accessed December 16, 2022).
119. U.S. Department of Agriculture, U.S. Forest Service, “Unplanned Fires,” https://www.fs.usda.gov/detail/inyo/
landmanagement/resourcemanagement/?cid=stelprd3804071 (accessed December 16, 2022).
120. See, for example, Sherry Devlin, “A Conversation with Jim Hubbard: Unplanned Wildfires Rule West’s
Forests,” TreeSource, March 28, 2017, https://treesource.org/news/lands/jim-hubbard-forest-service-wildfires/
(accessed December 16, 2022).

Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise



121. U.S. Department of Agriculture, U.S. Forest Service, “FY 1905–2021 National Summary Cut and Sold Data
Graphs,” https://www.fs.usda.gov/forestmanagement/documents/sold-harvest/documents/1905-2021_Natl_
Summary_Graph_wHarvestAcres.pdf (accessed December 16, 2022), and U.S. Department of Agriculture, U.S.
Forest Service, “Forest Products Cut and Sold from the National Forests and Grasslands,” https://www.fs.usda.
gov/forestmanagement/products/cut-sold/index.shtml (accessed December 16, 2022).
122. Donald J. Trump, “Promoting Active Management of America’s Forests, Rangelands, and Other Federal Lands
to Improve Conditions and Reduce Wildfire Risk,” Executive Order 13855, December 21, 2018, https://www.
govinfo.gov/content/pkg/DCPD-201800866/pdf/DCPD-201800866.pdf (accessed December 16, 2022).
123. Ibid.
124. Ibid.
125. Dietary Guidelines for Americans, https://www.dietaryguidelines.gov/ (accessed December 16, 2022).
126. Dietary Guidelines for Americans, “History of the Dietary Guidelines,” https://www.dietaryguidelines.gov/
about-dietary-guidelines/history-dietary-guidelines (accessed December 16, 2022).
127. Daren Bakst, “Extreme Environmental Agenda Hijacks Dietary Guidelines: Comment to the Advisory
Committee,” The Daily Signal, July 17, 2014, https://www.dailysignal.com/2014/07/17/extreme-environmentalagenda-hijacks-dietary-guidelines-comment-advisory-committee/ (accessed December 16, 2022).
128. Healthy, Hunger-Free Kids Act of 2010, S. 3307, 111th Cong., 2nd Sess., https://www.congress.gov/bill/111thcongress/senate-bill/3307/text (accessed December 16, 2022), and Dietary Guidelines for Americans, “Current
Dietary Guidelines,” https://www.dietaryguidelines.gov/usda-hhs-development-dietary-guidelines (accessed
December 16, 2022).

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11

DEPARTMENT OF
EDUCATION
Lindsey M. Burke

MISSION

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Federal education policy should be limited and, ultimately, the federal Department of Education should be eliminated. When power is exercised, it should
empower students and families, not government. In our pluralistic society, families and students should be free to choose from a diverse set of school options and
learning environments that best fit their needs. Our postsecondary institutions
should also reflect such diversity, with room for not only “traditional” liberal arts
colleges and research universities but also faith-based institutions, career schools,
military academies, and lifelong learning programs.
Elementary and secondary education policy should follow the path outlined
by Milton Friedman in 1955, wherein education is publicly funded but education
decisions are made by families. Ultimately, every parent should have the option
to direct his or her child’s share of education funding through an education savings account (ESA), funded overwhelmingly by state and local taxpayers, which
would empower parents to choose a set of education options that meet their child's
unique needs.
States are eager to lead in K–12 education. For decades, they have acted independently of the federal government to pioneer a variety of constructive reforms
and school choice programs. For example, in 2011, Arizona first piloted ESAs, which
provide families roughly 90 percent of what the state would have spent on that
child in public school to be used instead on education options such as private school
tuition, online courses, and tutoring. In 2022, Arizona expanded the program to
be available to all families.



Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise

The future of education freedom and reform in the states is bright and will
shine brighter when regulations and red tape from Washington are eliminated.
Federal money is inevitably accompanied by rules and regulations that keep the
influx of funds from having much, if any, impact on student outcomes. It raises the
cost of education without raising student achievement. To the extent that federal
taxpayer dollars are used to fund education programs, those funds should be blockgranted to states without strings, eliminating the need for many federal and state
bureaucrats. Eventually, policymaking and funding should take place at the state
and local level, closest to the affected families.
Although student loans and grants should ultimately be restored to the private
sector (or, at the very least, the federal government should revisit its role as a guarantor,
rather than direct lender) federal postsecondary education investments should bolster
economic growth, and recipient institutions should nourish academic freedom and
embrace intellectual diversity. That has not, however, been the track record of federal
higher education policy or of the many institutions of higher education that are hostile
to free expression, open academic inquiry, and American exceptionalism. Federal postsecondary policy should be more than massive, inefficient, and open-ended subsidies
to “traditional” colleges and universities. It should be rebalanced to focus far more on
bolstering the workforce skills of Americans who have no interest in pursuing a fouryear academic degree. It should reflect a fuller picture of learning after high school,
placing apprenticeship programs of all types and career and technical education on an
even playing field with degrees from colleges and universities. Rather than continuing
to buttress a higher education establishment captured by woke “diversicrats” and a
de facto monopoly enforced by the federal accreditation cartel, federal postsecondary