|
BEGIN:VCALENDAR |
|
BEGIN:VEVENT |
|
SUMMARY:Opening by NotMyNick |
|
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Helsinki:20250214T123000 |
|
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Helsinki:20250214T125000 |
|
UID:7730d5a4-024a-54f9-9bb9-a576bb9613a1 |
|
DESCRIPTION:Opening by NotMyNick |
|
LOCATION:Terminal Stage |
|
URL:https://disobey.fi/2025/profile/disobey2025-334-opening-by-notmynick |
|
END:VEVENT |
|
BEGIN:VEVENT |
|
SUMMARY:KEYNOTE : SIGINT\, COMINT\, Hack it |
|
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Helsinki:20250214T130000 |
|
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Helsinki:20250214T140000 |
|
UID:fe174764-b730-57b7-8e75-ffda42d9e2ac |
|
DESCRIPTION:Radio communications are everywhere and can replace traditiona |
|
l wired connections to provide greater flexibility in new products and sys |
|
tems. However\, this shift introduces unique risks to both consumer produc |
|
ts and critical infrastructure. Identifying\, analyzing\, and exploiting t |
|
hese vulnerabilities requires some methodologies and specialized tools. In |
|
this talk\, we will see the potential risks exposed by RF communications\ |
|
, and discuss the techniques and tools necessary to effectively uncover an |
|
d address these security challenges. |
|
LOCATION:Terminal Stage |
|
URL:https://disobey.fi/2025/profile/disobey2025-263-keynote-sigint-comint- |
|
hack-it |
|
END:VEVENT |
|
BEGIN:VEVENT |
|
SUMMARY:From promises to performance: A critical review of WAF solutions |
|
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Helsinki:20250214T141500 |
|
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Helsinki:20250214T150000 |
|
UID:55c95a80-dfbb-599a-97ce-931a82453199 |
|
DESCRIPTION:Dive into the world of Web Application Firewalls (WAFs)\, expl |
|
oring the strengths and limitations of leading providers such as Azure & A |
|
WS\, as well as some decidedly commercial offerings. Through a detailed ev |
|
aluation based on a subset of the OWASP Top Ten vulnerabilities\, DoS/DDoS |
|
protection and AI/ML capabilities\, we uncover whether WAF solutions deli |
|
ver as promised in terms of protecting against common and bespoke web thre |
|
ats. Participants will gain insights into practical recommendations for se |
|
lecting and deploying WAFs effectively\, emphasizing the integration of de |
|
veloper expertise for enhanced security models. A blend of technical analy |
|
sis and identification of weak areas despite what glossy brochures would h |
|
ave you believe.\n\nTL\;DR: A quick look at what a WAF is\, some of the co |
|
mmercial offerings in WAF space\, what it can and cannot do for you\, some |
|
WAF fails |
|
LOCATION:Terminal Stage |
|
URL:https://disobey.fi/2025/profile/disobey2025-257-from-promises-to-perfo |
|
rmance-a-critical-review-of-waf-solutions |
|
END:VEVENT |
|
BEGIN:VEVENT |
|
SUMMARY:Guardians of the Hypervisor\, |
|
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Helsinki:20250214T154500 |
|
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Helsinki:20250214T163000 |
|
UID:41fea0e4-37fb-57ee-9b66-d653a9e2fd0b |
|
DESCRIPTION:All ransomware actors now have the capability to encrypt hyper |
|
visors\, which has led to some of the biggest attacks and has brought down |
|
entire organisations. This talk will give in-depth insight into how these |
|
attacks are performed in real-life\, how to protect against them but also |
|
how detection and response can be accomplished\, even though it is not po |
|
ssible to install any security agents in ESXi or vCenter Server. |
|
LOCATION:Terminal Stage |
|
URL:https://disobey.fi/2025/profile/disobey2025-329-guardians-of-the-hyper |
|
visor- |
|
END:VEVENT |
|
BEGIN:VEVENT |
|
SUMMARY:OODA Loops and Building Mental Snowmobiles with Genghis John |
|
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Helsinki:20250214T164500 |
|
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Helsinki:20250214T173000 |
|
UID:763a5cec-5aec-5e67-9fff-e93c2e815dfe |
|
DESCRIPTION:Just as offensive use cases of AI proliferate\, with the confl |
|
uence of data storage costs decreasing\, advent of big data computing and |
|
edge computing capabilities increasing - now is the time to start modeling |
|
AI for organizational benefit. This presentation will give a brief introd |
|
uction to "Genghis" or "40 second" John Boyd\, OODA Loop basics like what |
|
is Exceptional Information and why it matters\, how to structure a home-gr |
|
own Online Analytical Processing (OLAP) cube for rapid anomaly detection a |
|
t scale\, common cultural and cognitive biases and how they pertain to dis |
|
aster psychology\, the eustress vs. distress spectrum and the birth of Ent |
|
erprise Stress Management / Ikigai in HR programs\, how backwards or conic |
|
al planning can completely change how your organization accomplishes strat |
|
egic planning and ultimately how digitally captured after action reviews ( |
|
AARs) can pave the way to Implicit Guidance and Control. |
|
LOCATION:Terminal Stage |
|
URL:https://disobey.fi/2025/profile/disobey2025-244-ooda-loops-and-buildin |
|
g-mental-snowmobiles-with-genghis-john |
|
END:VEVENT |
|
BEGIN:VEVENT |
|
SUMMARY:Exploiting Token Based Authentication: Attacking and Defending Ide |
|
ntities in the 2020s |
|
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Helsinki:20250214T174500 |
|
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Helsinki:20250214T183000 |
|
UID:39b775a8-d84a-5945-ba9b-7efc3e98dca2 |
|
DESCRIPTION:Modern services\, whether on-prem or cloud\, are using token-b |
|
ased authentication. These tokens are cryptographically signed or encrypte |
|
d and used as proof of users' identity when consuming services.\n\nThis ta |
|
lk explains two known token-based authentication attacks: stealing tokens |
|
(token-replay) and forging tokens. I will cover how adversaries are conduc |
|
ting both attacks and how to detect & protect against them. |
|
LOCATION:Terminal Stage |
|
URL:https://disobey.fi/2025/profile/disobey2025-297-exploiting-token-based |
|
-authentication-attacking-and-defending-identities-in-the-2020s |
|
END:VEVENT |
|
BEGIN:VEVENT |
|
SUMMARY:Adventures in developing a C2 framework |
|
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Helsinki:20250214T190000 |
|
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Helsinki:20250214T194500 |
|
UID:e431c920-523f-5cea-addb-80957eb85d51 |
|
DESCRIPTION:Instead of going with an existing Command & Control (C2) frame |
|
work\, we decided to go a different route in our Red Team and have been de |
|
veloping our own tool called "Citadel". During this presentation\, I want |
|
to talk about the architecture we chose as well as some of the challenges\ |
|
, weird behaviors\, and solutions to these that we found during the develo |
|
pment process. |
|
LOCATION:Terminal Stage |
|
URL:https://disobey.fi/2025/profile/disobey2025-289-adventures-in-developi |
|
ng-a-c2-framework |
|
END:VEVENT |
|
BEGIN:VEVENT |
|
SUMMARY:Will It Run? Fooling EDRs with command lines using empirical data |
|
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Helsinki:20250214T200000 |
|
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Helsinki:20250214T204500 |
|
UID:cb3a9053-fd04-5390-a881-87349f461c57 |
|
DESCRIPTION:Most Endpoint Detection & Response solutions (‘EDRs’) heav |
|
ily rely on analysing process events for detecting suspicious behaviour\; |
|
in particular\, command-line arguments are inspected for keywords or chara |
|
cter sequences that may indicate malicious activity. This is still common |
|
practice\, despite the widely known fact that a process’ command line ca |
|
n be altered\, hidden\, or otherwise spoofed\, which may bypass such defen |
|
sive measures.\n\nLesser known is that\, particularly on Windows operating |
|
systems\, there is a wealth of system-native programs that happily accept |
|
‘unexpected’ command-line transformations\, such as character substit |
|
utions\, deletions or insertions. An implication of this is that command-l |
|
ine-based detections can be bypassed with minimal effort\, and unlike comm |
|
and-line spoofing\, without the need for special system calls. Tools vulne |
|
rable to this include those often leveraged in attacks that ‘live off th |
|
e land’ (also known as LOLBins or LOLBAS). \n\nThis talk will show\, bas |
|
ed on empirical analysis of the 60 most commonly used LOLBins\, how many d |
|
etections can bypassed making minimal tweaks to how a LOLBins are called. |
|
Furthermore\, we will introduce a new web-based tool that not only documen |
|
ts the results for all these executables\, it allows everyone to generate |
|
obfuscated command lines themselves with the click of a button. |
|
LOCATION:Terminal Stage |
|
URL:https://disobey.fi/2025/profile/disobey2025-292-will-it-run-fooling-ed |
|
rs-with-command-lines-using-empirical-data |
|
END:VEVENT |
|
BEGIN:VEVENT |
|
SUMMARY:Dissecting the Cicada - In the shadow of the Black Cat |
|
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Helsinki:20250214T210000 |
|
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Helsinki:20250214T214500 |
|
UID:0a692c49-0040-51d7-bff6-1c43d190073f |
|
DESCRIPTION:In the end of June 2024\, a new enigmatic ransomware-as-a-serv |
|
ice group emerged under the name Cicada 3301. They have apparently stolen |
|
the name and branding from a cryptographic puzzle to add mystery to their |
|
name. Since the start\, this ransomware has added numerous victims to thei |
|
r onion site and analysis of their attacks has shown several links to the |
|
notorious ransomware group BlackCat/ALPHV\, that was dissolved in a multi- |
|
million exit scam after the group’s infrastructure was hacked by interna |
|
tional law enforcement.\n\nThis presentation will contain technical and no |
|
n-technical evidence suggestion a link between Cicada and BlackCat\, such |
|
as\n\nIn-depth malware analysis of both ESXi and Windows ransomware used b |
|
y Cicada and similarities to the ALPHV ransomware\nTools\, Techniques and |
|
Procedures (TTP) used in ransomware attacks investigated by Truesec\, comp |
|
aring Cicada 3301 incidents to BlackCat/ALPHV\nConnections to a possible a |
|
ccess broker\, responsible for the Brutus botnet\nCommand and control infr |
|
astructure used by Cicada 3301 and how it is linked BlackCat\nTracing prof |
|
iles on Russian cybercrime forums related to Cicada 3301\nWe at Truesec we |
|
re the first cybersecurity company to publish the links between Cicada 330 |
|
1 and BlackCat. Since publication\, by Bleeping Computer and other news si |
|
tes\, we have investigated more data and can present further evidence of c |
|
onnections between these two groups.\n\nWe will demonstrate how a holistic |
|
approach to threat intelligence\, combining reverse engineering\, forensi |
|
c analysis and dark web investigation can provide a deeper understanding o |
|
f threat actors. |
|
LOCATION:Terminal Stage |
|
URL:https://disobey.fi/2025/profile/disobey2025-251-dissecting-the-cicada- |
|
in-the-shadow-of-the-black-cat |
|
END:VEVENT |
|
BEGIN:VEVENT |
|
SUMMARY:Hacking people and organizations for greater good |
|
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Helsinki:20250214T141500 |
|
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Helsinki:20250214T150000 |
|
UID:0d88922b-2ab7-5442-9529-fddd6784fd75 |
|
DESCRIPTION:Life is a game. You're a part of a game called worklife chess. |
|
Players and goals shift highlighting the importance of understanding the |
|
core rules and the metagame in order to succeed. But only a part of the ga |
|
me is visible or clear. The rest is happens beyond your reach. You are sur |
|
rounded by attitudes\, ambitions\, hidden agendas and human irrationality |
|
on your journey to safeguarding the organization from evil and chaos. Can |
|
you reach your goals? What actually are your goals? Can you succeed by pla |
|
ying by the rules or do you need to force a change into the rules? |
|
LOCATION:Security Theater |
|
URL:https://disobey.fi/2025/profile/disobey2025-304-hacking-people-and-org |
|
anizations-for-greater-good |
|
END:VEVENT |
|
BEGIN:VEVENT |
|
SUMMARY:State of Union |
|
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Helsinki:20250214T151500 |
|
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Helsinki:20250214T160000 |
|
UID:5ac5a305-6c9a-55c7-96e6-4781c0fdf197 |
|
DESCRIPTION:Updated Radio Equipment Regulation is practically ready to be |
|
enforced and Cyber Resilience Act is in horizon.\n\nWhat does this mean fo |
|
r consumers and manufacturers? \nHow many of our devices actually meets th |
|
e new requirements?\nHow the consumer market of smart devices will look li |
|
ke in 2030? |
|
LOCATION:Security Theater |
|
URL:https://disobey.fi/2025/profile/disobey2025-239-state-of-union |
|
END:VEVENT |
|
BEGIN:VEVENT |
|
SUMMARY:Let's get physical |
|
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Helsinki:20250214T161500 |
|
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Helsinki:20250214T170000 |
|
UID:1ff8c11a-754c-552e-9b74-d547af0078be |
|
DESCRIPTION:It will be demonstrated through stories\, images\, and videos |
|
how various locking mechanisms can be bypassed. The lecture will cover wea |
|
knesses in\, among other things\, doors\, key switches\, combination locks |
|
\, padlocks\, access control systems etc.\, providing a unique insight int |
|
o the vulnerabilities of common security systems that we rely on. |
|
LOCATION:Security Theater |
|
URL:https://disobey.fi/2025/profile/disobey2025-253-let-s-get-physical |
|
END:VEVENT |
|
BEGIN:VEVENT |
|
SUMMARY:Hunting for Attack Paths in OpenAPI Documentations |
|
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Helsinki:20250214T173000 |
|
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Helsinki:20250214T181500 |
|
UID:4856635c-435b-55e9-b7f2-78dad531c7ab |
|
DESCRIPTION:How to uncovered vulnerabilities in APIs by analyzing the docu |
|
mentation and how testing techniques can be improved based on these result |
|
s. |
|
LOCATION:Security Theater |
|
URL:https://disobey.fi/2025/profile/disobey2025-277-hunting-for-attack-pat |
|
hs-in-openapi-documentations |
|
END:VEVENT |
|
BEGIN:VEVENT |
|
SUMMARY:Supercharging Your Security Pipeline: Managing Vulnerabilities in |
|
a Multi-Tool Jungle |
|
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Helsinki:20250214T183000 |
|
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Helsinki:20250214T190000 |
|
UID:057e6e71-0be1-5ba7-8157-cfefc6730d93 |
|
DESCRIPTION:In today’s rapidly evolving cybersecurity landscape\, the sh |
|
eer number of security tools available to scan your pipeline is constantly |
|
increasing. With new tools entering the market at an unprecedented pace\, |
|
it can be challenging to manage overlapping findings and determine which |
|
tools excel in specific areas. The overwhelming amount of data generated c |
|
an make it difficult to focus remediation efforts and build a comprehensiv |
|
e security posture.\n\nVulnerability management tools like [DefectDojo](ht |
|
tps://github.com/DefectDojo/django-DefectDojo) address this challenge by c |
|
orrelating findings from various security tools\, including SAST\, DAST\, |
|
SCA scanners\, and image/container/posture scanners\, presenting them on a |
|
single pane of glass. By creating a data model of your product stack and |
|
security engagements\, and enriching it with metadata such as internet exp |
|
osure and criticality\, security management can make informed decisions on |
|
prioritizing vulnerability mitigation and remediation across your product |
|
range.\n\n[DefectDojo](https://github.com/DefectDojo/django-DefectDojo) e |
|
nables the triage of findings—filtering out non-applicable findings\, fa |
|
lse positives\, and deduplication—prior to assigning them as work items\ |
|
, regardless of the source. While traditional process-based approaches can |
|
still be utilized\, [DefectDojo](https://github.com/DefectDojo/django-Def |
|
ectDojo) offers users the capability to automate much of the process. Allo |
|
wing teams to run multiple security tools in parallel\, comparing their ou |
|
tputs to determine the most effective solutions for your security needs.\n |
|
\n**Why is this important?** According to the Verizon 2024 Data Breach Inv |
|
estigations Report ([verizon.com/dbir](https://verizon.com/dbir))\, accele |
|
rating the patching of critical vulnerabilities is crucial. By filtering o |
|
ut irrelevant data and enabling developers to focus on quickly remediating |
|
critical vulnerabilities through risk-based SLAs\, you can significantly |
|
reduce the time from vulnerability disclosure to remediation. Additionally |
|
\, integrating tools through APIs and automating the processing\, prioriti |
|
zation\, deduplication\, and assignment of findings to the appropriate dev |
|
elopers further increases remediation velocity. |
|
LOCATION:Security Theater |
|
URL:https://disobey.fi/2025/profile/disobey2025-265-supercharging-your-sec |
|
urity-pipeline-managing-vulnerabilities-in-a-multi-tool-jungle |
|
END:VEVENT |
|
BEGIN:VEVENT |
|
SUMMARY:WarGames: Security in Games |
|
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Helsinki:20250214T191500 |
|
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Helsinki:20250214T200000 |
|
UID:60e44f28-ceee-544c-a6f0-4575ec4d944e |
|
DESCRIPTION:What sets games apart from other applications on the web?\nAlm |
|
ost nothing and everything! While many games are just like any other moder |
|
n website with an API\, database\, data going back and forth games introdu |
|
ce a interesting new vector in it all.\nNot only can items in games be wor |
|
th a lot of money\, accounts can be grown and harvested to be sold and gam |
|
es themselves can become the attack vector for something else.\nWith inter |
|
net entertainment having evolved from game trailers\, to Let's plays\, to |
|
streamers\, to VTubers we see attacks targeting single individuals to hara |
|
ss or dox through the games they play.\nSo what attacks do we see\, what d |
|
esign patterns do we use to minimize our attack surfaces and what can happ |
|
en when we fail?\nLet's take a dive beyond the normal problems with web ap |
|
plications into the world of games. |
|
LOCATION:Security Theater |
|
URL:https://disobey.fi/2025/profile/disobey2025-301-wargames-security-in-g |
|
ames |
|
END:VEVENT |
|
BEGIN:VEVENT |
|
SUMMARY:Flipping Bits: Your Credentials Are Certainly Mine |
|
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Helsinki:20250214T201500 |
|
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Helsinki:20250214T210000 |
|
UID:a47310c0-d7e6-59ce-a4ad-08e58b76ff77 |
|
DESCRIPTION:Did you know that if you change a single bit from 1 to 0 (or v |
|
ice versa) in the first 'g' of the domain name google.com (which is 011001 |
|
11 in binary) you will end up with variety of valid "bitflip" domains like |
|
coogle.com\, oogle.com\, & woogle.com\n \nSo what happens if you generate |
|
and register a bunch of cheap bitfliped versions of popular cloud / Saas |
|
provider domains\, point them to your VPS\, log all incoming requests & th |
|
en forget about the whole thing for two years?\n \nWell you will in fact r |
|
eceive a stiff bill\, generate huge log files and eventually run out of di |
|
sk space. But on the upside\, you will also have collected a treasure trov |
|
e of legit credentials & interesting stuff like valid OAuth refresh tokens |
|
\, JWT tokens\, bearers\, cookies\, emails\, meeting invites with password |
|
s & truckloads of internet scanner noise.\n \nIn this session we will revi |
|
sit bitflip research from the last decade and weponize it. Showcase 'Certa |
|
inly' a pioneering offensive / defensive tool that employs Wildcard DNS ma |
|
tching & on-the-fly generated SSL certificates and custom payloads for inc |
|
oming requests across various protocols. All with the intention to downgra |
|
de security\, harvest credentials\, capture emails and replacing dependenc |
|
ies with custom "malicious" payloads |
|
LOCATION:Security Theater |
|
URL:https://disobey.fi/2025/profile/disobey2025-254-flipping-bits-your-cre |
|
dentials-are-certainly-mine |
|
END:VEVENT |
|
BEGIN:VEVENT |
|
SUMMARY:How Fast and Deliberate Swiping Gave Us Access to Very Sensitive D |
|
ata |
|
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Helsinki:20250214T211500 |
|
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Helsinki:20250214T214500 |
|
UID:6143e6f4-9f44-5765-97f0-5c747eec4ea6 |
|
DESCRIPTION:When pentesting for a customer\, we discovered that fast and d |
|
eliberate swiping could give us access to very sensitive data through a mo |
|
bile phone.\n\nIn this talk Bartek Pszczola will tell the tale of how he d |
|
iscovered a 0-day in a widely used VMware app\, what it could lead to and |
|
how the process was when reporting the vulnerability to the vendor. |
|
LOCATION:Security Theater |
|
URL:https://disobey.fi/2025/profile/disobey2025-291-how-fast-and-deliberat |
|
e-swiping-gave-us-access-to-very-sensitive-data |
|
END:VEVENT |
|
BEGIN:VEVENT |
|
SUMMARY:Build a Debugger from Scratch |
|
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Helsinki:20250214T141500 |
|
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Helsinki:20250214T171500 |
|
UID:207fd33a-2040-59f8-8a38-c0fab64443e0 |
|
DESCRIPTION:This workshop focuses on how to build a debugger from scratch. |
|
It will look at various types of debuggers used for malware analysis foll |
|
owed by an in-depth walkthrough of building a Windows debugger from scratc |
|
h using Python in JupyterLab. |
|
LOCATION:Security Forum |
|
URL:https://disobey.fi/2025/profile/disobey2025-258-build-a-debugger-from- |
|
scratch |
|
END:VEVENT |
|
BEGIN:VEVENT |
|
SUMMARY:Abloy Classic Picking: From Beginner to Boss Level |
|
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Helsinki:20250214T180000 |
|
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Helsinki:20250214T200000 |
|
UID:a628c9bb-059e-5655-a07c-d0a8ac671382 |
|
DESCRIPTION:Every Finn knows the legend of the unpickable Abloy lock. Now |
|
it is your chance to challenge that myth and earn the exclusive "I picked |
|
Abloy" -sticker\, proving your mastery of this legendary lock. In our wor |
|
kshop\, you will face a series of Abloy Classic practice locks\, each more |
|
challenging than the last\, carefully designed to guide you on your path |
|
to expertise. Those who conquer the final boss mob –the iconic Abloy Cla |
|
ssic – will be awarded by coveted sticker. Are you ready to make the imp |
|
ossible\, possible? |
|
LOCATION:Security Forum |
|
URL:https://disobey.fi/2025/profile/disobey2025-314-abloy-classic-picking- |
|
from-beginner-to-boss-level |
|
END:VEVENT |
|
BEGIN:VEVENT |
|
SUMMARY:Is this it: Does DevOps development style decrease the security of |
|
software and it’s development? |
|
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Helsinki:20250215T103000 |
|
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Helsinki:20250215T111500 |
|
UID:1cef67fd-a9f7-561e-a5ae-a658cdd3fb0b |
|
DESCRIPTION:The DevOps methodology has become dominant on the software dev |
|
elopment field. It’s benefits have been praised for years. In 2022\, we |
|
carried out a literature review on DevOps security postures and greatest c |
|
hallenges for software development. The BSIMM framework was used for organ |
|
izing the data.\nSynopsis corporation has gathered data from over 130 orga |
|
nizations by using the BSIMM software security maturity framework. This pr |
|
ovided us a chance to compare findings from our study using the academic s |
|
ources with those from real industry\, and also with regard to timeline co |
|
vering 2019-2024.\nTop findings of our academic literature review on 2022 |
|
were:\n1) People have been complaining about security being considered too |
|
late on the software development cycle for ages\, still we did not identi |
|
fy that security postures would cover the whole development cycle.\n2) Dev |
|
Ops development is carried out on a multi-complex environment.\n3) DevOps |
|
style even brings in novel challenges for software security. \n\nIn this t |
|
alk\, \n1) First\, challenges and common postures for software security fr |
|
om the2022 literature review are summarized\; the findings related to DevO |
|
ps development style are discussed in more detail than in the original res |
|
earch.\n2) Secondly\, we compare the results with the findings of the mos |
|
t recent BSIMM research.\n3) Thirdly\, we discuss the trend of integrating |
|
security into DevOps in the light of this analysis covering 4 years.\n\nB |
|
y our analysis\, we conclude that \n-it seems that DevOps brings additiona |
|
l challenges to secure software development\n-It seems that security is st |
|
ill not taken into consideration in a wholistic way\n-As more and more sof |
|
tware is produced by using AI\, uttermost care should be taken to train th |
|
e AI with the code models that take security into consideration.\n\nWe cha |
|
llenge you to:\nDisagree – what contrasting evidence do you have? (on th |
|
e brief discussion after the presentation)\nMake a world better – one so |
|
ftware development project at time (this happens when you go home and see |
|
anyone forgetting the security on their software development postures). |
|
LOCATION:Terminal Stage |
|
URL:https://disobey.fi/2025/profile/disobey2025-287-is-this-it-does-devops |
|
-development-style-decrease-the-security-of-software-and-it-s-development- |
|
END:VEVENT |
|
BEGIN:VEVENT |
|
SUMMARY:Cloud Custodian Unleashed: Automate and Dominate Cloud Governance |
|
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Helsinki:20250215T113000 |
|
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Helsinki:20250215T120000 |
|
UID:25f9839c-495a-562b-9e25-64ca004b5e72 |
|
DESCRIPTION:You installed the cloud security posture monitoring software\, |
|
but you have a ton of alerts and don't know where to start. What would it |
|
take to get to 100% compliant? A workshop-style talk showcasing Cloud Cus |
|
todian\, a simple cloud governance automation tool\, with teeth. Automatic |
|
ally fix compliance issues in real-time with AWS Config\, as they appear\, |
|
and build a defense in-depth approach to cloud security. |
|
LOCATION:Terminal Stage |
|
URL:https://disobey.fi/2025/profile/disobey2025-323-cloud-custodian-unleas |
|
hed-automate-and-dominate-cloud-governance |
|
END:VEVENT |
|
BEGIN:VEVENT |
|
SUMMARY:How to break a voice scrambler: Privacy features in walkie-talkies |
|
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Helsinki:20250215T121500 |
|
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Helsinki:20250215T124500 |
|
UID:66b25e13-6bbe-58ad-9e40-8b7f5d2a113e |
|
DESCRIPTION:Analog hand-held radios\, aka. walkie-talkies\, are still a vi |
|
able option to mobile phones in many situations. Their users are generally |
|
aware of the drawback that they transmit in the clear\, without any encry |
|
ption.\n\nSome radio manufacturers offer privacy options like 'privacy cha |
|
nnels' and voice scrambling to prevent eavesdropping. We'll take a look at |
|
how secure exactly some of these legacy techniques are\, as well as some |
|
ways to use signal processing and visualisations to un-scramble frequency |
|
inversion\, split-band inversion\, and rolling-code scrambling. |
|
LOCATION:Terminal Stage |
|
URL:https://disobey.fi/2025/profile/disobey2025-327-how-to-break-a-voice-s |
|
crambler-privacy-features-in-walkie-talkies |
|
END:VEVENT |
|
BEGIN:VEVENT |
|
SUMMARY:KEYNOTE: You're in the Army Now: How Cyber Offense Became Militari |
|
zed but Defense Not - Challenges Ahead for Those Who Protect |
|
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Helsinki:20250215T130000 |
|
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Helsinki:20250215T134500 |
|
UID:57b6fb60-f27f-5950-a1ef-29cb5d598ce6 |
|
DESCRIPTION:With the designation of cyberspace as the fifth domain of warf |
|
are\, the military's grip on cyber operations has tightened in an effort t |
|
o enhance their strategic potential and tactical success. As cyber offense |
|
increasingly resembles special forces with their slick coordination and l |
|
aser-focused missions\, as seen in Hollywood movies\, many enterprises con |
|
tinue to flounder in outdated management structures and a consensus-orient |
|
ed mindset that cannot contend with this emerging breed of adversary. To s |
|
tand a chance\, defenders must not only understand their opponents' end ga |
|
me and strategies but also be trained to engage at a comparable level. Dra |
|
wing on years of personal hands-on experience in both offensive and defens |
|
ive activities\, this keynote will provide insights into the "behind the s |
|
cenes" aspects of the strategic and tactical planning of state-sponsored c |
|
yber operations and explain why the public sector has been drawn into orga |
|
nized hybrid warfare without consent. By focusing on the limitations of bu |
|
siness-oriented environments and civilian mindsets when defending against |
|
resourceful\, mission-oriented threat actors\, this talk aims to stimulate |
|
the audience’s independent thinking and reasoning about the necessary c |
|
hanges in problem-solving\, decision-making\, and leadership in "left-behi |
|
nd" nonmilitant defense. |
|
LOCATION:Terminal Stage |
|
URL:https://disobey.fi/2025/profile/disobey2025-333-keynote-you-re-in-the- |
|
army-now-how-cyber-offense-became-militarized-but-defense-not-challenges-a |
|
head-for-those-who-protect |
|
END:VEVENT |
|
BEGIN:VEVENT |
|
SUMMARY:On the Receiving End of TIBER: A Reformed Red Teamers Perspective |
|
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Helsinki:20250215T141500 |
|
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Helsinki:20250215T150000 |
|
UID:950803f9-8696-5e32-b2e7-a7a6b5f98ad9 |
|
DESCRIPTION:Going from a red team lead on numerous international red team |
|
engagements and recently a TIBER test to a detection engineer at a large f |
|
inancial institution\, perspectives on red teaming change. Come along as w |
|
e dissect the results of Storebrand's first TIBER test in a brutally hones |
|
t story covering targeted (successful) social engineering against portfoli |
|
o managers\, the very real human toll of red team testing\, (really) expen |
|
sive red team tools and C2 frameworks being used against us\, company wide |
|
attack alerts\, token theft\, defensive failures\, pitfalls and huge wins |
|
. The talk will explore a reformed red teamers perspective on their previo |
|
us actions\, social engineering tactics\, OPSEC\, engagement value and wha |
|
t they would do differently were they performing red teaming today. |
|
LOCATION:Terminal Stage |
|
URL:https://disobey.fi/2025/profile/disobey2025-272-on-the-receiving-end-o |
|
f-tiber-a-reformed-red-teamers-perspective |
|
END:VEVENT |
|
BEGIN:VEVENT |
|
SUMMARY:Playing hide and seek in Java land - Extra Spicy edition! |
|
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Helsinki:20250215T154500 |
|
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Helsinki:20250215T163000 |
|
UID:9677ca1d-db67-5d02-b14d-c1582c6f8a1a |
|
DESCRIPTION:We'll take you on a journey from conventional Java exploitatio |
|
n to the emerging threat of supply-chain attacks in the land of Java.\n\nY |
|
ou'll learn about attack patterns in Java and why (and how) they're easily |
|
detectable. You'll also learn about exploits that are much stealthier (an |
|
d why). Further\, we'll transition into the latest and hottest trend in so |
|
ftware security: Supply-chain attacks.\n\nAs a grand finale\, we'll talk a |
|
bout Cross-Build Injection as a pivot point and advanced persistence in th |
|
e Java build pipeline. As a parting gift\, we provide you with an open-sou |
|
rce tool we wrote for Red Teams to simulate these kinds of attacks in a vi |
|
able way.\n\nIf you work with organizations/clients that build Java code\, |
|
then you need to see this. |
|
LOCATION:Terminal Stage |
|
URL:https://disobey.fi/2025/profile/disobey2025-264-playing-hide-and-seek- |
|
in-java-land-extra-spicy-edition- |
|
END:VEVENT |
|
BEGIN:VEVENT |
|
SUMMARY:Navigating Chaos: A Prison's Struggle with Ransomware and Legacy S |
|
ystems |
|
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Helsinki:20250215T164500 |
|
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Helsinki:20250215T173000 |
|
UID:84fabaa2-ccc7-55aa-ac35-6a330548ed37 |
|
DESCRIPTION:As a seasoned security consultant with decades of experience\, |
|
I've witnessed a wide range of cybersecurity incidents. In this talk\, I |
|
will share a compelling true story of a prison that fell victim to a ranso |
|
mware attack\, leading to the exfiltration of over 250GB of personally ide |
|
ntifiable information (PII). |
|
LOCATION:Terminal Stage |
|
URL:https://disobey.fi/2025/profile/disobey2025-318-navigating-chaos-a-pri |
|
son-s-struggle-with-ransomware-and-legacy-systems |
|
END:VEVENT |
|
BEGIN:VEVENT |
|
SUMMARY:Ransomware Leaks Lead To Floods - How Leaked Files From Ransomware |
|
Can Be Weaponized Against Further Victims |
|
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Helsinki:20250215T174500 |
|
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Helsinki:20250215T183000 |
|
UID:30e20c8a-bfb9-5d83-8dd8-776d8b7e3c98 |
|
DESCRIPTION:We analyze the content we have aggregated from files exposed o |
|
n ransomware leak sites to assess the types of files and the types of cont |
|
ent these files contain. We further evaluate how the types of content can |
|
be scraped and weaponized by threat actors against further victims by crim |
|
inal\, nation-state\, and hacktivist or extremist actors. Finally\, we att |
|
empt to find evidence linking an organization that has been hit by ransomw |
|
are to mentions of the organization in earlier leaks. |
|
LOCATION:Terminal Stage |
|
URL:https://disobey.fi/2025/profile/disobey2025-306-ransomware-leaks-lead- |
|
to-floods-how-leaked-files-from-ransomware-can-be-weaponized-against-furth |
|
er-victims |
|
END:VEVENT |
|
BEGIN:VEVENT |
|
SUMMARY:Microsoft Entra ID: Gateway to Supply Chain Attacks on a Global Sc |
|
ale |
|
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Helsinki:20250215T190000 |
|
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Helsinki:20250215T194500 |
|
UID:e0d7ff38-a367-557d-998d-ba7ae51b67a5 |
|
DESCRIPTION:Entra ID holds a criticality on par with Active Directory\; it |
|
s compromise equates to the compromise of the entire company. Standard sec |
|
urity practices include the use of dedicated administration accounts\, Pri |
|
vileged Identity Management (PIM)\, Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) requ |
|
irements\, and Conditional Access Policies to safeguard and protect the en |
|
vironment.\nHowever\, there are dangers that sometimes go unnoticed. In on |
|
-premise Active Directory\, issues such as credential caching (dumping via |
|
tools like Mimikatz)\, NTLM attacks (including NTLM relay and Net-NTLM ha |
|
sh cracking)\, among others\, enable ransomware threat actors to move late |
|
rally within a matter of hours.\nEntra ID\, a recent and complex technolog |
|
y\, is not exempt from these issues. As best practices continue to evolve\ |
|
, there is room for misconfigurations that can be just as exploitable.\nIn |
|
my presentation\, I will elucidate how poor practices and misconfiguratio |
|
ns in Enterprise Applications and GDAP can lead to an exponential supply c |
|
hain attack. The session aims to shed light on these vulnerabilities\, pro |
|
viding insights into how they can be identified and mitigated to protect a |
|
gainst such expansive threats. |
|
LOCATION:Terminal Stage |
|
URL:https://disobey.fi/2025/profile/disobey2025-250-microsoft-entra-id-gat |
|
eway-to-supply-chain-attacks-on-a-global-scale |
|
END:VEVENT |
|
BEGIN:VEVENT |
|
SUMMARY:Out of Order: protocol confusion attacks in the real world |
|
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Helsinki:20250215T200000 |
|
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Helsinki:20250215T204500 |
|
UID:b91703fb-126f-53df-9aa9-994d0c7f1497 |
|
DESCRIPTION:IPMI\, a protocol many will never have heard of\, underpins re |
|
mote access to some of the most critical elements of server infrastructure |
|
. The years have not been kind to IPMI\, and research has repeatedly found |
|
flaws in these systems. As part of our talk we will explore new issues th |
|
at have been discovered following our research and how they impact an open |
|
source IPMI implementation. \nThe talk will provide technical background |
|
on what Baseboard Management Controllers (BMCs) are\, the role they play i |
|
n our infrastructure\, and how they can be abused to grant privileged acce |
|
ss to servers across the world. \n\nSpecifically\, we'll look at protocol |
|
exploitation and state machine analysis\, explaining the steps taken to an |
|
alyse remote management protocols\, how audience members can use this to a |
|
nalyse other protocols\, and how this resulted in discovering critical fla |
|
ws in IPMI and other software\, allowing remote administrative access to s |
|
erver infrastructure.\n\nThe main takeaways from the presentation will be: |
|
\n - Learning about the IPMI protocol (maybe TLS/WPA too)\n - showing off |
|
some interesting vulns\n - Learning about protocol research methodology\, |
|
and how to design secure protocols |
|
LOCATION:Terminal Stage |
|
URL:https://disobey.fi/2025/profile/disobey2025-326-out-of-order-protocol- |
|
confusion-attacks-in-the-real-world |
|
END:VEVENT |
|
BEGIN:VEVENT |
|
SUMMARY:Closing by NotMyNick |
|
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Helsinki:20250215T210000 |
|
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Helsinki:20250215T220000 |
|
UID:e739f813-0c6a-5f74-bf55-ed6cc31d1c79 |
|
DESCRIPTION:Closing by NotMyNick |
|
LOCATION:Terminal Stage |
|
URL:https://disobey.fi/2025/profile/disobey2025-335-closing-by-notmynick |
|
END:VEVENT |
|
BEGIN:VEVENT |
|
SUMMARY:Social Engineering and elicitation techniques of hacking a human b |
|
eing |
|
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Helsinki:20250215T103000 |
|
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Helsinki:20250215T111500 |
|
UID:45521d82-98c1-5323-9861-8dd305b2acfb |
|
DESCRIPTION:1. **What is social engineering? History\, Attack vectors.**\n |
|
2. **Examples of Real Social Engineering Attacks.**\n3. Four Phases of Soc |
|
ial Engineering (Reconnaissance\, Engagement\, Exploitation\, Closure)\;\n |
|
4. Building your artwork: What is elicitation? Elicitation Techniques.\n5. |
|
I know how to make you like me - Building Rapport\n6. Becoming Anyone you |
|
want to be - Pretexting.\n7. **Influence and persuasion.**\n8. **Reality |
|
alteration (framing).**\n9. Now What? Skills you need to become a social e |
|
ngineer\, and how to defend yourself.\n10. **Conclusion\, final thoughts.* |
|
* |
|
LOCATION:Security Theater |
|
URL:https://disobey.fi/2025/profile/disobey2025-252-social-engineering-and |
|
-elicitation-techniques-of-hacking-a-human-being |
|
END:VEVENT |
|
BEGIN:VEVENT |
|
SUMMARY:Deep fake it till you make it! |
|
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Helsinki:20250215T113000 |
|
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Helsinki:20250215T120000 |
|
UID:905b53ab-21ae-5f42-a66e-bcc65c4a5897 |
|
DESCRIPTION:Deep fake it till you make it is a continuation of a talk i di |
|
d at Häjysec in Vaasa\, The concept is to look at the evolution of AI and |
|
it's implications\, the talk is humourous in nature and involves several |
|
demos. |
|
LOCATION:Security Theater |
|
URL:https://disobey.fi/2025/profile/disobey2025-255-deep-fake-it-till-you- |
|
make-it- |
|
END:VEVENT |
|
BEGIN:VEVENT |
|
SUMMARY:Staying Sneaky in Microsoft Azure |
|
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Helsinki:20250215T121500 |
|
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Helsinki:20250215T124500 |
|
UID:457d5c86-4e08-5e55-9560-deb705cf2705 |
|
DESCRIPTION:Microsoft are improving their cloud platform by providing more |
|
log sources that can be consumed to gain visibility into enumeration and |
|
data read events. However\, due to Azure's complexity\, such as different |
|
legacy and modern systems\, the same objective can be achieved by an attac |
|
ker through different methods\, inherently with different indicators. As a |
|
result\, the challenges that organisations face\, and will continue on fa |
|
cing\, are the following:\n\n- Attackers using known and lesser-known APIs |
|
to perform activities against a tenant and Azure resources.\n- Attackers |
|
remaining undetected due to assumptions taken by defensive teams in how sp |
|
ecific attacks would be performed.\n\nThis talk will aim to build up on pu |
|
blicly available research into undocumented APIs within Azure and present |
|
different ways that attackers can use these APIs to gather information abo |
|
ut an environment and also perform actions against the estate. With each m |
|
ethod that is discussed\, the talk will also present what controls exist t |
|
o try and prevent their abuse within an organisation as well as what telem |
|
etry is generated when performing these attacks. Thus\, allowing attendees |
|
to understand the available attack surface within Azure and help provide |
|
guidance on the potential non-typical log sources that should be ingested |
|
to improve an attack detection in an estate. |
|
LOCATION:Security Theater |
|
URL:https://disobey.fi/2025/profile/disobey2025-324-staying-sneaky-in-micr |
|
osoft-azure |
|
END:VEVENT |
|
BEGIN:VEVENT |
|
SUMMARY:Investigating Industrial Control Systems |
|
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Helsinki:20250215T141500 |
|
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Helsinki:20250215T150000 |
|
UID:386d3b5b-5084-5e00-8fea-dbbea9388e14 |
|
DESCRIPTION:What to expect when you're all of a sudden called in to invest |
|
igate a suspected cyber attack against a power plant or an oil refinery? H |
|
ow does such a system even look like from DFIR perspective\, and how would |
|
an adversary approach attacking them?\n\nIn this talk I will teach you so |
|
me basics of Industrial Control Systems (ICS)\, explain what a successful |
|
cyber attack against an ICS system often looks like\, and finally present |
|
my personal opinion on how investigating an ICS incident differs from inve |
|
stigating a compromised IT system. If you've never heard about the ICS Cyb |
|
er Kill Chain or don't know what a PLC or an RTU is\, then this talk is fo |
|
r you! |
|
LOCATION:Security Theater |
|
URL:https://disobey.fi/2025/profile/disobey2025-308-investigating-industri |
|
al-control-systems |
|
END:VEVENT |
|
BEGIN:VEVENT |
|
SUMMARY:Ten Security Design Strategies from 2004 |
|
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Helsinki:20250215T151500 |
|
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Helsinki:20250215T160000 |
|
UID:c18cd24e-dd14-5290-83a6-6c18110d1d06 |
|
DESCRIPTION:In 2004\, I compiled a list of ten security design strategies |
|
for software engineering. In this presentation\, I revisit the original sl |
|
ide deck and reflect on the last 20 years of software security. |
|
LOCATION:Security Theater |
|
URL:https://disobey.fi/2025/profile/disobey2025-268-ten-security-design-st |
|
rategies-from-2004 |
|
END:VEVENT |
|
BEGIN:VEVENT |
|
SUMMARY:Email hacking\, attacks and defence today |
|
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Helsinki:20250215T161500 |
|
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Helsinki:20250215T170000 |
|
UID:47b8beea-29cf-5140-ba0e-a2e9dc9bde3f |
|
DESCRIPTION:Email is the open non-proprietary messaging system on the inte |
|
rnet that reaches everyone. Practically all other internet systems rely on |
|
email at least as a backup contact or for notifications. Hear about the c |
|
hanging threat landscape of internet email\, see current and evolving emai |
|
l threats and attacks\, and learn best practises of defence against email |
|
abuse. |
|
LOCATION:Security Theater |
|
URL:https://disobey.fi/2025/profile/disobey2025-290-email-hacking-attacks- |
|
and-defence-today |
|
END:VEVENT |
|
BEGIN:VEVENT |
|
SUMMARY:Web security is fun (or how I stole your Google Drive files) |
|
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Helsinki:20250215T173000 |
|
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Helsinki:20250215T180000 |
|
UID:18cd9ca8-24cc-53e5-8b1f-df22c2e87145 |
|
DESCRIPTION:This talk is about a vulnerability in Google Drive. But it's a |
|
lso a talk about web security concepts\, how services can be made to inter |
|
act in unintended ways\, and how a few seemingly harmless flaws can be cha |
|
ined to defeat security boundaries. |
|
LOCATION:Security Theater |
|
URL:https://disobey.fi/2025/profile/disobey2025-311-web-security-is-fun-or |
|
-how-i-stole-your-google-drive-files- |
|
END:VEVENT |
|
BEGIN:VEVENT |
|
SUMMARY:Living off Microsoft Copilot |
|
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Helsinki:20250215T181500 |
|
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Helsinki:20250215T190000 |
|
UID:b16e5f6a-7c34-50eb-b928-7350b4a231d0 |
|
DESCRIPTION:Whatever your need as a hacker post-compromise\, Microsoft Cop |
|
ilot has got you covered. Covertly search for sensitive data and parse it |
|
nicely for your use. Exfiltrate it out without generating logs. Most frigh |
|
tening\, Microsoft Copilot will help you phish to move lately. Heck\, it w |
|
ill even social engineer victims for you!\n\nThis talk is a comprehensive |
|
analysis of Microsoft copilot taken to red-team-level practicality. We wil |
|
l show how Copilot plugins can be used to install a backdoor into other us |
|
er’s copilot interactions\, allowing for data theft as a starter and AI- |
|
based social engineering as the main course. We’ll show how hackers can |
|
circumvent built-in security controls which focus on files and data by usi |
|
ng AI against them.\n\nNext\, we will drop LOLCopilot\, a red-teaming tool |
|
for abusing Microsoft Copilot as an ethical hacker to do all of the above |
|
. The tool works with default configuration in any M365 copilot-enabled te |
|
nant.\n\nFinally\, we will recommend detection and hardening your can put |
|
in place to protect against malicious insiders and threat actors with Copi |
|
lot access. |
|
LOCATION:Security Theater |
|
URL:https://disobey.fi/2025/profile/disobey2025-331-living-off-microsoft-c |
|
opilot |
|
END:VEVENT |
|
BEGIN:VEVENT |
|
SUMMARY:Sounds from the basement: Extreme low-level game cheating |
|
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Helsinki:20250215T191500 |
|
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Helsinki:20250215T200000 |
|
UID:cedeeb3f-1087-51b5-8847-bdfaff8326b4 |
|
DESCRIPTION:In this talk\, we will explore an advanced method for cheating |
|
in multiplayer PC-based games by leveraging System Management Mode (SMM) |
|
as the cheat’s runtime environment. SMM\, a privileged execution mode in |
|
x86_64 processor architecture\, operates at the lowest level of the CPU p |
|
rivilege rings\; beneath even the kernel's ring 0 or hypervisor’s “rin |
|
g -1” - SMM executes in so-called “ring -2”. This makes it an ideal |
|
environment for executing anything undetected by traditional detection sof |
|
tware typically running in higher privilege rings\, be it anti-cheat or an |
|
ti-virus software. \n\nWe will cover the technical details of how to use S |
|
MM\, its inherent advantages over other cheating techniques\, and the chal |
|
lenges in interfacing with game memory and game object types while remaini |
|
ng undetected from the most established anti-cheat platforms. This talk wi |
|
ll include a demonstration of a working game cheat which can bypass modern |
|
anti-cheat tools and a deep dive into the potential implications for anti |
|
-cheat developers (and other security professionals whose job it is to det |
|
ect malicious activity in their context). Attendees will leave with a soli |
|
d understanding of why SMM is a powerful tool for stealth in executing cod |
|
e maliciously and what countermeasures might be required to combat such so |
|
phisticated attacks. |
|
LOCATION:Security Theater |
|
URL:https://disobey.fi/2025/profile/disobey2025-284-sounds-from-the-baseme |
|
nt-extreme-low-level-game-cheating |
|
END:VEVENT |
|
BEGIN:VEVENT |
|
SUMMARY:Security safeguards in continuous integration |
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DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Helsinki:20250215T141500 |
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DTEND;TZID=Europe/Helsinki:20250215T171500 |
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UID:2515dbc8-4167-57e4-a457-42a2150063e2 |
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DESCRIPTION:Learn how to safeguard your software development project by im |
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plementing automated security checks in continuous integration. |
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LOCATION:Security Forum |
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URL:https://disobey.fi/2025/profile/disobey2025-275-security-safeguards-in |
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-continuous-integration |
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END:VEVENT |
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END:VCALENDAR |