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Methods to create password verifiers for PostgreSQL
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""" | |
Generate the password hashes / verifiers for use in PostgreSQL | |
How to use this: | |
pw = EncryptPassword( | |
user="username", | |
password="securepassword", | |
algorithm="scram-sha-256", | |
) | |
print(pw.encrypt()) | |
The output of the ``encrypt`` function can be stored in PostgreSQL in the | |
password clause, e.g. | |
ALTER ROLE username PASSWORD {pw.encrypt()}; | |
where you safely interpolate it in with a quoted literal, of course :) | |
""" | |
import base64 | |
import hashlib | |
import hmac | |
import secrets | |
import stringprep | |
import unicodedata | |
class EncryptPassword: | |
ALGORITHMS = { | |
'md5': { | |
'encryptor': '_encrypt_md5', | |
'digest': hashlib.md5, | |
'defaults': {}, | |
}, | |
'scram-sha-256': { | |
'encryptor': '_encrypt_scram_sha_256', | |
'digest': hashlib.sha256, | |
'defaults': { | |
'salt_length': 16, | |
'iterations': 4096, | |
}, | |
} | |
} | |
# List of characters that are prohibited to be used per PostgreSQL-SASLprep | |
SASLPREP_STEP3 = ( | |
stringprep.in_table_a1, # PostgreSQL treats this as prohibited | |
stringprep.in_table_c12, | |
stringprep.in_table_c21_c22, | |
stringprep.in_table_c3, | |
stringprep.in_table_c4, | |
stringprep.in_table_c5, | |
stringprep.in_table_c6, | |
stringprep.in_table_c7, | |
stringprep.in_table_c8, | |
stringprep.in_table_c9, | |
) | |
def __init__(self, user, password, algorithm='scram-sha-256', **kwargs): | |
self.user = user | |
self.password = password | |
self.algorithm = algorithm | |
self.salt = None | |
self.encrypted_password = None | |
self.kwargs = kwargs | |
def encrypt(self): | |
try: | |
algorithm = self.ALGORITHMS[self.algorithm] | |
except KeyError: | |
raise Exception('algorithm "{}" not supported'.format(self.algorithm)) | |
kwargs = algorithm['defaults'].copy() | |
kwargs.update(self.kwargs) | |
return getattr(self, algorithm['encryptor'])(algorithm['digest'], **kwargs) | |
def _bytes_xor(self, a, b): | |
"""XOR two bytestrings together""" | |
return bytes(a_i ^ b_i for a_i, b_i in zip(a, b)) | |
def _encrypt_md5(self, digest, **kwargs): | |
self.encrypted_password = b"md5" + digest( | |
self.password.encode('utf-8') + self.user.encode('utf-8')).hexdigest().encode('utf-8') | |
return self.encrypted_password | |
def _encrypt_scram_sha_256(self, digest, **kwargs): | |
# requires SASL prep | |
# password = SASLprep | |
iterations = kwargs['iterations'] | |
salt_length = kwargs['salt_length'] | |
salted_password = self._scram_sha_256_generate_salted_password(self.password, salt_length, iterations, digest) | |
client_key = hmac.HMAC(salted_password, b"Client Key", digest) | |
stored_key = digest(client_key.digest()).digest() | |
server_key = hmac.HMAC(salted_password, b"Server Key", digest) | |
self.encrypted_password = self.algorithm.upper().encode("utf-8") + b"$" + \ | |
("{}".format(iterations)).encode("utf-8") + b":" + \ | |
base64.b64encode(self.salt) + b"$" + \ | |
base64.b64encode(stored_key) + b":" + base64.b64encode(server_key.digest()) | |
return self.encrypted_password | |
def _normalize_password(self, password): | |
"""Normalize the password using PostgreSQL-flavored SASLprep. For reference: | |
https://git.postgresql.org/gitweb/?p=postgresql.git;a=blob;f=src/common/saslprep.c | |
using the `pg_saslprep` function | |
Implementation borrowed from asyncpg implementation: | |
https://github.com/MagicStack/asyncpg/blob/master/asyncpg/protocol/scram.pyx#L263 | |
""" | |
normalized_password = password | |
# if the password is an ASCII string or fails to encode as an UTF8 | |
# string, we can return | |
try: | |
normalized_password.encode("ascii") | |
except UnicodeEncodeError: | |
pass | |
else: | |
return normalized_password | |
# Step 1 of SASLPrep: Map. Per the algorithm, we map non-ascii space | |
# characters to ASCII spaces (\x20 or \u0020, but we will use ' ') and | |
# commonly mapped to nothing characters are removed | |
# Table C.1.2 -- non-ASCII spaces | |
# Table B.1 -- "Commonly mapped to nothing" | |
normalized_password = u"".join( | |
[' ' if stringprep.in_table_c12(c) else c | |
for c in normalized_password if not stringprep.in_table_b1(c)]) | |
# If at this point the password is empty, PostgreSQL uses the original | |
# password | |
if not normalized_password: | |
return password | |
# Step 2 of SASLPrep: Normalize. Normalize the password using the | |
# Unicode normalization algorithm to NFKC form | |
normalized_password = unicodedata.normalize('NFKC', normalized_password) | |
# If the password is not empty, PostgreSQL uses the original password | |
if not normalized_password: | |
return password | |
# Step 3 of SASLPrep: Prohobited characters. If PostgreSQL detects any | |
# of the prohibited characters in SASLPrep, it will use the original | |
# password | |
# We also include "unassigned code points" in the prohibited character | |
# category as PostgreSQL does the same | |
for c in normalized_password: | |
if any([in_prohibited_table(c) for in_prohibited_table in | |
self.SASLPREP_STEP3]): | |
return password | |
# Step 4 of SASLPrep: Bi-directional characters. PostgreSQL follows the | |
# rules for bi-directional characters laid on in RFC3454 Sec. 6 which | |
# are: | |
# 1. Characters in RFC 3454 Sec 5.8 are prohibited (C.8) | |
# 2. If a string contains a RandALCat character, it cannot containy any | |
# LCat character | |
# 3. If the string contains any RandALCat character, an RandALCat | |
# character must be the first and last character of the string | |
# RandALCat characters are found in table D.1, whereas LCat are in D.2 | |
if any([stringprep.in_table_d1(c) for c in normalized_password]): | |
# if the first character or the last character are not in D.1, | |
# return the original password | |
if not (stringprep.in_table_d1(normalized_password[0]) and | |
stringprep.in_table_d1(normalized_password[-1])): | |
return password | |
# if any characters are in D.2, use the original password | |
if any([stringprep.in_table_d2(c) for c in normalized_password]): | |
return password | |
# return the normalized password | |
return normalized_password | |
def _scram_sha_256_generate_salted_password(self, password, salt_length, iterations, digest): | |
"""This follows the "Hi" algorithm specified in RFC5802""" | |
# first, need to normalize the password using PostgreSQL-flavored SASLprep | |
normalized_password = self._normalize_password(password) | |
# convert the password to a binary string - UTF8 is safe for SASL (though there are SASLPrep rules) | |
p = normalized_password.encode("utf8") | |
# generate a salt | |
self.salt = secrets.token_bytes(salt_length) | |
# the initial signature is the salt with a terminator of a 32-bit string ending in 1 | |
ui = hmac.new(p, self.salt + b'\x00\x00\x00\x01', digest) | |
# grab the initial digest | |
u = ui.digest() | |
# for X number of iterations, recompute the HMAC signature against the password | |
# and the latest iteration of the hash, and XOR it with the previous version | |
for x in range(iterations - 1): | |
ui = hmac.new(p, ui.digest(), hashlib.sha256) | |
# this is a fancy way of XORing two byte strings together | |
u = self._bytes_xor(u, ui.digest()) | |
return u |
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