Rob Carlson
IFSM 304 7381 Ethics in Information Technology (2222)
April 12, 2022
Ethical issue: Apple AirTags can be used by abusers to stalk their victims using a surveillance network composed of unwitting iPhone owners
| Stakeholders | Autonomy | Justice | Publicity |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1. Apple | While Apple has a duty to allow everyone to decide whether to participate in the AirTag system, it activates every iPhone by default into the network (Cahn & Galperin, 2021). | As the operator of the network and devices, Apple has a duty to protect anyone affected by their surveillance network from having their privacy violated unknowingly (Cole, 2022). | Apple has a duty to the public to have open discussions and make sure that all participants can be involved and have a say (Cole, 2022). |
| 2. AirTag owners | AirTag owners have a duty to place tags only on their own property and not use them to track other people without their consent (Apple, 2022). | Because AirTags regularly rotate their unique Bluetooth ID, AirTags owners get the benefit of the surveillance network without assuming any of the privacy risks (Macworld Staff, 2022). | AirTag owners take advantage of other phone users who may not even aware be that they are part of network of tracking devices (Leswing, 2021). |
| 3. iPhone owners who are not AirTag owners | Individual owners have the duty to decide whether to be a part of the network of reporting nodes (Macworld Staff, 2022). | Owners of many iPhones become unwitting nodes in the surveillance network and are constantly sending location and tag data back to Apple in encrypted format (Leswing, 2021). | All iPhone users have a duty to make morally informed decisions but disabling the tracking features of their phone is “completely inaccessible to all but the most technically proficient” (Cahn & Galperin, 2021). |
| 4. People unwillingly tracked using AirTags | Victims lose autonomy of whether they want their location disclosed because a AirTag placed on their person does not alert for 72 hours (Cahn & Galperin, 2021). | Victims of tracking assume all the risks of the system without any benefits. They may never be aware that an AirTag has been placed on them or property if they do not own an Apple or Android phone (Gullo & Galperin, 2021). | Victims have a duty to take steps to preserve their privacy on their own devices, but may never realize when nearby phones are reporting their location (Coalition Against Stalkerware, n.d.) |
| 5. Government | U.S. legislators have a duty to create laws which promote individual autonomy (U.S. Const., Amend. XIV, Sec. 1). | Not all states have the same laws and only 23 have any specific tracking statute at all (National Conference of State Legislators, 2022). | Law enforcement is poorly educated about AirTags and may not know what finding one means (Cole, 2022). |
I chose this dilemma because I feel that Apple’s recent introduction of the AirTag network sits at an intersection of global and personal surveillance, and I knew that it had already been used to track women without their consent in at least 50 documented cases (Cole, 2022).
I chose the principles of autonomy, justice, and publicity. I chose autonomy because the creation of the AirTag network had the potential to interfere with personal autonomy of people being tracked without their consent. I chose justice because the design of the device creates an inequality in agency between victims and abusers. I chose publicity because it appeared clear that a system of this type and scope needs to be designed in an open and transparent way to minimize negative externalities.
Most media coverage has focused on cases of actual abuse or the potential for it while Apple’s responses focus on additional marketing (Cole, 2022) or mitigation and adjustments to the program (Apple, 2022). Because of the newness of this program there are few if any statistics available to quantify a decision. For example, when 150 police reports related to AirTags were reviewed, they were equally divided between alleged stalking and lost property (Cole, 2022) while the usual ratio of property to violent crime in the United States is more than five to one (Gramlich, 2020).
Research also made clear that the burden of negative effects from stalking falls on women, with one in three reporting being victims at some point in their lives (Smith et al, 2021). It is noted that new technologies in general tend to increase “the ease by which people can pursue and harass others in ways that might be frightening and threatening” (Smith et al, 2021). Although neither of these points are included in the matrix, they are still important to understanding that nearly all the individuals in the matrix category of “people unwillingly tracked by AirTags” will be women.
Apple AirTags are a digital tracking tool with a documented record of placing an undue burden on victims of stalking and abuse (Cole, 2022). Lack of open information about the operation of the system and automatic inclusion of all Apple devices into the tracking network have created a situation in which the participants with the most control (i.e., Apple, AirTag owners, and the government) shoulder the least risk and those with the least control (i.e., iPhone owners and unwilling victims) shoulder the most. Varying regulation regarding the misuse of digital tracking devices across U.S. states has contributed to uncertainty about potential consequences that confuses both victims of tracking as well as law enforcement (National Conference of State Legislators, 2022).
This policy must be enacted by Apple to shift the burden of risk between participants. It mandates better tools and strong protections to the most vulnerable participants while at the same time reducing the timing and availability of information available to abusers of the system. It strives to equalize enforcement of consequences by mandating specific technical penalties and consequences for misuse and by calling on Apple to petition state and local governments to enact meaningful legislation with specific penalties for misuse of electronic tracking devices.
This policy is designed to impose responsibilities on Apple to modify the AirTag network to provide opt-in policies to participants, enact direct consequences on AirTag owners for misuse, give iPhone users increased visibility into system, and provide victims of AirTag abuse adequate time and information to respond to potentially dangerous situations.
- Apple must configure AirTags to not allow their location to be revealed to the user until after the device has audibly alerted for an extended period at a high volume.
- Apple must configure the system so that the owner of an AirTag is not notified immediately if an AirTag device is disabled or transported to a police station, since the riskiest period for a victim is when an abuser loses control (Kirchgaessner & Holpuch, 2021).
- Apple must configure the system to limit users to a specific number of times to track an AirTag which is an extended distance away from them over a period of three days.
- Apple must configure the system so that a newly activated AirTag which moves more than a mile from the owner should require third party confirmation prior to revealing a location.
- Apple must configure the system so that Apple iPhone users should be allowed to know how many devices they have seen and detected over the course of the day.
- Apple must configure the system so that Apple device users need to opt in to participating in the tracking network and provide an easy mechanism to opt back out.
- Apple must provide software tools that allow users on all phone platforms to be instantly informed if an AirTag is moving with them.
- Apple must strongly encourage all state and local governments to pass legislation that provides strong penalties and enforcement for the abuse of AirTag devices.
- Apple must proactively reach out to law enforcement with tools and resources which make it clear that a surreptitiously planted AirTag is valuable physical evidence of a crime.
- Apple must design and market an affordable device that can detect and report the ID of AirTags in regular proximity to a person even if they do not own or have access to a phone.
- Apple must provide documented victims of AirTag stalking with temporary virtual privacy fences around their home, school, and work where AirTags will not function or be excluded.
- Apple must prohibit abusers of the AirTag service from ever enabling future AirTag devices or similar services.
- Apple must allow law enforcement who find a surreptitiously planted device to request that all AirTag functionality for that Apple account be disabled immediately.
Apple. (2022, April 10). An update on AirTag and unwanted tracking. Apple Newsroom. Retrieved April 10, 2022, from https://www.apple.com/newsroom/2022/02/an-update-on-airtag-and-unwanted-tracking/
Cahn, A. F., & Galperin, E. (2021, May 13). Apple’s AirTags are a gift to stalkers. Wired. Retrieved April 5, 2022, from https://www.wired.com/story/opinion-apples-air-tags-are-a-gift-to-stalkers/
Coalition Against Stalkerware. (n.d.). Information for survivors. Retrieved April 5, 2022, from https://stopstalkerware.org/information-for-survivors/
Cole, S. (2022, April 6). Police records show women are being stalked with Apple AirTags across the country. Vice. Retrieved April 10, 2022, from https://www.vice.com/en/article/y3vj3y/apple-airtags-police-reports-stalking-harassment
Gramlich, J. (2020, November 23). What the data says (and doesn’t say) about crime in the United States. Pew Research Center. Retrieved April 12, 2022, from https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2020/11/20/facts-about-crime-in-the-u-s/
Gullo, K. & Galperin, E. (2021, December 16). Apple’s Android app to scan for AirTags is a necessary step forward, but more Anti-Stalking mitigations are needed. Electronic Frontier Foundation. Retrieved April 5, 2022, from https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2021/12/apples-android-app-scan-airtags-necessary-step-forward-more-anti-stalking
Kirchgaessner, S., & Holpuch, A. (2021, May 6). A bill aims to stop abusers stalking ex-partners. US telecom firms are lobbying against it. The Guardian. Retrieved April 5, 2022, from https://www.theguardian.com/society/2021/may/06/us-wireless-industry-bill-domestic-violence-victims
Leswing, K. (2021, April 22). Apple’s AirTag relies on a feature no competitor can match: 1 billion iPhones. CNBC. Retrieved April 11, 2022, from https://www.cnbc.com/2021/04/21/apple-airtag-relies-on-massive-iphone-installed-base.html
National Conference of State Legislators. (2022, February 14). Private use of location tracking devices: State statutes. Retrieved April 10, 2022, from https://www.ncsl.org/research/telecommunications-and-information-technology/private-use-of-location-tracking-devices-state-statutes.aspx
Macworld Staff. (2022, February 21). How to find, block, and disable an unknown AirTag moving with you. Macworld. Retrieved April 5, 2022, from https://www.macworld.com/article/345863/how-to-find-block-disable-airtag-moving-with-you.html
Smith, S., Basile, K., & Kresnow, M. (2021). The National Intimate Partner and Sexual Violence Survey: 2016/2017 Report on Stalking. National Center for Injury Prevention and Control, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. Retrieved April 10, 2022 from https://www.cdc.gov/violenceprevention/pdf/nisvs/NISVS-Stalking-Report_508.pdf.
U.S. Const., Amend. XIV, §1.