Tronempire Security Audit Report

TRX_Tronempire_report.md

Tronempire Security Audit Report

1. Summary

Tronempire smart contract security audit report performed by Callisto Security Audit Department

This is a game on a smart contract. The user for the in-game currency tickets buys several types of transport and receives a profit for it.

https://tronempire.net

2. In scope

1. Tronempire.sol

3. Findings

In total, 3 issues were reported including:

• 1 medium severity issue.

• 1 note.

• 1 minor observation.

No critical security issues were found.

3.1. Possible loss of a large number of transport when joining

Severity: medium

Code snippet

function join(), line 409

Description

When the transport is joined, the values are summed. tto.count and tfrom.count are uint16 with a maximum value of 65535. But when summed, they can exceed this value. There is a check at line 403:

require(tto.count + tfrom.count <= 65535, "Too large count");

But it can also overflow.

Example:

// tto.count += tfrom.count;
tto.count = 30000 + 35550; // this equals 14

It is real case because 65535 Steam Engines (transport type #2) cost about $ 180,000. Or if someone today buys Steam Engines for $ 25,000, he will receive such a quantity of transport in about a year without additional investments.

Recommendation

Use condition require(tto.count + tfrom.count > tto.count, "Too large count");

3.2. Overflow is theoretically possible

Severity: note

Code snippet

function buy(), line 363

Description

When calculating the cost may overflow if some parameters(like tt.price or maximum value of _count) in the code will be updated.

Recommendation

This should be taken into account, for example, when updating the transport parameters.

3.3. The removed transport remains in storage

Severity: minor observation

Code snippet

function removeWithLength(), line 447

Description

In fact, when using remove() or removeWithLength() functions the elements of the transport array is not deleted from the storage. Just changing the variable length of m.units structure. This means that if we directly call to the element m.units.items[i] with the index of the removed item, we will be able to get the removed transport data, or change them.

In the code of the contract, there was not found the possibility of direct access by index, but it's better to clear data from storage.

4. Conclusion

There are some vulnerabilities were found that should be fixed.

5. Revealing audit reports

https://gist.github.com/yuriy77k/4a6836cb71f924056a9b4727e02d78d8

https://gist.github.com/yuriy77k/c47b96bef121308cc905727a6cd6fded

https://gist.github.com/yuriy77k/ed9195212c45d480fbed8d66f2c1f72c