stanford-prison-cites

stanford-prison-cites.txt

Sarah asserts, "I knew there were some sketchy things about the Stanford prison
experiment but whew this piece!"

Dan asserts, "A rare situation where even I don't care about the truth, either
they weren't monsters and we shouldn't say they were, or they were made monsters
and we still shouldn't say they were. Either way, grant them their peace. And we
should still worry about deference to authority."

Sarah asserts, "Not sure you caught the implications — that the basic premise of
the experiment, that there's a monster in all of us, exonerates systems... A
cultural belief that sadism is a spontaneous result of situational placement
rather than, say, carried out at the behest of your direct superiors as part of
a racialized system, seems to matter?"

Thomas assets, "Also the pretty frightening bit about how the experiment
contributed to the “nothing works” attitude that stymied prison rehabilitation
programs for decades."

Dan asks for a citation, but never gets it and seems uninterested in obtaining
it from the article on his own.

So! Citations:

CLAIM 1:

"the SPE's premise is that there's a monster in all of us [waiting to be
"unlocked by a situation], exonerates systems [because it presumes that the
"blame is inherent to the situation and not on the guards or their superiors.]

CITATION 1:

> The appeal of the Stanford prison experiment seems to go deeper than its
scientific validity, perhaps because it tells us a story about ourselves that we
desperately want to believe: that we, as individuals, cannot really be held
accountable for the sometimes reprehensible things we do. As troubling as it
might seem to accept Zimbardo’s fallen vision of human nature, it is also
profoundly liberating. It means we’re off the hook. Our actions are determined
by circumstance. Our fallibility is situational. Just as the Gospel promised to
absolve us of our sins if we would only believe, the SPE offered a form of
redemption tailor-made for a scientific era, and we embraced it.

> Many other studies, such as Soloman Asch’s famous experiment demonstrating
that people will ignore the evidence of their own eyes in conforming to group
judgments about line lengths, illustrate the profound effect our environments
can have on us. The far more methodologically sound — but still controversial —
Milgram experiment demonstrates how prone we are to obedience in certain
settings. What is unique, and uniquely compelling, about Zimbardo’s narrative of
the Stanford prison experiment is its suggestion that all it takes to make us
enthusiastic sadists is a jumpsuit, a billy club, and the green light to
dominate our fellow human beings.

> “You have a vertigo when you look into it,” Le Texier explained. “It’s like,
‘Oh my god, I could be a Nazi myself. I thought I was a good guy, and now I
discover that I could be this monster.’ And in the meantime, it’s quite
reassuring, because if I become a monster, it’s not because deep inside me I am
the devil, it’s because of the situation. I think that’s why the experiment was
so famous in Germany and Eastern Europe. You don’t feel guilty. ‘Oh, okay, it
was the situation. We are all good guys. No problem. It’s just the situation
made us do it.’ So it’s shocking, but at the same time it’s reassuring. I think
these two messages of the experiment made it famous.”

> “What the Stanford Prison Experiment did,” Cullen says, “was to say: prisons
are not reformable. The crux of many prison reforms, especially among academic
criminologists, became that prisons were inherently inhumane, so our agenda had
to be minimizing the use of prisons, emphasizing alternatives to prison,
emphasizing community corrections.”

> In an era of rapidly rising crime, this agenda proved politically untenable.
Instead, conservative politicians who had no qualms about using imprisonment
purely to punish ushered in a decades-long “get tough” era in crime that
disproportionately targeted African Americans. The incarceration rate rose
steadily, standing now at five times higher than in comparable countries; one in
three black men in America today will spend time in prison.

> It would, of course, be unfair to lay mass incarceration at Zimbardo’s door.
It is more accurate to say that, for all its reformist ideals, the Stanford
prison experiment contributed to the polarizing intellectual currents of its
time. According to a 2017 survey conducted by Cullen and his colleagues Teresa
Kulig and Travis Pratt, 95% of the many criminology papers that have cited the
Stanford prison experiment over the years have accepted its basic message that
prisons are inherently inhumane.

> “What struck me later in life was how all of us lost our scientific
skepticism,” Cullen says. “We became as ideological, in our way, as the climate
change deniers. Zimbardo’s and Martinson’s studies made so much intuitive sense
that no one took a step back and said, ‘Well, this could be wrong.’”

> Most criminologists today agree that prisons are not, in fact, as hopeless as
Zimbardo and Martinson made them out to be. Some prison programs do reliably
help inmates better their lives. Though international comparisons are difficult
to make, Norway’s maximum-security Halden prison, where convicted murderers wear
casual clothing, receive extensive job-skill training, share meals with unarmed
guards, and wander at will during daylight hours through a scenic landscape of
pine trees and blueberry bushes, offers a hopeful sign. Norwegians prisoners
seldom get in fights and reoffend at lower rates than anywhere else in the
world. To begin to ameliorate the evils of mass incarceration, Cullen argues,
will require researching what makes some forms of prison management better than
others, rather than, as the Stanford prison experiment did, dismissing them all
as inherently abusive.

CLAIM 2:

"[rather than] sadism spontaneously arising from a situation [as the SPE seems
"[to show], [the body of evidence indicates that sadism tends to arise
"[explicitly from authority figures instead.]"

CITATION 2:

> Despite the Stanford prison experiment’s canonical status in intro psych
classes around the country today, methodological criticism of it was swift and
widespread in the years after it was conducted. Deviating from scientific
protocol, Zimbardo and his students had published their first article about the
experiment not in an academic journal of psychology but in The New York Times
Magazine, sidestepping the usual peer review. Famed psychologist Erich Fromm,
unaware that guards had been explicitly instructed to be “tough,” nonetheless
opined that in light of the obvious pressures to abuse, what was most surprising
about the experiment was how few guards did. “The authors believe it proves that
the situation alone can within a few days transform normal people into abject,
submissive individuals or into ruthless sadists,” Fromm wrote. “It seems to me
that the experiment proves, if anything, rather the contrary.” Some scholars
have argued that it wasn’t an experiment at all. Leon Festinger, the
psychologist who pioneered the concept of cognitive dissonance, dismissed it as
a “happening.”

> A steady trickle of critiques have continued to emerge over the years,
expanding the attack on the experiment to more technical issues around its
methodology, such as demand characteristics, ecological validity, and selection
bias. In 2005, Carlo Prescott, the San Quentin parolee who consulted on the
experiment’s design, published an Op-Ed in The Stanford Daily entitled “The Lie
of the Stanford Prison Experiment,” revealing that many of the guards’
techniques for tormenting prisoners had been taken from his own experience at
San Quentin rather than having been invented by the participants.

> In another blow to the experiment’s scientific credibility, Haslam and
Reicher’s attempted replication, in which guards received no coaching and
prisoners were free to quit at any time, failed to reproduce Zimbardo’s
findings. Far from breaking down under escalating abuse, prisoners banded
together and won extra privileges from guards, who became increasingly passive
and cowed. According to Reicher, Zimbardo did not take it well when they
attempted to publish their findings in the British Journal of Social Psychology.

> A few years later, after deciding to write a book about Alex’s story, I
discovered evidence that he hadn’t told the whole truth about his involvement.
When I confronted him, he confessed to me that his choice to participate in the
bank robbery [which was suggested to him by his superiors in the military] was
freer and more informed than he had ever let on before. Accepting responsibility
was transformative for him. It freed him from the aggrieved victim mindset in
which he had been trapped for years. Zimbardo’s “situational forces” excuse had
once appeared to give my cousin a way to believe in his fundamental goodness
despite his egregious crime, but seeing the personal growth that came with
deeper moral reckoning, I began to wonder if it had really done him a service.

You're proposing a viral model of monstrousness, where without guidance from an authority, a sort of "original decency" prevails.

I didn't say that, if anything I said the opposite. I said "people exhibit abusive behavior when encouraged to by an authority they respect".

Now, is monstrousness viral? I think studies would show that yes, values/morals/behaviors are transmitted socially, like a meme.

Does monstrousness happen without guidance from an authority? SPE says yes, but it's false so it's no help there. Milgram says that one way that it happens is explicitly under guidance from an authority. We would need tests to know whether decency prevails in a vacuum or whether monstrousness organically arises. We've been debating whether Lord of the Flies is true for a long time now, and I don't think we have a good answer. We have definitely seen examples of both immediate monstrousness in vacuums and remarkable cooperation and humanity in vacuums. I would wager that "put humans in a vacuum" is not sufficient predictor of monstrosity, and we have to look at other metrics and details. It's just hard to design experiments because keeping innocent random people in cages against their will for long periods of time is against our moral code. In short, we don't know. But I am not making a claim or proposition to that effect. I'm just saying SPE is bunk.

SPE's obvious failing is that it suggests the collapse is near-instantaneous. That's as false...

So we agree that SPE's main assertion is false! My job here is done.

At some point, circumstances create concepts -- explanations, predictions, actions. It is terrifying to believe that, under the right circumstances, you will start forming certain ideas and concepts that you presently consider noxious.

I don't disagree. I and the article in question just disagree that SPE shows that. We would need other studies on the interactions between circumstances and morality (of which I'm sure there are a few already.)

What I see of value in SPE, is: Don't let those circumstances occur. You're not covered because you hired "the right people". Upper class white kids, in these circumstances, with these pressures, with those incentives, became monsters.

Sure but "if you hire 'good' guards and tell them to act brutally for a good cause, some of them will do it," is not a unique experiment: it's already been done by Milgram, it's already obvious. The whole reason SPE exists, and the whole reason this article exists and the whole reason Sarah and Thomas and I are arguing with you, is because the SPE tried to show that any guard-prisoner situation will inherently and organically create abuses. And that's just false. We have counter-evidence, SPE is a lie, it's just false. Zimbardo doesn't get a spot on national TV for a groundbreaking study saying that "if you fill a good person with bad ideas about being a prison guard, they'll be brutal." We don't need a psychology professor to tell us that that's true. He tried to show that prisons are by definition abusive and he failed. That's it. Everybody with a brain already knows that "a few bad apples" in your criminal justice system will poison the whole thing. We simply do not need SPE, SPE is fake news, and the value you see in it is not worth the harm in believing falsified data. If you want to prove this point that you've just tried to make, just use Milgram's study to make the exact same point and you'll get way farther with it with way less argument.

The flip side of that is when prisons are too good, free society demands they be made worse. ... It's systemically inevitable.

This is not shown by SPE and is falsified by the fact that good prisons exist in other societies. You're using an anecdote about contemporary American society to make a fallacious point about all possible societies.

SPE demonstrates that ugly systems will generate ugly people. You don't want ugly people? Don't run ugly systems.
The experiment is obviously faulty because it accelerates the process. But the process obviously, inexorably occurs. People really want SPE to be false, and thus they're incorruptible.

The truth we now see about SPE demonstrates only that guards who are told to be evil will be evil. It says nothing about systems except for the preceding sentence, it does not say that it obviously or inexorably occurs, and falsifying SPE does not prove that people are incorruptible. Milgram is still true, people are still corruptible, an ugly system (i.e. one where supervisors encourage/tolerate bad guards) will still be ugly. SPE just isn't necessary to prove any of that.

Situational corruption exists, because situations cause coercion causes situations causes coercion ad nauseum.

I don't personally dispute that. SPE just doesn't show that because it's a lie. Milgram shows coercion, and it's obvious that situations and coercion could have some feedback loops, so ditch SPE. Use Milgram.

 I had no idea there was a huge debate about whether circumstances or people influence behavior. 

I personally believe that both do. However SPE does not prove that circumstances influence behavior, because it started out with the experimenters explicitly dictating behavior. Other tests would be needed. Ditch SPE. Use Milgram. Seek out other situational studies which surely exist.

It probably is the case that many people, not under significant distress, not explicitly given direct instructions to misbehave, don't "go dark".

Then you agree that SPE is probably bunk and more experiments are needed. Because Zimbardo would not agree with you here. He was trying to prove that "many people, not under significant distress, not explicitly given direct instructions to misbehave, DO INDEED QUICKLY AND SOLELY BY THEIR CIRCUMSTANCE 'go dark'." SPE is bunk. Look at Milgram.

But some do. And if nobody punishes those defectors, more, and more, and more will, because as the rule goes, 10% will do right, 10% will do wrong, 80% are seeing who wins. You have to be incredibly careful about the systems you build.

Neither Milgram nor SPE tests the case where guards are allowed free reign, some eventually go bad (an untested presumption as far as I know), and those who go bad are either punished or not punished. That would be a really great experiment! Neither Milgram nor SPE did that experiment however. And SPE is bunk. You have a very compelling anecdote that I personally agree with, but I know of no scientific study that backs it up. I would like to see such a study.

You can't just say, oh, we hired a bad guy to be a torturer. If it was a good guy torturer, real stand up family man, everything would have been ok.

SPE tried to test this, but it failed. I would absolutely like to see the results of an honest, reproducible SPE to see what happens when good guards endure the life of being a guard, with good supervisors for a long time. Obviously if they are instructed to torture, then we know the outcome: that's what Milgram tests. There are no "good guy torturers." The question is, is it possible to have good prison guards? The existence of idyllic Norwegian prisons suggests it is possible. Further research is needed.

However imperfect SPE is, the purported gains from rebutting SPE are ten kinds of ugly.

False. Truth and reproducibility in science are the only thing that tells us anything about our world. If we kept, and supported, flawed science based on false premises, we'd literally still think that the sun revolves around the Earth. (I mean look at it, it's obvious to anyone with eyes!) -- sure you might cause a Crusade over the truth that the Earth revolves around the sun, but the truth will let your species set foot on the moon within six generations. The truth is worth it. And the downsides are far less severe than you're insinuating. Milgram already proves what you seem to be trying to prove, letting go of SPE won't hurt. Just open your eyes, the ground is right there, you won't fall. Most politicians probably don't even know what the Stanford Prison Experiment is.

[this article is] about loose claims that SPE made prisons bad, and about how those guards didn't really go bad anyway.

That's one element in the article which you'll notice is not the bit quoted above. The bit Sarah, Thomas and I wanted you to read is this bit in this Gist, and now that you've read it we're finally debating apples and apples instead of Chapter Two Oranges versus Chapter Three Apples. Are there loose claims that SPE made prisons bad? Yes. But that's not the part that interested us. The interesting and useful part was the two claims we made that you have been resisting: "the SPE's premise is that there's a monster in all of us [waiting to be unlocked by a situation], exonerates systems [because it presumes that the blame is inherent to the situation and not on the guards or their superiors.]" and "[rather than] sadism spontaneously arising from a situation [as the SPE seems [to show], [the body of evidence indicates that sadism tends to arise [explicitly from authority figures instead.]" Those two points indicate that clinging to SPE is simply unnecessary, possibly harmful, and other studies more-accurately show what SPE actually showed now that we know the truth. What SPE purported to show was tainted, is not useful, is bad science, and much much more research is needed to figure out the truth of. (Perhaps long-term studies of prisons that control for the goodness or badness of guard supervisors? Just not one-week studies that were tainted by obviously-evil supervisors.)

Nobody should have to live with scientific proof that they could be turned into a monster, nobody should have to live with scientific claims that they could be turned into a monster.

Unfortunately, Milgram (and the true SPE) shows that you can become a monster if you're told by someone you respect that monstrous actions are justified. Whoopsie, we have an individual duty to disobey immoral orders even when they fit with our biases, and we can't blame it on "the job."

I don't want us to do anything but agree, those people experienced an abusive experiment that revealed nothing about them, personally.

We definitely agree the guards experienced an abusive experiment in both SPE and Milgram. Unfortunately, both showed that they could be convinced to behave like monsters. Whoopsie.

But seriously, let's not forget the lessons of SPE with regards to the systems we do or do not build. You build a monster engine, you're gonna get monsters. It ain't random.

We both agree that if you build a monster-engine, you get monsters. The SPE just doesn't tell us much about what elements of an engine make it monstrous. Is it the fact that there are people in cages? Is it the fact that the people outside cages are called "guards" with all the social presumptions associated? We don't know. Maybe. Maybe not. Is it the fact that guards can be convinced to act terribly? Yes, SPE and Milgram both show that guards can be convinced to act terribly. An engine which asks its participants to be monsters will most likely become a monster engine. SPE is not required to show that.

"We just gotta stop hiring monsters for prison guards, that's the problem. It's our pipeline."

I don't think either SPE or Milgram make this assertion, and I don't think absence of SPE will justify anyone making this assertion. I think this is what you're worried will happen if SPE is abandoned, but I don't think it's likely. Milgram and common sense already prove that anyone can be convinced to act terribly.

The question is not "how do we make lazy disprovable excuses for our prison problems," the question is "what elements of problem prisons make them problems, and what elements of good, rehabilitative criminal justice keep it good?" When people re-run SPE, they have not yet found that guards naturally become evil. When people re-run Milgram, they often find (and we can see in daily life) that good people can be coerced to do bad things. So with those bits of information, we know that a "good criminal justice system" could include guards and "prisons," but must train those guards to do good things and never do bad things. Anecdotal evidence suggests that getting rid of the cages and poor living conditions and negative attitude from guards may be a good idea, we should probably test stuff that scientifically.

SPE is not necessary, and in its original presentation may actually hinder "good prisons."

I think at this point my original goal has been satisifed: literally all I wanted you to do was read the paragraphs Sarah and Thomas and I were trying to get you to read. You've now read and digested them. We win, whether you want to reject or uphold SPE at this point is up to you but we at least finally got you to RTFM and it only took like three dozen tweets and two days.

This is silly. You have entirely missed the point that the societies with humane prisons are themselves much more humane, and that the humanity of the society creates a bound for the humanity on the prison. You seem to be desperately holding onto "even if it's true, this is a bad experiment", which has validity but not as much as you desire. I'm not going to go point by point on this, you're going to believe what you want to believe, because you consider the outcome of losing this argument to be more noxious (basically, that you can't blame prison guards for being evil).