This document serves to provide resources to help Prevent, Detect, and Respond to MS Teams-based Initial Access, with a heavy focus on MS Teams > RMM/QuickAssist attacks.
| #!/usr/bin/env python3 | |
| import requests | |
| import urllib3 | |
| import xml.etree.ElementTree as ET | |
| from datetime import datetime, timezone | |
| import sys | |
| import uuid | |
| from xml.sax.saxutils import escape |
| # ================================================ | |
| # Sysmon & Windows Event Log Configuration Script | |
| # ================================================ | |
| # Check for administrative privileges | |
| $currentUser = [Security.Principal.WindowsIdentity]::GetCurrent() | |
| $principal = New-Object Security.Principal.WindowsPrincipal($currentUser) | |
| if (-not $principal.IsInRole([Security.Principal.WindowsBuiltInRole]::Administrator)) { | |
| Write-Host "This script requires administrative privileges. Please run as an administrator." -ForegroundColor Red | |
| exit 1 |
hi, i'm daniel. i'm a 15-year-old high school junior. in my free time, i hack billion dollar companies and build cool stuff.
3 months ago, I discovered a unique 0-click deanonymization attack that allows an attacker to grab the location of any target within a 250 mile radius. With a vulnerable app installed on a target's phone (or as a background application on their laptop), an attacker can send a malicious payload and deanonymize you within seconds--and you wouldn't even know.
I'm publishing this writeup and research as a warning, especially for journalists, activists, and hackers, about this type of undetectable attack. Hundreds of applications are vulnerable, including some of the most popular apps in the world: Signal, Discord, Twitter/X, and others. Here's how it works:
By the numbers, Cloudflare is easily the most popular CDN on the market. It beats out competitors such as Sucuri, Amazon CloudFront, Akamai, and Fastly. In 2019, a major Cloudflare outage k
Original report
- Affected Vendor: OpenPrinting
- Affected Product: Several components of the CUPS printing system: cups-browsed, libppd, libcupsfilters and cups-filters.
- Affected Version: All versions <= 2.0.1 (latest release) and master.
- Significant ICS/OT impact? no
- Reporter: Simone Margaritelli [[email protected]]
- Vendor contacted? yes The vendor has been notified trough Github Advisories and all bugs have been confirmed:
| [ | |
| "928350122843193385", | |
| "1185047194261274665", | |
| "956202276408688650", | |
| "956104664821157918", | |
| "1185047092478095443", | |
| "1185046791826178099", | |
| "1185047045413797898", | |
| "928483283698851901", | |
| "1185047444619284641", |
| #!/usr/bin/env python3 | |
| import ctypes | |
| import time | |
| import threading | |
| def test(): | |
| def access(path): | |
| f = open(path, 'rb') | |
| __ = f.read(8192) |
| There appears to be a string encoded in the binary payload: | |
| https://gist.github.com/q3k/af3d93b6a1f399de28fe194add452d01#file-hashes-txt-L115 | |
| Which functions as a killswitch: | |
| https://piaille.fr/@zeno/112185928685603910 | |
| Thus, one workaround for affected systems might be to add this to `/etc/environment`: | |
| ``` |
This is a living document. Everything in this document is made in good faith of being accurate, but like I just said; we don't yet know everything about what's going on.
Update: I've disabled comments as of 2025-01-26 to avoid everyone having notifications for something a year on if someone wants to suggest a correction. Folks are free to email to suggest corrections still, of course.
| from __future__ import annotations | |
| import re | |
| from itertools import cycle | |
| MAX_SETTINGS = 128 | |
| def load_mapping(filename: str) -> dict[int, int]: | |
| """Processes textual Volatility memmap output into a page mapping.""" |