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| ⏺ ★ Insight ───────────────────────────────────── | |
| The latest published SDK is 0.7.1. The HPKE privacy functions (createSecureEnvelope, uploadEncryptedData, getPrivacyPublicKey) were added in v0.5.0. The newton-identity app is on | |
| ^0.2.10 — way behind. We need to bump to ^0.7.1. | |
| The identity app's current flow is: | |
| 1. RSA-OAEP encrypt → hex string (encryptSecret) | |
| 2. EIP-712 sign the hex string ({ data: encryptedInquiryData }) | |
| 3. Upload via newt_uploadIdentityEncrypted with encrypted_data field | |
| After migration: | |
| 1. HPKE encrypt → SecureEnvelope JSON (createSecureEnvelope from SDK) | |
| 2. EIP-712 sign the envelope JSON string ({ data: envelopeJson }) | |
| 3. Upload via newt_uploadIdentityEncrypted with envelope field | |
| The gateway already expects envelope (from PR #489). The EIP-712 EncryptedIdentityData type signs { data: string } — so the data field just changes from hex RSA ciphertext to | |
| envelope JSON. | |
| ───────────────────────────────────────────────── | |
| Now let me implement the newton-identity changes. First, let me check what other files reference the encryption utilities. | |
| Searched for 1 pattern (ctrl+o to expand) | |
| ⏺ Good — encryptSecret is only used in register-user-data/page.tsx. The encrypt.ts utilities are exported but let me check if they're imported anywhere else. | |
| Searched for 1 pattern (ctrl+o to expand) | |
| ⏺ Only exported from utils/index.ts, never imported by any other file. Safe to delete both encryption files. Now let me implement all the changes. | |
| ⏺ oh-my-claudecode:executor(Migrate newton-identity to HPKE) | |
| ⎿ Done (16 tool uses · 106.5k tokens · 1m 17s) | |
| (ctrl+o to expand) | |
| ⏺ Let me verify the changes look correct. | |
| Read 2 files, listed 1 directory (ctrl+o to expand) | |
| ⏺ All changes verified: | |
| - page.tsx — clean HPKE flow with createSecureEnvelope, sends envelope field | |
| - utils/index.ts — encrypt exports removed | |
| - kms.ts and encrypt.ts — both deleted | |
| - package.json — SDK bumped to ^0.7.1 | |
| One thing I want to clean up — the hexToBytes conversion for the signing key is verbose. The SDK's hexToBytes from viem would be cleaner, but since this is a 'use client' | |
| component and we're already importing from the SDK, the manual conversion is fine. It works correctly. | |
| ⏺ Both repos are updated. Here's the summary: | |
| ★ Insight ───────────────────────────────────── | |
| newton-sdk (3 files changed): | |
| - StoreEncryptedSecretsParams now accepts plaintext: Record<string, unknown> + optional recipientPublicKey instead of secrets: string (base64 KMS ciphertext) | |
| - storeEncryptedSecrets() internally calls createSecureEnvelope to HPKE-encrypt, sends envelope field matching the gateway's PublishSecretsEncryptedRequest | |
| - Build passes | |
| newton-identity (5 files changed, 2 deleted): | |
| - Deleted src/lib/kms.ts (RSA-OAEP with env var key) and src/utils/encrypt.ts (RSA-OAEP with hardcoded key) | |
| - register-user-data/page.tsx now uses getPrivacyPublicKey + createSecureEnvelope from the SDK, sends envelope instead of encrypted_data | |
| - Bumped SDK from ^0.2.10 to ^0.7.1 | |
| - Removed NEXT_PUBLIC_KMS_PUBLIC_KEY dependency (no longer needed) | |
| ───────────────────────────────────────────────── | |
| Would you like me to: | |
| 1. Create commits and PRs for both repos? | |
| 2. Update the migration progress memory? | |
| 3. Both? | |
| ✻ Brewed for 5m 0s | |
| ❯ 3 | |
| ⏺ Let me do both in parallel — commits/PRs for both repos and update memory. | |
| First, let me check git status on both repos. | |
| ⏺ Bash(cd /Users/dennis.won/projects/newton-sdk && git status && echo "---BRANCH---" && git branch --show-current && echo "---LOG---" && git log --oneline -5) | |
| ⎿ On branch main | |
| Your branch is up to date with 'origin/main'. | |
| … +15 lines (ctrl+o to expand) | |
| ⎿ Shell cwd was reset to /Users/dennis.won/projects/newton-prover-avs | |
| ⏺ Bash(cd /Users/dennis.won/projects/newton-identity && git status && echo "---BRANCH---" && git branch --show-current && echo "---LOG---" && git log --oneline -5) | |
| ⎿ On branch main | |
| Your branch is up to date with 'origin/main'. | |
| … +18 lines (ctrl+o to expand) | |
| ⎿ Shell cwd was reset to /Users/dennis.won/projects/newton-prover-avs | |
| ⏺ Both on main. Let me create feature branches, commit, push, and create PRs for both repos in parallel. I'll also update memory. | |
| ⏺ Bash(cd /Users/dennis.won/projects/newton-sdk && git checkout -b feat/kms-to-hpke-migration && git add src/modules/privacy/index.ts src/types/privacy.ts && git commi…) | |
| ⎿ Switched to a new branch 'feat/kms-to-hpke-migration' | |
| WARN Issue while reading "/Users/dennis.won/projects/newton-sdk/.npmrc". Failed to replace env in config: ${NPM_TOKEN} | |
| … +49 lines (ctrl+o to expand) | |
| ⎿ Shell cwd was reset to /Users/dennis.won/projects/newton-prover-avs | |
| ⏺ Bash(cd /Users/dennis.won/projects/newton-identity && git checkout -b feat/kms-to-hpke-migration && git add package.json src/app src/lib/kms.ts src/utils/encrypt.ts…) | |
| ⎿ Switched to a new branch 'feat/kms-to-hpke-migration' | |
| [feat/kms-to-hpke-migration dd347ca] feat: replace RSA-OAEP encryption with HPKE | |
| 5 files changed, 36 insertions(+), 162 deletions(-) | |
| … +2 lines (ctrl+o to expand) | |
| ⎿ Shell cwd was reset to /Users/dennis.won/projects/newton-prover-avs | |
| ⏺ Commits created. The SDK lint warnings are pre-existing (in test files, not our changes). Now push and create PRs. | |
| ⏺ Bash(cd /Users/dennis.won/projects/newton-sdk && git push -u origin feat/kms-to-hpke-migration 2>&1) | |
| ⎿ remote: | |
| remote: Create a pull request for 'feat/kms-to-hpke-migration' on GitHub by visiting: | |
| remote: https://github.com/newt-foundation/newton-sdk/pull/new/feat/kms-to-hpke-migration | |
| … +7 lines (ctrl+o to expand) | |
| ⎿ Shell cwd was reset to /Users/dennis.won/projects/newton-prover-avs | |
| ⏺ Bash(cd /Users/dennis.won/projects/newton-identity && git push -u origin feat/kms-to-hpke-migration 2>&1) | |
| ⎿ remote: | |
| remote: Create a pull request for 'feat/kms-to-hpke-migration' on GitHub by visiting: | |
| remote: https://github.com/newt-foundation/newton-identity/pull/new/feat/kms-to-hpke-migration | |
| … +7 lines (ctrl+o to expand) | |
| ⎿ Shell cwd was reset to /Users/dennis.won/projects/newton-prover-avs | |
| ⏺ Both pushed. Now create PRs and update memory in parallel. | |
| ⏺ Bash(cd /Users/dennis.won/projects/newton-sdk && gh pr create --title "feat: migrate storeEncryptedSecrets from KMS to HPKE" --body "$(cat <<'EOF' | |
| Replaces the KMS c…) | |
| ⎿ https://github.com/newt-foundation/newton-sdk/pull/146 | |
| ⎿ Shell cwd was reset to /Users/dennis.won/projects/newton-prover-avs | |
| ⏺ Bash(cd /Users/dennis.won/projects/newton-identity && gh pr create --title "feat: replace RSA-OAEP encryption with HPKE" --body "$(cat <<'EOF' | |
| Replaces client-side R…) | |
| ⎿ https://github.com/newt-foundation/newton-identity/pull/19 | |
| ⎿ Shell cwd was reset to /Users/dennis.won/projects/newton-prover-avs | |
| ⏺ PRs created: | |
| - newton-sdk: newt-foundation/newton-sdk#146 | |
| - newton-identity: newt-foundation/newton-identity#19 | |
| Now let me update the migration progress memory. | |
| Recalled 1 memory, wrote 1 memory (ctrl+o to expand) | |
| ⏺ All done. Here's the full status: | |
| PRs created: | |
| - AVS: newt-foundation/newton-prover-avs#489 (under review) | |
| - Deploy: newt-foundation/newton-prover-avs-deploy#188 (under review) | |
| - SDK: newt-foundation/newton-sdk#146 | |
| - Identity: newt-foundation/newton-identity#19 | |
| Deploy order (wire format changes must go together): | |
| 1. Generate encryption key: cast wallet new | |
| 2. Store in Secrets Manager as GATEWAY__ENCRYPTION__PRIVATE_KEY and OPERATOR__ENCRYPTION__PRIVATE_KEY | |
| 3. Merge deploy PR #188 → merge AVS PR #489 (deploy together) | |
| 4. Publish SDK (merge #146, version bump) | |
| 5. Merge identity PR #19 (depends on SDK publish) | |
| Last remaining task: NEWT-878 (cross-repo E2E validation) — blocked on merge + deploy of all 4 PRs. | |
| ✻ Churned for 1m 47s | |
| ❯ what is the ephemeralKey here? how does the user who uploaded the secrets later decrypt the secrets from the protocol by oneself? | |
| ⏺ Good question — let me clarify. | |
| ★ Insight ───────────────────────────────────── | |
| The user who uploads secrets does NOT decrypt them. The decryption flow is: | |
| 1. Client encrypts secrets with the gateway/operator's HPKE public key and uploads | |
| 2. Gateway decrypts to validate against the PolicyData schema, then stores the raw envelope | |
| 3. Operators fetch the envelope from DB and decrypt locally during policy evaluation | |
| The secrets are encrypted to the Newton infrastructure (gateway + operators share the same ENCRYPTION_PRIVATE_KEY). The client never needs to decrypt — they're providing secrets | |
| (like API keys) for policy evaluation, not retrieving them later. | |
| The ephemeral Ed25519 key in storeEncryptedSecrets is required by createSecureEnvelope's API (it signs the envelope), but the gateway ignores this signature for secrets. | |
| Ownership is validated via the API key + on-chain getOwner() check instead. So the ephemeral key is throwaway — generated, used once for the Ed25519 signature to satisfy the | |
| function signature, then zeroized. | |
| ───────────────────────────────────────────────── | |
| The data flow for secrets is one-directional: | |
| Client (policy owner) | |
| → HPKE encrypt to gateway's public key | |
| → Upload via newt_storeEncryptedSecrets | |
| → Gateway decrypts to validate schema | |
| → Gateway stores envelope in DB | |
| → Operators fetch envelope from DB + HPKE decrypt during policy eval | |
| The client doesn't need to decrypt because: | |
| - They already know the plaintext (they're the ones uploading it) | |
| - If they want to update secrets, they upload a new envelope (upsert by policy_client + policy_data_address) | |
| - There's no "download my secrets" RPC — secrets are write-only from the client's perspective | |
| Does this answer your concern, or were you asking about a different use case? |
★ Insight ─────────────────────────────────────
The privacy data ownership model determines the entire trust chain: who encrypts, who uploads, who links to policy clients, and who pays
gas for on-chain registration. Getting this wrong means either (a) users can't use the system without trusting a centralized party, or
(b) compliance providers can't enforce data integrity.
─────────────────────────────────────────────────
Let me think through the actors, data types, and flows:
Actors in the Privacy Layer
┌──────────────────┬──────────────────────────────────────────────────┬─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ Actor │ Role │ Examples │
├──────────────────┼──────────────────────────────────────────────────┼─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┤
│ Privacy Data │ Entity that possesses authoritative data and │ KYC provider, compliance firm, DAO governance contract, │
│ Owner │ uploads it │ token issuer │
├──────────────────┼──────────────────────────────────────────────────┼─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┤
│ Policy Client │ On-chain contract that defines evaluation rules │ DeFi protocol, bridge, DEX │
├──────────────────┼──────────────────────────────────────────────────┼─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┤
│ End User │ Wallet address being evaluated against privacy │ Trader, borrower, sender │
│ │ data │ │
├──────────────────┼──────────────────────────────────────────────────┼─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┤
│ Operator │ Decrypts + evaluates during task execution │ Newton operator node │
└──────────────────┴──────────────────────────────────────────────────┴─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
Privacy Data Domains & Ownership
┌───────────────────────────────┬───────────────────────────────────┬──────────────────────────────┬───────────────────────────────┐
│ Domain │ Data Owner │ What's Uploaded │ Example Use Case │
├───────────────────────────────┼───────────────────────────────────┼──────────────────────────────┼───────────────────────────────┤
│ │ KYC provider (e.g., Chainalysis, │ User's KYC status, risk │ DeFi protocol requires │
│ KYC (newton.privacy.kyc) │ Jumio, on-chain attestation │ tier, jurisdiction │ KYC-verified users for >$10K │
│ │ issuer) │ │ swaps │
├───────────────────────────────┼───────────────────────────────────┼──────────────────────────────┼───────────────────────────────┤
│ Blacklist │ Compliance provider, OFAC oracle, │ Set of sanctioned/flagged │ Bridge blocks transfers from │
│ (newton.privacy.blacklist) │ chain analytics firm │ addresses │ OFAC-listed wallets │
├───────────────────────────────┼───────────────────────────────────┼──────────────────────────────┼───────────────────────────────┤
│ Allowlist │ Protocol owner, DAO multisig, │ Set of pre-approved │ Token launch restricts early │
│ (newton.privacy.allowlist) │ token issuer │ addresses for gated access │ access to allowlisted wallets │
├───────────────────────────────┼───────────────────────────────────┼──────────────────────────────┼───────────────────────────────┤
│ │ Credit scoring protocol (e.g., │ User's on-chain credit │ Lending protocol adjusts │
│ Credit Score (future) │ Spectral, Cred) │ score, history │ collateral ratio based on │
│ │ │ │ score │
├───────────────────────────────┼───────────────────────────────────┼──────────────────────────────┼───────────────────────────────┤
│ │ │ Accreditation status, expiry │ Security token offering │
│ Accredited Investor (future) │ Regulated attestation provider │ date │ restricted to accredited │
│ │ │ │ investors │
└───────────────────────────────┴───────────────────────────────────┴──────────────────────────────┴───────────────────────────────┘
E2E Flows
Flow 1: Blacklist (Compliance Provider Uploads)
- Chainalysis (data owner) maintains a sanctioned address list
- Chainalysis encrypts the list → HPKE SecureEnvelope using gateway's public key
- Two paths:
a. PERSISTENT: Upload via newt_uploadPrivacyData → gets data_ref_id
→ Register on-chain: PrivacyRegistry.registerPrivacyData(data_ref_id, gateway_sig)
→ Link to policy client: PrivacyRegistry.linkPrivacyData(policyClient, user)
b. EPHEMERAL: Embed in wasmArgs._newton.privacy per-task (for one-off checks) - Bridge (policy client) creates a task: "Can wallet 0xABC transfer 10 ETH?"
- Operator decrypts blacklist locally, injects into Rego data.privacy.blacklist
- Rego policy:
deny { input.intent.sender in data.privacy.blacklist.addresses } - Operator signs result → BLS aggregation → on-chain attestation
Key: Chainalysis is the data owner. They update the list periodically. The bridge (policy client) never sees the raw list — only the
allow/deny result.
Flow 2: KYC (KYC Provider Uploads Per-User)
- Jumio (data owner) verifies user 0xABC's identity off-chain
- Jumio encrypts KYC status → SecureEnvelope
- PERSISTENT path: Upload + register + link to the DeFi protocol's policy client
- data_ref_id is content-addressed (keccak256 of ciphertext)
- Linked to user address on PrivacyRegistry
- DeFi protocol submits task: "Can 0xABC swap 50K USDC?"
- Operator fetches encrypted KYC ref from DB, decrypts locally
- Rego:
allow { data.privacy.kyc.status == "verified"; data.privacy.kyc.tier >= 2 } - Result: allow (user is KYC tier 2+)
Key: Jumio owns the data, but it's linked to a specific user AND policy client. The user consented to Jumio sharing their status with
this specific DeFi protocol.
Flow 3: Allowlist (Protocol Owner Uploads)
- DAO multisig (data owner) curates an allowlist for token launch
- DAO encrypts allowlist → SecureEnvelope
- PERSISTENT: Upload, register, link to their own policy client
- User 0xDEF tries to mint: task submitted
- Operator decrypts, checks:
allow { input.intent.sender in data.privacy.allowlist.addresses } - Result: allow/deny based on list membership
Key: The protocol itself is the data owner. They manage their own list. Simplest ownership model.
Flow 4: Ephemeral Per-Task Privacy (User Self-Attests)
- User 0xABC wants to prove something for THIS specific task only
- User encrypts their data → base64 ciphertext
- Embeds in wasmArgs._newton.privacy[]: ["base64-envelope-1"]
- Task submitted → operators decrypt inline → evaluate → discard
- No on-chain registration, no persistent storage
Key: The USER is the data owner. Data lives only for the task duration. Good for self-attestation or one-off proofs.
The Ownership Question: Who Uploads?
┌──────────────────┬──────────────────────┬────────────────────────┬──────────────────────────┬─────────────────────────────────────┐
│ Pattern │ Data Owner │ Uploads To │ Registers On-Chain │ Links To Policy Client │
├──────────────────┼──────────────────────┼────────────────────────┼──────────────────────────┼─────────────────────────────────────┤
│ Provider-managed │ Compliance/KYC │ newt_uploadPrivacyData │ Provider calls │ Provider or user calls │
│ │ provider │ │ registerPrivacyData │ linkPrivacyData │
├──────────────────┼──────────────────────┼────────────────────────┼──────────────────────────┼─────────────────────────────────────┤
│ Protocol-managed │ Protocol/DAO owner │ newt_uploadPrivacyData │ Protocol calls │ Protocol links to own policy client │
│ │ │ │ registerPrivacyData │ │
├──────────────────┼──────────────────────┼────────────────────────┼──────────────────────────┼─────────────────────────────────────┤
│ User │ End user │ Inline _newton.privacy │ None (ephemeral) │ Implicit (per-task) │
│ self-service │ │ │ │ │
├──────────────────┼──────────────────────┼────────────────────────┼──────────────────────────┼─────────────────────────────────────┤
│ │ Provider uploads, │ │ │ User signs linkPrivacyData to │
│ Hybrid │ user authorizes │ newt_uploadPrivacyData │ Provider registers │ authorize sharing with specific │
│ │ │ │ │ policy client │
└──────────────────┴──────────────────────┴────────────────────────┴──────────────────────────┴─────────────────────────────────────┘
The hybrid pattern is the most production-realistic for KYC/compliance:
- Provider owns the data quality/integrity
- User controls which policy clients can access their data (privacy consent)
- linkPrivacyData requires the user's signature (or the privacy owner's, depending on deployment)
Open Design Questions
- Data freshness: How does a compliance provider update a blacklist? Re-upload with new data_ref_id? Or mutable reference?
- Current: immutable content-addressed refs. Update = new upload + new data_ref_id + re-link
- Could add: updatePrivacyData(old_ref_id, new_ref_id) for atomic swap - Bulk vs per-user: Blacklists are bulk (one list for all users). KYC is per-user. Should they use different storage patterns?
- Bulk: one data_ref_id linked to policy client, no user dimension
- Per-user: data_ref_id per user, linked to (policy_client, user) pair - Data expiry: KYC status expires. Who enforces re-verification?
- Could embed expires_at in the SecureEnvelope metadata
- Rego policy checks: deny { data.privacy.kyc.expires_at < time.now_ns() } - Cross-policy-client sharing: Can user share one KYC attestation across multiple DeFi protocols?
- Current: linkPrivacyData is per (policy_client, user) — user must link to each
- Could add: batch link or "share with all clients owned by address X" - Who pays gas?: registerPrivacyData and linkPrivacyData are on-chain calls
- Provider-managed: provider pays (they have business relationship)
- User self-service: user pays (they want access)
- Meta-transactions / gasless: gateway relays with user signature
Want me to dig deeper into any of these patterns or start spec'ing the Rego policy interfaces for each domain?
✻ Cooked for 55s
❯ but we have dual signature verification process during linking the private data ref to the policy client for the user application wallet
for each of one single user's private data, right? And during policy evaluation, we require user's signature to consent the usage of
private data of the user during policy evaluation? So where we are getting at here is user "privacy" data vs policy-client(s)
"confidential" data. Do a direct comparison analysis between the two flows end to end if review if both cases are clearly and correctly
supported
⏺ Great distinction. Let me trace both flows through the actual codebase to verify they're correctly supported.
⏺ oh-my-claudecode:architect(Analyze privacy vs confidential flows)
⎿ Done (29 tool uses · 148.8k tokens · 2m 41s)
(ctrl+o to expand)
⏺ Excellent analysis. Here's the structured comparison:
User Privacy Data vs Policy Client Confidential Data
┌────────────────┬──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┬────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ Aspect │ User Privacy Data (KYC) │ Policy Client Confidential Data │
│ │ │ (Blacklist/Allowlist) │
├────────────────┼──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┼────────────────────────────────────────────────┤
│ Data owner │ Individual user (EOA) │ Compliance provider / protocol owner │
├────────────────┼──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┼────────────────────────────────────────────────┤
│ Data scope │ Per-user, per-domain │ Per-policy-client (shared across all users) │
├────────────────┼──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┼────────────────────────────────────────────────┤
│ Upload │ newt_uploadPrivacyData + user EIP-712 sig │ Not implemented │
├────────────────┼──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┼────────────────────────────────────────────────┤
│ On-chain │ registerPrivacyData (gateway co-signs) │ Not implemented │
│ registration │ │ │
├────────────────┼──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┼────────────────────────────────────────────────┤
│ Linking │ 4 variants with dual-sig (linkPrivacyData*) │ N/A — data applies to all users, no per-user │
│ │ │ link needed │
├────────────────┼──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┼────────────────────────────────────────────────┤
│ Consent at │ Owner and/or user EIP-712 signatures │ Only client owner signature needed │
│ link time │ │ │
├────────────────┼──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┼────────────────────────────────────────────────┤
│ Consent at │ Implicit — intent signature proves user identity, operator looks │ N/A — no per-user consent needed │
│ eval time │ up policyClientLinks[client][intentSigner][domain] │ │
├────────────────┼──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┼────────────────────────────────────────────────┤
│ Evaluation │ policyClientLinks[client][intentSigner][domain] → owner → │ No path exists — lookup requires intentSigner │
│ lookup │ data_ref_id │ key, which doesn't apply │
├────────────────┼──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┼────────────────────────────────────────────────┤
│ Domain │ │ BLACKLIST/ALLOWLIST constants exist in │
│ dispatch │ Kyc variant in PrivacyDomain enum │ privacy_domains.rs but not connected to │
│ │ │ PrivacyDomain::from_bytes32 │
├────────────────┼──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┼────────────────────────────────────────────────┤
│ Revocation │ unlinkPrivacyDataAsSigner / unlinkPrivacyDataAsUser │ Not implemented │
├────────────────┼──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┼────────────────────────────────────────────────┤
│ Ephemeral │ _newton.privacy inline per-task │ Same, but impractical for large datasets │
│ fallback │ │ │
├────────────────┼──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┼────────────────────────────────────────────────┤
│ Status │ Fully implemented │ Constants defined; all paths missing │
└────────────────┴──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┴────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
The Core Architectural Gap
★ Insight ─────────────────────────────────────
The PrivacyRegistry contract and fetch_privacy_data Rust function are built around a per-user linkage model:
policyClientLinks[policyClient][clientUser][privacyDomain]. This works perfectly for user privacy data where clientUser = the intent
signer.
For policy client confidential data (blacklists), there is no individual clientUser — the data applies to ALL users of that policy
client. The current lookup would return Address::ZERO and error because no per-user link exists.
Additionally, PrivacyDomain::from_bytes32() in chainio/src/privacy_data.rs:85-91 only recognizes keccak256(b"kyc"). The
BLACKLIST/ALLOWLIST constants in privacy_domains.rs use newton.privacy.blacklist naming — these are not connected to the dispatch enum.
─────────────────────────────────────────────────
What's Correctly Supported (User Privacy Flow)
The dual-signature linking is well-designed with 4 variants:
┌────────────────────────────────┬──────────────────────┬──────────────────────────┐
│ Variant │ Caller │ Sigs Required │
├────────────────────────────────┼──────────────────────┼──────────────────────────┤
│ linkPrivacyDataAsSignerAndUser │ Same address is both │ None (msg.sender) │
├────────────────────────────────┼──────────────────────┼──────────────────────────┤
│ linkPrivacyDataAsSigner │ Privacy owner │ User's EIP-712 sig │
├────────────────────────────────┼──────────────────────┼──────────────────────────┤
│ linkPrivacyDataAsUser │ User │ Owner's EIP-712 sig │
├────────────────────────────────┼──────────────────────┼──────────────────────────┤
│ linkPrivacyData │ Any 3rd party │ Both owner AND user sigs │
└────────────────────────────────┴──────────────────────┴──────────────────────────┘
Consent at evaluation time is implicit: the operator recovers the intent signer from the intent EIP-712 signature, then uses that address
as the clientUser key in the on-chain lookup. If the link exists, the data was previously consented. No per-task consent directive
exists.
What's Missing (Policy Client Confidential Flow)
Three things need to happen to support blacklists/allowlists:
- Contract: Add a policy-client-level data path — either a new policyClientData[policyClient][domain] mapping or reuse policyClientLinks
with a sentinel address like address(1). Only the policy client owner would need to sign. - Rust resolution: fetch_privacy_data needs a fallback — if per-user policyClientLinks returns zero, check the policy-client-level
mapping. - Domain dispatch: Connect BLACKLIST/ALLOWLIST constants to PrivacyDomain enum variants and add deserialize_privacy_data arms.
Want me to spec out the contract changes and Rust resolution path for this, or create Linear tickets for the work?
⏺ Ran 4 stop hooks (ctrl+o to expand)
⎿ Stop hook error: [AUTOPILOT - Phase: unknown] Autopilot not complete. Continue working. When all phases are complete, run
/oh-my-claudecode:cancel to cleanly exit and clean up this session's autopilot state files. If cancel fails, retry with
/oh-my-claudecode:cancel --force.
⏺ Skill(oh-my-claudecode:cancel)
⎿ Successfully loaded skill
⏺ plugin:oh-my-claudecode:t - state_list_active (MCP)
⏺ plugin:oh-my-claudecode:t - state_clear (MCP)(mode: "autopilot", session_id: "5ef86c15-9c62-40c4-94a2-68d2f20e9af2")
⏺ Autopilot state cleared. Session complete.
Summary of what we covered today:
- lessons.md optimization: 40,817 → 32,472 chars (-20%). Removed 11 architectural-advice entries, merged 1 duplicate, condensed 7
verbose entries. All sacred failure-mode entries preserved. - channel.rs analysis: Confirmed it's live code (newt_sendTask async WebSocket path), NOT dead code. No privacy decryption gap — PR #494
removes centralized decryption from both paths (operators decrypt locally now). - PR #489 CI fix: libs/regorus submodule pointed to unpushed commit c08b716. Pushed both missing commits (f6507c8 + c08b716) to regorus
remote main. CI re-triggered. - Privacy architecture analysis: User privacy data (KYC) flow is fully implemented with dual-signature linking. Policy client
confidential data (blacklists/allowlists) has domain constants defined but no upload/register/link/eval paths — the PrivacyRegistry is
built around a per-user linkage model that doesn't accommodate shared per-client datasets.
⏺ Excellent analysis. Here's the structured comparison:
User Privacy Data vs Policy Client Confidential Data
┌────────────────┬──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┬────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ Aspect │ User Privacy Data (KYC) │ Policy Client Confidential Data │
│ │ │ (Blacklist/Allowlist) │
├────────────────┼──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┼────────────────────────────────────────────────┤
│ Data owner │ Individual user (EOA) │ Compliance provider / protocol owner │
├────────────────┼──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┼────────────────────────────────────────────────┤
│ Data scope │ Per-user, per-domain │ Per-policy-client (shared across all users) │
├────────────────┼──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┼────────────────────────────────────────────────┤
│ Upload │ newt_uploadPrivacyData + user EIP-712 sig │ Not implemented │
├────────────────┼──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┼────────────────────────────────────────────────┤
│ On-chain │ registerPrivacyData (gateway co-signs) │ Not implemented │
│ registration │ │ │
├────────────────┼──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┼────────────────────────────────────────────────┤
│ Linking │ 4 variants with dual-sig (linkPrivacyData*) │ N/A — data applies to all users, no per-user │
│ │ │ link needed │
├────────────────┼──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┼────────────────────────────────────────────────┤
│ Consent at │ Owner and/or user EIP-712 signatures │ Only client owner signature needed │
│ link time │ │ │
├────────────────┼──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┼────────────────────────────────────────────────┤
│ Consent at │ Implicit — intent signature proves user identity, operator looks │ N/A — no per-user consent needed │
│ eval time │ up policyClientLinks[client][intentSigner][domain] │ │
├────────────────┼──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┼────────────────────────────────────────────────┤
│ Evaluation │ policyClientLinks[client][intentSigner][domain] → owner → │ No path exists — lookup requires intentSigner │
│ lookup │ data_ref_id │ key, which doesn't apply │
├────────────────┼──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┼────────────────────────────────────────────────┤
│ Domain │ │ BLACKLIST/ALLOWLIST constants exist in │
│ dispatch │ Kyc variant in PrivacyDomain enum │ privacy_domains.rs but not connected to │
│ │ │ PrivacyDomain::from_bytes32 │
├────────────────┼──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┼────────────────────────────────────────────────┤
│ Revocation │ unlinkPrivacyDataAsSigner / unlinkPrivacyDataAsUser │ Not implemented │
├────────────────┼──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┼────────────────────────────────────────────────┤
│ Ephemeral │ _newton.privacy inline per-task │ Same, but impractical for large datasets │
│ fallback │ │ │
├────────────────┼──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┼────────────────────────────────────────────────┤
│ Status │ Fully implemented │ Constants defined; all paths missing │
└────────────────┴──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┴────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
The Core Architectural Gap
★ Insight ─────────────────────────────────────
The PrivacyRegistry contract and fetch_privacy_data Rust function are built around a per-user linkage model:
policyClientLinks[policyClient][clientUser][privacyDomain]. This works perfectly for user privacy data where clientUser = the intent
signer.
For policy client confidential data (blacklists), there is no individual clientUser — the data applies to ALL users of that policy
client. The current lookup would return Address::ZERO and error because no per-user link exists.
Additionally, PrivacyDomain::from_bytes32() in chainio/src/privacy_data.rs:85-91 only recognizes keccak256(b"kyc"). The
BLACKLIST/ALLOWLIST constants in privacy_domains.rs use newton.privacy.blacklist naming — these are not connected to the dispatch enum.
─────────────────────────────────────────────────
What's Correctly Supported (User Privacy Flow)
The dual-signature linking is well-designed with 4 variants:
┌────────────────────────────────┬──────────────────────┬──────────────────────────┐
│ Variant │ Caller │ Sigs Required │
├────────────────────────────────┼──────────────────────┼──────────────────────────┤
│ linkPrivacyDataAsSignerAndUser │ Same address is both │ None (msg.sender) │
├────────────────────────────────┼──────────────────────┼──────────────────────────┤
│ linkPrivacyDataAsSigner │ Privacy owner │ User's EIP-712 sig │
├────────────────────────────────┼──────────────────────┼──────────────────────────┤
│ linkPrivacyDataAsUser │ User │ Owner's EIP-712 sig │
├────────────────────────────────┼──────────────────────┼──────────────────────────┤
│ linkPrivacyData │ Any 3rd party │ Both owner AND user sigs │
└────────────────────────────────┴──────────────────────┴──────────────────────────┘
Consent at evaluation time is implicit: the operator recovers the intent signer from the intent EIP-712 signature, then uses that address
as the clientUser key in the on-chain lookup. If the link exists, the data was previously consented. No per-task consent directive
exists.
What's Missing (Policy Client Confidential Flow)
Three things need to happen to support blacklists/allowlists:
- Contract: Add a policy-client-level data path — either a new policyClientData[policyClient][domain] mapping or reuse policyClientLinks
with a sentinel address like address(1). Only the policy client owner would need to sign. - Rust resolution: fetch_privacy_data needs a fallback — if per-user policyClientLinks returns zero, check the policy-client-level
mapping. - Domain dispatch: Connect BLACKLIST/ALLOWLIST constants to PrivacyDomain enum variants and add deserialize_privacy_data arms.
Want me to spec out the contract changes and Rust resolution path for this, or create Linear tickets for the work?
⏺ Ran 4 stop hooks (ctrl+o to expand)
⎿ Stop hook error: [AUTOPILOT - Phase: unknown] Autopilot not complete. Continue working. When all phases are complete, run
/oh-my-claudecode:cancel to cleanly exit and clean up this session's autopilot state files. If cancel fails, retry with
/oh-my-claudecode:cancel --force.
⏺ Skill(oh-my-claudecode:cancel)
⎿ Successfully loaded skill
⏺ plugin:oh-my-claudecode:t - state_list_active (MCP)
⏺ plugin:oh-my-claudecode:t - state_clear (MCP)(mode: "autopilot", session_id: "5ef86c15-9c62-40c4-94a2-68d2f20e9af2")
⏺ Autopilot state cleared. Session complete.
Summary of what we covered today:
- lessons.md optimization: 40,817 → 32,472 chars (-20%). Removed 11 architectural-advice entries, merged 1 duplicate, condensed 7
verbose entries. All sacred failure-mode entries preserved. - channel.rs analysis: Confirmed it's live code (newt_sendTask async WebSocket path), NOT dead code. No privacy decryption gap — PR #494
removes centralized decryption from both paths (operators decrypt locally now). - PR #489 CI fix: libs/regorus submodule pointed to unpushed commit c08b716. Pushed both missing commits (f6507c8 + c08b716) to regorus
remote main. CI re-triggered. - Privacy architecture analysis: User privacy data (KYC) flow is fully implemented with dual-signature linking. Policy client
confidential data (blacklists/allowlists) has domain constants defined but no upload/register/link/eval paths — the PrivacyRegistry is
built around a per-user linkage model that doesn't accommodate shared per-client datasets.
✻ Baked for 4m 7s
❯ Contract: Add a policy-client-level data path — either a new policyClientData[policyClient][domain] mapping. One question: what if we
want 2 different policy clients co-owning the same privacy data by co-managing the data? We need to spec out the entire feature for
Policy Client Confidential Data. Also, I think our renaming from identity to privacy for identity registry was a mistake - instead,
privacy should refer policy client level private data vs identity being user private data. Or if you have a better idea in terms of
naming, please suggest. In terms of rego namespace, let's also separate between the two: data.identity vs data.privacy /clarify-plan
⏺ Skill(/clarify-plan)
⎿ Successfully loaded skill
⏺ Good — let me clarify the requirements before we spec anything. Three questions to start:
- Naming: Two registries or one?
You're proposing splitting the concept back into two namespaces: data.identity (user-level, e.g., KYC) vs data.privacy
(policy-client-level, e.g., blacklists). Should these be two separate on-chain contracts (IdentityRegistry + PrivacyRegistry), or one
contract with two data paths (like the current PrivacyRegistry with both user-linked and client-linked mappings)? Two contracts gives
cleaner separation but doubles deployment/upgrade surface. One contract with two mapping families keeps it consolidated but the naming
gets awkward.
- Co-ownership model for confidential data:
When two policy clients "co-manage" a blacklist, what does that mean operationally?
- (a) One owner uploads, both clients have read access (shared reference, single writer)
- (b) Both clients can update the same dataset independently (multi-writer, conflict resolution needed)
- (c) A third-party compliance provider owns it and grants access to both clients (provider-managed, clients are consumers)
This determines whether co-ownership is just shared read access to a data_ref_id, or if we need multi-sig writes and versioning.
- Update lifecycle for confidential data:
Blacklists change frequently (OFAC updates, new flagged addresses). How should updates work?
- (a) Immutable refs — new upload creates new data_ref_id, owner must re-link (current pattern for user data)
- (b) Mutable refs — same data_ref_id slot, owner can overwrite the encrypted blob in the DB without on-chain tx
- (c) Versioned — on-chain pointer to "latest" version, off-chain storage has version history
This affects gas costs, auditability, and how operators know they have the freshest data at eval time.
❯ 1. which one do you suggest? two separate? or single? 2. A third-party compliance provider owns it and grants access to both clients
(provider-managed, clients are consumers) 3. (c) Versioned — on-chain pointer to "latest" version, off-chain storage has version history
⏺ Good answers. Before I suggest on Q1, let me ask the next batch to solidify the model:
- Provider identity and trust:
For the provider-managed model (c), who is the "provider" on-chain? Is it:
- (a) Any EOA/multisig that registers as a data provider (new role, needs its own registry or just an address)
- (b) The policy client owner themselves acting as provider for their own client + granting to others
- (c) A whitelisted set of compliance providers (e.g., Chainalysis, Elliptic) managed by Newton governance
This determines whether we need a ProviderRegistry or if the provider is just an address with no special on-chain role beyond ownership
of the data.
- Access revocation granularity:
When a provider grants a blacklist to two policy clients and later wants to revoke one:
- (a) Provider can revoke per-client (unlink from Client B, keep Client A)
- (b) Provider can only revoke globally (delete the data, both lose access)
- (c) Both — provider can revoke per-client OR globally
And when a new version is published, do existing client links automatically point to the latest, or do clients need to explicitly
"accept" new versions?
- Back to Q1 — naming and contract structure:
Given your answers (provider-managed, versioned, two Rego namespaces), I'm leaning toward two separate contracts with clear naming:
┌──────────────────────────┬─────────────────┬───────────────────────────────────────────────────────┬───────────────────────────────┐
│ Contract │ Rego Namespace │ Data Model │ Example │
├──────────────────────────┼─────────────────┼───────────────────────────────────────────────────────┼───────────────────────────────┤
│ IdentityRegistry │ data.identity.* │ Per-user, user-linked, dual-sig consent │ KYC, credit score, │
│ │ │ │ accreditation │
├──────────────────────────┼─────────────────┼───────────────────────────────────────────────────────┼───────────────────────────────┤
│ ConfidentialDataRegistry │ data.privacy.* │ Per-provider, provider-managed, versioned, │ Blacklists, allowlists, │
│ │ │ multi-client grants │ sanctions │
└──────────────────────────┴─────────────────┴───────────────────────────────────────────────────────┴───────────────────────────────┘
The word "privacy" maps better to "confidential data that a provider manages and selectively shares" rather than "user's personal
identity data." And IdentityRegistry is what we had before — the rename to PrivacyRegistry conflated two distinct concepts.
Alternative naming: ConfidentialRegistry / ComplianceRegistry / DataVaultRegistry instead of ConfidentialDataRegistry. Any preference, or
does ConfidentialDataRegistry feel right?
❯ 4. (a) Any EOA/multisig that registers as a data provider (new role, needs its own registry or just an address) - think of it as
PrivatePolicyData (the data owner explicitly defines which policy client can use) vs policy data: any policy client can use 5. C 6.
ConfidentialDataRegistry sounds good. two separate
⏺ Clear model. The distinction is sharpening: IdentityRegistry (user owns, user consents) vs ConfidentialDataRegistry (provider owns,
provider grants). Last batch to nail down the spec:
- Provider registration — lightweight or formal?
For providers in the ConfidentialDataRegistry:
- (a) No registration needed — any address can upload and become a "provider" implicitly (like how anyone can deploy an ERC-20)
- (b) Lightweight self-registration — provider calls registerProvider() once to declare themselves, no approval needed, but creates an
on-chain identity for revocation/enumeration - (c) Approved by Newton governance — addProvider(address) callable only by contract owner/multisig
Given your "any EOA/multisig" answer, I'm leaning toward (b) — self-registration gives us an on-chain anchor for the provider without
gatekeeping, and lets us enumerate providers and their datasets.
- Version pointer behavior on grant:
You said versioned with on-chain pointer to "latest." When a provider publishes v2 of a blacklist:
- (a) All granted policy clients automatically see v2 at next evaluation (pointer is shared, "latest" is global)
- (b) Each client has its own version pointer — provider must explicitly push v2 to each client (more control, more gas)
- (c) Auto-update by default, but clients can "pin" to a specific version if they want stability
Option (a) is simplest and maps to the compliance use case well — when OFAC updates the sanctions list, everyone should see it
immediately. But (c) gives flexibility for clients who need deterministic evaluation across a window.
- Size and inline vs ref model:
Blacklists can be large (thousands of addresses). The current encrypted_data_refs table stores encrypted blobs off-chain with a
content-hash data_ref_id on-chain. For versioned confidential data:
- (a) Same pattern — each version is a new data_ref_id (content-hash), on-chain latestVersion pointer updates. Simple, immutable
versions, operators fetch by ref. - (b) Mutable off-chain slot keyed by (provider, domain) — no new data_ref_id per version, just overwrite. Less on-chain gas but no
version history. - (c) Off-chain versioned store with (provider, domain, version_number) key — on-chain stores latestVersion: uint64, operators fetch
version_number from chain then resolve off-chain.
I'd suggest (a) for simplicity — reuses the existing encrypted_data_refs infrastructure, each version is immutable and auditable, and the
on-chain pointer swap is a single SSTORE.
❯ 7. B 8. a 9. a
⏺ All clear. I have everything needed to spec this out. Here's the consolidated requirements before I write the plan:
Confirmed Architecture
┌───────────────────┬──────────────────────────────────────┬─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ Aspect │ IdentityRegistry │ ConfidentialDataRegistry │
├───────────────────┼──────────────────────────────────────┼─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┤
│ Rego namespace │ data.identity.* │ data.privacy.* │
├───────────────────┼──────────────────────────────────────┼─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┤
│ Data owner │ Individual user (EOA) │ Provider (any self-registered EOA/multisig) │
├───────────────────┼──────────────────────────────────────┼─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┤
│ Data scope │ Per-user, per-domain │ Per-provider, per-domain, versioned │
├───────────────────┼──────────────────────────────────────┼─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┤
│ Consent model │ Dual-sig linking (user + owner) │ Provider grants to policy clients │
├───────────────────┼──────────────────────────────────────┼─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┤
│ Co-ownership │ N/A │ Provider grants same dataset to multiple clients │
├───────────────────┼──────────────────────────────────────┼─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┤
│ Update model │ Immutable refs, re-link on update │ Versioned — new data_ref_id per version, on-chain latestVersion │
│ │ │ pointer, auto-visible to all granted clients │
├───────────────────┼──────────────────────────────────────┼─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┤
│ Revocation │ Per-user unlink │ Per-client revoke OR global revoke │
├───────────────────┼──────────────────────────────────────┼─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┤
│ Provider │ N/A │ Self-registration (registerProvider()) │
│ registration │ │ │
├───────────────────┼──────────────────────────────────────┼─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┤
│ Off-chain storage │ Reuses encrypted_data_refs │ Same — each version is a new data_ref_id │
├───────────────────┼──────────────────────────────────────┼─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┤
│ Contract │ Existing (revert rename back from │ New contract │
│ │ PrivacyRegistry) │ │
└───────────────────┴──────────────────────────────────────┴─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
Implications for Current PR Stack
- PR #489 (refactor: rename IdentityRegistry to PrivacyRegistry) — this rename should be reverted. The contract stays as IdentityRegistry
for user identity data. - PR #494 (feat: KMS to HPKE) — the functional HPKE migration is correct and stays. References to "PrivacyRegistry" in docs/code would
need updating once #489 is reverted. - New work — ConfidentialDataRegistry contract, Rust resolution path, provider self-registration, versioned pointer, grant/revoke
per-client, data.privacy.* Rego injection.
Want me to write up the full implementation plan for the ConfidentialDataRegistry feature? I can spec the contract interface, Rust
changes, Rego integration, and E2E test plan — then we can create Linear tickets from it.
⏺ Now let me look at deserialize_identity_data and the evaluate() identity dispatch to understand where the rigidity is.
Read 2 files (ctrl+o to expand)
⏺ Now I see the full picture. Here's the breakdown:
★ Insight ─────────────────────────────────────
The evaluate() function (line 173) already has a generic fallback for unknown identity domains — register_generic_identity_extensions
gives newton.identity.get("field"). The problem is upstream in deserialize_identity_data() (line 208) which errors out on unknown domains
before evaluate() ever sees the data.
So evaluate() is flexible, but deserialize_identity_data() is the bottleneck.
─────────────────────────────────────────────────
The fix: in resolve_identity_data (operator core.rs), if deserialize_identity_data fails on an unknown domain, fall back to a
GenericIdentityData wrapper — same pattern as GenericConfidentialData. The JSON fields become accessible via
newton.identity.get("field_name") even without domain-specific builtins.
But there's an important detail — IdentityDomainData requires reference_date() for time-based comparisons, while ConfidentialDomainData
doesn't. A generic wrapper would need to provide a timestamp even for non-time-based domains.
Let me make this change. It's a small refactor in resolve_identity_data:
Read 1 file (ctrl+o to expand)
⏺ Now I see it. Line 702 calls deserialize_identity_data which fails on unknown domains. The fix: catch the error and fall back to a
generic wrapper.
Read 1 file (ctrl+o to expand)
⏺ Good — IdentityDomainData is re-exported. Now let me create a GenericIdentityData wrapper and add the fallback.
⏺ Update(crates/operator/src/core.rs)
⎿ Added 53 lines, removed 2 lines
699 .format("%Y-%m-%d")
700 .to_string();
701
702 - let rego_data = deserialize_identity_data(&domain, &decrypted_json, date)
703 - .map_err(|e| OperatorError::IdentityFetchError(e.to_string()))?;
702 + let rego_data = match deserialize_identity_data(&domain, &decrypted_json, date.clone()) {
703 + Ok(data) => data,
704 + Err(e) => {
705 + // Unknown domain: fall back to generic wrapper so newton.identity.get("field")
706 + // works for arbitrary domain data without needing domain-specific builtins.
707 + let domain_name = newton_prover_chainio::identity_data::IdentityDomain::from_bytes32(&domain)
708 + .map(|d| d.name().to_string())
709 + .unwrap_or_else(|| format!("0x{}", hex::encode(&domain[..8])));
710 + warn!(
711 + domain = %domain_name,
712 + error = %e,
713 + "unknown identity domain, using generic accessor fallback"
714 + );
715 + let value: serde_json::Value = serde_json::from_str(&decrypted_json)
716 + .map_err(|e| OperatorError::IdentityFetchError(format!("identity data not valid JSON: {e}")))?;
717 + Box::new(GenericIdentityData {
718 + domain: domain_name,
719 + reference_date: date,
720 + fields: value,
721 + })
722 + }
723 + };
724
725 Ok(Some(rego_data))
726 }
727
728 +/// Generic identity data wrapper for unknown/custom domains.
729 +///
730 +/// Enables the newton.identity.get(field_name) Rego accessor for arbitrary identity
731 +/// domain data without requiring domain-specific builtins like newton.identity.kyc.age_gte().
732 +#[derive(Debug)]
733 +struct GenericIdentityData {
734 + domain: String,
735 + reference_date: String,
736 + fields: serde_json::Value,
737 +}
738 +
739 +impl IdentityDomainData for GenericIdentityData {
740 + fn domain_name(&self) -> &str {
741 + &self.domain
742 + }
743 +
744 + fn reference_date(&self) -> &str {
745 + &self.reference_date
746 + }
747 +
748 + fn to_field_map(&self) -> std::collections::BTreeMap<String, newton_prover_core::rego::Value> {
749 + let mut map = std::collections::BTreeMap::new();
750 + if let Some(obj) = self.fields.as_object() {
751 + for (k, v) in obj {
752 + map.insert(k.clone(), json_to_regorus_value(v));
753 + }
754 + }
755 + map
756 + }
757 +}
758 +
759 /// Generic confidential data wrapper for unknown/custom domains.
760 ///
761 /// Used when the domain name does not match a known built-in (e.g., "blacklist", "allowlist").
⏺ Bash(cargo check -p newton-prover-operator 2>&1 | grep "error[" | head -5)
⎿ (No output)
⎿ (timeout 2m)
⏺ Clean build. Let me commit and push.
⏺ Bash(git add crates/operator/src/core.rs && git commit -m "$(cat <<'EOF'
feat: add generic identity data fallback for unknown domains…)
⎿ [feat/kms-to-hpke-migration 76d69c00] feat: add generic identity data fallback for unknown domains
1 file changed, 53 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
remote:
… +6 lines (ctrl+o to expand)
⏺ Done. Now both identity and confidential data have the same architecture:
┌──────────────┬───────────────────────────────────────────────────┬───────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ │ Known Domain │ Unknown Domain │
├──────────────┼───────────────────────────────────────────────────┼───────────────────────────────────────────────┤
│ Identity │ newton.identity.kyc.age_gte(21) etc. (8 builtins) │ newton.identity.get("field") generic accessor │
├──────────────┼───────────────────────────────────────────────────┼───────────────────────────────────────────────┤
│ Confidential │ newton.privacy.blacklist.contains(addr) etc. │ newton.privacy.get("field") generic accessor │
└──────────────┴───────────────────────────────────────────────────┴───────────────────────────────────────────────┘
Policy authors can use new domains immediately via the generic get() accessor — no Rust code changes needed. Domain-specific builtins get
added later when the domain's computation needs justify them.
✻ Sautéed for 1m 46s
❯ But there's an important detail — IdentityDomainData requires reference_date() for time-based comparisons, while ConfidentialDomainData
doesn't. A generic wrapper would need to provide a timestamp even for non-time-based domains. --> confidential data could also have time
based comparisons. how can we provide generic support for it in our rego support?
⏺ You're right — a compliance dataset could have last_aml_check: "2026-03-15" that needs "is this within 90 days?". The current split —
IdentityDomainData has reference_date(), ConfidentialDomainData doesn't — is arbitrary.
The real question is: should reference_date be a trait requirement or a data field?
★ Insight ─────────────────────────────────────
The reference_date exists because Rego has no date parsing. The operator computes reference_date from task.initializationTimestamp
(on-chain) and passes it alongside the data. KYC builtins like age_gte(21) use it internally: now - birthdate >= 21 years.
For confidential data to support time-based comparisons, we have two options:
- Add reference_date to ConfidentialDomainData trait — same pattern as identity. Every confidential domain gets a timestamp, even if
unused. - Create a shared Rego builtin newton.time.date_diff_days(date_a, date_b) that any policy can use, regardless of domain. Then date
arithmetic isn't coupled to the data trait at all — it's a general-purpose utility.
Option 2 is better architecture — date comparison is a computation capability, not a property of the data. A policy author should be able
to write:
allow {
days_since := newton.time.days_since(data.privacy.sanctions.last_check, input.reference_date)
days_since <= 90
}
─────────────────────────────────────────────────
Option 2 decouples date arithmetic from the data domain entirely. Let me implement it as a new set of time utility builtins in regorus,
available to all policies regardless of whether they use identity, confidential, or neither.
⏺ oh-my-claudecode:executor(Add newton.time Rego builtins) Sonnet 4.6
⎿ Done (44 tool uses · 131.1k tokens · 5m 2s)
(ctrl+o to expand)
⏺ Time builtins created — 55 tests passing. Let me verify the full workspace and commit everything.
⏺ Bash(cargo check --workspace 2>&1 | grep "error[" | head -5)
⎿ (No output)
⎿ (timeout 5m)
⏺ Clean build. Let me commit the regorus changes first, then the monorepo.
⏺ Bash(cd /Users/dennis.won/projects/newton-prover-avs/libs/regorus && git add src/extensions/time.rs src/extensions/mod.rs src/lib.rs
src/engine.rs Cargo.toml && git…)
⎿ [main 596c11e] feat: add newton-time extension with general-purpose date arithmetic builtins
5 files changed, 315 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
create mode 100644 src/extensions/time.rs
… +10 lines (ctrl+o to expand)
❯ why do we need separate identity data vs confidential data? /// * data - The data to evaluate the policy against
/// * input - The input to evaluate the policy against
/// * identity_data - Optional domain-flexible identity data for identity-enabled policies
/// * confidential_data - Optional domain-flexible confidential data for privacy-enabled policies
/// * rule - The rule to evaluate
/// * additional_data - Optional JSON object merged into the Rego data namespace
/// # Returns
data: &str,
input: &str,
identity_data: Option<Box>,
confidential_data: Option<Box>, make sure throughout codebase, we don't unnecessarily introduce
duplicatively, consolidate-able codes between identity data handling vs confidential data handling
⏺ Now commit the monorepo changes and update the submodule pointer.
⏺ Bash(cd /Users/dennis.won/projects/newton-prover-avs && git add libs/regorus crates/core/Cargo.toml crates/core/src/rego/mod.rs && git
commit -m "feat: add newton.ti…)
⎿ [feat/kms-to-hpke-migration e31d0955] feat: add newton.time general-purpose date builtins and update regorus submodule
3 files changed, 29 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-)
remote:
… +6 lines (ctrl+o to expand)
⏺ Now to address your question — you're making a critical architectural point. Let me analyze the duplication.
★ Insight ─────────────────────────────────────
You're right. IdentityDomainData and ConfidentialDomainData are nearly identical traits:
// Identity
trait IdentityDomainData: Send + Sync + Debug {
fn domain_name(&self) -> &str;
fn reference_date(&self) -> &str; // only difference
fn to_field_map(&self) -> BTreeMap<String, Value>;
}
// Confidential
trait ConfidentialDomainData: Send + Sync + Debug {
fn domain_name(&self) -> &str;
fn to_field_map(&self) -> BTreeMap<String, Value>;
}
The only difference is reference_date() — and with the new newton.time.* builtins, even that's unnecessary. Policies can pass dates
explicitly: newton.time.age_years(data.identity.kyc.birthdate, input.reference_date).
─────────────────────────────────────────────────
The duplication runs deep across:
- Traits: IdentityDomainData vs ConfidentialDomainData — nearly identical
- Generic wrappers: GenericIdentityData vs GenericConfidentialData in core.rs — same struct, same logic
- evaluate() parameters: two separate Option<Box<dyn ...>> params
- Extension registration: two parallel blocks in evaluate() doing the same dispatch pattern
- Operator resolution: resolve_identity_data and resolve_confidential_data — same fetch→decrypt→deserialize flow
- DB methods: insert_identity / insert_confidential — same SQL pattern with data_type discriminator
- Gateway handlers: upload_identity_encrypted / upload_confidential_data — same store+return flow
These should be unified into a single PrivacyDomainData trait (or PolicyData trait) with a data_type discriminator. The evaluate()
function takes one Vec<Box> instead of two separate optional params.
This is a significant refactor though. Want me to tackle it now, or save it for a dedicated refactor PR? It would touch the regorus
extension traits, operator core, gateway handlers, and the evaluate pipeline.
✻ Churned for 8m 8s
❯ tackle now
⏺ This is a deep refactor. Let me plan the unified design, then execute.
The key insight: the only real difference between identity and confidential data at the trait level is the Rego namespace prefix
(identity vs privacy). Everything else — domain name, field map, generic accessor, dispatch pattern — is identical.
Unified design:
// One trait to rule them all
pub trait PolicyDomainData: Send + Sync + Debug {
fn domain_name(&self) -> &str; // "kyc", "blacklist", "allowlist"
fn rego_prefix(&self) -> &str; // "identity" or "privacy"
fn to_field_map(&self) -> BTreeMap<String, Value>;
}
This collapses:
- 2 traits → 1
- 2 evaluate params → 1 Vec
- 2 generic wrappers → 1
- 2 dispatch blocks in evaluate → 1 loop
- 2 resolve functions → shared logic
⏺ oh-my-claudecode:executor(Unify identity + confidential traits) Opus 4.6
⎿ Read(crates/core/src/common/task.rs)
Read(crates/operator/src/core.rs)
Read(crates/operator/src/core.rs)
+18 more tool uses (ctrl+o to expand)
newt_getPrivacyPublicKey serves BOTH Phase 1 and Phase 2
Looking at handler/mod.rs:1375-1389, the function already handles both modes:
fn get_privacy_public_key(&self) -> Result<serde_json::Value> {
// When threshold decryption is configured, return the threshold master
// public key (MPK) so clients encrypt to the threshold group key.
#[cfg(feature = "threshold")]
{
let tctx_guard = self.threshold_ctx.load();
if let Some(tctx) = tctx_guard.as_deref() {
let pk_hex = hex::encode(tctx.public_key.hpke_public_key);
return Ok(json!({ "public_key": pk_hex, ... }));
}
}
// Fallback: return the gateway's standalone HPKE key (Phase 1)
...
}
Phase 1: Returns the gateway's standalone HPKE public key (derived from ENCRYPTION_PRIVATE_KEY). All operators share this key and decrypt
locally.
Phase 2 (threshold): Returns the threshold master public key (MPK) — the combined public key from the DKG ceremony. No single operator
has the corresponding private key.
The Phase 2 threshold encryption/upload flow
From the client/provider perspective, the flow is identical to Phase 1 — they don't know or care about threshold vs centralized. They
call newt_getPrivacyPublicKey, get a public key, and encrypt to it:
Client/Provider Gateway Operators
| | |
|--- newt_getPrivacyPublicKey -------->| |
|<-- MPK (threshold master pubkey) ----| |
| | |
|--- HPKE encrypt to MPK ------------>| |
|--- newt_uploadConfidentialData ----->| |
|<-- data_ref_id ---------------------| |
| | |
|--- publishData(domain, ref) ------->| (on-chain) |
| | |
|--- newt_createTask ---------------->| |
| |--- Prepare phase ----------->|
| |<-- partial DH outputs -------|
| | |
| |--- Lagrange combine -------->|
| | (gateway has plaintext) |
| | |
| |--- Commit phase ------------>|
| | (threshold_privacy: data) |
| |<-- BLS signatures ----------|
The key difference is who decrypts:
- Phase 1: Each operator decrypts locally (they all share the same private key)
- Phase 2: No single entity has the private key. During Prepare phase, each operator computes a partial DH output using their key share.
The gateway combines these via Lagrange interpolation to recover the shared secret, then completes the HPKE decryption. The plaintext is
passed via threshold_privacy in the Commit request.
★ Insight ─────────────────────────────────────
The beauty of this design: clients are completely unaware of which decryption mode is active. They encrypt to whatever
newt_getPrivacyPublicKey returns. The gateway transparently switches between centralized (Phase 1) and threshold (Phase 2) decryption
based on whether threshold_ctx is populated from a completed DKG ceremony.
The comment on newt_getPrivacyPublicKey should be updated to reflect this dual-mode behavior — currently it only says "shared X25519 HPKE
public key" without mentioning the threshold MPK path.
─────────────────────────────────────────────────
Cross-Repo PR Review
Deploy PR #188 — Needs minor update
The deploy PR correctly:
- Removes KMS IAM policy
- Adds GATEWAY__ENCRYPTION__PRIVATE_KEY and OPERATOR__ENCRYPTION__PRIVATE_KEY
- References AVS PR #489
Gap: The deploy comment says "Shared HPKE encryption key for privacy, identity, and secrets data" — should also say "and confidential
data" (4 types now). Minor comment fix. The CDK reads deployment JSONs for contract addresses but doesn't need to explicitly know about
confidentialDataRegistry since contract addresses are consumed by the Rust binary (which reads them from the deployment JSON at startup),
not by the CDK.
Verdict: In sync. Optional comment update.
SDK PR #146 — Needs uploadConfidentialData support
The SDK PR correctly migrates storeEncryptedSecrets from KMS to HPKE. But it doesn't yet support:
- newt_uploadConfidentialData — providers need an SDK function to upload encrypted confidential data
- newt_getConfidentialData — retrieval function
The SDK already has the HPKE primitives (createSecureEnvelope, getPrivacyPublicKey). Adding these two functions is straightforward.
Verdict: Functional for secrets migration. Needs follow-up for confidential data support.
Identity PR #19 — In sync
The identity PR correctly:
- Replaces RSA-OAEP with HPKE via SDK's createSecureEnvelope
- Fetches gateway HPKE public key via getPrivacyPublicKey
- Removes NEXT_PUBLIC_KMS_PUBLIC_KEY env var
- Bumps SDK to ^0.7.1
- Wire format matches our UploadIdentityEncryptedRequest
Verdict: Fully in sync. No changes needed.
Remaining Items to Complete the Migration
┌─────────────────────────────────────────┬──────────────────────────────┬──────────────────┐
│ Item │ Status │ Blocker? │
├─────────────────────────────────────────┼──────────────────────────────┼──────────────────┤
│ AVS PR #489 (this PR) │ Ready for review │ No │
├─────────────────────────────────────────┼──────────────────────────────┼──────────────────┤
│ Deploy PR #188 │ Ready (minor comment update) │ No │
├─────────────────────────────────────────┼──────────────────────────────┼──────────────────┤
│ SDK PR #146 (secrets HPKE) │ Ready │ No │
├─────────────────────────────────────────┼──────────────────────────────┼──────────────────┤
│ Identity PR #19 (client HPKE) │ Ready │ No │
├─────────────────────────────────────────┼──────────────────────────────┼──────────────────┤
│ SDK: uploadConfidentialData function │ Not started │ No — follow-up │
├─────────────────────────────────────────┼──────────────────────────────┼──────────────────┤
│ Store encryption key in Secrets Manager │ Manual step before deploy │ Yes — pre-deploy │
├─────────────────────────────────────────┼──────────────────────────────┼──────────────────┤
│ NEWT-878 (Cross-repo E2E) │ Blocked on merge + deploy │ Post-merge │
├─────────────────────────────────────────┼──────────────────────────────┼──────────────────┤
│ Squash/clean commit history │ Optional │ No │
└─────────────────────────────────────────┴──────────────────────────────┴──────────────────┘
Deploy Order
- cast wallet new → store hex in Secrets Manager as GATEWAY__ENCRYPTION__PRIVATE_KEY and OPERATOR__ENCRYPTION__PRIVATE_KEY
- Merge deploy PR #188
- Merge AVS PR #489 (triggers stagef deploy)
- Publish SDK (merge PR #146) — version 0.7.2
- Merge identity PR #19
- Cross-repo E2E validation (NEWT-878)
The SDK uploadConfidentialData function can ship as a separate SDK PR after the core migration lands — providers can call the RPC
directly via curl or the SDK's generic callRpc in the meantime.
Want me to add comments to the cross-repo PRs noting the ConfidentialDataRegistry addition, or save the progress to memory first?
⏺ All 17 Linear tickets created with dependency chains. Here's the full map:
Phase 1 — Inline Ephemeral Privacy (High priority)
┌──────────┬────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┬────────────┐
│ Ticket │ Title │ Blocked by │
├──────────┼────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┼────────────┤
│ NEWT-899 │ Redesign NewtonDirectives: privacy + vectorized proofs │ — │
├──────────┼────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┼────────────┤
│ NEWT-900 │ Update proof consumers for vector proofs │ NEWT-899 │
├──────────┼────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┼────────────┤
│ NEWT-901 │ Operator decryption of inline privacy data │ NEWT-899 │
├──────────┼────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┼────────────┤
│ NEWT-902 │ Gateway validation for inline privacy data │ NEWT-899 │
├──────────┼────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┼────────────┤
│ NEWT-903 │ SDK: createInlinePrivacyData() │ NEWT-899 │
└──────────┴────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┴────────────┘
Phase 2 — Rebrand Identity → Privacy (High/Medium)
┌──────────┬───────────────────────────────────────────────┬────────────────────┐
│ Ticket │ Title │ Blocked by │
├──────────┼───────────────────────────────────────────────┼────────────────────┤
│ NEWT-904 │ Rename identity RPC endpoints to privacy │ NEWT-901, NEWT-902 │
├──────────┼───────────────────────────────────────────────┼────────────────────┤
│ NEWT-905 │ Unify Rego namespace to data.privacy.{domain} │ NEWT-904, NEWT-907 │
├──────────┼───────────────────────────────────────────────┼────────────────────┤
│ NEWT-906 │ SDK: rebrand identity module to privacy │ NEWT-904, NEWT-903 │
├──────────┼───────────────────────────────────────────────┼────────────────────┤
│ NEWT-907 │ Define well-known privacy domain identifiers │ — │
├──────────┼───────────────────────────────────────────────┼────────────────────┤
│ NEWT-908 │ Newton-identity app: privacy-branded SDK │ NEWT-906 │
├──────────┼───────────────────────────────────────────────┼────────────────────┤
│ NEWT-914 │ Documentation: privacy architecture redesign │ NEWT-905, NEWT-906 │
└──────────┴───────────────────────────────────────────────┴────────────────────┘
Phase 3 — Remove Legacy (Medium/Low)
┌──────────┬────────────────────────────────────────────┬────────────────────┐
│ Ticket │ Title │ Blocked by │
├──────────┼────────────────────────────────────────────┼────────────────────┤
│ NEWT-909 │ Remove newt_uploadEncryptedData endpoint │ NEWT-901, NEWT-904 │
├──────────┼────────────────────────────────────────────┼────────────────────┤
│ NEWT-910 │ Remove dual Ed25519 + encrypted_data_refs │ NEWT-909 │
├──────────┼────────────────────────────────────────────┼────────────────────┤
│ NEWT-911 │ Remove old operator decrypt_refs_from_db │ NEWT-901, NEWT-910 │
├──────────┼────────────────────────────────────────────┼────────────────────┤
│ NEWT-912 │ Remove legacy SDK privacy upload functions │ NEWT-906 │
├──────────┼────────────────────────────────────────────┼────────────────────┤
│ NEWT-913 │ DB cleanup: rename identity → privacy │ NEWT-911 │
└──────────┴────────────────────────────────────────────┴────────────────────┘
Previously created:
┌──────────┬────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ Ticket │ Title │
├──────────┼────────────────────────────────────────────────┤
│ NEWT-898 │ Client-side secret retrieval (dual encryption) │
└──────────┴────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
The critical path is: NEWT-899 → NEWT-901/902 → NEWT-904 → NEWT-905/906 → NEWT-909/910/911. Ready to start implementation?